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VAISESIKA CATEGORIES AND THEISM
as somehow identical and different both. The postulation of the relation of samavaya between the two would not solve the problem. It would rather add another category equally unamenable to perception. Moreover, the relation of samavaya is accepted as eternal, ubiquitous and unitary, whereas the terms related by it are transitory and limited in extension, and different in different contexts. Again, the samavaya itself would require another samavaya to relate itself with the terms, and this would lead to infinite regress leaving the terms unrelated. Nor would the quality of conjunction (samyoga) serve the purpose. Conjunction, being admitted as quality by the Vaiseṣika, can reside exclusively in a substance, and not in samavaya which is not a substance. The substantive-adjective relation is also not helpful. Such relation is possible only when the terms are already related by another relation. For instance, the stick can function as an adjective if the relation of conjunction between the person and the stick held by him is known beforehand. The Vaiseṣika might contend that the samavaya relates itself to the term by itself independently of any other relation. Samavaya is itself a relation and therefore does not need another relation for its relation with the term. But the contention is not tenable. Even as the conjunction (samyoga) and such other qualities require a relation for their residence in the substance, so the samavaya must also be admitted to be in need of another relation for its residence in the terms. It cannot be accepted as self-related. The Vaiseṣika might argue: "Self-relatedness is the intrinsic nature of samavaya, even as hotness is of fire. There is no justification for comparing the nature of conjunction (samyoga) with that of samavaya Fire is hot and water is cold. It is a question of fact. One should not ask: Why fire is not cold and water is not hot ?" But the Jaina philosopher does not find any substance in the argument. Had the self-relatedness of samavaya been established by perception, the Vaiseṣika could appeal to the nature of things. But it is a question of logic which can be decided only by appeal to reason. The case of conjunction was cited only for the sake of argument against the postulation of sama vaya as an independent category and not as a proof against such postulation. In fact, Prasastapāda proves sama vaya by inference.1
Vidyananda has adduced a number of cogent arguments against samavā ya and the reader will find many interesting points in it. With the refutation of samavaya the quality of samyoga ( conjunction) is also refuted. The postulation of absolute difference is the besetting sin. Some sort of identity between the terms
1 Vide SSP, p. 36, § 14.
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