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BUDDHIST IDEALISM
ever been argued in defence by the subjectivist that this line of attack on the part of the opponent is neither fair nor consistent. How can the charge of a fallacy or a self-contradiction be advanced against the subjectivist when the opponent knows that the former does not believe in the reality of anything other than consciousness? The use of logic will become superfluous after the ultimate truth viz, the reality of consciousness alone is realized. Dignāga and his followers in spite of their ultimate conviction of the truth of pure consciousness alone have elaborated logical weapons and this is not inconsistent with their philosophical convictions. They have frankly avowed that logic has its place and utility only on this side of realization of the ultimate truth and is necessary to combat the prevailing misconceptions of philosophers. So the charge of self-contradiction or inconsistency is nothing better than argumentum ad hominem.
The Jaina philosopher observes that his charges could be ineffective if the Buddhist idealist succeeded in proving that his conclusion was established by an unimpeachable logical ground. Dharmakīrti asserts that the identity' of cognition and content follows from the necessity of their being known together' (sahopalambha-niyamāt). But what is the meaning of the expression the necessity of being known together and of the term 'identity'? The former may possibly be interpreted as the absence of separate cognition' and 'identity' may be understood to mean 'absence of numerical difference'. In other words, the negation of separate cognition' may be made the ground for the inference of negation of numerical difference'. But this is not possible because there can be no necessary relation between two negations. As regards such negative inferences as of the absence of sinoke' from the absence of fire', or the 'absence of triangle' from the 'absence of figure', they are legitimate only because they derive their cogency from the necessary concomitance between their positive counter-terms. Thus there is necessary concomitance between effect and cause, and so the negation of cause leads to the inference of the negation of effect. Likewise, there is necessary concomitance between 'figure' which is the genus and triangle' which is the species. And so the negation of the former entails the negation of the latter. There is no independent relation possible between two negations. The Buddhist arguinent could be effective if the positive concomitance between 'separate cognition' and 'numerical difference' were possible. To be explicit, the Buddhist is the last person to assert that a separate cognition of the content from that of the cognition concerned is possible by means of which the numerical difference of the cognition and content can be established ; for the admission of the possibility of the content, separate and numerically different from that of the cognition, will knock out the Buddhist position of identity of cognition and content. The Buddhist therefore is preclu
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