Book Title: Society Epistemology And Logic In Indian Tradition
Author(s): Dharmchand Jain
Publisher: Prakrit Bharati Academy

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Page 126
________________ Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition vilakṣaṇatva and 'this is away from that' this is near to that', are the examples of tat pratiyogītva. Acārya Hemcandara corroborates the kinds proposed by Manikyanandin. 112 23 Vādidevasūri, the author of Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka and Syādvādaratnākara used the new terms of tiryak sāmānya and ūrdhvatā-sāmānya relating to the definition of recognition. Tiryak sāmānya means the similarity amongst the objects and ūrdhvatā sāmānya means the identity of the same entity at different stages, for example the gavaya is like cow denotes tiryak sāmānya and he is the same Devadatta denotes ūrdhvatāsāmānya." In Indian philosophy Nyāya, Vaiseṣika, Mīmāmsā, Vedanta and Kaśmīra Saivism also discuss the concept of recognition, but they include it in perception and do not recognize it as a separate organ of valid cognition. Jayanta Bhatta a foremost Naiyāyika, accepts the validity of recognition under perception, because it is generated by sense object contact with the help of latent trace (samskāra). But the Buddhist logicians are of the opinion that recognition cannot be a pramāņa, because of infinite regress, illusory knowledge having no object and uncorresponding nature of it." For establishment of recognition as independent valid organ of cognition the Jaina logicians have given many arguments. The main arguments are being presented here.25 1. Recognition is neither merely a recollection nor merely a perception, but it is different from the both and is possessed of being a new pramāṇa, because it has to cognize a different object which is not cognized by mere perception 23 PT 3.5 and 5.4 "See Jain Dharm Chand, p. 310 25 For origanial references of arguments see Jain, Dharm chand pp. 311 to 318

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