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Acarya Sumati does not agree with this definition. He questions: is the thing before the eyes of the observer apprehended purely by itself, as characterised by its own form which is impossible anywhere else? or is it not so apprehended? If Kumarila answers: there is non-apprehension of the thing in a form distinguished from other things, then Sumati states that in this position either there would be apprehension of the thing itself only, or there would be no perception of the thing at all. He illustrated his theory by reference to the perception of a Jar. The Jar should be either apprehended without having the form of others or it should not be apprehended. There could be no escape from these alternatives69.
Kumārila's view is based on the definition of perception given in the Jaimin yasatra90 It is refuted by all nonMmāmsaka philosophers, Vedic 91 as well as Buddhist and Sumati appears to be the first Jaina Acarya to join them in refuting this view.
Having criticised the view of Kumarila, Sumati proceeds to criticise the view of Buddhist Acryas, especially, that of Santarakṣita. As we have seen, Santarkṣita, a follower of Dharmakirti, defines perception as knowledge free from conceptual contents and not erroneous 93 He tries to prove his theory by means of inference and establishes that the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (indeterminate perception) is the only real perception. Santarakṣita further clarifies his own view by citing examples. He says: in case a thing has no particular form, it cannot be accepted as a particular thing. For instance, the white house owing to different charactristics cannot be mistaken for a cow. It is the same case with the perception. 94
Here in this definition the kalpana is the main figure which has been defined in various ways by Buddhist Philosophers. Šantarakşita defined it as visistaviṣayāvabodhaḥ (knowledge of qualified object). Sumati is said to be against this view. He
