Book Title: Sambodhi 1988 Vol 15
Author(s): Ramesh S Betai, Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Page 177
________________ 16 is both eternal as well as non-eternal. Citrarūpa, again is a conglomera. tion of several mutually exclusive rūpas which belong to a single substance.32 Even though Nyāya-Vaišeşikas have accepted the generality and particularity as two idependent categories, they are not able to discard the path of Anekānta. Vātsyāyana mentions that both contradictory elements can exist in one and the same33 place. Jati34 is, again, both general as well particular. Amongst the two kinds of universals, (i.e. Parā and aparā) aparasamánya is both, general as well as35 particular. The Sānkhyas doctrine of evolution of praksti, according to which prakyti is neither absolutely eternal nor absolutely changing, but eternal cum-change is in no way different from the Jaina doctrine of parināminitvatā. The difference between the two view is that the Sankhya doctrine is applicable only to non-sentient prakyti, while the Anekānta of Jainas has its application to all the fundamental things, sentient as well as nonsenstient.36 Vyāsa and Vācaspati Miśra followed the path of Anekānta in their commentaries on Patanjala yogasutra in many places. Both of them admit the eternal-cum-non-eternal nature of the phenomenal world and substance.37 Even, things are always both, general and particular.38 In respect of prakrti-purașa relation, Vyāsa clearly admits the identity-cumdifference like the Jainas. Puruşa is not absolutely different from intellect (i.e. product of praksti), nor absolutely identical with it. The relation between the two is identity-cum-difference.39 The Mimāmsā school practically admits the Anekāntavāda by stating that substance has three characteristics of origination, decay and permanence.40 Kumārila Bhatta, while discussing the part and whole (avayava and avayavi), clearly states that both are not absolutely different from each other. Their relation is identity-cum-difference.41 Pārthasārathi Misra upholds the same position. A thing is real as well as unreal, Universal as well as particular. 2 Again, the view, that the same eternal word (Vāk) manifests itself in the evanescent phases of the Vaikhari, the Madhyamā and the Paśyanti is verv similar to anekāntavāda.43 Anekānta method has a place in all the schools of Vedānta philosophy. Even, Sankara the great critic of Syādvāda has applied this doctrine at some places. Sankara, while criticising the prakstikäranavāda of Sankhya, states (like Jainas) that both pravrtti (activity) and nivýtti (inactivity) which are contradictory, can exist in Isvara.44 The Advaita Vedāntins view that the same immutable self appears in the changing states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, is basically, Anekāntavāda only. Influence of Anekāntavāda is found in the latter Vedanta works such as works of Ramānuja; Bhāskara, Vijñānabhikṣu, Nimbārka, Srikantha, śivācārya, and Vallabha. 46

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