Book Title: Society Epistemology And Logic In Indian Tradition
Author(s): Dharmchand Jain
Publisher: Prakrit Bharati Academy

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Page 145
________________ The Concept of Nirvikalpatā in Buddist Logic and the Indian Tradition 131 An object of perception in Buddhism is a unique particular or thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa). The unique particular is momentary and it does not proceed to a different place nor exists in another moment, nor it is in fact expressible by words. It is the real entity i.e. paramārthasat. The concept of nirvikalpatā as an essential property of pratyaksa pramāna is a brilliant contribution of Dignāga to Indian philosophy. He might have developed the notion on the basis of the old texts of Buddhism. Two statements to this effect are found in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā : (1) cakṣurvijñāna-samangī nīlam vijānāti no tu nīlamīti. (2) arthe'arthasamjñī natvarthe dharmasañjīti.* These two statements reflect that when a person cognizes nīlārha (blue matter) with his eyes and does not think that “it is nīla', then it is devoid of mental construction or kalpanā, but knowledge in the form 'it is nīla' is considered to be a kalpanā. When a real thing is known without any attribute and verbal designation, then it is considered as nirvikalpatā. Influence on Kumārila Bhatta The Mīmāmsaka philosopher Kumārila Bhatta (6th7th century) entering in the field of dialogue, has refuted various notions of Dignāga, but he accepts two types of perception as nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. While accepting the concept of nirvikalpaka pratyakşa, he seems influenced by Dignagā. He defines nirvikalpatā in the following wordsHattori, Dignāga, on perception, Pramāṇasamuccayavrtti, Da, a-2, Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, p.64,22-23; Dvādaśāram Nayacakram, vol.I, pp. 60-61

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