Book Title: Jainism in Buddhist Literature
Author(s): Bhagchandra Jain Bhaskar
Publisher: Alok Prakashan

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Page 173
________________ ( 154 ) the Sad skäras recall for any particular purpose the things experienced in the past. The memory of such things is a source of knowledge gainend through senses. Therefore smrti is declared to be a Pramana, since it is tiue of facts samvadın just as perception. The validity of pramāna cannot be ascertained merely by relation to its depedence or independence of experience. If this argument is accepted even pramäua will cease to be a pramana, for inference also depends on knowledge already acquired through direct emprical perception.135 While examining smrti pramina, we may also discuss Dhinat ühika pramāna ( continuous cognition ). The Dhārāvā. hikaji ina is accepted as a pramāņa by the Nyāya-Vaiseşikas154 and the Mimārnsakas.155 In Buddhist tradition only Aracata accepts it.156 He says that only the Yogin's dhārāvähika Iñina is pramāņa, because it involves awareness of Saksmakalakala ( minute divisions of time ), while ordinary man's continuous cognition is not a pranāna, because it does not involve such awareness. The Jain logicians have two traditions regarding dhārāva. hika Pramana. According to the Digambara tradition, 157 it is valid provided it produces a visista pramāņa. a knowledge of special objects ), while the Svetambara tradition accepts the dhirugihika ñina as a praināņa without any conditions 158 Pratyabhisana Pratyabhijñana (recognition ) is the result of perception and recollection. Its nature is of tadevedam (that is definitely this ), tatsadrasan ( it is similar ), tadvilak sanın (it is some. what dissimilar ), and tatpratiyogi ( it is different from that ), which are avisamvadir ( non-discrepant ) and therefore are pramāņas themselves. 159 Kumārıla160 as well as Jayanta 181 includes pratyabhijfāna in pratyaksa. But the Buddhists do not accept it as a separate pramīņa. In support of their theory, they advocate the idea that pratyabhijñina is nothing, but only a combination or recollection or remembrance and perception. Further they urge that a thing is momentary ( ksanika) if it dismisses the

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