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The Concept of Nirvikalpata in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition 129
In the Indian tradition Buddhist logicians seem to have been the first to have discussed the concept of nirvikalpata in the context of pratyakṣa-pramāņa (perception as a means of valid cognition) There after it is mentioned in the epistemology of the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāmsā schools as well. Jaina thinkers consider it as a characteristic of darśana or darśanopayoga which occurs before determinate knowledge i.e. jñānopayoga and they do not accept as a pramāṇa. In the Yogasūtra the term nirvikalpată can be regarded as being a characteristic of nirvitarka and nirvicāra samādhi (see Yogasūtra 1.4344). In this way nirvikalpatā has been discussed widely in the Indian tradition.
Dignaga's contribution.
In the field of Indian logic and epistemology, the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (470-530 CE), the pioneer stalwart and founder of Buddhist logic, is considered to be the thinker who introduced the concept of nirvikalpatā as an essential property of perception. He propounds two types of valid means of cognition (pramāṇa) namely perception and inference and two types of their respective objects as unique particular (svalakṣaṇa) and general character (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). In his Pramāṇasamuccaya he defines perception as a means of valid cognition which is devoid of verbal designation (Kalpanapohatā).' Dignāga defines kalpana as a construction or an arrangement of name (nama) genus (jāti), quality (guna), function (kriyā) and
Pratyakşam kalpanāpoḍham nāmajātyadi samyutam.-Pramāṇasamuccaya, 1.3
