Book Title: Jainism in Buddhist Literature
Author(s): Bhagchandra Jain Bhaskar
Publisher: Alok Prakashan

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Page 160
________________ ( 141 ) refuted by the Buddhist philosophers. Santa rakṣita, even having defined perception as lucid knowledge without reflection ( kalpana ) criticised the view of Sumati on the ground that an entity does not have any particular qualities by which it can be differentiated at the moment of apprehension. He thus sought to assert that there is no particular thing at all. But the particular characteristic of a thing is implicit in his classification of the universal (Sämānya) into two. types, viz. (i) distinguished by qualifications, and (ii) not distinguished by qualifications. The first is Nirvikalpaka, and next is Savikalpaka pratykşa (conceptual-preception). The former is the real pratyaksa while the latter is practical. On this basis, Santaraksita presents two arguments to refute Sumati's theory. The first is that an entity does not possess any characters by which it can be differentiated. We see a thing first and then realise it as a pot or any particular thing. When the thing is apprehended, the nagation of all other things comes forth naturally. Hence, the non-conceptual perception ( nirvikalpaka pratyaksa ) in the specific form of colour, shape, etc. appears and then there follows the conceptual content ( vikalpatmaka jñana ) associated with the words it is different.103 Here the words do not lead to cognition. The reason behind this is that the specific individuality (svalaksanavastutva ) itself is independent of the words. The perception generated by them also should be deprived of the words. The words do not have any relation with the meaning. In the absence of words a thing exists, and in the absence of a thing we use the words, which are dependent on gestures. and intentions. There is, therefore, no possibility of words in the Nirvikalpaka pratyaksa. The second argument which Sāntarakşita puts forth is that in particular thing there should be no other characteristics except that of the "Particular' 104 Thus, whatever cognition appears with regard to the "specific individnality" of things it beyond the range of

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