Book Title: Society Epistemology And Logic In Indian Tradition
Author(s): Dharmchand Jain
Publisher: Prakrit Bharati Academy

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Page 120
________________ Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition 106 (iv) Svaparavyavasāyi jñānam pramānam.-Pramāṇanayataftvāloka, 1.2 The knowledge determining itself and the object is pramāņa. (v) Samyagarthanirņayaḥ pramāņam.-Pramāņa-mīmāmsā, 1.1.2 Right judgement of an object is pramāņa. (vi) Svāpūrvārthavyavasayātmakam jñānam pramānam. – Parīkşāmukha, 1.1 Judgemental knowledge ot the self and the other object hither to unknown, is pramaņa. (vii) Avisamvādakam pramāņam.-Laghīyastryavrtti, 22 Judgemental knowledge (free from wrongness) is pramāņa. With above definitions, it is clear that Jaina logicians accept pramāna as definitive cognition, which is always savikalpaka. It is illuminating the self and the object. The Jaina logicians uphold that the contact of the senseorgan and an object never can be a pramāņa. They say that like another object, the sense-object contact also cannot be a preeminent cause in generating valid knowledge, because both of them are non-revelatory." Therefore Jaina thinkers propound that pramāņa is useful for accepting the desired object and rejecting the undesirable one, hence it must be a cognition." They also accept that a valid cognition through a pramāņa does not require to prove its validity, because the knowledge is " LTv 1.3 : sannikarşāderajñānasya prāmānyamanupapannam arthāntaravat. "PMk 1.2 : hitāhitaprāptiparihārasamartham hi pramānam tato jñānameva tat.

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