Book Title: Sramana 2007 10
Author(s): Shreeprakash Pandey, Vijay Kumar
Publisher: Parshvanath Vidhyashram Varanasi

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Page 99
________________ 94 : śramaņa, Vol 58, No. 4/October-December 2007 principle, the mind is impotent without the physical mind, consequently, the phenomena of mental activities cannot be explained in the case of asamjñins. The only possible explanation of this division is that the negation in the case of asamjñins, does not mean total absence, but an undeveloped condition or an indistinct presence of it. "The mind of the lower grade animals is not so developed as amounting to rationality. This view is further confirmed by the first division of samjñā, stated above. The animals by instinct also possess mind in undeveloped form; and consequently, they have śruta also. The Object of Mind: According to the Non-Jaina systems mind is an essential condition for all types of psychic function. It is only the Vedānta, which holds certain qualities as sākṣībhāva (cognised by the pure soul). But, as far as the cognition of external things is concerned also holds antahkarana, as an essential condition. The Jaina does not favor this view. The Nandi clearly holds the sense cognition as different from the mental cognition. The first is pratyakṣa while the latter is parokşa. All types of paroksa in the logical period, except Āgama are included into parokșa-mati. Akalanka includes them into śruta; but this difference is related with the fixation of a demarcation line between mati and śruta. Akalanka includes all types of mental cognition into śruta. As far as the sense cognition is concerned hc does not differ from the Nandi. Thus, mind is not an essential condition for all types of knowledge. In the logical period it is held that mind functions in the case of sense-cognitions also. But, that is an external influence. We have stated the variety of mati exclusively related with the senses. In such cases the soul cognises the object through the medium of senses, without depending upon the assistance of mind, just as in the case of supersensual cognition, it does so directly. It is another thing that in the case of samjñins, the mind begins to function as soon as an object is presented.

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