________________
32
SATYAŚĀSANA-PARIKSA
cognitions polarized as cognitum and cognizer.1 Pure consciousness alone is real. Even as paintings drawn on plane surface appear solid with depressions and elevations, so does the pure consciousness appear as subject and object to the deluded person under the influence of nescience. The idealist proves his thesis by the argument : "The objects --chair and the like-are not different from their cognitions, because they are cognized by thein, e. g., the cognition which is cognized by itself.' And he refutes the realist's position thus : The chair and the like are not external material objects, because they are cognizeci, e. g., pleasure and the like which are internal and immaterial.'2
The Jaina philosopher observes that the subjectivist establishes his position by means of inference, and refutes the validity of all instruments of knowledge in the same breath. This is nothing but blatant self-contradiction. Without the support of an organ of knowledge, the Buddhist cannot prove the falsity of the theories of rival philosophers who believe in extra-mental reality. Not only this, the subjectivist cannot prove the falsity of the differentiation of cognition into an act and content. He holds that our cognitions are momentary and self-intuited and that there are other epistemic subjects. Certainly all these facts cannot be proved by our intuitions. The service of inference as a valid instrument of knowledge must be requisitioned. 3 A cognition may be felt by itself, but it is not felt as momentary, or as not cognized by another. Moreover, if the cognition has no veridical reference to a real extra-subjective fact, how can the subjectivist believe in the existence of other subjects? The denial of genuine extra-subjective reference must end in solipsism. If the entire logical apparatus including the difference of probans and probandum and the necessary relation between them be a false creation of nescience, then the subjectivist cannot prove anything including his own position. The subjectivist seeks to establish the identity of content with cognitions on the ground of the two being felt together.4 But this very assertion proves that he believes in the duality of cognition and content. Is this not a case of self-contradiction like the vocal statement of a person: "I am an observer of the vow of silence' ?5 It has how
1 samvittir eva khandaśaḥ pratibhāsamanā sakala-vedya-vedaka-vyavahārāya
kalpyate.--SSP, p. 11. 2 Cf. niladih samvedanad avyatiriktas tadvedyatvät, tatsvarūpavat; na jado
niladih pratibhāsamānatvāt, sukhādivat.-SŚP, p. 14. 3 yogācāreņa vijñānānām kșanikatvam ananyavedyatvam nānasantāmatvam
anumānenaiva vyavasthāpaniyam.-SSP, p. 12. 4 Cf. nfla-tajjñānayor abhedah sahopalambha-niyamät.-SSP, p. 13. 5 ...sadā mauna-vratiko'ham ityabhilāpavat sva-vacanavirodhasyaiva svíkara
ņāt.-Asfasahasri, p. 242.
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
