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SAUTRĀNTIKA FLUXISM
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parts constitute the whole. But what is the relation between the whole and the part? The whole cannot reside in the parts individually or jointly. The postulation of a pecular relation called samavāya in the inherence is also not helpful, because samavāya in the ultimate analysis is nothing but another name of what we call “residence'. The cancept of a composite whole is thus an absurd notion.
The Jaina philosopher postulates the relation of identity-in-difference between the whole and its parts, which is exactly similar to the relation obtaining between a cognition and its two constituents, viz, the cognizing agent and the congnized content. The cognition, the cognizer and the content are three distinct facts inseparably rolled into one.1 They are identical as well as different. The relation is sui generis and for want of a better name may be called identity-in-difference. The whole is as nuuch a real unity as each of its parts. There is nothing repugnant in admitting the atoms as combining together to make one unit which is amenable to perception, And such unity must be admitted as real. Otherwise, there bei available at any stage, the unity of atom would also remain unestablished.
The question of the reality of universals is also raised by Vidyānanda in this context. The Jaina philosopher identifies the universal with similarity or reseinblance. Similarity must be admitted as real. Otherwise there could be no occasion for the erroneous cognition of shell as silver. There is similarity between shell and silver, which is responsible for the occurrence of erroneous cognition in the presence of the other relevant conditions of error. The Jaina philosopher does not admit the category of eternal and ubiquitous universals of the Nyāya-Vaisesika philosopher, for he does not believe in any valid experience of such category.2 This similarity is called horizontal universal (tiryak-sīmānya) in sain philosopby. 8 There is another called vertical universal (ürdhvatā-sâmânya) which relates to the identity of a substance through time. 4 A substance changes but does not cease to be. It is perinanent and also one. This permanence and unity is called vertical universal. The Jaina philosopher does not find any difficulty in adınitting the same self running through different modes and preserving its identity. He likens this vertical identity to the unity of a cogni
1 yathaiva hi jñānasya vedya-vedakākārābhyām tādātmyam asakyavivecanatvāt,
......tathă avayavyāder apyavayavadibhyas tādátmyam asakyavivecanatvad
eva.--SSP, p. 24. 2 na ca sādharmyad aparam samanyam asti, tasya nitya-vyāpi-svabhāvasya
kvacid apyaprativedanāt.---SŚP, p. 26. 3 sadrsapariņāmas tiryak khanda-mundadişu gotvavat.-PKM, IV. 5 (p. 467). 4 parāpara-vivartavyāpi dravyam ūrdhvatā, mydiva sthāsādişu.
wak khanda-mundādişu gordiva sthāsādişu. 1V. 6 (p. 488).
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