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argues that a thing cannot be qualified without having a connection-with the qualifications, as in the case of a stick (danda ) and the stick-holder ( daņdin ). Hence the cognition which apprehends the qualifications ( višeşata ) is conceptual (savikalpaka ).95 He again draws our attention to this defect of self-contradiction in this theory pointing out that if there is always the apprehension of the things as distinguished from homogeneous ( sajūtiya ) and heterogeneous ( vijatiya things, then the apprehension would becom determinate ( savikalpaka for it can be conveyed “this is different". Otherwise low does it apprehend the difference between things. 96
Sumati pointed out another defect in the Buddhist theory. He asserts that there is no particular ( vises a ) without a touch of the universal (Samanya ). It cannot be argued in his opinion that the universal or "being” is not touched at all by the sense-perception at the time of apprehension, because in this position the particular would be devoid of existence and thus it could become characterless; and as such could not be apprehended by sense-perception, because it would be devoid of being' and become like the sky-flower (ākajakusuma)."7 Thus Sumati is of the view that the particular is perceived with the character of the universal.
All Jaina logicians have tried to refute the Buddhist theory of sense perception following in the footsteps of Sumati. Akalanka is the mun figure to raise the question in this respect. Adding the adjectives anadhigatarthagrahin, arisanvadin, and visada to the existing definition of perception98 he established that the Nirrikalpaka pratykșa gets transormed into the savikalpaka is the pramana.99 Later on most of the Jaina logicians such as Acārya prabhācandra, 100 Anantavirya, 101 Vädıräja, Vidyānanda, 102 imitated him and elaborated his ideas to refute the opponent's views. 102 Refutation of the Jaina conception of savikalpaka
Pratyaksa by Sāntrakṣita The Jaina conception of Savikalpaka Pratyakya has been
