Book Title: Society Epistemology And Logic In Indian Tradition
Author(s): Dharmchand Jain
Publisher: Prakrit Bharati Academy

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Page 170
________________ Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition Parasanigraha consists in understanding and describing everything as real. But Jainas observed that Advaita-Vedāntin treats this understanding and description as absolute and says that everything is real and real alone, and all the other properties are delusory. This comprehensive reductionism of Vedāntins amounts to the fallacy called parasangrahābhāsa (Pseudocomprehensively-collective view). On the other hand, Jainas observed, Samkhyas do not reduce everything to 'real', but they divide the world to two basic categories, prakṛti and puruşa and describe all objects of the world as manifestations of prakṛti. This non-comprehensive reductionism of Sāmkhyas can be called apara-sangrahābhāsa. 156 Generally Cārvākas are accused of committing vyvahārābhāsa. But the reason is not clear. A possible reason is that whereas Cārvākas accept empirical reality (Vyāvahārikasatta) they do not accept the so-called ultimate reality (Pāramārthika-sattā) beyond that. This is an absolutist or exclusivist approach to vyavahāra which Jainas seem to be interpreting as the fallacious view-point called vyavahārābhāsa (Pseudo-empirical view-point). In fact Jainas interpret vyavahāranaya as particularist view-point. In that case treating particularity as absolutely real and universal features as unreal will be the pseudo-particularist view-point which can be called vyavahārābhāsa. Jainas could have attributed it to the Buddhists who accept only unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa) as real and universals (sāmānya) as unreal. The Jainas claim that the Buddhists treat this immediate view-point as absolute. They regard only immediate momentary experiences as real and others as illusory. Therefore

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