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VEDÂNTA-SÓTRAS.
causal energy.-That assumption also is fruitless, because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not imbued with the nature of the cause (i. e. in which the nature of the cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the cause does continue to exist in the effect is impossible (on the Bauddha doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of general non-permanency.-Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the effect ; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all cases !. - Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which the Bauddha speaks nust either constitute a thing's own form or another state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing, it would follow that the word 'thing' and the words 'origination' and 'cessation' are interchangeable (which is not the case).—Let then, secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in consequence of which the terms origination' and 'cessation' may denote the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is called thing.- In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be abandoned. -Let then, as the third alternative, origination and cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo is from a horse.—That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would be led up to, if we understood by the origination and cessation of a thing merely its perception and non-perception ; for the latter are attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself. - Hence
1 And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material causes such as clay, &c. ?
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