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1xviii
VEDÂNTA-SOTRAS.
other hand, the vidyâ is one only, all the different qualities of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one meditation.—The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the three texts.
Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyas being really separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are the udgithavidyâs of the Khậndogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain similarities—such as bearing the same name and the udgîthia being in both identified with prâna-yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the Khandogya vidya is not the whole udgîtha but only the sacred syllable Om, while the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad represents the whole udgîtha as the object of meditation.
Satra 9 constitutes in Sankara's view a new adhikarana (IV), proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 1), the Omkâra and the udgitha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being,
Let a man meditate on that Omkâra which,' &c.-According to Råmânuga's interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sûtra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikarana.Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called prânavidyas and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the prana, which are mentioned in the different texts, within one meditation.
Adhik. VI comprises, according to Sankara, the Sûtras 11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special vidya. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, men
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