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II, 2, 9.
TIME.
77
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an egg-shell separately, but both would arise in one, they two being intimately dependent one on the other ; just so, if there were no name there would be no form. What is meant by name in that expression being intimately dependent on what is meant by form, they spring up together. And this is, through time immemorial, their nature?.'
* You are ready, Nâgasena, in reply.'
9. The king said: 'You speak, Nagasena, of time immemorial. What does this word "time" mean?' • Past time, O king, and present, and future.'
But what? is there such a thing as time?' • There is time which exists, and time which does not.'
Which then exists, and which not?' [50] . There are Confections (constituent potentialities of being) , O king, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be, or of having been dissolved, or altogether changed. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing
* Evam etam digham addhânam sambhâvitam: which Hardy, p. 141, renders: They accompany each other (as to the species, but not as to the individual) during infinitude.' But even the Simhalese text cannot be made to mean this.
. Samkhårå. See the full list in my · Buddhism,' pp. 91, 92 (a list, indeed, not found as yet in the Pilakas, and probably later, but yet founded on the older divisions, and explanatory of them). They are all those divisions into which existence (or the process of becoming and ceasing to be as Buddhism looks at it) should be divided, and are practically so many sorts of action (Karma). For the older divisions see the note at the passages quoted in Vinaya Texts,' I, 76.
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