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38
VEDÂNTA-SOTRAS.
injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other passage quoted (as action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is purportless') we remark that if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all information about existent things is meaningless'. If, on the other hand, the Veda- in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation of activity-does give information about existent things as being subservient to some action to be accomplished, why then should it not give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).But, it will be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are instrumental to action, the information given about such things is merely subservient to action. This, we reply, does not matter; for although the information may be subservient to action, the things themselves about which information is given are already intimated thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain actions. Their final end (prayogana) indeed may be subserviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given about them, intimated in themselves. Well, and if they are. thus intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose ?? We reply that the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a
I That, for instance, in the passage “he is to sacrifice with Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.
. I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been cstablished ?
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