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VEDANTIC MONISM
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Vedāntist. In the first place, the postulation of nescience which the Vedāntist hinself admits to be incapable of any proof strikes him as an unphilosophical position. It is extre: nely puzzling that a philosopher should subscribe to a position which is not amenable to test by any accredited organ of knowledge. Whatever may be the subject of dispute, call it truth or untruth, science or nescience, the matter can be finally decided by means of the accredited sources of knowledge available to us. The Jaima does not dispute the existence of nescience, but he insists that this is also a matter of proof. When the Vedāntist asserts nescience as an actuai existent, he is certainly aware of its existence. And this awareness must be true and valid. Otherwise, he will not be in a position to make the assertion. The Vedantist had to admit that nescience is a felt fact. But he chooses to call the awareness of nescience an alogical knowledge. The reason seems to be the opposition of nescience with knowledge which is also a felt fact. That we commit error is not open to dispute. That this error is corrected and cancelled by knowledge of the true character of reality such as of the shell as opposed to silver, is not also liable fo be disputed. But the cancellation of error, which consists in the proof that the predicate does not belong to the subject in the context in spite of its reality in another context, need not be construed as evidence of the unreality of error or of its content. That we make error is also capable of being established by a veridical knowledge. This is apparent from the consileration that the Vedāntist also cannot deny that we misperceive shell as silver. This misperception is a fact which can be known by an unchallengeable cognition. And this cognition is possible if an organ of cognition operates tipon the fact. But the Vedāntist may urge Well, if error be an object of veridical cognition, it will be a real like true cognition. Not only this, it will also have to be admitted that the knowledge of error will be true knowledge, and this will amount to the assertion that there is no difference between error and truth.'
The Jaina does not regard these objections as real difficulties. In the first place, he admits that error is as much a fact and verity as truth. In the second place, he admits that the cognition of error is true cognition. In other words, the Jaina believes that error as a psychical event is a true occurrence, and its cognition is the cognition of a true fact. It has been observed by Akalanka "A cognition is true in reference to a fact which is not contradicted by another cognition'.1 The Vedantist also endorses the factuality of error as a psychical fact, and he also admits that there is awareness of such error. But he refuses to give
1 na ca pramāpānām avidyāvişayatram ayuktam, vidyāvad avidyāyā api kathañcid vastutvāt. tathā vidyatvaprasanga iti cet, na kiñcid anistam 'yathā yatrāvisamvādas tathā tatra pramānatā' ityakalankadevairuktatvāt.
-SSP, p. 9.
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