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SATYAŠĀSANA-PARIKSĀ
either absolutely different from the latter or absolutely identical with it. In the latter case, the successive production of the evolutes would be impossible, because there is no corresponding succession in the prakrti. And in the foriner case, it would be illogical to regard them as evolved from the prakrti, there being absolute cleavage between the two.
Now if the Sámkhya philosopher admits the transformation to be neither different nor identical, and asserts that the prakrti transforms itself as mahat and the like, much like the straight or circular shapes assumed by a reptile, he would be abandoning his doctrine of absolutely eternal praksti.1 This would be tantamount to the admission of the doctrine of non-absolutism sponsored by the Jaina philosopher.
The Samkhya cioctrine of unchanging purusa also does not commend itself to the Jaina. The purusa should be conceived as permanent-cum-changing. We have already discussed the point in connection with our exposition of the doctrine of fluxism.
7. The Vaiseșika Categories and Theism
The Vaiseșika school postulates six categories, viz, cravya (substance ), guņa ( quality ), karman ( activity ), sãinãnya ( universal ), višeşa (particularity) and samavāya ( inherence ), and asserts that the discriminative comprehension of these categories of truth is the condition of liberation. The soul has the nine specific qualities of buddhi ( knowledge ), sukha ( pleasure ), duḥkha (pain), icchā (desire ), dveşa (aversion ), prayatna(effort ), dharma (merit ), adharma (demerit ) and samskāra (predispositions). On the absolute dissociation of these qualities, the soul attains liberation and regains its natural state of freedom from contamination with these specific qualities. The school believes in the plurality of souls which are ubiquitous.
The Jaina philosopher observes that the Vaiseșika postulation of absolute difference between the parts (avayava ) and the whole (avayavin ), qualities and their substratum, action and the active, universal and the individual, is opposed to experience. We do not perceive the two terms as absolutely different from one another, though of course distinction is not denied. They must be admitted
1 atha na bhinno nāpyabhinnah parināmah kevalam mahadadirūpeņa pradhānam
pariņamati dandakundaladyäkāraih sarpavad iti cet, tadetat svestanityaikāntabādhakam.-SŚP, p. 32:
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