Sambodhi 1988 Vol 15

Author(s): Ramesh S Betai, Yajneshwar S Shastri
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 23

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quilifying proviso (viz. that the object of pramāṇā should be an uncognised one) is not required. If it has reference to the substance, substance is eternal and the self-same substance is cognised in either state-cognised before or to be cognised, and again the epithet becomes futile.
As a matter of fact, barring the Buddhists, no other logician of any school has adhered strictly to the condition of pramāņa being knowledge of an uncognised object. Recognition and series of repeating (dhārävähin) congnitions are recognised as pramāņa. And as Hemacandrācārya has pointed out, even those wlio deny the status of pramāņa to recollection (smsti) do so on the ground that it is not directly derived from the object, and not on the ground that it is cognisant of a pre-cognised object. (See Jayanta Bhattas (Nyayamañjari, p. 23).
Thus the definition of pramāņa as given by Hemacandra is very brief and simple and at the same time packed with meaning and faultless.
Perception (protyakşa) is similarly defined as far: (at4 fui :) 928% (1.1.13), lucid right definitive cognition of an object. And its lucidity (vaišadya) consists in its independence of another organ of knowledge or apprehension of its content as 'this' (particular existent). as a (711721atacaal afara at agen – 1.1.14). This definition can apply to both mukhya pratyakşa (principal perception) and Sāṁvyavahărika pratyakşa (empirical perception ) as recognised by the Jaina philosophers.
It would not be out of place to give just one example of Hemacandra's deep and alert scholarship.
The Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4 defines pratyaksa thus: .. इन्द्रियार्थ सन्निकर्षीत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मक प्रत्यक्षम -The unerring cognition, unnameable and definitive that is produced by senseobject contact is perception. It is clear that pratyaksa is defined as of the nature of knowledge and Hemacandra feels that this is in agreement with the Jaina view that the organ of knowledge is always cognitional in character. But eminent scholars led by Trilocana and Vācaspati have set their face against the interpretation of the sūtra by the earlier exponents and sought to explain the sūtra differently. Their contention is that the definition of perceptual cognition is found in the expression is afers Forca g ent, and the terms 'avyapadesya' and 'vyavasāyatmaka'