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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Students of Indian philosophy are generally accustomed to think that the Mimāṁsā school, since it flourished under the patronage of priests wholeheartedly devoted to the problems of Vedic ritualism, has little to offer that should interest them. As a matter of fact, however, it is one of the three Indian schools whose philosophical output has been most original and extensive, the other two being the Nyāya-Vaiseșika school and the school of Buddhist logic founded by Dinnāga and Dharmakirti. There is deubtless something freakish about a Buddhist or a Mimāmsaka taking genuine interest in philosophy. For Buddha is already noted for his antipathy towards metaphysical speculations and it would have surprised no one if there never arose a school of Buddhism to cultivate philosophy in right earnest. Likewise, it would have surprised no one if the priestly propounders of Mimāṁsā left philosophy. severely alone. But as things stand, both the Buddhist followers of Dinnāga and Dharmakirti and the Mimāmsaka followers of Kumārila and Prabhākara have contributed gems to the treasure-house of Indian philosophy. A case in point is Slokavārtika, Kumārila's magnum opus and a very high-ranking philosophical masterpiece.
As a Mimāsaka Kumārila stood committed to maintain the thesis that Vedas are an authorless composition. For in the eyes of his school and schoolmates some such thesis alone would ensure that Vedas are an absolutely infallible source so far as our knowledge of religious matter is concerned. The argument was that since religion deals with things supersensuous and since no man, however competent, can by himself cognize things supersensuous towledge of religious 'matter cannot be yielded by a source originating from man. For various reasons, historically determined, the Mimāṁsakas did not posit God and so they also could not say that knowledge of religious matters is to be yielded by a source of divine origin. Thus cornered (rather thus having cornered themselves) they fell back upon the thesis that knowledge of religious matters is to be yielded by Vedas which are a text devoid of origin, human or divine. To the outsiders this thesis sounded nothing short of preposterous but within the body of a Mimāṁsaka's philosophical speculation it acted as a veritable running thread. For one thing, it is this circumstance that explains as to why the Mimāṁsaka is so much preoccupied with the problem of verbal testimony and as to why he thinks it necessary to bestow consideration on the means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony placed at man's disposal. For he has to demonstrate that no means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony placed at man's disposal can yield knowledge of things supersensuous in general and religious matters in particular, and this necessitates a consideration of the nature of those
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