Society Epistemology And Logic In Indian Tradition

Author(s): Dharmchand Jain
Publisher: Prakrit Bharati Academy
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/022928/1

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SOCIETY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND Logic In INDIAN TRADITION DHARM CHAND JAIN SEN PRAKRIT BHARATI ACADEMY Jaipur (Raj.)

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About the Book Indian epistemology encompasses mainly two dimensions as knowledge (jnana) and organ of valid cognition (pramana). This book deals with both the dimensions along with the view point (naya) of a knower. It also discusses acquired knowledge (apara vidya) and selfmanifested spiritual knowledge (para vidya), sensuous and super-sensuous knowledge, nirvikalpaka (devoid of verbal designation) and savikalpaka (determinate) knowledge, its five kinds according to Jaina philosophy as 1. Matijnana (sensous knowledge) 2. Sruta jnana (scriptural or verbal knowledge) 3. Avadhijnana (clairvoyance) 4. Manahparyaya jnana (a knowledge reading mental modes of others) 5. kevalajnana (pure and perfect knowledge). It describes definition of pramana, its kinds as perception, inference, and testimony along with the establishment of recollection (smrti), recognition (pratyabhijnana), inductive reasoning (tarka), as pramana. It mentions logic as a part of pramanamimamsa in the form of inference for others and also as inductive reasoning. Buddhist contribution in defining perception as nirvikalpaka (devoid of verbal designation) and the contribution of Jaina philosophers to Indian epistemology and logic has been enumerated. It also discusses about the concept of society in world-renouncing philosophy of Jainism and Impact of Vedic culture on it. A chapter analyses the concept of consciousness according to Jaina scriptures which does have importance even in the modern scientific era and an another chapter provides with solutions of conflicts prevailing in the minds of human beings and the society.

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SOCIETY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND Logic IN INDIAN TRADITION DR. DHARM CHAND JAIN PRAKRIT BHARATI ACADEMY Jaipur (Raj.)

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PUBLISHER PRAKRIT BHARATI ACADEMY 13-A, Gurunanak Path, Malviya Nagar, Jaipur - 302017 Phone: 0141-2524827, 2520230 E-mail: prabharati@gmail.com Web-site : prakritbharati.net With the Support of CSR Activities Of BLO *First Edition 2016 * Publisher *ISBN 978-93-81571-71-2 *Price: 250/ baiMka oNpha mahArASTra Bank of Maharashtra bhArata sarakAra kA udyama eka parivAra eka baiMka *Computerisation : Prakrit Bharati Academy, Jaipur. *Printed at Indian Map Service, Jodhpur Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition With Specific Reference to Jainism by Dr. Dharmchand Jain PRAKRIT BHARATI ACADEMY, JAIPUR Book Printed on Eco-friendly paper

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Publisher's Note This book deals with the Indian epistemology and society. There are mainly three branches of philosophy i.e. (1) Ontology or metaphysics (2) Epistemology and logic (3) Ethics. Ontology or metaphysics is a core area which deals with the reality or physical existent elements in the universe. Epistemology discusses about the origination of knowedge, its nature, sources and validity; and logic is a science of argumentation and inference for others. Ethics covers the concept of sinful and virtuous conduct of a human being. - Indian tradition is quite rich in thoughtful and consistent ideas. Regarding epistemology and logic three schools are the foremost in India - Nyaya Vaisesika, Buddhist and Jaina school. Dr. Dharm Chand Jain has worked in the field of Buddhist and Jaina epistemology and logic. His two books are available in Hindi regarding Buddhist and Jaina epistemology. One is published from Parshvanath Vidyapitha, Varanasi and another from the Buddhist Studies Centre, Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur. We have a pleasure to publish his English book which is a collection of his valuable research papers presented in National and International seminars in India and abroad. This book contains his six articles on Jaina and Buddhist epistemology and logic. He has discussed the subject in such a way that it touches the views of other philosophical schools also. Dr Jain accepts that epistemology encompasses mainly two dimensions of philosophy i.e. jnana-mimamsa

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(Theory of Knowledge) and pramana-mimansa (Theory of organ of valid cognition). He has written articles on both the aspects. In Indian philosphy logic is a part of pramanamimamsa. Articles on knowledge, naya and nayabhasa, nirvikalpata and srutajnana are related to epistemology. An article on concept of consciousness is important in the modern era which is also connected with the philosophical branch of epistemology. Two articles namely 'Society in Jaina Philosphy and Literature' and 'Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism' are related mainly with Ethics. We are happy to publish this book and hope its usefulness for the interested readers of Indian tradition and philosophy in general and Jaina and Buddhist schools of philosophy in particular. D.R. Mehta Founder & Chief Patron Prakrit Bharati Academy, Jaipur

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Preface Indian philosophy has a rich tradition of different ideas about metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Epistemology is a branch of philosophy which deals with nature of knowledge (jnana), its origination, sources, validity and consistency and also it deals with an organ of valid cognition (pramana). Every Indian philosophy proposes a goal to achieve a blissful life and emancipation from sufferings forever. Knowledge is a powerful resource to control and remove the feeling of sufferings. It is helpful in knowing and propounding the real truth of existent elements of the universe and the pious deeds. In this book an article entitled "Knowledge in Jainism: an Overview" discusses the nature and kinds of knowledge and the contribution of Jainism to Indian philosophy. Knowledge is considered as an attribute or property of a soul. Nyaya philosophers consider it as a separate category of attribute which resides in a soul with inherence relation whereas Jaina philosophers consider knowledge as an essential, identical and natural attribute of a soul, without which consciousness cannot be defined in a soul. Vedanta philosophers also accept knowledge or cognitive function as an essential character of the soul or brahma. Knowledge is not only acquired, it is also intrinsically manifested in a soul after removal of ignorance and subsidencecum-destruction (ksayopasama) of knowledge-obscuring (jnanavarana) karma. Sense organs, mind and intellect are the

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means of acquiring knowledge and soul is a knower. This acquired knowledge is called as aparavidya in the Upanisads. In Jainism, it is called as matijnana. A soul has an ability to know the objects directly without the help of sense organs and mind also. That knowledge is defined as supersensous and spiritual knowledge which emerges within a soul after removal of ignorance and subsidence-cum-destruction of knowledgeobscuring karma. In the Upanisads, it has been called as paravidya. In Jainism, this knowledge has been considered as avadhijnana, manahparyayajnana and kevalajnana, Srutajnana is considered as a scriptural, verbal and spiritual knowledge. Thinking about validity of knowledge is also a subject of epistemology. Yogacara Buddhists and Jaina philosophers accept knowledge as illuminating the self and the object.Hence in their views, no other knowledge is required to determine the validity of that knowledge in the practiced position, but if the knowledge of an object is not familiar, then another knowledge is needed to verify its validity. Nyaya philosophers accept that validity of one knowledge is determined through some other valid knowledge. Mimamsaka philosophers have a different view. They accept that invalidity in a knowledge comes from other causes, knowledge itself is valid. Jaina tradition has contributed in the field of Indian epistemology by propounding five types of knowledge viz- 1. Matijnana (sensous knowledge) 2.Srutajnana(scriptural or verbal knowledge) 3.Avadhijnana (clairvoyance) 4. Manahparyayajnana (a knowledge reading mental modes of others) 5.kevalajnana(pure and perfect knowledge). vi

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Srutajnana is important, because of its utility in revealing kevalajnana (pure and perfect knowledge). It is found in every living being in a right or perverted form, hence the prevalent meaning of srutajnana as a verbal or scriptural knowledge is insufficient. This fact has been pointed out and a wide meaning usable for achieving liberation has been investigated in the article entitled "Significance of Srutajnana". Indian philosophers have developed a distinguished branch of epistemology and logic as pramana-sastra and nyaya-vidya. An organ of valid cognition is called pramana and an examination of a reality through pramanas is called nyaya. Method of inference for others using two to five organs (avayavas) is also called as Nyaya. In the western terminology it has been defined as logic. Every Indian philosophical school has accepted pramana as an organ of valid cognition, but they have different opinions in their numbers. Carvaka considers only one pramana i.e. perception (pratyksa). Vaisesika and Buddhist philosophers propound two pramanas including inference (anumana) with it. Jainas also accept two, but they gave a different name to second pramana as indirect (paroksa) pramana, in which they include recollection (smrti), recognition (pratyabhijnana), inductive reasoning (tarka), inference (anumana) and testimony (agama) as its kinds. Samkhyas propound three pramanas as perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana) and testimony (agama). Nyaya philosophers describe four pramanas keeping comparision (upamana) as a different pramana. PrabhakaraMimansakas accept five including arthapatti (presupposition) and Mimansaka Kumarila Bhatta accept six pramanas propounding non-availability (anupalabdhi) as a different pramana. The article on Jaina Epistemology and Logic gives a vii

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brief account about the development of Jaina epistemology and its contribution to Indian epistemological tenets alongwith discussing the pramanas in general. - There is a discussion in Indian epistemology on perception (pratyaksa), whether it is nirvikalpaka(devoid of verbal designation) or savikalpaka (determinate)? Buddhist philosopher Dignaga has propounded that perception through sense organs is always nirvikalpaka. Kalpana (mental or verbal construction) is an addition to it, and that is not a part of perception. This concept of nirvikalpata has been discussed in a separate article entitled "The concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddhist Logic and the Indian Tradition" in this book. Here it is notable that Jaina philosophers accept pramana as a determinate knowledge which is devoid of doubt, pervertedness and indeterminateness,hence pramana should be sarvikalpaka (determinate) in their view. Buddhist logician Dharmakirti has given arguments in favour of nirvikalpaka perception. Other schools of Indian Philosophy like Yoga, Nyaya and Mimamsa have also discussed nirvikalpata. Nayavada is a specific original contribution of Jainism to the panorama of Indian epistemological doctrines. Nayavada is a view point or stand point to know and to describe a reality. Jaina philosophers discuss mainly two and seven kinds of nayas, which have been described in an article on "Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa" Naya is also a science to grasp the real meaning of sentence, whereas niksepa is a term to investigate the appropriate meaning of a word. Naya and Niksepa are related to linguistic aspect also. When a naya bears an absolustic view point then it is treated as nayabhasa. An article entitled "The Concept of Consciousness in Jainism" presents the nature of consciousness, its various levels viii

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as alertness (apramattata), cognitive function (upayoga), vitality (prana), body-consciousness, sanjna (eagerness to eat, feeling fear, sexual desire, desire of possessiveness), vedana (feeling of pleasure and sorrow), virya (enthusiasm) etc. Science has reached in its research up to consciousness of brain, cells and genes, whereas Jainism accepts that these body parts are felt conscious due to the consciousness of a soul. According to Jainism consciousness is an essential and inseparable attribute of a soul, which could not be known through the empirical or materialistic instruments. Jainism is considered as a world-renouncing religion, hence it is assumed often that society is neglected in it, but this assumption is not true. Lord Mahavira and other Tirthankars deliver their preaching for the welfare of the society and all living beings. A concept of fourfold ford (caturvidha tirtha or sangha) gives a formation of society of religious persons in Jaina Philosophy. Although the followers of Jainism follow Hindu laws in respect of various social ceremonies. Vardhamanasuri(15th century) has propounded various sacraments for monks and house holders. Non-violence, theory of Karma, Non-absolutism (anekantavada), non-possession (aparigraha), compassion of tirthankara also convey the social importance of all living beings. In this way this article proves the social significance of Jaina tenets. It also evaluates the impact of Hindu culture on Jaina thought of society and presents the social attitude of present Jaina society as well. "Conflict Removing Vision of Jainsim" is an article, which provides with a light to understand the causes of confrontation among the human beings and the solutions available in the Jainism with the views of anekantavada, Nayavada, non-violence, theory of karma etc. ix

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I am delighted to express my respect and gratitude to Dr D.R. Mehta, founder of Prakrit Bharati Academy for inspiring me to prepare this book. I bow to his honest dedication for service to humanity and love to valuable literature. I am also grateful to Prof. Peter flugel for his able guidance and permission to include the paper entitled "Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature" which was presented at Centre of Jaina Studies, SOAS, university of London in 2006. Paper on Buddhist Nirvikalpata was presented in Lumbini International Research Institute, Lumbini, Nepal in 2013. I am obliged to Prof. Cuppers for permission and Prof. Jayendra Soni, Austria for editing it. I am also indebted to the organizers of various National and International seminars and lecture series (at Valiyanad-Kocchi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Delhi) who invited me to present the papers and for inclusion of them in the present collection. I heartily thank Prof. KalpanaPurohit and Dr. S.K. Harit who have gone through these articles and improved the language. I shall be satisfied, if it is proved useful to any interested reader. Dharm Chand Jain Department of Sanskrit Jai Narain Vyas University Jodhpur, Rajasthan

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Contents Preface 1. Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature 2. Knowledge in Jainism: An overview.. 3 Significance of Srutajnana 4 Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines........ 5 The Concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition 6 Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa 7 The Concept of Consciousness in Jainism... 8 Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism .43 66 .81 .128 .143 ......163 ..177

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature Jainism is considered as a religion and philosophy that promotes world-renunciation. It might therefore be assumed that there are no rules for society in Jainism. Yet, this would be a misconception. Jaina philosophy and literature have enough citations to prove that welfare of all beings' society is always in focus in preachings of fordmakers (tirthankara). Society denotes mutual co-operation or inter-relationship of individuals which takes place in the path of salvation too. Ford (tirtha) or four-fold religious order (caturvidha-sangha) is a significant evidence to confirm this notion. This article aims to (i) explore the concept of society in Jainism, (ii) analyse the philosophical tenets from the point of view of their social significance, (iii) discuss the position of society in Jaina canonical and posterior literature, (iv) evaluate the impact of Hindu culture on Jaina thought of society, (v) present the social attitude of present Jaina society. Concept of Society in Jainism Human survival is nearly impossible without the existence of society. Although society is a changing phenomenon, it exists all the times. What is society? It is not merely a group of people, but it denotes the inter-relationship of individuals. The sociologists R. M. Maciver and Charles H. Page (1950: 6) state: "Society exists only where social beings

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 'behave' towards one another in ways determined by their recognition of one another." Umasvati says: "Souls render service to one another." Nathmal Tatia explains Umasvati's statement and the commentaries of Umasvati/Umasvami, Pujyapada and Siddhasenagani as follows: "Worldly souls influence each other through service that may be favourable or unfavourable, beneficial or harmful. They cannot live independently of one-another. They have to share their pleasure and pains with others. They create a common environment and live together in weal and woe.' ,,2 This explains a wider concept of society of all beings. It keeps all souls in the view, propounding their relationship which includes the society of human beings also. 2 Jaina canons describe the concept of six categories of worldly souls (sad-nikaya)3 and infinite number of souls. Jaina philosophy accepts every soul as an independent or separate entity. Every soul has its own identity. All the human beings also have their separate identity. Mutual interaction and relationship of these make a concept of society in Jaina philosophy and religion. In the Bodhapahuda, the fourth chapter of the Astapahuda, Kundakunda says that the religion stated by tirthankaras is beneficial for beings of all six categories.* The central theme of Jaina religion and philosophy is spiritual purification, but it cannot be achieved without the 2 1 TS 5.21: parasparopagraho jivanam. Tatia (1994: 131). 3Sadnikayas are six categories of worldly souls: prthvikayika (earth bodied beings), apkayika (water bodied beings), taijaskayika (fire bodied beings), vayukayika (air bodied beings), vanaspatikayika (vegetation) and trasakayika (mobile beings with two or more sense organs). For details see AS 1.1.2-7. Bodhapahuda, verse 60: chakkayahiyankaramuttam. 4

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3 Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature purification of behaviour of a soul towards the whole world of other souls. Mahavira, the 24th tirthankara of Jaina tradition is always concerned about the world of all beings in his teachings to the people." He established the equality of all human beings and other souls on the basis of their sensitivity. The Sutrakrtangasutra tries to make a man sensitive towards the all beings of the world. It says: as you feel pain at the time of beating or torturing by others, so others also feel in that way if you torture them.' This kind of preaching of non-violence (ahimsa) is not limited to the human beings; its sphere goes to all the living beings of the world. In Acaranga and Sutrakrtangasutra non-violence has a social aspect, which motivates a man to become sensitive to others with compassion and friendliness. Violent behaviour is enemy for the society,' but non-violence is a prerequisite friend for it. For co-existence and peace of the society non-violent and friendly behaviour is very much essential. Prasnavyakarana-sutra states that non 5 1) AS 1.2.3: savvesim jivitam piyam naivayejja kancanam. 2) DK 6.11: savve jivavi ichanti jivium na marijjium. a. SK 2.1.680: savve pana savve jiva savve bhuya savve satta na hamtavva, na ajjaveyavva na parighetavva na paritaveyavva, na uddaveyavva. b. SK 1.1.4.9: evam khu nanino saram jam na himsai kincanam ahimsa samayam ceva, etavamtam viyaniya. 'SK 2.1.679: se jahanamaye mama assayam dandena va atthina va [...] himsakaram dukkham bhayam padisamvedemi, iccevam jana savve pana java satta dandena va java kavalena va audijjamana va hammamana va tajjijjamana va tadijjamana va pariyavijjamana va kilamijiamana va uddavijiamana va java [...] evam nacca savve pana java savve satta na hamatavva, na ajjaveyavva, na parighetavva, na paritaveyavva, na uddaveyavva. Acaranga- and Sutrakrtangasutras stress on the sensitivity of a living being and propound that every living being wants to live, nobody wants sorrow, as AS 1.4.2 says: savvesim pananam savvesim bhutanam savvesim jivanam savvesim sattanam asayam aparinivvanam mahabhayam dukhham ti, tti bemi. 'AS 1.1.2: tam se ahitaya tam se abodhie.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition violence is like a shelter for fearful persons, like a flying path for birds and like water for thirsty persons. It results in benefit for all beings, mobile (trasa) and immobile (sthavara)." Thus concept of society in Jainism can be formulated in the following words- "Society is a phenomenon of all living beings that exists on their mutual relations and behaviour." All human beings on the ground of humanity are equal and their purpose is achieving high goals of life. The perception of society in Jaina philosophy and religion is to strive for a condition of existence without fear in order render service to one another. It should be without exploitation and be beneficial for all. 4 Relevance of Society in World-Renouncing Jainism Jainism is considered as a world-renouncing religion, hence someone may assume that concept of society in Jainism is difficult to sustain, but Jaina religion has both the qualities. It suggests the principle of renunciation of the worldly sensual pleasure for the sake of salvation from sorrows and also it inspires to engage oneself in doing welfare of others along with self-restraint from the sensual pleasure and sinful acts. The Uttaradhyayanasutra explains: "Refrain from one side and engage your self to other side, abstain from sinful acts and do the acts of self-restraint.' ,,11 10PV 2.1.3: esa sa bhagavai ahimsa ja sa bhiyanam viva saranam, pakkhinam viva gamanam, tisiyanam viva salilam, tasa-thavara-savva-bhuya-khemankari. "Utt 31.2: egao viraim kujja egao ya pavattanam; asanjame niyattim kujja, sanjame ya pavattanam.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature This statement inspires us to leave the bad acts and do the good acts. Good action may be of two types - first leads to self-purification and other one instructs in doing welfare of the society of all beings - including human beings. Upadhyaya Amar Muni (1966:21) accepts that: "The feeling of renunciation in personal life is prerequisite for fair social well-being. Emancipation from limitless lust and desires is essential ethical duty of a person for performing social service." Sukhlal Sanghavi (1957: Part 2/146) observes: "A society neither can entirely sustain on the maze of reclusive principles, nor can it rely on worldly pleasures. People believing only in worldly pleasures can submerge in the whirlpool of physical and materialistic ambitions, it is also true that high and dry philosophical inclination towards renunciation can also alienate living society from the source of vitality. It is historical and philosophical fact that involvement and detachment are the two sides of the same coin. No one can escape from doing evils, if he does not make efforts for attaining virtues" (Translated from Hindi). Sagarmal Jain (1982 II: 140) comments: "Both world engagement and renunciation are relevant in their spheres, but mutual encroachments may endanger the significance of each of these two" (Translated from Hindi). These statements by leading exponents prove that Jainism is not only considered to be a world-withdrawing religion, but it is a religion of acts of welfare too, and offers numerous significant ideas related to society.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Opposition to the brahmanical Caste System In the Vedic tradition of Indian philosophy, the Hindu class system and system of stages of life (varnasrama-dharma) were governing factors of Hindu Society. There were four classes (varna) - Brahmin (brahmana), warriors (ksatriya), merchants (vaisya) and service class (sudra) on the basis of profession and virtues of a person. As the Bhagavadgita 4.13 says: "I created four varnas on the basis of virtues and profession." ,,12 These four varnas, after a period, were developed into four castes. Although the names of four varnas and castes are the same, but the caste is considered by birth, whereas varna is considered by profession or conduct. A varna may change in to another varna e.g. a ksatriya may become a brahmana by his conduct or profession, but caste does not change like it. A ksatriya as a caste remains always a ksatriya in his whole life. 6 Principle of caste system can create a complex of superiority and inferiority among the people. The Uttaradhyayana opposed the prevalent caste system of superiority and inferiority of human beings on the basis of different castes. As Pierre Paul Amiel (2008: 30) observes: "In Jainism, divisions in castes and sub-castes did not concern higher and lower classes like in Hinduism." He also observes thereto: "In Jainism, when one speaks of castes and sub-castes, it is more questions of profession and geographical origin." Discrimination among them on the basis of caste, creed and colour is not justified according to the 12 caturvarnyam maya srstam gunakarmavibhagasah.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature Uttaradhyayanasutra. It opens the doors for everyone to attain salvation from sorrows. Harikesi Candala, a man of very lower caste, assigned duty in cremation places, became a great monk and experienced the path of liberation. The Uttaradhyayana mentions an event of Harikesi Muni who was denied alms by the brahmanas indulged in performing a sacrificial rite (yajna)." The scene depicted there in a few gathas is really alarming. Brahmanas having pride of their caste told Harikesi muni-"Where did you come from? You are looking like a ghost; go from here, this food has been prepared only for brahmanas. We cannot give it to you." Muni was tortured with sticks and whips by the disciples of those brahmanas and expelled from that place." It was really a formidable task to fight with such stubbornness of caste system at that time. Mahavira believed in the virtues of a man. He established the importance of virtues in spite of outer colour, caste and creed. As the victory of Harikesimuni over the brahmana attitude proves this fact. The essence of the chapter 'Harikesiya' of the Uttaradhyayana has been presented in the following words: - "The effect of penance is clearly visible, while effect of caste is barely seen. "IS Caste is not important; the significance of penance is always experienced. A man becomes good or bad by his virtues and behaviour, as mentioned in another chapter of the Uttaradhyayana: 13 Utt: chapter 12. Vide Utt: chapter 12. 1 Utt 12.37: Sakkham khu disai tayo viseso, na disai jai visesa koi.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition "A person does not become a monk (sramana) only by shaved head, equanimity makes him monk, by chanting omkara nobody becomes brahmana, he becomes brahmana by virtues of celibacy (brahmacarya), only living in jungle does not make a monk, he needs real knowledge for it, a person becomes an ascetic by holding penance not by having grass garbs. A person becomes brahmana or ksatriya or vaisya or sudra by his conduct.":16 Thus virtue or conduct is important in Jainism. Jaina acaryas have criticized the concept of caste system, Gunabhadra says in Uttarapurana: "There is no difference in human beings on the basis of their shape as it appears between a cow and a horse." 17 Ravisena (7th C.) says in his Padmapurana: "No caste is vile, virtues are only the cause of welfare, a Candala performing vows has been known as brahmana by jinendras."! Asadhara (13" century CE), in his Sagaradharmamrta, says that a sudra, person of lower caste can follow a religion after attaining a maturity of time (kalalabdhi)." 16 Utt 25.31-33: na vi mundiena samano, na omkarena bambhano; na muni ranna vasenam, kusa cirena na tavaso. samayae samano hoi, bambhacerena bambhano; nanena ya muni hoi, tavena hoi tavaso. kammuna bambhano hoi, kammuna hoi khattio, Vaisso kammuna hoi, suddo havai kammuna. Uttarapurana 74.492, quoted in Sastri (1948: 348): nasti jatikrto bhedo manusyanam ganaenanat. * PP 11.203: najati garhita kacid, gunah kalyanakaranam; vratasthamapi candalam, tam deva brahmanam viduh. "SD 2.22: jatya hinopi kaladilabdhau hyatmasti dharmabhak.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature The Uttaradhyayanasutra suggests some virtues of brahmana, which are obviously the characteristics of a Jaina sramana. For instance: "A lotus flower originated in water does not get besmeared with water. Similarly who is not inflicted with passions is called a brahmana. >>20 Jainism does not support the asrama system of the Vedic tradition." Efforts for liberation from worldly sorrows and evils are given top priority in the Jaina religion and philosophy. Sthanangasutra propounds three types of ages for adopting ascetic life in the first part of life, in the middle age and in the middle past life. 22 Jainas do not bear the viewpoints that brahmana born from the mouth of brahma as mentioned in Veda.23 Prabhacandra (980-1065 CE) refutes this idea. He asks whether brahma is brahmana or not? If he is not, then how can a brahmana take birth from him? A human being cannot take birth from a non-human being. If brahma is brahmana then the question is whether he is brahmana with all his organs or only by mouth. If he is brahmana at all organs then all the beings of Utt 25.27: jaha pommam jale jayam, novalippai varina; evam alilttam kamehim, tam vayam buma mahanam. There are four stages of life (asrama): (i) Life of a studentship (brahmacarya -- up to age 25), (ii) Life of a householder (grhastha - up to the age of 50), (iii) Life of an anchorite (vanaprastha - up to age 75) and (iv) Life of an ascetic (samnyasa- up to death). Sth 3.2.122: tihim vaehim aya kevalam munde bhavitta agarao anagariyam pavvaijja, tanjaha-padhame vae, majjhime vae, pucchime vae. * As Purusasukta of the Rgveda 10.90.12 says: Brahmana has been born from the mouth of brahma, kshatriya from his arms, vaisya from his thighs and sudra from his feet (in Telang & Chaubey 1973).

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition : 10 the world born from brahma come in the category of brahmana. If brahma is brahmana from mouth only, then other parts of the body come in the category of sudra, hence brahmanas should not bow their heads in the feet of brahma.24 Jaina Acaryas on Society Haribhadrasuri (700-770 CE) and Somadevasuri (10th century) have given some thoughts regarding the society from the Jaina point of view. Haribhadra propounds two kinds of religion for laity (grhastha-dharma): (1) Common and (2) Specific. Common dharma of a householder is to perform honestly the traditional graceful good works. Specific dharma of his is to follow twelve vows of a laity (sravaka). " He puts stress on honest earning "If a householder earns money honestly then it is beneficial for this world and for the other world of that person." 26 Somadevasuri (11" century) has rightly described two types of dharma- worldly religion (laukika) and other worldly religion (laukottara). Worldly religion has been defined according to the Vedas and Smstis and other worldly religion has been defined as sramana-dharma and sravaka-dharma." A well-known Tamil work, Thirukkurala (author unknown), of the 1* century BCE, considered as a Jaina treatise 24 NK commentary on verse 65: kinca brahmano brahmanyamasti na va? yadi nasti, kathamato brahmanotpattih? na hi amanusyat manusyotpattih pratita. atha asti, sarvatra mukhapradese eva va? yadi sarvatra, sa eva praninam bhedabhavanusangah, atha mukhapradese eva, tadanyatrasya sudratvanusangat na vipranam tatpadayoh vandyatvam syat. 29 Vide DB prakarana 1 & 3. ** DB 1.4: nyayopattam hi vittamubhayalokahitayeti. 27 Yasastilakacampu 8.373, quoted in Sastri (1989: 64).

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11 Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature on the basis of its contents, is significant for every householder and monk. It guides a person to live a better personal and social life. It comprises three sections of religion (dharma), property (artha) and pleasure (kama) and 133 chapters on various subjects related to personality development of a human being. We find various useful thoughts in dharma section on gratitude, impartiality, self-restraint, celibacy, patience, sinful acts, giving alms, vegetarianism, non-violence, truth-speaking etc.; in artha section on qualities of king, learning, illiteracy, gauging of power, choosing the proper time, duties, cruel rule, espionage, strenuous effort, method of action, essential elements of a state, agriculture, mendicancy, way of accumulating wealth, greatness of an army etc. and in kama section on beauty, love, mutual desire, temporary quarrel etc. The three sections support the Vedic view of three goals of life (trivarga: dharma, artha and kama), but do not support the varnasrama system of Vedic tradition. It is also to be pointed out that there is explicit acceptance of the fourth goal of salvation (moksa-purusartha) in dharma and artha sections of this treatise. Actually, the Thirukkurala requires a separate study to determine its significance from the social point of view. Somdevasuri in his Nitivakyamrta has also discussed dharma, artha and kama along with penal code, polity, defence, war, ethical conduct etc. keeping in view the right path of Indian society. Impact of Hindu Culture Acarya Jinasena (late 9th century CE) in his "Adipurana" has given place to varnasrama dharma system of Vedic tradition. He has mentioned that the king Rsabhadeva

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 12 who became the first tirthankara established three varnas namely ksatriya, vaisya and sudra. His son Bharata established a new varna- brahmana." Jinasena has referred to about marriage norms and other sacraments also." He has divided sudras into two kinds: artisan (karu) and non-artisan (akaru). Karu-sudras were also of two types, one of them were untouchable to other persons." Such description in Jaina literature is considered as an impact of prevalent Vedic or "Brahmanical system. According to the essence of Jaina philosophy the division of human beings in four varnas of brahmana, ksatriya, vaisya and sudra is not real. It is only conventional. A person of low status (nica-gotra) karma may attain high status (uccagotra) in the same lifespan by adopting great vows (mahavratas) in real sense. *2 Mahavira, ganadharas and acaryas did not propound separate social norms for Jaina followers, but they suggested some reformations in them. For example animal sacrifice (pasu-bali), ceremony performed in honour of departed spirits (sraddha) and death feast (motyu-bhoja) were not acknowledged by Jaina acaryas. Although some Jaina families perform sraddha after the death of their family members and they also organize feast after few days of the death due to effect of Hinduism on them. Marriage ceremonies with seven rounds 28 AP: 16. 243-245. AP:16. 246. 30 AP: 16. 247. 31AP:16.185-186. >>? As discussed by Sastri (1989: 130).

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature 13 are arranged according to Hindu rituals. Mostly the Hindu Panaitas perform methodical ceremony of marriages except few instances in Khandelval Digambar Jains and some individuals of various Jain sects. The Acaradinakara written by Vardhamanasuri (15th century CE) a disciple of Abhayadevasuri (third) of Rudrapalligaccha is a notable Jaina work, which describes 16 sacraments (samskara) of a householder, 16 sacraments of a saint and 8 sacraments common for the both." It is the first book in Jain literature which elaborates the sacraments in a systematic way from the Jaina point of view. Sixteen sacraments of household person found in Acaradinakara are as follows: 1. Conception sacrament (garbhadhana-samskara) 2. Male production sacrament (pumsavana-sanskara) 3. Birth sacrament (janma-sanskara) 4. Worshiping idols of sun and moon (surya-candra-darsana-sanskara) 5. Milk feeding sacrament (ksirasana-samskara) 6. Worshiping mother deity (sasthi-samskara) 7. Purification sacrament (sucikarma-samskara) 8. Naming sacrament (namakarana-sanskara) 9. Food giving sacrament (annaprasana-samskara) 10. Sacrament of piercing the ears to put earrings on (karnavedha samskara) 11. Ceremony of tonsure (culakarana-samskara) 12. Initiation sacrament (upanayana-samskara) * See AD, purva pithika and udaya 1-40.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 13. Learning sacrament (vidyarambha-samskara) 14. Marriage sacrament (vivaha-samskara) 15. Vow adopting sacrament (vrataropana-samskara) 16. Funeral sacrament (antya-samskara) These sacraments have some differences from the Vedic tradition of samskaras. Garbhadhana- and pumsavanasamskaras are also different in nature to some extent. Vardhamanasuri has interpreted these sacraments from the Jaina point of view. He mentioned 16 sacraments of a saint: 1. Celibacy adopting ceremony (brahmacarya-vratagrahana-vidhi) 2. Lower monk ceremony (ksullaka-vidhi) 3. Initiation ceremony (pravrajya-vidhi) 14 34 34 Vide AD, udaya 17-32. 4. Ordaining ceremony (upasthapana-vidhi) 5. Ceremony for elevation of mind, speech and body (yogodvahana-vidhi) 6. Lesson receiving ceremony (vacanagrahana-vidhi) 7. Permission ceremony for a teacher monk (vacananujnavidhi) 8. Ordaining ceremony for religious teacher (upadhyaya pada-sthapana-vidhi) 9. Ordaining ceremony for a preceptor (acarya-pada-sthapanavidhi) 10. A specific penance ceremony of a monk (bhiksupratima-udvahana-vidhi)

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature 15 11. Initiation ceremony of a nun (sadhvi-diksa-vidhi) 12. Ordaining ceremony of a teacher nun (pravartinipada-sthapana-vidhi) 13. Ordaining ceremony of a chief nun (mahattara pada-sthapana-vidhi) 14. Daily routine of a monk (ahoratri-carya-vidhi) 15. Routine in different seasons (rtucarya-vidhi) 16. Religious death ceremony through diminishing the passions (samlekhana-vidhi) These sacraments are related to a saint or a sadhvi, simultaneously these are having a social importance, because an acarya and upadhyaya remain indulged in teaching and administration in their gaccha or gana. The eight common sacraments for a householder (sravaka) and a saint are as follows: 1. Consecration ceremony of an idol (pratistha-vidhi) 2. Peace making ceremony (santika-karma) 3. Nourishing ceremony for good deeds (paustika-karma) 4. Oblation ceremony (bali-vidhana-vidhi) 5. Expiation ceremony (prayas citta-vidhi) 6. Ceremony for execution of essential deeds (avasyakavidhi) 7. Penance ceremony (tapa-vidhi) 8. Rank ordaining ceremony (padaropana-vidhi). The above description about sacraments denotes that in the 15th Century A.D., Jaina acaryas tried to describe sacraments (samskara) in the framework of Jainism. 35 Vide AD, udaya 33-40.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Samskaras related to sadhus are specific, which are not found in the Vedic tradition, but names of samskaras propounded for householders are almost similar like garbhadhana, pumsavana, namakarana, annaprasana, karnavedha, cudakarana, upanayana, vidyarambha, vivaha, antyesti etc. but some separate sacraments have also been described, such as vrataropana samskara. This samskara has been mentioned instead of vanaprastha and samnyasa samskara of the Vedic tradition. It has a provision of twelve vratas of a sravaka or sravika. The sacraments common for both monks and householders are also specific which are not found in the Vedic tradition. 16 This account of sacraments gives a path to social system of Jaina householders, monks and nuns, but we can say that it was a result of influence of the Vedic tradition of various sacraments mentioned in Smrti-literature. However it proves that Jaina acaryas have a concept of society in their mind when they talk about the separate sacraments for sadhus and householders. It also makes it clear that the Jaina acaryas tried to develop a separate social system for Jaina community or society. In fact Acaradinakara of Vardhamanasuri requires a separate article on it. Jainism is a religion of salvation. Hence there is no much impact of Acaradinakara on Jaina society. Monks follow the Jaina rules, but householders are still following the Hindu social rituals, because they are unaware of the basics and fundamentals of Jainism. Actually there is not much difference between Jaina sacraments and Hindu sacraments. Before Vardhamanasuri, Somadevasuri (11th century), the famous author of the Yasastilakacampu was having a view that:

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature 17 "Jaina tradition can accept all those Vedic social norms which are not inconsistent with right view (samyaktva or samyagdarsana) and do not corrupt the vows of a male laity (sravaka) or female laity (sravika)." 36 This is a clear path for Jaina societies to follow the customs of prevalent Hindu tradition. It was a reason that Vardhamanasuri mentioned 16 sacraments with mild difference in Hindu sacraments or rites (sanskara). Some of the Jaina families have formulated new Jaina system for marriage ceremonies, but it is not being followed by a majority of Jainas. Thus Jaina tradition is not totally different from Hindu tradition regarding the social customs. This tendency of assimilation of Hindu customs by Jaina societies was one main reason of their stability in India. Still in modern India some judges of High Court and Supreme Court do not provide Jainas a cadre of minority. Here we can say that Jaina societies are different from Hindu societies from the religious point of view, but they are not so much different from the social point of view. At present, several social customs of Jaina society such as marriage ceremony, birth ceremony and other rites are often performed in Hindu manner, but many festivals like mahavira jayanti, paryusana, samvatsari, dasalaksana parva, jnanapancami etc. are celebrated by Jaina norms. Although Jaina panditas have evolved separate book for performing marriage sacrament, there is a paucity of Jaina panditas to perform the marriage ceremony, so the brahmana panaitas are called at the marriage occasions of Jaina families also. * Yasastilakacampu 8.34, quoted in ....: sarva eva hi Jainanam, pramanam laukiko vidhih; yatra samyaktva hanirna, yatra na vratadusanam.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 18 Organisation of the Tirtha Mahavira did not propose any profession-based social organization, but like other tirthankaras he propounded fourfold (caturvidha) ford (tirtha or sangha) for the followers. As mentioned in the Vyakhyaprajnaptisutra: "Tirtha comprises four categories of sangha-monks (sramana) nuns (sramani) laity (sravaka) and female laity (sravika). "37 The tirtha is a religious organisation, which is meant for performing religious practice(sadhana) for the attainment of salvation, but there are also some rules for mutual behavior amongst sanghas. There are some stern provisions and codes of conduct for the mutual behaviour of monks (samana or sadhu) and nuns (samani or sadhvi). Four Chedasutras explain these rules elaborately. How a sadhu should behave with his acarya and other colleagues, with sadhvis, sravakas and sravikas has been also propounded in the canonical literature." Observing the five mahavratas, fivefold self-regulation (samiti) and threefold selfcontrol (gupti), a Jaina monk or nun should take care to avoid improper conducts. For example a sadhu should not stop to talk to a sadhvi at cross roads and when alone. Sadhus and sadhvis cannot live together in their living places. Even they cannot do meditation (kayotsarga) in one another's places. These >>VP: 20.8: tittham puna cauvvannainne samana-sanghe panntte, tanjaha-samana, samanio, savaga, savigao. 38 The four Chedasutras are: Dasasrutaskandha, Brhatkalpa, Vyavahara and Nisitha. 39 UttI & BK explain it at many places.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature restrictions have been imposed with a view to protect their celibacy." However, in case of calamities, they can give support and can touch each other to save their lives. If a nirgranthasadhu gives support to a slipping or falling sadhvi then he does not disobey the preaching of a Jina." Some more sutras of the Brhatkalpasutra say that for removal of a thorn, a piece of glass or a chip of stone, a sadhu can help a sadhvi and a sadhvi can help a sadhu." Rules regarding behaviour with sravakas and sravikas by the samanas and samanis have also been mentioned in Jain canonical and later literature. Sravakas and sravikas are supposed like parents of samanas and samanis for well support of their restraint and disciplined life and good conduct. All the codes of conduct have been laid down for the faultless accomplishment of the fourfold sangha. The codes of conduct support the spiritual advancement of the souls and their flawless behaviour to the world. Acarya Samantabhadra (6th century) mentions as characteristic of the Jaina tirtha: "Your tirtha is destroyer of all sufferings, and is eternal, and it leads to welfare of all beings." Theory of karma and Society In the theory of Jaina karma philosophy concept of statusdetermining (gotra) karma is often defined that birth in a higher BK 3.1.73: no kappai niggamthanam, niggamtthinam uvassayamsi citthitaye va --- --- sajjhayam va karittaye jhanam vajhaittaye, kausaggam va thaittae. BK 6.7.180: niggamthe niggamthini duggamsi va visamamsi va pavvayamsi va pakkhalamanim va pavadamanim va ginhamane va avalambamane va naikkamai. 42 Vide BK 6.3-18. * YA 61: Sarvapadamantakaram nirantam sarvodayam tirthamidam tavaiva.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 20 race or descent is a result of high status (ucca gotra) karma and birth in a lower race or descent is a result of lower status (nica gotra) karma, but it is to be clarified that according to the theory of Jain karma philosophy nica gotra karma may change into ucca gotra in the same life-span.** Thus here 'gotra' word does not denote any caste or sub-caste, but it denotes the internal impressions (samskara) of a person. If he does not have pride of his own caste, beauty, creed, richness, character, knowledge, penance and power, then he bears an ucca gotra, and if he takes pride in these then he becomes a person of nica gotra." In one life span one can have both the gotras." Hence the concept of gotra karma in Jaina philosophy is not related to the birth in specific caste. It is related to the internal impressions of the attitude of a person. Question is - what is the social aspect of gotra karma? Here we can say that although it is related to the higher or lower impressions of a person, which is an internal matter, its effect is seen in outer world also. In the view of Jaina karma theory, a person who is possessed with pride is not great, but the person who is not possessed with superiority and inferiority complex is great. The concepts of pleasure giving (satavedaniya) karma and grief or pain giving (asata vedaniya) karma instruct the society in a right path that if you do good to others it will result in good to you and if you do bad to others it will bear bad * KG 2:16: says that nicagotra karma remains manifested up to fifth gunasthana, after that ucca gotra occurs in sixth and other higher gunasthanas. When a person becomes a sadhu, he bears ucsagotra karma. * In the commentary of AN 2.88: Jatirupakulaisvaryasilajnanatapobalaih; kurvanohankytim nicagotram badhnati manavah. * Utt 12: Harikesi Muni is an instance of this fact.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature 21 consequences to you. The causes of these sata- and asatavedaniya karmas have been mentioned in the Tattvarthasutra as follows: "If a soul causes pain, grief, agony, crying, injury or lamenting to others then it attracts asatavedaniya or pain karma, and if a soul generates compassion through charity to all living beings as well as to those observing religious vows, then it is a cause of satavedaniya or pleasure karma."47 Forbearance is also a cause of satavedaniya. The Tattvarthasutra explains that if we are co-operative to others positively, then as a result it provides us pleasure or happiness. Negative behaviour results in pain or asata. This is not just a theory of karma, but also a reciprocal theory of social norms. This guides the society towards the balanced and proper behavior, which in turn benefits the individual also. Triratna and its Social Corollary Jainism is considered as the religion and philosophy of salvation. It underscores the value of right world-view (samyagdarsana), right knowledge (samyagjnana) and right conduct (samyakcaritra) for its attainment. This path is quite individualistic, because it requires detachment from all worldly affairs. In spite of this samyagdarsana, an essential element of salvation bears a characteristic of kindness (anukampa).*9 47 TS 6.12-13: dukhah-soka-tapakrandana-vadha-paridevananyatma parobhayasthanyasadvedyasya. bhutavratanukampadanam saragasamyamadiyogah ksantih saucamiti sadvedyasya. TS 1.1: samyagdarsanajnanacaritrani moksamargah. " TB 1.2: tadevam prasama-samveganirvedanukampastikyabhivyaktilaksanam tattvarthasraddhanam samyagdarsanam.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 22 Kindness is a very important aspect of an individual towards the society and other beings of the world. In the absence of kindness or compassion (karuna) one may not have samyagdarsana and in the absence of samyagdarsana eternal liberation from worldly sorrows does not occur according to Jainism. Hence a right attitude with kindness towards other souls or societies of all beings is essential for liberation. Right knower (samyagjnanin), a person having samyagjnana changes his behavior from negative to positive towards the other human beings. When he proceeds in right conduct (caritra), his attitude towards the society bears a radical change. His anger (krodha) changes into forgiveness (ksama), pride into politeness, deceit into simplicity and greed into contentment." His jealousy converts into love. He loves everybody. He does not love others for his own empirical pleasures, but for the purification of the self. This radical change towards the society occurs after the attainment of samyagjnana. It controls the behaviour of a person to himself and to others. He understands that as I feel pleasure in favourable conditions, so do others in those conditions, and as I feel grief in unfavourable conditions, so do others. This thinking tilts a person for real welfare of the world. Rightly has been told in Brhatkalpabhasya 4584: "What you desire for yourself, desire for others too; and what you do not desire for yourself, do not desire ** Utt 28.30: nadamsanissa nanam, nanena vina na hunti caranaguna; agunissa natthi mokkho natthi amokkhassa nivvanam. 51 DK 8.39 : uvasamena hane koham manam maddavaya jine; mayam cajjavabhavena lobham samtosao jine.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature 23 for others at all - this is the essence of preaching of Jina. 1952 This is echoed in Sanskrit literature also: "A person should not behave with others adversely, which is meant adverse for himself.953 As we expect good conduct, graceful and respectful behavior from others, so should be our behaviour with others, protecting their self-esteem and dignity. What we do not like from others, we should not behave in that manner. This is an essential principle of social behaviour given in Jaina literature. It is also echoed in Acarangacurni in some different words:** "As I like pleasure and happiness, others also like these and as I dislike grief and sorrow, others also do not like them." This thinking can protect not only human rights, but can save the rights of every being of the world. At present, there are more than fourteen thousand Jaina sadhus and sadhvis in India. The Dasavaikalikasutra of the Svetambara sect instructs that a sadhu should not be a burden on the society. His conduct of taking food from the houses of laypersons is compared with a black bee that takes nectar of flowers without torturing them. Like that an ascetic monk also 52 jam icchasi appanatto, jam ca na icchasi appanatto; tam iccha parassa vi, ettiyagam jinasasanam. * atmanah pratikulani paresam na samacaret (a renowned verse). ** AC 1.1.6: jaha me itthanitthe suhasuhe taha savvajivanam. 35 Babulal Jain (2010: 116).

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition takes food from the householders without harming them." This kind of behaviour of an ascetic has two aspects - the first is his own spiritual practice (sadhana) and another is not to give trouble to others. This gives a message to us to behave in such a way that others should not be troubled for the sake of our cause. Importance of Others' Life A famous motto of Jainism is: "Live and let live." We can say that Jainism is a philosophy that gives importance to others life also. We should understand that every worldly soul wants to live, and we should protect his or her right to live as much as possible. Aaarangasutra (1.2.3) says: If understood at the level of human beings, this fact will lead to positive change in the attitude and behaviour towards the society. 56 24 "All worldly souls love their life, they wish to relish pleasure, loathe misery, hurt or injury is not desired by anybody, life is dear to all, and they want to live. Life is dear to all beings." 9957 58 Mahavira suggested that no living being should be killed, governed, made slave, tortured and made restless." Ahimsa is not merely non-violence. It has its positive social aspect and that can be called as friendliness (maitri) to all living beings. Amitagati in Samayikapatha (verse-1) says: 57 DK 1.4-5 vayam ca vittim labbhamo, na ya koi uvahammai; ahagadesu riyamte, pupphesu bhamaro jaha. mahugarasamabuddha, je bhavanti anissiya; nanapindarayadamta, tena vuccanti sahuno. savve pana piyauya suhasaya dukkhapadikula appiyavaha piyajivino, jiviukama savvesim jiviyam piyam. 58 AS 1.4.1: savve pana savve bhuta savve jiva savve satta na hamtavva, na ajjavetavva, na parighetavva, na paritaveyavva, na uddaveyavva.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature "Friendliness towards all beings, delight in the qualities of virtuous ones, utmost compassion for afflicted beings, equanimity towards those who are not well disposed towards me, May O Lord! my soul have such dispositions as these forever." 9959 Non-absolutism (anekantavada) and Society Non-absolutism (anekantavada) is the central philosophy of Jainism. It defines reality as universal-cumparticular. Society is also of this nature. Maciver and Charles Page (1990: 7) say: 59 "Society involves both likeness and difference. If people were all exactly alike, merely alike, their social relationship would be as limited, perhaps, as those of the ant or bee." Thus anekantavada itself defines the nature of society. Anekantavada has its ethical value also. It provides an opportunity to understand the other's views through theory of different standpoints (nayavada). It is very much useful for social communication and mutual harmony. Prejudices close the doors to understand other's views rightly. Anekantavada is a base of human behaviour as the eminent Jaina philosopher Siddhasena (5th century) says: 25 "I bow to the anekantavada, a teacher of the world, without which behavior of the world cannot run.' 9961 sattvesu maitrim gunisu pramodam, klistesu jivesu krpaparatvam; madhyasthabhavam viparitavrttau, sada mamatma vidadhatu deva. ? 60 PT5.1: tasya visayah samanyavisesadyanekantatmakam vastu. "SP 3.69: Jena vina logassa vi vavaharo savvaha na nivvadai; tassa bhuvanekkaguruno namo anegantavayassa.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 26 Thus, anekantavada is the root of social behaviour. This point of view goes well with post-modernist perception of social welfare imbibing the principle of diversity and respecting its existence. In recent decades the western world has seen rise of authoritarian ideologies. Jainism with its emphasis on diversity in society provides apt answer to such authoritarian tendencies. Language and Society Language is a principal instrument for communication among the human beings and maintaining social relations. Jaina tirthankaras delivered their sermons in the Ardhamagadhi language," which was a language of common people at that time. Although every language has its social importance, a language of common people has crucial and sometimes central role to play in social transactions. The use of Ardhamagadhi by Mahavira denotes the belief in proper communication in the maximum people of society. Social Importance of the Anuvratas Jaina code of conduct for laypersons mentions twelve vows, out of which five vows of partial renunciation (anuvrata) are very important for a good citizen of any country and for the avoidance of unnecessary conflicts in the society. The five anuvratas that are mentioned concern: the abstinence from killing a living being (pranatipata-viramana), abstinence from falsehood (mrsavada-viramana), abstinence from stealing (adattadana-viramana), satisfaction with own spouse only (svadara or svapati-santosa-parimana), and limiting the 62 SS 34.22: bhagavam ca nam addhamagahie bhasae dhammamaikkhai.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature possession (parigraha-parimana) or limiting the desires (icchavidhi-parimana) (UD Chapter 1). These anuvratas have social, moral and spiritual values. A person pursuing these anuvratas cannot be harmful to the society. He may be beneficial in some respect. He bears humanity in him and behaves with compassion and restraint. According to first anuvrata a person is not allowed to keep others in captivity, to beat or kill them, to mutilate, to overload and to deprive them of food and drink." This shows the necessity of compassion and equality towards other living beings of the world. It involves the recognition to life of all and their equal right to live. The second anuvrata is related to control the speaking of untruth. Liars are not to be harboured in society: "Falsehood is censured by saints in the world. It is a cause of mistrust among the people, hence it should be avoided. 63 64 ww 27 One should speak harmless truth. Nothing should be told in such a manner that it might cause embarrassment, anxiety or unhappiness to others." The third anuvrata demands abstaining from the inclination for theft." Taking a thing that has not been granted or given by the owner, comes under the category of theft. Refraining from theft shows respect for others' property and rights. It involves abstinence from all deceptive practices such as bribery that lead to social disintegration. This anuvrata UD 1.45: bandhe vahe chavicheye aibhare bhattapanaviccheye. 64 'DK 6.13: musavao ya logammi, savva sahuhim garahio. avissaso ya bhuyanam, tamha mosam vivajjae. 65 TB 7.9: himsaparusyapaisunyadiyuktam vacah satyamapi garhitamanrtameva bhavatiti. "TS 7.10: adattadanam steyam

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 28 has a wide power to control economic corruption in the society. Fourth vrata is important for restraint of sexual corruption. It has at least three benefits: - (1) Increase in mental and spiritual power, (2) control over sexual corruption in the society and (3) control over some diseases like AIDS. The fifth vow (vrata) puts limits to the desires of a man or woman for possessing more and more things. It weakens or dissolves the greed towards acquisition of worldly things. Most of the conflicts arise in the society due to money, land, properties, power etc. This parigraha-parimana vrata keeps a person tensionless because of the limit of desire. Jaina philosophy says: "Even if the whole world is given to a person, he will not be satisfied by it, hence the worldly things cannot contend a soul."87 The modern society is heading towards the final critical stage of capitalism and facing the danger of the greed of acquiring materialistic things. Jainism does not oppose the science and scientific development, but it makes us cautious about the attachment towards the materialistic world. If we do not want to suffer from tension, depression, or bodily diseases then we must avoid extreme ambition for possession of materialistic goals. Uttaradhyayanasutra points out: "If the whole world is yours, whole money is yours, then also it is not sufficient for you, and it cannot protect you." Utt 8.16: kasinam pi jo imam loyam, padipunnam dalijja ikkassa; tenavi se na samtusse, ii duppurae ime aya. " Utt 14.39 : savvam jagam jai tubbham, savvam va vi dhanam bhave; savvampi te apajjattam, neva tanaya tam tava.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature 29 This message was given by Queen Kamalavati to King Isukara in the Uttaradhayanasutra, which is relevant in the modern society also. It is the eternal truth that the allurement of materialistic world cannot ultimately protect our lives. The Jaina religion and philosophy also propound that the outer world or materialistic world is not the cause of grief or sorrows, our inner world is the real cause of our own sorrows. Mahavira says: "The materialistic world is not the cause of equanimity (samata) and inequanimity (vikrti), but the inner world of aversion (pradvesa) and possession (parigraha) through delusion or attachment (moha) generate sorrows or deformity in human beings." Although this teaching of Mahavira is directly related to an individual, its impact goes to the society. Society changes through the fundamental thoughts regarding life. Attitude of the Jaina Tirtharkaras Tirthankaras of Jaina religion reflect compassion towards all beings of the world. They preach their sermon for the benefit of the beings of the world, as depicted in Prasnavyakaranasutra: "Reverend tirthankara has given his sermon for the protection and compassion of all beings of the world." 70 Utt 32.101 : na kamabhoga samayam uventi, na yavi bhoga vigaim uventi; je tappaosi ya pariggahi ya, so tesim moha vigaim uvei. * PV 2.1: savva-jagajiva-rakkhana-dayathayae bhagavaya pavayanam sukahiyam

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 30 In the Sakrastava," a eulogy performed by the Indras, many such adjectives of tirthankaras are available which express their benevolent attitude towards the world. For example Lord of the world (loganahanam), Benefactor of the world (logahiyanam), Lamp of the world (logapaivanam), Revelator of the world (logapajjoyagaranam) are the words which depict that the persons enlightened with pure complete knowledge kevalajnana always do good for others. The Caturvimsatistava," a eulogy of the 24 tirthankaras depicts a tirthankara as a person who enlightens the world with his knowledge. Knowledge is not useful only for oneself; it is useful for enlightening others also. Some Ethical Doctrines and Society: 73 The concept of religious giving (dana) in Jainism is having an important aspect of social behavior. Umasvati says that for the welfare of others if something is given with relinquishing one's ownership then it is called dana." Action of dana cannot sustain without the assertion of the concept of society. Dana is of many kinds. It mainly deals with food, knowledge, medicine and fearlessness or protection (KA 362). This concept of dana is very important for the positive inter-relationship of human beings and all other beings. Conception of dana is doubly beneficial. Donors as well as receivers both are benefited by dana. Donor is benefited with dissociation of his sinful karma 71 It starts with the word namotthunam. It is called pranipatasutra also. It is a part of the Samayikapatha. 72 Vide AvS chapter 2. 13 TS, 7.33: anugrhartham svasyatisargo danam.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature and with earning of meritorious (punya) karma. Receiver is benefited by getting the things, knowledge and fearlessness. It has also a socio-cultural impact on human society. In modern society we talk about free will. Jaina philosophy accepts the idea of free will because of the independence and self-doership of every soul, but it suggests keeping a control of rationality on our mind. "The mind is like a wicked horse, it runs everywhere, and so by understanding a real dharma, control over it, is possible."74 Jaina philosophy enlightens that one should keep control on his mind, speech, body and belongings." He should do good activities and leave bad activities. One should think good for others, speak well and do activities for the welfare of mankind. In Jaina ethics, social aspects of religion have been given suitable importance. Sthanangasutra mentions 10 kinds of dharmas:" (i) observance of custom of a village (gramadharma) (ii) observance of customs of a city (nagara-dharma) (iii) duty towards a nation (rastra-dharma) (iv) religion of a renouncer (pakhanda-dharma) (v) conduct of descents or monks of the same teacher (kula-dharma) (vi) observance of customs of a republic (gana-dharma) (vii) conduct of fourfold order (sangha-dharma) (viii) observance of religion of scripture (siddhanta-dharma or sruta-dharma) (ix) observance 7* Utt 23.58: mano sahasio bhimo dutthasso paridhavai; tam sammam tu nigihnami dhamma sikkhai kamthagam. "Sth 4.2: manasamjame, vayasamjame, kayasamjame, uvagaranasamjame. **BD 45: asuhado vinivitti suhe pavitti ya jana carittam. > See Sth chapter 10.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition of religion of conduct (caritra-dharma) and (x) Properties of extensive substances (astikaya-dharma). Out of these ten dharmas first seven are completely related to the society. Except for the Sthanangasutra we do not find such description of dharmas in Jaina canonical literature. This division of ten dharmas seems a later addition to the Sthanangasutra, but it has established the importance of these sectors of work for a smooth social life. Duties pertaining to grama, nagara etc. also need the purity of mind, speech and activities of a person. 32 Description of polite conduct (vinaya) or of a disciple towards his teacher has been described elaborately in Jaina literature. Polite conduct is a symbol of educated society. 78 There is a concept of rendering services to others (veyavacce or vaiyavrtya) in Jain canonical literature. It is a service rendered by a monk to another monk, reverend saint, a gana or sangha. Jaina canonical literature considers it as a penance, which is a means of dissociation (nirjara) of old karmas. Vyavaharasutra (uddesaka 10) mentions ten types of service: 1. Service rendered to a preceptor of the order (acarya-vaiyavrtya) 2. Service rendered to a religious teacher of the order (upadhyaya-vaiyavrtya) 3. Service rendered to an aged monk, a senior monk or learned monk (sthavira-vaiyavrtya) 4. Service rendered to a monk practicing penance (tapasvivaiyavrtya) "For example, see Utt chapter 1.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature 33 5. Service rendered to a newly initiated monk indulged in learning (saiksa-vaiyavstya) 6. Service rendered to a sick monk (glana-vaiyavrtya) 7. Service rendered to a monk of the same religious tradition (sadharmika-vaiyavrtya) 8. Service rendered to monks related to same teacher lineage (kula-vaiyavrtya) 9. Service rendered to monks related to the same preceptor (gana-vaiyavrtya) 10. Service rendered to the religious order (sangha-vaiyavrtya) These ten types of service (vaiyavrtya or veyavacce) prove the social aspect of a sadhu or sadhvi. Vaiyavstya is a penance and hence it is a means of karma-dissociation. Although the word vaiyavrtya has been used for the service rendered by sadhus or sadhvis, it is implied that a householder should also render his services to the needy persons, families and to a sangha. The Avasyakavrtti of Haribhadra propounds the importance of vaiyavrttya in the following words: "Oh lord! One who serves a patient (monk or nun) is thankful or one who visits you? Gautam! One who serves a patient (monk) is thankful.":79 In the Uttaradhyayanasutra two works of a monk (sadhu) or nun (sadhvi) are considered top priority: (1) "AvN folio 61-62: kim bhante! jo gilanam padiyarai se dhanne udahu je tumam damsanena padivajjai? goyam! je gilanam padiyarai.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition - svadhyaya (study) and (2) dhyana (meditation), but there is a provision in another sutra that if a sadhu of that group is ill or suffering from malady etc, then, with the permission or order of acarya,a monk should first render his services to the sufferer and afterwards he should study (svadhyaya) or perform meditation (dhyana). Svadhyaya and vaiyavrtya both are similarly important in ascetic life, vaiyavstya or rendering of services to ill saint should be without any hate. Concept of selfless service to ailments is available in the Jaina texts. Sutrakstangasutra says: "A monk should serve an ill saint, without any hate or reluctance." 82 Some penal codes have been defined in Jaina canonical literature and in latter literature. In the Uttaradhyayanasutra smugglers have been defined as culprit and some penal codes have been proposed for them.** Avasyaka niryukti narrates three panel codes as (i) to aware someone of his wrong doing (hakara), (ii) to prohibit someone from his wrong doing (makara) and (iii) to condemn someone wrong doing (dhikkara). ** These penal codes also prove the attentiveness of Jaina acaryas towards the well being of the society. Modern Jaina Society and Social Services by Jains In modern times Jaina society seems very active in religious and as well as in social sector of life. Jainism is open for all the * See Utt 26.12, 18. *Utt 26.10. "SK 3.4-21: Kujja bhikkhu gilanassa, agilae samahite. * See Utt chapter 21. "NS, AVN v. 167.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature 35 castes and classes. After becoming a monk caste is neglected, but for a house holder caste remains important especially for marriage purpose. For instance, ifa Jaina is Khandelval by caste then he needs a Khandelval girl to marry. Therefore, caste system in Jain followers is still prevailing. It is a social requirement of Jainas. Agustin Paniker (2001:295) stresses: "The important thing to retain in all this explanation of castes and classes is that Jainism does not eliminate castes." But Paniker's observation compels us to perceive that Jainism is a philosophical or religious term and that does not make any difference between two castes (jati). The rise of Jainism occurred in the context of socially troubled India and appeared to offer a far more unifying theology. However, in contemporary India prevailing social tendencies and habits have proved for stronger determinants than the liberal tenets of Jainism. Though on theoretical level a society without caste barriers is accepted by all and preached by its acaryas, in practice it has not been found to be translated into reality. This is true of all idealistic philosophies and not of Jainism alone. Yet with changing times the narrow sectarian and caste outlook is far rapidly being changed and more and more Jain polity is trying to remove these narrow barriers. It has mainly two facets - One is religious in which caste, class, creed, colour have no place and another is of many kinds, such as-based on caste, business, clubs etc. It does not need mention that presently several Jaina followers and social organizations are dedicated in the field of

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition charity and social services. They have built many schools, hospitals, hostels and they are managing them efficiently. Paul Dundas (2002: 198) has rightly mentioned: 36 "Outward piety and restraint, a propensity towards religious giving in the form of building hospitals, temples and educational establishments, and a general reticence about family and business affairs have tended to remain features of Jain lay life." It is to be clarified that self-purification is primary and the welfare of the society is secondary. It is difficult to change others without the positive change in us. Sometimes a man indulges in the social services, but he increases his pride, anger, deceit and greed. Jaina philosophy suggests that do social services but do not increase the evils within you. It is also an aspect of religious practice that sometimes social services are successful in reducing evils like pride, anger, deceit and greed. Although there is an impact of Hindu social norms on Jains of India and abroad, Jains have their own identity with their Svetambara, Digambara. Sthanakavasi and Terapantha sects. They perform religious rituals with major or minor differences. They have developed distinguished societies in the view of other religious followers. The prevalent Jain schools, gana, gaccha and the social and religious practices have attracted the scholars from abroad for studies and research. Conclusion In conclusion, it can be said that society in Jainism is not limited merely to human beings, but it encompasses all the beings of the world. It is not merely anthropomorphic,

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature 37 ethnocentric and culture specific, but it is universal or global due to mutual relations and interactions with all the living beings of the world. Human society is a part of that larger global society. When bird flu or mad cow diseases expand in a country all the human beings become terrorized with its effect on them. At subtle level all beings of the world are inter-connected. This broad thinking of Jaina religion and philosophy makes a human society vigilant to the whole universe. But in narrow sense Jainism talks about the human society also. It considers all human beings equal without discrimination of caste, creed and colour. Human society is only one," as says Jinasena in his Adipurana. The Jaina philosophy accepts society as real and suggests reformations to eradicate the evils prevalent at the different times. It accepts that self-purification is not possible without the right attitude of kindness (anukampa) towards the all beings of the world." Metaphysics, ethics and the epistemology of Jaina philosophy are correlated with society. The Jaina system has discussed the independence of every soul and their mutual relationship. The Jaina theory of karma, the theory of nonabsolutism (anekantavada) and the ethics of religious giving (dana), polite conduct (vinaya), service (vaiyavrtya), forgiveness (ksama), friendliness (maitri) elucidate the concept of society in Jainism. The discussion of varna-vyavastha and sanskaras in Adipurana, Anagaradharmamrta, Yasastilakacampu and in Acaradinakara seems the impact of $AP 38.45: manusyajatirekaiva jatinamodayadbhava. ** Anukampa is a characteristic of samyagdarsana without which a path of liberation does not proceed ahead. There are five characteristics of amyagdarsana as: sama, samvega, nirveda, anukampa and astikya. (TB: 1.2).

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition brahmanical culture on Jinasena, Somadevasuri, Asadhara and Vardhamanasuri. Vardhamanasuri's Acaradinakara is an important work which discusses about the sacraments of house holders and saints from the Jaina point of view. Concept of fourfold sangha or tirtha is a religious organization, but it is intermingled with the society in many forms. Its social aspects cannot be denied. Concept of society is quite wide ranging and logical in Jaina philosophy and religion rather than the other philosophies of Indian and western tradition. Jainism is considered as worldwithdrawing religion due to its emphasis on the attainment of salvation, but it gives proper attention on the right activity of a person towards the society of all beings of the world including the society of human beings. Bibliography Primary Sources & Translations AP Astapahuda of Kundakunda. Prakrit. Hindi Translation and Commentary by Jayacandra Chhabara. Mumbai:: Sethi Digambara Jaina Granthamala, 1971. Anagaradharmamsta of Asadhara. Translated into Hindi by Khubacandra Sastri, Sholapur: Seth Khusalacanda Panacanda Gandhi, 1927. Ayarangacurni of Jinadasagani, Surat: Jainananda Pustakalaya, 1941. Acaradinakara of Vardhamanasuri. Hindi Translation by Moksaratnasri and edited by Sagara Mal Jain. 4 Volumes. Shajapur: Pracya Vidyapitha, 2006-2007. Adipurana of Jinasena. (vol. 1.) Edited and Translated in Hindi by Panna Lal Jain. Sixth Edition, New Delhi. Bharatiya Jnanapitha Prakasana, 1951/1998. AN AP

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature 39 AS AVN AVS Acarangasutra. Prakrit. Edited and Annotated in Hindi by Sricanda Surana 'Saras.' Second Edition. Byavar: Agama Prakasana Samiti, 1989. Avassayanijjutti (Avasyakaniryukti) of BHADRABAHU. In: srimad-Acaryavarya-Bhadrabahu-keta-Niryuktiyutam PurvadharAcarya-Vihita-Bhasya-Bhusitam Srimad-BhavavirahaHaribhadrasuri-Sutrita-Vitty-Alanketam Srimad-Avasyakasutram (Prathamo & Purva Vibhagah). Prakasakah Javheri Cunilala Pannalala-Datta-Kincid-Adhikargha-Dravya-Sahayena sahaVenicanda-Suracanda Asyaikah Karyavahakah. Idam Pustakam Mumbayyam Nirnayasagaramudranaspade Kolabhatavithyam 23 Tame Gshe Ramacandra Yesu Sedagedvara Mudrayitva Prakasitam, 1916 (Agamodayasamitisiddhantasamgrahe Ankah 1). Avasyakasutra. Prakrit. Hindi Translation and Annotation by Sadhvi Suprabha 'Sudha.' Byavar: Agama Prakasana Samiti, 1985. Bhagavadgita. Gorakhpur: Gitapress V.S. 2040=1983). Brhatkalpabhasya. Vol 1-5. Edited by Caturavijaya and Punyavijaya. Bhavanagara: Atmananda Jaina Sabha, 1933. Bshaddravyasamgraha of Nemicandra.Prakrit. Sanskrit Commentary by Brahmadeva and Hindi Translation by Javaharlala. Agasa:: Paramasruta Prabhavaka Mandal, Srimad Rajacandra Asrama, 1989. Byhatkalpasutra (satikam). Prakrit. Edited by Acaraya Hastimal, with Sanskrit Commentary of Unknown Writer. Second Edition with Hindi Translation by: Dharmchand Jain. Jaipur: SamyagJnana Pracaraka Mandala, 1950/2007. Dasavaikalikasutra. Prakrit. Edited and Translated into Hindi by Acarya Hastimala and Sasikanta Jha. Jaipur: Samyag-Jnana Pracaraka Mandal, 1983. Dharmabindu of Haribhadrasuri. Ahmedabad: Nagaji Bhudhara ki Pole, 1951. BhG BB BD BK DK DB

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 40 KG KA NK NS NV PP PT Karmagrantha of Devendrasuri. Vol. 2. Byavar: Marudhara Kesari Sahitya Prakasana Samiti, 1975. Kartikeyanupreksa of Svamikumara. Third Edition. Agasa: Parama Sruta Prabhavaka Mandala, 1990. Nyayakumudacandra of Prabhacandra. Edited by Mahendra Kumar. Bombay: Manikyacandra Digambara Jaina Granthamala, 1941. Niryukti Samgraha (Avasyakaniryukti) of Bhadrabahu. Edited by Acarya Vijayajinendrasuri. Jamanagar: Harsa Puspamsta Jaina Granthamala, Lakhabavala, 1989. Nitivakyamstam of Somadeva Suri, with Hindi Translation by Sunder Lal Sastri. Byavar: Acarya Jnana Sagara Vagartha Vimaria Kendra, 1996. Padmapurana (Part I). Edited and Translated by Panna Lal Jain. Second Edition. Delhi: Bharatiya Jnana Pitha, 1977. Pramananayatattvaloka of Vadidevasuri. Third Edition, Ahmadanagara: Tilokaratna Sthanakavasi Jaina Dharmika Parikna Board, 1980/2000. Prasnavyakaranasutra. Prakrit. Translated into Hindi by Muni Pravina Ksi and Edited by Sobha Candra Bharilla. Byavar: Agama Prakasana Samiti, 1983. Samayikapatha or Paramatmadvatrinsika of Amitagati. In: Nirgrantha-Bhajanavali. Jaipur: Samyag-Jnana Pracaraka Mandal, 1997. Sagaradharmamsta of Asadhara. Edited by Kailasacandra Sastri. Sixth Edition. New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanapitha, 2007. Sutrakstangasutra (Part I-II). Prakrit. Translation and Annotation in Hindi by Sricanda Surana "Saras." Second Edition. Byavar: Agama Prakasana Samiti, 1991. Sanmatiprakarana of Siddhasena. Prakrit. Annotated by Sukha Lal Sanghavi in Hindi, Ahmedabad: Gyanodaya Trust, 1969. Samavayangasutra. Prakrit. Translation and Annotation in Hindi by Hiralal Sastri. Second Edition. Byavar: Agama Prakasana Samiti, 1982/1991. PV Sap SD SK SS

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature Sth TS, TS2 TB TK TC UD Utt VP YA 41 Sthanangasutra. Prakrit. Translation and Annotation in Hindi by Hiralal Sastri. Second Edition. Byavar: Agama Prakasana Samiti, 1981/1992. Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati. Hindi Commentary and Annotation by Sukhlal Sanghavi, Third Edition, Varanasi: Parsvanatha Vidyapitha, 1985. Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati/Umasvami. English Translation by Nathmal Tatia as "That Which Is.", Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1994/2007. Tattvarthabhasya (Sabhasyatattvarthadhigamasutra) of Umasvati. Hindi Translation by Khoobacandra Sastri. Third Edition, Agasa: Paramasruta Prabhavaka Mandal, 1975/1992. Thirukkurala with English and Hindi Translation. Second Edition, Jaipur: Prakrit Bharati Academy, 2006. Trini Chedasutrani (Dasasrutaskandha, Brhatkalpa and Vyavaharasutra). Prakrit. Translation and Annotation in Hindi by Muni Kanhaiya Lal 'Kamal' and Triloka Muni.. Byavar: Agama Prakasana Samiti, 1992. Uvasagadasao. Prakit. Hindi Translation and Annotation in Hindi by Editor Chhagan Lal Sastri. Byavar: Agama Prakasana Samiti, 1980/1989. Uttaradhyayanasutra (3 Vols.) Prakrit. Hindi Translation by Acarya Hastimal and Sasikant Jha. Jaipur: Samyag-Jnana Pracaraka Mandal, 1983-1989. Vyakhyaprajnaptisutra. Prakrit (Translated and Annotated in Hindi by Sri Amar Muni. Series Editor: Pt. Sobha Candra Bharilla. Byavar: Sri Agama Prakasana Samiti, 1986. Yuktyanusasana of Samantabhadra. Hindi Translation and Commentary by Jugal Kisora Mukhtara 'Yugavira.' Sarasava: Vira Seva Mandira, 1951. Secondary Sources Amiel, Pierre Paul. Jains Today in the World. Varanasi: Parshvanath Vidyapith, 2008.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Cort, John E. Jains in the World: Religious Values and Ideology in India. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Dundas, Paul. The Jains. Second Revised Edition. London: Routledge, 2002. 42 Flugel, Peter. "Jainism and Society [Review Article of J.E. Cort, Jains in the World]." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 69, 1 (2006) 91-112. Handiqui, K.K. Yasastilaka and Indian Culture. Sholapur: Jaina Samskrti Samsthana Sangha, 1949 (Jivaraja Jaina Granthmala 2). Jain, Babulal Ujjavala. Samagra Jain Caturmasasuci. Mumbai: Gajendra Sandesa Karyalaya, 2010. Jain. Sagarmal. Jaina, Bauddha aur Gita ke Acara Darsanom ka Tulanatmaka Adhyayana, Vol. 2. Jaipur: Rajasthan Prakrit Bharati Samsthan, 1982. Maciver, R.M. & Charles H. Page. Society: An Introductory Analysis. Madras: Macmillan India, 1950/1990. Paniker, Agustin. Jainism: History, Society, Philosophy and Practice, Translated into English from the Revised Spanish Edition by David Sutcliffe. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 2001/2010. Sangave, Vilas A. Jaina Community, Second Revised Edition, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1980. Sanghavi, Sukhlal. Darsana aur Cintana, Hindi. Ahmedabad: Gujarat Vidya Sabha, Bhadra, 1957. Sastri, Phulcandra. Varna, Jati aur Dharma. Second Edition. New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanapitha, 1963/1989. Tatia, Nathmal (tr.). That which Is, London: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1994/2007. Telang, N. Kanta Nath Shastry & Braj Bihari Chaubey (ed.). The New Vedic Selection. Part II. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan, 1973. Upadhyaya Amar Muni. Sri Amara Bharati (Monthly). Agra: Sanmati Jnanapitha, April 1966.

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Knowledge In Jainism : An Overview Knowledge is a key of upliftment of our present life, development of values and salvation from sufferings. Hence, in the Upanisads two kinds of knowledge (vidya) are propounded as paravidya and apara vidya (Mundakopanisad 1.1.4-5). Apara vidya is a kind of knowledge which is earned and useful for elevation and success of a human being in his empirical life, where as paravidya is a knowledge which is intuitively emerged and manifested in a soul by which ultimate truth is achieved and spiritual upliftment is experienced. This paravidya is solicited for liberation from sufferings and sorrows forever. Both of these are also useful for generating human values. Paravidya generates eternal values whereas aparavidya can generate contexctual values. Vaisesika philosophy discusses about vidya and avidya'. Avidya is of four kinds' as - doubt (samsaya), perverted knowledge (viparyaya), unditermined (anadhyavasaya) and dream (svapna) and vidya is also of four types as 1. Perception (pratyaksa) 2. Inference (anumanal Laingika), 3. Recollection (smsti) and testimony (arsa/sabda). Vaisesikas mention vidya as a quality (guna) which remains in a soul with relation of inherence. 'Isavasyopanisad(11) also mentions these two: vidyam cavidyam ca yastad vedobhayam saha. avidyaya mrtyum tirtva vidyayamstamasnute. Prasastapadabhasya, gunavaidhaimya prakarana (In Vyomavati, vol.2 p.115): tatravidya caturvidha samsaya-viparyayanadhyavasaya-svapnalaksana. Ibid.: Vidyapi caturvidha, pratyaksa-laingika-smrtyarsalaksana. (In Vyomavati, vol. 2, p. 137)

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition In Vedanta philosophy complete destruction of ignorance has been accepted as a means of eternal liberation (moksa)* and knowledge (vidya) is the means for achieving it. Samkhya Philosophy accepts two kinds of knowledge. One is reffered as buddhi or mahat which is a product of prakrti (unconscious element) and another is reffered as a characteristic of a purusa (conscious element) in the form of Viveka (distinguishing Knowledge) which is helpful in obtaining salvation from sufferings forever. Sensuous knowledge is an activity of prakrti gaining a shadow of purusa whereas distinguishing knowledge is a characteristic of conscious purusa. Knowledge: a characteristic of a soul 44 In Jaina philosophy knowledge (jnana) is accepted as an essential, natural, identical and inseparable characteristic of a soul. Jaina philosophers do not accept a soul without knowledge. It is an inevitable characteristic of a soul, which represents the consciousness and without consciousness a soul cannot be defined. In the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophies, knowledge is not considered as a natural characteristic of a soul. They consider it as an attribute which remains in a soulsubstance due to relation of inherence and in the state of salvation this attribute of consciousness vanishes from that soul. Jaina philosophers refute this notion. The Jaina philosophers have similarity to some extent with the Vedantins. Vedantins define Brahma or Atman as 'Saccidananda' (Vedantasara,33). Here 'cit' (cid) is the synonym of knowledge and consciousness. According to Jaina text Uttaradhyayana 'Nyayamakaranda p. 336: avidyastamayo moksah

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45 Knowledge In Jainism: An Overview sutra (28.11) a soul bears the following characteristics: nanam ca damsanam ceva carittam ca tavo taha. viriyam uvaogo ya, eyam jivassa lakkhanam. "A soul has characteristics like- knowledge, intuition (darsana), conduct (caritra), austerity (tapa), enthusiausm (virya) and consciousness (upayoga)". Thus Jaina propound some more characteristics of a soul than Vedantins accept, but these two philosophies agree on the point that knowledge is an essential characteristic of a soul. Jaina philosopher Umasvati propounds 'Upayoga' (consciousness) as the main characteristic of a soul in his renowned work Tattvarthasutra (2.8). Upayoga is of two kinds- (i) Jnana (articulate cognition) and (ii) Darsana (inarticulate cognition). These two are the categories of cognition. Jnana is an articulate cognition (Sakaropayoga) and Darsana is an in-articulate cognition (Anakaropayoga). Darsana and Jnana have an essential order. Darsana or anakaropayoga occurs first and then after Jnana or sakaropayoga takes place. The Jaina conception of knowledge has its most significant place in the sphere of Indian philosophy. According to Jaina philosophy no one soul can exist without knowledge. All the souls of the world including the organisms like tree, fire, water etc. having only one sense of touch, also have the characteristic of knowledge. Even liberated souls do have knowledge. They have complete knowledge which is called kevalajnana and the worldly souls have atleast two types of knowledge namely matijnana and srutajnana. Here, one thing is to be clarified that knowledge in Jainism is accepted either as

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 46 samyak (right) or as mithya (wrong or perverted). If the souls have right view or Samyagdarsana then they have right knowledge and if they are possessed of perverted attitude then they have mithyajnana or ajnana. The word 'ajnana' in Jaina system does not denote the complete absence of knowledge, but it indicates the pervertedness of the knowledge. In this way the living beings bearing one sense-organ of touch are possessed of ajnana, but it is true that the phenomenon of cognition is also found always there. The creatures like caterpillar, ant, termite, butterfly also have knowledge in the form of ajnana. Thus knowledge or cognition is an essential and inseparable characteristic of a soul in Jainism. Jnanavarana karma: An obstruction in manifestion of knowledge Jaina thinkers accept that every bhavya (having potential for ultimate emancipation) soul has a capability of becoming omniscient, but the bondage of jnanavarana (knowledge covering) karma is an obstruction in its manifestation. Whenever a soul completely destructs the Karma-bondage of jnanavarana, the pure and complete knowledge Kevalajnana arises at the moment. Before arising of kevaljnana, mohaniya karma (deluding karma) is destructed. Darsanavarana (intuition covering) karma and *There are eight karmas in Jainism which obscure or obstruct the menifestation of real attributes of a soul. They are (i) jnanavarana (obscures knowledge) (ii) darsanavarana (obscures sensitivity or intuition) (iii) vedaniya (provides pleasure and sorrows) (iv) mohaniya (deduding karma) (v) ayusya (karma related to lifespan) (vi) nama (provides body, sense organs etc) (vii) gotra (provides higher or lower life-values) (viii) antaraya(obstructs the qualities of generousity etc.).

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47 Knowledge In Jainism: An Overview antaraya (Obstructive) karma also got destructed altogether with jnanavarana. Umasvati says "Pure and perfect knowledge (omniscience) arises when deluding karma is eleminated and as a result, knowledgecovering, intuition-covering and obstructive karma are eliminated." It means knowledge is affected by deluding karma. Whenever deluision in our views arises, the right knowledge is affected. Hence for manifestion of right knowledge destruction of mohaniya (deluding) karma is needed. Causation of knowledge According to Jaina philosophy knowledge does not come from outside. It always manifests in a soul after the destruction (ksaya) or subsidence-cum-destruction (Ksayopasama) of Jnanavarana Karma. Although we know the objects through sense-organs and quasi-sense (mind), but these are only the instruments. The knowledge does not manifest in them. Knowledge is an attribute of a soul. In the view of Jaina thinkers light and objects are not the real causes of the origination of a knowledge. Although their presence helps in the manifestation of a knowledge to us, but these are not needed for a person who has supersensuous intuition, therefore the Jaina philosophers do not accept the direct causation of light and object. Acarya Hemacandra says (In brief) : "Tattvarthasutra, 10.1: Mohaksayaj-jnana-darsanavaranantarayaksayacca kevalam.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 48 "Light and object are the general causes like space and time. These are not the direct causes of generating knowledge in a living being."' Further Hemacandra says- "In the mirage we know water inspite of its absence. some animals like cow, cat, etc. can see in the night without light, hence light and object are not the real causes of the knowledge. Yogins know the objects of past, present and future, but causation of the objects is not seen there."8 Self and Object - illuminating (Sva-para-Prakasakatva) Jaina philosophers propound that knowledge illuminates itself and the object. Self illuminating and the object illuminating (Svaparaprakasakatva) is a natural characteristic of a knowledge. In the view of Jaina philosophers, if a knowledge does not illuminate itself, then it cannot illuminate the objects also. They give an example of the sun, which illuminates itself and the objects as well.' Naiyayikas accept that a knowledge can not illuminate itself, it can illuminate, its object only. For illumination of a knowledge an another knowledge is required. Buddhist Vijnanavadins do not accept any existence other than of vijnana (knowledge). Hence they accept a knowledge self-illuminating only. 'Pramana- mimamsa 1.1.25 vrtti: Narthalokau Jnanasya nimittama-vyatirekat. Bahyo visayah prakasasca na caksurjnanasya saksat Karanam; desakaladivattu vyavahitakaranatvam na nivaryate, jnanavaranadiksayopasamasamagryamaradupakarit-venanjanadiva- ccaksurupakaritvena cabhyupagamat. See Pramana mimamsa 1.1.25 vstti 'Niyamasara, tatparyavrtti, 159 and Pramananaya-tattvaloka 1.17

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Knowledge In Jainism : An Overview Samyag jnana: two forms We find two forms of samyagjnana (right knowledge) in Jaina literature. First form of samyagjnana is included in the trio-jewels (samygjnana, samyagdarsana and samyak caritra) which lead to the path of salvation. This samyagjnana is linked with samyagdarsana (right view). In the presence of right view the existing knowledge converts into samyag-jnana (Sarvartha siddhi, 1.1.7). On the contrary in the presence of mithyadarsana or midhyatva (deluded view) the existing knowledge is called as ajnana or mithya-jnana. Mithyadarsana: is a perverted or deluded view of a soul which leads to mundane world and samyag-darsana leads a soul to the path of salvation. This is the first form of Samyag-jnana found in Jaina canons and latter literature. The second form of samyag-jnana is found only in the epistemological literature, when Jaina philosophers define pramana (an organ of valid knowledge) as samyag-jnana"Samyag-jnanam pramanam."! Vidyananda (775-840 A.D.) and Abhinava-dharmabhusana have given definition of pramana as samyagjnana, but here samyag-jnana is not linked with the inevitable presence of samyag-darsana. In defining pramana samyag-jnana has another characteristic i.e. devoidness of doubt (samsaya), illusion (viparyaya) and indeterminateness (anadhyavasaya). The knowledge determining the self and the object and devoidness of doubt, illusion and indeterminateness is called pramana." ''Tattvartha Sutra, 1.1 "Pramana-pariksa, p.1 & Nyayadipika, p.9. "Pramanamimamsa 1.1.1. Vrtti & Nyaya-kumuda-candra, Vol. I p.4.8: Prakarsena samsayadi-vyavachedena miyate parichidyate vastutattvam yena tat pramanam pramayam sadhakatamam.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 50 Thus samyag-jnana defined as pramana is different from the samyag-jnana leading to liberation. The basic difference in these two is of inner view. First one right knowledge is leading the path of salvation and another one is guiding our empirical behaviour. First one may be compared with paravidya of Upanisadas and second one with aparavidya. Vattakera in Mulacara defines samyag-jnana as follows: "By which the truth is known, by which the mind is restrained and by which the soul is purified is the knowledge in Jaina-teachings." By which a man abstains from attachment, by which he engages himself in welfare and by which friendly behaviour with everybody takes place is the knowledge in Jainateachings." This knowledge is one of the jewels in trio-jewels leading to the path of liberation, but Jaina scholars accepted the empirical world as a reality, hence they developed their own epistemological fundamentals which are more practicable. Knowledge as pramana Jaina logicians propounded pramana for uncontradictory behaviour of a person. The foremost Jaina logician Siddhasena Divakara says in his Nyayavatara- "This system of valid cognitive criteria is having neither any beginning nor any end, also it is well known to all people in daily life, even thought it is propounded here."l4 "Mulacara, Verses 267-268 "Nyayavatara,32: Pramanadi-vyavastheyamanadinidhanatmika Sarvasamvyavahartr nam prasiddhapi prakirtita||

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Knowledge In Jainism: An Overview Pramana is a part of daily cognitive life. Without Pramana knowing process may remain unsuccessful or invalid. Buddhist logician Dharmakirti also says- "Validity of knowledge is proved through daily behaviour"15 51 Jaina logicians created many works for the establishment of Jaina pramana vidya and for refutation of other systems in this regard. They developed pramana sastra and logic on the basis of knowledge and its kinds enumerated in the Jaina canons. They kept an empirical view in the development of pramana-sastra, hence they considered the sensuous knowledge after wards as perception and established smrti (recollection), pratyabhijnana (recognition) and tarka (inductive reasoning) as indirect (paroksa) pramana. They included karana, purvacara and uttaracara probans in the list of right probans (sadhetus).16 Right Knowledge and mohaniya karma In Jaina philosophy, it is notable that the right knowledge leading to the path of liberation is not only connected with the subsidence or destruction of knowledgecovering (jnanavarana) karma, but it also has relation with the subsidence or destruction of the view-deluding (darsana mohaniya) karma, The righteousness of knowledge (jnana) depends on the destruction or partly destruction and subsidence of deluding-karma (mohaniya). Mohaniya karma is mainly of two types - (1) View-deluding karma (darsana mohaniya) and (2) cunduct-deluding (caritra mohaniya) karma. Darsana mohaniya karma represents the deluded inner view of a person 15 Pramanyam Vyavaharena - Pramana vartika, 1.7 16 "A separate chapter of this book on 'Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines' is discussing on Pramana and hetus.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition towards the life and the world. Caritra-mohaniya is linked with the perverted activities of a soul, e.g. anger (krodha), proud (mana), deceit (maya) and greed (lobha) are conduct-delduing passions. Each of these are of four types, viz-Anantanubandhi (tenacious), Apratyakhyanavarana (non-abstinent), pratyakhyanavarana (partially abstinent) and sanjvalana (flickering passions). When the category of anantanubandhi krodha, mana, maya and lobha are subsidised or destructed alongwith the category of darsana mohaniya the right-view emerges in a soul and the existing perverted knowledge changes into right knowledge. 52 This righteousness of knowledge depends on the subsidence, subsidence-cum-destruction or destruction of some part of mohaniya karma. Another very important relation between them is manifested when the total destruction of mohaniya karma leads to complete destruction of jnanavarana karma and then kevalajnana emerges in a soul. In this way destruction of mohaniya karma is a cause of destruction of jnanavarana karma after which complete and perfect knowledge kevalajnana arises. Types of Knowledge Five types of knowledge found in Rajaprasniya, Uttaradhyayana(28.4) Sthananga(5.3.464) Anuyogadvara sutra(sutra, 1), Nandisutra(sutra, 1) and Vyakhyaprajnaptisutra (8.2.23) are as follows: 1.Abhinibodhika jnana/mati jnana (sensuous knowledge) 2. Srutajnana (scriptural or verbal knowledge) 3. Avadhijnana (visual intuition/clairvoyance) 4. Manahparyaya jnana (intuition of mental modes) 5. kevalajnana (pure and perfect knowledge/omniscience)

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53 Knowledge In Jainism: An Overview These five types of knowledge are the specific contribution of Jaina wisdom to the Indian epistemological sphere. In Nandisutra(sutra 2) this fivefold knowledge has been divided into two kinds- (1) pratyaksa (direct) (2) paroksa (indirect). This broad division of knowledge has been accepted by Jaina logicians in the division of pramana also. The knowledge which requires the sense-organs and quasi-sense in its manifestation, comes under the category of indirect (paroksa) knowledge and the knowledge which occurs only through a soul without the help of sense organs and mind is called direct (pratyaksa) knowledge. In this respect the Jaina view is different from the other Indian systems because all other systems of Indian philosophy consider the sensuons knowledge as direct knowledge where as the early Jaina thinkers accept it as indirect knowledge. The Jaina logicians including Jinabhadragani (6th century CE), Bhatta Akalanka (720-780 CE) introduce sensuous knowledge as empirical perception (samvyavaharika pratyaksa). This was a latter development in the Jaina philosophy. Matijnana or Abhinibodhikajnana Generally matijnana or abhinibodhika jnana is considered as sensuous knowledge. Somewhere it occurs through sense-organs only, somewhere through sense-organ and quasi-sense, and somewhere it occurs through quasi-sense (mind) only. In Nandisutra (sutra 71) we find synonyms of abhinibodhika jnana as- iha, apoha, vimamsa, maggana, gavesana, sanna, sai, mai and panna. These synonyms present a vide perspective of matijnana or abhinibodhika jnana.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Thinking, reasoning, memory, intellect are also the forms of abhinibodhikajnana. Jati-smarana jnana(knowledge of former birth) is also included in the abhinibodhika jnana. Thus it is having a vast area of knowledge. Umasvati in his Tattvarthasutra (1.14) has defined it as the knowledge which is generated or manifested by the sense-organs and quasi-sense. He has given five synonyms" of it as sensuous knowledge, memory, recognition, argument and inference. All these are the kinds of matijnana or abhinibodhika jnana which were approved as the base of development of Jaina logic. Bhatta Akalanka considered. 'mati' as sensuous perception and quasisensuous perception and developed new prmanas as smrti, pratyabhijnana, tarka and infernce pramana from the memory (smrti), recognition (sanjna), thinking (cinta) and abhinibodha words. This abhinibodhika knowledge has been divided into two types-(1) srutanisrita and (2) asrutanisrita. Asuratanisrita matijnana is divided into four kinds of buddhis-(1) autapattiki (2) vainayiki (3) karmaja and (iv) parinamiki. 54 Autpattiki buddhi is an intellectual exercise of highly and quickly right decision, about the situations and things which were never seen, heard or otherwise known before. Vainayiki buddhi is the intellct of finding out a right solution in a complicated matter after getting some guidance. Karmaja is the intellect developed through practice in a particular work. The parinamiki intellect is attained through inference, reasoning and other such methods after seeing a result of prior 17 "Tattvartha sutra, 1.13: matih smrtih sanjna, cinta-bhinibodha ityanarthantaram.

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Knowledge In Jainism : An Overview 55 action. These four types of buddhis are mentioned in the Nandisutra with examples (sutra 48-52) and in the Sthanangasutra(4.4) by names. This division of asrutanisrita is not available in Digambara tradition. In Svetambara tradition this division is not found in the Bhagavati, Prajnapana, Avasyaka niryukti and Anuyogadvara sutra. Srutanisrita matijnana is of four kinds- (i) Avagraha (ii) iha (iii) avaya and (iv) dharana. These four types of matijnana are actually the four stages which occur in a certain order and have a significant value in the theory of knowledge in Indian System. Avagraha is a non-specific cognition of mere existence of an object, Iha is a further step in which the knowledge is inclined towards ascertainment of that object. It is different from doubt because during the doubt, knowledge hangs towards two things while in Iha the knowledge is inclined towards one of them. 'Avaya' is the ascertained knowledge of the object. Dharana is retention or impression of the judgement which becomes the cause of memory. In the Nandisutra, commentaries of the Tattvartha sutra and in the Visesavasyakabhasya of Jinabhadraganin a detailed account of these four stages of matijnana is available. Here, it will be an important note that these stages may be helpful in strengthening the learning process of human being. The things which we want to recall, the learning process of them should go upto dharana (retention) stage. Dharana is the cause of memory. In this way study and application of these four stages namely avagraha, iha, avaya and dharana might

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition have been proved fruitful in the field of educational psychology for moderating the learning process of children. Srutajnana (Scriptural Knowledge) The Nandisutra says that where abhinibodhika jnana is present, srutajnana is also there, and where srutajnana is present, the abhinibodhika jnana is also there. Both of these are found together. One characteristic of srutajnana is quoted everywhere in Jaina literature that srutajnana occurs after matijnana - srutam. matipurvam." Nandisutra says'maipuvvam jena suyam". 56 20 18 19 Tattvarthasutra, 1.20 20 Nandisutra,45 Generally srutajnana is defined as scriptural Knowledge or verbal knowledge, but it has been accepted in Jaina literature that every living being bears at least two knowledges as - matijnana and srutajnana. Hence a question arises here that when every living being possesses srutajnana alongwith matijnana, then it cannot be a scriptural knowledge, because a soul like one-sensed being has no knowledge of scriptures or canons. Although canonical literature of angapravista and anarigapravista comes under the roof of sruta-jnana, but there must be some another characteristics of srutajnana or sruta-ajnana as it is found in every worldly soul." srutajnana is like a directive knowledge to lead a life. It is an inner voice of the self, depending on the experience occured through matijnana. "Nandisutra, 45: jattha abhinibohinanam tattha suyananam, jattha suyananam tattha abhinibohinanam dovi eyaim annamannamanugayaim.' "A separate article on 'Significance of srutajnana' is available in the book for detailed discussion.

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Knowledge In Jainism : An Overview 57 Somewhere in Jaina canons srutajnana is considered as equal to kevalajnana in some respect. Gommatasara of Nemicandra says "In the respect of knowing all the objects srutajnana and kevalajnana are equal, but srutajnana is considered as paroksa (indirect) and kevalajnana is always pratyaksa (direct). 22 This statement glorifies the significance of srutajnana. Kundakunda says "The person who knows a soul in the pure form with the help of srutajnana, is considered as srutakevalin, by the yogins who illuminate the world with their knowledge.":23 Avadhijnana (visual intuition/clairvoyance) Avadhi is the knowledge of material objects directly emerged through a soul, in a soul, without the help of senseorgans and mind. It is of two types - (i) Bhava-pratyaya (ii) Guna pratyaya (ksayopasamanimittaka). Bhavapratyaya avadhijnana is found by birth. It is accepted in the souls of hell and heaven. Gunapratyaya avadhijnana is found in human beings and animals. It is attained by austerity, observing vows etc. In an avadhijnana one can know a very small fraction of a material and he can also know the all material objects of the world. Gunapratyaya avadhijnana is of six types(i) Anugamika- It follows the onwer of avadhi even if he leaves the place of its manifestation. . (ii) Ananugamika- It does not follow the onwer if he leaves that particular place where avadhijnana was experienced. * Gommatasara, Jivakanda, 369 "Samayasara, 9

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 58 (iii) Hiyamana-It shrinks gradually after its appearance. (iv) Vardhamana- It increases continuously after its manifestation. (v) Avasthita- It remains steady upto attainment of kevalajnana or up to the end of life. (vi) Anavasthita- It decreases or increases or may disappear after its manifestation. Manahparyaya jnana Manahparyaya jnana is also a direct knowledge in which the modes of mind of others are known lucidly. It is a result of subsidence - cum - destruction of manahparyaya jnanavarana. It is different from avadhijnana on the following points according to Tattvarthasutra, (1.26):(i) Manahparyayajnana is more vivid and lucid than avadhijnana. (ii) Area of manifestation of manahparyayajnana is only two and half dvipa land, where human beings live. Minimum area of manifestation of avadhijnana is the small fraction of an angula(finger) and maximum area is complete world (loka). (iii) An onwer of manahparyayajnana can only be a human being especilly a monk standing in seventh Gunasthana, while onwer of avadhijnana may be a soul from any four gatis (types of living beings). (iv) An object of avadhijnana may be all materialistic substances and their modes of the universe, while in manahparyaya jnana object is only the modes of mind of others.

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59 Knowledge In Jainism: An Overview Manahparyaya jnana is of two types - (i) rjumati and (ii) vipulamati. Vipulamati is more lucid and vivid than rjumati. Vipulamati is infallible where as rjumati may disappear after certain period. Vipulamati turns into kevalajnana. (Tattvartha sutra 1.25) There are two opinions about the object of manahparyaya jnana, Pandita Sukhalal Sanghavi has mentioned these in his notes on Pramana mimamsa (p.37): (i) According to the Nandisutra, Avasyaka-niryukti and Tattvarthabhasya, in manahparyaya jnana, alongwith the modes of manas (mind) the substances and their modes of which thinking is prevailing are also known. (ii) According to the Visesavasyaka- bhasya and Nandi-curni, only mental modes of others are perceived through manahparyaya jnana and the things of which thinking is prevailing are known through inference. Kevalajnana Kevalajnana is a complete and perfect knowledge after which nothing remains to know. It is a knowledge by which all substances and their modes of present, past and future are known directly and lucidly. It never needs sense-organs and mind for its manifestation. After complete destruction of jnanavarana karma along- with mohaniya, darsanavarana and antaraya karma-bondage, this perfect, pure and complete knowledge appears in a soul. It is also defined as omniscient knowledge. Jaina thinkers give many cogent arguments in favour of omniscience of kevalin or kevalajnanin. Acarya Hemacandra says-"The degree of knowledge should rest at the

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition extreme. This extreme of knowledge is kevalajnana which is considered as omniscience."24 Some more arguments are as follows: (1) The things subtle, hidden and far are assumed as perceptive by someone, because of their knowability. In kevalajnana all the things are known lucidly."5 (ii) Many times the statements of astrologers are seen true, It means it is enough possible to know the things which are not perceptive by the sense-organs. 26 25 (iii) There is not any contradictory pramana against omniscience.27 60 In the respect of omniscience a question arises that what the purpose of knowing everything of the universe is? The Jaina philosophers reply that it is a nature of pure soul that every object is known by it. Some of the Indian systems do not agree with the concept of omniscience of a person. Especially, Mimamsakas criticise the notion of omniscience at a length. Buddhist philosophers agree with the concept of omniscience. Asvaghosa says- "(Buddha) saw the whole universe (in his knowledge) like in a clean mirror."28, but a pioneer Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti denies the purpose of omniscience as he says: "Knowledge of distant objects is not important, if it is so then we should worship vultures who see the objects at a very high distance." 24 9929 Pramana mimamsa 1.1.16: prajnatisaya- visrantyadi-siddhestat-siddhih. Pramanamimamsa vrtti 1.1.16 26 Ibid. 1.1.16 27 Ibid.1.1.16 28 Dadarsa nikhilam lokamadarsa iva nirmale. - Buddhacaritam 14.8 29 Pramanavartika, 1.35 25

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Knowledge In Jainism: An Overview Therefore Acarya Kundakunda propounds that the knowledge of all substances and their modes is possible with an empirical standpoint, but in the view of absolute reality a kevalin knows only the self.30 9,31 Regarding omniscience we get one sentence in Acarangasutra (1.3.4). "One who knows one, knows all and one who knows all knows one." Jaina philosophers took it as a proof for the concept of omniscience. Dr. Nathmal Tatia (1951: 70) has explained this statement of Acaranga in this way- "The Jainas hold that each and every entity is related to all entities other than itself in the universe in some relation or other. These relations are called paryayas (modes) of the entity. In order to know as entity completely, these relations or paryayas are to be completely known. And hence, it follows that the complete knowledge of one entity involves the complete knowledge of other entities as well. If the relations are real and if it is also possible to know these relations, it logically follows that omniscience is possible."32 In this way there are two views regarding omniscience. One is empirical, in which kevalajnanin knows directly every thing of the world with its all modes of past, present and future. The another view is of absolute reality in which kevalin knows completely the self with it's all modes. Here one more explanation may be added that kevalin is omniscient in the sense that nothing is remained to be known by him. He knows every thing in that sense. 30 61 31 32 Janadi passadi savvam, vavaharanayena kevali Bhagavam. Kevalanani janadi passadi niyamena appanam||. -Niyamasara, 158 Acarangasutra 1.3.4: Je egam janai se savvam janai, je savvam janai se egam janai. Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 70

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 62 Nayavada One important point about knowledge in Jainism is nayavada or the concept of standpoint of knowing. The object according to Jain philosophy, is multidimensional or multifaceted. We cannot know it completely at a time. We know it by one standpoint or another. Our knowledge of the object may be true from some standpoint. This nayavada has a significant place in Jainism regarding its theory of knowledge. It is related mainly with srutajnana. Acquiring of knowledge Although knowledge is an essential characteristic of a soul, and its manifestation depends on subsidence-cumdestruction (ksayopasama) or on complete destruction (ksaya) of jnanavarana karma, but it is notable that scriptural knowledge or informative knowledge is acquired by a soul through sense orgams, mind and intellect. In the eleventh chapter of Uttaradhyayana sutra five obstructions have been defined in achievement of such knowledge, i.e. - (i) Pride (ii) anger (iii) carelessness (iv) illness (v) idleness." Alongwith this, eight assisting causes are also mentioned for acquiring knowledge- (i) politeness (ii) restrain (iii) silence at other's secrets. (iv) well-conduct (v) avoidance of mis-conduct (vi) avoidance of ardent desire(greed) (vii) victory on anger (viii)interest in the truth." A disciplined desciple is quite able to enrich knowledge as it is clear from the first and the eleventh chapter of Uttaradhyayanasutra. A student who lives near a teacher with self restrained mind and activities, performing "Uttaradhyayana, 11.3 * Uttaradhyayana, 11.4-5

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Knowledge In Jainism : An Overview penance, acting affectionately and speaking kindly can get knowledge or education." In the Nandisutra a process for acquiring knowledge has been described with the help of eight qualities of buddhi "A desciplined student (i) intends to listen to the teacher (ii) asks real questions (iii) listens the answers carefully (iv) understands them (v) thinks over them (vi) determines the meaning (vii) takes it for further memory (viii) tries to practice them in life."36 In this way a student can acquire knowledge, but it is possible only in the position of subsidence-cum-destruction of Jnanavarana karma. Svadhyaya (self-study) is also a means of acquiring knowledge and for destruction of jnanavarana karma. Uttaradhyayan sutra (29.18) says- "Through self-study one can destruct the knowledge-obscuring-karma." The person having scripturul knowledge may get light in life at every moment, as stated in a different way "A person having knowledge of scriptures does not loose himself in the world, as a needle with thread fallen on ground is never lost."37 Conclusion Knowledge is identical with a soul and it cann't be separated from that soul. If it is perverted, it is called mithya, >> Uttaradhyayana sutra 11.14 ** Nandisutra, gatha 95: Sussusai padipucchai sunai ginhai Thae vavis tato apohae va, dharei karei va kammam. > Uttaradhyayan, 29.56 : jaha sui sasutta padiya vi na vinassai| evam jive sasutte samsare na vinassai||

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition and in the presence of right view (samyagdarsana), it is considered as right (samyak). Samyagjnana can only lead the path of liberation with the help of samyag-darsana and samyak caritra. By accepting Anekantavada and Nayavada Jaina Philoso-phers consider the empirical world and its knowledge as a real fact. Five types of knowledge are the pecularity of Jaina system which exclude Jaina epistemology from other Indian systems. A vast Jaina literature is available to understand the nature of knowledge and its development into pramana. Jaina philosophers have specific views regarding the concept of knowledge and its manifestations. Bibliography Anuyogadvarasutra of Aryaraksita, Prakrit with Hindi translation and annotations, Beawar: Agama prakasana samiti, 1987. Buddhacarita of Asvaghosa, Varanasi : Chaukhambha Vidyabhavan, 1983 Gommatasara (Jivakanda) of Nemichandra, Agasa: Sri Parama sruta Prabhavaka Mandala, V.S. 2041. Isavasyopanisad and Mundakopanisad (In Isadi Nau Upanisad), Gorakhpur: Geetapress. Vikram Samvat 2040 Mulacara of Vattakera, Delhi : Bharatiya Jnanapitha, 1992 Mundakopanisad - see lsavasyopanisad. Nandisutra of Devavacaka, Beawar: Agama Prakasna Samiti. Niyamasara of Kundakunda with Tatparyavstti, Jaipur : Kundakunda Kahana Digambara Jaina Tirtha Suraksa Trust, 1984 Nyaya-dipika of Abhinava-dharma-bhusana (ed.) Darbari Lala Kothia, Delhi : Virasevamandira, 1968

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65 Knowledge In Jainism: An Overview Nyaya-Kumuda-candra of Prabhacandra, (2 Vols) Edited by Pt. Mahendra Kumara Nyayacarya, Bombay Digambara Jaina Granthamala, 1938 and 1941 Manikya candra Nyaya-makaranda of Anandabodha (Adaita Vedantist), Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1901 & 1907. Nyayavatara of Siddhasenasuri, Bombay Parama sruta Prabhavaka Mandala, 1950 Pramana-mimamsa of Hemacandra, Edited and annotated by Pt. Sukha Lala Sanghavi, Ahmedabad-calcutta Singhi Jaina Granthamala, 1939 Pramana-naya-tattvaloka of Vadidevasuri, Hindi Translation by Pt. Shobha Chandra Bharilla, Ahmedanagar Shri Tilokaratna Sthanakavasi Jain Dharmika Pariksa Board, 2000 Pramana Pariksa of Vidyananda, (ed.) Darbari Lala kothiya, Varanasi: Viraseya mandira Trust, 1977 Pramanavarttika of Dharmakirti with commentary of Manorathanandi, Varanasi : Bauddha Bharati, 2nd edition, 1984 Prasastapadabhasya ( In Vyomavati Part 1 and 2), Varanasi : Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, 1983-1984 Rajaprasniya sutra, Beawar : Agam prakasana samiti. Samayasara of Kundakunda, Agasa: Sri Paramasruta Prabhavaka Mandala, V.S. 2038 Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati, Hindi Commentary by Pt. Sukha Lala Sanghavi, Varanasi : Parsvanatha Vidyapitha, 5th edition, 2001 Tatia, Nathamal, 1951, Studies In Jaina Philosophy, Varanasi: P.V. Research Institute. Uttaradhyayana sutra (vol.3), Jaipur Samyagjnana Pracaraka Mandala, 2nd edition, 1989 Vedantasara of Sadananda, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1979 Vyakhyaprajnapti sutra, Prakrit, with Hindi translation, Beawar : Agama Prakasna Samiti.

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Significance of Srutajnana In the Vedic tradition four Vedas are also named as 'sruti' and in the Jain tradition, scriptural knowledge is generally named as sruta or srutajnana. But when we study Jain texts, we find that all living beings, even one sensed to four sensed beings not having auditory organ also bear sruajnana. They bear its perverted form as sruta-ajnana. Here a doubt arises, how one sensed living beings are supposed to have scriptural knowledge, even when they cannot hear and understand scripts containing sermons of enlightened persons.? Which kind of srutajnana exists therein? This paper proposes to discuss this problem and tries to find out a solution from the original Jaina texts. Another point, to be discussed in this article is to differentiate srutajnana from matijnana, which is also found in every living being and occurs before srutajnana. Third point to be discussed herein is to find out the importance of srutajnana for salvation or liberation from sufferings and sorrows. On the basis of Jaina canonical literature fourteen and twenty types of srutajnana are also to be mentioned. Jaina tradition propounds five types of knowledge:- 1Sensuous knowledge (matijnana), 2. Scriptural knowledge or knowledge of the self (srutajnana), 3. Clairvoyance or visual intuition (avadhijnana), 4. Intuition of mental modes (manahparyaya-jnana), 5. Pure and perfect knowledge (kevalajnana). Here, we will discuss only the concept of srutajnana.

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Significance of Srutajnana 67 Meaning of Sruta and Srutajnana Srutajnana or sruta word has the following meanings:1- What is heard with auditory sense organ is sruta. (sruyate 'iti srutam.) 2- Preachings of a trustworthy person are meant as sruta, because they are also heard. A collection of their preachings in the form of canons (agamas) is also sruta. This is the source and instrumental cause for generating real srutajnana in a soul. 3- The knowledge which elevates a soul after listening to trustworthy persons or after study of canons is also considered as srutajnana. 4- Which is heard by a soul is sruta sruyate atmana taditi srutam (Maladhari Hemacandra vstti, on Visesavasyakabhasya, verse 81.) This knowledge is helpful in the salvation from sufferings and sorrows. Difference between Srutajnana and kevalajnana Srutajnana has been compared with pure and perfect knowledge 'kevalajnana', with a slight difference that kevalajnana is a direct perceptual knowledge, whereas, srutajnana is considered as indirect (paroksa) knowledge. Its importance has been mentioned by Kundakunda in Samayasara and in Pravacanasara that a Samayasara, 1.9 : jo hi suyenahigacchai appanaminam tu kevalam suddhami tam suyakevali-misino bhananti loyappaivayara. Il 'Pravacanasara, 1.33: jo hi sudena vijanadi appanam janagam sahavena. I tam suyakevalimisino bhananti loyappadivayara. II

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 68 person who knows a pure soul through srutajnana is considered as srutakevalin by enlightened persons. Kevalin directly knows all the substances and their modes whereas srutajnanin knows these through srutajnana.' Srutajnana is a wishful knowledge for a living being which directs him to the right path of liberation. Dravyasruta and Bhavasruta Umasvati provides synonyms of srutajnana in Tattvarthadhigamabhasya as - "aptavacana, agama, upadesa, eitihya, amnaya, pravacana, jinavacana'. All these synonyms establish that the sermons of jinas [who have conquered attachment (raga) and aversion (dvesa)] or the perfect authentic persons are considered as srutajnana . This is a dravyasruta (sruta in the form of preachings) and it can lead to bhava-srutajnana (manifested knowledge in the self through preachings) in a person who conceives the meaning of that dravyasruta. Sruta and Sruti The word 'sruta' bears resemblance with the word 'sruti used for Vedas. Both of these have the same characteristic of verbal testimony. According to Mimamsakas, there is no creator of sruti or Vedas, whereas Naiyayikas consider that the God is the creator of Vedas, but in Jaina philosophy when a Kevalin or Tirtharkara expresses the truth for the welfare of all living beings, then it Gommatasara, Jivakanda, verse, 369: sudakevalam ca nanam, donni vi sarisani honti bohado i sudananam tu parokkham, pacchakham kevalam. nanam II "Sabhasya-tattvarthadhigamasutra, 1.20 : "srutam aptavacan-agamaupadesa-eitihyam-amnayam pravacanam jinavacanamityanarthanataram"

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69 Significance of Srutajnana is called as sruta or dravyasruta and when its meaning or message is experienced by someone, then it is called srutajnana or bhavaasruta. One more interesting point is that sruti is not considered in every living being as an essential element, whereas srutajnana is essentially accepted in every living being. It is another thing that due to perverted attitude it may be sruta-ajnana. Matijnana precedes Srutajnana It has been accepted that srutajnana takes place after matijnana. In the Tattvarthasutra, its commentaries and in the Visesavasyakabhasya, it has been propounded that srutajnana takes place after matijnana. Matijnana has been considered as an efficient cause of srutajnana. Here, a question has been raised by Pujyapada Devanandin in his Sarvarthasiddhi that if sruta is manifested after matijnana then it should also be mati, because 'karanasadrsam hi loke karyam drstam', an effect comes out similar to its cause, but in the view of Pujyapada Devanandi it is not always true, for instance stick (danda) is an instrumental cause for making an earthen pot but the stick (danda) does not turn into a pot. Similarly, matijnana is not converted into srutajnana, but it becomes instrumental cause for producing srutajnana. Even in the presence of matijnana, srutajnana may not appear due to effect of srutajnanavarana Karma. Subsidence-cum-destruction of srutajnanavarana karma is also essential for the manifestation of srutajnana." (i) Tattvarthasutra: 1.20- srutam matipurvam dyanekadvadasabhedam: (ii) Visesavasyakabhasya, verse 105: maipuvvam suyam uttam "Sarvarthasiddhi, p. 85

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition In the Visesavasyakabhasya Jinabhadraganin ksamasramana supports the notion that srutajnana is preceded by matijnana- 'maipuvvam suyam' and he applies various meanings of word 'purva' which is derived from the root pr palanpuranayoh. He says that word 'purva' may be used to denote the meaning of causing, guarding, nourishing, protecting etc. Matijnana is an efficient cause of srutajnana and it also nourishes and protects the same. He also says that sruta is obtained, and it can be distributed to others through matijnana. In the absence of matijnana, srutajnana cannot be preserved or sustained.' 70 Bhatta Akalanka in his Tattvarthavartika raises a question that if sruta is caused by mati, then there is a beginning of sruta and which has a beginning, has its end also. In this way canonical notion that 'sruta has no beginning and no end' is defeated. Here he answers that for a particular person or situation it may have beginning but in universal point of view, sruta is always present. 8 Although srutajnana has been defined as verbal cognition conceived from the words known through matijnana, but it is not limited upto the cognition of words. Vidyananda explained it that knowledge manifested through sense organs and quasi-sense is instrumental cause of srutajnana. In this way knowledge manifested through touch-sense, gustatory sense, olfactory sense and sense of 'Visesavasyakabhasya, verse 105 and 106: maipuvvam suyamuttam na mai suyapuvviya viseso`yam | puvvam purana-palana-bhavao jam mai tassa purijjai Pavijjai dijjai va jam maie namaina palijjai ya maie gahiyam ihara panasejja || Tattvarthavartika, 1.20.7

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Significance of Srutajnana vision may also lead to srutajnana.' Srutajnana is a later stage of matijnana. Even a knowledge originated through mind can also lead to srutajnana. It is also different from memory, recognition, concomitance and inference. Srutajnana is indirect pure knowledge by which a person becomes able to know the obstructed, distant and the subtle substances. Due to this characteristic of knowing, a knower is called a srutakevali. Difference between Matijnana and Srutajnana 71 Umasvati, in his Tattvarthadhigamabhasya differentiating srutajnana from matijnana clarifies that matijnana or abhinibodhika jnana deals with only the present existing things, whereas srutajnana deals with the objects of all three times i.e. present, past and future." A question arises here that memory (smrti) is also a kind of matijnana and it deals with the past, then how it can be said that mati is limited upto present objects? Haribhadra replied to this question in his Tattvarthavrtti that memory (smrti) is nothing than the knowledge of the things known in previously present. 11 One more characteristic of srutajnana has been pointed out by Umasvati that it has more clarity then matijnana." 'Tattvartha slokavartika: 1.20.10 matisamanya-nirdesanna srotra-matipurvakam | srutam niyamyate asesamatipurvasya viksanat || "Tattvarthabhasya, 1.20 "utpannavinastartha-grahakam sampratakalavisayam matijnanam Srutajnanam tu trikalavisayam. Utpannavinastanutpannarth-agrahakam" "Haribhadriya Tattvartha vrtti on Tattvartha sutra. 1.20 p. 99 "smrteratitavisayatvanna sarvamevamvidhamiti cet, na, samprata-kalagrhuitatiriktasya kasyacidasmaranat." "Sabhasyatattvarthadhigamasutra 1.20: srutajnanam tu trikalavisayam visuddhataram ceti.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Haribhadra explains that srutajnana may deal with the obstructed, distant and subtle objects, hence that has more clarity." One another differentiating characteristic between these two knowledges, according to Tattvarthabhasya is that srutajnana has wider objectivity than matijnana. It gives two arguments in the support: the first, that srutajnana is produced by an omniscient and the second, that it deals with infinite knowables. Srutajnana is quite different from matijnana (sensuous knowledge). Matijnana has stages of avagraha, iha, avaya and dharana knowledge and it requires sense organs, mind or both for its manifestation whereas srutajnana requires an inner light which leads a person to understand and experience the momentariness of worldly things. It is a self-knowledge by which a person becomes able to discriminate between the good (sreya) and covetable (preya). It tends a person to a real spiritual development. He can renunciate the worldly attractions. It can be called as prajna (wisdom). In other words matijnana is a knowledge and srutajnana is a wisdom. Bhavasruta-jnana: Essential in Every Living Being According to canonical notion every living being has at least two knowledge, i.e. matijnana and srutajnana. In the absence of right view (samyaktva) these are called as matiajnana and sruta-ajnana. If we consider srutajnana as verbal or scriptural knowledge, then it never appears in one "Haribhadriya Tattvartha vrtti 1.20, p.103 "Sabhasyatattvarthadhigamasutra 1.20 : sarvajnapranitatvad-anantyacca jneyasya srutajnanam. matijnanan mahavisayam.

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73 Significance of Srutajnana sensed to four sensed living beings and in some of five sensed beings also. A few human beings can have this scriptural srutajnana. Jinabhadra, in his Visesavasyakabhasya has given a solution to this problem that every living being can have bhava-srutajnana. He propounds two kinds of srutajnana as dravya-srutajnana and bhava-srutajnana. Dravya-srutajnana is a verbal knowledge and bhava-srutajnana is experienced through it in a soul, but somewhere bhava-srutajnana is experienced without dravyasruta also, as in the case of one sensed to four sensed living beings. It is also propounded as labdhyaksara srutajnana. This kind of aksarsrutajnana is a minimum qualification for a soul without which a soul cannot remain a living being. It may turn into non-living thing." 15 Significance and Nature of Srutajnana Srutajnana is important for emancipation. When right view, right knowledge and right conduct are considered as the path of emancipation, role of srutajnana as right knowledge is considered significant. Although matijnana, avadhijnana and manahparyaya-jnana are also the right knowledge but srutajnana is more important for the achievement of kevalajnana and emancipation from sorrows. Srutajnana may be defined as atma-jnana or knowledge of the self. Matijnana has a limit to know the outer world, but it can help in manifestation of srutajnana which is an instrument to know the self. It is not produced through sense-organs. Tattvarthasutra says 15 "see, Visesavasyakabhasya, verses 110 to 117

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition "srutamanindriyasya"." Here 'anindriya' word denotes a mind and a soul. It can be called as atma-jnana. Thus srutajnana is produced through mind and soul. It is the only knowledge which is important for conquering one self. It shows us that attachment and aversion are not beneficial for a soul. Samanasuttam Mentions: "The knowledge by which ultimate truth is known, mind is restrained and soul is purified, is the right knowledge in Jaina tradition. The knowledge, by which a person gets detachment from worldly things and is attracted towards auspicious things and friendliness to the all beings is considered as right knowledge in Jain tradition." This knowledge can be named as srutajnana. Srutajnana is an inner light of one self which leads him to right conduct. Acaranga sutra says: "A soul is a knower and a knower is a soul". Knowledge is a quality and power of a soul to cognize the things and oneself and it is never destroyed. It is important to note that srutajnana is never fully obscured. It is experienced by every soul to some extent. It has been accepted in Visesavasyakabhasya, Satkhandagama and Gommatasara that an infinitesimal part of kevalajnana or srutajnana is always un-obscured in a soul. " "Tattvarthasutra 2.22 "Samanasuttam, verse 252 and 253 jena taccam vibujjhejja, jena cittam nirujjhadi 1 jena atta visujjhejja, tam nanam jinasasane II jena raga virajejja, jena seasu rajjadi ! jena mitti pabhavejja, tam nanam jinasasane II "Acaranga sutra, 1.5.5 sutra 177 "Je ata se vinnata, je vinnata, se ata", (1) Sarkhandagam 5.5.48 : akkharassanantimo bhago niccugghadio. (2) Gommatasara (Jivakanda, verse 320): havadi hu savva-jahannam niccugghadam niravaranam.

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Significance of Srutajnana 75 Visesavasyakabhasya propounds that srutajnana is actually a soul." In the view of Tirthankaras, it is a characteristic of a soul as Maladhari Hemcandra says srutajnana is a mode (paryaya) of a soul." Kinds of Srutajnana The Nandisutra and Avasyakaniryukti mention the following fourteen categories of srutajnana: 1. Aksara sruta - It is imperishable and divided into three types- samjnaksara, vyanjanaksara and labdhyaksara. Samjnaksara means a particular shape and form of a letter of script. All the words of different languages with particular meaning are called vyanjanaksara. Labdhyaksara is the minimum characteristic of a living being and it is considered as bhava sruta. Anaksarasruta - It is defined as the symbols of bodily activities. Bhatta Akalanka includes inferential knowledge in it. 3. Samjnisruta- It is defined as mental power of retaining the past experiences and speculation for future plans etc. 4. Asasjnisruta- Contrary to samjnisruta is called asasjnisruta 5. Samyak sruta- The scriptures composed by the Ganadharas or other acaryas having the knowledge of 10 purvas is called samyak sruta. ** Visesavasyakabhasya, verse 99 "suyam tu paramatthao jivo", "Vtitti of Maladhari on Visesavasyaka bhasya, verse 98 - atmanah parinamasca srutajnanamisyate,

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 76 8. 6. Mithyasruta - Non-Jaina scriptures like the Mahabharata, the Ramayana are called as mithyasruta, but this is not a proper notion. In the absence of right view, every scripture may turn into mithyasruta. 7. Sadi sruta- According to the stand point of modes (paryayarthika naya) srutajnana may have a beginning. Anadi sruta - According to the stand point of substance (dravyarthika naya) srutajnana is not having any beginning. Saparyavasita - In the view of paryayarthika naya it can have an end. 10. Aparyavasita- In the view of dravyarthika naya it is endless. 11. Gamika- The sruta which repeats the same text again and again is known as gamika sruta. Drstivada is considered in this category. 12. Agamika- The sruta composed in various meters and prose is agamika. It is also known as kalika sruta. 13. Argapravista- Twelve agamas composed by Ganadharas are called as angapravista sruta. 14. Anangapravista- The agamas composed by the acaryas other than Ganadharas are called as anangapravista sruta or angabahya sruta. Satkhandagama defines srutajnana on the basis of alphabets and their mutual combination and provides 20 types of srutajnana as-1. Paryaya, 2. Paryaya samasa,

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77 Significance of Srutajnana 3. Aksara, 4. Aksara samasa, 5. Pada, 6. Pada samasa, 7. Sanghata, 8. Sanghata samasa, 9. Pratipatti, 10. Pratipatti samasa, 11. Anuyogadvara, 12. Anuyogadvara samasa, 13. Prabhrta Prabhrta, 14. Prabhrta prabhrta samasa, 15. Prabhrta 16. Prabhrta samasa, 17. Vastu, 18. Vastu samasa, 19. Purva and 20. Purva samasa. 22 Here, Virasena (9th century) in his Dhavala commentary defines aksara srutajnana as eternal knowledge which is never obscured even in labhdhyaparyaptaka nigoda being." Labhdhyaksara knowledge is found incessant in every living being. In Gommatasara Jivakanda, it has been categorized under paryaya srutajnana." Digambara and Svetambara texts accept that this knowledge is always unobscured in a living being and it is pre-requisite for every living being. This fact proves the eternal nature of srutajnana. Modern scholar Nagin J shah (2003: p. 37) thinks that concepts of matijnana and srutajnana have been developed on the basis of Vedic thought of sravana and manana. This thought of Nagin J Shah does not seem proper in the context of Jainism, because in Jainism matijnana precedes srutajnana while in the Vedic tradition sravana precedes manana. one more point discards his view. In Jainism matijnana is considered as a sensuous knowledge, but in Vedic tradition "Satkhandagama 5.5.48, Detail about these kinds may be seen in its commentary 'Dhavala'. 23 Dhavala commentary on Satkhandagama 5.5.48: akkharassanantimabhago niccugghadio. 24 see, Gommatasara (Jivakanda), verse 320

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 78 manana is limited up to mind's activity. Kanhaiya Lal Lodha (2010 : p.16) propounds that srutajnana is a knowledge which differentiates between wished and unwished, acceptable and to be abondoned elements. It is a natural knowledge of a soul and helpful in eternal liberation. Conclusion 1. Srutajnana is an essential characteristic of every worldly soul. In the presence of right view (samyagdarsana) it is considered as samyag srutajnana and in the presence of perverted view (mithyatva) it is considered as sruta-ajnana. 2. Generally srutajnana is considered as a verbal testimony. It includes scriptures, canons or sermons of an authentic teacher and the knowledge originated through them. 3. It is preceded by matijnana. Matijnana is manifested through sense organs and mind, whereas srutajnana requires the prior occurrence of matijnana. This srutajnana comes into action after acquiring ability through the subsidence-cum-destruction of srutajnanavarana karma. 4. It is not generated only by verbal cause; every matijnana may lead to srutajnana. Matijnana is an instrumental cause (nimitta karana) and a soul itself is a natural cause for (upadana karana) manifestation of srutajnana. According to Jinabhadragani, avadhijnana and manahparyaya jnana may also be the instrumental causes of srutajnana.

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79 Significance of Srutajnana 5. Srutajnana is the only knowledge which has a similarity with kevalajnana and which can lead to the emancipation from all sorrows and the manifestation of kevalajnana. 6. If srutajnana is accepted as verbal or scriptural knowledge, it is not possible in one-sensed to foursensed living beings and in some of the five-sensed beings also. Hence, there must be a different nature of srutajnana. Jinabhadragani has suggested that bhava srutajnana is found in the one sensed to four sensed living beings which can occur directly without dravyasruta in those living beings. 7. Srutajnana is the knowledge which leads a person to decide distinction between the real needs and the futile wants in life. It enables a person in attaining detachment from the worldly allurements and motivates him to proceed towards the salvation from sorrows. It is a big power for spiritual development of a soul. When it is obscured or perverted, a soul cannot decide the right path. Bibliography Acarangasutra (first part), Beawer: Agama Prakashana Samati, 4th edition, 2010 Gommtasara (Jivakanda) of Nemicandra, Agas: Shri Paramashruta Prabhavaka Mandala, 1985 Pravacanasara of Kundakunda, Prakrit. Agas: Shri Paramashrutra Prabhavaka Mandala, 1984 Sabhasya-Tattvarthadhigamasutram of Umasvati, Agas: Shri Paramashruta Prabhavaka Mandala, 1992

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Samanasuttam, Varanasi Sarvaseva-sangha-Prakashan, Rajghat, 80 1975. Samayasara of Kundakunda, Agas: Sri Parama-shruta Prabhavaka Mandala, 1982 Sarvarthasiddhi of Pujyapada Devanandin, New Delhi : Bharatiya Jnana pitha, 15th edition, 2009 Satkhandagama of Puspadanta Bhutabali with Dhavala commentary of Virasena (Part 13), Ed. Heeralal Jain, Bhelasa, 1955 Sri Nandisutram, Jaipur Samyagjnana Pracharak Mandala, 2nd edition 2009 Tattvarthadhigamasutram (with Commentary of Haribhadrasuri), ed. Vijayanemi Chandra Suri, Jamnagar Shri Harsh Puspamrta Jain Granthamala, volume 369, Vikram Samvat 2056 Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati, Hindi commentary by pt., Sukhlal Sanghavi, Varanasi : Parshvanatha Vidyapitha, 5th edition, 2001 Tattvarthavartika of Bhatta Akalanka, ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain, New Delhi, Bharatiya Jnanpitha, 8th edition, 2008 Tattvarthaslokavartikalankara, Part 3, Hindi translation by Ganini Suparshvamati Mataji, Kolkata, Vikram Samvat 2066 Visesavasyakabhasya (Part-I), of Jinabhadragani with commentary of Maladhari Hemacandra, Mumbai : Divya Darshan Trust, 68, Gulabvadi, Vikram Samvat, 2039 Modern Sources Lodha, Kanhaiya Lal, 2010; Bandha Tattva, Jaipur : Prakrit Bharati Academy. Shah, Nagin J, 2003- Jaina Darsana mem Sraddha (samyag darsana), Matijnana Aura Kevalajnana ki Vibhavana, Ahmedabad: sanskrit-sanskriti Granthamala. Shastri Indra Chandra, 1990; Jaina Epistemology, Varanasi : P.V. Research Institute.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines [Part I of this article gives an account of the historical development of the Jaina logic and epistemology and Parts II deals with the contributions of Jaina philosophers regarding epistemological doctrines.] PART - I A BRIEF SURVEY OF LITERARY CONTRIBUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC Epistemology : Theory of knowledge Epistemology is a branch of philosophy which deals with origination of knowledge, its nature, sources and validity etc. and logic is a core area of epistemology which deals with valid arguments and inference for others and the concepts of consistency, inconsistency, truth and falsity. The term epistemology encompasses mainly two dimensions of philosophy, i.e. Jnanamimamsa and Pramana mimamsa. To some extent, both the dimensions are intermingled. Pramana is not absolutely different from knowledge or cognition. Particularly in Jaina tradition, pramana is always accepted as a kind of cognition or knowledge. Hence, all the descriptions made in Jaina canons regarding knowledge come under the scope of pramana. When we discuss pramana, we have to resort to the theory of knowledge.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition There is only one difference in pramana and right knowledge (samyagjnana) that the right knowledge depends on right view (samyag darsana), where as pramana does not reqire any such condition. Introduction to Pramana Pramana is an instrumental knowledge which is devoid of doubt (samsaya), illusion (viparyaya) and indetermination (anadhyavasaya). In Jaina philosophy pramana has been accepted as a definitive cognition of knowable thing and knowledge itself. The Jaina logicians are almost unanimous on this characteristic of pramana. Although at the early time of Tattvarthasutra, there was no such difference between pramana and right knowledge. Umasvati, the author of Tattvarthasutra had clearly divided five types of knowledge into two kinds of pramana without mentioning any difference between right knowledge and pramana. He kept matijnana (sensuous knowledge) and srutajnana (scriptural or verbal knowledge, succeeding matijnana) under the category of paroksa pramana (indirect organ of valid cognition), and the other three types of knowledge i.e. avadhijnana (visual intuition), manahparyaya jnana (intuition of mental modes) and kevalajnana (pure and perfect knowledge) were placed in the category of pratyaksa pramana (perception).* 'Hemacandra, vrtti on PM 1.1.1 : prakarsena samsayadivyavachedena miyate parichidyate vastutattvam yena tat pramanam pramayam sadhakatamam. (also in NKC of Prabhacandra, Vol. I p. 48.10) ?PT 1.2: Svaparavyavasayi jnanam pramanam. Five types of knowledge are : 1. Matijnana (Sensous knowledge) 2. Srutajnana (Scriptural knowledge and knowledge of the self) 3. avadhijnana (Visual intuition or clairvoyance) 4. Manahparyayajnana (intuition of mental modes of others) 5. Kevalajnana (pure and perfect knowledge ) "TS, 1.10.12 Tat pramanam, adye pavoksam, pratyaksamanyat.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines Tattvarthasutra is the first work of the Jaina system which propounded right knowledge as pramana (an organ of valid cognition) and divided it into two types, pratyaksa and paroksa. This division of pramana is based on the process of knowledge. The right knowledge which occurs directly through a soul was called pratyaksa pramana (perception) and the right knowledge which occurs through sense organs and quasi sense was called as paroksa pramana (other than perception or indirect knowledge) In Indian philosophy all the systems other than Jaina, consider that the knowledge acquired through sense organs comes under the category of perception, but the view of earlier Jaina thinkers like Umasvati and Pujyapada Devanandin who followed the notion of Jaina canonical literature, considered it in the category of paroksa. They explain that the knowledge that occurs directly through a soul without the help of sense organs comes under the concept of pratyaksa or direct cognition and the knowledge occurs through sense organs and mind is kept in the category of indirect cognition (paroksa pramana). The Jaina logicians, after interaction with other schools, accepted the sensuous knowledge under the category of empirical perception (samvyavaharika pratyaksa). This development is seen first in the Visesavasyakabhasya of Jinabhadragaai Ksamasramana. He says jam indiyamanobhavam tam samvavahara-paccakkham (Visesavasyakabhasya, 95) which means knowledge occuring through sense organs and quasi sense is samvyavaharika pratyaksa (empirical perception). Bhasta Akalanka and other

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 84 Jaina logicians followed him. Hence, they considered two types of pratyaksa as mukhya pratyaksa and sanvyavaharika pratyaksa. The perception that occured directly through a soul comes under the category of mukhya pratyaksa and the perception that occured through sense organs and mind comes under the category of samvyavaharika pratyaksa (empirical perception). At this stage, the Jaina logicians entered into a dialogue with other Indian logicians. Pramana in canonical literature It may be noted that in sthanangasutra and Anuyogadvarasutra, the word pramana was used in the meaning of measurement and we find four types of that pramana there in i.e. dravyapramana (measurement as substance), ksetrapramana (measurement as space), kalapramana (measurement as time) and bhavapramana (measurement as modes). Somewhere in the Bhagavatisutra (also known as Vyakhyaprajnaptisutra) and Anuyogadvarasutra the four types of pramana propounded by the Nyayasutra are also mentioned as pratyaksa (perception), anumana (inference), upamana (comparison) and agama (testimony)". These four types of pramana were also mentioned in Upayahrdaya an old text of Buddhism.' It sounds that Buddhist and Jaina philosophers developed their own pramanasastra after Nyaya philosophy. In the Sthanangasutra these four types of pramana are mentioned as the four types of hetu - (Sthanangasutra, 245, Bhagavatisutra 5.3.192 (In ST) Pamane cauvihe pannatte, tamjaha paccakkhe anumane ovammeagame, Jaha anuogadare. UH, p. 13: Atha katividham pramanam? caturvidham pramanam. Pratyaksamanumanamupamanamagamasceti.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 85 Suttagame, p. 215). Sthanangasutra has also mentioned three types of vyavasaya i.e. pratyaksa, pratyayika and anugami - (Sthanangasutra, 245). Pandita Dalsukha Malvaniya (1966 : 138-139) has mentioned that these three types of vyavasaya have got a place in Siddhasena's Nyayavatara and Haribhadra's Anekantajayapataka as the developed form of pramana i.e. pratyaksa, anumana and agama. It is true that the seeds and roots of the Jaina concept of pramana are found in Jaina canons. The Anuyogadvarasutra and Sthanangasutra have great importance in this context. In the Sthanangasutra perception is divided into two types i.e. kevala and nokevala. In the later development of pramanasastra the Jaina logicians termed these types as sakala and vikala perception. In the Anuyogadvarasutra and Nandisutra perceptual knowledge is divided into two types, i.e. indriya pratyaksa and no-indriya pratyaksa. This division shows that in the later canonical literature the knowledge occurred by sense organs was included in perception. This division of perception is not mentioned in the Tattvarthasutra. So it seems that this addition was made in the canons at a later stage. It is possible that Jinabhadraganin (6th century) developed a concept of samvyavaharika pratyaksa as mentioned earlier, on the basis of the above mentioned division of perception in the Nandisutra and Sthanangasutra. Contribution of Jaina Logicians before Akalanka Jaina epistemology regarding pramana was actually systematized by Bhatta Akalanka in the eight century CE. The main contribution of Bhatta Akalanka was to establish smrti (recollection), pratyabhijnana (recognition) and tarka

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 86 (inductive reasoning) as independent pramanas under the category of paroksa. This is also one of the main contributions of Jaina epistemology to Indian philosophy. Before the advent of Akalanka (720 - 780CE), Umasvati (2nd - 3rd century CE), Pujyapada Devanandin (5th century) Siddhasen Divakara (54 century) Samantabhadra (6 century), Mallavadi Ksamasramana (5EUR century), Jinabhadragaai Ksama sramana (6" - 7th century), Simhasuri (7" century), Sumati (7th - 8h century), Patrasvami (7h century), Sridatta, Kumaranandin (74h century) and Haribhadrasuri (700 - 770 CE.) also contributed their mite to the Jaina epistemology to some extent. Acarya Kundakunda attempted to prove the nature of knowledge illuminating itself and the object. Umasvati (or Umasvami) systematized the Jaina epistemological doctrines to some extent. As earlier stated Umasvati, in his Tattvarthasutra mentioned two types of pramana - pratyksa and paroksa. He accepts the cognition that occurred directly through a soul, without any help of sense organs and quasi sense is perception (pratyksa) and rest of cognition is paroksa. On this basis matijnana and srutajnana were kept into paroksa pramana and the other three kinds of knowledge (avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala) into the category of pratyaksa pramana. Pujyapada Devanandin, in his Sarvarthasiddhi has explained the views of Umasvami. Siddhasena Divakara was a great logician who flourished before Akalanka in the fifth century CE. and wrote an independent work on Jaina logic known as Nyayavatara. It is a systematic work comprising 32 karikas (stanzas), which presents a brief description of Jaina pramana sastra. S.C.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 87 Vidyabhusana mentioned Siddhasena Divakara as the father of Jaina Logic and recognized his Nyayavatara as the first work on Jaina logic. (A History of Indian Logic p. 173). Hence it is an important work for Jaina Logic. Siddharsiganin, a philosopher of the ninth century wrote a comprehensive commentary on it. Siddhasena Divakara tells about pramana-prameya-vyavastha (systematization regarding organ of valid cognition and knowable objects), that although it is eternal and famous for all its users, it is presented again to remove ignorance about its nature." "This system of valid cognitive criteria is having neither any beginning nor any end, also it is well known to all people in daily life, even thought it is propounded here." "Objective of defining these famous valid organs of knowledge, is to remove delusions or illusions of the people of deluded minds." M.A. Dhaky (1995 : 43-46) is of the view that Siddharsigatin, the commentator of Nyayavatara' was himself the writer of Nyayavatara, but his opinion does not seem acceptable, because if Siddharsigaoin (9th century) would have written it, then he must have mentioned smoti, pratyabhijnana and tarka as pramana because before the advent of Siddharsiganin, Bhatta Akalanka emphatically established them as pramana. Piotr Balcerowicz (2008 : Preface) has assumed that the author of Nyayavatara is Mahamati 'NA verse 32 and 3: Pramanadi - vyavastheyamanadinidhanatmika, Sarva samvyavaharatrnam prasiddhapi prakirtita. Prasiddhanam pramananam laksanoktau prayojanam Tadvyamohanivrtih syad vyamudha manasamiha.

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88 Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Siddhasena, who lived between circa 710-780 and who is different from Siddhasena Divakra, the authour of the Sammati-tarka-prakarana, a work composed before Dignaga (480-540). According to him Siddhasena Mahamati was probably slightly senior to Akalanka (720-780). Balcerowicz has given arguments to prove his notion. Here it can be said that Nyayavatara was constructed before Akalanka's works, because it does not mention about smrti, pratyabhijnana and tarka pramana; but it was written after Dignaga (480-540) and Dharmakirti (600-660), because Nyayavatara criticizes them. Santisuri of Purnatalagacchiya wrote a varttika and commentary on Nyayavatara, which is also an important work for the study of development of Jaina logic. Santisuri defined perception as clarity of knowledge and propounded three types of it i.e. indriya pratyaksa (sensuous perception), anindriya pratyaksa (quasi-sensuous perception) and yogaja pratyaksa (Nyayavatara varttika 17). He defined vividness (vaisada) of knowledge as the apprehension of its content as 'this' (Nyayavatara varttika,17). This definition has been followed by Hemacandra in his Pramanamimamsa (1.1.14) Sanmatitarka-prakarana of Siddhasenasuri is also an important treatise consisting of three chapters namely - Naya mimamsa, Jnanamimamsa and Jneya mimamsa. Siddhasena was a great philosopher who contributed to the establishment of the theory of non-absolutism. One of the prominent philosophers, Mallavadi Ksamasramana flourished in the fifth century A.D. discussed all the main philosophical tenents in his famous work

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines 89 Dvadasara-nayacakra. He refuted several times the epistemology of other systems. Simhasuri's commentary on it is also an authoritative work for understanding Dvadasaranayacakra. Like Siddhasena Divakara, Samantabhadra's main contribution was to establish Anekantavada or non absolutism, but ocasionally he discussed some concepts of pramana sastra also. His Yuktyanusasana, Aptamimansa and Svayambhustotra are the main works. Sumati, Patrasvami, Sridatta and Kumaranandin were such prominent philosophers of the 74 and 8th centuries, whose works are mentioned by Buddhist and Jaina logicians, but the works have not yet been found. Sumati and Patrasvami were renowned philosophers whose names are referred by the Buddhist logician santaraksita (8th century) in his work Tattvasamgraha. Patrasvami's Trilaksanakadarthana was a famous trastise in which the hetulaksana of Buddhist philosophy was refuted vehemently. Vidyananda mentioned in Tattvarthaslokavarttika about Jalpanirnaya the work of Sridatta and in Pramana parikna, he mentioned Vadanyaya, the work of Kumaranandin. In the eighth century Haribhadra Suri (700 - 770), an original thinker and profound philosopher, authored several works. His famous philosophical works are Anekantajayapataka, Sastravarta samuccaya and Saddarsana samuccaya. Commentary of Gunaratnasuri is famous on Saddarsana- samuccaya - and commentary of Yasovijaya (17th century) is also renowned on Sastravarta samuccaya.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Thus from Umasvati down to Haribhadrasuri, the predecessors of Bhatta Akalanka developed and enriched the Jaina epistemology. Bhatta Akalanka's contribution 90 The advent of Bhatta Akalanka had a great significance from the point of view of systematization of Jaina logic and epistemology. He flourished during the period from 720 to 780 CE as is upheld by Pandita Mahendra Kumar Nyayacarya in the introduction to his Akalankagranthatrayam. Bhatta Akalanka has critically examined the views regarding metaphysics and epistemology of previous Indian philosophers like Dignaga, Dharmakirti, Prajnakaragupta, Karnakagomi and Kumarilabhatta. He authored two commentaries entitled Tattvarthavartika and Astasati on Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati and Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra respectively. In the Tattvarthavartika Bhatta Akalanka has discussed the definition of pramana and accepted that pramana (organ of valid cognition) is valid even after it cognizes the object previously cognized. He gave the instance of a lamp which illuminates the object even after the moment it is lit. Although the main subject matter of Tattvarthasutra is not intended to propound epistemology, in the context of description of knowledge, commentator Akalanka discussed the definition of pramana propounded by other Indian systems also. Astasati is a precise commentary having the size of eight hundered anustubh metres. Deep sense, few words and logical acumen are the specialties of Akalanka's style and they are more distinct in Astasati. Akalanka included some new topics in the commentary and threw light on pramanasastra explaining the Karika No. 101 of

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91 Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines Aptamimamsa. He seems impressed by the Buddhist definition of pramana also, because he used the term avisamvada for defining pramana. He says that pramana is a kind of cognition devoid of discrepancy (visamvada) and indetermination. Bhatta Akalanka wrote four independent works viz. Laghiyastraya along with the vrtti, Nyaya-viniscaya along with the vrtti, Pramana-samgraha and Siddhiviniscaya along with the vrtti. All these four works mainly deal with epistemology and logic. Laghiyastraya is a composite work having three manuals (prakaranas) viz. (i) Pramana pravesa (ii) Naya pravesa (iii) pravacana pravesa. Pramana pravesa contains four chapters on (i)nature of pramana (ii) classification (iii) object, and (iv) resultant. Naya pravesa is mainly devoted to the description of Nayas. Pravacana pravesa, though it begins with the definition of pramana, naya and niksepa, mainly deals with srutajnana, a kind of paroksa pramana. Nyayaviniscaya, another work of Akalanka, has three chapters on perception, inference and testimony. Pramana- samgraha, an important work of Akalanka, deals with every aspect of epistemology in nine chapters. Siddhiviniscaya is also an important work regarding epistemology and logic. He defines here pramana as siddhi. This treatise comprises twelve chapters which are indicative of their subject matter. Akalanka says here that every knowledge is valid due to its corresponding nature and it is invalid due to its discrepancy-(Siddhiviniscaya 1.19) If we summarize the contribution of Akalanka on the basis of his above mentioned four works, then we can point out his views as follows:

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 92 1. It was he who for the first time established recollection (smrti), recognition (pratyabhijnana) and inductive reasoning (tarka) as pramana. He placed these under the category of paroksa pramana. He propounded that if these cognitions are indiscrepant and devoid of doubt, illusion and indetermination (anadhyavasaya), then these are very much the means of valid cognition. He upholds two types of pratyaksa as samvyavaharika (empirical) and mukhya (transcendental). The types of matijnana such as avagraha (receiving), iha (speculation) avaya (perceptual judgement) and dharana (retention) were included by him in Sanvyavaharika- pratyksa and he has accepted their sequential position as propounded in canonical literature. 3. He accepted differences between matijnana and srutajnana according to the canonical tradition and placed srutajnana under the category of paroksa pramana. Srutajnana is known in epistemology as agama pramana. 4. He included upamana pramana (comparison) in the recognition (pratyabhijnana) of similarity which he conceptualized taking Samjna of Umasvati's, Tattvarthasutra (1.13) as its basis. 5. He discussed all the epistemological terms, such as hetu, (probans) sadhya (probandum), drstanta, vyapti etc. 6. He introduced some new hetus such as karana (cause) purvacara, uttaracara and sahacara. 7. Akalanka discussed naya and niksepa also which have formed an integral part of epistemology.

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93 Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines Philosophers after Akalanka The Jaina philosophers contributing to Indian epistemology after Bhatta Akalanka are : Vidyananda, Anantavirya, Manikyanandin, Vadiraja, Abhayadevasuri, Prabhacandra, Vadidevasuri, Hemacandra, Abhinava Dharmabhusana, Gunaratnasuri, Mallisena, Vimaladasa and Yasovijaya. Since it is not possible to discuss the contributions of all these logicians, it would be proper to appraise the contributions of the prominent logicians. Vidyananda (775-840), the first commentator of Akalanka, was a profound philosopher deeply acquainted with Jaina and other systems of Indian philosophy. He put forth a step to establish the Jaina pramana sastra logically. He wrote three commentaties viz. Tattvarthaslokavarttika on the Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati, Astasahasri on Astasati of Bhatta Akalanka and Yuktyanusasanalamkara on Yuktyanusasana of Samantabhadra. In these commentaries he has cogently established the Jaina philosophy and has refuted other systems. Tattvarthaslokavartika, a commentary on the Tattvarthasutra, presents an exhaustive description of Jaina epistemology. He has discussed all the five types of knowledge. He also deals with perception, recollection (smarana), recognition (pratyabhijnana), reasoning (tarka), inference (anumana) and testimony (agama). Astasahasri having thousand stanzas expounds Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra and Astasati of Akalanka, but Astasahasri has become a kastasahasri, having thousands troubles because its comprehension is an uphill task. Yuktyanusasanalankara is an important work for understanding the Jaina philosophy in general.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Apart from his commentaries, Vidyananda wrote six independent works, viz. Vidyanandamahodaya, Aptapariksa, Patrapariksa, Satyasasana -pariksa and Sripuraparsvanathastotra. All these works are important for the study of Jaina philosophy, particularly his Pramana-pariksa is fully devoted to discuss the different aspects of epistemology. Herein Vidyananda defines pramana as right cognition. He repudiated the concept of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa mainly propounded by Buddhists. He says that perception is a kind of valid cognition and every valid cognition is regarded as determinate cognition. Vidyananda has also discussed the defintion of probans (hetu) and refuted the position of Buddhists and Naiyayikas who consider hetu's trairupya (having three forms) and pancarupya (having five forms) respectively as its essential characteristics. 94 Pramana-pariksa is really the first composite and systematic work which explains the complete Jaina epistemology and logic briefly. The second commentator of Akalanka was Anantavirya. There are four Anantavityas referred to in Jaina literature, but he was the third Anantvirya who flourished during A.D. 950 to 990 and wrote commentatries on Pramanasamgraha and Siddhiviniscaya of Akalanka. Commentary on Pramanasamgraha is known as Pramanasamgrahabhasaya and commentary on Siddhiviniscaya is known as Siddhiviniscayatika. Pramanasamgrahabhasya is not yet available, but its reference is found in the Siddhiviniscayatika. It is an important commentary for understanding the development of Jaina thinking regarding epistemology.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 95 Manikyanandin ( 993 -1053 CE) was the first logician who wrote an aphoristic treatise entitled pariksamukha which present the Jaina system of epistemology in a nutshell. Prabhacandra, a prominent philosopher wrote a voluminous commentary on it entitled Prameyakamala- martanda. Laghu Anantavirya's prameyaratnamala, Carukirti's Prameyaratnalankara and santivarni's Prameyakanthika are also famous commentaries on Pariksamukha. All these commentaries depict the importance of this first aphoristic treatise of Jaina logic. Vadiraja (1025 CE) was also a commentator of Akalanka. He wrote a commentary on Nyayaviniscaya of Akalanka known as Nyayaviniscayavivarana. This is a big commentary comprising the size of twenty thousand anustubh stanzas. It discusses the doctrines of several Indian philosophers like Kumarila. Prabhakara, Mandanamisra, Vyomasiva, Bhasarvajna etc. and refutes them cogently. Another work of Vadiraja on Jaina epistemology is Pramananirnaya. It is an independent work on Jaina logic (nyaya). Vadiraja propounds only two types of paroksa pramana as inference and testimony and includes recollection, recognition and reasoning as the subdivisions of inference. Abhayadevasuri, the commentator of Siddhasena's Sanmatitarka-prakarana was a disciple of Rajagacchiya Pradyumnasuri. Pandita Sukhalala Sanghavi and Pandita Becaradasa Dosi have placed him during the second half of the tenth century and first half of the eleventh century. Mahendra Kumara Nyayacarya considers him belonging to the last part of the eleventh century of Vikrama Samvat, but he does not clearly say who was earlier, between Abhayadevasuri and

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Prabhacandra. It seems that Abhayadevasuri's commentary on Sanmatitarka was written earlier than the works of Prabhacandra because the issues raised in the Tattvabodhavidhayini (commentary on Sanmatitarka) are found more systematic in the works of Prabhacandra. The commentary of Abhayadeva, explains naya, jnana and jneya extensively. Abhayadevasuri was a well versed commentator on Jaina epistemology. He has a penetrating view when he refutes the other systems. The second part (kanda) of his commentary mainly deals with epistemology. 96 Prabhacandra, a renowned Jaina logician, has contributed a lot by writing two voluminous commentaries entitled Nyaya-kumudacandra and Prameya-kamalamartanda. Prameya-kamala-martanda is a commentary on Pariksamukha of Manikyanandin and Nyayakumudacandra is a commentary on Laghiyastraya of Akalanka. Pandita Kailasacandra Sastri places him during 950 to 1020 CE in the introduction to the first part of Nyaya-kumudacandra and Pandita Mahendra Kumar Nyayacarya has fixed him with a minor modification during 980 to 1065 CE. Prabhacandra has given many new cogent arguments to refute the other systems and to establish the Jaina philosophy. He has discussed prima facie views (purvapaksa) of other works like Tattvarthavritti, Sakatayana-nyasa, Sabdambhojabhaskara, Pravacanasarasarojabhaskara, Gadyakathakosa, Mahapurana- tippana, Ratnakarandatika, Kriyakalapatika and Atmanusasanatilaka, but scholars have divergent opinions about the authorship of some of these works. Although Prameya-kamala-martanda comes under the

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 97 category of a commentary, it seems to be an independent original work. Prabhacandra has also discussed all the other Indian systems in detail and has subjected them to devastating criticism. In his other commentary Nyayakumudacandra, Prabhacandra discussed some new topics and presented new arguments to establish the Jaina theory of epistemology. There is no doubt that he has explained all the aspects of pramana in a systematic and logical style in both the commentaries. Like Manikyanandin, A Digambar Acarya, Vadidevasuri was the first Svetambar Acarya who wrote an aphoristic treatise on Jaina logic entitled Pramana-nayatattvaloka. Vadidevasuri differs from Manikyanandin on the topics of kevali-kavalahara, emancipation of a woman etc. Vadidevasuri's Pramana-naya-tattvaloka comprises eight chapters having two more chapters than Pariksamukha, dealing with naya and vada also. Vadidevasuri was the first logician who systematized the rules of vada according to Jaina views. Chapter on naya summarizes the Jaina perspective of naya. A profound philosopher of the seventeenth century, a celebrated Jaina philosopher Acarya Yasovijaya, has followed his Pramana-naya- tattvaloka in his Jaina Tarka Bhasa. Vadidevasuri himself wrote a valuable commentary on Pramana-naya- tattvaloka as Syadvada-ratnakara. It is a voluminous commentary having eighty-four thousand anustubh-metres. The title Syadvada-ratnakara is significant by its subject matter. Vadidevasuri discussed those topics too which could not be taken up by Prabhacandra. The language of the work is very lucid and attractive. Syadvadaratnakara is of

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition paramount importance since it goes one step further in developing Jaina epistemological doctrines. He was the first and the last commentator among the Jaina sects who wrote such a big and authoritative commentary on Jaina epistemology. He dealt with all the philosophical aspects and cogently proved the validity of karana, purvacara, uttaracara, sahacara and vyapya hetus (Probans) and coined the two new terms tiryak samanya and urdhvata samanya in the context of Pratyabhijnana of prameya. 98 Hemacandrasuri, known as Kalikalasarvajna, was not only a logician, but also a poet, rhetorician, grammarian, lexicographer etc. His unique work Pramana-mimamsa has established him as an original thinker in the field of epistemology. He defines pramana as an authentic definitive cognition of an object. He does not feel any neccesity of inserting 'sva' word in the definition of pramana, because in the opinion of Hemacandra Svanirnaya' does not distinguish it from illusory cognition.' Prior to Hemcandra pramana was defined as svaparavyavasayi, svaparavabhasaka etc. which means pramana is a definitive cognition of an object and of the self. Thus Hemacandra has his own views whereas Manikyanandin inserted the word 'apurva' in the definition of pramana." Hemacandra repudiates his insertion and says that a cognition taking note of an object previously cognized does not lack the status of pramana exactly as the cognition which takes 10 'PM 1.1.2 Samyagarthanirnayah pramanam 'PM 1.1.3 Svanirnayah sannapyalaksanam, apramane'pi bhavat 10PMk 1.1. Svapuravartha-vyavasayatmakam jnanam pramanam. "PM 1.4 Grahisyamanagrahina iva grhitagrahinopi napramanyam.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 99 note of what is to be cognized in future". He proposes that with the point of view of modes cognition of a previously cognized object is not possible, because a substance is changing every moment from the angle of its modes. Jinesvarasuri's Pramalaksma (10"-11h centuries CE) Candrasenasuri's Utpadadisiddhi, Abhinavadharmabhusana's Nyayadipika, Narendrasena's Pramana prameyakalika are also important works which have enriched the Jaina epistemological literature. In the seventeenth century Acarya Yasovijaya, who emerged as a prominent philosopher, wrote more than a hundred works. His works mainly related to Jaina epistemology are Jainatarkabhasa, Jnanabindu,Astasahasritatparyavivarana and sastravartasamuccayatika. Among these works the former two are independent treatises and the latter are the commentaries. Astasahasritatparyavivarana is a commentary on Astasahasri of Vidyananda and Sastravartasamuccayatika is a commentary on Sastravartasamuccaya of Haribhadrasuri. To conclude, we can say that the Jaina epistemology has completed a long journey of development ranging from the second century CE to the seventeenth century CE. It has been enriched by a huge literature comprising aphoristic treatises, commentaries, varttikas, bhasyas and independent works. It goes without saying that both from the point of view of volume of literature and quality of philosophical discussion it is not less advanced, (if not more), than the Nyaya logic and Buddhist logic. Some points are noted here:

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition A. The Jaina philosophers of both the sects Digambar and Svetambar joined their hands to develop the Jaina epistemology and logic. Jaina philosophers were well versed with all the systems of philosophy, whatever they thought appropriate for the Jaina system was accepted. Their refutation of opponents' views was based on cogent reasons. B. If the works of Sumati, Kumaranandin and Patrakesari are found available, then the history of the development of Jaina epistemology may be rewritten. C. D. E. 100 F. Umasvati was the first philosopher who recognized right knowledge as pramana and classified the pramana into two types i.e. pratyaksa (perception) and paroksa. After the establishment of right knowledge as pramana all the descriptions of knowledge found in canonical literature came under the category of pramana. The division of knowledge as indriya pratyaksa and no indriya - pratyaksa as found in the Nandisutra seems a later development. Although Nyayavatara is the first systematic work on Jaina epistemology and logic, Bhatta Akalana more systematized it. He included recollection, recognition and reasoning as pramana under the category of paroksa pramana. He introduced karana, purvacara, uttaracara and sahacara hetus as valid probans. The knowledge occurring through sense organs was first included as empirical perception (samvyavaharika

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 101 pratyaksa) by Jinabhadraganin. Earlier it was mentioned as indriyapratyaksa in the Nandisutra. In the Nandisutra the concept of anindriya pratyaksa (quasi sense) is not mentioned. The Nandisutura mentions about no- indriya pratyaksa, but this term was used to denote transcendental perception. The Mukhya pratyaksa was given a new name as paramarthika pratyaksa by Vadidevasuri. He further divided it into two types as sakala and vikala pratyaksa on the basis of a division found in the Sthananga sutra as kevala and no-kevala. H. The Svetambar logicians are unanimous in accepting the validity of cognition which cognizes the object previously cognized. Whereas Digambar logicians like Akalanka, Manikyanandin and Prabhacandra were of the opinion that it is a condition for valid cognition to be regarded as a pramana that it must cognize the object which is previously not cognized. Hemacandra for the first time mentions that mind is capable of knowing the all objects. Umasvati says that mind is only an instrument ofsrutajnana. As stated in the beginning of the article, Jaina philosophers maintained Jaina epistemology on the foundation of description of knowledge found in Jaina canons. A brief survey regarding the development of the division or types of pramana is as follows:

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Development Regarding Division of pramana (1) In The Anuyogadvarasutra Pratyaksa (Perception) 1. Indriya Pratyaksa 2. No-Indriya pratyaksa Avadhi 1. Bhavapratyaya 2.Yathoktanimitta Pratyaksa (Perception) Manahparyaya 1. Rjumati Anumana (Inference) 2. Vipulamati Pramana 2. Sesavat 3. Drstasadharmyavat Note:- Bhagavatisutra (5.3.192) and Sthanangasutra (430) also quote above four types of pramana. The division found in Anuyogadvarasutra is much identical with that of Nyayasutra of Gotam and the Buddhist text Upayahrdaya. (2) In The Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati/Umasvami (2nd century CE) 1. Purvavat 1. Sadharmyopanita Upamana (Comparison) Pramana 2. Vaidharmyopanita 2. Lokottara Kevalajnana Matijnana Paroksa (Indirect) 1. Avagraha 2. Iha 3. Avaya Agama (Testimony) 1. Laukika 4. Dharana Srutajnana 1. Angabahya 102 2. Angapravista

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines 103 (3) In The Nyayavatara of Siddhasena (5" or 8th Century CE) Pramana Pratyaksa Samvyavaharika 1. IndriyaPratyaksa Pratyaksa 2. Ant ndriya pratyaksa 1. Svartha 2. Parartha (4) Bhatta Akalanka (8th Century CE) Mukhya 1. Avadhi 2. Manahparyaya 3. Kevalajnana Pramana Paroksa Inference (Anumana) 1. Svartha 2. Parartha Smrti Pratyabhijnana Scripture (Agama) Paroksa Tarka HH Anumana 1. Svartha 2. Parartha Agama (Sruta) Note :-Almost all the posterior Jaina philosophers maintained above division of Bhatta Akalanka with minor moderation as below: 1. Vidyananda propounded two types of Pratyabhijnana : ekatva and sadrsya. Manikyanandin added two more types-vailaksanya and Pratiyaugika. 2. Vadidevasuri used a new word 'Paramarthika' pratyaksa in place of 'Mukhya' and provided its two kinds- (1) Sakala

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 104 and (ii) Vikala. Sakala paramarthika perception is Kevalajnana and vikala paramarthika perception is of two types - (i) Avadhijnana (ii) Manahparyayajnana. PART II AN APPRAISAL OF CONTRIBUTION TO EPISTEMOLOGICAL DOCTRINES The fivefold knowledge i.e. matijnana(sensuous knowledge), srutajnana(scriptural or verbal knowledge), avadhijnana (visual intuition), manahparyayajnana (intuition of mental modes) and kevala-jnana (pure and perfect knowledge) is an original contribution of Jaina tradition which was maintained by the Jaina logicians by including it in the twofold pramanas. Now we should highlight the points on which Jaina logicians contributed to the Indian epistemology and logic regarding pramana. The main contributions of the Jaina logicians are as follows: (i) Definition of pramana and its nature illuminating the self and the object. (ii) Establishment of recollection (smrti) as an independent pramana. (iii) Establishment of recognition (pratyabhijnana) as an independent pramana. (iv) Establishment of inductive reasoning (tarka) as an independent pramana. Definition of probans (hetu) as incompatibility with the contradictory (anyathanupapatti).

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines 105 (vi) Establishment of new probans such as karana, purvacara, uttaracara and sahacara. (vii) Particular view about the members of syllogism (pararthanumana) (viii) Theory of standpoints (nayavada) and sevenfold predication. (ix) Nature of prameya (object) is substance-cum-mode dravyaparyayatmaka or samanyavisesatmaka. Now we shall discuss the above and clarify the thoughts ofthe Jaina logicians about these points. (i) Definition of pramana: Regarding the definition of pramana Jaina philosophers are unanimous in propounding it as definitive cognition. The other characteristic of pramana accepted by them is the nature of illuminating the self and the object. Some definitions given by Jaina logicians are as follows: (i) pramanam svaparabhasi jnanam badhavivarjitam-Nyayavatara, 1 Pramana is a cognition revealing itself and the other object without any hindrance. (ii) Svaparavabhasakam yatha pramanam bhuvi buddhilaksanam.-Svayambhustotra., 63 Pramana is a knowledge illuminating itself and the other object in the world. (iii) Vyavasayatmakam jnanamatmarthagrahakam matam.-Laghiyastraya, 60 - - The knowledge which determinates the self and the other object is pramana.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 106 (iv) Svaparavyavasayi jnanam pramanam.-Pramananayataftvaloka, 1.2 The knowledge determining itself and the object is pramana. (v) Samyagarthanirnayah pramanam.-Pramana-mimamsa, 1.1.2 Right judgement of an object is pramana. (vi) Svapurvarthavyavasayatmakam jnanam pramanam. - Pariksamukha, 1.1 Judgemental knowledge ot the self and the other object hither to unknown, is pramana. (vii) Avisamvadakam pramanam.-Laghiyastryavrtti, 22 Judgemental knowledge (free from wrongness) is pramana. With above definitions, it is clear that Jaina logicians accept pramana as definitive cognition, which is always savikalpaka. It is illuminating the self and the object. The Jaina logicians uphold that the contact of the senseorgan and an object never can be a pramana. They say that like another object, the sense-object contact also cannot be a preeminent cause in generating valid knowledge, because both of them are non-revelatory." Therefore Jaina thinkers propound that pramana is useful for accepting the desired object and rejecting the undesirable one, hence it must be a cognition." They also accept that a valid cognition through a pramana does not require to prove its validity, because the knowledge is " LTv 1.3 : sannikarsaderajnanasya pramanyamanupapannam arthantaravat. "PMk 1.2 : hitahitapraptipariharasamartham hi pramanam tato jnanameva tat.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines 107 always of the nature of illuminating the self and the object. They give an example of the sun or a lamp which illuminates itself and the object." It is true in our experience also that we know what we know. The Naiyayikas accept that a cognition can illuminate only its object and Vijnanavadins say that a knowledge always illuminates the self. The Jaina logicians clearly accept that a knowledge is possessed of both the qualities in its nature. About its nature of determinate, the Jaina logicians are firmly determined. Hence, they have refuted the Buddhist definition of pratyaksa which is devoid of determination due to its nirvikalpata. (ii) Establishment of recollection (smrti) as pramana: Recollection is a knowledge which arises after the stimulation of memory-impression and is expressed by the pronoun 'that' (tad). Manifestation of recollection is necessarily conditioned by stimulation of memory impression. Hemcandra defines recollection as such:- vasanod-bodha-hetu ka-tadityakara smrtih (Pramana-mimamsa. 1.2.3) Almost all the philosophers from Bhata Akalanka down to Vadidevasuri define recollection almost in the same manner. Bhatta Akalanka says that recollection is a resultant of retention, but it is also a pramana, because of its resultant (pramana-phala) as recognition (pratyabhijnana)". Although Prasastapada has mentioned recollection as a kind of vidya (right knowledge)," but he did not accept it as an ** PT 1.16-17 "LTv in AGT p.5: avisamvadasmrteh phalasya hetutvat pramanam dharana smrtih samjnayah. "He accepts four kinds of vidya as pratyaksa, Laingika, smrti and arsa in the pratyaksa prakarana of Prasastapadabhasya p. 153

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 108 independent pramana. Nyayasutra mentions it as an attribute of a soul", but none other system than Jaina has accepted it as an independent pramana. The Mimansa philosophy does not consider it as pramana, because it cognizes the object previously cognized and pramana, in their opinion always cognizes the object previously not cognized. Buddhist philosophers also give the same argument, but they present some more arguments, such as (i) it is not generated by an object, so it does not correspond to the object, (ii) if recollection is considered as pramana then intention, repugnance (dvesa) etc. will also be considered as pramana and it will create an infinite regress, (iii) recollection deals with the past object. Jaina logicians have refuted all these arguments. The Jaina logicians Akalanka, Vidyananda, Prabhacandra and Vadidevasuri put forth many cogent arguments to establish recollection (smeti) as an independent pramana. Some of them are presented here." 1. Recollection is an organ of valid cognition, because it is an indiscrepant cognition. Whenever the recollection is found discrepant then it comes under the pseudo-organ of valid cognition. The recollection which is corresponding to an activity(arthakriya) is an indiscrepant knowledge. If recollection is not regarded as a separate organ of valid cognition, because it cognizes the object previously cognized, then it is not a valid reason, because the recollection also cognizes partly unknown object from the point of view of time as Manikyanandin accepts in his Pariksamukha. " Nyayasutra 3.2.40 "For reference of arguments see Jain, Dharm Chand (1995) pp. 297to 307

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 109 3. 4. Inference cannot be an organ of valid cognition without having recourse to recollection of invariable concomitance. Every philosopher who accepts inference as a means of valid cognition has to invariably resort to recollection of invariable concomitance. For example, when we perceive smoke on a mountain the impression of our previous cognition of smoke pervaded by fire in kitchen is awakened and we recollect it immediately. Vidyananda says that without accepting the validity of recollection, the validity of recognition does not exist. If recognition is not valid then inductive reasoning cannot take place. Without the help of valid inductive reasoning the inference cannot occur. If inference does not take place then validity of perception cannot be proved. In this way, in absence of the pramanas object cannot be proved. Thus if we do not accept the validity of recollection all the organs of valid cognition and the knowable things will not exist in the world of reality. Recollection is a valid organ of cognition because it is a means of knowledge like a perception. The intelligent people cannot behave without the validity of recollection. If we do not accept its validity then we cannot even reach our homes. All the transaction of money will be stopped. The students will not be able to write anything in their answer sheets at the time of examination. Thus the validity of recollection is duly established in all our empirical activities. If recollection is understood as invalid cognition on account of its occurrence after perception then it is also not legitimate because inference also occurs after perception. 6.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 110 7. As inference is a valid organ of cognition because it is devoid of doubt, illusion and indetermination, so is the recollection, because it also has the same quality. 8. Without the memory of probans (hetu) and probandum (sadhya) the invariable relation between them cannot be established. Nyaya-Vaisesika philosopher Jayanta Bhatta in his Nyayamanjari says that recollection is not invalid because of the cognizance of the object previously cognized, but it is invalid because it is not generated by the object." The reason of the invalidity of recollection pointed out in the Karika by Jayanta Bhatta is also corresponding to the Buddhist view.Vidyanada replies to the Buddhist philosophers that in the Buddhist view even the perception also, is not generated from the object because the object does not exist at the time of correspondence due to its momentariness. Prabhacandra replies in a different way that we the Jains do not accept the perception generated from the object. It is true that in Jaina philosophy the knowledge is a result of subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma obscuring knowledge. Acarya Hemcandra gives a different argument that recollection is a valid organ of cognition even without its emergence from an object, for example yogijnana (perception by a yogi) is also a valid organ of cognition without its emergence from an object. "Quoted in PM p. 5: na smrter apramanatvam grhita-grahita -kstam I api- tvanartha-janyatvam tad apramanya-karanam II ZTSv1.13.27 :narthaj janmopapadyeta pratyaksasya smrteriva I Tadvat sa eva tadbhavadanyatha na ksana-ksayah II

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 111 (iii) Establishment of recognition (pratyabhijnana) as pramana: Another contribution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the establishment of recognition (pratyabhijnana) as an independent organ of cognition. According to the Jaina logicians recognition is the synthetic judgement born of observation and recollection. Akalanka has used the term samjna, samjnana and pratyabhijnana for recognition. The Jaina philosophers have included the comparison (upamana-pramana) under recognition as one of its kinds. They did not accept comparison as a separate organ of valid cognition. The Jaina logician Vidyananda propounded two types of recognition i.e. knowledge of oneness (ekatvajnana) and knowledge of similarity (sadrsyajnana). When the object previously perceived and recollected now is the same at the time of recognition, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of oneness and when the object is similar to the object being perceived and recollected, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of similarity." He is the same Devadatta (so'yam devadattah) is the example of knowledge of oneness and as an ox so the gavaya (go-saduso gavayah) is the example of knowledge of similarity. Manikyanandin, a profound scholar of Jaina epistemology, goes a step further and recognizes recognition on its various aspects. He says that the recognition can be manifold. Some examples are: it is identical with that, it is similar to that, it is different from that, itrelates to that." Former two types of recognition have already been mentioned above. A buffalo is different from a cow is the example of tad "PP p. 42: tadevam ityekatva-nibandhanam tadssam evedam iti. sadrsya-nibandhanam. 22 PMk 3.5 : tadevedam tat-sadrsam, tadvilaksanam, tat-pratiyogity

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition vilaksanatva and 'this is away from that' this is near to that', are the examples of tat pratiyogitva. Acarya Hemcandara corroborates the kinds proposed by Manikyanandin. 112 23 Vadidevasuri, the author of Pramana-naya-tattvaloka and Syadvadaratnakara used the new terms of tiryak samanya and urdhvata-samanya relating to the definition of recognition. Tiryak samanya means the similarity amongst the objects and urdhvata samanya means the identity of the same entity at different stages, for example the gavaya is like cow denotes tiryak samanya and he is the same Devadatta denotes urdhvatasamanya." In Indian philosophy Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Vedanta and Kasmira Saivism also discuss the concept of recognition, but they include it in perception and do not recognize it as a separate organ of valid cognition. Jayanta Bhatta a foremost Naiyayika, accepts the validity of recognition under perception, because it is generated by sense object contact with the help of latent trace (samskara). But the Buddhist logicians are of the opinion that recognition cannot be a pramana, because of infinite regress, illusory knowledge having no object and uncorresponding nature of it." For establishment of recognition as independent valid organ of cognition the Jaina logicians have given many arguments. The main arguments are being presented here.25 1. Recognition is neither merely a recollection nor merely a perception, but it is different from the both and is possessed of being a new pramana, because it has to cognize a different object which is not cognized by mere perception 23 PT 3.5 and 5.4 "See Jain Dharm Chand, p. 310 25 For origanial references of arguments see Jain, Dharm chand pp. 311 to 318

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines 113 and mere recollection. So recognition is an independent organ of cognition. 2. It is a pramana, because it is found indiscrepant in behaviour. Acarya Hemacandra says that without accepting the recognition as independent pramana (valid organ of cognition) the logical justification of bondage and emancipation would become absolutely impossible. If it is the self same person who suffers from bondage and achieves liberation, it is possible that the person can try to achieve the joy of freedom." 3. Bhatta Akalanka maintains the sequence of recollection, recognition and inductive reasoning. He says that recognition is the resultant of recollection and inductive reasoning is the resultant of recognition. He tells that the meaning of a word can be known only if the validity of recognition is accepted. Perception is not experienced capable to differentiate between distant and near, short and long etc., only through recognition we can do so. 5. Vidyananda says that without the acceptance of recognition we cannot know that I am the same who was child, teenager, young and adult before and now have become an old man." He says that without accepting its validity of recognition Buddhists would not be able to consider the oneness between two momentary objects or svalaksana. It is necessary to accept the validity of recognition for the knowledge of similarity also. 4 2 PM vriti 1.2.4 >> TSv, 1.13.46. -

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 114 7. 1 6. Recognition is different from inference because it recognizes the probans (hetu)only and inference is a later process. The object of recognition is not cognized by recollection and perception separately, hence it cognizes the object which is not cognized by any other pramana. 8. There is no contradictory cognition which affects its validity. Thus the Jaina logicians have established the recognition as an independent pramana. It is to be noted that they include upamana pramana (comparison) the category of the knowledge of similarity under recognition. (iv) Establishment of inductive reasoning (tarka) as pramana: It is also a significant contribution of the Jaina logicians that they established tarka as an independent pramana. They propound that invariable relation(vyapti) between probans (hetu) and probandum (sadhya) can be known only by tarka pramana. Tarka or inductive reasoning expresses the universal necessary concomitance between probans and probandum. Hemacandra says that inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non observation.28 In the Nyayasutra of Gotama tarka (reasoning) has been used for presumptive cognition (Arthapatti).It is only the Jaina logicians who considered tarka as a knowledge of universal concomitance. Akalanka, Vidyananda, Prabhacandra, 2 PM, 1.2.4

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 115 Vadidevasuri and Hemcandra are the logicians who advanced cogent arguments for the establishment of tarka as an independent pramana. The main arguments are:1. The object which is cognized by tarka is not cognized by any other pramana. Tark is knowledge of universal concomitance. No other pramana can do so, neither perception nor inference. The validity of inference depends on tarka, because it is the knowledge of necessary concomitance and without the knowledge of necessary concomitance inference cannot arise. 3. It has a corresponding nature. 4. It is not conceivable that perception is competent to discharge the entire series of operations that are involved in the knowledge that whatever is a case of smoke is invariably the product exclusively of fire in all places and times, and not of anything else. The reason that it is not discursive and owes its genesis to the inference exerted by a datum that is present. If inference is competent to know the necessary concomitance then it will result in infinite regress, because an inference will require another inference. Thus the Jaina logicians have established tarka as an independent pramana by presenting cogent arguments. This shows their innovative thinking about the system of epistemology and logic. "For references see Jain Dharm Chand (1995) pp. 322 to 330

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 116 (v) Definition of probans (hetu): One important contribution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the definition of reason or probans (hetu). Probans is a necessary means. for the occurrence of inference. Inference is the knowledge of probandum on the strength of probans. All the Indian philosophers who accept inference as an organ of valid cognition, unanimously agree that probandum (sadhya) can be known by probans (sadhana, hetu) as in the case of probandum fire on mountain can be known by probans smoke. But regarding the definitions of probans the Indian philosophers have divergent views. The Buddhist philosophers propound three characteristics of a valid probans :- its subsistence in the subject(paksa-dharmatva), its subsistence in the homologue (sapaksa-sattva) and the absence of the same in a heterologue (vipaksasattva)."" These three characteristics of probans are also mentioned in the Prasastapadabhasya of Vaisesika philosophy." But the Nyaya philosophy admitted two new characteristics apart from the above three which are : the absence of contradiction of the probandum (abadhitavisayatva) and the absence of a countervailing probans (asatpratipaksatva). The Jaina logicians have given a new idea about the characteristics of probans that it bears only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility (anyathanupapatti or avinabhava) of the one in the absence of the other."? Probans cannot exist in the absence of probandum. ** Nyayapravesa p. 1: hetustrirupah kim punastrairupyam? paksadharmatvam, sapakse sattvam vipakse casattvam iti. "see anumana prakarana of Prasastapadabhasya : yadanumeyena sambaddham prasiddham ca tadanvite. tadabhave ca nastyeva tallingamanumapakam. >>PT 3.11 : niscitanyathanupapattyekalaksano hetuh.

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117 Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines This is the only characteristic of probans; for example, smoke a probans cannot exist in the absence of a probandum fire. The Jaina philosophers have refuted the notion of triple characteristics (trairupya) and five characteristics (pancarupya) of probans maintained by Buddhists and Naiyayikas respectively. The Jaina philosophers right from Siddhasena down to Yasovijaya have indifferently propounded that a probans has only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility of that (probans) in the absence of probandum. It is having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. Patrasvamin was profound logician who wrote a separate book Trilaksanakadarthana to refute the Buddhist view. Buddhust logician Santaraksita has criticized the view of Patrasvamin, but the Jaina logicians have firmly defended their views. The main arguments of the Jaina philosophers are as follows:33 1. The sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum is sufficient for defining probans. Three or five characteristics are not required for a valid probans. There are some probans (hetus) possessed of three characteristics, but devoid of validity, e.g.he must be swarthy in complexion since he is the son of Maitreyi(a woman of swarthy complexion). It is an instance of a defective probans," although, here triple characteristics have been used. 'Tatputratvat' propabans remain in maitreyi's son which is subject (paksa), other "For references of arguments see Jain, Dharm Chand (1995) pp. 223 to 234 (i) TSn 1369: Sa syamas tasya putratvad drsta syama yathetare | Iti tri-laksano hetur na niscityai pravartate || (ii) PP p. 45: sa- syamah tat-putratvad tasyaanyaputravat. 34

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition sons are homologue (sapaksa) and that probans does not go into hetrologue (vipksa). But it is not necessary that every son of Maitreyi will be swarthy in complexion. So in the absence of necessary factor of universal concomitance the three characteristics are useless. 2. 35 There are many probans which are not possessed of triple characteristics but they are competent, because of having a unitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum; for example tomorrow will be Thursday because today is Wednesday. Sakata constellation will arise after some time (muhurta), because the krttika constellation has just arisen," are such probans which do not have triple characteristics (Trirupata), but competent enough for the inferential cognition of a probandum. The only one characteristic of Anyathanupapatti is needed to define a probans. Patrakesarin says (As quoted in Tattvasangraha (verse 1368) of Buddhist Philosopher Santaraksta) - 118 anyatha-nupapannattvam yatra tatra trayena kim. nanyatha-nupapannattvam yatra tatra trayena kim. Vidyananda gives two arguments to prove the illegitimacy of triple characteristics of probans as under:" (i) It is found in fallacious probans also. (ii) It is not a differentia to distinguish a probans from a pseudo-probans. "Clavel has discissed in her paper presented at Lumbini Seminar (12-15 March 2013) that this inference may not happen right in some cases. See proceedings as 'Buddhist and Jaina Studies'. 36TSV part 3 p. 273 na ca trairupyasyasadharanata tadhetau tadabhasepi tasya samudbhavat. tato na tadhetulaksanam yuktam.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 119 Acarya Hemacandra says that refutation of triple characteristics (trairupya) will also serve as a refutation of the five characteristics (panca-rupya). Since this is nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance. Thus it is a new perspective of Jaina logic which speaks of the deep and penetrative thinking of Jaina logicians. (vi) Establishment of new probans (such as karana etc.): The Jaina logicians propounded four new probans also, namely karana (cause), purvacara, (predecessor), uttaracara (successor), sahacara (simultaneous). These kinds of probans have not been accepted by other Indian systems. The Jaina logicians propose so many examples of these probans as means of inference. "There would be rain, since a particular type of clouds is seen" is an example of karana hetu. "Sakata constellation would rise because otherwise the rise of krttika would not have been there" is an example of purvacara hetu. Here, after the rise of krttika the rise of the sakata takes place immediately after it, without exception, and therefore, the krttika indicates the rise of the sakata as its predecessor reason. "Bharani rose before, because kittika is rising" is an example of uttaracara probans. Here the rise of krttika which succeeds the rise of Bharani indicates it. These Two purvacara and uttaracara are different from the cause and effect as they are mediated by the obstacle of time. "The fruit of mango should be possessed of a colour because the fact of being possessed of taste"-is an example of sahacara hetu. Here taste which is always simultaneous with the colour being not justified in its absence indicates it. All these probans are valid because of their invariable concomitance with their probandum.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 120 Acarya Manikyanandin clarifies that there are two types of avinabhava : saha-avinabhava and krama-avinabhava. 7 Karana, karya, purvacara and uttaracara hetus are found valid because of their krama-avinabhava and sahacara hetu is found valid because of its saha-avinabhava. In this way the concept of vyapti has also been developed by the Jaina logicians. It shows their logical acumen. Right from Akalarka down to Yasovijaya almost all the Jaina logicians have accepted the validity of aforesaid four new probans (hetus). Philosophers of other systems do not consider a cause as hetu, because cause is possible even without its effects, therefore it is not a perfect indicator of the effect. The Jaina logicians reply this question that where it is possible to ascertain that all other causes are also cooperating and there is no hindrance in its capability, then alone the cause can be the perfect indicator of effect. We can give examples to support their thinking as - milk is sweet, because sugar has been added to it, balloon will fly up because hydrogen gas has been filled up. If a cause is capable to make an effect and it is devoid of hindrance then it may be a valid probans, but in the respect of definition of probans as propounded by the Jaina logicians that probans never remains in the absence of effect, contradicts in the case of karana hetu, because karana hetu remains even in the absence of effect. In purvacara hetu also the same situation is happened. When a sequence of the incidences is definitive then purvacara and uttaracara probans are useful for a common man. Sahacara probans is also common in our daily SPMK 3.12 sahakramabhavaniyamo avinabhavah.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines life. For example: back part of a wall is inferred by perceiving front part of it. 121 It seems clear that the Jaina logicians have accepted these probans, because of their corresponding nature in behavior. It is also clear that they are very precise in defining the probans (hetu) but they have elaborately conceived kinds and sub-kinds of probans (hetu). 38 Regarding the members of syllogism (pararthanumana), the Jaina logicians have propounded that paksa-vacana (the statement of the thesis) and hetu (probans) these two members are sufficient for an inference for others (pararthanumana), but for the dull minded persons, they have accepted five members including udaharana (illustration with concomitance), upanaya (statement of probans in the place of probandum) and nigamana (conclusion). One more contribution of Jaina logicians is to introduce a concept of antarvyapti, where invariable concomitance of probans is found in probandum only. Theroy of standpoints (nayavada) : Nayamimamsa is also a dimension of epistemology which has been discussed extensively by Jaina philosophers. Pramana-mimamsa and nayamimamsa are not absolutely different from jnanamimamsa. The Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati propounds clearly that knowledge of an object is attained by pramana and naya". Herein it is also clear that adhigama (knowledge) is a resultant and pramana and naya are the means. pramana and jnana are the terms which are 38PT 3.28 and 3.42 "TS 1.6: pramana-nayairadhigamah.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition . . 122 commonly found in all the systems of Indian philosophy, but the concept of 'naya' is a peculiar contribution of Jaina system to Indian epistemology. Although 'naya' is a part of srutajnana, it has been developed by the Jaina logicians as a separate branch of knowledge which denotes the different standpoints of a knower. It includes the standpoints of a speaker also. There is wide discussion on theory of naya, and its kinds in canonical and other later literature. Saptabhanginaya is related to the standpoints of a speaker. Theory of 'naya' and sevenfold predication are the result of thought of anekantavada (nonabsolutism) and syadvada. For deciding the right meaning of a word Jaina thinkers have given a concept of niksepa. There are four kinds of niksepa as- nama, sthapana, dravya and bhava. Tirthankara Mahavira replies many questions with the view of dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava, which also denotes the epistemic view of Jaina tradition. Conclusion The view of non-absolutism helped Jain logicians in developing the epistemological doctrines and they formed many new technical terms such as: samvyavaharika pratyaksa, tiryak samanya,urdhvata-samanya, saha-avinabhava, kramaavinabhava, antarvyapti, bahirvyapti etc. The Jaina epistemological literature is undoubtedly of paramount importance for understanding the development of Indian and Jaina thinking of epistemology. The Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to Indian epistemology in many ways. They discussed about every aspect of Indian epistemology and logic. It seems that they have a deep study of other systems also. It is noteworthy that they developed the epistemology regarding pramana upholding the canonical views, but they

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 123 have given due significance to the empirical view also. The Jaina epistemological literature is having importance for the understanding of the epistemological thinking of other systems also, because the Jaina philosophers have presented their opponents' view honestly and systematically. The Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to the development of epistemological doctrines which can be summed up as follows: A. The Jaina philosophers of both the sects Digambara and Svetambara joined their hands to develop the Jaina epistemology and logic. Jain philosophers were wellversed with all the systems of philosophy, whatever they thought appropriate for Jaina system was accepted. Their refutation of opponent's views is based on cogent reasons. B. They cogently established recollection, recognition, and inductive reasoning as independent pramanas. C. They are very precise in defining the probans (hetu), but they have elaborately conceived kinds and sub-kinds of probans (hetu). D. They established the nature of pramana illuminating itself and the object. E. If the works of Sumati, Kumaranandin and Patrakesari are found available, then the history of the development of Jaina epistemology may be rewritten. F. Umasvati/Umasvamin was the first philosopher who recognized right knowledge as pramana and classified the pramana into two types i.e. pratyaksa (perception) and paroksa. After establishment of right knowledge as

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition pramana all the descriptions of knowledge found in canonical literature came under the category of pramana. G. Acarya Kundakunda has proved the nature of knowledge as illuminating the self and the object. H. Although Nyayavatara is the first systematic work on Jaina epistemology and logic, Bhatta Akalanka has contributed a lot. He included recollection, recognition and reasoning as pramana under the category of paroksa pramana. He introduced karana, purvacara, uttaracara and sahacara hetus as valid probans. I. 124 J. The knowledge occurring through sense organs was first included as empirical perception (samvyavaharika pratyaksa) by Jinabhadraganin. Earlier it was mentioned as indriyapratyaksa in the Nandisutra. The Mukhya pratyaksa was given a new name as paramarthika pratyaksa by Vadidevasuri. He further divided it into two types as sakala (complete) and vikala (partial) pratyaksa on the basis of a division found in the Sthananga-sutra as kevala and no-kevala. K. The Svetambara logicians are unanimous in accepting the validity of cognition which cognizes the object previously cognized, Whereas Digambara logicans like Akalanka, Manikyanandin and Prabhacandra were of opinion that it is a condition for valid cognition to be regarded as a pramana that it must cognize the object which is previously not cognized. L. Hemacandra for the first time mentions that mind is capable to know all the objects. Umasvati says that mind is an instrument of srutajnana.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines 125 Bibliography Primary sources AD Anuyogadvarasutra of Aryaraksita. Prakit. With Hindi translation and annotations, Beawar : Agama Prakasana Samiti, 1987 AGT Akalankagranthatrayam (Nyayaviniscaya, Pramanasangraha, Laghiyastraya) Mahendra Kumar Nyayacarya, Ahmedabad-Kolkata: Singhi Jain Granthamala- 12, 1939 AM Aptamimansa of Samantabhadra, Varanasi : Sri Ganeshavarni Digambar Jain Sansthan, 1975 LT Laghiyastraya with Vitti of Bhatta Akalanka, found in Akalankagranthatrayam (AGT). NA Nyayavatara of Sidhasenasuri, Bombay : Parama Sruta Prabhavaka Mandala, 1950 NB Nyayabindu of Dharmkarti with tika (commentary) of Dharmmottara, Edited, translated and annotated by Shrinivasa Sastri, Meerut: Sahitya Bhandar, 1975 ND Sri Nandisutra. Prakrit. Hindi translation by Acarya Hastimal, Jaipur : Samyagjnana Pracharak Mandal, Second Edition 2009, First Edition 1942 NKC Nyayakumudacandra (Vol.I) of Prabhacandra. Ed. Mahendra kumar, Girgaon Bombay : Manikyacandra Digambara Jain Granthamala, Heera baug, 1938 NS Niyamasara of Kundakunda. Jaipur: Kundakunda Kahan Digambara Jain Tirtha Suraksa Trust, Bapunagar, 1984 Ny Nyayasutra of Gotam, Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sansthana, 1970 Prasastapadabhasya of Prasastapada. Translated in Hindi by Acarya Dhundhiraj Sastri, Varanasi : Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sansthana, 1980 PB

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 126 PM PMK PP PT ST TB Pramanamimamsa of Hemacandra with own commentary, Ed. Sukhlal Sanghavi, Ahmedabad- Calcutta : Singhi Jaina Granthamala, 1939 Pariknamukha of Manikyanandin. Translated in Hindi by Mohanlal Jain, Jhansi Pramanapariksa of Vidyananda, Ed. Darbari Lal Kothia, Varanasi:Veerseva Mandir Trust, 1977 Pramananayatattvaloka of Vadidevasuri. Third Edition, Ahmadanagar : Sri Tilokaratna Sthanakavasi Jaina Dharmika Parikna Board, 2000 (First Edition 1980). Suttagame (part I) (Bhagvatisutra, Sthanangasutra) Prakrit. (ed.) Muni Pupphabhikkhu, Gurgaon chavani : Gurgaon sutragama prakashan samiti, 1953 Tarkbhasa of Moksakargupta, Baroda : Oriental Institute, 1942 Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati. Hindi commentary by Sukhlal Sanghavi, Third Edition, Varanasi : Parsvanatha Vidyapitha, 1985. Tattvasangraha (2Vols.) of Santaraksita with Panjika commentary of Kamalasila, Varanasi : Bauddha Bharati, 1981-82 Tattvarthaslokavartika of Vidyananda. (ed.) Manikyacandra Kaundeya. Solapur : Shri Acarya Kunthusagar Granthmala, 1951-53 Tattvarthavartika of Bhatta Akalanka, (ed.) Mahendra kumar Nyayacarya, Kashi : Bharatiya Jnanapitha, 1953 Upayahrdaya, see Tucci Giuseppe in modern sources Visesavasyakabhasya of Jinabhadragani, Parkrit. Mumbai : Diyya Darsana Trust, V.S 2039 TS TSn TSV TV UH VB

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines 127 Modern sources Balcerowicz, Piotr, 2008. Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Vol. I) Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Private Ltd. Clavel Anne, 2013. Can The Rise of Rohini be Inferred from The Rise of Krttika? A Buddhist- Jaina controversy, proceedings of Lumbini seminar Buddhist and Jaina studies. Lumbini International Research Institute, Nepal, 2014 Jain, Dharm Chand, Jodhpur 1995, Bauddha Pramana-mimamsa Ki Jaina Drsti Se Samiksa (Hindi), Varanasi : Parshvanatha Vidyapitha, 1995 Malavaniya Pandita Dalsukha, 1966, Agama Yuga Ka Jaina Darsana, Agara : Shri Sanmati jnanpitha. Reprinted by Prakrit Bharati Academy, Jaipur, 1990 Shah, Nagin J. 1967. Akalanka's Criticism Of Dharmakirti's Philosophy: A Study, Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology Tatia, Nathmal, 1951. Studies In Jaina Philosophy, Varanasi : P.V. Research Institute Upadhye, A.N. 1971. Siddhasena's Nyayavatara and other works, Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal Vidyabhusana, Satish Chandra, 1978, A History of Indian Logic, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass. Tucci, Giuseppe 1929. Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese sources (Upayahrdaya etc). Baroda Gaikwad Oriental Series Dhaky M.A., 1995. The Date and Authourrship of Nyayavatara, Published in Nirgrantha Vol. I, Ahmedabad: Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre.

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The Concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition Nirvikalpata is a concept that is discussed in the context of pratyaksa-pramana (perception as a means of valid cognition) and samadhi (intense meditation). The Buddhist philosohers Dignaga (470-530 CE) and Dharmakirti (620-690 CE) are the pioneer stalwarts who consider kalpanapohata or nirvikalpata (absence of verbal designation) as an essential property of pratyaksa (perception). Philosophers of the Nyaya and Mimamsa schools also accept nirvikalpaka pratyaksa (perception without verbal designation) but they propound a kind of savikalpaka-pratyaksa (perception with verbal designation) also. It is noteworthy that these schools entered into the discussion about defining nirvikalpata after Dignaga's time. Jaina philosophers do not accept nirvikalpata in pratyaksa-pramana. They have the notion of darsana or darsanopayoga which is always nirakara and nirvikalpaka, but it is not included in the category of pramana. This paper aims to discuss the concept of nirvikalpata and its development in the Indian tradition with reference to specific texts in order to bring out the remarkable contribution of Buddhist philosophers to the panorama of Indian epistemology and logic. Jaina views will also be considered wherever appropriate.

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The Concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition 129 In the Indian tradition Buddhist logicians seem to have been the first to have discussed the concept of nirvikalpata in the context of pratyaksa-pramana (perception as a means of valid cognition) There after it is mentioned in the epistemology of the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mimamsa schools as well. Jaina thinkers consider it as a characteristic of darsana or darsanopayoga which occurs before determinate knowledge i.e. jnanopayoga and they do not accept as a pramana. In the Yogasutra the term nirvikalpata can be regarded as being a characteristic of nirvitarka and nirvicara samadhi (see Yogasutra 1.4344). In this way nirvikalpata has been discussed widely in the Indian tradition. Dignaga's contribution. In the field of Indian logic and epistemology, the Buddhist philosopher Dignaga (470-530 CE), the pioneer stalwart and founder of Buddhist logic, is considered to be the thinker who introduced the concept of nirvikalpata as an essential property of perception. He propounds two types of valid means of cognition (pramana) namely perception and inference and two types of their respective objects as unique particular (svalaksana) and general character (samanyalaksana). In his Pramanasamuccaya he defines perception as a means of valid cognition which is devoid of verbal designation (Kalpanapohata).' Dignaga defines kalpana as a construction or an arrangement of name (nama) genus (jati), quality (guna), function (kriya) and Pratyaksam kalpanapodham namajatyadi samyutam.-Pramanasamuccaya, 1.3

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition appurtenances (dravya) to the direct cognition. For example, if we perceive a thing with our eyes, without any name etc., then it comes in the category of perception, and if we give it a name, then that is a kalpana or a construction of verbal designation. Naming a perceived thing is not a part of perception. It is a result of our previous experience and a retention or memory of if. 130 ,,3 Dignaga mentions examples of kalpana as follows"namna visito'rtha ucyate dittha iti. jatisabdesu jatya gauriti gunasabdesu gunena sukla iti, kriya sabdesu kriyaya pacaka iti, dravya- sabdesu dravyena dandi visaniti. 'this is dittha is nama Kalpana, this is a patch of white colour is guna kalpana, this is a cow is jati kalpana, this is a cook is kriya kalpana, this is a staff bearer is dravya kalpana. All these are the examples of verbal designation to the cognition of an object. It is not the characteristic of perception. Stcherbatsky in his Buddhist Logic says: This can be called the epistemological form of judgment and every judgment reduces to this form, since it is a known fact, admitted now in European Logic, that in every real judgment a reference to some reality is always understood, cp. Sigwart Logik3, p.67. It can be also viewed as construction, a division, a bifurcation, an imagination (vikalpa) etc., since every such judgment suggests in its predicate a division of the whole into the predicate and its counterpart, e.g. blue and not-blue, cow and not-cow etc. Cp. about vikalpa Madhy. vritti, p. 350.12" (vol.2, p.21 fn.) "Atha keyam kalpana. nama jatyadiyojana. Dignaga's vrtti before 1.3 'Dignaga's vrtti to 1.3, Dignaga, on Perception, p.12

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The Concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition 131 An object of perception in Buddhism is a unique particular or thing-in-itself (svalaksana). The unique particular is momentary and it does not proceed to a different place nor exists in another moment, nor it is in fact expressible by words. It is the real entity i.e. paramarthasat. The concept of nirvikalpata as an essential property of pratyaksa pramana is a brilliant contribution of Dignaga to Indian philosophy. He might have developed the notion on the basis of the old texts of Buddhism. Two statements to this effect are found in the Abhidharmakosavyakhya : (1) caksurvijnana-samangi nilam vijanati no tu nilamiti. (2) arthe'arthasamjni natvarthe dharmasanjiti.* These two statements reflect that when a person cognizes nilarha (blue matter) with his eyes and does not think that "it is nila', then it is devoid of mental construction or kalpana, but knowledge in the form 'it is nila' is considered to be a kalpana. When a real thing is known without any attribute and verbal designation, then it is considered as nirvikalpata. Influence on Kumarila Bhatta The Mimamsaka philosopher Kumarila Bhatta (6th7th century) entering in the field of dialogue, has refuted various notions of Dignaga, but he accepts two types of perception as nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. While accepting the concept of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa, he seems influenced by Dignaga. He defines nirvikalpata in the following wordsHattori, Dignaga, on perception, Pramanasamuccayavrtti, Da, a-2, Abhidharmakosavyakhya, p.64,22-23; Dvadasaram Nayacakram, vol.I, pp. 60-61

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 132 asti hyalocanajnanam prathamam nirvikalpakam 1 balamukadi vijnanasadesam suddha-vastujam 11 -Slokavartika, pratyaksa sutra, 112 He says that after a sense-object contact, first of all indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception is experienced which is bare perception, similar to the perception of a baby and a dumb person. This is the perception produced by the object and it is devoid of verbal designation. This definition of nirvikalpata has affinity with that of Dignaga. Kumarila explains the adjective suddha- vastujam as follows: na viseso na samanyam tadanim anubhuyate. / tayor adharabhuta tu, vyaktir evavasiyate. Il -Slokavartika, pratyaksa sutra, 113 "The cognition per se that arises through the object can not differentiate and generalise that particular object. There is a mere cognition of an object, of something, which then becomes the basis of generality and particularity." In his critique of Indian realism D.N. Shastri 1976 (P 437-438)says that a clear-cut distinction between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception was introduced for the first time in Indian philosophy by Dignaga. Kumarila Bhatta seems to have been influenced by Dignaga when he defines nirvikalpaka as suddhavastujam. (produced from pure form of reality) In Kumarila's view, after an indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka), a determinate perception also occurs which is also a valid cognition. Here it is to be noted that according to Dignaga determinate perception is not a

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The Concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition 133 valid cognition, Where as accoding to Kumarila determinate perception is also a valid perception. Dharmakirti's view Dharmakirti (620-690 CE), a profound commentator of Dignaga, is of view that sometimes a direct perception (nirvikalpaka) might be illusive due to disease or deformation in the sense organs, hence a perception must be devoid both of construction and of illusion. He goes a step further and defines kalpana as"abhilapasamsargayogya- pratibhasa pratitih kalpana (Nyayabindu 1.5) Stcherbatsky explains this aphorism of Nyayabindu as "construction (or judgment) implies a distinct cognition (Pratiti) of a mental reflex (pratibhasa) which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation." (Buddhist Logic, vol II, p.19) Dharmottara (700CE), a commentator of Dharmakirti explains the statement : - "abhilapyate aneneti abhilapah vacakah sabdah, abhilapena samsargah ekasmin jnane abhidheyakarasy abhidhananakarena saha grahayakarataya milanam. tato yadaikasmin jnane abhidheyabhidhanakarau sannivistau bhavatas tada samssste abhidhanabhidheye bhavatah Stcherbatsky translates explanation of Dharmottara in this way. Tatra Kalpanapodhamabhrantam. pratyaksam - Nyayabindu, 1.4 ; (2) Avikalpakam ekam ca pratyaksabham. - Pramanavartika, 2.288

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition "A verbal designation is a word of speech through which something is denoted. To coalesce with a word means (such a condition when) the denoted aspect of the object and its verbal aspect are mixed up in its apprehended aspect. Thus, when denoted fact and the word denoting it have entered in to one act of cognition, then the word and object have coalesced." (Buddhist Logic, vol II, p.19) Dharmottara's view 134 Dharmottara explains the importance of the word 'abhilapa-samsarga-yogya' and says that there are two types of cognition: (1) one is associated with a word, as in the case of ghata-jnana (knowledge of a pot) of a person having conventional knowledge of ghata (pot), (2) another cognition which is not yet associated with a word, but seems capable of being associated with it, as in the case of a baby, who is unaware of conventional knowledge. Both of these cognitions come under the category of kalpana'. Here the word 'yogya' (capable) includes the second category of a cognition above which forms the definition of kalpana. Although a new-born baby has no verbal association with a cognition of mother's breast, but if capable of giving a name to that, then that also may be considered as kalpana. Here a question arises how is the capability for verbal designation is decided? Dharmottara answers this question by saying that the verbal designation is not produced by the object actually apprehended and, therefore, it is not a restricted mental reflex, since the factor corresponding to it does not exist; it is created by the 'Nyayabindutika, p.44

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The Concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition 7 135 synthesis of productive imagination. According to Buddhist logic the perceived object is the real cause of restricted mental reflex (niyata pratibhasa) but verbal designation or the capability of it is not caused by object and so it can not be a restricted mental reflex. 8 Dharmottara explains that vikalpa does not require an object for its manifestation. If a vikalpa arises after a nirvikalpaka cognition due to recalling a previously cognised object, then also it is aniyata pratibhasa. Niyata pratibhasa is the deciding factor of nirvikalpata according to Dharmottara, and that occurs in the presence of an object only. The definition of kalpana as given by Dharmakirti and Dharmottara refutes the definition of nirvikalpata given by kumarila Bhatta. In his Slokavartika Kumarila considers the cognition of a baby and dumb person as belonging to the category of nirvikalpata, but Dharmakitri says that a cognition of a baby and a dumb person would come under the category of kalpana, if that cogniton would have the capability of coalescing with a verbal designation." Dharmakirti and Dharmottara prove the fact that concept of nirvikalpata as an essential property of perception is found not only in indriya pratyaksa, but also in the other kinds of perception as in manasa-pratyaksa, svasamvedana and yogi-pratyaksa. Dharmottara says 'Asaty-abhilapa-samsarge kuto yogyatavasitir iti cet, Aniyatapratibhasatvat.- Nyayabindutika 1.5, p.45 Arthasannidhi-nirapeksatvat. Nyayabindu tika, 1.5, p. 46 'See, Nyayabindutika, 1.5, pp. 44-46

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 136 regarding yogi-pratyaksa that it is nirvikalpaka because of its vividness (sphutabhata)" Dharmakirti also thought :na vikalpanubaddhasyasti sphutarthavabhasita (Pramanavartika, 2.283). If we add nothing to pure knowledge, then it is called nirvikalpakata. In the case of perception through the ears (Srotra vijnana), if a conventional meaning is not understood, then that perception can also be nirvikalpaka. Prajnakaragupta (8th century) defines kalpana in a different way: "vicesanadi-sambandha-vastu pratibhasapratitih kalpana (Pramanavartikabhasya, p. 245) "If an object is known with its atributes or quality then that cognition is called kalpana." This definition has been adopted by the Navya Naiyakas when they say :- saprakarakam jnanam savikalpakam or in other words when they say vaisistyavagahi jnanam savikalpakam. Santaraksita and Kamalasila The Buddhist logicians santaraksita (705-764 CE) and Kamalasila (8th century) supported the views of Dignaga and Dharmakirti. Santaraksita defines kalpana asabhilapini pratitih kalpana (Tattvasamgraha, 1213) This definition includes the ones given by Dignaga and Dharmakirti. The Word abhilapini includes verbal association and the mental reflex having capability for verbal designation." Sphutabhatvadeva ca nirvikalpakam - Nyayabindutika, 1.11, p. 66 "Sabdartha-ghatana yogya vrksa ity-adirupatah 1 ya vacam aprayogepi sabhilapeva jayate. Il - Tattvasamgraha, 1214

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The Concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition 137 santaraksita and Kamalasila suggested a modification in the definition of kalpana given by Dignaga. Kamalasila says :- tatra heya jatyadiyojana paraprasiddha kalpana. (Tattvasamgrahapanjika, 1220, p- 451). He accepts that all verbal associations are included in sabadayojana, hence there is no need to accept jatyadi yojana which is accepted by other philosophers. He stresses the word 'ucyate' when he says- sabdayojanaya sarva yojana vyaptal Tattva samgrhapanjika, p. 455) Nirvikalpata in Nyaya - Vaisesika School The Nyaya-Vaisesika school has also discussed the concept of nirvikalpata on the basis of word 'avyapadesya (unnamable) used in the definition of perception given by Gotama (150 CE) in the Nyayasutra."? Vacaspati Misra (9th century) and Jayanta Bhatta (9th Century) have developed the notion of nirvikalpata in Nyaya-Vaisesika school. Vacaspati Misra propounds two types of perception as indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) on the basis of the words 'avyapadesya'and 'vyavasayatmaka' used in the Nyayasutra by Gotama. Jayanta Bhatta is also of this view. They consider nirvikalpaka perception to be without a verbal element and so have an affinity with Kumarila. In the Vaisesika school Prasastapada, prior to Dignaga uses the term 'Svarupalocana-matra'"' which means a mere apprehesnion of a reality is a perception, but "Artha-sannikarsotpannam jnanam avyapadesyam avyabhicari vyavasayatmakam pratyaksam-Nyayasutra, 1.4 "Prasastapadabhasyam, p.443

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 14 the development of this concept into nirvikalapaka and savikalpaka percetion was made by the commentators of Prasastapadabhasya. Sridhara in his Nyayakandali says that in indeterminate perception, particular and universal dharmas are not apprehended, while in determinate perception these dharmas are apprehended." This view has an affinity with the theory of Dignaga, and also with that of Kumarila. Udayana (10th century) says in his Kiranavali that only the individual or the substratum of universal is apprehended at the nirvikalpaka stage. Gangesa in his Tattvacintamani has made a clear distinction between nirivalpaka and savikalpaka perception. According to him, savikalpaka perception is differentiated and qualified knowledge (saprakarakam jnanam) and nirvikalpaka perception, on the other hand, is devoid of the relation between a substance and its attribute.15 Jaina View Jaina philosophers accpet nirvikalpaka cognition in the form of darsana, but they do not consider it as pratyaksa-pramana. They have refuted the validity of nirvikalpaka pratyksa, because it is not useful in daily life (vyavahara). Bhatta Akalanka, Vidyananda, Anantavirya, Abhayadeva, Prabhacandra, Hemacandra did not accept the validity of nirvikalpaka perception for practical life or empirical behavior, because a determinate or savikalpaka knowledge would be a means to decide what is acceptable, "Ibid. p. 446-447 15 Tatra nama jaty-adiyojana-rahitam vaisistyavagahi nisprakarakam nirvikalpakam. -Tattvacintamani, p. 809 138

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The Concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition 139 not acceptable and what are the objects which should be disregarded." Here it is to be noted that Buddhist philosophers were also aware of this fact, hence, Santaraksita in Tattvasamgrah says: avikalpakamapi jnanam vikalpotpattisaktimat | niscesa-vyavaharangam taddvarena bhavatyatah. Il - Tattvasamgraha, 1305 Nirvikalpaka perception can produce a vikalpa, and that vikalpa becomes a part of every vyavahara. Kamalasila explains that the perception has a capacity to produce a determinate knowledge and that is considered as practicable in our life. Nirvikalpata in Samadhi Before Dignaga, Patanjali had defined samadhi as "tadevartha-matra-nir-bhasam svarupa-sunayam iva samadni (Yogasutra, 3.3). Only a reality is apprehended in samadhi without any verbal designation or a bifurcation of the object and the meditator. Vacaspati Misra in his commentary Tattva-vaisaradi has clearly mentioned that apprehension of pure form of reality is devoid of kalpana." Conclusion It is clear that concept of nirvikalpata is well defined in the Indian tradition and it can also be announced loudly that Buddhist logicians with their philosophical acumen have contributed significantly in defining perception very "See e.g. Vadidevasuri : abhimatanabhimata-vastu-svikara-tiraskara-ksamam hi pramanam ato jnanam eva tat. -Pramananayatattvaloka, 1.3 "Tattvava-vaisaradi on Yogasutra, 2.3

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 140 minutely. Deliberations held with Buddhist logicians by other systems created a path to the development of this concept, as with many other philosophical tenets in the panorama of Indian Philosophy. By establishing the concept of nirvikalpata Buddhist logicians inspired other philosophers to think about and accept the notion in their philosophical deliberations. The Mimansaka and Nyaya-Vaisisika philosophers were obviously influenced by Dignaga and Dharmakirti, but Jaina philosophers do not seem to have been influenced in any significant respect, most probably because of their notion of darsana which is defined as nirakara and nirvikalpaka.'' Although the seeds of the notion of . nirvikalpata were available in the Yogasurta, Jaina canons, Nyayasutra and Prasastapadabhasya, the evolution making a clear-cut distinction between determinate and indeterminate knowledge was pioneered by Buddhist logicians. Bibliography Primary sources Dravyanuyoga (vol.I) Prakrit-Hindi. Compiled from the Svetambara canons by Upadhyaya Kanhaiyalal Kamal, Ahmedabad : Agam Anuyoga Trust, 1994 Dvadasaram nayacakram of Acarya Sri Mallavadi Ksa masramana (vol. 1, with the commentary Nyayagamanusarini of Simhasuri), ed. Muni Jambuvijaya, Bhavanagar (Gujarat) : Atmananda Sabha, 1966 Goyama! Sagare se pare bhavai, anagare se dansane bhavai. (pannavana, chapter 30, Dravyanuyoga, vol.I, p. 568).

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The Concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition 141 Kiranavali of Udayana, edited and translated in to Hindi by Gaurinath Sastri, Varanasi : Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, 1980 Nyayabindutika of Dharmottara (a commentary on Dharmakirti's Nyayabindu) edited and annotated by Srinivasa Sastri, Meratha: Sahitya Bhandara, 1975 Nyayamanjari of Jayantabhatta, edited by Pt. Surya Narayana Sukla, Banaras: The Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1936 Nyayavartika-Tatparyatika of Vacaspatimisra, ed by Pt. Rajesvara Sastri Dravida, Varanasi Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, reprint 1990. Patanjalayogadarsanam (Yogasutra with Vyasabhasya, Tattva-vaisaradi and Yogavartika), ed. Srinarayana Misra, Varanasi : Bharatiya Vidya Prakashana, 1998 Pramana-naya-tattvaloka of Vadidevasuri, translated and annotated by Pt. Sobhacandra Bharilla. Ahmednagar: Sri Tilokaratna Sthanakavasi Jaina Dharmika Pariksa Board, 3rd reprint 2000. Pramanasamuccaya (with vrtti) of Dignaga, ed. H.R. Rangasvami Iyengar, Mysore: Mysore University, 1930 Pramanavartika of Acarya Dharmakirti (with the commentary 'vrtti' of Acarya Manorathanandin), Varanasi : Bauddha Bharati, 2nd ed., 1984. Pramanavartikabhasyam or Vartikalankarah of Prajnakaragupta, deciphered and edited by Rahula Sankrityayana. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Prasastapadabhasya (with Nyayakandali of Sridhara Bhatta), edited by Pt. Durgadhara Jha, Varansi: Sampurnananda Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, 1977 142 Slokavartika of Kumarila Bhatta (with the commentary Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathi Misra), edited and revised by Svami Dvarikadasa Sastri. Varanasi: Ratna Publications, 1978. Tattvacintamani by Gangesa (Pratyaksa-khanda). Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1884. Yogasutra: see Patanjalayogadarsanam. Secondary Sources Hattori, Massaki, Dignaga, on Perception, Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1968 Jain, Dharm Chand, 1995: Bauddha Pramana- Mimamsa Ki Jaina Drsti se Samiksa (In Hindi), Varanasi : Parsvanath Vidya pitha. Shastri, D.N., 1976: The Philosophy of Nyaya - Vaisesika and its conflict with The Buddhist Dignaga School (Critique of Indian Realsim), Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan. Sigwart, Christoph, 1895: Logic. Tr. from the German by Helen Dendy. London, etc.: Swan Sonnenschein. Soni, Jayendra (ed), 2012: Jaina Studies (Proceedings of the Dot 2010 Panel in Marburg, Germany) New Delhi Aditya Prakashan, Stcherbatsky, Theodore 1962: Buddhist Logic (Volume II), New York: Dover Publications. Tatia, Nathmal, 1951: Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Varanasi : P.V. Research Institute,

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Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa Anekantavada, Syadvada and Nayavada Nayavada is an epistemological tenet, Anekantavada is a metaphysical theory and Syadvada is a method of faultless statements. According to Jainism real entity is multi-faceted. It has multi-characteristics. Modes of a real entity are infinite. To accept a real entity with multi-faceted characteristic attributes and modes is called 'anekantavada'. A real entity having two or more attributes is called as anekadharmatmaka (multi-faceted or multi-attributed) substance. In Jainism, a real entity sat is defined as - "Which bears origniation (utpada) cessation (vyaya) and persistence (dhrauvya) is a real entity (sat)'." In a real entity these three characteristics are found simultaneously - a new mode is originated, present mode becomes past and the substance remains persistent (dhruva). Origination and cessation of modes approve non-eternity and persistence shows eternity of that reality. This characteristic of reality (sat) is also mentioned as a nature of substance-cum-mode. Substance is eternal and modes are non-eternal or impermanent. Hence, sat is eternalcum-non-eternal. Substance is considered as generic and modes are considered as particular, hence a reality can be mentioned as generic-cum-particular. Knowing of a reality needs the different standpoints and those standpoints are called 'naya' in Jainism. From the 'utpada-vyaya-dhrauvyayuktam sat. - Tattvarthasutra 5.29

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144 Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition standpoint of substance a reality is persistent and from the viewpoint of modes that reality is changing or non-eternal. In this way in the process of knowing and also in describing a reality view points (nayas) are needed. These view-points have importance in proper understanding and describing the truth. Syadvada is an indefective method of describing or mentioning the truth using word 'syat' or 'syad. Here 'syat' word is an indeclinable which denotes a meaning of a certain view-point. In this way a statement using word 'syat' is a statement in some perspective. In the Jaina canon Vyakhyaprajnapti Sutra Lord Mahavira has used this word often in answering with different view points of substance (dravya), space (ksetra), time (kala) and modes (bhava). Hence it can be said that syadvada is a theory of explaining the reality in an indefective way. If 'syat' word is not used in a sentence then it may be defective in a sense to deny the existing other facts, but word 'syat' keeps other facts in a view neglected or latent at that moment. Syadvada, anekantavada and nayavada are mutually interlinked. Anekantavada is understandable through nayavada and expressed through syadvada. Expressing power is in syadvada which also expects nayavada for its proper expression. Nayavada has two aspects- 1. Knowing and 2. Expression. What is the intention of a speaker is naya and what is intended by a knower is also naya. Nayas are also expressed using word 'syat'. Hence 'syadvada' is used in expression of nayas also. Thus 'syat' word is a relative term which depicts a certain viewpoint.

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Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa 145 Pramana and Naya: The concept of naya is as important as the concept of pramana in Jainism. Both of these are the means of knowledge. As Umasvati in his Tattvarthasutra clearly mentions "Valid means of knowledge (pramana) and the standpoints (naya) are the instruments for understanding the real elements." Thus naya is also a means to know the reality. Generally naya is understood as a part of pramana and related to verbal testimony (agamapramana) as Vadidevasuri defines naya:- "After knowing a reality with srutajnana, a characteristic or a mode of that reality is known by a knower becoming indifferent to other characteristics and modes of that reality is called naya"". Hence (i) naya is a part of pramana due to knowing point of view. (ii) naya is a kind of srutajnana. (iii) a characteristic or a mode is known with a naya of a reality. Somewhere more characteristics and modes are also known with a particular view point (naya). Naya is a part of pramana as- Pujyapada Devanandi quotes in his Sarvarthasiddhi, "Naya is that which grasps a part of the content comprehended by Pramana." When pramana is contrasted with naya, then 'pramana' means complete knowledge or holistic knowledge and naya means partial knowledge. Naya is not a false cognition or erroneous cognition. So it is said that naya is neither pramana (which 'Tattvarthasutra 1.6: Pramana-nayairadhigamah. 'Niyate yena srutakhyapramana-visyikrtasyamsastaditaramsaudasinyantah sa pratipatturabhipraya-viseso nayah. - Pramana-naya-tattvaloka, 7.1 "Sarvarthasiddhi on 1.6 p.24: Sakaladesah pramanadhino vikaladeso nayadhinah.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 146 means complete knowledge) nor apramana (which means erroneous or false cognition), but it is pramanamsa (partial knowledge). Yasovijaya says "A part of an ocean is neither an ocean, nor not-orean, similarly a naya is neither pramana nor apramana".' Being partial knowledge, naya represents a particular stand-point or a particular perspective through which one understands an object. While doing so it does not deny that there are other stand-points or other perspectives. Naya and pramana are different because of their objects. An object of pramana is anekanta and the object of naya is ekanta.'Bhatta Akalanka has propounded that right anekanta is pramana and right ekanta is naya." Definition of naya The definition of naya as given by Prabhacandra explains its nature: "Naya is the intention of the knower which cognises a part of the reality without negating the contrary view-points." In another words "Anaya can be defined as a particular opinion or viewpoint which does not rule out other different view points and is thereby, expressive of a partial truth about an object." (Padmarajiah, 1963:310) (i) Yathahi samudraikadeso na samudro napyasamudrastatha naya api na pramanam, na va apramanamiti. Jainatarkabhasa, nayapariecheda, (ii) napramanam va, nayo jnanatmako matah, syatpramanaikadesastu sarvathapyavirodhatah - Tattvarthailokavarttika, nayavivarana, verse 16 *Kim ca na pramanam nayah, tasyanekanta visayatvat. na nayah pramanam tasyaikantavisayatvat- Virasena, Dhavala commentary, Jainendra siddhanta kosa, Vol. 2, p.516 *Tattvarthavartika, 1.6 : Samyagekanto naya ityucyate. samyaganekantah pramanam. Wanirakrtapratipakso, vastvamsagrahi jnaturabhiprayo nayah."Prameyakamalamartanda, Vol.3 p.657

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Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa 147 Yasovijaya says in Jainatarkabhasa: "Nayas are the specific determinate cognitions which grasp a single aspect of the reality, without denying other aspects, the reality consisting of infinite characteristics which is known through pramana." Naya expresses a particular partial or relative standpoint and does not deny others. But it does not recognise other standpoints either. It is said to be indifferent (udasina) about other standpoints. This is how it can be distinguished from pramana. Pramana recognises the existence of many standpoints from which a thing having infinite characteristics can be understood. When for example one who has understood the nature of soul in its totality says "From a view point soul is eternal", ("Syat jivah nityah"), he is not only expressing a standpoint, namely substantial standpoint from which soul is permanent, but also indicating that it is not the only standpoint, but there are other standpoints from which soul is non-eternal and so on. In fact three ways of approaching the reality are available to us. One has a holistic and non-absolutist approach in which one expresses a standpoint while acknowledging the existence of other standpoints. Second one expresses a standpoint without denying other standpoints but by being indifferent to them. Third one has an absolutist approach in which he expresses a standpoint as if it is the only correct standpoint and others are wrong. The first approach can be called pramana which is pramanaparicchannasya anantadharmatmakasya vastuna ekadesagrahinah taditaramisa- pratiksepino'dhyavasayavicesa nayah"-Jaina Tarka Bhasa, Nayapariccheda 16...itaramsaudasinyatah....", Pramananayatattvaloka, 7.1

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition expressed through syadvada, the second one can be called the approach of naya. The third approach is called a bad naya or pseudo-naya (durnaya or nayabhasa).Hemacandra in Anyayogavyavacchedadvatrimsika expresses the three approaches lucidly as: 148 "A thing is cognized in three ways: through a perverse view-point (durnaya) as "It is real only", through a partial viewpoint (naya) as "It is real" and through right knowledge (pramana) as "In a way, it is real"." Classifications of Naya As we have seen above, naya is regarded as a part of srutajnana. Hence naya is not only a way of knowing, it is also a way of describing. Siddhasena-Divakara says: "There are as many view-points (nayas) as there are ways of speaking.' ,12 Since things have innumerable characteristics, there can be innumerable view-points and consequently innumerable descriptions of things. However the Jaina texts classify nayas in different ways. One broad classification is into dravyarthikanaya and paryayarthikanaya. Dravyarthikanayas are those which focus on enduring characteristics of objects; and paryayarthikanayas are those which focus on the changing characteristics of objects. This gives us a notion of reality as a synthesis of permanent and impermanent characteristics. In fact the reality according to Jainas is the synthesis of many binaries - one and many, identity and difference, particular and universal, ""sadeva, sat, syat saditi tridhartho, miyeta durnitinayapramanaih/ yatharthadarsi tu nayapramanapathena durnitipatham tvamasthah// "Anyayogavyavaccheda-dvatrimsika, verse. 28 "Javaiyavayanapaha tavaiya ceva hunti nayavayal, Sanmatitarka, 3.47

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Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa 149 permanence and impermanence. Out of the two poles of a binary, a naya focuses on one of the two poles and neglects the other. The seven-fold classification of nayas is most commonly accepted in different texts. Anuyogadvara clearly mentions seven nayas: naigama, sangraha, vyavahara, rjusutra, sabda, samabhirudha and evambhuta." In Svetambara version of Tattvarthasutra (1.34) only first five are counted as the kinds of naya. But then sabdanaya is subdivided into three kinds: sabda, samabhirudha and evambhuta. The reading of Tattvarthasutra accepted in Digambara tradition mentions all the seven nayas." Siddhasenasuri in Sanmatitarka (1.4-25) mentions six nayas excluding naigamanaya. He subdivides naigama into two kinds: universalistic and particularistic. He reduces the former to sangrahanaya and the latter to vyavaharanaya. A fifth century Jaina thinker Mallavadi Ksmasramana wrote Dvadasaranayacakra in which he introduced the wheel of twelve nayas. He explains this twelvefold classification in terms of the two-fold classification into dravya and paryaya and also the well-known sevenfold classification. The other broad classification is arthanaya and sabdanaya. Arthanaya is about the thing's own characteristics. sabdanaya is about the characteristics caused by the association of the thing with language. Through the broad category of sabdanaya Jainas indicate the fact that many a time our "Satta mulanaya pannatta, tamjaha - negame, sangahe, vavahare, ujjusue, sadde, samabhirudhe evambhute. - Anuyogadvarasutra, sutra 606 "Naigama-sangrah a -vyavahararjusutra -sabda -samabhirudhaivambhuta nayah Sarvarthasiddhi, 1.33

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 150 understanding of things is coloured by the linguistic categories imposed on them. Vyakhyaprajnaptisutra introduces another classification namely niscaya-naya (true view-point) and vyavahara-naya (conventional view-point)." Kundakunda used this classification in his theorisation of spiritual view point as niscaya naya and empirical view point as vyavahara naya. This classification is comparable to the Buddhist classification of truths between paramarthasat and lokasamvsti-sat and the Vedanta classification between paramarthika-satta and vyavaharika-satta. Sevenfold Classification: Sevenfold classification is quite old in Jaina literature, as it is found in the Anuyogadvara sutra. Among these seven nayas naigama, sangraha and vyavahara nayas are the expansion of dravyarthika naya and the rest four nayas - rjusutra, sabda, sambhiradha and evambhuta nayas are the part of paryayarthikanaya. Here a brief introduction to the seven nayas is presented:i)Naigamanaya (Goal-oriented viewpoint or pluralistic view-point): The term naigama is derived in two ways and accordingly naigama-naya is interpreted in two ways.(1) naigama is derived from nigama which means intention (sankalpa) for achieving an aim or goal. When someone is performing an action with some aim or goal, the action can be described as actualisation of that goal. For example a person is going to jungle with an axe in hand in order to cut wood and "See, Vyakhyaprajnaptisutra, sataka 18, uddesaka 6

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Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa 151 produce a wooden measuring pot called prasthaka. When asked what he is doing, he may simply answer, "I am making a prasthaka." This answer shows an intention of that person." When a student intends to go to college and at the time of wearing clothes his father asks him - 'What are you doing?' He answers - "I am going to college." The student's goal is to go to college and wearing clothes is a part of that goal, hence student's statement is right according to naigamanaya.(2) The term naigama is derived as "naika-gamo (not one understanding) naigamah."Accordingly Naigama means considering a thing in plural or diverse ways. Naigama involves focusing on different general and specific characteristics of things by treating one of the characteristics as main and the other as subordinate. ii)Sangrahanaya (Collective view-point): When something is described in terms of its general characteristic shared by other things, having a collective view-point is called sangrahanaya. It is concerned with the general or common attributes of a class or group of identical objects. For example word 'dravya' includes all six categories of dravya in it with sangraha naya. Sangrahanaya is of two kinds: parasangraha (comprehensively collective view-point) and aparasangraha, (Non-comprehensively collective viewpoint) Comprehensively collective view-point says that all the things in the world share a common characteristic namely that they are real. Non-comprehensively collective view-point describes things in terms of lower universals such as substance-ness, quality-ness etc. "The example of prasthaka is found in Anuyogadvarasutra. On the basis of this example AcaryaPujyapada gives this interpretation of Naigamanaya in his Sarvarthasiddhi, 1.33, p. 100: anabhinirvittartha - sankalpamatragrahi- naigamah.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 152 iii) Vyavaharanaya (Particularist or differential view-point): Whereas sangrahanaya emphasises unity and commoness, vyavaharanaya is the view-point which emphasises particularity and diversity. It cognises things as having many kinds. For example when it talks about a soul, it immediately classifies souls into liberated ones and transmigrating ones. The transmigrating souls are again classified into mobile (trasa) and immobile (sthavara) ones, or those into onesensed, two-sensed etc. up to five-sensed and also mind possessing souls and so on. iv)Rjusutranaya (Immediate view-point): Rjusutranaya focuses on an immediate present mode of object. It ignores enduring or substantial aspects of things and concentrates on their momentary and immediately available aspects. Under this naya we do not consider, though we do not deny that the same object had some modes in the past and would have some modes in future. We may describe such an object by using the expressions as 'this is red' or 'here now yellow' or 'here is now the feeling of pleasure''?. v)Sabdanaya (Syntactical view-point): One who is using sabdanaya is focusing on the influence of the grammatical form of words on the meaning of the description. Tense of the sentence, the case-endings of the words, the genders of the nouns, singularity or plurality and suffixes of the word-forms are the factors which are responsible for the difference in meaning of a sentence. One who is applying sabdanaya emphasises these factors for example "Rama was a king of Ayodhya" this sentence gives its meaning that Ram was a king in the past, not in the present. This reflects 'sabdanaya'. "" sukhavivartah sampratyasti", Pramana-naya-tattvaloka, 7.29

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Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa 153 vi)Samabhirudhanaya (Etymological view-point): One who is using samabhirudhanaya emphasises that the meaning or the shade of the meaning of a word changes according to the etymology of the word. For instance the three Sanskrit synonyms Indra, Sakra and Purandara denote the same mythological person namely the king of gods. But the connotations of these words change according to their etymologies. So 'Indra''8 means prosperous, 'Sakra" means powerful and 'Purandara" means destroyer of the cities. Still use of these words for the same person can be regarded as a case of samabhiruuhanaya. vii)Evambhutanaya (Functionalist view-point): Evambhuta literally means "(which) exists in this way". According to this view-point a word is applied to a thing when the thing is performing the function indicated by the word. This viewpoint is also concerned with etymology, but here the focus is on whether the present function of the object tallies with the etymology of the word used for referring to it. For example one may prefer to call a person a lecturer only at the time when he or she is lecturing. Expansion of Naya theory in daily life In the beginning naya theory was limited to grasp the suitable meaning of canonical sentences. Hence, it was put in the category of srutajnana or srutapramana. Later on, its sphere developed to understand the real meaning of sentences spoken by a scholar and a layman. Nayas are very much helpful in understanding the reality consisting of multi attributes "Derived from the root Vind=to prosper "Derived from the root vsak = to be able to Derived from the pur ( = city) + root vdr ( = to destroy)

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition (aneka-dharmatmaka vastu). It is very much useful to understand the truth with various aspects. Nayas are used in daily life now in understanding the others' views and expressing our own views. Theory of naya is helpful in synthesizing the philosophical ideas applying view points in them. This theory is also a solution to the problems of obstination and harshness in behaviour. It develops an art of speaking with avoiding confrontations and also understanding the things in a way to solve the problems which generate confrontations. Hence naya theory is very much useful in our daily life. 154 The doctrine of Nayabhasa: When a view point excludes and rules out another view points, then it is called as 'nayabhasa'. Nayabhasa can be defined as absolutistic fallacy which consists in treating a relative truth as absolute truth. Since different philosophical systems understand and describe reality in different ways, different nayas can be correlated to different philosophical systems. The doctrine of naya in this way is a metaphilosophical doctrine. In the history of Jainism Siddhasenasuri (5th century) compared Indian philosophical systems with nayas. Afterwards Akalankabhatta (8th century) described those systems as the cases of nayabhasa. The idea was that though different systems of philosophy understand and describe reality from a partial view-point, they regard their understanding and description as absolute and complete truth. As a result their view-point becomes a pseudo-view-point (nayabhasa) or a defective view-point (durnaya). Vadidevasuri (12th century) has given examples of different doctrines of various Indian philosophies as nayabhasa, due to their

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Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa 155 absolustic view. Mallisenasuri (15th centuy) clearly categorises the Indian philosophies in different nayabhasas. Upadhyaya, Yasovijaya (17" century) has supported him. Which Indian system comes under the category of which nayabhasa is shown below: Nayabhasa Philosophical system Naigamabhasa Nyaya-Vaisesika Para-sangrahabhasa Advaita-Vedanta Apara-sangrahabhasa Sankhya Vyavaharabhasa Carvaka Rjusutrabhasa Buddhism Sabdanayabhasa Vyakarana Samabhirudhabhasa Vyakarana Evambhutabhasa Vyakarana This classfication of nayabhasa was discussed by Mallisenasuri in his syadvadamanjart' and by Yasovijaya in his Adhyatmasara.? Explanation Regarding Nayabhasas: In our language there are different words for substances, qualities, motions and relations. Naigamanaya consists in describing them as different. But Nyaya-Vaisesikas accept different categories (padarthas) as absolutely distinct from each other like substance, quality, action, univarsal etc. Hence the Jainas accuse the Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas for committing the fallacy called naigamabhasa (Pseudo-pluralistic view). Corresponding to each type of sangrahanaya, Jainas conceived of the corresponding sangrahabhasa. For example Syadvadamanjari, p.248 "Adhyatmasara, verse 879.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Parasanigraha consists in understanding and describing everything as real. But Jainas observed that Advaita-Vedantin treats this understanding and description as absolute and says that everything is real and real alone, and all the other properties are delusory. This comprehensive reductionism of Vedantins amounts to the fallacy called parasangrahabhasa (Pseudocomprehensively-collective view). On the other hand, Jainas observed, Samkhyas do not reduce everything to 'real', but they divide the world to two basic categories, prakrti and purusa and describe all objects of the world as manifestations of prakrti. This non-comprehensive reductionism of Samkhyas can be called apara-sangrahabhasa. 156 Generally Carvakas are accused of committing vyvaharabhasa. But the reason is not clear. A possible reason is that whereas Carvakas accept empirical reality (Vyavaharikasatta) they do not accept the so-called ultimate reality (Paramarthika-satta) beyond that. This is an absolutist or exclusivist approach to vyavahara which Jainas seem to be interpreting as the fallacious view-point called vyavaharabhasa (Pseudo-empirical view-point). In fact Jainas interpret vyavaharanaya as particularist view-point. In that case treating particularity as absolutely real and universal features as unreal will be the pseudo-particularist view-point which can be called vyavaharabhasa. Jainas could have attributed it to the Buddhists who accept only unique particulars (svalaksana) as real and universals (samanya) as unreal. The Jainas claim that the Buddhists treat this immediate view-point as absolute. They regard only immediate momentary experiences as real and others as illusory. Therefore

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Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa 157 Buddhism according to them exemplifies the fallacious viewpoint called rjusutrabhasa. Sabdanaya emphasises the role of words in determining the nature of reality. Vyakarana school overemphasizes this role and gives the word the status of Brahman. Jainas call this absolutist approach to word as Sabdanayabhasa (Pseudosyntactical view-point). If we consider sabdanaya as a broad category, then samabhirudhanaya and evambhutanaya can be taken to be the special cases of Sabdanaya. Hence fallacies of these nayas can be treated as special cases of Sabdanayabhasa. Samabhirudhanaya stands for emphasis on etymological meanings of words. Hence overemphasis on etymological meaning of words would amount to Samabhirudhabhasa (Pseudo-etymological view). So if someone insists that a person can be named as 'Indra' only if he is prosperous, as 'Sakra' only if he is powerful and as 'Purandara' only if he is destroyer of the cities then the claimant is committing the fallacy called Samabhirudhabhasa. Evambhutanaya emphasises application of a word to a thing only at the time when the object performs the function indicated by the word. Now overemphasis on functionalist meaning of a word would be a case of evabhutabhasa (Pseudo-functional view). For example if one insists that someone can be called a teacher only at the time when he or she is teaching, and that he or she ceases to be a teacher when he/she comes out of the class, then one is committing the fallacy called evabhutabhasa. Pradeep Gokhale (1989) has accepted the application of nayabhasa in western Phhilosophical field also. He says "The

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 158 doctrine of nayabhasa has wider applicability which goes beyond the domain of Indian philosophical systems. It can be applied to absolute dogmatic views held by some western philosophers as well. For example Platonism which holds only universal ideas as real and empirical objects as appearances would amount to aparasangrahabhasa. Phenomenalism which accepts only immediately given sense datum as real would amount to rjusutrabhasa. Cartesian view of absolute distinction between mind and matter would be a case of naigamabhasa." Jaina Doctrine of Nayabhasa in this way can be appreciated as an important contribution to non-formal logical thinking in Indian philosophy. Saptabhangi-naya Theory of Sabtabhanginaya is an expansion of naya theory. Predications about any thing can be seven in nature. If we say about existence of a soul then the statements may be made as follows:1. Relatively Rama exists (syadasti Ramah) This relativity refers to present substance, space, time and mode about Rama. 2. Relatively Rama does not exists (syad nasti Ramah) - This also refers to some relative term that ancient Rama, son of Dasaratha does not exist. 3. Relatively Rama exists and does not exist (syad asti, syad nasti Ramah) (if statement is made in a certain order then both the facts may be said in this way) 4. Relatively it is in-expressible (syad avaktavyah) - if we say simutaneously about Rama's existence and inexistence, then it is in-expressible.

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Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa 159 5. Relatively from the view point of present Ram, he exists and simultaneous view point it is in-expressible. (syad asti avaktavyah). 6. From the present viewpoint past Rama does not exist and from the simultaneous point of view it is in-expressible (syad nasti avaktavyah). 7. From the point of view of present Rama, he exists, from the point of view of past Rama he does not exist and if we say simultaneously, then it is in-expressible (syadasti nasti avaktavyah). In this way seven kinds of predications are made. The basic kinds are three - Exists (asti), does not exists (nasti) and inexpressible (avaktavyah). By permutation of these three, seven kinds of predications come out in to existence. Niksepa Niksepa is a technical term for a method by which proper meaning of a word in the relevant context is grasped. There is a minor difference between naya and niksepa. Naya deals with a sentence and niksepa deals with a word. Naya conveys the proper meaning of a sentence and niksepa conveys suitable meaning of word in the context. There are four types of niksepa - 1.Nama (name) 2.Sthapana (symbol) 3.Dravya (potentiality) and 4.Bhava (actuality). 1. Nama Niksepa - A word used to name some person, thing etc. is nama niksepa, This name does not require its etymological meaning, for example a name Mahavira is used for a person who is coward by nama niksepa. A blind person may be Jyotiprakash (enlightened) by his name. Arihanta may be a name for a new born baby or for a building by nama niksepa.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 160 2. Sthapana Niksepa - When a word is used for an artificial identity of a person, thing etc. representing its original identity then it is called "Sthapana niksepa'. Through this niksepa a real character is understood in its image, picture, role etc. For example Rama was a son of king Dasharatha, but through Sthapana niksepa Rama word can be used for his statue or for a dramatist playing a role of Rama. By this niksepa a child understands a picture of peacock as a real peacock. An idol of Mahavira is treated as Tirthankara Mahavira by this niksepa. 3. Dravya niksepa - In dravya niksepaa word is used for a person, thing etc. on the basis of its past and future state. For example a student studying in a medical college may be called doctor on the basis of his future position. A patavari (a person serving in a village for farms measurement etc.) even after his retirement called as patavari on the basis of his past position. 4. Bhava niksepa - when an activity is also performed according to the use of a word then that is called bhava niksepa. for example when a person is engaged in teaching, then the use of teacher word is proper in the light of bhava niksepa. Thus use of word dancer is quite proper at the time of a person's dancing activity The concept of niksepa is useful for finding a proper meaning of a canonical word, but it is also useful in our daily life as well. Conclusion Theory of naya is ancient, unique and an original contribution of Jaina thinkers to the Indian tradition. It is clearly found in Anuyogadvara sutra and Tattvarthasutra. Application of drayarthika naya and paryayarthika naya is very much

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Naya, Nayabhasa and Niksepa 161 available in Vyakhyaprajnapti sutra when lord Mahavira replies to the various questions of inquisitive persons. For example in Vyakhyaprajnapti sutra a question was arose - Are souls eternal or non-eternal? Mahavira replied that from the point of view of substance the souls are eternal. They are never generated, but from the point of view of modes they are noneternal, because souls get different modes of living beings of the hell, the heaven and on the earth as animals, birds, insects, human beings, etc. This type of answering was prevalent in the canonical literature. Concept of niksepa is also an original contribution of Jainism to Indian tradition. It gives a view to investigate the proper suitable meaning of a word in the prevailing context. Bibliography Primary Sources: Adhyatmasara of Yasovijaya, with Hindi Translation and commentary by Sadhvi Pritidarsanasri, Ahmedabada: Sri Rajarajendendra Prakasana Trust, 2009. Anyayogavyvacchedadvatrimsika of Hemacandra as in Syadvadamanjari of Mallisena. (see Syadvadamanjari) Anuyogadvarasutra, Beawar: Agama Prakashana samiti, 1987. Dvadasaranayacakra, (ed) Muni Jambuvijaya, Bhavanagar : Atmanand Jain Sabha, 1966. Jaina-Tarka-Bhasa, Translated with Notes by Dayananda Bhargava, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1973 Jainendra-siddhanta-kosa (Vol.2), Delhi : Bhartiya-Jnanapitha Pramananayatattvaloka of Vadidevasuri, With Hindi Translation by Pt. Shobha Chandra Bharilla, Ahmedanagar: Shri Tiloka Ratna Sthanakavasi Jain Dharmika Parikna Board, 2000

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 162 Prameyakamalamartanna (Vol. 3) by Prabhacandrasuri, Hindi translation by Aryika Jinamati, Hastinapur: Digambara Jaina Triloka sodha samsthan. Sanmati- tarka by Siddhasenadivakara, English translation by A.S. Gopani, Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1939/2000. Sarvarthasiddhi by Acarya-Pujyapada, Delhi : Bharatiya Jnanapitha, 154 edition 2009. Syadvadamanjari of Mallisenasuri, A commentary on Anyayogavyavacchedadvatrimsika of Hemacandra, Agas: Param sruta prabhavaka mandala. 1992. Tattvarthaslokavartika, nayavivarana, published in Mailladhavala's Nayacakra (ed.) Kailasachandra sastri, Delhi : Bharatiya Jnanapitha, 1971. Tattvarthasutra, Translation with Hindi commentary by Pt. Sukhalal Sanghavi, Varanasi : Parshvanath vidyapitha, 5th edition 2001. Tattvartha-varttika of Bhatta Akalarka, Delhi : Bharatiya Jnanapitha, 8h edition 2008. Vyakhya prajnptisutra, Beawar:agama prakasana samiti Modern Sources Gokhale, Pradeep: "The Jaina Doctrine of Nayabhasa", Sambhasa, (Journal of the Department of Indian philosophy, University of Nagoya, Japan), Vol. 11, 1989. Jain, Dharm chand, "Naya evam Niksepa" (Hindi), Jaina Dharmadarsana : eka Anusilana, Jaipur: Prakrit Bharati Academy, 2015 Jain, Sagarmal: Jaina Philosophy of Language (English Translation by Prof. Surendra Verma), Varanasi: Parshvanath Vidyapitha, 2006 Padmarajiah, Y.J. (1963): A comparative study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and knowledge, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass.

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Concept of Consciousness In Jainism Philosophy is the root cause of origination and development of science, because philosophy gives ideas for inventions and experiments. But there is a basic difference between science and philosophy; science has made its field of experiments on matter (pudgala) only, whereas philosophy has much wider field of knowledge and formless entities like soul. If we think about the concept of Consciousness according to the various branches of science, then consciousness can be defined as the activity of sense-organs, mind, brain and the cells, on one hand and when consciousness is defined according to Jaina philosophy then it is an attribute of a soul, which could not be known through the empirical or materialistic instruments on the other hand. Consciousness and soul The word 'consciousness' is used mainly in two meanings - 1. Alertness (awareness) 2. Feeling of livingness (cetana). In Jainism 'apramada' word is used in the sense of alertness and 'upayoga', 'prana', 'sanjna' for the feeling of livingness. In Jainism, a soul is considered as the ultimate source of consciousness. Consciousness is the very nature of a soul with or without body. If the soul departs from the body, sense organs and brain do not work; the body is called dead. So it is a question for the scientists that how the consciousness arises and how it vanishes. Where does it come from and where does it go? Except the Carvaka thinkers, all the branches of Indian philosophy accept a concept of soul which is the source

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 164 of consciousness. Nyaya and Vaisesika philosophers mention soul as omnipresent, but they accept its consciousness limited to body. Vedanta philosophers propound omnipresent brahma and living beings as its part (caitnayamia). Buddhist philosophers do not accept soul as eternal entity. They accept a flow of consciousness which is called vijnana or citta. Jain philosophy is specific in this regard. It stresses that the soul of living beings resides within the body. Every living being is having a different or independent soul. A soul is a knower; sense organs, mind and brain are the instruments for knowing the objects. This soul has a nature of consciousness which serves consciousness in different parts of the body including brain, nervous system and every cell. It is difficult to define a soul, but consciousness is the very nature of a soul. According to Uttaradhyayanasutra knowledge (jnana) intuition or observation (darsana), conduct (caritra), penance (tapa), internal power (virya) and cognitive application (upayoga) are the nature of a soul'. We can know a soul through its attributes or activities. Knowledge (jnana) and observation (darsana) are the main characteristics of a soul. In Vyakhyaprajnapti sutra, it is stated that soul is knowledge (right or perverted) and knowledge is soul. Soul is darsana and darsana is soul?. In this way the nature of a soul can be defined as knowledge (jnana) and observation or intuition (darsana). Application of these two is called as upayoga. This upayoga is consciousness. Nanam ca damsanam ceva carittam ca tavo taha. viriyam uvaogo ya eyam jivassa lakkhanam - Uttaradhyayanasutra, 28.3 Goyama aya siya nane, siya annane, nane puna niyamam aya Goyama aya niyamam damsane, damsane vi niyamam aya. -Vyakhyaprajnapti sutra, Sataka 12, Uddesaka 10, Sutra 10-18

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Concept of Consciousness In Jainism There are eight types of soul - 1. A soul as a substance (dravyatma) 2. A soul with passions (kasayatma) 3. A soul with activities of mind, speech and body (yogatma) 4. A soul with cognitive activity (upayogatma) 5. A soul with attribute of knowledge (jnanatma) 6. A soul with attribute of intuition (darsanatma) 7. A soul with conduct (caritratma) and 8. A soul with attribute of internal power (viryatma)3. Basically a soul is a substance, but when it exhibits any of the above characteristics or it enjoins passions etc. then it is addressed by respective names. 165 Consciousness and its various levels Consciousness can be technically termed as 'upayoga' in Jainism. Upayoga is an application of cognitive and intuitive ability of a soul. Consciousness includes an attitude, vision and conduct of a living being. Cognition of happiness and sorrow also denote consciousness. There are many levels of consciousness; we can put them in the following categories: 1) Consciousness as apramattata or alertness. 2) Consciousness as upayoga or knowing activity. 3) Consciousness as prana (active ability of sense organs, mind, speech, body, respiration and life-span). 4) Consciousness in mind 5) Consciousness in body 6) Consciousness as sanjna (eagerness to eat, feeling fear, sexual desire, desire of possessiveness). 7) Consciousness as vedana 3 8) Consciousness expressed in virya or enthusiasm. Vyakhyaprajnaptisutra, Sataka 12, Uddesaka 10, Sutra 1

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 166 In this way, there are many levels or kinds of consciousness experienced by a living being. A pure and complete consciousness is found in the liberated souls (having destroyed the eight karmas") and in pious souls having destroyed the four ghati karmas (namely jnanavarana, darsanavarana, mohaniya and antaraya). Variations in Consciousness and apramattata Mostly living beings on the earth are having karmic bondage, hence the consciousness is not fully manifested in them. There are six categories of the living beings on the basis of variation in manifestation of the consciousness. The living beings having only one tactile sense organ are the lowest in manifestation of their consciousness. Two sensed beings can manifest more consciousness than one sensed, three sensed beings more than the two sensed beings; In this way five sensed beings are able to manifest more consciousness. The being having mind with the five sense organs are quite more able in expressing consciousness. The human beings possessing a right view can express more consciousness. The degree of consciousness increases in experience of pious conduct and character. In Jainism a holy monk with five mahavratas ((i)abstinence from violence (ii) abstinence from falsehood (iii) abstinence from theft (iv) abstinence from sexual desire (v) abstinence from possessiveness), five samitis or vigilances (in movement, speaking, eating, handling things and evacuation) and three guptis (as control of mind, speech and body) bears more vividness in consciousness. A monk having alertness in Eight karmas are - jnanavarana, darsanavarana, vedaniya, mohaniya, ayusya, nama, gotra and antaraya.

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Concept of Consciousness In Jainism 167 every activity expresses more consciousness. In this way living with alertness shows high level of consciousness. A laity man having five small vows is also on the path to live with better consciousness than a lay man, if he is alert in doing activity with awareness. Consciousness as upayoga 'Upayoga' denotes the cognitive function of a living being. It includes knowing through sense organs, mind and directly through a soul. * Upayoga is of two kinds i) Knowing in a constructive or articulate form i.e. (jnana) ii) Knowing in nirvikalpaka or in-articulate form i.e. darsana. Jnana and darsana are the key factors of upayoga or cognitive function. In Nandisutra and other texts of Jain philosophy five types of knowledge are mentioned as matijnana (sensuous knowledge), srutajnana (scriptural or verbal knowledge), avadhijnana (visual intuition), manahparyaya jnana (intuition of mental modes) and kevaljnana (pure and perfect knowledge). Among these knowledges matijnana appears in a soul through sense-organs, or mind or by both. Sense organs and mind are the instruments; consciousness comes in these organs from the soul. Matijnana or abhinibodhika jnana includes recognition, thinking, reasoning, intellect and inference in it. Knowledge of former birth (jati smarana jnana) is also a phenomenon of matijnana. Four types of intellect (autpattiki, vainayiki, karmaja and parinamiki) are also the part of matijnana. All intellectual activities of a person denote consciousness. Srutajnana appears

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition in a living being as verbal knowledge or as discriminative knowledge (vivekajnana). Discriminative knowledge is a significant nature of consciousness. Avadhijnana, manahparyayajnana and kevalajnana appear directly in a soul. Through avadhijnana material world can be known without the use of sense organs and mind. manahparyayajnana is also direct knowledge, by which mental modes of others are known by a conscious monk. Kevalajnana is a pure and perfect knowledge with which everything and its every mode is perceived lucidly. 168 Knowledge illuminates itself as well as the object. In Niyamasara Acarya Kundakunda propounds the selfluminosity of knowledge. He says - "Knowledge is not without a soul and soul is not without knowledge. It is doubtless, hence, knowledge is self and object illuminating. Darsana is also self and object illuminating like knowledge." Darsana is also a significant term in Jain scriptures to denote consciousness. It is an in-articulate cognition, which is succeeded by articulate-cognition i.e. knowledge. There are four types of darsana- (a) caksu-darsana (in-articulate cognition through eyes) (b) Acaksu-darsana ( in-articulate cognition through mind and sense organs other than eyes) (c) Avadhi-darsana (in-articulate cognition directly by soul succeeded by avadhi-jnana) (d) Kevala-darsana (in-articulate cognition or intuition directly by a soul succeeded by Kevalajnana). appanam vinu nanam, nanam vinu appago na samdeho tamha saparapayasam nanam taha damsanam hodi II - Niyamasara, 171

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Concept of Consciousness In Jainism 169 Every soul has an essential attribute of in-articulate cognition and articulate cognition. Both of these cognitive attributes are manifested as consciousness in a sequence of inarticulate and articulate manner. The scientists have explored the system of knowing through sense organs and their link with the nervous system and brain, but they do not have reached up to the source of consciousness. There are four stages of knowing the material objects through sense organs i.e. avagraha, Tha, avaya and dharana. Avagraha is a primary knowledge in which an object is known without its specific properties. Iha is a knowledge having inclination to know the object with its property, and the ascertaining knowledge about the object is called avaya. When that avaya knowledge goes into retention, then it is named as dharana knowledge. These four stages are very important in learning process. Why children do not learn the lesson properly? Its answer is lying in the Jaina principle of learning through stages of matijnana. This principle is useful in the educational psychology. This is a psychological science of learning that if a learning process is up to retention, then memory takes place. Without retention memory cannot take place. Consciousness as Prana Prana (vitality) is another technical term in Jaina scriptures which shows consciousness in a living being. This 'prana' word has a different meaning from the meaning which is referred in Yoga philosophy. In Yoga philosophy prana word has been used for vital airs which are of five kinds- prana (air inhaled and exhaled), apana (air goes out through anus), vyana

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 170 (air pervaded in the whole body), udana (air in the throat), samana (air in the stomach). In Jainism pranas are of 10 types 1. Auditory sense 2. Visual sense 3.Olfactory sense 4. Gustatory sense 5. Tactile sense 6. Mental force 7. Power of speech 8. Power of body 9. Respiration and 10. Karma related to life span (ayusya karma). The Pranas depict the living power of the five sense organs, body, speech, mind, respiration and ayusya karma. Every sense organ has power to work. If that sense organ is damaged or harmed then that does not work as knowing instrument. A person can live life even in the non-working position of some sense organs, but the working power of sense organs denotes consciousness. I hear a word. I see a bird, I smell a flower, I taste a candy. I touch a chair- all these knowing activities show consciousness of sense organs and also of a knower. A knower remains the same in knowing process with the help of different sense organs. We feel consciousness in the functioning of mind and speech. We feel consciousness in the whole body also. In the violence these pranas are affected and at the time of death these pranas are destroyed. According to Jainism sense organs, body, mind, speech are made of pudgala or material contents, but these are having consciousness due to association with the conscious soul. Consciousness in Mind In Jainism, mind is made of matter (pudgala), but it has a quality of thinking and desire, hence mind also bears consciousness. A conscious mind is very useful for the real development of a human being. If it is controlled or restrained, then it is useful for spiritual development, if it is uncontrolled or wanton, it is a big cause for fall of a person. Neurologists talk about brain and accept that mind is a product of brain.

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Concept of Consciousness In Jainism 171 According to Svetambara Jain texts this mind is a separate entity and pervaded in the whole body, whereas Digamber texts, accept its shape as eight feathered lotus flower and its residence is in the heart only. But mind is used in every knowing activity of sense organs and its own. In Vyakhyaprajnapti sutra a question has been raised that a mind is conscious (sacitta) or unconscious (acitta)? Answer has been given that mind is not conscious, it is unconscious'. Here it is to be clarified that mind is different from a soul and it is made of matter or pudgala", hence it is not conscious, but it is found only in living beings' and formed at the time of thinking only. A sense organ is associated with an object, mind is associated with that sense organ and the soul is associated with the mind. This is the procedure of knowing the objects through sense organs. Somewhere a soul can know the objects directly through the mind. Sorrow and happiness can be known in this manner. Psychologists accept mind as a separate entity and Freud mentions three types of mind as-conscious, unconscious and sub-conscious. We are aware of the conscious mind. A big part of our mind remains unconscious, which has a store of imprints of our unfulfilled wants and samskaras. Sub-conscious mind has a function to get some feelings or desires from conscious mind to unconscious mind and from unconscious mind to conscious mind. Sacitte bhante! mane? Goyama! No sacitte mane, acitte mane. - Vyakhyaprajnapti sutra, Sataka 13 Uddesaka 7, Sutra 11(2) Aya bhante! Mane? Anne mane? Goyama! No aya mane, anne mane -Ibid, sutra 10 Ruvi bhante! mane aruvi mane? Goyama ruvi mane, no aruvi mane - Ibid, sutra 11(1) Jivanam bhante mane, ajivanam mane? Goyama! jivanam mane no ajivanam mane - Ibid sutra 11(4) Puvvim bhante mane, mannijjamane mane? Mana-samaya-viikkante mane? Goyama! No puvvim mane, mannijjamane mane no mana-samaya-viikkante mane-Ibid, sutra 12

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 172 Consciousness in body Jaina scriptures enumerate five types of bodies as {1} Gross body (audarika) {2}Protean body(vaikriya) {3}Translocational body(aharaka) {4}Luminious body (taijasa sarira) {5}Karmic body (karmanasarira). In these five types of body, we are aware of the gross body only. All human beings, animals, birds, insects, plants etc. are having gross or audarika body. This body is made of gross material. Vaikriya body is found in heavenly bodies (devas) and hell bodies (narakas) by birth. In human beings this body may enjoin the gross body after some required spiritual achievement. This body can have different modes on the will of its owner. Aharaka or translocational body is a subtle body which is used by a monk having a vast knowledge of 14 purvas. This body is used to get answers from a Tirthankara residing in a distant place like Mahavideha. This subtle body comes out from the gross body and after getting answer, it enters again at its place. This body may be a mystery for the biologists. Taijasa and Karmic bodies are more subtle and these are not obstructed by any obstacle. These two bodies are found in every non-liberated soul. Karmic body is a store house of Karma- bondage, and Luminous or Taijasa body maintains a level of energy and it is helpful in the procedure of digestion etc. These two subtle bodies live with a soul even in the way of getting a new birth. Biologists have done experiments on gross body, but they do not know about vaikriya, aharak, taijasa and karmic bodies. In present human beings vaikriya and aharaka bodies are often unavailable, but taijasa and Karmic bodies are liable for investigation. If something is known after experiments that might be a pace in the biological science, knowing the mystery of life.

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Concept of Consciousness In Jainism 173 Consciousness as Sanjna An instinct desire or sanjna also indicate consciousness in a living being. There are four famous sanjnas - 1. Eagerness for food (ahara sanjna) 2. Feeling of fear (bhaya sanjna) 3.Sexual desire (maithuna sanjna) 4. Desire of possessiveness (parigraha sanjna). These four sanjnas are experienced in every living being including in the plants. Every living being feels hunger and wants to take food. It makes an effort for gaining food. The feeling of fear is also a characteristic of worldly living beings. All living beings fear from death, harm etc. This fear is found only in the worldly soul. Sexual desire is also a phenomenon of consciousness. This desire may have three forms - 1. Desire of intercourse of a male with female. 2. Desire of intercourse of a female with male. 3. Sexual desire of hermaphrodite. This is a desire of reproduction. Possessiveness is also found in conscious beings. Human beings, insects and even plants bear this phenomenon. The non-living things do not bear these four sanjnas. Consciousness as Vedana Vedana is another technical term of Jainism, which denotes an experience of happiness and sorrow, coldness and hotness etc. by a living being. This 'vedana' is felt on the level of mind and body. It may be a result of the karma-bondage. Pleasure or comfort may be felt through five sense organs and mind. Consciousness as Virya Enthusiasm (virya) is also a significant nature of consciousness. A living being feels enthusiasm with in him to

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition do something. Where does from this enthusiasm come? Generally it is accepted that enthusiasm comes from the food which we eat. Vaidic statement 'annam vai pranah' proves it. It is true that without food body cannot run for a long time. Food is the source of energy to work through body. Body is made of matter (pudgal), so materialistic (paudgalika) food is required to sustain it. Soul has its own enthusiasm or power which is expressed in mental power and in emotional balance. Soul gives consciousness to body, but it has to leave the body, if that is not capable to sustain with consciousness. If the body is decayed and pranas are arrested then soul leaves that body and goes to take birth in a new body with two subtle bodies namely taijas and karmana. Conclusion 174 Science has reached in its research up to consciousness of brain, cells and genes and it has proved that cells of the body are changing every moment. Body cells are renewed in a certain time interval; hence food is needed for this activity of change. This gross body cannot survive without food. According to Jainism, animation in gross body, brain, genes etc. is found due to consciousness of the soul. In the presence of a soul all of these work consciously. Science has done experiments on the matter or pudgala having eight touch qualities". Gross body, blood, brain, genes are the matter of eight touch qualities. Jaina scriptures propound a matter of four touch quality and two touch quality also. Karmana and Taijas bodies are the example of four touch 11 Eight types of touch are - cold, hot, smooth (positive charge), rough (negative charge), light, heavy, soft and hard.

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Concept of Consciousness In Jainism 175 quality matter. These should be taken up for an experiment by the scientists. Paramanu or atom in Jainism has been propounded with a quality of two touches of smooth (positive charge) or rough (negative charge) and hotness or coldness. Matter can be the part of experiment by instrument, but the real consciousness of soul is difficult to come under the purview of experiments. Its approval has three sources according to Jaina philosophers 1. Self-perception or self-realization 2. Inference- There are many logical arguments by which an entity of soul is approved. In Rajaprasniyasutra Kesisramana has given so many arguments to king Pradeshi for establishment of a soul which is different from a body. Sense organs, mind are the instruments; someone should be the user of these instruments and that user is a soul. 3. Canonical literature- The enlightened souls have told about the independent existence of a soul, by which consciousness is felt in a body. It is interesting to know that violence of pranas, falsehood, theft, sexual copulation, possessiveness, anger, pride, deceit, greed, attachment, aversion etc. 18 sins appear in a soul", but these are having a characteristic of subtle pudgal having five colours, two odours, five tastes and four touches (cold, hot, smooth and hard). Scientists have done experiments on subtle matter, but still they have to do experiments on the intensity of anger, pride, deceit, greed, attachment, aversion etc. 12 Vyakhyaprajnapti Sutra, Sataka 20, Uddesaka 3, Sutra 1

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 176 These experiments will help a human being in understanding the intensity of these passions and disorder. Knowing the intensity a person will be aware enough to reduce these sinful emotions and activities. At present the examination of blood, sonography, MRI, CT scan are quiet helpful in the physical health. The examination of anger etc. will be quiet helpful for mental and spiritual health. Bibliography Niyamasara of Kundakunda, Jaipur : Kundakunda Kahana Trust, Todarmal, Smaraka, Uttaradhyayanasutra (Part 3), Prakrit with Hindi translation and commentary, Jaipur: Samyagjnana Pracaraka Mandala, 1987 Vyakhya prajnaptisutra, Beawar, Agama prakasana samiti.

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism Today, we have conflicts in our life regarding mutual relations and behavior. Conflicts arise due to our wrong beliefs and misunderstandings. We adhere to our thoughts and opinions but discard others thoughts and opinions because of narrow mindedness and prejudices. Although the religions in the world have a motto to unite the people of the world in brotherhood and love, but due to mal-intentions of the leaders and staunchness of the followers, some conflicts prevail among the religions. The humanity suffers from mutual aversion of the followers towards other religions. Conflict is not bad, if it gives rise to the development of human values, philosophy and the nation, but it is shocking when it converts into fundamentalism and intolerance. It is well known from the history that countless wars have been fought in the name of the religions. Many staunch followers do not understand the real essence of the religion and they consider themselves better than other religious followers. Hence, they hate others. This tendency is prevalent everywhere, among the family members, society and between the nations. Future of the human world depends on education, which a person gets at home and through various courses and *Somewhere conflict inspires and motivates a person to become better in thoughts and deeds. He makes efforts to surpass his competence by increasing qualities within him. Hence sanskrit poet Bharavi says-Conflict with great pure-hearted persons is good: (varam virodhopi samam mahatmabhih, Kiratarjuniyam, 1.8)

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition curriculum taught at various institutes. Education has a very significant role in developing and building the mental understanding of a human being. If a person is lacking spiritual and moral values in education, then, conflicts among the people arise more frequently. For maintaining peace, harmony and mutual cooperation with positive attitude towards all human beings and the other living beings of the world, spiritual and moral values must be included in the world education. A person faces conflicts in his own life due his mismanagement of thought process and misunderstanding about the reality and priority order of the works to be done. In this respect, proper education with spiritual and moral values can help. to 178 Jain religion and philosophy has many tenets for development of right understanding and deciding the right conduct to avoid conflicts in the minds of the people. A few of them are- non-absolutism, non-violence, tolerance, forgiveness, truthfulness, honesty, celibacy, limiting the possessions, theory of karma etc. All of these provide vision and can change the mentality of a person to remove the conflict. These can also help in bringing peace, harmony and solutions to many man-made problems. Vision of Anekantavada And Nayavada Jaina philosophy has given us a thought of nonabsolutism i.e. anekantavada which establishes unity in diversities and harmony among the people of different ideologies. It gives an idea to honour others ideology. In the world, reality is one and the same, but the philosophers view it from different visions and mention the truth in different

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism 179 ways. We can't say that the views of one philosopher are right while others are wrong. They may be true from their angle, hence the harmony towards the persons of different ideas should be maintained. We can have an example of the photographs of a building taken from different angles. Every photograph is true from an angle, but we can't say that photograph taken by me is only true and other photographs are wrong. Here, all the photographs depict a photo of the same object from the different angles; hence all the photographs may be correct from different points of view. We have to examine the truth or true value of all the photographs. Similarly all the religious and philosophical thoughts have some truth or true value, but we have to examine and then accept them. This is the message of anekantavada of Jain philosophy. Anekantavada suggests us that the thoughts of different individuals may have some component of truth, hence we should try to understand and respect others point of view. It will help us avoiding many possible conflicts and resolving them in a harmonious atmosphere. Tirthankara Mahavira has propounded many views to know and to examine the objects. In Jaina canonical text vyakhyaprajnapti sutra, a question was raised about the universe (loka) - Is the loka endless or has an end? Mahavira replied this question from four points of views from the point of view of substance (dravya) the universe is finite. From the point of view of space also it is finite. From the point of view of time it is endless and from the view of modes -

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition (paryaya) also it is infinite.' This technique of understanding and explaining the things is found in Jain canonical literature. Many questions have been replied from the different views. A question was raised as to whether the worldly souls are eternal or non-eternal? Mahavira replied that from the substantial point of view souls are eternal but from the view of modes (or change) they are non-eternal. This method of answering has been accepted widely in Jain canonical literature. So in the case of conflicts we have to look at the problem from different viewpoints. Non-absolutism of Jaina philosophy prevents an individual to be dogmatic and one sided in approach. It pleads for a broader outlook and an open mindedness which can resolve the conflicts that emerge from differences in ideologies and faiths. A renowned Jaina philosopher Siddhasen Divakara (5th Century) has rightly said "All schools of thought (nayas) are valid when they are understood from their own standpoints and as far as they do not discard the truth or true value of others"." 3 180 Jainism has developed frameworks of nayas to observe the object in Anekantavad. A naya can be defined as a standpoint to know the object. It does not rule out other different view-points and expresses a partial truth about an object. These nayas or standpoints may be many in number, but Jaina philosophers have discussed mainly two nayas as 1. 'Vyakhyaprajnapti-sutra (vol. 1) Sataka 2, Uddesaka 1, Sutra 24 'Ibid, Vol. 2, Sataka 7, Uddesaka 2, Sutra 36 'Sanmatitarka, 1.28: niyaya vayanijjasacca savvanaya paraviyalane moha. te una na ditthasamao vibhayai sacce va alie va. *Laghiyastraya, verse 52: nayo jnaturabhiprayo.

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism 181 Substance stand point (dravyarthika naya), 2. Mode view point (paryayarthika naya). These two nayas solve the problems of eternity and non-eternity of reality, which are propounded respectively by Vendantists and Buddhists. Both these schools have confrontation about defining the reality. Vedanta philosophy propounds reality as eternal and Buddhism explains it as non-eternal. Jaina philosophy solves this problem by giving theory of standpoints. According to Jainism, reality is eternal from the viewpoint of substance and it is non-eternal from the viewpoint of modes. This naya theory weaves together the two opposite philosophical tenets and accepts that every substance of the world can be thought to have two opposite characters. From the view point of substance everything is permanent, but from the viewpoint of modes everything is changing every moment. In Jaina view, every entity of the world has multiple characters and we do not perceive all the characters at the moment. Hence, logically it will be wrong to deny the existence of characteristics that we do not perceive. The real entity is the same for all the viewers but there is a difference due to their own perspective. In other words we can say that unity and diversity are the two facets of the same reality. Reality itself is unity in diversity. From the generic point of view, unity is perceived and from the specific point of view diversity is observed. 'Pramananayatattvaloka 7.5: samasatastu dvibhedo dravyarthikah paryayarthikasca. 'Syadvadamanjari, p.10.16 (on verse 5) sarve hi bhava dravyarthikanayapeksaya nityah, paryayarthikanayadesat punaranityah.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Jainism also propounds two standpoints in a different way niscaya naya (spiritual viewpoint) and vyavahara naya (empirical viewpoint). Niscaya naya leads a person to the spiritual truth, whereas vyavhara naya puts him forward for a good conduct. These two viewpoints are complementary to each other. If a person stresses only on niscaya naya then he may sideline the code of conduct and proper behavior. And if he stresses on vyavahara naya then he may derail from his ultimate goal. Hence there is a need of both the nayas for real progress towards the ultimate goal. 182 Jaina Philosophers also propounded seven standpoints naigama naya, samgrahanaya, vyavaharanaya, rjusutranaya, sabdanaya, samabhirudhanaya and evambhutanaya.' Out of these seven standpoints first three are substance viewpoints and next four depict the viewpoint of modes. In another classification first four of these are considered as artha naya and rest three are classified as sabda naya.' These nayas help in understanding the motif of a speaker. Apart from these seven nayas, theory of sevenfold predication also exists. In these predications a word 'syat' is used in a determinate perspective as syad asti, syad nasti, syad asti-nasti, syad avaktavya, syad asti avaktavya, syad nasti avaktaya, syad asti-nasti avaktavya. as 'Anuyogadvarasutra: 606, p. 467: se kim tam nae? satta mulanaya pannatta. tam jaha negame samgahe vavahare ujjusue sadde samabhirudhe evambhute. 'Pramananayatattvaloka 7.6 and 27: adyo naigama-samgrahavyavaharabhedat tredha. paryayarthikascaturdha rjusutrah sabdah samabhirudha evambhutasca. 'Laghiyastraya, verse 72: catvaro-arthanaya hyete jivadyarthavyapasrayat. trayah sabdanayah satyapadavidyam samasritah.

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism 183 Here it is to be quotable that Jaina philosopher Mallisena (13"century)and Yasovijaya (17th century) have categorically mentioned that Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers represent naigama naya, Samkhya and Vedanta philosophers represent samgrahanaya, Carvaka view point represents vyavaharanaya, Buddhist philosophy represents rjusutranaya and the philosophers of grammar may represent sabda naya." In this way Jaina philosophers perceive the various Indian philosophies from the different points of views and give regard to them to establish harmony. A person should leave the attitude of obstinacy that he is only true and rest of the people are wrong. If a view point denies other viewpoints then that is counted as fallacious. Yasovijaya says: - "A true non-absolutism does not disdain any faith but treats all the salvation oriented faiths equally as a father behaves to his sons. 11 (1) Syadvada-manjari of Mallisena, p. 248: tatha hi naigamanayadarsananusarinau Naiyayika-Vaisesikau. sangrabhiprayapravsttah sarvepyadaivatavada samkhya-darsamca. vyavaharanayanupati prayascarvaka-darsanam. rjusutrakuta - pravsttabuddhayas-tathagatah. sabdadinayavalambino vaiyakaranadayah. (2) Yasovijaya says in Adhyatamasara : verse 879: bauddhanamsjustrato matamabhud vedantinam samgrahat samkhyanam tata eva naigamanayad yogasca vaisesikah 11 sabdabrahmavido'pi sabdanayatah sarvairnayairgumphita | Jaini drstiritiha saratarata pratyaksamudviksyate II Adhyatmopanisad, verse 69-70: ---- yasya sarvatra samata nayesu tanyesviva. tasyanekantavadasya kva nyunadhikasemukhi. tena syadvadamalambya sarvadarsana-tulyatam. moksoddesavisesena yah pasyati sa sastravit.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 184 Jaina philosophers have assimilated Anekantavada in their thinking, hence they regard other thinkers with equal respect. Acarya Haribhadrasuri says : "I possess no bias for Mahavira and no aversion against Kapila and other saints and thinkers. Whosoever is rational and logical ought to be accepted". Haribhadra says again :-"I venerate all those who are free from all vices and filled with virtues, be they Brahma, Visnu, Siva or Jina.". Acarya Hemcandra proclaims : 'I worship him who have destroyed attachment and aversion, the seeds of birth, be he Brahma, Visnu, Siva or Jina":14 This is the liberal attitude of Jaina philosophers towards other religions or sects. They give stress on perfection which denotes the eradication of attachment and aversion. Jaina worship the merit of a person. In the sacred namaskaramantra of Jainas, veneration is paid to the spiritual posts such as arhat, siddha, acarya, upadhyaya and sadhu.' 15 "Lokatattvanirnaya, verse 38 : paksapato na me vire na dvesah, Kapiladinu Yuktimad vacanam yasya, tasya karyah parigrahah. "Lokatattvanirnaya, verse 40 yasya nikhilasca dosa na santi sarve gunasca vidyante. brahma va visnur va haro jino va namastasmai. "Sri Mahadeva-stora, 44 bhavabijankurajanana ragadya ksayamupagata yasya. brahma va visnur va haro jino va namastasmai. Vyakhyaprajnapti sutra, Vol. 1.1.1 : Namo arahamtanam, namo siddhanam, namo ayariyanam, namo uvajjhayanam, namo loye savva sahunam.

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism 185 Jain philosophers have consistently shown reverence to other ideologies and faiths. Sutrakstanga- the second earliest Jaina work, mentions that those who praise their own faith and views and disregard those of their opponents, possess, malice against them and hence remain confined to cycle of birth and death." A famous Jaina old text the Isibhasiyaim comprises the teaching of 45 saints of sramana and Brahmana traditions such as Narada, Bharadvaja, Mankhali Gosal and many others have been presented with due regards of Arhat Rsi.' Vision of Non-Violence Non-violence (Ahimsa) is another tenet of Jainism which bears universal value and has a capacity to resolve conflicts. The concept of non-violence is accepted by almost all religions of the world, but Jainism observes it minutely. Jainism prohibits not only killing of human beings and animals but of the vegetable kingdom as well." Harming the plants, polluting water and air are also the acts of violence. Jainism has favoured non-violence for co-existence of all living beings. It cares not only the life of human beings, but it also cares for the life of animals, birds, insects, serpents, plants, aquatic kingdom etc. Mahavira suggested that no "Sutrakstaniga 1.1.2.23 : Sayam sayam pasamsamta garahamta paramvayam, je u tattha viussamti, samsaram te viussiya. "'Devanaradena arhata isina buiyam- Isibhasiyaim, 1.1 and in other chapters also refer it. Jainism accepts six categories of worldly souls as- earth bodied (prthvikayika), water bodied (apkayika), fire bodied (tejaskayika), air bodied (vayukayika), vegetables (vanaspatikayika) and mobile beings having two sense organs to five sense organs and mind (one word for all these is trasakayika).

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 186 living being should be killed, governed, made slave, tortured and made restless." All these are considered as violence in the view of Jainism. Hence violence is not just killing a living being but any form of torture, exploitation, mental or physical harm is also violence. Violence may occur through our mind, speech and actions. Not only this, but to motivate or support others for violence is also considered as violence. In this way non-violence has a much broader connotation. It provides directive ways to think, speak and behave in such a manner that doesn't hurt anyone. First of all, violence generates in our mind, and then it comes to our speech and actions giving rise to conflicts. Hence, non-violence can act as an important instrument in conflict removal. Firstly, it will avoid many possible conflicts, and in case of remaining conflicts the broader form of non-violence can guide us to the best remedy for conflict removal. Ahimsa is not merely non-violence, it has its positive social aspect and that can be called as friendliness (maitri) to all living beings. Amitagati in Samayika patha says: "Friendliness towards all beings, delightedness on the qualities of virtuous ones, utmost compassion for afflicted beings, equanimity towards those who are not well disposed towards me, May O Lord! my soul have such dispositions as these forever." "Acarangasutra 1.4.1: savve pana savve bhuta savve jiva savve satta na hamtavva, na ajjavetavva, na parighetavva, na paritaveyavva, na uddaveyavva. * Paramatma-dvatrinsika 1: sattvesu maitrim gunisu pramodam, klistesu jivesu krpaparatvam; madhyasthabhavam viparitavsttau, sada mamatma vidadhatu deva.

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism Acaranga sutra establishes an importance of other's life. It mentions: 'All worldly souls love their life, they wish to relish pleasure, loathe misery, hurt or injury is not desired by anybody, life is dear to all, and they all want to live. Life is dear to all beings." ,,21 187 This statement gives a message to understand and protect others life and their right to live. Every living being wants to live, nobody wants to be killed. We should honour their right to live and we should adopt our lifestyle without killing or lesser killing. This lifestyle will help us in removing mutual conflicts among the people and the living beings. Today, a person wants to increase his power by adopting violent attitude and behaviour. He forgets the value of others life and emotions. Jaina canonical literature describes the concept of six categories of worldly souls (sadnikaya) and infinite number of souls. Jaina philosophy accepts every soul as an independent or separate entity. Every soul has its own emotions, passions and virtues. 22 Sutrakrtanga sutra tries to make a man sensitive towards all beings of the world. It says: 21 This kind of preaching of non-violence (ahimsa) is not limited to the human beings; its sphere goes to all the beings of the world. In Acaranga and Sutrakrtanga non-violence "Acarangasutra 1.2.3: savve pana piyauya suhasaya dukkhapadikula appiyavaha piyajivino, jiviukama savvesim jiviyam piyam 22Mentioned in the footnote 18 Sutrakrtanga 2.1.19 "As you feel pain at the time of beating or torturing by others, so others also feel in that way"." 23 23

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 188 has a social aspect that motivates a man to become sensitive to others with compassion and friendliness.Violent behaviour is enemy for the society, but non-violence is a friend for it. For co-existence and peace of the society, nonviolent and friendly behaviour is essential. It applies for all the beings - be it mobile (trasa) or the immobile (sthavara). In this way by developing empathy for other living beings, non-violence can play a big role in removal of conflict. There is a misconception in our minds that violence and wars are the instruments for bringing peace in our life, but it is notable that violence can never bring peace in our minds and hearts. This thinking generates conflicts in our minds many times with other human beings, but a spot of blood on a cloth never can be washed by blood. Only nonviolence is helpful in establishing internal equanimity and peace. Actually impure thought injures the real nature of a soul by disturbing its equanimity. This is called sva-hinsa i.e. violence of the self. This violence is more harmful, because it harms one own self and the others too. External violence occurs after internal violence. Hence, first we have to control the violence on internal level. Weapons and wars are not actual instruments for establishing peace. Acaranga Acaranga and Sutrakstanga sutras stress on the sensitivity of a living being and propound that every living being wants to live, nobody wants sorrow, as acaranga (1.4.2) says- savvesim pananam savvesim bhutanam savvesim sattanam asayam aparinivvanam mahabhayam dukkham ti, tti bemi. Acarangasutra : 1.1.2 : tam se ahitaya tam se abodhiye. **Prasnavyakarana 2.1.3: esa sa bhagavai ahimsa ja sa bhiyanam viva saranam, pakkhinam viva gamanam tisiyanam viva salilam tasa-thavarasavva-bhuya-khemarikari.

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism sutra explains that weapons may be superior to each other, but nothing is superior to non-violence." 27 189 Although complete non-violence is difficult for a householder, but he can avoid killing as much as possible. Dr Sagarmal Jain has rightly said: "According to Jaina point of view, all the beings have equal right to lead a peaceful life. Though violence is unavoidable, yet it cannot be the directive principle of our living, because it goes against the judgments of our faculty of reasoning. If I think that nobody has any right to take my life, on the same ground I have no right to take another's life". 28 He further says: "Though in our worldly life complete non-violence is not possible, yet our motto should be-'Lesser violence is better living" ,,29 Right Attitude, Right Knowledge And Right Conduct Jainism is a religion and philosophy of salvation from sorrows. Fallacious view, nescience (wrong knowledge) and misconduct are the causes of suffering. Fallacious view is the cause of wrong knowledge and wrong knowledge is the cause of misconduct which includes passions (emotions) of anger, pride, deceit and greed. All these passions put a person into sorrows. Such a person remains tensed and creates tension for others. It generates confrontation with other people. This confrontation may be avoided by developing right view, which is helpful in 27 "Acaranga Sutra 1.3.4: Atthi sattham parena param, natthi asattham parena param. Peace, Religious Harmony and Solution of World Problems from Jaina perspective, p.57 "Ibid, p.57

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 190 understanding the nature of the world and reality. Jainism underscores the value of right world-view (samyagdarsana), right knowledge (samyagjnana) and right conduct (samyakcaritra) for the attainment of salvation and removal of conflicts forever. This path is quite individualistic, because it requires detachment from all worldly affairs. Samyag darsana bears an essential characteristic of kindness (anukampa)." Kindness is a very important aspect of an individual towards the society and other beings of the world. In the absence of kindness or compassion (karuna) one may not have samyagdarsana and in the absence of samyagdarsana eternal liberation from worldly sorrows does not occur according to Jainism." Hence a right attitude with kindness towards other souls or societies of all beings is essential for ultimate liberation and liberation from conflicts. Right knower (Samyagjnanin), a person having samyagjnana changes his behavior from negative to positive towards the other human beings. When he proceeds in right conduct (caritra), his attitude towards the society bears a radical change. His anger (krodha) changes into forgiveness (ksama), pride into politeness, deceit into simplicity and greed into contentment." His jealousy converts into love. He loves everybody. He does not love ** Tattvarthasutra 1.1: samyagdarsanajnanacaritrani moksamargah. "Tattvarthadhigamabhasya 1.2: tadevam prasama-amveganirvedanukampastikyabhivyaktilaksanam tattvarthasraddhanam samyagdarsanam. Uttradhyayanasutra 28.30: nadamsanissa nanam, nanena vina na hunti caranaguna. agunissa natthi mokkho natthi amokkhassa nivvanam. Dasavaikalikasutra 8.39: uvasamena hane koham manam maddavaya jine; mayam cajjavabhavena lobham samtosao jine.

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism 191 others for his own empirical pleasures, but for the purification of the self. This radical change towards the society occurs after the attainment of samyagjnana. It controls the behaviour of a person towards himself and to others. He understands that as I feel pleasure in favourable conditions, so do others in those conditions, and as I feel grief in unfavourable conditions, so do others. This thinking tilts a person for real welfare of the world. Rightly has been expressed in Bshatkalpabhasya (4584): "What you desire for yourself, desire for others too; and what you do not desire for yourself, do not desire for others at all- this is the essence of preaching of Jina". This is echoed in Sanskrit literature also - "A person should not behave with others adversely, which is meant adverse for himself".* As we expect good conduct, graceful and respectful behavior from others, so should be our behaviour with others, protecting their self-esteem and dignity. What we do not like from others, we should not behave in that manner. This is an essential principle of social behaviour given in Jaina literature. It is also echoed in Acaranga curni in some different words- "As I like pleasure and happiness, others also like these and as I dislike grief and sorrow, others also do not like them." Brhatkalpa bhasya 4584 : jam icchasi appanatto, jam ca na icchasi appanatto; tam iccha parassa vi, ettiyagam jinasasanas. atmanah pratikulani paresam na samacaret.(a renowned verse). * Acarangacurni 1.1.6: "Jaha me itthanithe suhasuhe taha savvajivanam"

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 192 This thinking can protect us from indulging in conflicts with the people we deal with. Conduct of Five Anuvratas Five vows of partial renunciation (anuvratas) are also helpful in removal of conflicts and preparing good citizens of any country. Five anuvratas are mentioned as abstinence from killing a life (pranatipataviramana), abstinence from falsehood (mosavada-viramana), abstinence from stealing (adattadana-viramana), satisfaction with own spouse only (svadara or svapatisantosa parimana) and limiting the possession (parigraha parimana) or limiting the desires (icchavidhiparimana vrata)." These anuvratas have social, moral and spiritual values. A person pursuing these anuvratas cannot be harmful to the society. He may be beneficial in some respect. He bears humanity in him and behaves with compassion and restraint. The main benefits of these partial vows can be summarised as below.. 1. Compassion and equality towards other living beings be observed in this manner that their equal right to live is safe. 2. Nothing should be told in such a manner that it might cause embarrassment, anxiety or unhappiness to others." 3. Refraining from theft shows respect for other's property and rights. This anuvrata has a power to "See, Uvasagasasao, chapter 1 Tattvarthadhigamabhasya 7.9: himsaparusyapaisunyadiyuktam vacah satyamapi garhitamanrtameva bhavatiti.

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism 4. 5. 193 restrict bribery and deceptive practices in the economic world. Control over sexual practices can increase mental and spiritual power, can overcome sexual corruption and can overcome diseases like AIDS. Most of the conflicts arise in the society due to money, land, properties, power etc. The fifth vow puts limits to the desires of a man or woman for possessing more and more things. It weakens or dissolves the greed towards acquisition of worldly things. If we do not want to suffer from tension, depression or bodily diseases, then we must avoid extreme ambition for possession of materialistic goals. Vision with Theory Of Karma In the view of Jaina Karma theory, a person gets result of his own deeds. The concepts of pleasure giving (satavedaniya) karma and grief or pain giving (asata vedaniya) karma instruct the society in a right path that if you do good to others it will result in good to you and if you do bad to others it will bear bad consequences to you. The causes of these sata and asata vedaniya karmas have been mentioned in Tattvartha Sutra as follows: "If a soul causes pain, grief, agony, cry, injury or lamenting to others then it attracts asatavedaniya or pain karma, and if a soul generates compassion through charity to all living beings as well as to those observing religious vows, then it is a cause of satavedaniya or pleasure karma."9 39 Tattvarthasutra 6.12-13: dukhah-soka-tapakrandana-vadha-paridevananyatma-parobhayasthanyasad-vedyasya. bhutavratanukampadanam saragasamyamadiyogah ksantih saucamiti sadvedyasya. *

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Forbearance is also a cause of satavedaniya. The Tattvartha Sutra explains that if we are co-operative to others positively, then as a result it provides us pleasure or happiness. Negative behavior results in pain or asata. This is not just a theory of karma, but also a reciprocal theory of social norms. This guides the society towards the balanced and proper behavior, which in turn benefits the individual also. 194 Although regarding ontology or metaphysics samkhya, Vedanta, Buddhism and Jainism are different, but all of these guide a person to be detached from worldly allurements and have to control over the sense organs, mind and the thought process tilting towards wrong doing. All of these thoughts may be different in their approaches in defining the reality, but these preach to achieve the same goal of emancipation from sorrows forever. Thus goal is same but methods to achieve the goal are different. They may be different, but still there are similarities that all of these instruct a path to remove attachment from the worldly attractions. Hence, according to Jainism, we should find out the path which leads us to achieve the goal of eternal happiness, peace and harmony towards all the beings of the world. Conclusion Thus Jainism has propounded non-absolution (anekanta-vada), non-violence (ahimsa), conduct of anuvratas including the tenet of limiting the possession, concepts of triratna, theory of karman etc. to remove conflicts of our minds which are by product of our

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism 195 misunderstanding or ignorance. Right view and right knowledge are the guiding factors of our right attitude and conduct; we have to understand the limits of knowledge which occurs through sense organs, mind and intellect. A real knowledge comes out directly from the soul after a radical change in our internal views. We have to make our mind pure with positive change in thought process, we should develop a vast understanding of the reality and evolve the education system incorporating the spiritual and moral values through learning the anekanta-vada, nayavada, non-violence, theory of karma etc. in resolving the conflicts and live a peaceful and progressive life with co-existence of all the diversities of all beings in the world. Bibliography Acarangacurni of Jindasagani, Surat : Shri Jainananda Pustakalaya, 1941 Acarangasutra, Beawar : Sri Agam Prakashan Samiti, 1989 Adhyatmasara of Upadhyaya Yasovijaya, Hindi Translation and Commentary by Sadhvi Pritidarsana sri, Shajapur (M.P) : Prachya Vidyapitha, 2009 Adhyatmopanisad of Upadhyaya Yasovijaya, Ahmedabad : Divya Darsana Trust. Anuyogadvarasutra, Prakrit, Beawar : Sri Agama Prakashana samiti, 1987 Bihatkalpabhasya, (ed). Muni Punyavijaya and chaturavijaya, Bhavanagar : Shri Jain Atmananda sabha, 2002 Dasavaikalika Sutra. Prakrit, Jaipur: Samyag Jnana Pracharak Mandala, 1983 Isibhasiyaim (ed.) walther schubring; Ahmedabad : L.D. Institute of Indology, 1974

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 196 Jain Sagar Mal, 2002: Peace, Religious Harmony and Solution of World Problems from Jaina Perspective, Varanasi : Parsvanatha Vidyapitha, 2002 Laghiyastraya of Bhatta Akalanka, published in Akalankagranthatraya, (ed.) Mahendra Kumar Lokatattvanirnaya of Haribhadrasuri, Bhavanagar : Sri Jaina Dharma Pracharaka Sabha. Paramatma-dvatrimsika of Amitgati, Published in Nirgrantha Bhajanavali, Jaipur : Samyag Jnana Pracharak Mandala, Sixth edition, 1997 Pramana-naya-tattvaloka of Vadideva suri, Ahmedanagar : Sri Tilokaratna Sthanakavasi Jain Dharmika Parikna Board, 3rd reprint, 2000 Sanmatiitarka of Siddhasenasuri, Pandit Sukhalalji Series 5 Ahmedabad. L.D.Institute of Indology, First revised printed edition 2000 (English) Sri Mahadevastotra of Hemacandra suri, Sirohi : Acarya Sri Sushila suri Jaina Jnana mandira, V.S. 2041 Sutrakstangasutra- Praksit, Beawer: Sri Agama Prakashan Samiti, second edition 1991 Syadvadamanjari (Commentary by Mallisena on Anyayogavyavacheda- dvatrimsika) Agasa : Sri Parama Shruta Prabhavaka Mandala, 4" reprint, 1979 Tattvarthadhigamabhasya of Umasvati, Hindi translation by Pandita Khoobchandra Shastri, Agasa Parama sruta Prabhanvaka mandala, 1992 Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati, Hindi Commentary by Pt. Sukha Lal Sanghavi, Varanasi : Parsvanath Vidyapitha, 1985. Uttradhyayanasutra (3 vols.) Prakrit, Hindi translation and annotations by Acharya Hastimal and Pt.Shashikanta Jha, Jaipur : Samyag Jnana Pracharaka Mandal, between 1983-1989 Vyakhyaprajnaptisutra, Prakrit (vol. 1) Beawar : Sri Agam Prakashan Samiti, second edition, 1991

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ABOUT THE AUTHOUR Dr. Dharm Chand Jain is a professor of Sanskrit in Jai Narain Vyas university, Jodhpur and has served as Head, Department of Sanskrit and as founder Director, Buddhist Studies Centre in the university. Indian Philosophy (especially Jainism and Buddhism), Sanskrit and Prakrit Language and literature are the subjects of his interest. He has written five books (1. Bauddha Pramana-mimamsa ki Jaina Dssti se Samikna, 2. Bauddha Pramana-mimamsa, 3. Chintana Ke Ayama, 4. Jaina Dharma - darsana : Eka Anusilana etc.) and edited more than 25 books (including on Smsti-sastra, Buddhism and Jainism). He has presented research papers in national and international seminars in India and abroad and also chaired some sessions of them. His numerous research articles have been published in reputed journals and proceedings. He is associated with various academic bodies of universities and educational institutes and has visited Hongkong (1995), London (2006 and 2013), Nepal (2013) and New York (2015) for academic purposes. Rajasthan Sanskrit Academy has awarded him with Abmbikadatta Vyasa award (1991) for Sanskrit prose writing and Darsana Sammana (2014-2015) for philosophical writing. He has been honoured with following awards for his scholarly writing and social services:Yuva-pratibha-sodha-sammana (1994), Champalal Sanda Smoti-purskara (1997), Acarya Hasti-smsti-sammana (2001), Karuna-writer-speaker-propagator-award (2014), Ramratan Kochar-smsti-sammana (2015), Hemachandracharya Sahitya sammana (2015) and Jaina seva-ratna-sammana (2016). prAkRta bhAratI akAdamI, jayapura 135, 14716 TRI, Hiddla Tr, , sta : 0141-2524827, 2520230 E-mail : prabharati@gmail.com Web-Site : prakritbharati.net With the support of CSR Activities ele baiMka oNpha mahArASTra Bank of Maharashtra bhArata sarakAra kA udyama eka parivAra eka baiMka 978-93-81571-71-2 250.00