Sambodhi 1988 Vol 15

Author(s): Ramesh S Betai, Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 25

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He might have got the hint for his definition of pramāna from Bhāsarvajña's 'Samyag-anubhava-sādhanam pramānam (Nyāyasāra), though he has criticised this definition inasmuch as it can apply even to organs or instruments such as sense-object contact which are of the nature of nonknowledge (p. 6).
His concept of dhāraṇa (retention) is interesting. He defines it as the cause of memory or recollection ( Flagefa --1.1.29). It is nothing but samskära (mental trace). Retention is thus the continued existence of a cognition for an indefinite length of time. Thus samskāra is, of the nature of knowledge, being a particular stage of perceptual knowledge. It can not be something other than knowledge as the Nyāya School holds. If it were not of the nature of knowledge it could not generate smrti (recollection) which is of the nature of knowledges and it could not also be an attribute of the sentient soul. Now the older Jaina ācāryas assert that avicyuti (absence of lapse) is also a case of dhāraņā (See Višeșāvašyaka-Bhasya, 180). How then could Hemacandra say that the cause of memory, viz. mental trace, alone is dhārana.? The answer to this is that there is such a thing as absence of lapse which is called retention, but that is included within the fold of perceptual judgment (avāya) and hence is not separately mentioned. Perceptual judgment when protracted for a length of time is entitled TITOTT (retention) qua avicyuti (absence of lapse). Or as avicyuti is also a cause of memory, it has been included under dhāraņā (as defined above). Mere perceptual judgment (avāya) bereft of absence of lapse (avicyuti) does not give rise to recollection (smsti). Perceptual judgments (avāya) which are not subjected to attentive reflection are almost on the level of unheeded cases of perception as the touch of grass by a man in hurried motion, and such cases of cognition are not found to give rise to any recollection. There should therefore be no objection as the above-stated definition of dhāraņā (retention ) includes both avicyuti (absence of lapse) and samskāra (mental trace) as the causes of smộti (recollection). Hemacandra further clarifies that though recollection (smrti) has been affirmed to be a species of retention (dhāraṇā) in authoritative texts, it has not been mentioned in the aphorism since it is an instance of n n-perceptual organ of valid knowledge (parokșa-pramāņa).3 It may be noted that Jinabhadra has concluded in his Viseşāvaśyaka-Bhasya (188, 189) and the commentary on it that dhāraṇā is three-fold-avicyuti, vāsanā (or saņskāra) and smsti., and Pujyapāda had said in his Saryārthasiddhi (1.15) that dharaņā is the cause of avismộti (non-forgetfulness). Thus two views came into existence as a result of these. A kalanka (Tattvårtharajavärttika 1.15), Vidyānanda (Tattvārthaślokavārttika 1.15, 21, 22) and Ananta