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Jaina Epistemology and Logic: Development and Doctrines
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always of the nature of illuminating the self and the object. They give an example of the sun or a lamp which illuminates itself and the object." It is true in our experience also that we know what we know. The Naiyāyikas accept that a cognition can illuminate only its object and Vijñānavādins say that a knowledge always illuminates the self. The Jaina logicians clearly accept that a knowledge is possessed of both the qualities in its nature. About its nature of determinate, the Jaina logicians are firmly determined. Hence, they have refuted the Buddhist definition of pratyakșa which is devoid of determination due to its nirvikalpatā. (ii) Establishment of recollection (smrti) as pramāņa:
Recollection is a knowledge which arises after the stimulation of memory-impression and is expressed by the pronoun 'that' (tad). Manifestation of recollection is necessarily conditioned by stimulation of memory impression. Hemcandra defines recollection as such:- vāsanod-bodha-hetu kā-tadityākārā smrtiḥ (Pramāņa-mīmāmsā. 1.2.3) Almost all the philosophers from Bhata Akalanka down to Vādidevasūri define recollection almost in the same manner. Bhatta Akalanka says that recollection is a resultant of retention, but it is also a pramāņa, because of its resultant (pramāņa-phala) as recognition (pratyabhijñāna)".
Although Prasastapāda has mentioned recollection as a kind of vidyā (right knowledge)," but he did not accept it as an
** PT 1.16-17 "LTv in AGT p.5: avisamvādasmrteh phałasya hetutvāt pramānam dhāraņā
smrtiḥ samjñāyāh. "He accepts four kinds of vidyā as pratyakşa, Laingika, smrti and arşa in the
pratyaksa prakarana of Praśastapādabhāşya p. 153
