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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition
There is only one difference in pramāṇa and right knowledge (samyagjñāna) that the right knowledge depends on right view (samyag darśana), where as pramāņa does not reqire any such condition. Introduction to Pramāņa
Pramāņa is an instrumental knowledge which is devoid of doubt (samśaya), illusion (viparyaya) and indetermination (anadhyavasāya). In Jaina philosophy pramāṇa has been accepted as a definitive cognition of knowable thing and knowledge itself. The Jaina logicians are almost unanimous on this characteristic of pramāņa. Although at the early time of Tattvārthasūtra, there was no such difference between pramāna and right knowledge. Umāsvāti, the author of Tattvārthasūtra had clearly divided five types of knowledge into two kinds of pramāṇa without mentioning any difference between right knowledge and pramāņa. He kept matijñāna (sensuous knowledge) and śrutajñāna (scriptural or verbal knowledge, succeeding matijñāna) under the category of parokșa pramāņa (indirect organ of valid cognition), and the other three types of knowledge i.e. avadhijñāna (visual intuition), manahparyāya jñāna (intuition of mental modes) and kevalajñāna (pure and perfect knowledge) were placed in the category of pratyakșa pramāņa (perception).*
'Hemacandra, vrtti on PM 1.1.1 : prakarșeņa samśayādivyavachedena mīyate parichidyate vastutattvam yena tat pramāņam pramāyām sādhakatamam. (also in NKC of Prabhacandra, Vol. I p. 48.10) ?PT 1.2: Svaparavyavasāyi jñānam pramāņam. Five types of knowledge are : 1. Matijñāna (Sensous knowledge) 2. Śrutajñāna (Scriptural knowledge and knowledge of the self) 3. avadhijñāna (Visual intuition or clairvoyance) 4. Manahparyāyajñāna (intuition of mental modes of others)
5. Kevalajñāna (pure and perfect knowledge ) "TS, 1.10.12 Tat pramānam, ādye pavokşam, pratyakşamanyat.
