Book Title: Society Epistemology And Logic In Indian Tradition
Author(s): Dharmchand Jain
Publisher: Prakrit Bharati Academy

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Page 158
________________ 144 Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition standpoint of substance a reality is persistent and from the viewpoint of modes that reality is changing or non-eternal. In this way in the process of knowing and also in describing a reality view points (nayas) are needed. These view-points have importance in proper understanding and describing the truth. Syādvāda is an indefective method of describing or mentioning the truth using word 'syāť' or 'syāď. Here ‘syať' word is an indeclinable which denotes a meaning of a certain view-point. In this way a statement using word 'syať' is a statement in some perspective. In the Jaina canon Vyakhyāprajñapti Sūtra Lord Mahavīra has used this word often in answering with different view points of substance (dravya), space (kṣetra), time (kāla) and modes (bhāva). Hence it can be said that syādvāda is a theory of explaining the reality in an indefective way. If 'syat' word is not used in a sentence then it may be defective in a sense to deny the existing other facts, but word 'syāť' keeps other facts in a view neglected or latent at that moment. Syādvāda, anekāntavāda and nayavāda are mutually interlinked. Anekāntavāda is understandable through nayavāda and expressed through syādvāda. Expressing power is in syadvāda which also expects nayavāda for its proper expression. Nayavāda has two aspects- 1. Knowing and 2. Expression. What is the intention of a speaker is naya and what is intended by a knower is also naya. Nayas are also expressed using word 'syat'. Hence 'syadvada' is used in expression of nayas also. Thus 'syat' word is a relative term which depicts a certain viewpoint.

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