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Naya, Nayābhāsa and Nikṣepa
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Pramāņa and Naya:
The concept of naya is as important as the concept of pramāṇa in Jainism. Both of these are the means of knowledge. As Umāsvāti in his Tattvārthasūtra clearly mentions "Valid means of knowledge (pramana) and the standpoints (naya) are the instruments for understanding the real elements." Thus naya is also a means to know the reality. Generally naya is understood as a part of pramāṇa and related to verbal testimony (āgamapramāṇa) as Vādidevasūri defines naya:- "After knowing a reality with śrutajñāna, a characteristic or a mode of that reality is known by a knower becoming indifferent to other characteristics and modes of that reality is called naya"". Hence
(i) naya is a part of pramāņa due to knowing point of view. (ii) naya is a kind of śrutajñāna.
(iii) a characteristic or a mode is known with a naya of a reality. Somewhere more characteristics and modes are also known with a particular view point (naya).
Naya is a part of pramāņa as- Pujyapāda Devanandi quotes in his Sarvārthasiddhi, "Naya is that which grasps a part of the content comprehended by Pramāṇa." When pramāņa is contrasted with naya, then 'pramāṇa' means complete knowledge or holistic knowledge and naya means partial knowledge. Naya is not a false cognition or erroneous cognition. So it is said that naya is neither pramāņa (which
'Tattvärthasutra 1.6: Pramāṇa-nayairadhigamaḥ.
'Niyate yena śrutākhyapramāṇa-viṣyīkṛtasyāmśastaditarāmśaudāsīnyantaḥ sa pratipatturabhiprāya-viseṣo nayaḥ. - Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, 7.1 "Sarvārthasiddhi on 1.6 p.24: Sakalādeśaḥ pramāṇādhīno vikalādeśo nayādhīnaḥ.
