Reality English Translation of Sarvarthasiddhi

Author(s): S A Jain
Publisher: Jwalamalini Trust Chennai

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all the senses except the sense of sight and the mind. Distinct apprehension obtains in the case of all the senses and the mind.
SCRIPTURAL KNOWLEDGE
Sensory knowledge has been described with its definition and divisions. Now it is time to define scriptural knowledge with its divisions.
श्रुतं मतिपूर्व हानेकद्वादशभेदम्
|| 20 ||
Srutam matipuram dvyanekadvādaśabhedam
(20)
20. Scriptural knowledge preceded by sensory knowledge is of two kinds, which are of twelve and many subdivisions. Though the word śruta is derived on the basis of hearing, by traditional usage it points to a particular kind of knowledge. For instance the word kusala, derived from the cutting of grass, by common currency means hale and hearty. What is that particular kind of knowledge? The answer is given in the sutra, 'Scriptural knowledge is preceded by sensory knowledge.' For it fulfils the validity of scriptural knowledge. Hence pūrvaṁ means instrumental cause or preliminary condition. Sensory knowledge has been described. Mati purvaṁ means having sensory knowledge as its cause. If scriptural knowledge is caused by sensory knowledge, it would become sensory knowledge. For in the world we see that the effect is like the cause. No, this is not invariably so. Though the pitcher is made by the stick and the wheel, it is not of the nature of the stick and the wheel. Moreover, scriptural knowledge does not arise even in the presence of sensory knowledge. Even if there were sensory knowledge and the external causes of scriptural knowledge, scriptural knowledge does not manifest itself on the rise of powerful karmic veil of scriptural knowledge. But, when there is destruction-cum-subsidence of the karmic veil to a high degree, then scriptural knowledge arises. Hence, sensory knowledge is merely an instrumental cause and not the efficient cause of scriptural knowledge.
Now verbal testimony is considered beginningless and endless. If it be preceded by sensory knowledge, that proposition falls to the ground. For that which has a beginning has an