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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition
appurtenances (dravya) to the direct cognition. For example, if we perceive a thing with our eyes, without any name etc., then it comes in the category of perception, and if we give it a name, then that is a kalpana or a construction of verbal designation. Naming a perceived thing is not a part of perception. It is a result of our previous experience and a retention or memory of if.
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Dignaga mentions examples of kalpana as follows"namnă visito'rtha ucyate diṭṭha iti. jātiśabdeṣu jātyā gaurīti gunaśabdeṣu gunena śukla iti, kriyā sabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti, dravya- sabdeșu dravyeṇa dandi viṣāṇīti. 'this is diṭṭha is nāma Kalpana, this is a patch of white colour is guna kalpana, this is a cow is jāti kalpana, this is a cook is kriyā kalpana, this is a staff bearer is dravya kalpanā. All these are the examples of verbal designation to the cognition of an object. It is not the characteristic of perception. Stcherbatsky in his Buddhist Logic says:
This can be called the epistemological form of judgment and every judgment reduces to this form, since it is a known fact, admitted now in European Logic, that in every real judgment a reference to some reality is always understood, cp. Sigwart Logik3, p.67. It can be also viewed as construction, a division, a bifurcation, an imagination (vikalpa) etc., since every such judgment suggests in its predicate a division of the whole into the predicate and its counterpart, e.g. blue and not-blue, cow and not-cow etc. Cp. about vikalpa Madhy. vṛitti, p. 350.12" (vol.2, p.21 fn.)
"Atha keyam kalpanā. nāma jätyädiyojanā. Dignaga's vṛtti before 1.3 'Dignaga's vṛtti to 1.3, Dignaga, on Perception, p.12
