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independent pramāņa. Nyāyasūtra mentions it as an attribute of a soul", but none other system than Jaina has accepted it as an independent pramāņa. The Mīmāņsā philosophy does not consider it as pramāņa, because it cognizes the object previously cognized and pramāņa, in their opinion always cognizes the object previously not cognized. Buddhist philosophers also give the same argument, but they present some more arguments, such as (i) it is not generated by an object, so it does not correspond to the object, (ii) if recollection is considered as pramāņa then intention, repugnance (dveşa) etc. will also be considered as pramāņa and it will create an infinite regress, (iii) recollection deals with the past object. Jaina logicians have refuted all these arguments.
The Jaina logicians Akalanka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra and Vādidevasūri put forth many cogent arguments to establish recollection (smệti) as an independent pramāņa. Some of them are presented here." 1. Recollection is an organ of valid cognition, because it is an
indiscrepant cognition. Whenever the recollection is found discrepant then it comes under the pseudo-organ of valid cognition. The recollection which is corresponding to an activity(arthakriyā) is an indiscrepant knowledge. If recollection is not regarded as a separate organ of valid cognition, because it cognizes the object previously cognized, then it is not a valid reason, because the recollection also cognizes partly unknown object from the point of view of time as Māņikyanandin accepts in his
Parīksāmukha. " Nyāyasūtra 3.2.40 "For reference of arguments see Jain, Dharm Chand (1995) pp. 297to 307
