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SATYASASANA-PARIKSA
by inference, because he does not accept the validity of inference. He is therefore compelled to admit self-intuition, and consequently the existence of the self or soul as the substratum of that intuition.
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Being radically different in nature from the material products, the soul must be eternal unlike the latter.1
The negation (pratiședha) of soul entails the reality of it, because in all genuine negations, the negatum must be a positive fact. Even the negation of square-circle presupposes separate reality of square and circle elsewhere. The figurative usages (gauņakalpana) like 'his pictures lack soul' also argue the existence of soul. All simple words (śuddha-pada) signify positive reals. The word 'soul' is a simple word and so must stand for a positive fact. There is also consensus of opinion among eminent men (aneka-visiṣṭa-jana-sammati ) and the testimony of the omniscient souls (jina) in favour of the existence of soul, which has been established by unimpeachable arguments of logic too. 2
The material elements are known as external objects while consciousness is felt as internal. This argues their absolutely different nature. Moreover, it is a common experience that a new-born babe has desire to suck the breast of his mother. This desire would be unexplainable in the absence of his recognition of the breast as milk-secreting organ. The recognition again presupposes memory and memory is based on past experience in a previous life. There are also instances of ghosts appearing and telling their story and gifted persons remembering their past lives. 3
The obvious disparity and variation in the mental and moral faculties of different individuals must have a cause, and this cause is asserted to be merits and demerits earned in previous lives. And this is the Moral Law which is the proof of life herebefore and hereafter.
ist
As regards the possibility of an omniscient soul, the Jaina asserts that the materialist cannot adduce any proof against such possibility. The materialaccepts perception alone as the valid instrument of knowledge. And perception, being capable of cognizing positive objects alone, cannot cognize the absence of omniscience. Even if perception is admitted as capable of cognizing the absence, the materialist should clarify whether it is capable of
1 vivādāpannam caitanyam anadyanantam prithivyādi-samudāya-sarirendriyavisayebhyo 'tyanta-vailakṣaṇyasyā 'nyathānupapatteḥ.-SSP, p. 17.
2 pratisedha-gauna kalpana-guddhapada-neka sam mati-jinoktail; nirbadha-lakṣaṇārthair linga ir api bhavyate bhavaḥ.-Quoted in SSP, p. 17. 3 tadaharja-stanehāto rakṣo-drster bhavasmrteḥ;
bhūtānvayanāt siddhaḥ prakṛtijñaḥ sanātanaḥ.-Quoted in SSP, p. 18.
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