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I ADHYAYA, I PÂDA, 5.
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a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the pradhâna, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedântin) also who assume an all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as consisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances; while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.
To these conclusions he (Vyasa) replies in the following Satra.
5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhâna) is not (to be identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not founded on Scripture.
It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for the non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sankhyas; because it is not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i.e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Kh. Up. VI, 2, (which begins : ‘Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw),
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