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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition
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1. It was he who for the first time established recollection
(smrti), recognition (pratyabhijñāna) and inductive reasoning (tarka) as pramāņa. He placed these under the category of parokșa pramāņa. He propounded that if these cognitions are indiscrepant and devoid of doubt, illusion and indetermination (anadhyavasāya), then these are very much the means of valid cognition. He upholds two types of pratyakșa as sāmvyāvahārika (empirical) and mukhya (transcendental). The types of matijñāna such as avagraha (receiving), īhā (speculation) avāya (perceptual judgement) and dhāraņā (retention) were included by him in Sāņvyāvahārika- pratykșa and he has accepted their sequential position as propounded in
canonical literature. 3. He accepted differences between matijñāna and
srutajñāna according to the canonical tradition and placed srutajñāna under the category of parokșa pramāņa.
Śrutajñāna is known in epistemology as āgama pramāņa. 4. He included upamāna pramāņa (comparison) in the
recognition (pratyabhijñāna) of similarity which he conceptualized taking Samjñā of Umāsvāti's,
Tattvārthasūtra (1.13) as its basis. 5. He discussed all the epistemological terms, such as hetu,
(probans) sādhya (probandum), drsțānta, vyāpti etc. 6. He introduced some new hetus such as kāraña (cause)
pūrvacara, uttaracara and sahacara. 7. Akalanka discussed naya and nikṣepa also which have
formed an integral part of epistemology.
