Jainism in Buddhist Literature

Author(s): Bhagchandra Jain Bhaskar
Publisher: Alok Prakashan
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/011023/1

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On the eve of the 2500th Anniversary of Lord Mahavira:
JAINISM
IN
BUDDHIST LITERATURE
Ву Bhagcbandra Jalo Bbaskar M. A., Sahityāchārya, Ph. D. (Ceylon ) Head of the Department of Pāli and Präkrit
Nagpur University
Foreword By
Prof. Hira Lal Jain, D. Litt. Formerly Professor of Sanskrit, Pali and Prākrit Department,
Jabalpur University
rut
ALOK PRAKASHAN
NAGPUR, INDIA

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Published by
Alok Prakashan
Gandhi Chauk, Sadar
.Nagpur, India.
All rights reserved by the author.
First Edition 1972
Thesis approved for the Degree of Ph. D. of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, 1966. )
Printed by
Hitchintak Press,
Ramghat,
Varanasi, India.
Price Rs. 40.00

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To My uncle, a great social worker,
Who Made me What I am.
LATE SARI SHAH DEEPCHAND
JAIN NAHAR Katara, Sagar. M P.

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FOREWORD
[By Dr. H. L. Jain, Formerly, Director, Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Prakrit, Jainology and Ahimsā Vaishali, Bihar, and Professor and Head of Sanskrit, Pāli and Prākrit Department, University of Jabalpur, India. ]
Jainisin and Buddism alike held Non-violence as a supreme virtue and laid emphasis on celibacy and renunciation. They · likewise condemned animal sacrifices, preached kindness to all creatures, Lig or small, and strove, not for worldly prosperity and happiness, but for absolute release from the cycle of birth and death through the goal of Salvation, Moksa or Nirvāṇa. Both the Prophets, Mahāvira and Buddha, were Ksatriya princes of Eastern India, and both renounced their kingdon for a life of asceticism, attained perfect knowledge through meditation and preached to the people the way to peace. Their career was spent for the most part in the province of Bihar where they were both born and died. Jina, Buddha and Sramana were their interchangeable titles, and many proper names such as Siddhartha, Gautama and Kāsyapa were common in their hierarchies.
These and many other common features misled the earlier Western historians, such as Elphinston to propound the view that Jainism was no more than an offshoot or school of Buddhism which had very wide ramifications in Asia and a much greater circle of followers in ancient India itself. This opinion, however, underwent a radical change, when scholars like Jacobi and Hoernle studied the Jaina and Buddhist systems more closely and analysed dispassionately the facts revealed by the ancient texts of the two systems

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of thought. It was then established beyond dispute that Jainism was not only independent of Buddhism, but it was older of the two in its origin and development, and it was. preached more than two centuries earlier than Mahavira by Päráva whose followers had continued to maintain their identity and religious propaganda all through the period, so that the parents of Mahavira, and probably of Buddha also, belonged to that faith. The name of Buddha's father Suddho. dana is in itself a testimony that he was a pure vegetarian, a rice consumer. implying there by that Ahursā was his creed.
Opinion is also unanimous that the two Prophets were contemporary. But, for how long, who was senior of the two and who attained Nirvana earlier, are disputed questions. Among various calculations and theories about Buddha's Nirvana, the two deserve particular attention. One is the reference in Ceylonese Chronicles, accordiog to which Buddha achieved salvation in 544 B. C. The second evidence is provided by the Chinese dotted Records which go to prove that the event took place in 487 B, C. This evidence is also in accord with an earlier Simhalese tradition. As against this, there is only one stable tradition about Malāvīra's Nirvana that it took place 470 years before Vikrama and. 605 years before Saka i, e. 527 BC There is plenty of literary and epigraphic evidence to support this, and what is clained to militate against this has been again and again proved to be based on an error or preconceived notions. There are frequent references in the Pāli literature of the Buddhists themselves that Nigantha Nätaputta i. e. Mahāvira was one of those six Tirthan karas or teachers who were senior to Buddha and were sufficiently famous and popular to be consulted by the contemporary monarch Ajātasatru on matters of religion and philosophy, before Buddha could be thought of for the purpose. Not only this, but it has also been clearly stated that when the news of Mahavira's Nır vāpa reached the ears of Buddha, the latter thought it fit to.

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Mummon all his followers together and warned them against any scbismatic tendencies after his death, as was allegedly happening in the case of Mahavira's Nirvana. To ignore these facts as erroneous, because they run counter to one's own fanciful theories and calculations, is not rational and logical
Doubts and debates a part, there is no denying the fact that Mahavira and Buddha had a contemporaneity of more than two decades, preacbing in the same localitis and finding some of their followers changing allegiance from one to the other teacher even more than once. This, taken into account with the fact that they both belonged to an earlier phase of the Sramana ideology, would naturally lead us to expect a large annount of similarity in the teachings of the two systems and numerous references to one another in their literature. This is more so in the Buddhist works than in the Jaina, presumably because the younger were more envious of their seniors than vice versa. On the other hand, it is also a fact that the known Jaina canonical works assumed their present shape much later than their Buddhist counterparts. Hence, whatever historical, philosophical or religious references to Jainism are found therein, they are of great importance, not only for both the systems of thought but for the cultural history of India as a whole.
This is what has been thoroughly studied by the author of the present book, Dr. Bhagchandra Jain. He is by birth and faith a Jaina and a Buddhist scholar by choice. He has not only dived deep into Buddhist literature, but also stayed long and travelled widely in Ceylon, collecting sifting, selecting and classilying his data. The book Jainism in Buddhist Literature" was originally submitted as a thesis for a Doctor Degree, and its acceptance for the same in a Ceylon University was a strong evidence of the fact that it withstood well the scrutiny of a team of specialists. Still Dr. Bhagchandra did not think it fit to project his thesis into publicity imme.

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diately after receiving his Doctorate. He allowed it, as weir as himself, to ripen with age and experience, while be engagedi himself in teaching Pali and Prākrit at the University of Nagpur, He has put his finger, not only on all the direct references to Mahāvira and his teachings, but also on all those ideas and practices which appeared to have a common. basis. The wealth of information stored in this book, thescholarly marshalling of well authenticated facts, penetrating judgement, systematic exposition and balanced conclusions make the book indispensable for all lovers of Indian culture as well as for those who wish to undertake any kind of study or research work in the field.
I congratulate the author and bestow my best blessings on the young scholar from whom I have reason to expect further contributions to our knowledge on a subject which, in its own way, is of deep interest and supreme importance in: the domain of Oriental Classical Studies.
Hira Lal Jain
Balaghat, M. P.
1-3-1972.

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PREPAGE
Nearely a hundred years ago, Weber, on the basis of some superficial similarities, came to the conclusion that Jainism was an off-shoot of Buddhism. In 1884 Jacobi corrected this view and with a thorough investigation into the historical and traditional records of the two religions, established the fact that Jainism was an earlier and independent religion of India. Although over eighty years have passed since Jacobi's researcbes, the much-needed comparative study of Jainism and Buddhism has not been undertaken seriously. There have been passing references to their contemporaniety and. doctrinal dissimilarities as well as the role they played together as a revolutionary opposition to Vedic Brahmana. The reason for the long delay in attempting a deeper study can easily be understood. The Buddhist literary and Philosophical works are in Pali and Sanskrit while the Jaina records are in Prākrit and Sanskrit. Neither in India nor in Ceylon do we find many scholars who had the opportunity of acquiring competence in all the three languages. Apart from the linguistic equipment, there is the more difficult problem of understanding fully the religious, philosophical, ethicals and epistemological Daunces of both religions. An adherent of Jainism or Buddhism knows his religion only ; but for comparative studies, a thorough grasp of botha is sine qua non.
My early studies gave me an opportunity to acquire an adequate knowledge of Sanskrit, Pāli, Prakrit, Philosophy and Ancient Indian History and culture and Archaeology. While studying for my M. A. in Pali I went through many Buddhistic texts. But these, in themselves, could not have given me the requisite qualification to handle a subject like Jainism in Buddhist literature.
When I was awarded the Commonwealth Scholarship for study in Ceylon and admitted to Vidyoda ya University of Ceylon, I felt that I could undertake a comparative study between Jainism and Buddhism more successfully. I was provided with the most suitable environment and facilities for

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"this work.
As a Jain I was conversant with my own religion and Vidyodaya, being a revered seat of Buddhist learning, the venerable scholar-monks who guided me in my researches "knew all about Buddhism. This, indeed, is a very rare opportunity for one who wants to study Buddhism. That is why I did not mind giving up half-way the work, I was doing at Benares Hindu University as a University Grant Commisssion Scholar, on the Saddhamapundarika.
This thesis represents only the beginning of a series of comparative studies which should be undertaken in the field of Buddhism and Jainism. My attempt is to trace the references to Jainism n Buddhist literature and to evaluate the information contained therein. It has been my intention to find out the degree of accuracy and completeness with which the Buddhist literature has recorded various dogmas . and teachings of Jainism.
The method addopted by me has been to examine the data in the Tipitaka, the Pali Non-Canonical literature and Sanskril philosophical works in that order. I have utlized the original texts in Pali and Sanskrit as far as possible. Where similarities or original Jaina versions of any doctrinal point were observed, the Jaina works in Ardhamagadhi and Sauraseni Prakrits and Sanskrit were used.
One observation has to be made at this stage on the scope of the research I had undertaken. Contrary to the general belief, the data on Jainism available in Buddhist Literature are very meagre. Though contemporaneous, the Buddhist records have only made scanty references to both Jainism and its Tirthankara or Tirthankaras. These references are distributed all ever the voluminous literature and the search for them has been a very arduous task whose magnitude and difficulty may not be very clear to an ordinary reader of these chapters.
My indebtedness to previous authors and translations of the Pali, Prakrit, and Sanskrit literature has been duly acknowledged in the references and the bibliography.

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Acknowledgements At the end it is my pleasant duty to acknowledge the help that I have received from various quarters. It is with gratitude that I record my sincere appreciation of all the assistance I received from the Government of India which selected me for this scholarship, and the Government of Ceylon and the authorities of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon who very kindly awarded the scholarship to me and made all arrangements for not only studies but also a very happy sojourn in this beautiful Island.
I am very grateful to my teacher and guide Ven. Balangoda Ananda Maitreya, D. Litt., Professor of Theravāda Buddism and Dean of the Faculty of Buddhism, Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, who supervised my studies and ven. late Dr. Palannoruwe Wimaladlanıma Nayaka Thero, D. Litt., then Vice Chancellor, the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon who too, gave me much encouragement and very valuable suggestions.
I am highly grateful to Dr. Hira Lal Jain, Formerly Director, Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Prākrit, Jainology and Ahinisā, Vaishali, Bihar, and Professor and Head of Sinskrit, Pāli and Prakrit Department, University of Jabalpur, India who encouraged me from time to time and blessed this work with his valuable Foreword.
I am gratefully recollect the valuable help received from Dr. Ananda W. P. Guruge, formerly Professor of Sanskrit, Vidyodaya University of Ceylon and the Senior Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Education, Government of Ceylon and at present UNESCO Expert and Professor of Educational Planoing, who inspite of his busy official schedule extended all the possible help in completing my work. He went critically through the thesis before it was submitted to the Voiversity. In fact, it was to a great extent due to him that my stay in Ceylon became comfortable and purposeful.

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I am also indebted to Dr. A. N. Upadhye, Professor and Head of the Department of Jainology and Prakrit, Mysore University, who helped me in every possible way in the completion of the work. He responded to my letters and queries without delay from Kolhapur while I was in Ceylon.
I am also grateful to my brother Dr. Ajaya Mitra Shastri. Reader in Ancient Indian History, culture and Archaeology. Nagpur University, who willingly went through the entire manuscript critically and made a number of valuable suggestions for better presentation. He has always been a sourcc of encouragement to my studies.
I shall fail in my duty if I do not express my gratitude to my teacher Dr. N. H. Samtani Department of Sanskrit and Pāli, Benaras Hindu University, Varanasi who suggested me to apply for the Commonwealth Scholarship for which I was fortunately selected. I am further indebted to him for the willing help he extended to me in various ways.
I would also like to express my gratitude to late Dr. Vashudeva Sharana Agrawala, Professor and Head of the Department of Art and Architecture, College of Indology, B. H, U., Dr. V. V. Gokhale, formerly Professor and Head of the Department of Buddhist Studies, Delbi University, Late Dr. Kamata Prasad, Jain Hon. Director, the World Jaina Mission, Aliganja (Etah), U. P., Ven. Bhadanta Ananda Kausalyayana, my teacher late Prof. B. Anomadassı, Lecturer in Pali, B. H. U., my elder brother Sar Dulichand Nabar Katara, Saugor, Dr. Darbari Lal Kothiya, Reader, Sanskrit Mahāvidyalaya. B. H. U., Pt. Parmananda Shastri, Dr. U.C. Tha, Ranchi Universtiy, Pt. Kalaish Chandra Shastri, and Dr. Gokul Chandra Jain who, whenever consulted, were ready to help me with very useful suggestions and advice.
My thanks are due also to Mrs. Sujata Guruge, and Mr. Punyavardhana Kuruppu for helping me in checking thereferences and reading the typescript in Ceylon

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I must here express my gratefulness to Mr. K. P. G. Wijayasurendra, then Deputy Registrar (Examination ), Vidyodaya University of Ceylon.
Mr. H. Gunasekera, then Registrar of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, Mr. E. H. Disanayake, then Deputy Registrar ( Administration) and Mr. P. Abeseker, then Assistant Registrar (Admiaistration ) who helped me in many ways.
I will be failing in my duty if I fail to express my gratitude to the, Librarians of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon, Vidyalankara University of Ceylon, Archaeological Department and the Public Library, Colombo, Ganesha jain Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya Library, Sagar, Pārsvanatha Vidyāshrama Library, Varanasi, Stādvāda Mabāvidyalaya Library Varanasi, and Librarians of Benares Hindu University and Nagpur University who went out of their way to assist me in getting the books and journals I needed for my work.
Last but not the least, my grateful thanks go to my uncle, Shah Deep Chandra Jain Nahar and my brother, Duli Chandra Jain Nahar, Katara, Sagar, M. P. for the encouragement they gave me in my studies and the security they provided for my mother and wife during my sojourn in Ceylon. Without their kindness and generosity I could never have had the education which enabled me to undertake this work. To my mother Smt. Tulsadevi Jain and my wife, Smt. Pushpa lata Jain M. A. I am extremely grateful for the many sacrifices they have made to help me achieve my ambition of bringing about a better understanding of the mutual dependence of Jainism and Buddhism and of the timely role these two great religions of India can play in bringing about peace and wellbeing to humanity.
I am also grateful to Shri Prof. Sudhakar Pandeya, M. P. and the authorities of the Năgari Prachäriņi Sabha, Varanasi and Shri Sharad Kumar Sadhak for the help in the printing of the book. I am also thankful to my friend Shri Prof. B. V. Mohril who prepared the index of the work.

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AA.
AP.
APT. AS. ASI. BU. ChāUP. D. DA.
DHA. DHP. DPPN. DS. DSV.
ABREVIATIONS Anguttara Nikaya. Anguttara Nikāya Atthakatba, 3. e. Manorathapūrani. Apadāna. Anekanta Pravesa Tika. Amitagati Srāvakácāra. Archaeological Survey of India. Buddhavamsa. Chandogyopanişada. Digha Nikaya. Digha Nikaya Atthakathi, 1. e. Sumangala Vilāsıni. Dhammapada Atthakatha. Dhammapada. Dictionary of l'ali Proper Names. Dravya Saugraha. Dravya Saugraha Vrtti. Epigraphia Carnatika. Epigraphia Indica. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Hetu Bindu Tiki. Hetu Bindu Tikāloka. Indian Antiquari. Indian Historical Quarterly. Jataka. Jaina Antiquary. Tournal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Suciety. Journal of the Pali Text Society. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. Laghiyastraya. Majstima Nikaya. Majjhima Nikaya Attakatha, i. e. Papancasūdani.
EC. EI.
ERE. HBT. HBTA. IA. IHQ.
J.
JA. JBORS.
JPTS JRAS. LT.
M.
MA.

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MHV. MK. NKC. · NM. NS. NV. NVV. PK. PKM. PM. PMU. PSU. PTS.
PV.
PVA. PVST. S. SA,
Mahavamsa. Mādhyamika Kārikā. Nyāya Kumuda Candra. Nyāya Manjari. Niyamasara. Nyāya Viniscaya. Nyaya Viniscaya Vivarana. Pancastikāyasăra. Prameya Kamala Mārtanda. Pramāna Mīmārúsā. Parik Zmuk ha. Purus rtha Siddhyupāya Pali Text Soccty. Prarrána Vārtika. Pramaya Vartikālankāra, Pramāņa Vārtika Svavřtti Țikā. Sainyutta Nikāya. Samyutta Nikaya Atthakatha, i. e. Sāratthappakisini. Sacred Books of the East. Sacred Books of the Jainas. Sutta Nipāta. Sutta Nipita Atthakathā, i. e. Paramattha Jotiki. Sarvártha Siddhi. Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa. Sūtrakrtānga. Tattva Sangraha. Tattva Sangraha Panjikā. Tattvārtha Sūtra. Tattvãıtha Sūtra Bhasya. Tattvārtha Vārtika. Vinaya Pitaka. Zeitschrift Deutschen Morganland Ischen Gescellschaft.
SBE. SBJ. SN. SNA.
SS.
STP. Sūkr. TS. TSP. TSū. TSūBh. TV.

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CONTENTS Foreword by Dr. Hira Lal Jain Prefaca Abreviations
Chapter One-THE HISTORICAL BACK-GROUND 1-59 A. Antiquity of Sramana Cult
1-21 Sixth Century B. C. (1), Vedic System (1). Later Vedic Literature (1). Sramaņa System (2), Independent Origin of the Sramaņa Cultural System (3) Classification of Sramaņas (3). Common features of Sramaņs (4), Ascetics in Buddhist Literature (6), Importance of the Sramaņas (6), Samaņas in Jaina and Buddhist Literature (7), Samana-Brāhmana in faina and Buddhist Literature (7), The Heretical Teachers (8), Purama Kassapa (10), Makkhali Gosala (12), Ajitakesakambali (12), Pakudha Kaccāyana (13), Sanjaya Belaţthiputta (14), Nigantha Nātaputta (14), Jainism and
Ajiviksm (16), Jainism and Buddhism (18), Conclusion (21). B. Jainism and its Literature
21-50 Jainism (21), Origin of Jainism (21), Antiquity of Jainism (22), Antiquity of Jainis.n and Buddhist Literature (22), The date of Nigintha Nātaputta (26), The place of Nigantha Nātaputta's death, (30), Schism in the Jaina Order (31), Prilosophical Literature of Jainas (33), The Canonical School 34), The Svetimbaras Canonical Literature (34), The Twelve Algas (31), The Twelve Upāngas (35). The Ten Painlas (35), The Six Cheyasuttas (35), The Four Mülasutras (35), The Two cūlıká sūtras (35), The Houre Councils (35), Development of Agama Literature (35) Resemblance to pāli Literature (36), Canonical School of Digambaras, (38; The Aúgapravist (38), The Augabāhya Sruta (38), Acărya Farampatā (39). Anekānta School (41). Spread of Jainism (43), The North (43). After
Mahavira (46) Jainism in Ceylon (46). C. Buddnism and its Literature
50-59 The Buddha and Buddhism (50). Sources of Buddhism (50), Buddhist Literature (52) Pali Literature (52), NonCanonical Literature (58), Sanskrit Buddhist Literature (59).

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Chapter Two-JAINA PHILOSPHY 60-92 The Six Dravyas (60). Jiva (61), Pudgala (69), Nature of Universe (69), Karmas (65), Dharma and Adharma (65), Akaba (66), Tbe Six Dravyas in Buddhist Literature (66), The Jaina Conception of Jiva (Soul) (66), Ajiva or Pudgala (73) Nature of Karmas Aśrava, Bandha, Sarvara and Nirjară (73), Mokşa (84), Nature of Universe (85), Nature of Word (89), Dharma, Adharma and Kāla Dravyas (90), Ākāśa (91), Conclusion (92).
Chapter Three - JAINA ETHICS 93-124 A. The Duties of Jaina House holders (93-109).
Jaina Ethics (93), The Four Siksāvratas (93), The Eleven Stages of the Ethical Evolution of Householders (94), The Duties of a Jaina House-bolders as reflected in Pāli Literature (94), Pañcāņuvratas (94), Tridanda and Hinsa (97), Guņavratas (100), Digvrata (101), Deśavrata and Anarthadaņdavrata (102), Siksavratas (103). Sāmāyika (103), Prosadhopavasa or Uposatha (103), The Stages of
Ethical Evolution of a Jaiaa House-holder (108). B. Jaina Monachism.
Twenty Múlaguņas (110), References to Jaina Monachism in pāli Literature (111), Church Units (112), Vassikvása (113), Requisities (114), Ascetic Practices (115), Mode of Eating (118), Quantity of Food (119), The Circumstances under which Food could not be taken (119), Fasting (119). Supernatural Powers (120), Daily Routine (120), Panicamahavratas (120), Pañcasamitis (122), Şadāvasyakas (122), Loca or Kesaluñcana (123), Acelakatva (123), Triguptis (123), Conclusion (124).
Chapter Four-EPISTEMOLOGY A. Pratyaksa Pramāņa.
125-133 Logical Discussions (124), Evolution of Epistemology (129), Knowledge and Vision (131), Classification of Knowledge (134), Pratyakşa Pramāņa (135), Jaina Conception of Savikalpaka Pratyaksa in Buddhist Literature (136), Its refutation in Buddhist Literature (140), The Object of Perception (142), Jaina Conception of Päramärthika Pratyaksa in Buddhist Literature (145).

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( 14 ) B. Parokya Pramānas.
153-167. Paroksa Pramanas (153), Smrti (153), Pratyabhijñāna (154), Tarka (155), Agama (155), Anumăna (156), Jaina Conception of Organs of Hetu in Buddhist Literature (158, Pramā pasamplavavada (166), Conclusion (167).
Chapter Five - ANEKĀNTAVĀDA 168 216A. The Nature of Reality Anekāatavāda)
(169.105) Anekantavada (169), "The Conception of Identity (170), The Conception of Difference (170;. The Conception of subordinating Difference to Identity (170). The Conception of subordinating Identity to Difference (171), The nature of reality (171). Relation between Guņa and Paryāya (172), Anekantavād in Buddhist Literature (173). Trayatmak ıvāda and Arthakriyavāda in Buddhist Literature. (175), Dual Character of an entity (180), Nature
of relation of an entity (183). B. The theory of Nayavada
(185-187) Nayavāda (185), Types of Navas (185), The Theory of Naya in Buddhist Literature (186 . C. The theory of Syādvida
(187 216) Svadvāda (187) Dosas (189). Abhivos (119). The Identity-in difference or Bhedābhedātmaka (191). Eternalcum-non-enternal aspects or Nityānityāt maka (191), Saptabhangi (191), Sjadvada Conception in Buddhist Literature. (193) Vedic (193) Uranisadic (194, Naiyāyikas (194), Sceptics (195), Makkhali Gosāla and S\ādvāda (198), the Buddha and Syádvida (200), Nigantha Nātaputta and Syadvāda (202), Refutation of Stādvāda in Buddhist Literature (204), Nāgirjuna and Syadváda 204), Dharmakirti and Svadvāda (2041, Prajñākaragupt and Syadvāda 1205), Arcata and Sy advāda (206), Santaraksita and Syād vada ( 208 ), Karnakagomin and Syādvāda (209), Jitāri and Syädvāda (210). Evaluation (211), Conclusion
(216). NOTES
217-262 APPENDIX
263-282 1. The Date of the Buddha
265-269 2. Buddhist Councils
270-271 3. The Conception of Omniscience in Buddhism. 278.282 Notes ( Appendices)
289-288 Select Bibliography.
289-299 Iodex
300-306 Errata.
307

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Antiquity of Sraman
System
Sixth Century B.C.
The Brāhmaṇas were dominant in society during the period of the Nigantha Nataputta and the Buddha. Their ritualism was represented by he priest who "vigorously claimed that the welfare and, indeed, the very existence of the world, including even the gods, depended upon the maintenance of their systems of sacrifice, which grew to immense size and complexity." Their "rites and ceremonies multiplied and absorbed man's mind to a degree unparalleled in the history of the world and literature occupied itself with the description or discussion of the dreary ceremonial." Vodic System
The Brāhmaṇical religious system had its beginning in early Vedic literature. The term Brāhmaṇa is derived from the root bh to grow, expand, evolve, develop, swell the spirit or soul. The priests, who were the custodians of such prayers, assumed a very high degree of spiritual supremacy in Vedic society and were considered to be the very progeny of Prajapati, the creator - God (Brahmano viprasya Prajapaterva a patymiti Brah. mano ). For the sole purpose of preserving spiritual leadership the Brahmaņas evolved a system of very elaborate sacrifices. These sacrifices were considered to be eternal and even the creation of the world was believed to be the result of a sacrifice. The rites were performed both to gain worldly enjoyment and to injure one's enemies. Later Vodic literature
In later Vedic literature the value of the actual sacrifices was transferred to their symbolic representation and to medi. tation on them. Later on, Upanişa dic thinkers observed that the nature of soul could be described only in negative terms; the atman was said to be neither this nor that (neti neti ), and was regarded as free from sin, old age, death, grief, hunger, and thirst. Its desires were true. Its cognitions were true. A man who kaows such ātman gets all his desires and all worlds.

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The soul or Brahman pervaded all objects of the universe. The universe has come out of Brahman.
Thus "we find the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic hymns, on the one hand, being supplanted by the growth of à complex system of sacrificial rites, and on the other, bending their course towards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate reality of the universe."
The social outlook and the goal of life of the Vedic system were based on the caste system. The so-called Sudras, the lower community, were considered ineligible to perform spiritual rites."
Śramana System
There prevailed, at that time, another stream of cultural current which was quite independent of the Brahmaņical or Vedic current and, probably older than it.
The word Śramana is derived from "Šram" to exert effort, labour, or to perform austerity, but is mixed in meaning with Sam a wanderer, recluse. One who performs acts of mortification or austerity is called Śramana ( Śramayati tapasyatiti Śramanah).
The Śramana cultural system was based on equality. According to it, a being is himself responsible for his own deeds. Salvation, therefore, can be obtained by anybody. The cycle of rebirth to which every individual was subjected was viewed as the cause and substratum of misery. The goal of every person was to evolve a way to escape from the cycle of rebirth. Each school of Sramaņas preached its own way of salvation. But they all agreed in one respect, namely, in discounting ritual as a means of emancipation and establishing a path of moral, mental and spiritual development as the only means of escaping from the misery of saṁsāra.
Thus the Vedic cultural system differs from Śramana cultural system in three respects; viz. (a) attitude to society, (b) goal of life, and (c) outlook towards living creatures. Consequently, both these cults were so opposed to each other that Panini and Patanjali referred to them as having Saivatvirodha and Govyaghravat-virodha.

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(18) Independent origin of the scomuna cultural system
There are two principal theories in regard to the origin of the Sramana cult : according to one (i ) It is more or less a protest against tbe orthodox Vedic cult, and, according to the other (ii) It is of an independent origion. The first theory, though supported by Wiaternitz, Rhys David, E. Leuoman etc., is no longer accepted by the majority of Jain scholars.1a .
From the survey of various theories about the origin of the Sramana cultural system Deo came to the conclusion that each of them stresses a particular aspect, such as, (i) Kşat. tiya protest, (i ) Organised sophistic wanderers, (iii) The qualities of the Brahmacãrin, (iv) Copy of the Brāhmanical rules for sanyasa, and (v) The existence of Māgadhan religion in the eastern part of India. All these factors, he says, "helped the formation of the great wandering community of the Sramanas. But Deo places greater emphasis on the Ksatriya protest against the Brāhmanical sacrifices. He says "The Sramanas did reveal anti-Brāhmanical feelings as they were dissatisfied with the degenerated Brāhmio priesthood13."
But this conclusion is not altogether correct, since we find very strong evidence, both literary and archeological, which proves, beyond doubt, that the Sramana cultural system as practised by the Jainas or the so-called Vratyasld of Vedic literature, existed prior to Brāhmaṇism. The great antiquity of the Šramanı religious system has received less attention from scholars due to the fact that in historical times the Brāhmana cult appeared to be more influential and widespread. The emergence of the Sramana cultural system at this time was only a revival of an ancient religious system. This gaining of influence had been made possible through protests against the ritualism of the Brāhmaṇas. That is why some scholars assumed the origin of Sramana cultural system to be a result of the protest against the Brahmanical sacrifices. Claesification of śramanas
The Sramaņas (Samana in Pāli) are classified in various ways. The Sutta Nipate refers to four kinds, viz. the Maggejings,

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Maggadesakas or Maggadesins, Maggajivinas, and the Maggot dusins. Disputes arose among them and a number of philosophical schools had already arisen by the time of the Buddha. These schools are generally designated as Ditthi17. The sixtytwo wrong views (Micchādiṭṭhi) referred to by the Buddha. in the Brahmajalasutta represent the teachings of such schools.
In the same work, Šramaņas are called disputatious (vadasila18), and are classified under three headings, viz. Titthiyas.. Ajivikas, and the Niganthas. These were recognised as rivals. of Buddhism. The Tamil tradition also observed the same classification, viz. Anivadins (Pakudha Keccayana's sect), Ajivikas, and the Jainas1o.
The Thananga20, a Švetāmbara Jain canonical work, gives as many as five divisions of the Samana class, viz. Nigantha,. Sakka, Tavasa, Geruya, and Ajiva. Here Sakka means the Buddhist, and Ajiva means the Ajivika, the followers of Makkhali Gosalaka. No accounts are found regarding the Geruya who wore red clothes and Tavasa who were Jaṭadhāri and lived in forest 21. The Ajivakas are no more. Only the. Niganthas and the Buddhists have survived the vicissitudes. of history.
Common features of the Śraman as
The Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms defines Šramaņa as follows: "Ascetics of all kinds: the Samanai or Samanaoi or Germanai of the Greeks, perhaps identical also with the Tungusian Samana or Śramana." Further it presents the common. features of Śramaņa: "He must keep well the truth, guard well every uprising (of desires), be uncontaminated by outward attractions, be merciful to all and impure to none, be not allotted to joy nor harrowed by distress, and able to bear whatever may come."
The Buddha also says that to be Acelaka (naked) is not the only characteristic of a real Samana. According to him. the real $ramana.is he who has got rid of covetousness, ignorance, and mastered the four Bhāvanas, viz. Friendliness; Compassion, Sympathetic joy and equanimity". At another place he says: "The real Samana is he who has acquired a

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perfectly purified conduct in speech, thought and mode of Uving, by controlling the sense organs, moderation in eating, being intent on vigilence, being possessed of mindfulness, and cloar consciousness, remote lodging in forests to get rid of doubt, getting rid of the five hindrances and being aloof from pleasures of the senses he enters on the four meditations one by one."
All these references indicate clearly that the Sramana is characterised in Buddhist literature, as an ordinary monk belonging to any sect except perhaps the Brāhmaṇas. Aiyaswami Shastria4 collected some common features of such religious communities from Tamil literature which are as follows:
(i) They challenged the authority of the Vedas. (ii) They admitted into their church all members of the
community irrespective of their social rank and
religious career (Varna and Asrama ). (iii) They observed a set of ethical principles, (iv) They practised a detatched life with a view to libera
ting themselves from worldly hfe etc. (v) They could take to a life of renunciation (pravrajyā)
on reaching majority. Likewise Deo28 refers to some of the features of monastic conduct which were common to all these communities. They are as follows: (i) The members of such groups gave up worldly life, and
severing all contact with the society, they wandered
as homeless persons. (ii) Being least dependent on society, they maintained
themselves by begging food. (iii) Having no home, they led a wandering life, staying,
huwever, at one place in the rainy season in order to
avoid injury to living beings. (iv) Lastly, they seemed to acknowledge no cast barriers,
and hence consisted of various elements of the society, The Samavāyanga refers to the ten types of conduct which should be followed by the Samanas. They are as follows: kşanti, mukti, arjava, mārdava, laghava, satya, sarayama, tapa, tyaga and

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brahmacariyavasa. At another place, some other types of con duct has been mentioned, viz. Upadhi, śruta, bhakti pana, ante lipragraha, dana, nimantrana, abhyutthana, kştikarma, vasy vrtya, samavasarana-sammilaga, samnisadya, and kathaprabandha.
In the Anguttara Nikaya28 the Buddha mentions three pursuits for a Bhikku :(i) training in the higher morality ( i ) higher thought, and (iii) higher insight. He then says that a monk must follow these pursuits with keenness; otherwise his presence in the order will be like that of an ass in a herd of cattle. Ascetics in Buddhist literature
In Buddhist literature all ascetics or wandering sects are referred to by the name Samana. Sometimes they are also designaed Titthiya, Paribbājaka, Acelaka, Mundasāvaka, Tedandika, Magandika, Aviruddhaka, Jatilaka, Gotamaka, Maggadesin, Maggadūsin. The sixty-two wrong views ( Micchadithi ) of the Brahmajala Sutta2! and three hundred and sixty-three views of the Satrakstänga refer to a great number of such sects. Some of these may be vedic, while others were teachings of moral sects of the Samaņas.
The Lalitavistara1 mentions a list of ascetics which inclades the Carakas, Paribrájakas, Vrddha-srāvakas, Gautamas, and Nirgranthas. A similar list is given in the Saddharmapurin darikas? where it is stated that Bodhisattva does not associate himself with them. Importance of the Samanas
Of all these numerous communities of ascetics the Sram&ņas always figure prominently in Jaina and Buddhist literatures. Upadhye says: 'All intellectual activities in ancient India were not confined only to Brihmanas : there was not only Brahmaņical literature, but there was also the Paribbajaka, Sramaņa, or ascetic literature. These two representatives of intellectual and spiritual life in ancient India are well recognised by the phrase Simaņa-Brahmani in Buddhist sacred texts, by reference to Sramana Brahmana in Buddhist inscriptions, and further by Megasthenes' distinction between Brahmanai and Samanais.

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Samapas in Jaina and Buddhist literature
The Samanas in Jaina and Buddhist literature are represented as "worker" (from Šram, to strive) in spiritual life who attain salvation through their own efforts. They are accorded high honour both within their circles and without. The Mahavagga refers to Samana who is honoured by the bhikkhus. Päli literature mentions usually, besides the Buddha, the wellknown six Samaņas, the so-called heretical teachers of outstanding position in the community.
12
Sometimes the term Samana is used in Pali literature, as an adjective showing respect towards the designated teacher. The Buddha himself is called Mahasamana, and his followers Sakyaputtiya Samanas34. So the followers of the Nigantha Nätaputta are designated the Samana Nigantha or, to be exact, the Niganthanama Samaṇajātikā35. Samaṇa-Brahmaṇa in Jaina and Buddhist literature
Buddhist literature, specially the Pali Canon, uses a compound designation "Samana-Brahmana" to denote a religious sect that is opposed to the caste superiority of the Brahmana community and its ritualism Likewise, the Jaina literature also mentions Šamaṇa-Mahaṇaḥ and Mahaṇa-Samaṇā 37
3
T. W. Rhys Davids rightly says that Samana connotes both asceticism and inward peace, He is of the view that "Samaṇa-Brahmana should therefore mean, a man of any birth who by his saintliness, by his renunciation of the world, and by his reputation as a religious thinker, had acquired a position of a quasi-Brahmana and was looked up to by the people with as much respect as they looked up to a Brahmana by birth. Jaina literature also gives the same connotation to this term 39."'
Sometimes the term Samaṇa-Brahmana is also used in Păli literature for the followers of the Brahmana community. The Brahmajälasutta and some other suttas refer to them as kecit Samana Brahmaṇā. And in some places it is used for any follower of any sect as mentioned in the course of the sixty-two wrong views (micchadithi ). Thus the term Samana-Brahmana is

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used, in Buddhist literature, in a very loose sentade. I, there fore, examined the views attributed to Samapa-Brāhmana and found that the teachings of Nigaptha Nātaputta are also represented among them.
The origin of Samanta-Brahmana is unknown, but we can trace it from the works of Papini ( prior to Buddha'1 ) and Patañjali ( second century B. C.) which mention a perpetual ermity ( básvata-virodha ) between a snake and mongoose (ahinakulavat) to illustrate the compound formation of Samana - Brāhmana. The edicts of Asoka also mention them; but the term is Brahmana-Samana, and not Samana-Brahmana's.
The reason of this variation in Asokan edicts, according to Sukumara Dutta, is that "The legends were composed by those who themeselves belonged to the Samana class and wished to give it precedence, while the Brāhmaṇa is put first in the edict because the Brāhmaṇical society was perhaps demographically more extensive in Asoka's empire. The accom. plishments of this ëlite, the Samaņa-Brāhmaṇa, are descri. bed from the Buddhist point of view in the scripture"".
Another reason for the relative positions of the two component parts of the compounds Samana-Brahmana and BrahmanaSamana may be adduced by reference to the antiquity of the Samana cultural system and the subsequent growth in importance of the Brahmana cultural system. The earlier appellation Samana Brahmaņa gives precedence to Samanas most probably because Samana cultural system was the more ancient system. The change in precedence in the term Brahmana-Samana might have been due to the waxing influence of the Brāhmaṇa religious system which resulted in relegating the Samaņas to a less important position in the religious life of India. The Heretical Teachers
The leaders of Sramanism were referred to in Buddhist literature as "Heretical Teachers". These contemporary teachers were doubtless, like the Buddha himself, inspired by the wave of dissatisfaction with the system of orthodox Brahmaņism.” Six such teachers are mentioned in the Páli Canon:--

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(i) Pürapa Kassapa. (ii) Makkhali Gosāla.
(iii) Ajita Kesakambali. (iv) Pakudha Kaccāyana. . (v) Sanjaya Belatthiputta, and (vi) Nigantha Nätputta.
In the Samannaphala Sætta each of these teachers is highly commended as a leader of an order ( gamino gamăcariyo ). Each ihas been described as being well-known (nata ), famous (yasassino ), the founder of a sect ( titthakară ), respected as a saint by many people (sadhusammata bahr-janassa ), a homeless wanderer of long standing (cira pabbajita ), and advanced in years ( vayonupatta ). Barua"? thinks of them as philosophers or theologians in the modern sense. But in the sixth century B. C. there were controversial theories which are said to have been propagated in various ways by the Acaryas who belonged to the Brahmaņa as well as the Sramaņa religious system.
The Samaññaphala Sutta deals with the doctrines of these heretical teachers in detail. It may be noted here that these doctrines are to be treated very cautiously; for it is evident that the authors had but a limited knowledge of the teachings of the heretics, and what knowledge they had warped by "odium theologicum.48"
As king Ajātasattu expressed his desires to know some. thing about spiritual matters, his six ministers, the followers of the six heretical teachers one, after another, suggested that the king should meet their Acāryas and clear his doubts. Ajatasattu then paid a visit to them and questioned them thus : “The fruits of various worldly trades and professions are obvi. ous. But is it possible to show that any appreciable benefit can be derived from asceticism (Sanditthikan Sämannaphalm) in this very life ?" The answers given by them could not satisfy Ajatāsattu. It was then suggested to him that he should ask the Buddha to answer the question. Hence, the Buddha is said to have solved his problem in a authoritative way.
Pali Canon refers to the teachings of Pūrana Kassapa and others in several Suttas. Although all such passages are stereotyped, they seem to give a fairly comprehensive summary of atleast the impressions which their teachings had made on the Buddhists. While we have no sufficient sources from which

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their accuracy can be verified, except, of course, in the case of Nigantha Nataputta, we are fortunate that the meagre references in the Pāli Canon are the only means by which we know about the existence of two of the six teachers".
(i) Purana Kassapa
This teacher upheld the view that there is neither merit nor demerit in any sort of action. He says, "He who performs an act or caused an act to be performed.. (karato kho kārayato pana atimapayato), he who destroys life, the thief, the housebreaker, the plunderer..the highway robber, the adulterer and the liar, commits no sin. Even if with a razor-sharp discus a man reduces all life on earth to a single heap of flesh, he commits no sin. If he comes down to the south bank of the Ganges, slaying, maiming, torturing, and causing others to be slain, maimed, or tortured, he commits no sin, neither does sin approach him Likewise if a man goes down the north bank of the Ganges, giving alms, and sacrificing and causing alms to be given and sacrifices to be performed, he acquires no merit, neither does merit approach him. From liberality, self-control, abstinence, and honesty is derived neither merit nor the approach of merit50"
This doctime is based on Akiriyāvāda, the theory of nonaction, according to which the soul does not act and the body alone acts. According to Barua it is Adhiccasamuppannikavāda (i.e things happen fortuitiously without any cause or condition51). Jain Commentator Šilanka considers the doctrine of Purana Kassapa as similar to the one which obtained in the Sankhya system 52. But Nalinak sa Dutt observes that "it would be wide of the mark if we say Kassapa's teaching is the same as that of Sankhya, though it holds that Purusa is only an onlooker, an inactive agent, the functioning factor being. the Prakṛti". As a matter of fact, Kassapa's teaching is so peculiar that we cannot find any similarity to the six Indian philosphies
In the Samyutta Nikaya and Anguttara Nikaya he is mentioned as an Ahetuvadin, which appellation is applied to

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(11) Makkhali Gosála in the Samakiaphata Sutta. He is also reported to have claimed omnisciences.
Baddhaghosa gives sonte biographical data on Purana Kassapa. He says that Karapa came to be known by his game from the fact that is birth completed (Parm4.) one hundred slaves ia a certain household. Owing to this fact he was never found fault with, even when he failed to do his work satisfactorily. In spite of this, he was dissatisfied and fied from his master's house. He then had his clothes stolen and went about naked57.
The Dhammapada Commentatory gives another account. It says that when the heretical teachers were unable to prevent the Buddha's miraculous power, they ran away. While fleeing Pūraņa Kassapa came across one of his followers carrying a vessel and a rope. Pūraņa took them and on the of river near Săvatthi he tied the vessel round his neck. He threw himself into the river and committed suicide 68. (ii) Makkhali Gosála
Originally Makkhali Gosala was a follower of Jainism of the Pārsvanātha tradition. As he was not appointed a Gaņadhara in Nigantha Nataputta's order, he left the Jain Sangha and founded another sect called Ajivikas. He too was a naked ascetic.
He was prophet of Niyativada ( fatalism ), according to which "There is neither cause nor basis for the sins of living beings; they become sinful without cause or basis Neither is their cause or basis for the purity of living beings; they become pure without cause or basis. There is no deed performed either by oneself or by others which can affect one's future births, no human action, no strength, no courage, no human endurance or human prowess can affect one's destiny in this life. All beings, all that have breath, all that are born, all that have life, are without power, strength, or virtue, but are developed by destiny, chance and nature, and experience joy and sorrow in the six levels for existence, Salvation, in his opinion, can be attained only by death and existence which

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are unalterably fixed (miyata). Suffering and happines, there - fore, do not depend on any cause or effect."
The Majjhima Nikayat calls this ahetukadithi or akiriyaditthi, while the Sūtrakstānga ( 1.127 ) Darianasāra" and Gomattasära Jivakandata of Jainas designate it as ajñanavāda.
The Buddha considered Makkhali as the most dangerous of the heretical teachers. He says: "I know not of any other single person fraught with such loss of many folk, such discomfort, such sorrow to devas and men, as Makkhali, the infatuate''4 "Buddha also considered his view as the meanest one as would appear from the following comment:
"Just as the hair blanket is reckoned the meanest of all woven garments even so, of all the teachings of recluses, that of Makkhali is the meanest66".
In the Digha Nikiya Commentaryer, Buddhaghosa shows how he was called Makkhāli Gosala. He says that he was once employed as a servant. One day while carrying an oil pot along a muddy road, he slipped and fell through carelessness, although warned thus by his master : Makhali ( stumble not ). Hence he is named Makkhali. He was called Gosala because he was born in a cow-shed. Pininio? describes him as Maskarin (one who carries a bamboo staff ). Uvasaga Dasão calls him Makkhaliputta68. (iii) Ajita Kesakambali
Ajitakesa Kambali was a meterialist who denied the existence of good or bad deeds. According to him, "There is no merit in almsgiving, sacrifice or offering ; no result or ripening of good or evil deeds. There is no passing from this world to the next. No benefit accrues from the service of mother or father. There is no afterlife, and there are no ascetics or Brahmanas who have reached perfection on the right path, and who, having known and experienced this world and the world beyond, publish ( their knowledge). Man is formed of the four elements; when he dies earth returns to the aggregate of earth, water to water, fire to fire, and air to air, while the senses vanish into space. Four men with the bier take up the corpse; they gossip ( about the dead man ) as far as the burning gro

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god (where his bones turn the colour of a dovo's wing, and his sacrifices end in ashes, They are fools who preach almsgiving, and those who maintain the existence (of immaterial categories ) speak vain and nonsense. When the body dies both the fool and the sage alike are cut off from life and perishe They do not survive after death".
Ajita's philosophy can be compared with the philosophy of Carvaka. In the Brahmajala Sutta it is classified as Ucchedavada (the doctrine of anihilation after death) or Tam Jivam tam sariram ( the doctrine of identity of the soul and body ). In the Mahabodhi Jataka, it is said, that Ajita was born, in a previous birth, as one of the five heretical councillors to the king of Varanasi. Then, too, he preached the doctrine of Ucchedavada. He was called Kesakambali because he wore a blanket of human hair, which is described as being the most miserable garment. It was cold in cold weather, and hot im the hot, foul smelling and uncouth". (iv) Pakudha Kaccayana
According to Pakudha Kaccāyana, the seven elementary categories are neither made nor ordered, neither caused nor constructed; they are barren, as firm as mountains, as stable as pillars. They neither move nor develop; they do not injure one another, and one has no effect on the joy and sorrow of another. What are the seven ? Earth, Water, Fire, Air, joy and Sorrow, with life as the seventh...No man slays or causes to slay, hears or causes to hear, knows or causes to know. Even if a man cleaves another's head with a sharp sword, he does not take life, for the sword-cut merely passes through the seven elements
In the Brahmjala Sutta this theory is classified as both A kiriyāvada and Sassatavada. According to Pakudha, good or bad deeds do not affect the elements which are eternal. Like Ucchedavada, this teaching is also criticised in Buddhist literature.
Buddhagbosa says that Pakudha Kaccayana avoided the use of cold water, using always hot water. When hot water was not available, he did not wash. If he crossed a stream he

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( 14 ) Would consider it as a sin, and would make expiation by consta tructing a mound of earth?'. () Sañjaya Belatthiputta
Saijaya Belatthiputta was the preacher of Ajflavada or Agnosticism. He says that if you asked me, "Is there another world ?" and if I believed that there was, I should tell you so. But that is not what I say. I do not say that is so, nor do I say that it is not so75.'
It is said that the Elders Sariputta and Moggalana were disciples of Sanjaya before they were converted to Buddhism Moggalāna and Sanjaya are mentioned as Jaina Munis in Jaina literature??
The Jaina doctrine of Syādvada is said to have been influenced by the teachings of Sañjaya. According to Malalaseker, "It is probable that Sanjaya suspended his judgements only with regard to those questions, the answers to which must always remain a matter of speculation. It my be that he wished to impress on his followers the fact that the final answer to these questions lay beyond the domain of speculation, and that he wished to divert their attention from fruitless inquiry and direct it towards the preservation of mental equanimity78''. But as a matter of fact Sajaya's teachings are based oo indeterminable characters, while the Syıdvada has a definite answer. That is why the Jaina philosophers criticised Sañjaya's theory7o. We can, however, say that whether Sañjaya was a Jaina muni or not, his teachings seem to be influenced to some extent by the Jaina doctrines. The sūtrakratānga does not mention his name in this context. Saijaya's view is criticised in Pali literature as an Amaravikkhepaval a theory of ecl-wrigglers80). (vi) Nigantha Nataputta:
In the Samaññaphala Sutla, Nigantha Nata-Putta is introduced as the teacher of Catuyamasamvara. "A Nigantha is surrounded by the barrier of four-fold restraint. How is he surrounded ?...He practises restraint with regard to water, he avoids allsin, by avoiding sin his sins are washed away, and he is filled with the sense of all sins avoideds 1...So Surrounded

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by the barrier of fourfold restraint his mind is perfected, cortrolled, and fire".
As printed out by Jacobi this reference to the teaching of Nataputta is very obscure. Caluyamasanuara as mentioned in the Samañña phalt Suttall consists of the four characteristica of the Jainas. The real Catuyāmasarn vara belonging to the Parsvanatha tradition, is found else-where in the Pali Canon itsell.
In response to the Buddha's question Asibandhakaputta Gamani said that the Nigantha Nataputta preached thus to his followers or Săvakas : a slayer of living creature (pana atipateti), a stealer of a thing ( not given to him ) ( adinnam adiyati), a subject of sensual passion wrongly ( kamesu miccha carati ), and one who tells a lie ( musa bhanati ) are all condemned. 86
Here are mentioned the four causes of sin. In the Anguttara Nikava the five ways of falling into sin, according to Nigantha Nātaputta, are outlined. They are : destruction of animates
panatipati hoti) taking what is not given adinnadayi hoti ). passionate enjoyment of evil (abrahmacari hoti), speaking a lie ( musāvādi hoti ), and living on liquor and drink ( suramera. yamajjap pamadatthayi hoti ).86
Both these references are neither correctly recorded nor in order. The Nikayas appear to have confused between the Vratas of Parávanātha and Mahavira. The Parigraha (attachment to the mundane affairs ), a fourth cause of sins according to the Parévanātha tradition, included the passionate enjoyment, was not mentioned in the Nikayas, while the Abrahmar carya, separated from Parigraha by Nigantha Nataputta, is mentioned there.
Non-violence is the fundamental principle of the Jainas which is recorded in the Pali Canon, The Niganthas do not
se cold water as living being exist therein.87 They take a vow not to go beyond a limited area, so that the possibility of destroying life while moving about is reduced to'a minimum.es

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The Kayadanda ( Physical deeds) is more blamable than Manodanda (mental deeds) in their oppinion. Intention (bhavá or manodanda) is the main source of violence, and if the injury is caused by the body intentionally (bhävena ), it will be considered more blamble. Meat-eating is completely prohibited in Jainism. It is said that while Siha Senapati served meat to Buddha and his followers, the Nlganthas had protested and criticised such activities.
Nakedness or nudity (acelakatva or Digambaratva) with a mind controlled and restrained from all sorts of attachment and the practice of severe austerities with right knowledge are the main sources of omniscience and salvation."1 Pali literature too records the Jaina claim to the omniscience of Nigantha Nataputta. The Pali Canon is also familiar with the rudiments of Syadvada and Navatattvas. Buddhist philosophical literature which developed later establishes and refutes the more advanced Jaina doctrines about epistemology and logic.
The foregoing is a brief description of the leaders o Śramanism as recorded in Pali literature. From this somewhat scanty data it is clear that their teachings can be grouped under two main headings :
(i) Ajivikism as taught by Purana Kassapa, Makkhali Gosala, and Pakudha Kaccayana and
(ii) Jainism as taught by Pārsvanatha and Nigaṇṭha Nataputta.
The doctrine of Sanjaya Belaṭṭhiputta does not fall into either of the above categories. But as Nalinaksa Dutt has shown, Sanjaya's teachings are "only a stepping stone to that of Buddha.98" We shall now take into consideration the interrelationship among the three prominent religious systems : Jainism, Ajivikism, and Buddhism.
Jainism and Ajīvikism:
Makkhali Gosala, the founder of the Ajivika sect, was a follower of Jainism, before he founded his separate school.4 It is, therefore, not unnatural for his teachings to be influenced

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by Jainism. Ajivikas and Jainas sbare a set of common monastic rules. Both were, normally naked and both followed the same method of eating. That is the reason why the Pali literature could not make a clear distinction between the Niganthas and the Ajivikas. The Sutta Nipāta86 distinguishes the Ajīvikas from other sects, whereas the Majjhima Nikaya87 includes all the heretical teachers in the general category of Ajivikas.
Buddhaghosa in his Dhammapada Commentary®8 describes an ascetic who knocks at the doors of all the sects including the Ajivikas and the Niganthas. Bat the same work refers indiscriminately to Nagga-samana, Ajivika and Acelakao. Simi larly the Divyavadāna1oo, in the story of Asoka, seems to use the term Ajivika and Nigartha (Nirgrantha ) synonymously..
Chinese and Japanese Buddhist literature classes the Ashibikas, (i. e, Ajivikas ) with thc Nikendabaras or Nirgranthas as practising severe penance. "They both bold that the penalty for a sinful life must sooner or later be paid so that the life to come may be free for enjoyment. Thus their practices were ascetic. Fasting, silence, immovability and burning themselves upto the neck were their expressions of penance. 101
Hoernie identifies the Ashibikas with the Digambara Jainas. In support of his theory, he refers to Halayudha102 which "enumerates a large number of names of the two divisions, the Svetämbaras and Digambaras...The latter are also known as the Ajiua, which is only a shorter form of Ajinika...It is evident now, from what has been said, that the terms Nigantha
jivika denote the two jaina orders which are known to us as Suetumbars and Digambaras. '108
Hoernle's further suggestion is that the term Nirgrantha implied only a Svetāmbara Jaina. This conclusion is not supported by any evidence. The verse quoted by Hoernle does not contain exactly synonymous words. It mentions the names of various schools. Basham remarks in this connection that the evidence of both Halāyudha and Yadava, inchading the Nirgrantha in the same category as the Nagnäftig
and

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should be adequate to disprove the theory. The term was obviously used for a Jaina of any type104.
"Nigantha" or "Nirgrantha" was always used with reference to Digambaras in the earlier works. Its application to Svetambaras was a later development subsequent to their breaking away from the original school of Jainism in the early centuries B. C.
a, the commentator of the Sutrakttānga, says : "They are the Ajivikas who follow the doctrine of Gosala, or Boţikas (i. e, Digambaras. 105"). On the basis of this reference Hoernle righty concluded that the later Aiivikas merged with the Digambara Jainas. He says "Šilaska states that the reference is to the Ajivikas or Digambars. Seeing that, in his comment on another passage of the same work, he identifies the Ajivikas with the Terasiyas (Sanskrit-Trairašikas ). It follows that in śilanka's view the followers of Gosāla, the Ājivikas, the Terasikas, and the Digambars were the same class of religious mendicants. "206
Basham, too, appears to support this view when he says that the Ajivi ka survived in Madras, Mysore and Andhra until the 14th century A. D., and that the original atheism of Makkhali Gosāla merged with that of the Digambara Jainas.107
But, as a matter of fact, Silanka could not make a clear statement that the Ajivikas and Digambaras were the same. It seems that on the basis of nakedness, Halayudha, Silā ka etc. referred to the words which have the same meaning 106 Jainism and Buddhism
As both Jainism and Buddhism were taught within the same geographical area during the same historical period, a high degree of mutual ideological influence was inevitable. The wandering of the Buddha for six years in search of enlightenment also would have brought him into contact with Jainistic dogmas.
Some ideas are found to be common to both Jainism and Buddhism. Buddhism is based on the Four Noble Truths

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Cattari ariyasaccom), viz. the Truth of suffering (Dukkhasacca), the Truth of the Arising of suffering (Dukkha-samudayasacca), the Truth of the Annihilation of Suffering (Dukkhanirodhasacca ) and the Truth of the Path leading to the Anpihtation of Suffering (Dut kkha-mirodhagamani.pafipada-ariyasacca ). Jainism, too, teaches substantially the same doctrines. During the twelve meditations ( Dwadasampreaşa ) a Nigantha thinks of the sature of the world and soul. In this way he tries to abstain from attachment to anything so that he could attain the state of Vitara gatva (freedom from all desires). Avidya (ignorance ), as in Buddhism, is the root cause of Karmic bondage, and release is possible through Right Vision (Samyagdarsana ), Right Knowledge (Samyagjñāna ), and Right Conduct ( Samyagcūritra100).
Buddhism extols the four meditations ( Bhavana ), viz. Motta (Frindship ) Karunā ( Compassion ), Muditā ( delight ), and Upekkha ( indifference110 ). The Jain Scripture declares that these should be meditated upon by everybody (Maitripramodakarunyamadhyasthani ca satvagunadhi kaklidyamānadinayesu ). They are realizable through concentration (yogakkhamari nibbanar ajjhagamar), and are free from ageing (ajarari). Salvation can be attained with the cessation of the chain of causation, Nibbāna, in Jainism, is a condition of the pure soul, free from all bondage of karmas, peaceful, enlightened and eternal111. Both religions believe that every being experiences fruits of his good and bad deeds in the present or future life and rebirth continues till the attainment of salvation.
Non-violence (Ahirósā ) is also a common feature of both Jainism and Buddhism. Buddhism, like Jainism, stipulates that its adherents should abstain from all forms of violence ( Hims). Bat Jainism appears more strict in this respect. The eating of flesh, which is not altogether forbidden in Buddhism, is completely forbidden in Jainism. In other words, Nonviolence is the foundation of Jaina religion and philosophy. Syadvada and Nayavāda, the spirit of reconciliation, is an integral part of its theme.

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Both Jainism and Buddhism hold that the Universe came into being without the intervention of the creator-God. Worshiping of the images of their sages is a common feature in both religions.
As regards the dissimalirities between them, they are so fundamental that any positive influence of Jainism on Bud. dhism or vice-versa is difficult to establish. Buddhism does not believe in soul, whereas Jainism regards it as an essential part of human personality and its purity is essential for the attainment of salvation. According to Buddhism, a thing which comes into being perishes in the next moment. All the psychical factors like feeling, cognition, names and concepts are discrete and momentary. The first moment is regarded as the material cause (upadāna) and the second the effect (upadeya ). The combined stream of Upadana and Upadeya give rise to the false notion of a permanent self.
On the other hand, Tainism, in spite of admitting the obvious psycho-physical changes, adheres to the belief that both jiva
ter) are eternal. It maintains that only the modes ( Paryāyas ) of a substance are subject to change while the substance with its essential qnality ( guna ) is unchanging and abiding. The Buddhist theory of flux has been, therefore, criticised bitterly by the Jaina philosophers.
These two religions resort to a common terminology. For instance, the word nigantha is used for Jainism in both scriptures. Buddhism also regard sabbaganthappahina"112 as the nature of Nibbana. Pudgala is used only in these two religions but with different meanings. In Jainism it means as inanimate thing, while Buddhism gives it the sense of Alma or Jiva. Likewise, Arhat, Buddha, Asava, samvara, Sammadithi (sanya disfi or Samyagjñana) Micchadifthi, Tisarana, Noraka. etc. are common to both the religious systems.
According to the Pali Canon, the Buddha himself had a more favourable impression of Nigantha Nataputta and Jainism than of any other contemporary teacher or teaching 118 though he condemned the Nigaạthas at a number of places. Apart from

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the fact that they arose from the same social milieu, the emphasis they both laid on ethical principles and on the empirical testing of truth seems to bave made them mutually respectful to each other. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has brought us to the conclusion that the Sramana cultural system led by the Jainas existed perhaps prior to Brābmaņa cult and that most of the leaders of difierent sects of that time were influenced by the Jaina dogmas. Jacobi came to the following oon clusion on the interrelationship of these religious teachers :
"The preceding four Tirthankaras (Makkhali Gosāla, Purana Kassapa and others) appear to have adopted some or other doctrines or practices of the Jaina system, probably from the Jainas themselves... Here it appears that Jaina ideas and practices must have been current at the time of Mahāvira and independently of him. This combined with other arguments, leads us to the opinion that the Nirgranthas (Jainas ) were really in existence long before Mahāvira, who was the reformer of the already existing sect."115
2. JAINISM AND ITS LITERATURE
Jainism is a religion based on sound scientific reasoning. It stresses the perfection of knowledge, and teaches as its fun. damental doctrine, the ethical evolution of man. It illuminates the path of liberation and persuades its adherents to seek real happiness in the immortal soul. Mental purity, not the external appearance, is the source of constant tranquillity and emancipation in Jaina opinion. Non-violence is primary principle of the Jaina religion and philosophy. Origin of Jainism
According to Jaina belief, Jainism is both eternal and universal. It is open not only to human beings of all castes and classes, bat even to 'animals, devas, and souls in hells. According to the Jaina tradition, twenty-four Tirthari karas appear in every kalpa.1 Rşabhadeva is said to be the first

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Tirthai kara of the present era. He is believed to have taught seventy-two arts ( Badattarin kaldo ) to men and sixty-four to women. The beginnings of human civilization, thousands of acons ago, are associated with him. Antiquity of Jainism
Jainism is believed to be a pre-Vedic religion. Jainas are referred to in early Vedic literature by the name of Vratyass They are identified as the members of Śramaņa cultural sys tem which is led by Jainas. The Rgveda", the oldest scripture of the Hindus refers to Rşabha, perhaps Rşabhadeva, frequently. Besides, the Hindu Purānas"contain accounts of his life and these tally with Jaina accounts. As regards archaeological and epigraphical evidence, the Kayotsarga (dedication of body) Yoga pose of sitting and standing images engraved on the seals of Mohanjodro, Harappa and Lothal are identified by some scholars as Rsabha images. The Hathi gumphā inscription of king Khāravela refers to an image of Jaina which was taken away to Magadba by king Nanda. Similar evidence is found with regard to other Tirthankaras who, too, had been historical personages of immense reputation in philosophical and religious circles?.
The modern scholars appear to agree with the view that Jainism is the oldest of Non-Aryan group. For instance, Dr. Zimmer says: "There is truth in the Jaina idea, their religion goes back to remote antiquity, the antiquity in question being that of the Pre-Aryan, so-called Dravidian period, which has recently been dramatically disillusioned by the discovery of a series of great Late Stone Age cities in the Indus valley dating from the third and even perhaps fourth millennium B. C."
The
Antiquity of Jainism and Buddhist literature
There was a time when European Scholars regarded Jainism as a religion of medieval advent or an off-shoot of Buddhismo. Jacobi was tbe first to etsablish in 1884 the antiquity of Jainism as an independent and pre-Buddhistic religion on the basis of the data available from the Pali Canon. He regarded Parsvanatha as a historical person and the founder of Jainism.

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But he also remarked : ''But there is nothing to prove that Parsva was the founder of Jainism. Jaina tradition is onanimous in making Rşabba, the first Tirthankara (its founder)......
They may be something historical in the tradition wbich makes him the first Tirthan kara 10"
The Pali Canon refers to Nigantha Nataputta as an elder heretical teacher and is als familiar with some characteristics of Parávanātha tradition. Besides, Buddhist literature mention, Rşabhadeva, Padma, Canda, Puspadanta, Vimala, Dharma and Aristanemi, the Jaina Tirthankaras.
Rşabhadeva is called one of the Jaina Tirtha karas in Chinese Buddhist literature11 The Mailjurimülakalpais refers to him as Roabha-nir granthara pin, and the Dharmottarapradi pa18 mentions him along with the name of Vardhamana or Mahavira., It may be noted here that the names and numbers of Buddhas Paccekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas in Buddhism appear to have been influenced by those of the Jaina Tirthaskaras. For instance, Ajita, the name of the second Tirthankara, has been given to the Paccekabuddha who lived ninety-one kappas14 ago. The Vepulla-pavvata in the time of Kassa pa Buddha appears to have been named after Supassa (Pali) or Suparsa, the seventh Tirthankara of Jainas. The people of Rājagaha were called Suppiya or the follower of Supassa at that time 5. Padma or Paduma, the sixth Tirthankara, is the name of the eighth of the twenty-four Buddhas18. It is also the name of a Pacceka-Buddha to whom Anupama Thera offered some akuli flowers17. Paduma is also referred to by the name of Cakkayatti of eight kappas ago18. Canda, the eight Tutharikara, is the name of a chief lay supporter of Sikhi Buddha.19 Pupphavati is the name of Benaras in the Jātaka.20 It would have been named after Puşpadanta, the ninth Tirthankara of Jainas. Vimala, a Paccekabuddha, has been named after the thirteenth Tirtha kara. A king who lived sixty-one kappas ago, has also been called Vimala 22. Likewise, Dhamma is the name of the fifteenth Tirthařkara of Jainas. A Bodhisatva who, was horn as Devaputta in a Kámāvacara Deva-world has also been.

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"referred to by this name 28. In the Milinda Patha, he is called a Yakkha 86 Aristanems or Nemi the twenty-second Tirthan kara of Jainas, is also referred to in Pali literature. The Dhammikasutta of the Anguttara Nikaya28speaks of Aranemi as one of the six Tirthankaras ( Sathāre tithaíkare ). The Majjhima Nikay427 refers to Arittha as one of the twenty-four Pratyek abuddhas who inhabited the Sigiri mountain. The Digha Nikāya28 draws our attention to the name of Drdhanemi as a Cakkavatti. In the same work there is a reference to king Ariffhanemi who is called a Yakkha?9. All these past references probably are to the Ariţthanemi of Jaina Tirthaikara. As we shall see later, Jainism had been a prominent religion In Ceylon before Buddhism was brought there. It is therefore not unnatural if we find some places named after the Jaina Tirthaůkaras. For instance, Ațitthapavvata is a mountain which is identified with modern Ritigala near Habarane in the North Central Provinces. Pānduābhaya lived there for seven years, awaiting an opportunity to make war on his uncles and it was near this place that ultimately defeated them 31,
Parsvanatha, the twenty-third Tirthaúkara of the Jainas, who flourished 250 years earlier than Mahāvīra or Nigantha Nataputta at Benaras, was born to King A svasena and queen Vāma. He is said to have attained Nirvāṇa (Salvation) on the Sammeda Sikhara which is called today the Pārsvanātha Hill.81 Tha Jatakas mention the names of Kings of Varāṇasi-Brahmadatta, Uggasena, Dhananjaya, Mahāsilava, Samyama, Vissasena, and Udayabhadda.32 Parsvanatha belongs to the Ugravaṁsa which may have been named after Uggasena and Vissasena may be recognised as his father. 99 Brahmadatta is also said to have been a Jaina king who devoted his whole life for Jainism. Vappa (Manorathaparani ), the Buddha's uncle, was a follower of Parávaná tha tradition.
In pāli literature various doctrines of Jainas have been acknowledged. They belong to Parsvanātha or Aristanemi, if not to earlier Tirtha karas. Parsvanatha was known as Purisajāniya or the distinguished man according to the Anguttara Nikāya(P. 290)

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The Dkarmottarapradi pa (P.286) also refers to both Pārévanatha and Aristanemi. The Catwyamasaomara, which is attributed to the Nigantha Nataputta in the Samannaphala Sulta, is in reality a teaching of Pārsvanatba. Some Nigaạthas mentioned in Pāli literature are apparently followers of Pārsvanātba.For instance, Vappa84, Upāli85, Abhaya88, Aggivessāyana saccaka87, Digha Tapassi88, Asibandhakaputta Gāmini39, Deva Ninka40, Upatikkha41, Siha49, are lay followers while Sacca, Lolā, Avavādikā, Patacārā4s etc. are lay women followers of the Parsvanatha tradition. They had later on become the followers of the Nigantha Nätaputta44. Jacobi, therefore, says that 'Parsva was a historical person is now admitted by all as very probable.
Mahavira or the Nigantha Nataputta of Pali literature was born in Kuņdagrāma45 (Kotiggama) of the Mahavagga, a suburb of Vaisalī46, and an important seat of the Jnātņi Kşatriyas. He was the son of Siddhartha and Trisalā, who belonged to the clan of Jõātris or Naha47. He renounced worldly enjoy. ment at the age of thirty without getting married and became a Nigaạtha ascetic. He then underwent a course of severe bodily mortification for the next twelve years and attained omniscience.
The Pali Canon does not mention anything of the early life of Mahavira, but refers to the period of his mission as a religious teacher. He was called Nigantka in the sense that he is free from all bonds, and was called Nataputta because Nāta or Naya was the name of his clan.49 As Gotama is generally referred to as the Buddha, Jina came to be used as the popular pame of Rsabha and other Tirtha ukaras, and their adherents began to be called 'Jainas'. The Pāli Nikāyas mention Nigantha in place of Jinas ( Amhäkan ganthanakileso paļobujjkinakileso natthi, kilesaganthirahitā mayam ti evan vaditaya Laddhanamavasena Nigantho 50). The term Nigaptha' for a Jaina came to be used perhaps along with the origin of Jainism itself.
Teachings of Nigastha Nataputta have been already mentioned in the course of our discussion on the six heretical teachers. It is remarkable here that both Jainism and Buddh

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ism arose and grew up in the same province of India. The leaders of both sects were sometimes living in the same city, but they never met perhaps personally51. Their followers, however, used to indulge in discussions, conversations and debates.
The date of Nigantha Nataputta
The date of Nigantha Nataputta, like the date of the Buddha has been a subject of much controversy among the scholars. The Pali Canon has two main references which give an idea of the age and death of Nataputta. Ajatasattu is reported to have spoken of Nigaṇṭha Nataputta to the Buddha in Samana. phala Sutta as "One who has long been recluse, old and wellstricken in years (cirapabbjjito, addhagato, vayonupatio53 ). Another reference recorded is that when the Buddha was at the Ambavana of the Sakyas, Nigantha Nataputta had just died at pāvā ( ekaṁ samayaṁ bhagavā sakkesu viharati vedhañña nama sakya tesam ambavane pasāde. tena kho pana samayena Nigantho Nataputto Pavayam adhuna Kalankato hoti.54 Ananda is supposed to have conveyed this news to the Buddha in a very pleasant mood.
The Chief landmark in Jaina chronology is the year of Nigantha Nataputta's death, which is generally placed somewhere between 468 and 482 or 527 and 546 B. C. Jacobi is perhaps the first savant who tried to determine the date of Mahavira. In the introduction to the Acarangasūtra, showing the differe nces between the Buddha and Mahavira, he says: Mahavira died in Pāvā, avowedly before the former (Buddha55). Hence, in the introduction to the Kalpas@tra56 he Suggests that his death might have taken place round about 468-467 B. C. This opinion was based on Hemachandra's Parisistaparoan57 which tells us that Chandragupta, the Sandrokottos of the Greeks, ascended throne 155 years after the death of Mahavira. The Chandragupta's ascension, according to Jacobi, took place in 313 B. C. Therefore the death of Mahävira must have occured in 468 B. C. (313+ 155468 B. C.) Charpentier58 also supported his view. If Hemachandra's chronology is accepted,

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( 27 ) the tradition of the Pali Capon has to be rejected. Both, Jacom bi and Charpentier were of the view that the statement in the Pali Canon to the effect that Mahavira died when the Buddha was at Pava was spurious. But this gives rise to a farther problem in view of the fact that the death of the Buddha is now widely accepted as having occured in 543 B. C. Therefore this quistion needs further investigation as the interval between the death of Buddha and Mahāvira could not have been as long as 75 years. Basham, too, is inclined to accept Jacobi's view. But he based his arguments on the Bhagavati Satra and a less favoured theory about the date of the Buddh's Parinirvana in 483 B. C. He says ; "If we accept 483 B. C. as the date of the Buddha's nirvāna, on the basis of Mahāvamsa synchronism, the accession of Ajātasattu must have occured in the year 481.480 B. C. The first campaign, soon after which the death of Gosāla occurred, must have taken place at some time between the date of Ajātasattu's accession and the year preceding the Buddha's death." He then suggests that "the first campaign occured in 484B, C,, and the death of Gosāla in that year, or in 484 B. C. On the strength of the Bhagvati statement that Mahāvīra survived Gosala for sixteen and a half years, this date would place Mahāvíra's death in 468-467 B. C59."
As regards the reference to the Nigantha Nataputta in Pāli scripture he suggests that “the Pāli record may not in fact refer to the death of Mahavira at Pavā, but to that of Gosāla at Savatthi, which Bhagvati Sūtra also mentions as having been accompained by quarrelling and confusion. At a later date, when the chief rival of Buddhism was no longer Ajivikism but Jainism, the name may have been altered to add to the signifi cance of the account6o. The explanation of Basham tbat the Pali Canon recorded the death of Gosäla and not that of Mābavira appears to be farfetched.
Majumdar and Raychaudhuri are of the view that Mahā. vira's death should have taken place in 478 B. C. In support of this theory they suggest that Mahavira died about sixteen

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years after the accession of Ajatasatru, and the commencement of his war with his hostile neighbours. This would place the Nirvana of the Jain teacher after the Buddha's death, as according to the Ceylonese chronicles, the Buddha's died eight years after the enthronement of Ajatasatru. This is supported by the Hemachandra's account that places the Chandragupta's accession a hundred and fifteen years after the Nirvana of Mahavira. We know that Chandragupta's enthronement took place in 323. B. C. (323+155-47861 B. C.).
Another attempt to date the death of Nigantha Nataputta has been made by Hoernle. According to him, 483 B, C. is "practically certain" date of Buddha's parinirvana. Bimbisāra was murdered by his son Ajataśatru eight years before the nirvana, or in 490 B. C. Hoernle believes that for some years before this Ajataśatru was de facto ruler, and the war took place not in the year of his legal, but of his de facto accession, which could not have been long before the murder of Bimbisāra. He accepts the Bhagvati tradition of the sixteen years interval between the death of Mahavira and Gosala. He therefore suggests 484 B C, for the death of Mahavira and 500 B. C. for that of Gosala, and for the war and de facto accession of Ajätasatru 2. The theory of Hoernle is more comprehensive, as he tries to establish the chronology of all events connected with the issue. In the aforesaid Pali record, Chunda expressed the hope that on the death of the Buddha a similar question would not arise in his order. This fact indicates that Nigantha Nätaputta's death was thought of as having taken place at a time when the Buddha himself was very old, when the Buddist monks were concerned about the future of the order after the death of its leader. Hoernle's theory which places Nigantha Nataputta's death two years prior to that of the Buddha tallies with the statement of Chunda in the Pali Canon.
The orthodox Jaina tradition which dates the death of Nigantha Nataputta in 527B. C. is not unanimously accepted by the scholars. The main problem with regard to this traditional date is that its accuracy depends on the correct calculation of

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( 29 ) the commencement of the Vikrama Era, According to one view, Vikrama was born 470 years after the death of Mabăvira while his accession and death took place 483 and 568 years respectively after Mahāvira's deaths. Another view holds that the Vikrama Era began 410 years after Mahavira's death. 64 According to these data, the date of Mahāvira's death mainly depends on the event in Vikrama's life which marked the commencement of the Vikrama Era. If the Vikrama Era commenced with Vikrama's birth, the date of Mahavira's death is 527 B. C. (i.e57 +470=527 B. C.66). If it began with Vikrama's accession, the date has to be 545 B. C. (57 +488-545 B, C.) 68 If the Vikrama Era began with Vikrama's death, Mahavira's death has to be dated as 622 B. C. (470+80+72=622 B. C.67). If we accept the tradition, which gives the interval as 60 years, the date of Mahāvira's death will be 467 B. C. (527-60=467 B. C, 168. Thus the dates of Mahāvıra's death will be 527 B. C., 545 B. C., 622 B, C. or 467 B. C. This makes the entire problem rather confusing and intricate.
Jacobi refers to the traditional date of the death of Nigantha Nātaputta as follows. "The reduction of the Jain's Canon or the Siddhānta took place, according to unanimously accepted tradition, at the Council of Valabhi, under the presidency of Devardhi. The date of this event ( 980 or 993 A. V.), corresponding to 454 or 487 A. D., is incorporated in the Kalpasūtra. Here the view of Hemachandra's Parisista paravan appears to be wrong as compared to the Titthogāli Painnaya which is an ancient and more reliable book. It is stated that the date of Chandragupta Maurya's accession falls 215 years after the death of Mahāvīra. Moreover, on the same day, Palaka began to rule in Ujjaini. He ruled over the country for sixty years. Afterwards Nanda's dominion is listed for 155 years. Then commences the enthronement of Chandragupta Maurya 70. But these sixty years have been omitted in the chronology of the Parisista paravan of Hemchandra. Puranachandra and Krishaachandra Ghosa write "Hemachandra must have omitted, by oversight, the period of 60 years of king Palaka after Mahavira 71. Hemachandra himself appears to have accepted 527 B..C. as the

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date of Mahavira's death. He says that Kumārapala of Chala. kyakula was born 1669 years after the Nirvana of Mahavira 73 It is now certain that Calukya Kumarapala was born in 1142 A. D.78 Accordingly, the date of Mahavira's death falls in 527 B. C. He has also made an attempt to prove 527 B. C. Muni Nagaraj has also made an attempt to prove 527 B. C. as the most likely date of Mabāvīra's (Nātaputta's ) parinirvāņa74.
Moni Kalyanavijaya, Kailash Chandra Shastri78, and Shantilala Shah77, accept this date but reject the evidence of PaliTripitka. Vijayendra Suri76 agrees with them as far as this date is concerned, but thinkes like Basham, that the death of Gosalaka, and not of Nigaņțba Nataputta, is recorded in Pāli Tripitaka. The date of the Buddha's death is accepted by them as 544 B. C. But other references made in Pali Nikayas are ignored by them.
On the other hand K. P. Jayasavalo, Radhakumuda Mok. erji8o and Kamata Prasada 61 favour the view that Mahavira's Nirvāṇa took place in 545 B. C.(i. e. 57+ 488=545 B. C.) Their main argument is that the Vikrama era commenced from the accession which took place 488 years after Mahāvira's death.
But their views are not correct as the evidence to prove 527 B. C. as the date of Nigantha Nataputta's parinirvana are rather more substential and reliable. J. K. Mukhtar proved successfully this view8%. The Jambusvāmicariu and other granthas also support the same opinion. The Pali records also pro. test its genuineness. Without going into prolonged discussion. we may now conclude that 527 B. C. seems to be more dependable as the date of Nigantha Nataputta's death.
The Place of Niganhtha Natapuatta's death
According to the Pali Canon, which has already been referred to in the earlier section, the Buddha was informed while he was at a Samagāma among the Sākyas, that Nigantha Nātaputta had died at Pāvá. In the Vividhatirtha-kalpa, Pavá is called Apāpapuri, perbaps on account of its religious importance. In the course of his peregrinations Mahavīra came from

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Jşmbhaka to the forest of Mahavarhsa. Eleven Ganadharas, Gaatama and the rest, were initiated here. Vardhamana ( Mahāvira ) went on a fast for two days. then preached bis last teachings and attained Nirvāpa88.
But there has been some controversy with regard to the location of Pāvă. The traditional Pāva.is near Rājagaha (Bihar) and is now called Pavapuri. Jacobi84 thinks that Mahavira's Nirvãņa took place at this Pavāpuri, while Mahapandita Rahula Sankrityanais85 of the opinion that Pavā is the modern Papaura village twelve miles away fsom Küsinara or Kasiya. situated on the little Gandaka river, to the east of the district of Gorakbpur, Nathuram Premiec agrees with Rahul Sankratyana. It is most probable that Pávå was included in the territory of the Mallas since a Santhāgāra was built by them in Pává. It is also said that at this place the Buddha ate his last meal at the house of Cunda, and as a result he had an attack of dysentery. He then left the place and proceeded to Kuginārā where he ultimately attained Parinirvāņa87.
The Mallas, a republican tribe of the same type as the Licchavis, were divided at that time into two groups. One having their capital at Påva and the other at Kusinīra. The Kolpasūtra says that on the eve of Nigantha Nataputta's death nine Mallas and nine Liccbavis, the chiefs of their respective tribes, were among those who went on Proşadhopavasa to mark the passing away of the great Jina. It is further stated that they ordered illuminations on the day of the new moon saying. "Since the light of intelligence is gone, let us make an illumi. nation of material matter88. Since Mahāvīra's nirvāṇa occured early in the morning, the Jainas worship Mahāvīra at that time and illuminate the earthern pots. The wbole day is now called Dipavali. This evidence confirms our view that Pāvā, the place of Nigantha Nātaputta's parinirvāṇa, is no other than Papaurā on the Gorakhapara district. Schism in the Jains Order
Signs of schism in the Jaina order might have appeared at the death of Nigaạtha Nātaputta as stated in Pálı Nikāyas.

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The Samagāma Sutta describes the state of the Jaina order after the Nirvāņa of Nigantha Nataputta. Ananda conveys the message of Cunda to the Buddha with elation. He says:
"Nigantha Nataputta had just died at Pāvā. At his death the Niganthas became disunited into two parts which took to mutual strife and conflict, quarelling and wounding each other with wordy weapons (tassa kālankstiyaya bhinnā Nigantha duedhikajata bhandanajata kalahajata vivadapanna annamannan mukhas attini vitudanta viharanti), thou does not understand this doctrine and discipline; but I do understand it. How should thou understand it? Thou art in the wrong. I am in the right. I am speaking to the point; thou art not. Thou sayest last what should be said first and what ought to come last. What thou hast so long excogitated is quite upset. The challenge is taken up; thou art proved to be wrong. Begone to get rid of thy opinion, or disentangle thyself if thou canst. Truly, the Niganthas, followers of Nātaputta, were out methinks to kill''89.
The Buddha gives the reasons of this disunity among the Nigantbas, "Their teacher was not supremely enlightened and a doctrine badly set-forth, badly imparted, ineffectual to guide, not conducive to peace 80. The Commentaries state that Nātaputta realising on his death-bed the folly and futility of his teaching, wished his followers to accept the Buddha's teachings. In order to bring this about, he taught his doctrine in two different ways to two different pupils, just before his death. To the one he said that his teaching was Nihilism (Veccheda ), and to the other that it was Eternalism (Sassata ). As a result they quarelled violently among themselves, and the order broke upoi,
Wbat we are concerned with is not so much the reasons mentioned above for disunity, as the existence of disunity itself. The rift took place actually in the Jaina order after the Nigantha Nātaputta's parinibbāņa, though it might not had been to the extent described 92. No evidence has yet been discovered to indicate that the final schism took place immediately after his death.. Therefore the passage quoted sbould

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be examined from two angles. Either it is said in hyperbolical language or it is a later addition. The first is more likely as a rival order will naturally exaggerate any differences or disunity in the opponent's group. But the germs of schism could not have been altogather absent. However, judging from the fact that Jainism, like Buddhism, continuied to be favoured by Kuniya or Ajatasattu, Asoka, Cetaka, Seniya, pradyota, Udayana etc83., it can be concluded that the culmination of these schismatic tendencies did not take place untill the famine of Magadha which lasted for 12 years during the period of Chandragupta Maurya.
Later on, the Jaina order divided itself into two divisions, viz, the Digambaras who accepted the complete nakedness as the essential requirement to attain salvation, and the Svetambaras who did not recognize this theory in toto. The first is the original sect. All the Tirtha karas including Pārsvanātha and Mahavira were Digambaras, All along in Pāli literature Mahāvīra is called Nigantha Nātaputta and his followers Niganthas. The reason for this is that they claimed to be free from all bonds ( amhākam ganthanakileso palibujjanakileso nattki, kilesaganthirahitamayari ti evdrig vaditaya laddhanamavasena Nigantho 104. The rift, which began immediately after the demise of Nigantha Nataputta, finally took shape in the second or third century BC, when the Digambara and Svetambara came to be differentiated. The Dhammapa datthakathaos refers to and criticizes both the Digambara and Svetämbara sects
Philosophical Literature of Jainas
A proper evaluation of Jainism as found in Buddhist literature necessitates some familiarity with Jajna literature. The Jaina contribution to Indian philosophical and religious knowledge is so profound that only a bare outline of the Jaina literature can be attempted here.
We are concerned here with the Jaina philosophical literature which can be divided into four schools07 :

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(i) Canonical School ( upto sixth century A.D.) (ii) Anekānta School ( from third century A.D. to eighth
century A.D.). (ili) Pramāņa School ( from 8tb A.D. to 17th A.D.), and (iv) Navya-nyāya School ( from 17th A.D.). The Canonical School
Both the Digambara and Svetambara sects of Jainas accept unanimously that Mahavira or the Nigaạtha Nataputta is the main source of their scriptures, which are said to have been collected by his disciple called Indrabhūti or Gautama98. He died at Rajagrha at the age of ninety-two, 12 years after Mahāviraś nirvana. Afterwards, according to the Digambaras, the successors of these teachers could not gain proficiency in all the Angas. As time passed on gradually they decreased and were completely lost 683 years after Mahavira's nirbana". But the Svetāmbara tradition claims to have preserved the Angas and Upūngas. It appears to me that upto certain time Canonical literature would have been preserved by both sects through the recitation method, but to prove its own antiquity as the original sect, the Svetāmbara tradition added some elements like the dialogues between Kesin and Gautam or jāmali episode, and eliminated some portions of the original literature. Seeing this the Digambara tradition would have completely denied their validity and announced it to have been lost.
The Svetāmbara Canonical Literature
The Svetāmbaras preserved a wide and profound Canonical literature, though mixed up with some elements. It consists of the following texts100 :
The twelve Angas: (i) Ayāranga, (ii) Süyagadanga, (iii) Tbāņāöga, (iv) Samavāyānga, (v) Viyābapaņņatti or Bhagavati, (iv) Náyadhammakabāo, (vii) Uvasagadasāo, (ii) Antagadadasão, (ix) Aņuttarovavaiyadasão, (x) Paṇhāvāgaraṇaim, (xi) Vivågasuya, and (xii) Diţthivāya.

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The twelve Upāngas : (i) Ovavãiya. (ii) Rāyapaseņijja, (iii) Jiväbhigama, (iv) Pannavaņā, (v). Suriyapannatti, (vi) Jambuddivapapņatti, (vii) Candapappatti, (vii) Niryavalio, (ix) Kappāvadamsião, (x) Pupphião, (xi) Pupphacūlião, (xii) Van. hidasão.
The Ten Paiņņas : (i) Causarana, (ii) Aurapaccakkhăņa, (iii) Bhattapariņņaya, (iv) Samthāraga, (v) Tandulaveyāliya, (vi) Candāvij jhaya, (vii) Devindatthava, (viii) Gaộivijjā, (ix) Mahāpaccakkhāņa (x) Viratthava.
The Six Cheyasuttas : 'i) Nisība, (ii) Mahaộisiha, (iii) Vavahara, (iv) Ayāradasão or Dasāsuyakkhandha, (v) Kappa or Brhatkalpa (vi) Pañcakappa, or Jiyakappa.
The four Mülasūttas : (i) Uttarājjhaya, or Uttarājjhayana, (ii) Avassaya, (iii) Dasaveyâliya, (iv) Piņdanijjutti.
The two Cūliki suttas : (i) Nandi, (ii) Aņuyogadāra. Development of Āgama Literature
Śrutakevali Bhadrabāhu predicted during the reign of Chandragupta Maurya that there would be a terrible famine in Magadha for twelve years. To ensure the purity of Jaina asceticism, the Sangha decided to leave Magadba. A group of monks under the leadership of Višākhachārya went to South India. But Sthūlabhadra remained in Magadha with some monks. After the famine was over, Visāklāchārya with his disciples came back to Magadha and found that the pupils of Sthūlabhadra had developed an attachment to clothes. 101
Visākhācāry tried to convince them for observing Digambaratva but he could not succeed in his achievement as the Sthūlabhadra and his followers were not ready to live without clothes. Hence the schism was started in the Jaina Sangba. On the other hand, Bhadrabāhu, the teacher of Visakhacā. rya, with his prominent pupil Chandragupta Maurya (Muni Prabhácandra) 102 left Magadha and went to South India. According to Digambar tradition, he observed there Samādhimaraña on the Kalvpra mountain ( Sramana Velagola Inscriptions, of Saka sam. 522).108

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After some time, according to the Svetāmbara tradition, there were held four Councils in Patāliputra, Mathurā and Valabhi where the Acāryas tried to gather the Agamas to the best of their ability. The present form of the Svetāmbara Jaina Canon is said to be the result of the Second Valabhi Council held under the presidency of Devardhigaṇin KşamaBramaņa in the beginning of the sixth century A. D. 993 years after Mahāvīra attained nirvāna.
This indicates clearly that the Svetāmbara Āgama was not the product of one period. It developed gradually during the course of several generations. It is not, therefore, unnatural if certain things have been changed 104, However, a good portion of very important and valuable material compiled in ancient times remains intact. Winternitz rightly says, "The works of the Siddhānta cannot have originated during one period. The canon which Devardhi compiled, and which has come down to us, is the final result of a literary activity that must have begun as soon as the organisation of the order and the monastic life were firmly established. This was ia probability the case not long after the death of Mahāvīra. The earliest po. rtions of the Canon may, therefore, quite possibly belong to the period of the first disciples of Mahavira himself, or at the latest to the second century after Mahivira's death--the period of the Maurya Chandragupta, in which tradition places the Council of Pătliputra---whilst the latest portions should probably be dated nearer to the time of Devardhi"105. In support of this statement other evidences are collected by Dco.106
Resemblance to Pali literature
The Svetambara Jaina Canon which is the result of several centuries appears to hive a close resemblance to Pāli scripture which was compiled in the first or second century after the Buddha's demise. In other words, the Jaina Canon has been influenced by Päli literature. The language and style are good enough evidences in this connection. For instance, a stanza of the Uttaradhyana ( 9.44 ), viz,

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Mäse mäse tu jo bālo kusaggonan tu bhunjat
Na so sukkha adhammasa kalamp agghai solasim. has a very close resemblance to the stanza of the Dhammapada ( 70 ), viz.
Mise māse kusaggena balo bhuñjetha bhojanan.
Na so sankhatadhammanam kalan agghati solasim. The stanzas of the Dhammapada ( 103, 405, 409 ) can be compared with the stanzas of the Uttaradkyana 9.34; 25.22;25. 24. Some other stanzas like 49, 66, 362 are similar to the stanzas 1.2, 4.1, 10. 12, of the Dasavaikalika. In the same way Pundarika Addhyana of the Sūtrakraega and the SaddharmaPundarika, Vipakasatra and Avadanašataka, and Karmasataka, Thinanga and Anguttara, Uttaradhyana and Dhammapada and Jataka Pātimokkha and Nisitha are very closely related to each others in subject matter. The Svetāmbara Agamas are called Ganipitaka107 as the Buddhist scripture are called the Tipitaka109 Thus the sveta: mbara Āgamas are undoubtedly influenced by the Buddhist scripture.100
The mixture of prose and verse, fantastic descriptions of the hells, preaching with the help of legends, parables, tales, dialogues and ballads, are the main characetristics of both Pāli and Jain Scriptures. But in comparison with Pali literature, Jain literature is presented in a rather uninteresting style. Winternitz has pointed out that "with rare exceptions, the sacred books of the Jainas are written in a dry-as-dust, matter of fact, didactic tone, and as far as we know them hitherto, are seldom instilled with that general human interest which so many Buddhist texts possess. Hence, important as they are for the specialist, they cannot claim the interest of the general reader to anything approaching so great an extent, 110
The language of the Canonical literature is a Prākrt called Ardhamāgadhi. The verses, like the Buddhist Canon, present more archaic forms. But the Commentaries (Nijjutti, Bhasa, Corni, and Țika ) are in both Prākřt( Jaina Mahārāştri ) and Sanskrit.

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Digambara Ceponical Literature
The Digambaras believe that the Cannon as preached by Nigantha Nataputta is no longer available as it was lost during the famine. But they have preserved in their earlist works, written by the ancient Achāryas, detailed accounts of the structure and the contents of their Cannon. According to such accounts the Digambara Canonical literature is divided into two groups : the Angapravista and the Angabahya :(A) The Argapravişta :
The Angapravisfd is of twelve kinds which are similar to the twelve Angas of the Svetāmbaras with the exception that the last Anga "Drastipravāda" is divided into five parts : (i) Five Parikarma ; (a) Candraprajñapti, (b) Sūryaprajñapti, (c) Jambūdvīpaprajāapti, (d) Dvipaprajñapti and (e) Vyākhya Prajñapti. (2) Sutra (3) four, Anuyogas (a) Prathamanuyoga, (b) Karaṇānuyoga, (c) Dravyānuyoga and (d) Caranānuyoga, (1) Pūrvagatas are fourteen : (a) Utapādapūrva, (b) Agrāyaṇī, (c) Viryanuvāda, (a) Astināstipravăda, (e) Jñanapravāda, (f) Șatpravāda, (g) Atmapravāda, (h) Karmapravada, (i) Prtyākhyāna (i) Vidyānuvāda, (k) Kalyāņavāda, (1) Prāņavāda (m) Kriyāvāda and (n) Trilokavindusāra. (5) Five CAlikas: (a) Jalagatā, (b) Sthalagatā, (c) Mayāgatā, (d) Rūpagatā, and (e) Akāśagatā. ( B ) Toe Angabāhya śruta.
The Angabāhya śruta is divided into fourteen Prakirņakas : (1) Sámāyika, (2) Sanstava, (3) Vandanā (4) Pratikramana (5) Vinaya (6) Krtikarma (7) Dasavarkalika (8) Uttaradhyayana (9) Kalpavyavahāra (10) Kalpākalpa, (11) Malākalpa (12) Pundarika.
(13) Mahapundarika, and (14) Nişiddhika, 111
The fact that the Digambara and the Svetāmbara traditions agree on fundamental features of the structure of the Jaina Canon establishes beyond doubt :
(a) that a Jaina Canon had been compiled, arranged and recognized before the schism, and

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(b) that thet traditional divisions were remembered even after the Digambaras rejected the Svetāmbara Canon as a later innovation. Achārya Paramparā
The Digambara tradition maintains that its Canon was lost gradually as the Achāryas who knew one or sveral Augas passed away without ansuring that their pupils had mastered the Angas. An Acharya.paramparā of such pupils, after the death of Mahāvira, is referred to by Yatirsabha, according to which Gautamasvami, Sudharmāsyāmi and Jambūsvāmi were Kevalins (having perfect knowledge of Canon ) for 62 years, Nandi, Nandimitra, Aparājita, Govardhana and Bhadrabāhu were Srutakevalin for 100 years, Visakhā, Proşthila, Kşatriya, Jaya, Nāga, Siddhārtha, Dhștisena, Vijaya, Buddhila, Gangadeva and Sudharama were knowers of eleven Angas and ten Pūrvas for 183 years, Nakşatra, Jayapāla, Pāņdu, Dhruvasena and Kansa were knowers of eleven Angas for 220 years, and Subhadra, Yaśobhadra, Yaśobabu and Loha were knowers of Acārānga for 118 years. Thus within the period of 683 years after the death of Mahāvīra all these Acāryas are said to have been perfect in the respective Canon. 112
Afterwards, according to the Dhavala and Jayadhavala, Dharasenāchārya was knower of partly the Augas and Pūrvas. But the Nandisangha Prākta Pattavali does not lead support to this view. According to this, the Acbārya-paramparā (from Gautama to Lohācārya ) is enumerated within 565 years. Then Arbadvali, Māghanandi, Dharasena, Bhutavali and Puspadanta are said to have known one Anga, and their period was for 28, 21, 19, 30 and 20 years. On the basis of this calculation Bhütavali and Puşpadanta come under the period of 683 years. This view is supported by Brhattippanika118 which mentioned Joni pahuda written by Dharasenācārya 600 hundred years after the death of Mahāvira. (ii) Anekanta School
Fortunately, Puşpadanta and Bhūtayali wrote a joint work named safkhanda gama of which Puşpadanta wrote the earlier portiod and Bhūtavali the latter and Gupadharācārya wrote

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Kasayapahuḍa on the basis of the third Pejadosaprabhṛta (Vastu-adhikara) of Jñänapravadapūrva in the first century B. C. The rudiments of Jaina philosophy are found in these works which form the basis of all later works on Digambara Jainism by such Acaryas as Kundakunda, Umāsväti, Samantabhadra. The Canon considered as lost by Digambaras is preserved by Svetambara tradition, as has already been stated, However in the absence of the original Canon, the Digambaras recognize the works of Puspadanta, Bhutavli, Gunadharācārya, Kundakunda, Svami Kartikeya, Umäsvāti, Vaṭṭakera and Sivarya as Canonical works.
cian.
Acarya Sumati is mentioned in the Buddhist philosophical literature. Santarakṣita refers to him in the course of Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa Pariksa in the Tattvasangraha.114 We do not know about his definite literary contribution115 but the above references are a testimony to his recognition as a Jaina logiAs regards his date, he is mentioned in the copper-plate inscription of Karkasuvarnavarga116 as the pupil of Mallavadi, an Acarya of the Mulasangha-sena-amnaya. The same inscription refers to Aparajita as a pupil of Sumati. This inscription belongs to Saka sarvat 743. Mallavadi referred to Dinnaga (5th century A. D. ) without mentioning Dharmakirti's name in his Nayacakra. He, therefore, flourished after Dinnaga and before Dharmakirti (7th century A, D.). Bhattacārya concludes his date as being near about 720 A. D 117
Patrakesari also is mentioned in the Tattvasangraha. Santarakṣita quotes the famous Karika118 composed by Patrasvamin, who was also called Patrakesari119. He is also referred to by several other writers 120 as the author of the Trilakṣaṇakadar. thanam which was written in order to refute Dinnaga's theory or Trilakṣaṇahetu. It may be noted here that Patrasvamin is not the naine of Vidyananda as Pathak121 and Vidyabhusana123 suggest, but he is undoubtedly a separate person.15 Srampavelagola Prasasti124 mentions his name and some other inscriptions125 refer to him after Sumati. Patrasvāmin must have, therefore, lived after Dinnaga and before Santarakṣita. He, therefore appears to have belonged to the last part of the
123

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6th century A. D. and earlier part of the 7th century A.D.126 Sridatta127 (prior to Pujypada) also established the Anyathāns. papatti as one of the forms of Hetu in the Jalpanirnaya.
The period of Anekānta is marked by the establishment of the Syādvada conception with greater emphasis. The Saptabhangi of Acarya Kundakunda is developed by Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Sumati, Patrekeśari and fridatta. A complete discussion of all the doctrines of Jainism is the characteristic of this age. This was a prolific age in other religious traditions too. For instance, the Vedic philosophers produced the Nyaydbhāsya, Yogabhâsya, šiit arabhaşya etc. while Buddhist logicians such as Nagarjuna and Dinnāga were already advancing their theories in refutation of Vedic and other contemporary philosophical system. ( lii) Pramāņa School.
One of the most revolutionary theories of this period was the concept of pratykşa as indicated knowledge. While the older Agamic tradition accepted Pratyakşa to be direct cogpition, these new theoreticians rejected this view on the ground that there would be no direct cognition when the sense organs were relied upon for empirical experience. The cognition through sense organs was therefore held to be Indriya Pratyaksa while only realization through mental perception could be considered jindriya Pratyakşı. Other Pramāṇas were included in the category of Paroksa Pramana (indirect knowledge ). Jina bhadra Kşamāśramana ( 6th century A. D.) divided first the Pramānas systematically into two types, Sam vyāvaharika Pratykşa (Empirical Perception), and paramdrthika Pratyakşa ( Transcendental Perception ).128 It may be noted here that the word Samyavahara originally belongs to the Vijanavādi Buddhists.
Conducting logical discussion to establish one's own views is another main feature of this period. The Nalanda Buddhist university had attained fame in this direction in the time of Dhammapala. His pupil Dharmakirti and others were engaged in philosophical debates with parties that were opposed to

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them. The Jaina philosophy, which is much closer then other religions to the Buddhist philosophy, also came in for a certain amount of criticism. Their main objections were raised against the dual characteristic of reality according to the Anekantavada conception, which was the result of endeavours to unite all the one-sided views. The Pramanavārtika of Dharmakirti and its Commentaries Pramanavārtikați kā of Deveudramati, Pramanavārtikalankūra of Prajñākaragupta Pramanavārtika svavsttitika of Karnakagomin, Tattoasangraha of Santarakṣita, Hetubindutikil of Arcaţa and other works of Buddhist philosophers had been already written to refute the Vedic views of Kumā. rila, iśvarasena and Mandanamiśra, and the Jaiga views of Umásvāni, Samantabhadra and Siddhasena. At this critical moment Acārya Akalanka and Haribhadra entered the field of controversy against the opponents of Jainism,
Mahendra Kumara established the view that the age of Haribhadra lies from 720 A. D. to 810 A. D. and that Akalanka flourished in 720-780 A. D. Both these great philosophers defended Jainism and in due course formulated a Jaina philosophical ideology on the bosis of Syadváda and Non-vilence128.
Here the persanality of Akalanka, who is mentioned only once in Buddhist literature, (DHP, p. 246) is very significant. His literary contribution is profound and extensive. All his works Tattvarthavārtika, Aştašati, Laghiyastrayasvavýtti, Nyayaviniscaya Saviurtti Siddhiviniscaya, Pramanasangraha, etc. "Stand as eloquent testimony to his penetrating mind and show a remarkable advancement in Jaina logic. He had a chivalrous disposition to help the people misled by the Buddhists. In his writings he was very satrical and caustic about Buddhists, particularly about Dharmakirti, in retorting the euphemistic criticism of Syädváda by Dharmakirti."130 Haribhadra and his works such as Sastravārtāsamuccaya, Anekāntajayapa. tākā and Anekāntāvādapravesa, also bear the same characteristics. The later Jaina philosophers developed the Jain philosophy of both these Acāryas, Akalarika and Haribhadra on their own ways.

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Thus the pramāņa school saw the establishment of several new philosophical theories and doctrines. The theory of Syādvada and Pramanas was further developed by Akalanka and his followers, and they defended Syādvada which was bitterly criticised by rival philosophers, using the principales of Syadvada itself for the purpose.
The foregoing is a brief outline of Jaina philosophical literature. It is to be remembered here that Jaina literature was of later origin than Vedic and Buddhist literature. Jain literature came to be written while the Vedic and Buddhist philosophers were engaged in debates. Therefore it was naturally influenced by them. The Jain philosophers came into contact with many Buddhist philosophers. That is the reason why the major part of Jaina literature is devoted to the refutation of Buddhist doctrines. Spread of Jainism
Pali literature refers generally to northern provinces of India where Buddhism originated and developed Some facts relating to Jainism, which are found scattered in Buddhist literature, throw light on the expansion of Jainism during the time of the Buddha. It may be noted here that Jainism had already been established as a religion in various provinces of India before the Buddha began his mission. But Pāli literature records only the discussions the Buddha had with certain Jaina followers he met, and not the Jaina doctrines in toto
Magadha was a center of missionary activities of all heretical teachers. 181 The Buddha also selected this province for the propagation of his teachings. Rajagaha and Nalanda were the main places where the Buddha had to face the Niganthas as strong rivals. Bimbi-ara was supposed to have been in favour of both the religions. The Buddha came across the Jain ascetics at Kālasila on the side of Isigili mountain in Rajagaha. They were practising severe act of self-mortification with the idea of eradicating the past Kammas and attaining salvation. The Buddha could not convince them against their views 192

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But he was able to convert Upali Gahapati, 193 Abhayarajakumāra, 184 and A sibandhakaputta Gamini195, the lay devotees of the Nigantha Nātaputta. Dighalapassi, a Jain monk, is reported not to have changed his religion, though he was convinced by Buddha. (M. 1, 371), Nigrodha is said to be a follower of Ajivikism who practised asceticism including Catuyāmasanvara of Jainism. He appears to have been a follower of Jainism and a supporter of Ajivikism. Whatever that be, he also could not be converted to Buddhism.136 The above incidents happened in Rajagaha and Nalanda. Most of the discourses given here by the Buddha were mainly to refute the teachings. This shows that Jainism in Magadha was on a firm footing, since the Buddha could not win over a number of followers of the Nigantha Nataputta.
Kosala was ruled over by Pasenadi during the Buddha's time. He respected all the six Tathiyas.137 Buddha spent twenty-one Vassas in Kosala. In addition, he visited this place several times Nigantha Nātaputta also had a good number of followers here. Savatthi and Saketa were the main places where the Buddha came into contact with the Jainas.
In Savatthi there was a very rich Setthi named Migāra who was a staunch follower of Jainism. His son's wife Visakha was perhaps a follower of Buddhism. She is said to have persuaded her father-in-law, Migāra, and other members of the family to be converted to Buddhism.188 Another Setthi named Kalaka, the son-in-law, of Anathapindaka, living in Sāketa is also described as having given up the faith of Nigantha Nātaputta and embracing the religion of the Buddha 189
The Sakyas were politically an independent entity. Kapila. vatthu was the birth place of the Buddha, but the Sākyas, were not strongly in favour of his doctrines. On the other hand, Jainism was very popular here since the Buddha's parents and their people were followers of Parsvanatha tradition. But the Buddha and his followers tried to convert the people from their faith. Mahānama, perhaps a relative of the Buddha, was an adherent of Nigantha Nätaputta's religion. The Buddha

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pointiog out the uselessness of severe mortification made an attempt to convert him140 and ultimately he succeeded in doing so. Hence both the Cala.Dükknandha Sutta and Sekha Sutta were preached to Mahādāma.
Devadaha was an important town in the eyes of the Jain mission. Here also the Nigantha Nātaputta's view, the theory of Kamma, is reported to have been refuted by the Buddha 141 But no follower of Jainism, except Vappa Sakya143, the Buddha's uncle who was converted by Moggalana, is mentioned in the Nikayas as having given up Jainism. The fact that the Buddha laid down special rules for the entry of Nigantha Nataputta's followers to the Sangha, however, seems to indicate that a number of Nirgranthas were converted to Buddhism.
The Liccahavis had a republican form of government, and Vaisali was their capital. Since Pärávanatha's time it had been a centre of Jainism. 149 Nigantha Nātaputta and his Näta clan were very closely related to the Licchavis. He was very much influential in his home town, Vesali. In the course of missionary activities Jainism came into contact with Buddhists of Vesāli. Saccaka144, a highly respected follower of Jainism was defeated by the Buddha in a religious disputation, Sallaka's parents also were followers of Jainism.145 On the other hand. Abhaya and Panditaku māra148 were not satisfied with the answers given by their opponents. 147 Siha, a general of the Licchavis, was of course, impressed by the Buddha's discourse and he became his follower. Inspite of active opposition of the Niganthas, the Buddha continued his work of conversion of the Licchavis to the newly established religion,
The Mallas, like Licchavis, were republican tribe. They were divided into two groups, the Mallas of Pavā, and the Mallas of Kusinārā, They were followers of both Jainism and Buddhism. The Nigantha Nätaputta's nirvāṇa took place ia Pāva 148 and the Mallas and Licchavis as a mark of honour, illuminated the place with earthern pots. This indicates that the Mallas were well disposed towards the Jainas,

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The Jainas carried on their missionary work in Varānasi Mithila, Simhabhūmi, Kausambi, Avanti etc. but Pāli literature makes no refernce to Jaina activities in these centres. Nigantha Nataputta wandered about iu Bihar and some part of Bengal and Uttar Pradesa in the course of his missionary activities which commenced immediately after the attainment of Kevaljñana. He got much help from his maternal uncle Cetaka, king of Vesali and his son-in laws Udayana, Dadhivähana Satanika, Canda Pradyota, Nandivardhana and Bimbisāra.
After Mah vira
After Mahāvira's parinirbāņa, Jainism was patronized by Saisunāges, Nandas, Khārvela, Mauryas, Sātavābanas, Guptas, Paramāras, Chandelas and others. Some of them were followers of Jainism while others provided all possible facilities to develop its literary and cultural activities. The Southern part of India was also a great centre of Jainism. Bhadrabahu and Visakhācārya with their disciples migrated to the South and propagated Jainism a lot. Andhra Sātavāhanas, Pallavas Pāņdyas, Colas, Cālukyas, Raşțrakūtas,etc. were main dynasties which rendered sufficient royal patronage and benefits to Jainism and its followers through the spirit of religious toleration existea in this region. The Jaipas were given magnificent grants for their spiritual purpose. Numerous Jaina temples and sculptures were eracted by kings and many facilities were provided for literary services through out India. As a result the Jaina Acāryas wrote their ample works in Sanskrit, Prakrit, Tamil, Telagu, Kannada, Apabhrama and modern Indian languages.
Jainism in Ceylon
Jainism crossed India from south in about the eighth century B. C. if not earlier, and became one of the important religions of Ceylon, which was known in those days by the name of Lanka Ratnadvi pa or Serihala.148

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The Mahavamsa, the best-known and most authoritative Ceylonese Chronicle in Pali verse, refers to the existence of Jainism in Ceylon even before the arrival of Buddhism. It is said there that Vijaya and his followers had to face the opposition of Yakkhiņis in their attempt to establish their kingdom in Lanka, After the passing away of Vijaya, Paṇḍuvasudeva, and Abhaya Paṇḍukābhaya captured the whole Island with the help of a Yakkhani named Cetiya who lived in the Dhumarakkha mountain near Tumbaramyana. Paṇḍukābhaya then settled his helpers, Yakkhas and Yakhiņis in various sides of the city of Anuradhapura, a capital of Lanka. He is also said to have handed over some cities to his relatives. He then made the appointment of hunderds of Candalas to work in the city and erected a cemetery for them. Estward of that cemetery Paṇḍukābhaya built a house for the Nigantha Jotiya. In the same reign there dwelt another Niganth named Giri and many other ascetics of various heretical sects. At the same place there was also built a chapel for the Nigantha Kumbhandaka. Towards the west from thence and eastward of the street of the huntsmen there lived about five families of hertical beliefs (nānapasandıkā150).
The five hundred families of heretical beliefs and the construction of Viharas to the Niganthas on behalf of the king of Lanka, Pandukābhaya, indicate clearly that Jainism was a living religion in Ceylon during his reign. Pandukābbaya's period, deduced on the basis of the date of Buddha's death as 544 B. C, is supposed to be 438-368 B, C. Jainism had apparently been introduced to Ceylon before Paṇḍukābhaya. It could have been even before the arrival of Vijaya. One may wonder whether a name like Arittha (i, e. that of Devanampiya Tissa's minister) had any connection with the Jaina Tirthankara of that name.151
Jainism continued to exist even after the establishment of Buddhism in the Island. Its existence during the first century B. C. is recorded in the Mahavamsa. It is said that after a battle with the Tamils, king Vaṭṭhagāmini Abhaya who was

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defeated fled out of the city. A Nigantha named Giri saw him and cried out loudly "The great black Simhal is running away" (patayati mahakala Simhalo ti bhusam ravi). When the great king heard this he thought "If my wish be fulfiled I will build a Vihara here (sidhe mama manorathe viharam kāressam) 152 Hence, after a few years when he drove away the Damila Dathika from Anuradhapura and regained his throne, he destroyed the Jaina monastery and built Abhayagiri Vihara in that place.153
19
According to the Mahavams Tika, this monastery was the scene of a tragedy in the time of Khallaṭanaga, predecessor of Vaṭṭagamini. This king, when he discovered a plot against his life by his nephew, went to Giri's monastery and ended his life by burning himself. At the spot, where this event occured, Khallaṭanāga's kinsman built a Cetiya called the Kurundavasoka Vihara,154
Jaina tradition takes the history of Jainism in Ceylon to Anera anterior to that reflected by the Ceylon Chronicles. According to Jaina records, the Yaksas and Raksasas who inhabited Ceylon prior to its Aryanization by Vijaya were not only human beings with a well-developed civilization but also Jainas by faith155. The Vividhatirthakalpa mentions that at Trikūṭagiri in Kişkindha of Lanka there was magnificient Jain temple which was dedicated by Ravana, for the attainment of supernatural powers (Kişkindhiyim Lankayah paṭalankayam Trikuṭagrirau Śrisantinathah). To fulfil a desire of Mandodari, the principal queen, Ravana is said to have erected a Jaina statue out of jewels and this, it is said, was thrown into the sea when he was defeated by Ramachandra. Sankara, a king of Kalyananagara of Kannada, came to know about this statue and he recovered it from the bottom of sea with the help of Padmavatidevi, a prominent Goddess of Jainas158.
It is said that the statue of Paranatha which is worshipped even now at Sripura Antariksa (India) was brought by Mäli and Sumali Vidyadhara from Lanka.157 Another statue of Pärsvanatha found in the caves of Terapura is also said to

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be from Lanka,158 The Karakanducariu describes how Amita. vega, a Jaina king of Malaya, used to visit Laňkādvipa as an intimate friend of Ravana who built a Jaina temple in malaya,159 This Malaya can be identified with Malaya, the name of the central hill country of Ceylon.
These references seem to point out that Jainism existed in Ceylon even before the birth of the Nigantha Nataputta. Vibhiṣaṇa, the younger brother of Ravana, who was a follower of Jainism according to Jain tradition and literature, is referred to as the tutelary Yakṣa of Ceylon (Vibhiṣaṇastamraparaṇiyan) in the Mahāmāyāri, a magical text of Northern Buddhists, which was translated into Chinese in the fourth century A. D. Vibhisana is still worshipped at Kelaniya and is supposed to be one of the four guardian deities of the Island.
Although the supremacy which Buddhism achieved in Ceylon could have led to the suppression of Jainism and incidents similar to the destruction of Giri's monastry by Vaṭṭa-Gamiņi Abhaya could have occurred at different times, Jainism did not disappear from Ceylon till at least after the eighth century. About the tenth century A. D.180 Muni Yasaḥkirti was requested by the then king of Ceylon to improve the state of Jainism in the Island.161 This shows that Jainism not only was in existence at that time in Ceylon, but it also enjoyed the patronage of Sinhala kings of Ceylon.
As regards the Jaina monuments in Ceylon, the view of S. Parnavitana, an authoritative scholar on Ceylon Archaeology, are relevant :
"No remains of any Jaina monuments have ever been found in Ceylon. The earliest Stupas and Viharas of Jainism did not differ from those of Buddhism so much so, that without the evidence of inscriptions or of iconography it would. be extremely difficult to differentiate between the two. Jain iconography had not yet developed in the times that we are dealing with. In the period during which this religion was prevalent in Ceylon, there were no monuments built of durable materials. Moreover, when Jainism disappeared, their places.
4

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of worship must have been appropriated by the Buddhists as at happened with regard to the monastery of Giri, and any traces of the earlier faith would certainly have been obliterated in this way, Some of the earliest unidentified stūpas of small dimensions may, however, be Jaina in origination."182
These meagre bits of evidence prove that Jainism existed in Ceylon from at least eighth century B. C. If any credit is given to the legends of Rāvana, the upper limit may be extended by a few inore centuries. If the historicity of these legends is established it would be interesting to find that early Jainism which preceded Pārsvanātha had also founded a foothold in Ceylon.
BUDDHISM AND ITS LITERATURE The Buddha and Buddhism
Buddhism is a pirt of purification based on the Majjhima pațiada (Middle path) which avoids the two extremes Kāmesu kama sıkhallakauttyoga (the attitude of sensual indulgence) and Attakılamathānuyoga (asceticism and self-mortification ). Thi, doctrine wus nunciated by the historical personality of Gautama, thr Buddha in the sixth century B. C.1 Source of Buddhism
There is no consensus of opinion among scholars regarding the source of Buddhism, because Buddhism has becn influenced by all the philosophical schools prevalent at that time. As Oldenberg says: "Hundreds of years before Buddha's time, movements were in progress in Indian thought, which prepared the way for Buddhism."
The Buddha, before gaining enlightenment, went to Alara Kaläma and Uddaka under whom he followed their religious observances. Alara Kālāma is supposed to be the Acārya of Saukhya philosophy. But Keith, while pointing out several similarities between Sankhya and Buddhism, says that "the proof of Sjukhya influence is obviously indirect and not in itself complete.''3 Oldenberg also thinks in a somewhat simiIar way.

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On the other hand, Jacobi.is of opinion that Buddhism has been derived from a corresponding theory of the forerunners of Jainism, Pande also accepts this view though not very emphatically. This view can be supported by reference to Pāli literature itself. After being dissatisfied with the teachings of Alara Kálāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, the Buddha went at last to mount Gayā-Uruvelā. Following the others, he himself occupied a spot beside the Nairañjarā river and with full purpose of heart he set himself the task of enduring self-mortification, restraining every bodily passion, and giving up thought about substance. With.purity of heart, he observed the rules of fasting which no worldly man can bear. Silent and still, lost in thoughtful meditation, he spent six years." He bin. self says that he experimented with the four types of religious practices of severe penance (tapa ), selfmortification (lakha ), avoidance (jeguccha), and seclusion (pavivittā).8 Here avosdance appears to be a reference to Jainism for it is said "I used to walk up and down conscientiously extending my com. passion even to a drop of water, praying that even the dangerous bacteria in it may not come to harm. "Such practices are mentioned at another place in the Majjhima Nikāya. 10 We shall compare them later with Jaina practices in the chapter on Ethics. These may bear testimony to the Jain view that the Buddha was a Jain muni at a certain stage of his ascetic life.
Acārya Devasena (8th century ) says that the Buddha was a great learned disciple of the saint Pihitaśrava who ordained him as muni Buddhakirti in the Sangha of Pārsvanātha, the twenty-third Tirthaikara of the present cra. But after a time the Buddha started taking flesh and dead fish as food and putting on a red cloth, he preached his own Dhamma, saying that there was no harm in taking such food.
Siripāsaņāhatitthe sarayūtīre palāsa nayaraţtho. Pihiya sa bassa sismo mahasudo buddhakittimurņo. Timi pūraņāsaņehim ahigayapvajjãoparibhatto. Rattam varam dharittā pavaţthiyam tena eyantam.

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Mamsassa natthi Jivo jahā phale dahiya-duddhasak karae. Tamha tam vāmchittā tam bhakkhanto na pävittho. Majjam pa vajjanijjam davadayvam jahājalar tahā edam.17 Idi loe ghositta pavatthiyam sabbasavajjani.
There is, however, no direct admission of this fact in any of the Buddhist texts, although the Buddha' own account of his six years of penance leaves little doubt as to the possibility of his being influenced by the doctrines of Jainism. It is also possible that the Buddha's attitude to meat-eating as well as to other forms of ultra-strict restrictions on human conduct ( as seen also from bis controversy with Devadatta in respect of the five rules, Pancavatthu ) was the reason for the establishment of a new religion where self-mortification is denounced as vulgar and futile. Buddhist Literature
Buddist literature is rich and varied and is found in several ancient and modern languages such as Pāli, Prakrit, Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese, Nepalese, Japanese, Sinhala, Bu mese, Thai, Combodian Uigur, Sogdian, Kuchanese and other languages of Central Asia. But for this survey our attention will be corfined only to the Buddhist literature in Pāli and Sanskrit.
Buddhist literature can be classified as follows :-(i) Pāli literature consisting of (a) Caponical, (b) Extra Canonical, and (c) Non-Canonical works. Tlie last is further divided into (a) Atthakathās, (b) Tikäs, (c) Tippaņis, (d) Sangahas, and (e) Pakaranas. (2) Sanskrit literature consisting of (a) Hinayāna, and ) Mahāyāna works. Pali literature
The Pali Canor, which represents the Theravada Buddhism, is popularly known as Tipitaka, the three baskets;12 the three Pifakas (Baskets-ot) parts, are th Vinava Pitaka, Sutta Pitaka and the Abhidhamma Pitaka. Like most other literary works of Ancient India, the Tipițaka too grew gradually over a period of several centuries. The three Councils stand out as landmarks in the process of its growth and development. It is generally

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accepted by scholars today that the Tripitaka, as we have it, including Kathavatthu, the last work to be attached to it by the Chairman of the Council himself, was accomplished shortly after the Third Council. During the Third Council it was decided to propagate Buddhism abroad. Mahinda, a pupil of Tissa and a son (according to another tradittion, the younger brother) of Asoka, was appointed to introduce Buddhism into Ceylon. In Ceylon, the Canon was preserved through oral tradition until it was reduced to writing in 84 B. C. during the reign of king Valagamba.13
The Vinaya Pitaka is the head of the Canon and is considered earlier than the Sutta Pitaka 14 It deals with rules and regulations to be observed by the members of the Buddhist order in their daily life. The Vinay a comprises three main parts (1) Suttavibhanga, consisting of (a) Mahavibhanga, and (b) Bhikkhuvibhanga. (11) Khandaka, consisting of (a) Mahavagga, and (b) Cullavagga. (111) Parivara or Parivārapāṭha,
The Patimokkha is the main part of the Vinaya Pitaka. It is said that the life of a good monk "is restrained by the restraints of the Patimokkha". (patimokkhasar varsamvuto ).15 It contains 227 rules out of which 152 were probably original while the remainder may have been added at the time of the compilation of the Vinaya Pitaka The Suttavibhanga is a commentary on the Patimokkha. It deals with Parajikadhamma, Sanghadisesadhamma, Aniyatadhamma, Pacittiyadhamma, Pațidesaniyadhamma and Sekhiyadhamma. The Khandhaka is the supplement of the Suttavibhanga. It contains the special rules for admission into the order, the Buddhist ceremonies such as Uposatha, modes of eating, begging, dwelling etc. The Parivara is of later origin. It consists of nineteen sections.
The Buddhist monachism as an institution was influenced by the Jaina monastic rules and regulations. For instance, Vassāvāsa, Uposatha, Pavarana and rules for admission to the order, are very similar to the rules of Jaina monachism. One may, therefore, expect many references to Jainism in the

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Tipitaka. But the direct references to Jain monachism are very few in the Vinaya Pitaka.
The Sutta Pitaka is the chief source of our knowledge of the Dhamma; it is, therefore, called Dhamma. It is divided into five Nikāyas, viz. Digha, Majjhima, Samyutta, Anguttara and the Khuddaka. The first four are mainly in prose and contain discourses, attributted to the Buddha and his disciples, The remaining Nikāya is a miscellaneous collection of smaller works, most of which are in verse. The Digha Nikāya contains the longest thirty-four Suttas arranged into three parts ( Vaggas ), viz Silakkhandha (1-13). Mahāvagga ( 14-23) and Pāţikavagga ( 24-34 ). In several Suttas of Digha Nikāya there are references to Jainism and particularly to Nigantha Nātaputta. The most significant among them are the Brahmajāla. (1) Sāmaññaphala, (2) Kassapasihanāda (8), Mahāparinibbăna (16), Patikasutta (54) Pasadikasutta (21), Atanatiya (32), and Sangiti Sutts, which provide invaluable data on the life and thoughts of Nigantha Näta putta. The Majjhima Nikaya is a collection of 152 discurses, The Culasihanāda (11), Cūlasaccaka, (35) Mahāsaccaka (86) Upāli, (56) Kukkurava. tika, (55) Abhayarājkumāra, (58) Dighanakha, (71) Sandaka. (76) Cūlasakuladāyi. (79) Devadaha and (101) Sāmagāma (104) contain references to Syâdvāda and other Jaina conceptions, and are, therefore, helpful in assessing in greater detail the Buddhist attitude to Jainism. The Sam yutta Nikaya and Arguttara Nikava consist of various types of Suttas. They are older as well as later, shorter as well as longer The Samyutta (grouped together ) Nikaya is of 56 San vuttas and atleast 2,990 Suttas with the division of five Vaggas, viz. the Sagātbavagga (1-11), Nidānavagga ( 12-22 ). Khandhavagga (23-34 ), Sadāyatanavagga ( 35-45 ) and Mahāvagga ( 45-56 ). Savkhadhammasutta, Acelakassapasutta, Acelasutta, Sattajatilasutta and Nānātitthiyasutta refer to Jaina ethics and philosophy. The Anguttara Nikaya is very similar to the Thāņānga of the Jainas. It deals mainly with the religious topics under the numbers from one to eleven. The number of the Suctas in the

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Nikaya is about 2308 which are divided into Vaggas containing as a rule 10 Suttas each. Aṭṭhangikasutta, Ananda vagga, Tikanipata, Tapodhamma-sutta, Vappa-sutta and Lokayatika-sutta provide some very useful date for the understan ding of several ancient Jaina concepts. The Khuddaka Nikaya is a collection of short pieces which are both diverse and. unsystematic both in content and arrangement. There is no unanimity about the pieces which belong to this Nikaya. According to the Ceylonese tradition it consists of (1) Khuddaka. patha, (a collection composed of only 9 short Suttas), (2) Dhammapada ( a collection of 423 memorial verses ), (3) Udana: ( a collection of solemn sayings of the Buddha), (4) Itivuttaka ("Thus-has-been-said" closely resembles the Udana) (5) Suttanipata, a very archaic in character consisting of four Vaggas. (6) Vimanavithu, (7) Petavatthu, (8) Theragatha, (9) Therigatha, (10) Jataka (11) Niddesa Mahaniddesa and Culla-Niddesa, (12) Patisambhida-magga, (13) A padāna, (14) Buddhavaṁ sa, and (15) the Cariyapitaka-Among these Udana (Sattajațilasutta), Suttanipāta (Dhammikasutta ), Therāpadāna, (Abhayattherapadāna), Jātaka (Mahabodhi) and the hammapada have preserved some valuble references to Jainism, though somewhat late.
The Abhidhamma Pitaka is a liter development. It is an attempt at scholastic analysis of the Buddhist psychology and philosophy. It does not deal with systematic philosophy. It is merely a supplement to the Dhamma. 16 Abhidhamma is highly honoured particularly in Burma. It comprises the following books (1) Dhammasangani (2) Vibhanga, (3) Kathāvatthu, (4) Puggalapaññatti, (5) Dhatukatha, (6 Yamaka and (7) the Patṭhāna, The Abhidhamma of the Sarvästivadins was entirely different. There is no reference to Jainism in this Piṭaka.
The Paritta or Mahaparitta is a collection of canonical texts which is used for magical purposes. Such Paritta ceremonies are still in vogue in Ceylon and are believed to avert evil and bring about well-being and happiness.

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)
There is another classification of the Buddhist scriptures into nine angas17 : (1) Sutta, (2) Geyya (mixed prose and verse) 73) Gathā ( verse ), (4) Udāna ( ecstatic utterences ), (5) Veyyākarana (explanation ) (6) Itivuttaka ( sayings beginning with the phrase "Thus-said-the-Buddha") (7) Jataka ( stories of former births of the Buddha ), (8) Abbhutadhamma (stories of wonders), and (9) Vedalla (questions and answers )18.
Besides the Canonical literature, there are some other works which were highly honoured and regarded as Extra-Canonica) books, such as the Nette pakarana, Pețakopadesa and the Milindapanha. The first two works are regarded as canonical in Burma. There are no references to Jainism in these two works. The third one the Milindapañha (P. 259), of course, referes to the Jain theory that water contains small insects and therefore should be used after getting it filtered and heated.
The Tnpitaka consists of speeches, conversations, songs, sayings, narratives and monastic rules and regulations. The most of the Canon is placed in the mouth of the Buddha himself. But it is difficult to pick out with a certainty the actual words oi the Buddha as there are in the Tripitaka contradictions, repetitions, interpolations which are characteristics of ancient religious works.
Rhys Davids19 has given a chronological table of Buddhist literature from the Buddha's time to the time of Asoka, which is as follows:
() The simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now found, in identical words, in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books.
(ii) Episodes found, in identical words, in two or more of the existing books,
(iii) The Silas, the Pārāyana, the Octades, the Patimokkha.
(iv) The Digba, Majjhim, Anguttara, and Samyutta Nikayas.
(v) The Suttanipāta, the Thera and Theri Gathās, the Udānas, and the Khuddakapātha,

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(vi) The Sutta vibhanga and the Khandhakas. (vii) The Jātakas and the Dhammapada.
(viii) The Niddesa, the Itivuttaka, and the Patisambhidãmagga.
(ix) The Peta and Vimāna-Vatthus, the Apadänas, the Carivā Pitaka, and the Buddha-Varisa.
(x) The Abhidhamma books, the last of which is the Kathāvatthu, and the carliest probably the Puggalapaññatti.
Law review's this chronological table and concludes that it is too catechetical, too cut and dried and too general to be accepted inspite of its suggestiveness as a sure guide to the determination of the chronology of the Pali Canonical texts.''20 In his concluding chapter he presents liis conclusions on the chronology of the Pali Canonical literature as follows 21 :--
(i) The simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now sound in the identical words in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books,
(ii) Episodes found in identical words in two or more of the existing books
(iii) The Silas, the Pārāyana group of sixteen poems without the prologue, the Atthaka group of four or sixteen poems, the Sikkhāpadas,
(iv) Digha, Vols. 11 and 111, the Thera-Theri-gāthā, the collection of 500 Jātākas, Suttavibhanga, Patisan.bladāmagga, Puggalapannatti and the Vibhanga.
(v) The Mahāvagga and the Cullavagga, the Pātimokklia completing 227 rules, the Vimänavatthu and Peravafthu, the Dhammapada and the Kathāvatthu.
(vi) The Cullaniddesa, the Mabāniddesa, the Udāna, the Itivuttaka, the Suttanipāta, the Dhātukathā, the Yamaka and the Patthāna.
(vii) The Buddhavanisa, the Cariyapitaka and the Apadana. (viii) The Parivāra pāțba. (ix) The Khuddakapātha.
On the whole we can say that the present Pāli Canonical literature must have been compiled up to the third century

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B. C. In other words the Third Council is the lower limit for this purpose, though some very minor changes could have been made up to the final writing during the reign king Vattagamani of Ceylon ( 1st century B. C. ). Law draws the conclusion that the lower limit is the last quarter of the first century B.C.. His conjecture is based on the Milinda pañha ( about the first century A. D.) which refers to the fact that when it was compiled, the division of the canon into three pitakas and five nikāyas was well established.22 He further says: "The Sinhalese commentaries, the Maha-atthakthā, the Mahapaccariya, the Maha-kurndrya, the Andhaka and the rest pre-supposed by the commentaries of Buddhadatta, Buddhaghosa, and Dhammapāla, point to the same fact, namely, that the Canon become finally closed sometime before the beginning of the Christian era. Thus we can safely fix the last quarter of the first century B. C, as the lower limit29.
As a matter of lact, it is doubtful whether the Canon compiled in the Third Council was indeed the same which has conie down to us in the Pāli Tipitaka. For no one can deny that between the third century BC. and the first century B, C. when then the writing down took place; the Tripitaka Inight have undergone many changes, especially much addition. Thus the Pålı Tipitaka as it now exists in not exactly identical with the Pālı Tipitaka compiled in the Third Council; luut the later accretions, interpolations and amendments do not appear to be so numerous and significant as to make the present Canon less valuable as an authentic record of the life and teachings of the Buddha (b) Non-Canonical iterature :
Non-Canonical literature, as we have already stated, can be divided into four categories : (1) Atthakathās, (ii) Tikās, (iii) Tippaņis, and (iv) Pakaranas. Out of these Non-Canonical works only a few like the Atthakathās of Buddhaghosa were found to be useful for my study. Some of the references to Jainism in Commentaries throw much light on the attitude of the later Buddhist monks to Nigantha Nātaputta and some

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of the impressions recorded by them do not coincide witbthe actual conditions as known to us from more authentic sources.
For instance, in the commentaries on 24 Dighanikaya and Majjhimanikaya,25 Buddhaghosa in the course of explaining the reference to the death of Nagantha Nātaputta states that Nigantha Nātaputta enjoined upon his followers in his last hours to accept the Buddha's teachings as he had realised the folly and futility of his doctrines. Further Buddhaghosa misunderstood the principle of Syadrada and complained that Nigantha Nātaputta taught his followers in two contradictory ways: to one he was supposed to have said that his doctrine was nihilism ( uccedavada ) and to the other that it was eternalism (sassalavada ). As a result, Buddhaghosa says, they quarrelled violently among themselves, and the order of Nigantha Nataputta was divided into two. This reference certainly indicates the timr around the fifth century when religious disputations were creating mutual inisunderstanding and certain dogmas were being explained according to their own whims and fancies mi order to influence the masses. Such instances are also found in Jaina literature.
Sanskirt Buddhist literature :
While Pāli had been the language of Theravada Buddhists only Sanskrit bad been a medium which was utilized by both the Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna Buddhists The Vaibhaşıka and the Sautrāntika schools belong to the H nayāna Buddists and the Madhyamika or Sanyodda and the Yogăcăra or Viñanavada schools are of Mahāyāna Buddhists The vast literature of these schools is available in different languages. We find there some valuable references to Jain philosophy in the works of Nāgā. rjuna, Aryadeva, Dharmakirti, Vasubandhu, Arcata, Säntaraksita, Prajñākaragupta, Jetāri etc. who refuted the Syadvada and other Jaina concepts which are dealt with in the present thesis in respective chapters. A large amount of work on Buddhist philosophy is lost and existed only in Tibetan or Chinese translation which could not be used here.

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Chapter-
JAINA PHỜILOSOPHY The Six Dravyas
The term dravya or padārtha ( substance ) in Jainism denotes any existence which possesses the significant factor of persistence d spite its numerous qualities and modifications. The Jaina theory of reality does not leave room for both an absolute permanent reality of Parmenides and an eternal flux of Heraclitus 1 It accepts only the dynamic reality which has the tlıree fundamental characteristics, viz. Utpada ( origin ), vyaya (destruction ), and dhraurya (Permanence ).2
Dravya is also the substratum of gunas (qualities) and paryāyas (modes). There is neither quality without substance nor substance without quality+ Drurya is one as a class, and is the inherent essence of all things manifesting diverse forms, In its reality it can neither he created nor destroyed; it has only permanent sulistantiality. But through its modes it secures the triple nature in character. Dravya is of six kinds, namely, Jiva (soul), pudga'a (matter), dharma (principle of motion), adharma (principle of rest), Akasa (space) and Kāla(time). The first five types of dravyas are called asti käyas (those which exist and have different pradeśas or areas like a body) and the last is named anastıkāya?
According to another classification it is of three kinds, viz.. sakriya (active) niskriya (inactive), and sakriyaaniskriya (activeinactive). The sakrıya dravyas, which have the capacity of moving from place to place, are pudgala and piva. The nişkriya druvya is against the nature of sakriya dravya. It has neit. her direct nor indirect functional power. Space comes under this classification, Kala is also included in the category of Nişkriya drduvas, though it accounts for changes in other things Sukriya riskria dravyas are those realities which move about without themselves undergoing changes or motion. These have merely uvigahana (place) The dharma and adharma dravya

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come under this classification. Tiva, dharma, and adharma bave innumerable areas or pradesas. akåsa has infinite pradesas, and pudgala is of numerable pradeśas. Kala has one pradeşa8. These six dravyds maintain their identical nature without losing their respective qualities, though they are mutually in terpenetrating and accommodate one another and mix up to occupy the same space. 9 Akasa, Kala, Jiva, dharma and adharma are formless or amarta dravyas. They do not possess the sense qualities of contact, taste, smell, sound and colour. Pudgala (matter) alone is mbrta. All the dravids, except Jiva, are acetana (devoid of consciousness) 10
In another classification, the dravjas or Tattvas are divided into seven categories, viz. Jiva (soul), agiva ( nonsoul ), asrava (inflow of karmic matter into the soul), bandha (bondage of soul hy karmic matter ), sambara ( stoppage of the inflow of karmic matter), nirjarā (shedding of karmic matter), and moksa (liberation of soul from karmic matter). The seven tattoos are so arranged here as to provide an epitome of the Jaina doctrine of salvation. The first two, jira and agire comprise the entire universe. The plight of the Jita in samsāra is on account of the karmic matter which fluws into it. San vara and nirjara are two states in the process of liberation wherein the inflow of karmic matter is first stopped and all karmic matter is subsequently shed. The jiva thus becomes completely free of karmic matter and attains mokşa. These seven tattvas are eternal and "sat" 11 (i) Jiva (soul)
The Jaina theory of soul, though fundamentally similar to the concept of soul in other philosophical schools, is still different from them in certain respects. Soul is eternal, uncreated and beginningless. There is no controversy on this point. The controrevsial point is its nature The Sanhitās of the Rigvedala and Atharvavedals state about the nature of the soul that when a man dies, it goes to the world of his forefathers and stays with ceaseless perfect life. The Satapatha Brahmana14 points out that it is enjoyer of good or evil deeds. The Upanişads are against

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its plural form15. According to the Kathopanisad16, it is eternal and distinct from body. Avidya is the cause of wandering into births17 Further, Gaudapada says that it is one and is neither born nor created. Maya (illusion) is the cause of appearance of births. Sankara follows Gaudapada's view, says: "It is due to maya, pure and simple, that the Great Self (Atman) appears as the threefold states (viz. walking, dreaming and dreamless sleep) even as a rope appears as a snake and the like, '18
Both the Sankhya and the Yoga systems are practically one.19 Sankhya presents the doctrines while the Yoga prescribes certain practices for the sake of their spiritual development'. The soul in these philosophies is accepted in the form of puruşa, but it is said to be absolutely non-active or unattached to prakṛti or matter and Puruşa is unaffected by the vicissitudes of the Prakṛiz20.
According to the Nyaya and the Vaiseṣika philosophy, the soul itself is responsible for its deeds. It is eternal and possesses the non-eternal qualities such as consciousness, desire etc. Jñana (knowledge) is distinct from soul and it obtains the capacity of knowing by association with itself That means Jñana is devoid of knowing power by nature21
The Buddha, on the other hand, declined to answer the nature of soul as he felt that it is not indispensible for the removal of suffering. The entire universe in his view is a bundle of Khandhacs, viz. rupa body), vedană (feeling), saññā (perception), sankhara aggregates), and viññana (consciousness). All things including even soul are analysed into the elements that can be perceived in them. All things are devoid of soul, just as a chariot is nothing but a congregation of wheel, frame, etc. "I" or "Mine" should not be attached with mundane affairs if one wants to attain salvation. Hence this view is named anatta in Buddhism22.
Jainism considers soul as the central figure. Its perfect knowledge (Bhedajñāna or Atmajñāna) is essential to destroy

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karmas and attain salvation.22 The nature of soul in Jainism is to be understood from the standpoint of non-absolutism (anekantavada). From the real standpoint (niscayanaya), soul is absolutely pure possessing the nature of knowledge and vision (ahume ko khalu siddho dum sanamiyo sadrupi) 24. It is regarded to be without smell, without sound, not an object of anumang (inference, without any definite bodily shape, imperceptible and intangible and is characterised by consciousness25. Acārya Nemicandra points out that the soul.is characterised by upayoga (consciousness), is formless (amutti), is an agent (katta), has the same extent as its own body ( sadehaparimano ), is the enjoyer of the fruits of karma ( Thotta ), exists in world (sansürattho), is siddha ( siddho) and has the characteristic upward motion (vissasoddhagar):
Jiro upaogamao amulli katta sadelaparimano. Bhottä sarj särattho siddho so missasoddhaga126,
Thus we have seen that the nature of soul in Jainism is dual in character. According to the realistic standpoint, it remains the same under all states, while according to the practical standpoint, it is transformed into modes and thus becomes different in number, place, form, etc. (ü) Pudgala ( metter)
Tbings perceived or enjoyed by the senses, bodies, mind, karma, and the other material objects are called Pudgala (matter)47. They can be touclied tasted, smelt, and have colour. Sabda (sound produced by various means), bandha (union caused by man or otherwise), sauksmya (fineness), stha ulya (grossness), sansthana (figure), bheda (division), tamas (darkness), chāyā (shade) and atapa (sun-shine) are the forms of Pudgala. It has two prominent forms, namely atoms (anu) and molecule (skandhas 28. They unite together to construct reality.
The nature of the universe in Jainism is based on the nature of reality which possesses triple characteristics, utpa ta, vyaja and dhrauvya. The things that exist cannot be destroyed and the things that do not exist cannot be

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originated from a realistic standpoint, but they get transiormed into their own attributes and modes from a practical point of view.29 This system of realities results in the universe being infinite as well as eternal in character. The entire universe, according to Jainism, is a compendium of the six Dravyas which are a permutation and combination of atoms. The atorn in Jainology is the smallest unitary part of pudgala, It is characterised by its internal cohesion (sneha) and indivisible unity. A molecule (anu), a combination of atoms, results in an aggregate of matter (skandha) 80 A nu is an indivisble entity and cannot be perceived by ordinary men.
Pudgala drayva is always transformed into skandha and paramānu. The upadana karana (substantive cause) and the nimitta karara (external cause are responsible for these modifications. For instance, in the manufacturing of a pot, clay is the substantive cause and the putter, stick, water, etc. are external causes. Each and every entity runs through these two causes and gets its similar modes
Thus the universe in Jaina philosophy is undivided, uncreated, eternal, sell-existent, and infinite from realistic standpoint; while from a practical standpoint of its inter-related parts it is transitory, phenomenal, evanescent, and finite, This theory rejects all the other theories based on the absolute standpoint such as Kalavada, Svabhavavada, Niyativada, Yadrochäväda, Puruşavāda, Isvarvada, Bhatuvada, etc.
The doctrine of karman seems to have developed against these doctrines of creation. According to Jainism, the vibrations (voga) and the passions (kaşayas) of soul attract karmic matter and transform it into karmic body. Soul is pure in its intrinsic nature. The relation of karmas is a cause that makes its cycling into births. This is the nature of bondage, Soul, which is amorta (spiritual), is affected by karmas which are maria ( material ). This concrete association of the spiritual and the material leads to the existence of universe, which is begianingless The material karman (drávyákarman) is a dvarand (cover) which brings about the bhävakarman (its spiritual

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( 65 ) couterpart) that is called dora like privation and perversion, This is the mutual relation as cause and effect of both these karmas.
Karmas are classified into eight main types, viz. (1) Inādāvarana (knowledge.obscuring). (2) Darsanāvaraṇa (visionobscuring ). ( 3 ) Vedaniya ( fecling-producing). ( 4 ) Mohaniya. (deludiug ). (5) Ayu ( longevity determining). (6) Nāma (body-making ). ( 7 ) Gotra ( status determining, and (8) Antarāya ( obstructive),
These karmas are sub-divided into one hundred and forty eight which may be seen in detail in the Gomaffasära Karman karda etc.
The inflow of karmic matter into the soul is called Asrava and the bondage of the soul by karmic matter is called Bandha in Jainism Both are related mutually to each other as cause and effect. Astava is the antecedent and anterior cause of bondage. The stoppage of inflow of karmic matters into the soul is called Samvara and the shedding of karmic matters by. the soul is called Norjară Evil thoughts and miseries lead to a suffering in the world as well as in hell. The happiness of heaven is also insignificant when we compare it to the happiness of salvation.31
Thus the Sarvara and Nirgard lead to the destruction of the karmas and reveal the purity of self, which is called Moksa. Umāsvāmi says that Moksa is a state of freedom from all karmic matter owing to the destruction of the cause of bondage and to the shedding of the karmas32. Pūjyapada in the Sarvarthasiddhi defines moksa "as the state of the highest condition of purification, unthir.kable inherent attitude of knowledge and unobstructed bliss, of a soul which becomes totally free from the defect of karmic dirt and is liberated from the body83
( 3-4 ) Dharma and Adharma :
Dharma and adharma dravyas convey special meaning in Jainism. Dharma is accepted as a kind of Ether which

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helps us in motion, Pudgala and Jiva move with the help of dharma as fish move with the help of water, Adharma is the exact opposite of dharma. It assists pudgalas and jivas in staying as ashadow assists travellers to rest 34, (5) Ākāsa Dravya :
Akasa in Jainism provides a place for all substances to exist. It is said to be anantapradesi ( possessing infinite pradesas ), am@rtika (having a non-physical factor), and miskriya ( inactive), and savayavi ( having parts). It is of two kinds, lokakasa and alokakasa. The former is co-extensive with the dravyas, whereas the latter is devoid of this characteristic. Loka consists of three divisions, Urdhvaloka (upper world ), Madhyaloka (middle world ), and Adholoka ( lower world ). They are the abodes of celestial beings, men and other creatures, and the inmates of hell. Beyond this Lokākāśa which is said to be eternal, infinite, formless, without activity and perceptible only by the omniscient35. (6) Kala Dravya :
Kala in Jainism is divided into two categories, V yavaharakala and Paramarthikakala. The former helps to change substances into their modes and the latter is understood from continuity. Time is not an apppearance but a reality since we experience it in the form of hours, minutes etc.36 The Six Dravyas in Buddhist Literature :
The references to six dravyas of Jainism are found in the Pali Canon as well as in later Sanskrit Buddhist literature, They are however, not referred to in a systematic order, (1) The Jaina Conception of Soul (Jiva).
In the course of a conversation with Sākya Mahānāma, the Buddha speaks of Nigantha Nātaputta's doctrine as follows:
"If there is an evil deed that was formerly done by you, get rid of its consequences by severe austerity. To keep away from evil deeds in the future, one should exercise for the control of body ( kayena sara vuta ), control of speech ( vācaya

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samvuta), and control of thought ( manasäsarjvuta). Thus by burning up, by making an end of former deeds, by the nondoing of new deeds, there is no transmission of modes in the future for him. From there being no transmission in future is the destruction of deeds (ayatım anavassavo), from the destruction of deeds is the destruction of ill, from the destruction of ill is the destruction of feeling, from the destruction of feeling all ill become worn away." The Buddha says further, "That is approved by us; it is pleasing to us: therefore we are delighted."
This is a comprehensive introduction to the seven states or Tattvas of the Jainas. The thoughts of Nigantha Natapulta represented in this passage are as follows :
(i) The existence of Soul.
(ii) Sukha or Duḥkha is due to previous karmas done.
(iii) By ascetic practices with right knowledge one could get rid of the effects of karmic matter.
(iv) On the complete stoppage of karmic matter, Dukkhas would be arrested, and without dukkha there would be no Vedana (feeling), and the absence of Vedanā leads to the end of dukkhas and this is called mokṣa. Here the first point represents Jiva and ajva, the second represents the asrava and the bandha, and the third point stands for samvara and nirjara, and the last corresponds to Mokşa.
The Brahmajalasutta in the Dighanikaya refers to the sixtytwo contemporary philosophical views which fall into two categories namely Pubbantanudutthi indicating the ultimate beginningless of things concerned with the ultimate past on eighteen grounds, and the aparantanuditțhi concerned with the future on forty-four grounds. All the current views of that time have been classified into these two groups, as the Buddha himself says that there is no other conception beyond them (natthi ito bahiddha ) 38
According to Pubbantanudiṭṭhis, the views about the beginning of things in eighteen ways are as follows:

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(i) Some (sasstatradis) hold in four ways that the soul (atta) and the universe (loka) are eternal,
(ii) Some (Ekaccasassatavādis) hold in four ways that the soul and universe are in some respects eternal and in some
not.
(iii) Some (antanantavadis) hold that the universe is finite or infinite or finite and infinite, or neither finite nor infinite. (iv) Some (amaravikkhepavadis) wriggle like eels in four ways and refuse a clear answer.
(v) Some (adhic casamuppannavādis) assert in two ways that the soul and the universe have arisen without a cause.
In the context of showing the aparantanudiṭṭhis 40 ( viewsabout the future), the Buddha mentions them in forty-four ways:
(i) Some (Uddhamāghātanıkā saññivādis) hold in sixteen ways that the soul is conscious after death.
(ii) Some (Uddhamaghatanika asaññivādis) hold in eight ways that it is unconscious after death.
(ii) Some ( Uddhamāghātanikā nevasaññi-nasaññīvādis ) hold in eight ways that it is neither conscious nor unconscious after death.
(iv) Some (Ucchedavadis) hold in seven ways the anuihilation of the soul.
(v Some (ditthadhammanibbānavādis) hold that nibbāna consists in the enjoyment of this life in five ways, either in the pleasures of sense or in one of the four trances.
Out of these conceptions, the theories of Uddhamaghatanika saññivada should be mentioned here, according to which the soul is conscious and eternal. The Buddha says: "There are brethren, recluses and Brahmaṇas who maintain in sixteen ways, that the soul after death is conscious and it is not a subject to decay. "The sixteen ways are as follows41:
(i) Soul has form (rap atta hoti arogo param marana saññi). (ii) Soul is formless ( arupi attà hoti arogo param maraṇā ). (iii) Soul has and has not form ( rapi ca arapi atta hoti. ).

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( 69 ) (iv) neither has nor has not form (nevartpi märapi atta hoti ).
(v) is finite ( antavā atta hoti ). (vi) is infinite (anantava atta hoti ). (vii) is both ( antavä сa anantava ca atta hoti ). (viii) is neither (nevantavā nānantavä сa atta hoti ). (ix) has one mode of consciousness ( ekattasanni atta hoti ). (x) has various modes of consciousness ( nànattasaññi atta
hoti). (xi) has limited consciousness (parittasanni atta hoti ). (xii) has infinite consciousness ( appamänasaññi atta hoti ), (xiii) is altogether happy (ekantasukhi atta hoti ). (xiv) is altogether miserable (ekantadukkhi atta hoti ). (xv) is both ( sukhadık khi atta hoti ). xvi) is neither (adukkhamasukh) atla hoti ).
A list of sixteen theories regarding the nature of soul is also referred to in the Udana42. The topics listed there are said to be debated by many Samanas and Brahmaņas, and they are the same type of conception of the soul as we find in the section of Uddhamaghātanıkā saññivāda. The same points are also treated sornewhat differently in the list of undetermined questions 43. There are several other places also in Pāli literature where such questions had been discussed 44.
Out of these views mentioned above, the thoughts of Nigantha Nataputta can be detected. As we have already seen, Buddhaghosa thought that Jainism was a combination of eternalism and nihilism. If this is due to an early Buddhist tradition, the Nigaytha Nutaputta's views might have been recorded in Pali Literature under these two sections. The sassatavada indicates the eternality of soul which should have been mentioned from the realistic standpoint and Ucchedavada points out the non-eternality of soul which should have been explained from practical standpoint. That means soul is eternal and having consciousness according to niscayanaya, and it is non-eternal and is a subject to change in its modifications from the viewpoint of vyavaharanaya. It is also pointed out

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that soul is extended over all parts of body which is very similar to the view of Jainas. Jainism is also of view that soul is formless and is possessed of consciousness46 Buddhaghosa also refered to this view of Jaina 548
Potthapāda 47 describes the theories of atta (soul) as follows:
(i) Atta has a form and is composed of the four elements enjoying food. This is the theory of material soul ( Olarikari kho, aham bhante, attanam pacccemi rapim catumahabhalikara kabalıkäraharabhakkham ti )
(ii) Atta is made of mind (manomaya) comprising all parts and not devoid of sense-organs ( manomayan kho aham bhante, attanam paccemi sabbanigapaccangini ahinindriyan tt ).
(iii) Atta is formless and with consciousness ( arapin kho aham, bhante, atlånam paceemi saññamayan li ).
(iv) Consciousness is ditterent from Attá ( anna va safna đĩa và atta ti ).
Out of these theories, Guruge is of view that the first theory probably belongs to the Jainas, for Jainism flourished in the same region where the Buddha was active&. As a matter of fact, this theory belongs to the Cārvāka philosophy according to which soul, like body, is a congregation of the four elements49. No such view is accepted by Jaina philosophy. The third view can be, of course, recognised as the Jaina thcory of soul, for soul in Jainism is accepted, as we have already seen, formless and conscious.
Vas ubandhu mentions that according to the Jainas, the soul is eternal by nature, and it makes extension according to the body 50
The Catuhsataka also pointed out that according to some philosophers the soul is spread over the entire body. It shrinks and extends according to the dimensions of the body of man or animal. Therefore, a bee, bird, elephant, etc. have their souls in proportion to their bodies51. This view mentioned in the

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( 71 ) Caluhsalaks is definitely related to the Jaina theory of sout Umäsvāti says that by the contraction and expansion of the pradeśas, the soul expands according to the body, as the light from a lamp gets expansion and contraction according to the room, That is the reason why a soul can occupy the space represented by an ant or an elephants.
Acārya Śántarkşita in his Tattvasangraha wrote a separate chapter entitled Atma Parikså or the examination of Soul. He there refuted most of the relevant theories. In this context he established the theory of soul according to the Jainas and then refuted it on the basis of the doctrine of momentariness of Buddhism.
The theory of sou), according to the Jainas, as he described, has been established through Dravyarthikanaya ( substance: point of view) and Paryāyarthrkanaya ( successive factors point of view). He says : the soul has the characteristic of consciousness only (cillaksana evätria). In the form of substance, it remains the same under all states (anugatatmaka or comprehensive) by nature, while in the form of successive factors, being distinct with each state, it is exclusive in its nature (vyadstyāt maka). This two-fold character of soul is cognised by direct perception, and does not stand in need of being proved by other evidence. Thus consciousness which continues to exist through all states, even though these states are diverse, is a form of pleasure and rest, from the substance standpoint, while the successive factors consist of the diverse states which appear one after the other; and all these are distinctly perceived 5
Santarakṣita further explains the above view of Jainas stating on behalf of them that if the substance were absolutely different from the successive factors, then no difference in it would be possible; because on the ground of their non-difference regarding place, time and nature, the two are held to be one. As a matter of fact, however, the two are different as regards number and other factors. For instance, the difference regarding number is that the substance is one, while the successive

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factors are many. By nature, one is comprehensive, while the other is distributive. In number, a jar, for example, is one, while its colour and the rest are many. In this way, their functions, etc. are also different. Thus substance is not absolutely different from the successive factors. Therefore, suul and its modes are also not absolutely different. Having the characteristic of conciousness, it is eternal and constant from the view of substance, while from the view of successive factors it changes in its modes such as pleasure, pain, etc54.
The Jainas try to convince the opponents by presenting the example of Narasimha. They say that, like Narasimha, there is no self-contradiction in the dual characteristic of soul. For. the soul is impartiate nirbhäga ); therefore it exists in the joint dual form, and hence is not perceived separately 55.
The theory of soul in Jainism, as referred to by śāntarakṣita, is also referred to by Arcata in his Hetubindutika56. The arguments submitted to refute the theory also are similar. The main defect, according to them, in this theory, is the selfcontradiction, which is not accepted by the Jainas Santaraksita urged that one entity cannot have two forms He puts forward two points in support of his view. He says if there is an unmodified substance in connection with successive factors, there is no difference in it, and in that case, it is not liable to be modifieds. Oneness between substance and its modes will involve the substance to be distributed like the forms of successive factors or the successive factors themselves would be mixed into the substance. Hence there would be no difference between them and the theory will be disprovedbe. As regards Narasimha, he says, it is an aggregate of many atrims, that is why it seems dual in nature ( anekānusamahatmā sa tathaiva pratiyate 59 Thus Sāntaraksita, as well as Arcata 60, refutes the theory on the ground that one cannot have two forms. Otherwise the eternality and the dual nature would be both untrue and unreliable,
As a matter of fact, the dual characteristic of soul is based on the standpoint of non-absolutism which is ignored by the

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Buddhist philosophers. The view of Jainas against these objections will be discussed in the chapter on Syadvada. Moreover, we can point out here that there is no self-contradiction in the dual characteristic of soul provided we conceive the problem through Non-absolutistic standpoint.
(2) Ajiva or Pudgala (matter): Nature of Karmas
The mundane soul attract the karmas and then they stand towards each other in relationship of phenomenal conjunction. This relation, according to Jainism, is beginningless and continues till one attains salvation. Soul and Karmas can be disso. ciated as they are two separate entities.
Pali Literature cantains some valuable references to the Jaina doctrine of Karma. Triyoga is the most significant aspect of Jaina ethics in that it explains the origin of karmas and their attachment to the soul through the three means of word, deed, and thought. This is also called the tridanda Karma1. The Buddha also recognises the tridanda Karma but in a somewhat different way. It is well know how the Buddha generally gave new meanings to old philosophical and ethical terms and taught new doctrines based on them. The famous triyoga or tridanda doctrine was originally a Jaina dogma. The Buddha himself has ascribed it to Nigantha Nataputta before refuting it. He asks a Nigantha named Dighatapassi in Nalanda ashow many kinds of wrong doings bring about evil effects according to the teaching of Nigantha Nataputta? Dighatapassï replied that the Kayadanda is most heinous62,
Here, danda means duccarita or wrong behaviour in body, speech and thought, which brings misery and distress to the mundane soul. The Buddha recognised kayakamma, Vacikamma and Manokamma in place of kayadaṇda, vacidanda and manodanda. The dispute between the Buddha and the Jainas on the use of Kamma and Danda is apparently due to the distinct connotation the term Karma has to each system. To the Buddhist it signifies volitional action while to the Jaina it is the endproduct of action which clings on to the soul in a material form. Both Danda and Kamma have the same meaning in

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Jainism. The use of the word Danda in the sense of Kamma can be seen in the Thananga (3. 126).
The more important difference of opinion between the Buddha and Nigantha Nataputta relates to the relative ethical significance of deed, word and thought. Which is the most heinous of all deed, word or thought? The Buddha says that the most heinous is thought (manodanda) while Nigantha Nataputta is said to have held deed ( kayadanda) to be the worst.
The reference in Upali Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya to this dispute gives the impression that the Niganthas did not realise the importance of the mind or Manodanda. It is really not so and it needs further clarification. Nigaṇṭha Nataputta did not, at any stage, envisage bodily action which is devoid of intention and volition. Involuntary acts-such as mistakes and accidents do not fall within the purview of Kayadnda. Only such action as is preceded by thought is Kayadanda and the true significance of Nigantha Nataputta's attitude to threefold action can be conveyed when kayadaṇḍa is translated and understocd rot as mere bodily action but as "thought converted into action."
Acarya Kundakunda condemned asceticism, if it is unaccompanied by intention ( bhava ). The guilt or otherwise of an action depends on the nature and intensity of thought and. intention. If ore is ever thinking of causing harm to another, he is guilty of malicious thought even though he does not actually cause any injury, while another, who, with no intention of causing any injury, becomes unconsciously the instrument of injury, should not be morally held responsible for that act. For instance, a burglar who fails in robbing after attempting to do so, is to be punished as a felon; and a surgeon, even though his patient may die during an operation skillfully performed with all attention, is not held responsible for such a death. But if any wrong is intentionally committed, he is, of course, more responsible and blamble for such "wrong" than he who merely harbours malicious thought but does not actually cause any injury:

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Avidhāyāpi hi hits himsāpbalabbājanamh bhavatyekah. Kștvā 'pyapaso hindsa himsăphalabhājanamh na syāt“. .
Thus in Jainism the Kāyadanda is worse than either Manodanda or Vacidanda. The Buddha indicated the same idea but defined its characteristics in a different manner. This is one area where the two do not really disagree, Jainism, like Buddhism, is a religion that gives importance to intention before an ethical judgement is made of any action,
Another reference in this connection is found in the Anguttara Nikaya where Nirantha Nataputta is designated kriyavadt (activist ), while the Buddha is said to be both kriyavadi and akriyavadi. An episode relates how Siha, the General of Licchavis, asked for permission to meet the Buddha, and how Nigantha Nätaputta did not allow him to do so saying that the Buddha taught the a kriyavada However, Siha decided to meet the Buddha and varified at once whether he is akriyavadi. In response to this question the Buddha said that he is both Kriyavadi and akrijāradi. He is akriyavadi in the sense that he taught beings how to abstain from evil actions, and he is kriyavadi in the sense that he taught them how to perform good deeds. The Buddha's reply is as follows:
"There is a way in which one might say of me that the ascetic Gotama holds the principle of non-action, teaches the doctrine of non-action, and by this leads bis disciples; and there is a way in which one might rightly say of me that the ascetic Gotama holds the principle of action ? I proclaim the non-doing of various kinds of wicked and evil things. And how might one say of me that the ascetic Gotama holds the principle of action ? I proclaim the doirg of good conduct of body, speech, and thought. I proclaim the doing of various kinds of goods things 65"
The question arises here as to why Nigantha Nataputta criticised the Buddha as an Akiryavadi ? and why the Buddha gave an answer like this? The Satraksianga includes Buddhists among the Akriyavādins, since they do not accept the exis

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tence of soul and hence deny karman as well66. Further it describes the types of Akriyavada as follows®7.
(i) On the dissolution of the five elements, i. e. earth, water, fire, wind, air, living beings cease to exist. On the dissolution of body the individual ceases to be. Everybody has an individual soul. The soul (xists as long as the body exists.
(ii) When a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul, which acts or causes to act ( SeKr. 1.1.1.33.).
(iii) There are five elements and the soul is a sixth substance. These six substances are imperishable.
(iv) Pleasure, pain, and final beatitude are not caused by the souls themselves, but the individual souls experience them.
(v) The world has been created or is governed by the gods. It is produced from chaos. (Sakt. 1.1 3.58 ).
(vi) The world is boundless and eternal.
All these views are reduced to four main types that correspond to those associated in the Palı Nikayas with four leading thinkers of the time, e. g. atheism like that of Ajita, eternalism like that of Katyāyana, absolutism like that of Käsyapa and fatalism like that of Gosāla.
The types of Kriyāvada that do not come up to the standard of Jainism are the following:
(i) The soul of a man who is pure will become free from bad karma on reaching beatitude but in that state it will again be. corne defiled through pleasant excitement or hatred.
(ii) If a man with the intention of kuiling a body hurts a gourd mistaking it for a baby, he will be guilty of murder. If a man with the intention of roasting a gourd roasts a baby, mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder.
But this definition of Satraktänga is also not altogether an adequate summary of the doctrine of Kriyavada and Akriyaväda. In another place the same work presents the characteristics in a better way. It says: the Kriyavada teaches that the soul exists, acts, and is affected by acts, and this held by

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the Jainas in common with the Vaišeşikas and Nyaya schools. The Akriyavada means a doctrine, according to which the soul does not act or is not effected by acts. It is held, according to the Jaina view, by the Buddhists in common with the Vedānta, Sankhya and Yoga schools88 It is, therefore, in the light of the negation of a soul by the Buddha that Nigantha Nātaputta called him an Akriyāvādin.
Sīlanka appears to hold that the Buddhists fall into the akriyavada category, for they denied the existence of a soul. But, as a matter of fact, the mere denial of the existence of a soul does not mean that Buddhism should be included into akriyavada. The Buddha believes fully in moral responsibilia ties and the ethical consequences of both good and bad acts, words, and thoughts. He fully accepted the doctrine of karma which governs the cycles of rebirth. Apparently the Jainas were not fully aware of these facts of Buddhist ethics. But it is somewhat surprising as the contemporary philosophers should have known that the Buddha himself criticised bitterly the teachings of Makkhali Gosāla, a contemporary nihilist, on the ground of akriyāivada.
Another reference to the karma doctrine of Nigaptha Nātaputta is found in the Majjhima Nikaya. According to that the inflow of karmas can be stopped by performing severe penance with right knowledge. The familiarity with the karma theory of Jainas can also be traced in the Mahabodhi Jātaka? It is said there that once the Bodhisattva was born in the family of a Brāhmana. When he came of age, he renounced the world and became a mendicant and lived at the Himalayas. During the rainy season he came down and going on his begging rounds he gradually approached Benaras. There he took up his abode in the royal park, and on the following day he got his meal from the king. Afterwards, the king bad a hut of leaves built for him and used to come to pay his respect to the mendicant daily thrice a day. And so twelve years.

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Now the king had five counsellors who advised him on temporal and spiritual matters. One of them denied the existeace of cause ( karma ). Another believed everything was the act of a Supreme Being. A third professed the doctrine of previous actions. A fourth believed in annihilation at death. A filth held the Ksatriya doctrine. He who denied the cause taught the people that existence in this world was purified by rebirth. He who believed in the action of Supreme Being taught that the world was created by him. He who believed in the consequences of previous acts taught that sorrow or joy that befalls man here is the result of some previous action. The believer in annihilation taught no one passed hence to another world, but that this world is annihilated. He who professed the ksatriya creed taught that one's own interest is to be desired even as the cost of killing one's parents. These men were appointed to sit in judgement in the king's court and being greedy of bribes they dispossessed the rightful owner of property.
Out of these, the thurd counsellor seems to have represented the thoughts of Nigantha Nataputta who preached that all things happened in life are due to the previous karmas, Such previous karmic matter, though present, begin to operate only when they become mature and then they produce corresponding psychic states through which they bind the self71.
The Bodhisattva of the Mahabodhi Jataka critcised this theory along with other theories belonging to the five counse. llors of the king. It is said there that while he accepted the offer of the king to be judge of his court, he became very popular within a short period. The five counsellors got angry with him and tried to convince the king that the Bodhisattva was sceking sovercignty. Hence the king diminished the honours paid to him and made plans to slay him. The Bodhisattva came to know all these things and went again towards the Himālaya,
The five counsellors in order to prevent him from coming again in the city publicised that the Bodhisattva with

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the help of queen wanted to slay the king. As a result, the queen was put to death. Hence the sons became enemies of the king. In the meantime the Bodhisattva came to know this conspiracy and came to the city to save the life of the king. He entered a frontier village and after eating the flesh of a monkey given to him by the inhabitants he begged for its skin which he had dried in his hermit's hut. He went then to the city of Benares and had himself seated in the park on the monkey's skin. The King with his counsellors came to see him. without any response the Bodhisattva began to rub the monkey's skin. The king asked why he was doing so ? The Bodhisattva replied that the monkey was very useful to me but I ate its flesh. The counsellors thought that this man is guilty of taking the life of a monkey. The Boddhisatva, addressing one by one, denied their cbarge and criticised their theories.
The third counsellor's theory which is supposed to have represented Jainism is criticised as follows:
From former action still both bliss and woe again : This monkey pays his debt, to wit, his former sin : Each acts a debt discharged, where then docs guilt come in? If such the creed thou holdst and this be doctrine true, Then was my action right when I that monkey slew. Couldst thou but only see him sinful is thy creed. Thou wouldst no longer then with reason blame my deed?.
The Majjhima Nikāya78 also supports the Jaina theory of Karmas. According to the Jaina Agamas, Soul enjoys all sorts of fruits of Karmas done?4. As regards the criticisrr. of this theory made by the Buddha, it does not provide any substantial argument. Moreover the Mahabodhi Jataka is a later development of the Jātaka literature, Silãika refers to only 500 Játaka stories belonging to the Jätakas57, which shows its nature of development.
In the Anguttara Nikayā76 the same idea is found in traditional doctrines of inaction ( tinimani bhikkhave titthayatanani yani panditehi samanuyunjiyamanani akiriyaya Santhahanti ). They are as follows:

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(i) There are certain recluses and the Brahmaņas who hold the view that "whatever happiness or misery or neutral feeling is experienced, all that is due to some previous action (yam kim cayam purisapuggalo patisam vedeti sukham va dukkham vā adukkhamasukhaṁ va sabbaṁ tam pubbekatahein 'ti )
(ii) all the pleasure and misery are due to a Supreme Deity (issaranimmänahetn ).
(iii) Others teach that all such pleasure and misery are uncaused and unconditioned (ahetu appaccaya).
Out of these three theories the first is undoubtedly related to the doctrine of Nigantha Nataputta. Criticising this view, the Buddha pointed out that owing to previous actions, men will become murderers, stealers, unchaste, liars, etc. For those who fall back on past deeds as the essential cause of present action, there is neither desire to do, nor effort to do, nor would they consider it to do this deed or abstain from that deed. The necessity for action or inaction not being found to exist in truth, the term Samana cannot reasonably be applied to yourselves, since you live in a state of bewildering with faculties unwarded??.
Here the argument raised by the Buddha against the first theory is that if all is due to the previous karmas, then it is not essential to make effort to abstain from them. This conception might have been known to Nigantha Nataputta when he accused the Buddha as an Akriyavadi (Non-actionist.) Acārya Kundakunda78 is of opinion that all the previously bound karmic matters operate only when they become mature. The Nigantha Nataputta prescribed severe penance with perfect knowledge to destroy the karmas. The Buddha himself, as we have already seen, expresses his satisfaction with regard to the theory?9.
The Anguttara Nikayaso describes the six breeds (chalahbhijali) as the different categories of beings, as declared by Purna Kassapa. They are,
(i) black breed (kaṇhābhijāti paññatta) category includes the mutton-butchers, hunters jailers etc.

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(ii) blue breed ( wilrbhajan pariatin ) includes the monks who live as though with a thorn in the side, and all others who protess the deed and doing so ( bhikku kantakaunttika ye
pana abcps keci kammavada kiriyadada ).
fiii) the third is the red breed ( lohitabhijati paffalda ), the category to which Niganthas belong:
(iv) the fourth is yellow breed (haliddabhijati) which includes the white-robed householders and followers of the Aji. vikas;
(v) the fifth is the white breed (sukkabhijas), which includes the Asīvikas.
(vi) the last is the purest white ( paramasukkabhijan ) is which Purana kassana is included.
The Buddha hears of this division from Ananda to whom later on he declares the six breeds according to his owa conception. These six divisions are mainly divided into two divisions, black and white. This division is based on the good and bad karmas of man. The Jainas also have about the same division into six categories, but they are not mentioned in Pali literature. The Jainas have the particular word Lesya for such division.
The Leiyas are different stages of soul influenced by different karmas and activities of mind. They are classified into six main types, viz. krsna (black), mila (blue), kapota (grey), sita (yellow), podma (pink) and smaldez (white). These are nothing but the states of beings based on their activities of mind. The kyma is the worst lesya of the first three and the bita is the least pure of the latter three Lesyas. According to another division, these six divisions are classified into two divisions, drapyalaya and bhavaleéya. This is similar to the classification made by the Buddha and the Yogadastra:** Slace the Conception of lasyas is not mentioned to the Pt Canon. ve can say that it may have originated later in Jainology as an Imitation d Šramana traditions.

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The Aguttara Nokaya describes three kinds of 'yoga (managa, vacana and kaya) wbich cause the inflow of the karmic matter into the soul due to ignorance ( dvijja ). It is said there that at Kapilavatthu, Vapp.84, a fulloner of Nigantha Nataputra went to visit Moggalayana. Moggalāyana asked Vappa "There is some one here, Vappa, restrained in body, speech and thought owing to the waning of ignorance and the arising of knowledge (kūyena, som uto, vācāya samvuto, mamasi samuto avijja riyaga wjjuppada). He then asked Vappa whether he perceives any cause owing to which the asavas causing pain would flow upon the man at some future time. (passassno tvar, vappa, tam thanan yato nidanan purisan dukkavedamiya Agava assaveyyurij abhisar parayan 'li ). Vappa then replied "Sir, I do see such reason. There may be in this case a certain evil deed whose fruit has not yet ripened, owing to the Asavas causing pain might flow in upon that man at some future time (passamahan bhante, tan thonam idhassu bhante pubbepapakammar Latam avipakkavipakani tatonidanam purisan dukkhavedaniya @sava assareyjum abhisamparāyam ). At this juncture, the Buddha came there and having a conversation he asked Vappa "As to these ā savis which come about as a result of bodily activities, in the case of one who sustains from bodily activities that causes vexation and distress, it follows that those a savas causing paia do not exist in him. He does not do fresh deeds, as to his former deed; he wears at out of constant contact with it, by a wearing out that is plain to see, not just for a time, one that asks for inspection that leads onward a wearing out that can be understood by the intelligent each for himself. The same is repeated in the context of vacisamarambhha paccaava and manosamarambha paccaya. The Buddha repeated tbrice this question. Upali answered it in the words that cannot be'. Further, the Buddha explained his views. He said : "Vappa, by the monk, whose heart is perfectly released, six constant abiding-states satatavihara ) are attained. He, seeing an object with the eye, is neither elated nor depressed, but rests indifferent, mindful

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and comprehending. Hearing a sound with the enr...... small ving a scent with the nose......tasting & savour with the tongue ......with body contacting tangibles......with wind .cognizing mental states, he is neither elated nor depressed, but rests in- different, mindful and comprehending. When he feels a feeling
limited by body, he knows that he so feels. He koows : when body breaks up, after life is used up, all my experiences in this world will lose their lure and grow cold. Suppose, Vappa, that shadow is cast by a stump. Then comes a man with axe and basket and cuts down that stump by the root. So doing he digs all round it. Having done so he pulls up the roots, even the rootlets and root-fibres. He chops that stump into logs and having done so chops the log into chips. The chips he dries in wind and sun, then buros them with fire, then inakes an ash-heep. The ash-heap he winnows in a strong wind or lets the ash be carried away by a swifty flowing river. Verily, Vappa, that shadow cast because of the stump, made not to become again, of a nature not to arise again in future time. Just in the same way, Vappa, by a monk, whose heart is the released, six constant abiding-places are won. He, seeing an object with the eye......with mind cognizing mentat states, is neither elated nor depressed, but abides indifferent, mindful and comprehending. When he feels a feeling limited by body...... limited by life, he knows that he so feels. He knows : "When body breaks up, after life is used up. all my experiences in this world will lose their lure and grow old."86
There is no substantial argument, in fact, in this criticism by the Buddha. Yoga attracts the karmic matter towards the soul and connects the same with it. The soul 18 obscured by such karmic matter since time immemorial. That is the Teason why it experiences fruits, good or bad. The destruction of Karmas, according to Jainisma, depends on the res. traint of mind, word, any body. By severe penance one can destroy all the past deeds and prevent the flow of new karmas. *
The Anguttara Nikaya87 refers to the five ways of falling into sin, according to Nigantha Nataputta.' They are destra

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ction of animates ( panatipata ), takug what is not given. (adinadayi...), passion enjoyment of evil ( abrahmacāri........), Speaking a lie (musavādi......), and living og liquor and drink. (surämerayamajjapamadaffhayi......). The Digha Nikaya88 - mentions the Cathyamasmvara of Nigatha Nātaputta. These are the references to the Pascanuuratas f lainas which will be dealt with in the next chapter.
The Buddha at another place in the Angutlara Nihaya89 says to Visakhā that the Niganthas took a vow got to go beyond the East, West, North or the soutit. fuis vow saves them from violence at least in the prescribed limitation. The Prosadhopavāsa also is said to be a way to destroy the karinas.90
Some other ways to make a purified suul also are recorded in Pāli literature. One becomes completely naked with no desire or attachment towards anyttung in the last stage of asceticism. In this acelakatva he should follow a lot of rules and regulations which have been mentioned in the Pali Canon as well as in the Jaina Agama. Thest will be discussed in the chapter on Ethics, Mokşa Tattva
The well-known reference of the Majjhima Nikaya to the severe panance of Jainas indicates the state of moksa according to Jaina philosophy. The Buddha says that... by severe penapce all the sufferings will be destroyed (sabbam dukkhamnijjinnam bhavissati). This means the freedom from all karmic matter is Moksa or Salvation according to Jainism.91 Kundakunda says: that if the causal condition of karmas disappears through the control of senses and thought, then the springs of karmas get blocked. When the springs of karmas thus get blocked the drarya karmas get repulsed. When the drarya karmas completely disappear, the person becomes all-knowing and all-percei ving and attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends the sense feeling and which is untouched by the sorrows of life :
Hedum bhave piyamā jāyadi ņāņissa āsavaạirodho. Asavabhāveņa vina jāyadi kammassa du nirodho.

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* Kammawäbbasepa va savvanhý savvaloya duas ya. : " Pavadi inciyarahidath avvavabach suhamagantach." Natare of Valverse
The common topics, which are said to have been debates by he Samanas Brahmanas and Pariadajakas, are referred to in Pāli literature. The Jaina conception of the nature of Universe also appears to be recorded in the Brahmhjala Sutta
The four different propositions maintained by contenaporary .teachers in this connection are as follows: (i) This world is finite and circumscribed fantood ayetin
boko pariyanto ) (ii) It is infinite and without limit (anantava ca ayan loko
apariyanto ). (iii) It is both finite and infinite ( antava ca ayam loko
apariyanto ). (iv) It is neither finite nor infinite ( nevāyam toko antava
na panananto ).
The third theory appears to be the view of Nigantha Nātaputta. Buddhaghosa does not clarify this view. He suggests only that the limited and unlimited character of the world depends on the limited or unlimited view taken by the contemplator in his mental perception or vision, 94. Perhaps he missed here the philosophical aspect of the proposition. If we apply the standpoiat of con-absolutism, its inner meaning can be easily grasped. However, we can point out that from the standpoint of substance ( dravya ) and place ( ksedra ), the world is limited and from the standpoint of kala and thada it is unlimited.
Records of theories held at the time have been repeated several times in Pali literature. But they do not add anything substantial to what has been mentioned before. The later Buddhist philosophical literature provides us with more data in this respect. It indicates a development of the concept ruader clinctussion

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( 86 ) Santarakṣita refers to a view of Ācārya Sūri, a Jaina - philosopher, in the course of refuting the doctrine of the thing by itself" (sva bhavavāda ), which throws light on the Jaina conception of the pature of the Universe. But to understand that reference it would be best to know first the context on which it is based. It provides a common ground to the Buddhist and Jaina Logicians, as they are not in favour of Svabhavavada.. According to this doctrine, as shown in the Tattasangraha and
other books, things originate neither from themselves nor from any other things. They are not dependent on causes. Tu prove this theory the bolder of this view queries, 'Who makes the diversity in the lotus and its Allament ? By whom have the variegated wings of the peacock and such things been created - Such arguments can be raised about other things too. For instance, the sharpness and other properties of a thorn or any other thing must be regarded as uncaused, since they are around us due to the influence of nature.95
Against this view, Sāntarak ita argues that if you do not postulate any cause, your view cannot be accepted, as nothing can be proved without adequate evidence. He then supports his arguments with those of Acārya Sūri. He says that Acārya Sūri, a Jaina philosopher, also upholds the same objection in the theory of "thing by itsell", as he says, "One who declares that there is no cause would demolish his own conclusion, if he adduced any reasons in support of his assertion; on the other hand, if he were also to adduce reasons what could be gained by mere assertion 1.96
Here the view of Sūri referred to by Santarakṣita appears. to be in conformity with Jainism. The theory of Svabhavao vada is accurate as far as the opposition to the theory tbat a God controls the universe is concerned, but if it carries the meaning of ahetuskavada, it cannot be admitted by the Jaina philosophy. According to this theory, the world possesses innumerable causes which have innumerable effects by nature, but its development requires some other material also. For Instance, the clay can produce the jar, but it also depends op

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the apparatus, as stick, wheel, potter, etc. Lotos como out of bud, which is a cause of its fragrance aod beauty. There fore, the view that only nature soabhida ) is responsible for the origination of things, is inadmissible to the Jainism. The Satrakstānga also criticises the view of Suabhāvand.da :
Kah kantakānā prakaroti taikşayanti, Vicitrabhāvar mrgapakşiņāă ca. Svabhāvatah sarvamida pravsttam,
Na kamacarosti kutah prayatnah,07 Another reference to the Jaina conception of the nature of the Universe is recorded by Santaraksita in his examination of the external world. Kamalasila, the well-known commentator of Santaraksita, explains the view saying that the universe accordingly is pon-perception of external world. They describe its nature as resembling of things (pratibimbadisannibham ). In support of this assertion they say that the entire universe comprising the threefold phenomena ( subjective or immaterial, objective or meterial, and immaginary or fictitious ) is mere ''ideation". This ideation through the diversity of the chain of causation” is endless and impure, for they have not realised the truth; but it is pure for those whose karmas have been got rid of. Kamalasīla further delineates the nature of the universe according to Buddhism saying that the universe is in perpetual flux and affects all living things. This idet of the entire universe is based on two points--(1) there can be no apprehender of the external world, being non-existent, and (2) every cognition is devoid of both "apprehender" and "apprehended", because it is cognition,
The main ground for esta hlishing this principle is that the perception of a thing depends on one's mentality. The diversity of imaginations is responsible for the diversity of realities. For instance, as stated by Acārya Aryadeve in his philosophical work Catuhsataka, "the corpse of a woman is considered in various forms. The sage considers it as the cause of wandering into the world, a libidinous man thinks about her beauty to fulfil his sexual desires, a cock, on the

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other hand, peroeives it for the purpose of eating. Therefore, the world is nothing but only the fiction of imaymation, 'Mit iB tot bo, reality should be perceived or thought the one for by the whole universe without any sort of sanketa or satys kara,
In this context Santeraksita refers to the view of Sumati and then refutes it from the Buddhist point of view. Acarya Sumatis argues accordingly that "all things have two aspects the Voiversal and the Particular. Consequently the universe is a combination of atoms which exist in two forms, viz. the common and uncommon. Of these the common form is apprchended by the senses, and the form of the atoms which is uncommon is held to be amenable to mystic perception." That means the compendium of atoms, tie so called Skandha is the universe, which we perceivt, and the atoms, which are so suhtle that they cannot be perceived by us, are perceived by the omniscient.
Thus the external world in the view of J inism is not imagination, but a multitude of atoms. It cannot he ignored, as perception of an entity which represents the external world is based on knowlege of feeling Since an entitv has diffcrent names it can be firtitious but its existence cannot re igno. red. The entity is paramirtha sat like knowledge or vija inas. Knou ledge can be dependent on the entity, but the entity cannot be dependent on krowledge. The innumerall thing in the world cannot be seen by tbe ordinary man, but it does not mean that they are not tn existence. 89
Santara kşita does not agree with these views. He remarks that they are the confounded assumptions of some dull-witted persons / durmatayah ). He argues that the two different forms of a thing must be different from each other. It cannot, therefore, be right to say that a single thing has two forms. The second and the most touching argument is raised to the effect that as the particular form of an entity is not entirely defferent from the universal form, there would be a possibility of the former being apprehended by the senses; and in that case there could

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not be the clear cut distinction that he commion form is amenable to sense cognition and the uncommon foram is amenable to mystic cognition."100
The above objections are met by the Jaina philosophers. They say that from the point of view of dravyärthikanaya, reality is the same but from the paryayarthikanaya standpoint its modes are different from each other, On the basis of the conception of non-absolutism, there is no room for selfcontradiction.100
The Nature of word
Santaraksita in the Tattvasangraha refers to a view of the Mimamsakas regarding the nature of the word with the idea of establishing his own theory. The mimarsakas hold the view that the word is eternal. Hence there is no author of the Veda. Therefore it is authoritative, reliable, and of divine origin (apauruşeva In this way, they set forth the several views that have been held by various philosophers regarding the exact nature of word Among them the Jainas are said to have held the view that the word is atomic in character (andgalo Digambarash 102 In the following kärikā two types of words are mentioned, viz Universal (Sāmānya) and particular Vileṇa) which are the main features of the Jaina conception of reality.
While the establishing of his own view, Śantarakṣita criticised the Mimamsakas' conception, but he did not refute the Jaina conception separately. He proved the falsity of the common types of words, while criticising the view of the Mimämiskas. He set up a theory that the Veda is not an authoritative and reliable source. Hence word is universal in character and noneternal in form.
As regards the divine origin of the Veda (apauruṣeyavāda) both Jainism and Buddhism are travellers of one and the same path. The arguments against the Mimamskas' view are adduced by both parties in a similar way, though they are based on their own fundamental principles, and therefore, they differ in some places.

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The Buddhists say that words are not representative of their meanings, bochuse they are used even for denoting the past and future realities. If they were having an inseparable connection, their usage would be restricted and no meaning would come out of them. They, therefore, think that the word signifies only the imaginary universalised reality.103
On the otber hand, the Jainas postulate a theory that words are of two kinds, universal and particular. If words were not valid to show the existence of the external world, they would be meaningless and therefore useless and knowledge would be impossible,104 Kundakunda says that there are four different kinds of material objects, viz. Skandhas, skandhadešas, skandha pradesas, and Paramanns. Skandhas are the aggregates of atoms. The next two are the differences in molecular constitution. The last one is a primary atom which constitus the other three classes, 108 The atom cannot be divided ( paramāņā ceva avibhāgi ).108 Sound is generated by skandhas when they strike against one another. The sound produced by skandhas may be natural (svabhävika) or artificial (prayogika. ) 107
Thunder of cloud and the roar of the sea are natural sound while the artificial sound is purposeful which is divided into two types, bhaşatmaka ( language ) and abhasātmūka (non-language ). The language sound again may be akarātmaka ( articulate) and anakşarātmaka (inarticulate). The aksaratmaka sound is made up of alphabetical sounds while the anaksara/maka is the language of animals. Anaksuratmaka sounds are of four kiads, viz (i) tata sound produced by musical instruments covered by leather, (ii) vitata sound produced by viņā, etc, (iii) gnana produced by metallic instruments like tala, etc. and (iv) sausira produced by wind-instruments, 108 These sounds can be heard and recognized as they are paudagalika.
(3, 4, 6 ) Dharma, Adharma, and Kala Dravyas
There are no references to dharma, adharma, and Kala Dravyas in Páli literature. The Darmästikaya is almost similar to the paticcasamuppuda ( dependent origination) of the

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Buddhists, but the adharmastikāya is quite unknown to them. the kala dravya is recognized in Budhism in the form of prajhaptimatre in the Athasalini, 109
(5) Akāśa Dravya
A reference is made to the Jaina conception of akala in the Tattvasangraha by the Mimamsaks. Santarakṣita raised a question against the Mimamsakas' view regarding the eternality of works like ghata (jar). They say that if the auditory organ is akasa, several objections could be brought against this theory. For instance, being all-Pervasive there would be equality of contact with all sounds and all organs. How then could the answer be provided on the basis of the auditory organ? The Mimamsakas try to reply that akasa cannot be regarded as being without parts, and therfore it is the auditory organ. They support their view of the Jainas and the Sankhyas both of whom have accordingly the idea of the auditory organ consisting of parts (jainairärhataiḥ Sankhyaissca niravavayavasya vyomaḥ niṣiddhātvat 110).
Santarakṣita and Kamalasila refute this view. They urge that if the divisible akașa is held to be eternal, then all the objections that have been urged against the view "the indivisible akaşa is eternal'' would become applicable.111 The defects pointed out by Santarakṣita in this theory are as follows. If ākāṣa is eternal and consists of parts, words should remain in the form "this is the same. Aonther argument, in support of this idea, is presented by him in the form that what is eternal does not stand in need of the help of anything. Hence, the cognitions that would proceed from the etetnal source, should all appear simultaneously. Therefore, he concludes that akasa is neither eternal nor consists of parts. 112 In the Abhidharmakosa akaśa (1.5) is enumerated in the asamskṛta dharmas and described as "without covering" (tatrākāśamanāvṛttiḥ ).118. According to Buddhaghosa, akaśa is infinite.114
The Jainas are of veiew that akata is eternal and consists of parts (sävayava ) and having infinite parts or pradeśas it

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provides to Jiba and ajiva. The etymology of akata itself indicates that it allows space to other substance to enter into or penetrate itself.115 This eatering or peneteration is expressed by the word avagaha.116 Different places occupy different locations of akasa. Its manifoldness connotes, as in the case of matter itself, its possession of parts. 117
Conclusion
This brief account of the Jaina philosophy as found in Buddhist literature shows us that :
(i) the six draʊyas and the seven Tattvas of Jainism were known to early Pali literature and further refuted in Sanskrit Buddhist philosophical literature.
(ii) Among the sixty two contemporary Philosophies depicted in the Brahmajalasutta and some other places in the Pali Canon. The Jaina view is described as both Ucchedavāda and sassatavada.
(iii) According to the Jaina philosophy, the soul is formless and consists of consciousness.
(iv) Mundane soul attracts karmas and then both stand towards each other in a relationship of phenomenal conjunction. This relation is beginningless and continues till one attains salvation.
(v) Kayadanda is more heinous than Manodanda, if a wrong deed is committed intentionally. That means intention is the main source of evil or virtuous acts. Soul will have to enjoy the fruits of karmas done. All is, therefore, a result of previous karmas.
(vi) The destruction of karms depends on triyoga and severe penance with right understanding.
(vii) Universe is not a creation of any god, but it is a combination of atoms.
(viii) Word is atomic in charcater, and
(ix) Akasa (space) is eternal and consists of parts.
These data also indicate that, inspite of minor errors, the knowledge of Jaina Philosophy which Buddhist scholars possessed was of a very high order.

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CHAPTER III
JAINA ETHICS The Dutien of jaias House-holders
Emancipation through the removal of karmic matter trom the soul is attainable only through righteous living according to ethical discipline. One should abstain from the five faults (pancapapa ) viz, injury (hinsä ), falsehood ( asatya), stealing (steya ), unchastity (abrahma) and wordly attachment (parigraha). These vows are of two kiads : Partial vow(Anuwatas) or limited abstention from the five aforesaid faults and Full vows (Mahavratas ) or total abstention from five faults. The former is prescribed for house-holders and the latter for ascetics. Five kinds or training (bhāvand) have been prescribed for each of these vows for the sake of securing stability in thema.
The above-mentined five uratas have been unanimously accepted by the Ācāryas, on the basis of Pratimas or Vratas or Paksa, Caryū and Sadhana. The difference of opinion is only with regard to the Gunavratas, Sikşavratas, Malagunas and Pratimas. The great Acarya Kundakunda described householder's duties on the basis of Pratimas. He simply presented the pames of Gunavratas e. g. dit parimaga, anarthadanad avarjana and bhogopabhogaparimana and Sikşavratas e. g. sümnyska prog' adha, atithi püja and sallekhana. Svāmi Kartikeya followed his line but placed dešavakašika in place of sallekhana-Vasunandi included sallekhana in Sikşavratās. These Acāryas described neither Astamala gunas nor adicāras of Vratas.
Ācārya Umāsvāmi and Samantabhadra are prominent Agures among those who described the house-holders duties on the basis of twelve vratas. Umasvāmi divided Vrati iato two e. g. Agāri who follows anuoratas and Anagari who follows Mahavratas. He took pains to describe the aticuraof each wala but did not refer to Arfamulagunas and pratimas. He might have followed the tradition of Upasakdasasontra. Umasvimi could not recognize the names of watas given by Kundakonda. He changed them into Digorata, dobavrata and amartha

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daadavrata in Gunavratas and sāmayika, prosadhopavasa, upa. bhogaparibhoga pariming and atithisanivibhāga in Sikşduratas. Desavakasika has been included into gunaurtas and bhogopabha gaparimana into Siksuratas. Samanatabhadra borrowed his views from kundakunda, Kārtikeya and Umäsyämi and put them in a reviewed ways. He regarded desăvakašik as a part of siksäurtas and placed Vaiyavratya in place of sallekhana He is perhaps the first Acārya who presented Mülagunas in the Ratnakarandakartvakacara.
Jinasena represents those Acāryas who described the housefolder's duties on the basis of paksa. carya and sadhana in the Adipurana. Later Acaryas followed either of these three traditions. The pali literature does not mention any of these controvertial names of vratas. We can therefore come to the conclusion that at the time of Parávanātha or Nigantha Nātaputta no such tradition was in force.
The five faults are the causes of recurrent births and therefore they are personified as "Dukkha" (pain) itself. For the sake of removing such dukkha, one should meditate upon the benevolence ( maitri ) for all living beings, delight in looking at better qualified beings (promoda ), compassion ( karunya ) for the afflicted, and indifference to both praise and blame ( madhyastha avinayaesu ).3 The duties of a Jaina House-holder as reflected in Pali Litt.
Pui Literature contains only scanty and scrappy bits of information on the duties of a Jaina House-holder. But they are invaluable as the gradual development of the vows could Le traced with the help of such information.
The Samaíñathala Sutta of the Dighanikaya refers to the Catujāmasanivara as a part of the doctrine of Nigartha Nataputta. This is not an accurate record, for Catuya masanavare is of Pārsvanātha, and not in the doctrine of Nigantha Nātaputta We shall discuss this matter later on. The four vows of Parávanatha were revised by Nigan tha Nataputta who found it necessary to specify Brahmacarya as a separate vow in view of the laxity

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be observed among the followers of Parsvanatha. Nigantha Na aputta, thus, established a discipline based on five vows as opposed to tbat of Pārsvanathat. The Buddhist circles were apparently unaware of this innovation by Nigantha Nātaputta.
Asibandhakaputta Gāmiņi, a Jaina house-bolder, goes to see the Buddha at Nālanda. In response to a question of the Baddna be says : Nigantha Nätaputta teaches a doctrine to his laymen ( Sävaka ) according to which a slayer of living creature parar ati pateti), one who steals (adinnan adiyati), one who indulges in sensual pleasures wrongly (kamasa miccha carats, and one wbo tells a lie ( musa bhanali ), would go to the purgatory ( so a payiko nerayiko ). In short his des tiny depends on the life he leads.5
The above reference deals with the vows of horse-holders who are said to be followers of Nigantha Nätaputta, but the vows recorded are four and not five in number. Another remarkable point is that "Kusila'' which was separated from parigraha in the form of Kāmesumicchacarati in Pali is referred to individually here. This shows that the Buddhists were aware of the reformation made by Nigantha Nata putta in the Pārsvanatha's religion, but the fact that Kušila was not postulated in place of Parigralia but in addition to it was appasently not understood.
A reference to five vows of Jainism is found fn the AnguItara Vikaya;6 this mentions the five ways of falling into sin as taught by Nigantha Nātaputta. The five ways are :
(i) destruction of living beings (panatipati hoti). (ii) taking what is not given ( adinnadayi hoti ). (iii) passionate enjoyment of evil (abrahmacari hoti ). (iv) speaking lies ( musavadi hoti). . (v) taking liquor and intoxicants ( suramsayamajja ppama
dathayi hosi ). This, again, is only partially accurate. The first tour kinds of sins are referred to correctly, though not in the Jaina order. As to the fifth, it is "Parigraha" which should have been mentioned. According to Jaina ethics, “Surāmaraya

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majjappamadaṭṭhāna" is an aspect of Himsa and notepate category. This list omits Parigraha altogether.
These references lead us to two observations: (i) According to the Parsvanatha tradition, there were four vows, and (ii) Nigantha Nataputta formulated five vows dividing the last into two Akulila and Aparigraha. The defects in these references are: (i) they do not follow the traditional Juna order of precedence, and (ii) the Parigraha, which is placed as the last way of falling into sin, is ignored in Pali Literature. The compilers of the Pali Tipitaka either were not well acquainted with the reformation of Nigantha Nataputta or they did not consider it very important.
The omission of Parigraha in all the references in the Pali Canon is significant. Parigraha is the most important Jaina contribution to Indian Ethics. It was altogether a new concept when it was first included in Parivanatha's doctrine. It embraced all aspects of indiscipline and abstinence from it and was recognized as the removal of the very root of all immorality. It was founded on the role which desire and craving played in human affairs. But the moral significance of Parsvanatha tradition was not adequately understood by the Buddha or his followers, for, if they did, they would have observed how the vow relating to Parsvanatha agreed with the Second Noble Truth of Buddhism as a diagnasis of suffering.
The Nikayas also recorded the Jaina notion with regard to Himsa, its causes, and their remedies. The Majjhima Nikaya says that Niganthas uphold three ways of committing Himsa viz, (i) by activity (kṛta). (ii) by commission (karita) and (iii) by approval of the deed (anumodana). To get a violence committed or to approve a violence committed is about the same as to commit violence by one's self, for one is involved in the activity directly or indirectly and shares it. Therefore, one who refrains from Himsa will not utter even a word hich is likely to give pain to another, will not commit any ct which may cause injury to another, will not harbour any thoughts prejudical to another, will not make anybody else

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utter words likely to cause pain to another, por entertain feelings of ill will towards another, and will not tricourage others to cause pain by word, deed, or thought to apother.?
In another place, the Majjhima Nikavas states that in Nalanda, Dighatapassi informed the Buddha that the Nigantha Nätaputta did not lay down Kamma Kamma, but his teaching was based on Danda danda. Wrong doings, according to him, as we have already mentioned, are on three kinds, viz. Kayadanda (wrong of body ), Vacidanda (wrong of speech), and Manodanda (wrong of mind) Further he says that Kayadanda is more heinous in the opinion of Nigantha Nataputta than either of the other two. This is supported by Nätaputta himself. He appreciates the statement of Dighatapassi and says that he has answered Gotama in a very proper way ( sadhu sadhu tapasii ). For how can an insignificant wrong of mind overshadow an important wrong of body, since a wrong deed of body is the more blamble? (kim hi sobhati chabo manodando imassa wanı olarskassa kajadandassa upanidhaya. atha kho kayadanda vå mahasävagjataro papassa...... ). Upali goes then to discuss the matter with the Buddha. The Buddha asked him 11 Nigan tha, who although suffers from sickness, refuses cold water and takes only hot water, passes away, what result does Nātaputta lay down for him?" Upali answers that he will be born among the Manosatta Devas. He also says that: according to Nātaputta, the blame is less; Because before he passed away, he was devoted to mind. The Buddha. says: "House-holder, take care of how you explain. Your earlier statement does not tally with sour latter, qor your latter with your earlier "( manast karoki, Ganapati... Ha kho te sandhiyati purimena va pacchaman, pacchimena sa puriman ) and then asks Upali: "While going out or returning, Fourfold restrained Niganth Nātaputta brings many small creatures to destruction. What Tespit, kouse-holder, does Nätaputta lay down for him ? Nataputta lays down that being unintentional, there is no great blame, "But if he does in

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tend it, it is of great blame. And this intention is included in that of wrong of mind," (tari kur manniasi, Gaha pati, idhasse Nigantho..... SO abhikkhamanto patikkamanto bahu khuddake pano sangkatan apadeti, imassa pana, Gaha pati, Nigantho Na. taputto kam Vipakam panna peti 'ti? 'asañcetanikam bhante, Nigantho Nataputto no mahasāvajjan .. manodandasmin, bhante." The Buddha urges then, “If a man comes here with a drawn sword and says that in a moment I will take all the living creatures in this Nālandā into one heap of flesh, one mass of flesh, what do you think about this? Is that man able in one moment, one second, to make all the living creatures in this Nalandā into one heap of flesh? (ahani jāvalıkā imassa Nalandaya påņa te ekena khanena ekena muhuttena ekan maṁsakhalam ekam mim sapunjam karıssamı ti.. su puriso katun ?.. ). Upali replies : "Even ten men, revered Sir, even twenty, thirty, forty men, even fifty men are not able in one monient, one second, to make all the living creatures in this Nalanda into one heap of flesh, one mass of flesh. How then can one insignificant man shine out at this stage?" The Buddha again points out the self-contradiction in the statement of Upūli.10
In fact, attachment and intention are very important in Jainism. They are regarded as the main sources of Himsa. If one, who observes the rules of conduct conscientiously, walks along, carefully looking ahead, end intent on avoiding injury to the crawling creatures, were to injure an insect by trampling it under foot by chance, he would not be respons:ble for Himsa. And it one acts carelessly or intentionally, he would be responsible for that whether a living being is killed or not. For, under the influence of passions, the person first injures the self through the self whether there is subsequently an injury caused to another being or not:
Yuktäcaranasya sato rāgādyāveśanantarena' pi Na hi bhavati jatu himsă prāņavyaparopaạädeva. Vyutthānāvasthāyām rāgādinām vašapravsttāyām Mryantāni Jivo mā vā dhāvatyagre dhruvari himsā. Yasmätsakaşayah san hantyātma prathamamātmanātma
nam

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Pascājjāyeta nā vā hinisā pränyantara parh tu."
Both, non-abstinence from Him sa, and indulgence in Hörnsa, constitute Hirosa; and thus whenever there is careless activy of mind, body of speech, there is always injury to living being. Mere possession of a sword would not make one guilty of Him sà. Even then such possession can be the cause of some injury to somebody. Therefore, to prevent all possibility of Himsa, one should not entertain even the desire for the possession of such objects as are likely to cause injury. 12
Thus all these references indicate that intention is the main source of injury in Jainism and if injury is caused by body intentionally, it will be considered more blamable. If killing of living beings is made an offence even when it is without intention, no one on earth can be an Ahimsaka, for the entire world is full of vitalities of all types which a man may kill in large number without knowing tliem at all :
Visva gyivacito loke kva caran ko'pyamoksyat. Bhavarkasadhanau bandhamokşau cennabharisyatam.13
As regards the eating of flesh, the Vinaya Pitaka has a good record of the Jaina point of view. It is said there that Siha, a General of the Licchavis and a follower of Nigantha Nataputta, had served meat to the Buddha. Knowing this Niganthas, waving their arms, were murmuring from road to road in Vaišali : Today a fat beast killed by Siba Senāpati has been served into a meal for the Buddha. The Buddha made use of this meat, knowing that it was killed on purpose for him.''14 This incident took place immediately after Siha was converted to Buddhism, The Niganthas, therefore, might have tried to blame both, the Buddha and Siha. Whatever that may be, this reference indicates clearly that the Jainas were completely against the eating of flesh. The followers of the Buddha appear to have been influenced by this idea of the Jainas. Jivaka visits the Buddha and asks if it is true that animals are slain expressly for the Buddha's use. The Buddha replies that he forbids the

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eating of meat only when there is evidence of one's eyes or ears as grounds for suspicion that the animal has been slain for one's expressed use. Anyone who slays an animal for the use of a monk and gives it to him, commits a great evil. Jivaka is pleased with the reply and declares himself a follower of the Buddha. 15
Likewise, Devadatta asked the Buddha for the imposition of the following five rules on all the members of the Sangha.18
(i) that monks should dwell all their lives in the forest. (i) that they should accept no invitations to meals, but
live entirely on alms obtained by begging. (ii) that they should wear only robes made of discarded
rags and accept no robes from the laity. (iv) that they should dwell at the foot of a tree and not
under a roof, and (v) that they shonld abstain completely from fish and
flesh.
But the Buddha thought that ruch sules should not be laid down for the Sangha as a whole. He left them for monks to observe purely on a voluntary basis.
Amộtacandra, a Jaina Acārya argues against the eating of flesh that it cannot be procured without causing destruction of life. One who uses flesh, therefore. commits Hirasa, unavoidably. Even if the flesh be that of a buffalo, oxe, etc., which has died of itself, Himsa is caused by the crushing of creatures spontaneously born. He who eats or touches a raw or a cooked piece of flesh, certainly kills spontaneously-born creatures constantly gathering together. 17 In conclusion he says that those who wish to avoid Himsă, should first of all take care to renounce wine, flesh, honey and the two udumbaras (gular and fig) and fruits of Pippala, Pakara and Banyan which are the birth places of small mobile beings. 78 Gunavratas or Multiplicative Vows
The early Scriputres seem to have been familar with the Gunavratas. In the Anguttara Nikaya the Buddha is said to

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have discussed the uposatha ceremony while he was neu Savatthi at Visakha's house. Visakhā, the Migāra's mother, was perhaps, Dot perfectly converted from Jainism to Buddhism at that time. One day she, having observed the U posatha, came to meet the Buddha at noon. Then the Buddha described to her three types of U posatha. It is to be noted here that the Uposatha is the tenth vow in Jainism.
fi) Digvrata
The Buddha says to Visakha : "There is a sect of naked ascetics ( Nigantho nama Samarajatika ), who exhort a disciple thus : "Now my good fellow, you must lay aside injury (Dandan nikkhi pähi ) to beings that exist in the East beyond the yojana from here, likewise to those in the West, North, and the South beyond a yojana from here. Thus they exhort them to kindness and compassion towards some creatures only 19" This is a corect description of the Digurata which is a life long vow to limit ones mundane activities in all directions from well-known objects, 20 But in subsequent lines the Buddha os reported to have criticised the doctrine saying : In this way they enjoin cruelty by making them not spare other living beings ( ekaccanan pāņānam namiddayāya nanukampaya samadapenti). This criticism is made only for the sake of cnticism. For, he who confines his activities within a limited sphere, follows a complete vow of Ahimsa as regards what is beyond those limits, because of total absence of non-restraint there21. He, therefore, tries to follow the vow of Mahavata":24.
Thus, this is undoubtedly an unfair attack on the Jainas. Jacobi says in this respect : "we cannot expect one sect to give a fair and honest exposition of the tenets of their oppogents: it is but natural that they should put them in such a form as to make the objections they want to raise against them all the better applicable. In the Jaina Agamas28 also we find misrepresentation of Buddhist ideas",
Another reference to this vow is found in the Digha Nikaya. It is mentioned there that the Buddha met at Vesali a certain

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ascetic named Kandara-Masuka, who maintained seven life-long vows in order to gain fame and honour. The seven vows are: As long as I live I will be naked, and will not put on a garment (vejjivaṁ acelako asssṁ na vatthaṁ parideheyyam), as long as I live, I will observe the vow of chastity (yavajjivam brahmacari assam na methunam dhammam patiseveyyam ), so long as I live, I will maintain myself by spirituous drink and flesh, eating no rice-broth or gruel ( yāvajjīvaṁ surämäṁseneva yapeyyan na odana-kummāsaṁ bhuñjeyyem), I will never go beyond the Udena shrine in Vesali in the East (puratthimena Vesalin Udenam nāma cetiyaṁ taṁ nätikkameyyaṁ ); I will never go beyond the Gotamaka shrine in Vesali in the South (dakkhinena Vesalim Gotamakan nama cetiya tam nätikkameyyarh); I will never go beyond the Sattamba shrine in Vesali in the West (Pacchimena ); and I will never go beyond the Bahuputta shrine in Vesali in the North ( Uttarena... 25
Here all the vows, except the third (i.e. the one referring to spirits and meat), represent the Jaina vows. It is quite possible that this vow which is inconsistent with the spirit of the other six vows, is either a mistake or an interpolation. The first two are common vows of most ascetics of that time, while the last four are vows of a Jainistic type, and they represent the Digurata. No other sect adhered to these last four vows. As regards the Ajivikas, I would prefer to quote the words of Basham, an accepted authority on Ajivikism. He says: "The ascetic Kandara-masuka is regularly referred to as acela, but nowhere as Ajivika, and we have no evidence that any of his vows, with the exception of the first, were taken by the organized Ajivika community.26" Now, we can say that kandaramasuka must be either an ascetic fallen from the Jaina asceticism, or his vows have been mixed up. For they cannot be accepted campletely, neither by Jainas, nor by Ajivikas, since both religions prohibited meat-eating completely.
(ii-iii) Desavrata and Anarthadaṇḍavrata
Delavrata means one should take a vow for a certain time not to proceed beyond a certain village, market place etc. No

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clear reference to this vow is yet found in Pali literature, as it is not much different from Digurata.
In the Anarthadandavarata, one should never think of hunting, victory, defeat, battle, adultery, theft, etc, because they only lead to sin.27 With regard to this vow nothing is mentio. ned separately, but we can trace its nature from other refe. rences. Dighata passi describes to the Buddha the three ways of falling into sin according to the Nigantha Nātaputta, viz. the Kūvadanda, vacidanda, and the manodanda 28. This indicates that to resist the käyu, vacana, and mana from doing wrong deeds is the aim of Anarthadandavrata. The fikṣāvratas or Disciplinary Vows (i) Sāmāyika :
There are several illuminating references to the Sik såvratas in the Pali Canon. It is Samāyika or Contemplation of the self that the Mjjhima Nikāya2° refers to when the Buddha says to Mahānäma that he had seen Nigaạthas on the Vulture peak, standing erect, refraining from sitting, experiencing pain...etc. This is an allusion to the Kayotsarga of the Jaina ascetics, but we can have an idea of the nature of Samayika prescribed for Jaina laymen since it is the pre-stage of Kayotsarga As this reference indicates, Samavika should be performed by sitting or standing at a tranquil place. (ii) Proşadhopavāsa
The Anguttara Nikaya presents a picture of a Proşadha. While the Buddha was staying near Savatthi, he criticises the opponents' Upoşathas and preaches the nature of Buddhist U posatha to Visakha. He says: "There are three kinds of U posaihas, the Gopalak U posatha, Nigantha Uposatha, and the Aryana Upoşatha.
In explaining what the Gopalak U posatha is, the Buddha said, "Suppose, Visakhā, the herdsman at evening restores the kin to their owners. Then he thas thinks: the kine grazed today at such and such a spot, and drank at such a spot. Tomorrow tbey will graze at such and such a spot. Likewise,

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the holder of Gopalaka U posatha thinks thus : tomorrow I shall eat such and such food, both hard and soft. And he spends the day engrossed in that covetous desire. This sort of Upoşatha, therefore, is not fruitful. It is not very brilliant. It is not very brilliant. It is not of great radiance, 30
He then describes the Nigantha Uppsatha: "There is a sect of paked ascetics, the so called Niganthanama Samanajatika. Then again on the Sabbath day they exhort the disciple thus : "I have no part in anything. anywhere, and herein for me there is no attachment to anything." The Buddlia then makes a remark on this sort of Uposatha. He says : "Yet for all that, his parents know him for their son and he knows them for his children and wife. Yet for all that his slaves and workmen know him for their master and he in turn knows them for his slaves and workmen. Thus at a time when one and all should be exhorted to keep the sabbath, it is in falsehood that they exhort them. This, I declare, is as bad as telling lies. Further the Buddha criticises that as soon as that night has passed he resumes the use of his belongings, which had not been given back to him really. This I declare as bad as stealing. This U posatha of the Nigaathas, therefore, is not of great fruit or profit. It is not very brilliant. It is not great radiance." Thereafter, the Buddha points out his own attitude towards the Upsoatha. He says that both these sorts of U posztha are not fruitful. The Upoşatha, which he exhorts, is perfectly right, is named Arya U poşatha. It brings the purification of a soiled mind by a proper process. For this purpose the Arya disciple calls to mind the Tathāgata thus : The Exalted One, the Arhanta, is a fully Enlightened One, perfect in knowledge, and in practice, a benevolent person, a world-knower, Unsurpassed, Charioteer of Beings to be tamed, Teacher of Devas and mankind, a Buddha is the Exalted One. As he thus bethinks him of the Tathāgata, his mind is calm; delight arises, the soil of the mind is abandoned. It is just like cleaning the head when it is dirty. Thus this sort of Utoşatha is more fruitful. 82

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Here, the second Upogatha belongs to the Nigantha Nätaputta and the third to the Buddha. But what about Gopalka Upar satha ? Whom does it belong ? I think that it should belong to either Rrahmanas or Aivikas, or it may be a part and parcel of the Niganthas' U posatha. As regards the Brāhmaṇa tradition, Upoşatha is observed with sacrifices and complete fasting 88, and the Ajīvikas are no-where mentioned as observers of any sort of Upoşatha. Now, if we go through Jaina literature, we will find that there was a tradition of baving U posatha both with and without meals. For, selfmortification is said to have been performed according to one's capability. The U posutha is observed to carry on contemplation in a better way: and that can be fulfilled by a lay devotee with or without meals, though without meals is preferred :
Sa proşad hopavāso yaccatusparvyām, yathāgamani, Samyasamskāradārdyāya caturbhuktyujhanam sadā. Upavisakşamajh kiryo' nupavasastadakyamaih. Acāmlanirvikstyādi saktyā bi sreyase tapah 94
Another point is that the Nigantha Uposatha is said to be performed by observing Digurata, the sixth vow of a Jaina lay devotee, and abandoning all attachment during that period. Here the Buddha is reported to have blamed the Jainas, accusing them of violence, since they have compassion towards beings existing only within a certain limited sphere, not to others. But as already pointed out, according to Jainism, a layman is to observe the partial vows ( anuuratas ), according to which, he is not to go beyond a certain limit. How then is there any possibilty of violence ?
Another criticism of the Buddha compares Nigantha Upofatha to lyeing and stealiog. He says that during the period of U posatha a Jaina layman becomes unclothed and thinks that nobody is his and he is of nobody's, and gets rid of worldly attchment for a limited time. After performing his Upoşatba he accepts his belongings and knows the parents as parents and so forth. We know, the vow was taken for a limited

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time, not on a permanent basis. It should be remembered here that this is the partial vow ( anuprata ) prescribed for the lay- men to practice a monk's life. Further a question of lyeing or stealing does not arise here.
Arguments, which were prevalent in those days are recorded in the Bhagavats Sataka.35 Ganadhara named Gautama ( not the Buddha) asked Mahāvira a question about some Ajivikas, the followers of Gosālaka, who had doubt about the Jaina U posatha. They asked them : 'Suppose a Jaina layman observes Uposatha and proceeds to meditation abandoning all his properties including the wives and suppose someone during his absence appropriates his properties and his wives, does that layman become guilty of taking other people's things on his return if he takes fuis properties and wives from the person who had appropriated them ? Māhāvira answered the above question saying that layman uses his own things, and not of others. For the belongings were abandoned for only of limited period, not for all time.
This reference makes it very clear that the impressions which the Buddha and the Ajivikas had of Niganth U posatha were alike. If Gopālaka of the Anguttara Nikaya is the Gośālaka of the Bhagawati Sataka, we can say that the Gopalaka U posatha might have belonged to the Ajivika sect. Because the founder of Ajivikism, Makkhali Gosāla, was formerly a fullower of Nigantha Nātaputta, Several of its doctrines were, therefore, influenced by the doctrines of Jainas. Whatever that may be, one thing is certain, that is, all sects and schools of Samana Cult had the U posatha, though in varying forms, as a common religious institution,
With regard to removing all clothes during the Samayika or Uposatha, Jacobi says, "The description, however, does not quite agree with the posaha rules of the Jainas." He depends on the definition of Posaha according to the Tattvarthasaradi pika as given by Bhandarakar. He says : "Posaha, i.e., to observe a fast or eat once only on the two holy days, one must give up bathing, unguents, ornaments, company of women, odours.

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incense, lights, etc. and assume renunciation as an ornament. Though the Posaha observances of the present Jains are apparently more severe than those of the Buddhists, still they fall sbort of the above description of the Nigantba rules : for a Jain layman does not, to my knowledge, take off his clothes during the posaha days, though he discards all ornaments and every kind of luxury; nor must he pronounce any formula of renunciation similar to that which the monks utter on entering the order. Therefore, unless the Buddhist arcount contains some mistake or is a gross mis-statement, it would appear that the Jainas have abated somewhat their rigidity with regard to the duties of a layman.36"
Jacobi's findings are based on the findings of Bhandarakar or on the Tattvärthasüradipika and are supported by his observation that the Jain laymen do not take off clothes during the Samayika, and therefore, he thinks that the Jainas bave somewhat relaxed the rigidity with regard to the duties of a layman. But, it appears, Jacobi had no opportunity to collect the references from Jaina literature, we have already pointed out from the Bhagawati Sataka that the Jaina laymen who wish to le initiated to the vows of monkhood take off their clothes at the time of Sumäyrka. The Sagaradharmamta37, which is only concerned with the dutis of the Jaina laymen, also clearly refers to the fact that during the Uposatha days senior observers of Samayika removed their clothes during the Samavika period. It is a personal observation of mine that even now the senior members who are on the verge of becoming muni (Digambara monk ) renounce their clothes at night during the performance of Sāmāyika. It should, therefore, be clear that the Jaina laymen still observe the rigid duties which are referred to in Pali literature.
The afore-mentioned reference to Nigantha-Uposatha in the Anguttara Nikāya points out the duties coming under Bhogopabhoga parimānaurata, the eleventh vow of lay devotees which enjoins that one should limit the enjoyment of consumable and non-consumable things. When this vow is observed,

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there is no scope for Himsa or violence. Because of the control of speech, mind and body, there is no room for telling a lie or stealing or for other kinds of himsa. Further because of abstinence from all sexual intercourse and attachment to worldly affairs, there is no Abrahmacarya and Parigraha.
The twelfth obligation of a Jaina layman is perhaps the most widely practised. It is due to the munificence of the laity which practised atithi samvibhāgavrata that Jaina monks, could, despite the numerous vicissitudes of time, preserve the Jaina tradition. In the Pali records we have references to the generosity of such Jaina laymen as Upali who gave alms and requisites not only to Jaina monks but also to other religious persons of the time. It is also this vow which has made Jainism one of the best-endowed religions of India with a very impressive group of temples of exquisite artistic excellence.
The Stages of Ethical Evolution of a Jaina House-holder
The stages of ethical evolution of a Jaina house-holder are called the Pratimas and are eleven in number. Ten of them (i.e. excepting Ratribhuktityaga) are referred to indirectly in the Pali Canon. Their main characteristics have been discussed in the course of our discussion on the Twelve Partial Vows (dvadasaṇuvratas ). The Anguttara Nikaya38 gives us a list of ascetics who were prevalent at that time, and it refers to Nigantha, Munḍāsāvakā, Jaṭilaka, Paribbājakā, Māgandikā, Tedandika, Aruddhakā, Gotamaka, and Devadhammika. The Niganthas are undoubtedly the followers of Nigantha Natputta who performed very severe penances. The Same Nikaya39 enumerates six Abhijatis and in that account the Niganthas are said to have worn one yellow stained cloth ( kaşayavastra). This may be a reference to Elaka or Kṣullaka (ie. the vow of wearing small loin,cloth with or without a cloth to cover the upper body40).
Buddhaghosa in his Commentary on the Dhammapada says that more assiduous Niganthas cover their water-pots so that no soul and sand should enter it.

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Commoner ascetic practices are also mentioned in the Nikaya.si, Out of them, Nabhikatari (refusing to accept the food cspecially prepared for them ), is related to the eleventh stage of Jaina House-holder called Uddistatyaga. Pratima.
From these indirect references we come to the conclusion. that at that time no such name was given to the vratis. How ever, it shows that there were some types of categories of vratis. Jaina Monachism
After completing the practice of Anuvratas and Pratimas, a house-holder seeks permission from his relatives to renounce completely mundane atlairs and become a Jaina wonk. Tben after worshipping pañca Parameşthins (Ashanta, Siddha, Acarya Upūdhyāya, and Sadhu ) he requests the Ganin to admit him into his Order. Being accepted by the Gapin, be pulls out his hair and becomes a completely naked ascetic according to the Digambara tradition.
There were at first no caste restrictions to be a Jaina monk, but later on Brāhmaṇa, Ksatriya, and vaisys are said to have been preferred.42 Robbers, sick persons, slaves, blinds, debtors. etc. are not to be admitted into the Order.43
The new monk makes gradual progress in monkhood and attains the position of Sthavira, Upadhyaya Acārya, Ganadhara. and pravarlaka 44 There are three Monastic Units which are recoguized by the Jainas :
(i) Gana consists of at least three monks and maximum a thousand.45 It is a unit made up of many kulas parasparasapeksanekakulasamudāyah ).46
(ii) Kula forms the Gana ( ganah kuldsamudayaḥ 147. (iii) Gaccka consists of seven monks (saptapuruşako gacchah
It is under a particular Ācārya (Guruparivärah. 149 The entire Order consists of monks, nuns, laymen, and women, and is called Sangha. If one breaks any rules or regulations, he should observe Prāyaściltas like Alocana, Pratikramapa.

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Ubhaya, Viveka, Vyutsarga, Tapa, Cheda, Parihara, and Upasthapana 50 During the rainy season a Jaina ascetic should stop his touring and abstain from walking on green grass or water. One should move about only during the day taking proper care not to tread on any living creature (sāmyak iriyā samiti ).51
Complete nakedness ( jahījāya ) is one of the essentials of Jaina (Digambara ) monkh.od.52 He should have 27 qualities Pran lipatavırmana etc.53 Among the requisites he is permitted to have a broom made of peacock feathers and a waterpot made of wood for using after answering calls of nature. He sleeps either on the bare ground or on a plank of wood. He never uses blankets and the like, even during the cold season. He is not supposed even to touch money.
A Jaina ascetic takes his meal and water once a day between about 9 A. M. and 18 Noon. He eats out of his own palms in a standing position. The concept behind this rule is to abstain from all botherations and mundane affairs. The food should be pure in nine ways (navakoți-parisuddham) 45 The faults pertaining to the improper begging of food are generally grouped into four, viz. Udgama (preparation of foud), Utpadana ( the ways of adopting food), Esana (the method of accepting food), and Paribhoga ( way of eating food, its quantity, etc).55 The main purpose of eating is to gain physical strength adequate for the purpose of Performing religious duties.
The fundamentals of moral discipline consist of the twentyeight Malagunas, the Uttaragunas, five-fold Acuras, the twelve Anupreksas or reflections, the twelve-fold penance or Tapas, ten kinds of Vaiyavṛtya, and the twentytwo kinds of Pariṣaha. They are as follows:
The twenty-eight Mulgunas :
(1) Pañca Mahāvratas: total abstention from five great sins, i.e. Hims (violence), Asatya (telling a lie), Steya (theft), Abrahma (sexual intercourse ), and Parigraha (worldly attachment).

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(2) Pafica Samités : five religious observances, vit. (i) Iriya of walking with proper care looking 31.yards ahead, (ii) Bhaga or speaking with proper care, (iii) Esani, or taking only pure food which was not specially prepared for him, (iv) Aainaniksepana or proper care in lifting and laving, and (v) pratişthapara or proper care in excreting.
(3) şad ivašyakas : five daily duties, viz. (1) Sāmāyika or equanimity of soul, (ii) Vandanā or saluting of Tirtharkaras images in the temples. (iii) Stuti, praising the qualities of holy beings. (iv) Pratikramana or repentence of faults, (v) Svadhyāya or reading the scriptures, and (vi) Küyotsarga or giving up attachment to the body and practising contemplation of the self.
(4) pancendriyanirodha or restraint of five senses.
(5) Pañcīcara : five kinds of ācāras, viz. Daršanācara or to induce strong and steady faith, (ii) Ji inücura or to increase knowledge, (ii) Ciritrāciira or to improve one's daily life, (iv) Tapācira, and (v) Viryäcūra, to increase the power of one's inner self.
(6) Trigu ptis : the three-fold restraint of mind, body and speech.
Besides, a monk is said to have seven other duties, viz. (i: Kesaluñcana or pulling the hair with one's own hands, (ii) Acelakatva, or Nakedn'ss, (iii) Asnanatva, or not to bathe, (iv) Bhríayanatya, or sleeping on the ground, (v) Ekabhukti or taking only a little food once a day, (vi) Adantadhāvanatva, or not applying a brush to the teeth, and (vii) Taking food in a standing posture, and only in the hollow of the folded hands.
A monk, as we have already referred to in the last chapter, is supposed to meditate on the twelve Anvprekşīs or Bhivanās (reflections and observe the austerities (tapas and Parisahas). References to Jaina Monachism in Pali Literature
Pāli, as well as Budhist Sanskrit, literature refers to Nigantha Nātaputta as the head and teacher of a very large Order ( sanghi ceva gani ca ganacarıyo cá ), well known (nata ), famous
yasassi ), the founder of a sect ( titlhakara ).57

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Here Sanghi, Gani, and Ganacariyo indicate the stages of gradual development in Jaina hierarchy. The Sadhu or Nigantha is mentioned as the ordinary category of monks. Such monks (seha or antevasin) are of four types in Jaina literature, and their main duties are to practise the monastic conduct and study. Acarya is superior to Upadhyaya and is supposed to be head of a small group of monks. The Avasyakaniryukli mentions the qualities of a Acarya viz. that he should possess the five-fold conduct (acāra) knowledge (jñāna), faith (darsana), good behaviour (curitra), penance (tapa ), and fortitude (virya ). Gani, a head of a gana, is separated from Acarya, but his duties are not much different. He is said to be equipped with eightfold gaṇisam pada, viz. Acāra, Śruta, Sarira, Vacana, Mati, Prayoga, and Sangraha.58 Gaṇadhara is a chief disciple of Tirthankar. The Tirthankara karma is obtained by meditation of Darsanaviśuddhi (purity or right belief), Vinayasampannata (reverence for means of liberation and for those who follows them). Silavrates vanaticura ( faultless observance of the five vows, and faultless sul dual of the passions), Abhikṣnajñānopayoga ( ceaseless pursuit of right knowledge), Samvega (perpetual apprehension of mundane miseries), Saktitastyuga (giving up according to one's capacity) Sadhusamadhi (protecting and reassuring the saints or removing their troubles ), Vaiyuvṛttyakarana (serving the meritorious), Arhadbhakti ( devotion to arhats or omniscients), Acuryabhakti ( devotion to Acaryas), Bahusrutabhakti ( devotion to Upadhyaya), Pravacanabhakti (devotion to scripture ), Arasyakaparihuni (not neglecting one's duties), Märgaprabhāvana (propagation of the path of liberation), and Pravacanavatsalatva (tender affection for one's brothers on the path of liberation),59
Church Units
The monks were grouped in various Units under their respective Heads. The whole congregation of monks, nuns, laymen, and lay-women is called Sangh. Gana, Kula, and Gaccha were the main Units, Nigantha Nataputta is

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said to be a head and a teacher of such Sangha and Gagele ( Sanghi ceva gani ca ganācariyo ca ).60 The gana was the largest unit made up of many kulas (paraspararasanikakulasamudayah ).61 The maximum number of the members of a Gana is said to be a thousand (utkrstah puru pusa pramanane. sahasrbyāptharktvam.62 It was headed by Ganadhara or Tirtharin kara.69 Vassávāsa or stay in raiay season
During the rainy season a Jaina ascetic is suposed to stophis touring. The rule was so popular that the people criticise the Buddhist monks for not adhering to it at the beginning, "How can these recluses, Säkyaputtiyas, walk on tour during the cold weather and hot weather and rain trampling down the crops and grasses, injuring life that is one-facultied and bringing many small creatures to destruction? Shall it be that these members of other sects, whose rules are badly kept, cling to and pripisid rains-residence, shall it be that birds having made their nests in the tree-top, cling to a proper rains-residence, which these recluses trample on walking "64 Then the Buddha prescribed the rules pertaining to the observance of indoor residence in the rainy season.
Here the word aññatitthiyi refers to the heretical teachers We are not aware of this rule in their doctrines, except in those of Nigantha Nātaputta. The Alülacara Mentions that a Jaina monk should stop touring in the rainy season and abstain from causing injury to vegetable beings which grow profusely during this time.
Tanarukkhabaridachedanatayapattapavālakandamūläin. Phalapupphabiyaghādam na karenti muni ņa kārenti. Pudhaviya samārambham jalapavaṇaggitasāņamārambhart. Na karenti ņā kūrenti ya kārentam ņānumodanti.65
The vassavāsa in Jainism 66 as well as Buddhism 67 commen nces on the full-moon day of a Aşadha and ends on the fulmoon day of Kartika. The Thūņārga permits the monks to go to another place under certain circumastences, 68.

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Requint es
A Jaina monk has no attachment to the world. Nakedness or acelakatva is considered one of the essential of monkhood K litigkappa ).89 Pali literature refers to Jaina ascetics as Niganthas, for they claimed to be free from all bonds (arhakam gan. thanakileso palibujjhankileso natthi, Kilesaganthirahitaāyam ti evani vāditaya laddhnūmavasena Nigantho ).70
Cloth and other requisities are considered parigraha (posse. ssion ) which is an obstacle to the attainment of salvation. Acārya Kundakunda says : ""If you were to say ) it is ( found ) stated in certain texts that monk accepts a piece of clothing and possesses a pot, (we are to ask ) how can he { with these ) be independent and without activities involving preliminary sins? If he accepts a piece of clothing, gourd. bowl or anything else, necessarily there is involved harm to living beings, and there is disturbance in mind.71 Somadeva also puts forth the same view.72 According to Digambaras, no body can attain complete emancipation from karmas without being naked.
The Buddha was completely against nakedness (Acelakatva ). He criticised this rule along with others on several occasions. In Pāli literature the word Acela is used quite loosely and referred to any naked ascetic rather than a member of any single organised religious sect.79 In the Vinaya74 both Acelaka and Ajivika are used synonymously. In the Majjhima Nikaya, the Buddha is said to have followed the Acelakatua before he had attained Buddhahood. But in the Dhammapadatthakatha, a person with an unsettled mind is conpared to one who starts as an Acelaka, Nigantha and Tápasa.75
In the same work an incident is referred to where the Niganthas wearing a piece of cloth are considered better than those who are completely unclothed ( Acelakas). The reason given for wearing a garment was the prevention of dust and dirt falling into their alms-dishes. For even dust and

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comprise beings endowed with life76. This reference appears to the Svetāmbara sect of Jainas which apparently bad come into existence at the time of Buddhaghosa.
The same work mentions another incident which happened during the marriage of Visākhā, a lay-woman who was a follower of Buddhism. It is said there that her father-in-law Migāra, follower of Jainism, escorted the naked ascetics (perhaps Jainas) into his house for a meal, and called Visakhā to pay homage to them. As she entered the hall where the naked ascetics were eating and looked at them, she said "Men like these are totally bereft of a sense of modesty and fear of mortal sin and have no right to the title of Arhant. Why did my fathar-in-law send for me???
Another story78 gives a dialogue between Sirigutta and Garhadinga, the followers of Buddha and the Nigantha Nātaputta. Garahadinna says to Sirigutta that the Niganthas (Jaina monks) are omniscient. They know the past, present and the future. Afterwards Sirigutta, a follower of the Buddha, trys to test this boast of the naked ascetics. He prepared a ditch to be dug between two houses, On invitation, when the Niganthas came, they fell into the pit aud their bodies were covered with mud etc. Then it is said that he had them beaten with sticks and brought humiliation upon them. In the end it was proved that Buddhist monks were omniscient for they could avoid the pit which was secretly dug for them too. One factor is important here, that is, the Jaina monks who figure in this story are only ordinary monks and Nigaạtha Nataputta is not connected with the incident at all.
All these references to Acelakas and Viganthas indicate that the Buddha and his followers were not only opposed to nakedness, but they also ridiculed it. On the other hand, it is clear that Acelakatva or nakedness was one of the essentials of Jaina monkhood. Ascetic Practices
Some ascetic pratices which were prevalent at that time

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among Samanas and Brāhmaṇas are referred to by the name of Acela Kassapa79. The same practices are said to have been practised by the Buddha himself before he attained enlightenments. The Ajivikas are also said to have followed them91. These practices are as follows:
(1) He goes naked (acelako hots).
(2) He is of loose habits (performing his bodily functions, and eating food in a standing posture, not crouching down, or sitting down, as well-bred people do muttacaro ).
(3) He licks his hands clean (after eating, instead of washing them, as others do )-(hatthapalekhano).
(4) When on his rounds for alms, if politely requested to stop nearer, or to wait a moment, he passes solidly on (na ehi bhaddantiko na tiṭṭha bhaddantiko).
(5) He refuses to accept food brought to him (nābhihataṁ) (6) He refuses to accept food if prepared especially for him ( na uddissakatam).
( 7 ) He refuses to accept any invitation ( na nimantānam sadiyati).
(8) He will not accept food straight from the mouth of a pot or pan (so na kumbhimakha patigganhati. na kalopimukhā patigganhati).
(9) He will not accept food placed within the threshold (na elakamuntaram ).
(10) Nor among the sticks ( na dandamantaram). (11) Nor among the pestles ( na musalamantaram).
( 12 ) Nor when two persons are eating (na dvinnaṁ bhuñjamānam).
(13) Nor from a pregnant woman (na gabbhaniya).
(14) Nor from one giving suck ( nu payumānāya).
(15) Nor from one in intercourse with a man (na purisantaragataya)
(16) H will not cept food collected ( na sankattisu ).
( 17 ) Nor accept food where a dog is standing (na yattha sa upatthito hoti).

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(18) Nor where flies are swarming ( na yattha makkhika sandasandacārini ).
( 19 ) Nor accept fish, nor meat, nor drink, nor intoxicants, nor gruel ( na maccham, na thusodkami pivati ).
( 20 ) He is one-houser accepting one mouthful or a twohouser accepting two-mouthfuls or a seven-houser accepting seven mouthfuls ( so ekāgariko và hoti ekalopiko va hoti dvalopiko, sattīgāriko vā hoti satt ålopiko ).
(21 ) He keeps himself going on alms given by only one or only two, or soon, up to seven ( ekissäpi datliya yai pets, dvihi pi dattihi yāpeti, sattahi pi dattihi yapeti ).
( 22 ) He takes food only once a day, or once every two days, or so on upto only seven days. Thus does he dwell observing the practice of taking food according to rule, at regular intervals, upto even half a month. ( ehühikam pi āhārmahareti, dvihrkan pi ūhāran ahareti, sattihukam pi ūharam ühüreti, iti carapam addhamasikam pi parıyāyabhottabhajanānuyogamanuyutto viharalt. )
Out of these practices, several are reminiscent of the eight faults pertaining to food, which are mentioned in the Mülacara viz. Udgama; Utpadana, Esana, Samyojana, Angara, Dhüma und Karana.32 These are identical with the rules prescribed for Jaina monks. Jacobi also accepts that "many are quite clear, and bear a close resemblance to well known Jaina usages. 33"
The Udgamadoşa84 are of sixteen kinds. viz. Adhahkarma, Auddesika, Adhyadhi, Pūtimısra, Sthapita, Bali, Pravişkarama, Krita, Pramţsya, Abhi ghata, Udbhinna, Maldroha, Accheddya and Anssista. Among these faults some are referred to in the above reference. They are as follows:
Nabhikataro (5) is the abhighāta dosa of the Mulācāra, according to which a Jaina monk should not aceept the food brought from other places 85 :
Na uddissakatam (6) is Auddesika Dosa of the Malacāra which means : whatever is prepared specially for any saint or Sramana or Nirgrantha, should not be accepted by a Jaina

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monk. The reason behind this rule is that the lay-devotees of Jainism should always take pure food and be prepared to offer faultless food to a monk at any time.87 Na kumbhi mukha pagigganhati, na kalopimukhā pațigganhati, na elakamantarań, na dandamantaram, ma musalamantaran ( 8-11 ) are the Sthapita and Misra dosas pertaining to food in Jaina asceticism.88 According to these rules, the utensils and things cooked therein should not be mixed :
Pasanndehi ya saddham sägarehim ya jadaņlamuddisiyam. Dādumidi samjadānari Siddhan missam viyāņāhi. Pāgādu bhāyaṇāo annambi ya bhāyananhi pakkhaviya, Saghare vã paraghare vá nihidam thavidan viyāņā hi 89
sankattisu (16) is the Praduşkara (sankramana) and Rnidoşa of the Mülacara. According to them, the food for Jaina monks should neither be collected nor be borrowed from any other places. This indicates that a donation should be made according to one's capacity.91 So ekagiiriko va. dvägariko vā. satiagăriko vā hoti ( 20 ) are identical with the Acinna dosa. A muni should not go begging beyond seven houses. He is supposed to have returned in case he could not get alm2. Na dubinam bhuñijaminanari, (12) Na gabbhiniyā83, (13) Na püyamanay 494 (14) Na puri santara gatāya (15) are identical with the Dāyaka Dosas, according to which a woman who is eating ( ghasatti ), is pregnant (gabbhini ) or is nursing a baby (piyamūnaris dūrāyari ) is not eligible to offer alms to a monk.85 Na ehi bhadantiko, Na tittha bhadantiko (4) Na uddissakatan (6) are related to Uddista-tyaga, according to which a Jaina monk does not accept any invitation. ( 1ddistam pindamapyujjhed ).
Mode of eating
We have already seen that a Jaina monk (Digambara) does not possess anything except a water-pot and a broom. He therefore eats food in the hollow of his palms in a standing position. The hattha palekhano (3) indicates the same mode of eating of Jaina saints in an ironical way. The Muttacāro (2) also perhaps hints the same, Somadeva points out here that

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although no body attains salvation by observing this mode of eating but it gives an impression that an ascetic takes an oath that he should take his meals till he could keep food is the hollow of his palms in standing position.97
Quantity of food
A Jaina monk is supposed to fill half his belly with food, one fourth with water, and one fourth with wind. The maximum quantity of food to be taken ordinarly is 32 morsels ( kavala ).88 the 'Ekūlopiko, dudlopiko, sattalopiko indicate further restrictions on the quantity of food consumed by a monk.
The Circumstances under which Food could not be taken
A long list of circumstances under which food could not be taken is given in the Malācāra. If a crow touches the food or if some onc vomits or if the monk happens to see blood or flesh or somebody crying or if living beings like flies fall into his food, no food should be accepted under such circumstances. Na yattha su upațshito hoti ( 17 ), Na yattha makkhika sandasandacárini (18), Na macchan, na mamsari, na suran, na merayam, na thusodakam prati (19) point out further circumstances. Fasting
The reference “Ekahikam pi ahiram ahareti, duihikam pi āharar ahäreti, sattihukam pe ahüram ahareti, iti evarüpani addha masikan pi pariyāyabhattabhojanānuyogamanuyutto viharati,'' (22) shows that fasting was prevalent in the A celaka sect, especially in Jainism. According to Jaina ethical standpoint, one should fast according to dravya (substance), kşetra (place), kala ( time ), and bhava ( mental state ). Various methods fasting are mentioned in Jaina literature and monks used to fast even for months.99
Thus the above mentioned references to Acelaka's practices in Pali literature are related in many respects to the practices of Jaina monachism,

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Supernatural Powers
Supernatural powers of Jaina monks are referred to in Jaina literature. 100 But they were prohibited to show them in public for such purposes as obtaining food.101 Later on, certain Occasions the Jaina monks were allowed to make us of such powers, 112 Acārya Samantabhadra 103 and Siddhasena Divakar104 are famous for displaying such supernatural powers.
The Vinaya Pitaka106 mentions that the six heretical teachers including Nigantha Nātaputta approached a great merchant of Rājagaha to get a bow). But all of them failed and Pindola Bharadwāja, a follower of the Buddha, fetched it down. Likewise, the Digha Nikāya refers to an incident where a Nigantha failed in manifesting the supernatural powers which he claimed. How far these references are correct, we cannot say. But the Jaina literature, does not preserve any record of such incidents which could tally with these references in Pali literature Daily routine
As regards the routine of a Jaina monk, he is supposed to spend more time in study and meditation. He gets up early in the morning and pays his homage to the Pañcaparamesthins during Sämäyıka or Kayotsarga. Besides begging and preaching he engages himselt in the performance of duties without transgressions. His duties are to observe the Pancamahiuratas, pañcasamstis, șadavašyakas Pañcendriyas Duādasūnuprekşas, twenty two Parişanas, Pañcácāras, and Triguptis. References to thein as found in the Pali hiterature are as follows: Pancamahāvratas
The Samaññaphala Sutta of the Digha Nikaya mentions the Cātuyāmasamvara of the Nigantha Nataputta. We have already discussed this matter to some extent in the section on the duties of laymen. The Yama means Mahāvrta or perfect vow. And Catuyāmasamvara means four restraints attained by Niganţha Nātaputta. These four Restraints are as follows according to the Samañña phala Sutta :

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(i) Sabbavarivārito or restrained as regards all water. (ii) Sabbaväriyuto or restrained as regards all evil. (iii) Sabbavāridhuto or all evil washing away. (iv) Sabbavāriphuto or he is filled with a sense of all sins
avoided.
This is undoubtedly a very faint picture of Nigamtha Nātaputta's doctrine. Buddhaghosa's Sumangalovilāsini also does not help much in this respect. Jacobi remarks : "This is certainly, neither an accurate nor an exhaustive description of the Jaina creed, though it contains nothing alien from it and successfully imitates the language of the Jaina Sūtras." He further says that “The Buddhists, I suppose, have made a mistake in ascribing to Nātaputta Mahavira's doctrine which properly belonged to his predecessor Paráva. This is a significant mistake; for the Buddhists could not have used the above term as descriptive of the Niganthas creed unless they had heard it from followers of Pārsva, and they would not have used it if the jeforms of Mahāvīra had already been generally adopted by the Niganthas at the time of the Buddha.''108
There are several versions of the Samaññaphala Sutta different from each other. For instance, the Tibetan Dulva , retains Nigantha Nataputta's authentic teaching of wiping and karma by penance, while in one of its Chinese versions dated 412-13 A.D. Nigantha Nätaputta claims omniscience, and in another Chinese version dated 381-395 A.D., he is mentioned to hold the view of karma.109 Basham thinks that SamannaphalaSutta shows a completeness and consistency lacking in the rest, and perhaps represents the original source of the other references"110 This, however, does not seem to be quite correct. As a matter of fact, the Caluyāmasamvara followed by Pārsvanatha tradition comprised : (i) Sarvapranatipātaveramana, (ii) SarvamȚsavadaveramana, (iii) Sarvadattādanaveramana, and (iv) Sarvabahiddbadanaveramana. Here the Masthuna (sexual intercourse and Parigraba (worldly attachment) were included in the last Vow, that is Sardabahiddhādānaveramana.

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In course of time its real meaning was forgotton and the followers of Parsvanatha tradition or Pasavaccijja considered the Sarvabahiddhadanaveramana ( Parigraha) as concerned only, with wealth, and not sexual desires. As a result, they did not consider the Strisambhoga to be a falt if it is done for getting a son.118 This is the reason why one was advised not to have contact with them.114
Observing this slackened conduct, Nigantha Nataputta separated the last into two vow viz Brahmacarya (celibacy) and Aparigraha (non-attachment to the worldly enjoyment), and made it into five. Since then the Jainas are called the followers of five great vows (Pañcamahavratas ).115 It seems, as we have already seen that the Pali Canon was also familiar with Pañcamahivratas.
Pañcasamitis
The Majjhima Nikaya111 describes the kind of language which should be used by a Jaina monk. It is said there that "Nigantha Nataputta sent Abhayarajakumara to the Buddha to ask a question whether he (the Buddha) utters a speech that is disliked by others, or disagreeable to them. If he speaks so, what is the difference between him and a common man." This indicates that according to Nigantha Nataputta no monk should speak harshly.117
Şadivasyakas
Among the Sadausyakas, only the Kayotsarga (kau aggo is referred to in Pali literature In the Majjhima Nikaya118 the Buddha told Mahānāma that while he was staying at Rajagaha, he had seen a number of Niganthas on the Isigili Kalasila standing erect, refraining from sitting, and experiencing acute, painful, sharp and bitter sensations.
This reference indicates the Kayotsarga or Samāyika as prescribed for the Jaina monks. It should be performed without movement of or attachment to the body (sthitaryasinasya sarvāngacalanarahitasya subhadhyānasya vṛttih Kayotsargah,119

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Loca or Kesaluñcada
One should pull out his hair of head and beard in five handfuls with intervals of two, three or four months following a upavasa and Pratikramana. 120 Before the attainment of Buddhahood, Prince siddhartha had himself observed this rule. He says, "I was one who plucked out the hairs of head and beard intent on the practice of doing so (kesama. ssulocako hoti, kesamassulocanānuyogamauuyutto ).121 Acelakatva
Acelakatva (nakedness) with non-attachment to anything is essential to attain salvation.122 According to the Majjhima Nikaya123, the Buddha, tom, followed this rule before attaining Buddhahood. Triguptis
Trigupti is the essence of a monk's creed to which he should thoroughly adhere to destroy karmas.124 The Niganthas, who were engaged in severe penance on Gijjhakūtapabbata at Rājagaha said to the Buddha that according to Nigantha Nātaputta, the past deeds could be destroyed by Preserving the proper control over the mind, body, and speech (yum panelha etarahi kayena sambuta; vacaya samvutā, manasa samvuta tari ayatim papassa kammassa akaranam.........). As its corollary it is said that the kāyadanda, vacidand 1 and manodanda are said to be the causes of sins. 125
Meditation 126 ( dhyana ) and concentration ( samadhi ) are fundamental obligations of a Jaina monk. Meditation is of four kinds, namely Artadhyāna (painful concentration) Raudra dhyina ( wicked concentration ), Dharmadhyana ( righteous concentration) and Sukladhyana (pure concentration ). The first two are the causes of bondage to the karmas, while the last two lead to salvation,127 The severe penance observed by the Niganthas at Rājagaha was to attain the last two dhyānas. for which the self-realization was essential. The regular study, the right conduct, right attitude, and nonattachment, are the factors which pave the way to Dharma

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dhyāna. 129 The Sukladhyūna contributes to the steadiness of the mind which ultimately results in the attainment of ompiscience,
Thus the reference to Jaina ethics as found in Pāli literature are, though meagre and sometimes defective, very important. From our survey of these references, we may conclude that:
(i) Catuvāmasamvara was followed by the Pārsvanatha tradition, and not Nigantha Nataputta tradition, and the Buddha and his followers were not perfectly aware of this difference in the two traditions,
(ii) Nigantha Nitaputta separated the last vow of Catupåmasamvara into two Brahmacarya aud Parigraha, which was known to the Pali Canon,
(jii) The Gunavratas and Stkşüur atas were so popular among both the monks and the lasty that their nature and implications were well known to Buddhist circles.
(iv) Acelakatva and other severe forms of penance were put into practice in Jaina community during that period, and Jainism had already acquired a fame for the severity of its vows and observences.

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CHAPTER IV
JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY 1-Pratyakşa Pramāṇa ( Direct Knowledge ) Logical discussions
Epistemology evolved as a rrsult of logical discussions. Sur h discussions and debates as the sceptics and sophists engaged in, in ancient Greece, were prevalent in Ancient India. They aimed at defending their own theories while refuting those of their opponents
The Sutta Nipata, which is supposed to be one of the earliest parts of the Pali Scripture, states that such debates took place among the Sramanas? and Brahainan is. Sometimes the Titthryas ( including Ajivikas and Nigaạthas ), the so called Vādasilas (habituate in the debate ), have also been associated with these debates. 4
All these debates are named takkı or takkika.. In Pali literature the ten possible ways of claiming knowledge have been criticised by the Buddha in addressing Kalāna.? One of them is called "takka-helu" which has been explained in the Commentary as "takka.gahena" ( addhering to reason ). This takki-hetu appears to be closely realated to prāmana or epistemological or logical ground, which is perhaps used first by Umāsvāmi, a Jaina Acārya of about the Ist century A. D.' The word hetu is also referred to in this sense in the Bhagwati Satra (336) and the Thanangasatra (309-10).
Such discussions were held for the sake of gaining triumph in arguments or to defend religions. The debaters used the vada, jalpa and vitanda forms which are the classifications of kathi or discussion in the Nyāya tradition, Pāli literature also makes similar references to this classification. The Sutta Nipata mentions the vida12, katha18 and vitanda.14 Buddhaghose associates this vitandasattha with the Brāhmanas, while

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the Saddaniti refers to the Titthiyas. It shows the vitanda was utilized at that time by all schools of thought, since the term Titthiya was applied to both the samanas and the Braha
maņas.
The discussion through which knowledge is gained about doctrines is called the Vada; that which is only for gaining victory over the opponents is Jalpa; the debate where the quibbles (chala) analogues (jati) and respondent's failures (nigrahasthana) are utilized to vanquish the opponent is called vitanda in Nyaya system and was used to defend their own views by right or wrong means.15
The Buddhist tradition also could not escape being influenced by this practice. The old logical compenda like the Upayahṛdaya, Tarkasastra, etc. appear to have allowed the use of quibbles analogues etc. for the specific purpose of protecting the Buddhist order, but Dharmakirti, realising that it was not in keeping with the high standards of truth and nonviolence, completely denied their usage in the Vadanyaya. Hence, Dharmakirti refers the qualities of the debater who speaks more or less than necesssary. Therefore he accepts only the two Nigrahasthānas, Asadhanañga and Adoṣodbhāvana forvadi as well as prātivādi.16
The Jainas, on the other hand, lay more stress on truth and non-violence. They think of the Vitanda as Vitandibhasa,17 Akalanka rejects even the Asadhananga and Adośodbhavana in view of the fact that they are themselves the subjects of discussion. He then says: a defendent should himself indicate the real defects in the established theory of a disputant and then set up his own theory.18 Thus he should consider each item from the point of view o' truth and non-violence.
The above fact is supported by Pali literature which contains references to the logical discussions of that period. Some adherents of Jainism had also participated in such discussions. Saccaka, Abhaya and Asibandhakaputta Gāmiņi are the main characters who took an active part in them.

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Saccaka is described in the Nikayas as one who indulged in debate, a learned, controversialist, who was highly esteemed by the common people.19 He is said to have debated with all the six teachers, including even Mahavira (Nigantha Nataputtta ), although Saccaka was a staunch follower of Nigantha Nataputta. This may imply that he was a follower of the Pārsvanatha tradition. But as Nigantha Nataputta became a Tirthankara of Jainism, Saccaka would have examined him through discussions and then accepted his religion, which was nothing but the refarmation of the Parsvanatha tradition. Saccaka boasts about his dialaectical skillin magniloquent language and speaks to the Licchavis at Vaiśāli: "To-day there will be a conversation between me and recluse Gautama.If Gautam takes up his stand against me, even as a powerful man, having taken hold of the fleece of a long fleeced ram, might tug it towards him." Further it has been mentioned there that the Buddha had asked a question which could not be replied by Saccaka. And the result was that he became a follower of the Buddha.20
Another reference is recorded in the Abhayrajakumara Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya21 to the effect that Abhayarājakumāra was sent by Nigantha Nataputta to ask a question from the Buddha about his speech, as to whether the Tatha. gata utters unpleasant words and is unkind to others.
The statement that "Abhaya was sent by Nigantha Nataputta" is not supported by Jaina literature. Whatever its reason, the fact is evident that the Jainas participated actively in discussions and tried to indicate the defects of others religious utterence made about the future of Devadatta. Abhaya then went to inquire as to how far he was correct in his view. He does not appear to have questioned merely with the idea of imputing faults to his opponent's theory. This seems to be the first and most fundamental principle of Jaina conception of logical discussions of that period. The propositional question put by Abhaya Rajakumara to the Buddha is as follows:

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(i) Would the Buddba make statements wbich are displeasing and unpleasant to others ? ( bhäseyya nu kho......Tathāgato tari vācam ya sci vacă paresam appiya amanā pa ).
(ii) If so, how is he different from the ordinary individual who also makes statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others ? (atha kiñcarahi..... puthujjanena nakaranam, puthujjano pi hi tam vācam bhāseyya, yä si vācā paresam appiya umanapa ).
(ii) The Buddha would not make statements which are displeasing and unpleasant to others (na T'athāgato tam vācām bhasati ya si vācii paresuri appiya ):
(iv) Then why has he pronounced about Devadatta that he is doomed to hell .....that he is incorrigible ( atha kiñcarakr......Devadatta byakato : a payiko Derudutto ryūkato ; ā payiko Devadatta atckicu Devadatto ?
Here .1! havad tried to show that the Buddha made a selfcontradictorv statement. Likewise, A stbandhak putta Gāmani22 a follower of Nigantha Nitaputta made the following remarks about the Buddhi as he understood him.
(i) The Buddha in various ways speak, showing compassion to people ( Bhagavii aneha parıyiyena kulānam anuddayam vanneti ).
(11) The Buddha during a famine... ..goes about with a Jarge number of disciples and behaves in a way detrimental to the interest of people ( Bhagavā dubbhikkhe .....mahatā bhikkusanghena saddhim carikan carati, ucchedaya Bhagava kulānam Patipanno ).
The questions asked by Abhaya Rājakumāra and Asibandhakaputta Gāmaņi are based on such type of framed questions : If he qestioned thus and he answers thus, we shall join issue ( vadain ) with him thus."28 They are called "dupadan penham or "abhayatok ofikam pantham" ( dilemmas ) 24 As a matter of fact, these are the conditional questions, which would have been thought out or taught before embarking on a dispute

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The Jaina attitude to these debates and discussions was that they were meant only to investigate the real defects in opponents theories. There were not allowed to gain a victory through evil means, like quibbling, analogues, power and so on. That is why Vitanda is considered Vitandabhasa in Jainism.26 The Buddha himself appreciates the attitude of such Panditas and agrees with them on other matters.26 He called them Vinnu or intelligent persons who are supposed to be hypothetical rational critics. 27 They used to make an impartial and intelligent assessment of the relative worth of conflicting theories, 28 On the basis of the above view the later Jaina philosophers established the definition and means of debates. Akalanka is perhaps the first to point out clearly such definitions. He says that if one is capable of establishing his own view ( paksa ) through right devices, it is Jaya ( victory ) for him and Parāja ya (defeat ) .for the other.29
The Buddhist philosohical literature which developed later, has not mentioned any discussions and refutations of Jaina conception in this connection. This may be due to the fact that both philosophies had similar rules and regulations regarding such dabates, except for a stw differences (especially in the case of Nigrahasthanas ).
Evolution of Epistemology
Epistemology and Logic are mainly concerned with the validity of knowledge and have been subjects of controversy among philosophers from time immemorial.
The Buddha classified such thinkers into three groups in a Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya. It is said there that a Brahmana student went to ask the Buddha "in which category he stands". The Buddha replied "there are some recluses and Brăbamaņas who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight ditthadhammübhitpavosona pāramip patta) into this life. "where does the veperable Gotama stand among them ?" The Bnddha replied "I say that there is a distinction among those who profess their doctrines after finding a final

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and ultimate insight in this life. There are some recluses and Brāhmaṇas who are traditionalists ( anussavika ), who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life, such as the Brāhmaṇas of the three Vedas ( tevijja ). There are also some recluses and Brāhmaṇas who profess their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life on mere faith a lone ( kevalarh saddha mättakena ) such as the reasoners ( takki) and metaphysicians (vimamsı, lit. speculators ). There are some other recluses and Brālimanas who prosess their dogmas after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by assimilating a higher knowledge ( ditthadhammabhinnavosāna paramippatta ) personally (samam Yeva) of a doctrine (dhamam) among doctrines not traditionally heard of before. Now I am one of those who profess the basis of their doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight in this life by gaining a higher knowledge personally of a doctrine among doctrines not traditionally heard of before".o.
This reference seeks to classify the pre-Buddhist and contemporary thinkers into three groups : (i) the Traditionalists ( anussūvika ), who obtained knowledge on the basis of their scripture and interpreted it according to them The Brāhmaṇas or the followers of the Vedas are enumerated in this group. (ii) The Rationalists or Reasoners (takki) who gained knowledge through reasons. Sceptics, and Materialists come under this group, and (iii) Experientialists, who attained highrer knowledge on the basis of personal experience (Samara Yeva ). Jainas, Buddhists, Ajivikas would fall into this category.
Like the Buddha, Nigantha Nataputta is said to have professed his doctrines after finding a final and ultimate insight by gaining a higher knowledge personally, not traditionally heard of before. That is why he emphasised more on knowledge rather than belief (Saddhaya kho Gahapati ñanari yeva panitataram ).31 It is reported that he claimed to have perfect knowledge (sabbañña) and vision ( sabbadassabi ). This insight can be obtained after attaining Right Vision

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i
(Samyagdarsana), Right-Knowledge (Samyagjñāna), and Right Conduct Samyagcaritra).82 Right view in the seven principles (Jiva or soul, Ajiva or matter, Asraud or inflow of karmas, Bandha or bondage of karmas, Samvara or checking of karmas, Nirjara or shedding of karmas, and Moksa, or complete liberation from karmas) is the Samyagdarsana, which is the basis of Right knowledge (Samyagjñana ). Purification of the attitude is regarded as the sine qua non of the purification of knowledge and conduct. While Darsanamoha (delusion of vision) destroys, immediately after Right Vision and Right Knowledge emerge. Then through Right Conduct one can attain the Perfect knowledge, the so-called Kevalajñāna or Sarvajñatva in Jainism.39
Knowledge and Vision ( Jñāna and Darsana)
In Jainism, knowledge and vision or jñana and darsana or omniscience are the result of p.nance ( tapa) and contemplation (dhyana, .33 That is why Nataputta is called Jñanavadin in the Anguttara Nikaya (ahai anantena ñanena anantam lokam janari passam viharami).34
According to Jaina literature, Jñana or cetana ( consciousness) also called Upayoga, is the main characteristic of soul in Jainology.35 This upayoga is of two kinds, viz. sākāra (determinate) and anakara ( indeterminate ). The former is called jina, while the latter is darsana. Sākāra upayoga consists of five classes of knowledge, viz. Matijñāna ( sensitive knowledge), Śrutajñāna (scriptural knowledge), Avadhi jñāna (visual knowledge), Manahparyaya jñāna (mental knowledge) and Kevalajñāna (perfect knowledge). Anakara upayoga is divided into four classes, viz. Cakṣudarsanavaraṇa (non-obscuring), Acaksudarśanavaraṇa ( non-ocular-obscuring), Avadhidarśanavarana (visual-obscuring ), and the Kevaladarsanavara na ( perfect-conation-obscuring ). Consciousness develops into the two forms, knowledge and vision (jñānākāra and Jieynkara).86 We can say that jñana is determinate knowledge (sākāra jñāna ) and darśana is indeterminate knowledge (anākāra jñāna ). This is the distinction between jääna and

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darsana. According to the Praj flapana Sutra also both upayoga and paśyatta can be sakara as well as anakaya.
Icārya Kundakunda mentions the view of his predecessors that vision reveals the self ( ditthi ap papayasayaceva ). Hence, he considers the problem from the empirical as well as the transcendental standpoint37 and concludes that the soul and its knowledge and vision are identical and hence each can reveal the self as well as non-self.
Virasena considers reality as a complex of, universal-cumparticular and says in his commentary called Dhavalā on the satkhaņdāgama of Puspadanta that jñāna comprehends external meaning of the nature of reality, while darsana is the comprehension of the true form of that nature.39 That means. jñana reveals the external reality while darśana intuits its internal characteristics. Siddhasena Divākara defines vision ( darśana ) as an apprehension of sämānya and knowledge
fiana) as an apprehension of visesa jam sāmannaggahanam damsanameyam visesiyanniņa). 40 By this time the defination of darsana had been developed to mean the apprehension of sāmānya of an entity.
It is clear that vision or darsana was originally considered to be the revealer of self (ätma-prūkäsaka ). That is the reason why malipāna, śrutajñāna and the avadhijñānā, which reveal external nature of reality, can be wrong if they are viewed from the wrong angle, whereas cakşudarśana, acakşudarsana and avadhidarsana, which come prior to them, are not so. It Visesa (particular) had been considered as having a meaning of general observation of an entity, the Samsaya { doubt, viparayaya (perversion ), and the anadhyava sāva (indecision) would have existed in its perception made earlier, and darśana would have been divided, like jñāna, into darśana-adarsana etc. This defect would not arise if we define vision as a revealer of self. For, it always exists prior to, as well as at the time of knowledge. 41
This idea was expressed in logical terms by Pujyapada.

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Devanandi in his Sarvārtha Siddhi.42 No endeavours had been made upto that time to consider darkana as a valid standard of knowledge (pramana ). Whether it should be regarded as pramāņa or not was the main problem for the logicians. Abhayadeva Sūri, a commentator on the Sanmari Tarka, expressed his view that Darsana, like Jñana, could be pramāna ( valid j48 while Manikyanandi and Vādideva Sūrj45 considered it as a Pramiņābhisa / falsely valid ). It may be that Nii vokalpaka darsana of Buddhism and not Darsana of Jainism was in their minds when darsana was declared a pramānābhāsa.
Pāli literature makes reference to the fact that Nätaputta possessed "infinite knowledge and vision". The Jaina Agamas46 confirm the ancient view and say jānadi passadi and *Jinamane pāsamāne". This indicates that the activities of both, knowledge and vision in an object can take place together and reveal its knowledge and vision simultaneously.
In the later period, some of the Svetambara Ācāryas tried to explain this original idealogy in a different way. They said that Jñana and darsana were conscious activities, and the two conscious activities could not occur simultaneously. But there is a controversy among them with regard to the case of one who is omniscient (Kevalin). Some stick to the Agamas, while others do not and assert either that a Kevalin's Jñana and darsana are simultaneous or that they are mutually identical and have no separate identity. Siddhasena Divākara and Jinabhadra are the exponents of these views.47
On the other hand, the Digambara Acãryas unanimously hold that the jñ ina and darsana of a kevalin occur simultaneously Kundakunda, a great Digambara Acarya states that jñāna and darśana of a kevalin occur simultaneously even as the light and heat of the sun occur simultaneously.48 Umā. svāmi40 and his follower Pūjyapāda Akalanka51, Vidyānanda 52 ete. also support this view.
Later, for the first time in the Jaina logical tradition it is analysed that knowledge and vision of an entity reveal its

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knowledge and vision simultaneously. A further explanation is given that an entity has two forms, viz. Universal and Particular. The former is the subject of vision and the latter of knowledge. Here knowledge and vision become separate. That is why perhaps Abhayadeva Sūri accepted both as valid.
Another point may he nntid here. The etymology of Pramāņa ( pramiyate gena tatpraminti ) points out that jñāna is the more important cause of right knowledge ( pramuina ) since it is an attribute of soul Sannikarsa ( contact of an organ of senses with its effect ) and sense organs cannot be pramana,53 Akalanka made a great coutribution towards the development of the definition of pramāņa. He maintains non discrepancy ( avisamvadin ) as a test of pramāna which adds one more characteristic, namely, that of ana dhigatartha grāhi ( knowledge which is not cognised ).54 Akalaňka, therefore, recognised only the validity of knowledge wbich is determinative (nimayātmaka), non-discrepancy ( avisamvādin ) and useful in sīruyavahāra ( empirical stand-point ). In this way, the savikal pakajñana (conceptual knowledge ), not the nirvi kalpakajñana (non-conceptual knowledge ), is considered as perception, The concept that nirvikala päka jñana could be regarded as perception is successfully refuted by Sāntaraksit in the Tattva sangraha. Classification of Knowledge
Jainism classifies Knowledge in two wars : (i) Canonical ( Agamika ), and (ii) Philosophical Dārśanika. The five kinds of knowledge such as mati, śruta, avadhi, manahparyaya and kevalajñāna are based on the former, while pratyaksa ( direct knowledge ) and paroksa (indirect knowledge ) are developments of the latter. The Pratya şa is defined as knowledge obtajned by self without the assistance of an external instrument. 58
It is only to the Jainas that "aisa" means "Soul."56 Thus Pratyaksa in Jain Agamika tradition does not mean empirical perception, i.e. Knowledge obtained through sense organs. According to this definition the Avadhijfāna ( visual knowledge ), Nanahparyaya jñāna ( intuition of mental knowledge)

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and Kevaljkāna pure and perfect knowledge ) are comprised Pratyaksa, and Matijfina (sensuous knowledge ) and Srutam jana ( scriptural Knowledge ) in Paroksa.57
The Jaina definition of pratyaksa was quite different from those of other philosophical systems. According to the latter, pratyaksa is aknowledge gained through sense organs. It created a serious difficulty for Jaina philosophers. The rivals began to question their standpoint. Having examined the arguments, the later Jaina philosophers accepted pratyakşa as the knowl. edge produced by the sense-organs also. Jinabhadra and Akal arka designated it as sāni vyavahārika pratyakșa (empirical perception ), while the real pratyaksa of āgamika tradition was called paramārthika pratyaksa (transcendental perception). 56 Indriyapratyaksa and mānasapratyaksa accepted by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiseyikas are included in the first category. Thus matijõūna, which was put under paroksa in the Agamika tradition, came under the category of pratyakşa in philpsophical tradition Likewise smrti, saññā, Cinta and abhnibodha, which were synonymous with mati in the Agamic traditions are synonymous with smarana, pratyabhjñana, tarka, and anumāna in the philosopbical tradition. Therefore paroksa prarana, are five including sruta (agama ). Pratyaksa Pramāņa or ( direct knowledge )
As we have already observed Pratyakşa in Jainism is accepted as self-cognition. Umāsvāmi 60 presented this definition in the Tattvārthashlra. Samantabhadra.61 defined it as knowledge which is of self-revealing charactar. Siddhasena Divākara in his Pramāna Mimänsa added to it one more characteristic, namely, Badhavarjit" ( admitting of no contradiction ).
Akalanka developed the theory further by adding avisanvādi (non-discrepancy) and andhigatartha grāhi (knowledge of object which is not yet cognised ) as characteristics of the validity of knowledge.62 This definition could remove several inner contradictions of the earlier definitions.
There are four sub-divisions of matijnlāna, viz. ava graha

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perception), ika ( speculation ), avaya !
a ( speculation ), avāya (perceptual judgewent ) and dhārana ( retention 185.
They are dependent of their pre-knowlede, but the emerge from sense-organs and acknowledge the modes of a particular object. It is, therefore, considered Samvyāvahārika pratya
k$2.64
Except Cārvaka, all other systems have classified Janyapartyaksa ( generated perception as (i) Laukika ( Empirical ) and (2) Alaukika (transcendental ). The nature of these perceptions is the same as the nature of Sūnavyāvahūrika and Parmūrthika Pratyakṣa of Jainas. Yogipratyakṣa or Yogi-jñāna of the Sankhya-Yogas, 66 Nyāya-vajśeşikas67, and the Buddhistsøe, Atmajñāna of the Mimāmsakas88, are synonymous with Transcendental perception ( Parmarthika or Alaukika Pratyakșa which is the special competence of the soul visiştāima saktr ). According to Sântarakṣita in the Taitvasanigraha, the Jainas70 called this knowledge name Yagi-pratyaksa or Yogaja-pratyakşa.
The philosophers are not agreed on the question whether transcendental perception is determinate (Savi kalpaka ) or indeterminate ( nirvikalpaka ) or both determinate and indeterminate ( ubhaya . The Buddhist tradition?l regards it as being only indeterminate, (Kalpanapodhari), while the Nyāya Vaise ikas and Mimamsakas 72 are of the view that it can be either determinate or indeterminata.
The Jainas, on the other hand, like the Sänkbyas, think that determinate ( savikal paka ) is the only real perceptions. Santarakşıta?4 refuted this idea. He referred to the view of Sumati who considered the Aksaja pratyaksa ( sensory perception ) as Samvyavaharika pratyaksa and Yogi pratyakşa (intuitive perception) as Pärmärthika pratyakşa. He also added that according to the Jainas the determinate perception ( saga ikalpaka pratyaksa ) is the real perception."
Savikalpaka pratyakşa or determinate perception
Knowledge (jñāna ) and vision. ( Darsana ), the two main

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characteristics of the soul which we had already discussed, are also called Dartanopayoga (indeterminate cognition) and Jñanopayoga (determinate cognition ).76 The former is called the Nirvikalpaka while the latter is called Savikalpaka,77
Te Āgamika tradition accepts both Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka as valid due to spiritual considerations. According to the real standpoint in this tradition, a man obtains Right knowledge, is right in his cognition and a man who holds a wrong view (mithyadrşti), is wrong in his cognition, while from a practical standpoint both views are right. Therefore in the Agamika tradition, both Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka are valid from relative stand-points. Acārya Umāsvami divided cognitions Into right and wrong ones. The Avadhidarsana, and Kevaldarsana are indeterminate transcendental perception, while Avadhijñana, Manaḥparyayajñana and Kevalajñana are determinate ( transcedental perception ).78
However, in the logical tradition the validity of pramāņa has been changed. To refute the opponents views, specially those of the Buddhists, the Jaina Acaryas used in their respectivc definitions of pramana some words like nirnaya ( detrmination) or jñana with a view to indicate that darśana or determinate cognition, which stands for cognition of the general (samanya-upayoga) falls outside the purview of these definitions.79
It may be noted here that the Buddhist philosophy accepts only the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa or indeterminate perception as valid knowledge. As regards the definition of perception there are two Buddhist traditions, one is headed by Dinnaga who does not accept non-illusory (abhranta) nature of perception, and the otber headed by Dharmakirti who does so. Śantrakṣita and bis followers support the latter stating that Sense-perception is free from conceptual contents and hence not erroneous.80 We see a thing first; th n realise its name. Thus the determinate knowledge (savikalpaka jñāna ) dep-ends on indeterminate knowledge (mirvikalpaka Jñāna)

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and, therefore, only indeterminate knowledge is perception.** In connection with establishing his own view Santarakşita refuted the view of Acarya Sumati. According to Sumati, both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka pratyakṣa should be recognised as valid as the first reflects the general form of a thing or, in other words, its existence as an indefinite thing, while the second (savikalpaka) reflects the special characteristic of an entity thus perceived.82
This theory appears to be in conformity with the Jaina. Agamika tradition, but not with the Logical point of view. Abhayadeva, the commentator of the Sanmatitarka also took up the same position. As we have already seen, the process of general perception commencing from avagraha (mere apprehension) and ending with Dharana (retention ) passes from the indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) state of knowledge to determinate (savikalpaka ).84
Kamalasila has explained the view of Sumati that a thing is amenable to non-conceptual perception in the form of mere observation, or purely sub jective ideation.85 But the Jaina philosophy does not accept it. Jainism asserts that a thing is perceived by Darsan or cognition, not by Alocana or observation,86 The visesavasyakabhasya criticises the view, viz "kei dihaloyana pubbaamoggaham venti" which means a thing can be apprehended by a purely subjective ideation In his commentatery Hemacandra Maladharide va referred to a karika by Kumārila "asti alocanā jñānam prathamam nirvikalpakaṁ "It is possible that the commentator thought this view was that of Kumarila and it is also probable that Kamalsila misunderstood the view of Sumati.
Kumarila, a Mimamsaka philosopher, asserted two kinds of sense-perception. According to him, non-conceptual perception is purely subjective ideation as apprehending the "specific individuality of the particular ( alocana janam nirvikalpakam vyaktisvalakṣaṇari), and the conceptual perception (savikalpaka pratyaksa) is the apprehension of the universal (samanyavişayam tu savikalpakam ).87

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Acarya Sumati does not agree with this definition. He questions: is the thing before the eyes of the observer apprehended purely by itself, as characterised by its own form which is impossible anywhere else? or is it not so apprehended? If Kumarila answers: there is non-apprehension of the thing in a form distinguished from other things, then Sumati states that in this position either there would be apprehension of the thing itself only, or there would be no perception of the thing at all. He illustrated his theory by reference to the perception of a Jar. The Jar should be either apprehended without having the form of others or it should not be apprehended. There could be no escape from these alternatives69.
Kumārila's view is based on the definition of perception given in the Jaimin yasatra90 It is refuted by all nonMmāmsaka philosophers, Vedic 91 as well as Buddhist and Sumati appears to be the first Jaina Acarya to join them in refuting this view.
Having criticised the view of Kumarila, Sumati proceeds to criticise the view of Buddhist Acryas, especially, that of Santarakṣita. As we have seen, Santarkṣita, a follower of Dharmakirti, defines perception as knowledge free from conceptual contents and not erroneous 93 He tries to prove his theory by means of inference and establishes that the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (indeterminate perception) is the only real perception. Santarakṣita further clarifies his own view by citing examples. He says: in case a thing has no particular form, it cannot be accepted as a particular thing. For instance, the white house owing to different charactristics cannot be mistaken for a cow. It is the same case with the perception. 94
Here in this definition the kalpana is the main figure which has been defined in various ways by Buddhist Philosophers. Šantarakşita defined it as visistaviṣayāvabodhaḥ (knowledge of qualified object). Sumati is said to be against this view. He

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argues that a thing cannot be qualified without having a connection-with the qualifications, as in the case of a stick (danda ) and the stick-holder ( daņdin ). Hence the cognition which apprehends the qualifications ( višeşata ) is conceptual (savikalpaka ).95 He again draws our attention to this defect of self-contradiction in this theory pointing out that if there is always the apprehension of the things as distinguished from homogeneous ( sajūtiya ) and heterogeneous ( vijatiya things, then the apprehension would becom determinate ( savikalpaka for it can be conveyed “this is different". Otherwise low does it apprehend the difference between things. 96
Sumati pointed out another defect in the Buddhist theory. He asserts that there is no particular ( vises a ) without a touch of the universal (Samanya ). It cannot be argued in his opinion that the universal or "being” is not touched at all by the sense-perception at the time of apprehension, because in this position the particular would be devoid of existence and thus it could become characterless; and as such could not be apprehended by sense-perception, because it would be devoid of being' and become like the sky-flower (ākajakusuma)."7 Thus Sumati is of the view that the particular is perceived with the character of the universal.
All Jaina logicians have tried to refute the Buddhist theory of sense perception following in the footsteps of Sumati. Akalanka is the mun figure to raise the question in this respect. Adding the adjectives anadhigatarthagrahin, arisanvadin, and visada to the existing definition of perception98 he established that the Nirrikalpaka pratykșa gets transormed into the savikalpaka is the pramana.99 Later on most of the Jaina logicians such as Acārya prabhācandra, 100 Anantavirya, 101 Vädıräja, Vidyānanda, 102 imitated him and elaborated his ideas to refute the opponent's views. 102 Refutation of the Jaina conception of savikalpaka
Pratyaksa by Sāntrakṣita The Jaina conception of Savikalpaka Pratyakya has been

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refuted by the Buddhist philosophers. Santa rakṣita, even having defined perception as lucid knowledge without reflection ( kalpana ) criticised the view of Sumati on the ground that an entity does not have any particular qualities by which it can be differentiated at the moment of apprehension. He thus sought to assert that there is no particular thing at all. But the particular characteristic of a thing is implicit in his classification of the universal (Sämānya) into two. types, viz. (i) distinguished by qualifications, and (ii) not distinguished by qualifications. The first is Nirvikalpaka, and next is Savikalpaka pratykşa (conceptual-preception). The former is the real pratyaksa while the latter is practical.
On this basis, Santaraksita presents two arguments to refute Sumati's theory. The first is that an entity does not possess any characters by which it can be differentiated. We see a thing first and then realise it as a pot or any particular thing. When the thing is apprehended, the nagation of all other things comes forth naturally. Hence, the non-conceptual perception ( nirvikalpaka pratyaksa ) in the specific form of colour, shape, etc. appears and then there follows the conceptual content ( vikalpatmaka jñana ) associated with the words it is different.103
Here the words do not lead to cognition. The reason behind this is that the specific individuality (svalaksanavastutva ) itself is independent of the words. The perception generated by them also should be deprived of the words. The words do not have any relation with the meaning. In the absence of words a thing exists, and in the absence of a thing we use the words, which are dependent on gestures. and intentions. There is, therefore, no possibility of words in the Nirvikalpaka pratyaksa. The second argument which Sāntarakşita puts forth is that in particular thing there should be no other characteristics except that of the "Particular' 104
Thus, whatever cognition appears with regard to the "specific individnality" of things it beyond the range of

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words and is bence non-conceptual perception. In his opinion, tbe lucidity and determination in the savikalpaka pratyksi is not its own characteristic. but it really comes from nirvikaIpaka pratpakşa, After a moment of rrvikalpaka pratykşa, the sarikalpaka protya kşa is generated and the ascertainment and lucidity of a thing which comes from nirvikalpala pralaksa appears to be of savikalpaka pratyakşa. In this manner savikaIpaka pratyaksa also determinates a thing and is called perception from a practical viewpoint ( vyavaliāra ), but the real perception is only the non-conceptual ( pirvikalpaka ) perception.
In the above criticism Sintarak sita's main arguments are that the nirvikalpaka pratyuksa is the real pratyaksa and a thing caonot be both universul and particular. Both these arguments are met by the late's Jaina Acāryas. They say that the nirvikalpaka jñana of the Buddhists is the formless perception which is not capablc of determinating the nature of a thing. Therofore, it is determinate (Sakara) and lucid (visada ), and could be accepted as a pramina.
It appears that to refute the validity of the Veda, the Buddhist philosophers denied the real relation between the words and their meanings. All sorts of knowledge generated in connection with words which are not supported by the nirvikaIpaka, are declared to be invalid. As a matter of fact Buddhism also acccepts Savikalpaka Pratyakşa. In the Vibhanga.105 Knowledge jñāna ) is divided into two types Cognitative (Savitakka ) and Non-cognitative (Avitakka ). Both these types are similar to Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Pratykst
The object of perception
We have mentioned earlier that the pratyk$a is of two kinds, viz. Sāmvyāvaharika ( knowledge obtained through the senses and mind ) and Parmirthika pratvakşa ( knowledge ob. tained by the soul itself, without the help of the senses and the mind ). The object of perception is related to both types of perception.

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The validity of Pramana in Jain philosophy is based on the nature of things, It asserts that a reality is a multitude of atoms and possesses a characteristic of being substance-cummode (dravyaparyāyalmakaṁ ). The permanence-in-change is its common nature, Out of six substances the jiva, dharma, adharma, akasa, and Kala are said to be perceived only by the omniscient who has the parmarthik pratyaksa while the mundane souls perceive the objects of inference, not of sense-generated perception. The rest pudgala dravya is a subject to be perceived by mundane souls through sense-generated perception (indriyajanya pratyakṣa ).
Jainism is absolutely realistic in nature. Each atom or reality, in its conception is quite indestructible and independent and always changes into different modes. This system is both natural and eternal. The whole universe continues in this way. There is no need to postulate a creator-god to explain the origin and evolution of the universe.
In connection with the examination of the external world, Santarakṣita refers to the view of Sumati, He says the atoms have two qualities, General (Samanya) and Particular (Viseṣa.) The objects perceived by sense-organs possess the general character. These objects are conglomerations of atoms which appear as an entity with a shape and size. The true quality of atoms is known only by the emancipated one who attained the pāramārthika Pratyakşa or Yogipratyaksa.106
This conception is made more clear in the Syadvadamañjari. It is said that atoms which are co-related generate paryayas. They have infinite and continuous changes which depend on the types of contact or relation with others. For instance, when the atoms of the soil come into contact with each other, they become compact and with their becoming compact produce a pot This process does not come about due to external pressure but is the result of an internal connection with each other. Therefore Jaina philosophy does not assert the extra avayavidravyas.

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As regards the existence of atoms, we have .both, Pratyak$a and Anumana. We see the atoms in the form of a pot ( ghata ). The atoms, that cannot be perceived by ordinary men due to their minuteness, are perceived by the Yogins. By inference also the Jainas try to prove the existence of atoms. The body itself is a mass of atoms wherein they get combined by such forces as time and cause the gross body 107.
This conception of object of perception has been a subject of criticism, especially with the Buddhist logicians. The Vijñānavāda, an extreme form of idealists which is propounded by the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools, asserts that there is no causal (yada kararo jñanm ) world of external ( reality. In its opinion reality is only the Vijñana (idea ).
Thus the Vijñanavā da denies the external world by denying the atoms. It says that the heap of atoms or a single body cannot be said to be in the external world. Both the Pratyaksa and Anumana are unable to prove their existence because ordinary mortals have never seen atoms even in a dream. As regards the Pratyaksa of Yogi, it demands great faith. The Anumāna also is not helpful in this respect; Because for want of pratyaksa of atoms now can we get at the hetu (reason) and the sadhya (to be proved). Nor does the external world consist of bodies. When the atom itself could not be proved, how can we hope to prove a body which consists of many atoms. It is thus nothing but only a superstition caused by a hypothesis of väsana due to avidya or ignorance.208
Acārya Santaraksita also denies the existence of atoms. He refutes the view of Sumati stating that one object cannot have two qualities. Otherwise the object also will be considered as two. Another argument is raised that if the two qualities are not defferent from each other, why do you say that the special quality of the atoms is perceived by the emancipated only ?109 By denying the existence of two qualities in one object, Säntaraksita tries to refute the view of Sumati.

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The above criticism is based on the Vijnanavada, which asserts that there is no existence of the external world. We see it only on account of the hypothesis of vasana. This criticism is answered by Jaina philosophers in latter works. Hemachandra tries to reply that the existence of the world cannot be refused, since knowledge is the action (kriya) in which the object is supposed to be directed. Without the external object there can be no perception. Therefore, Jainism admits the existence of both, the atoms and the body avayavi ).
As regards the criticism that the atorns of the body would be conflicting with one another, Jaina philosophy admits this fact, but it tries to solve this problem through Anekantavāda. As Hemachandra says, 'criticism' of atoms, therefore, cannot affect those who believe in Syādvāda, 110 according to which a body is one and yet manifold. Paramarthika Pratyaka ( Trancsendental Perception )
The Paramarthika Pratyakna is the outcome of the destruction of Jñanavaranakorma ( knowledge obscuring karma ). It springs forth from the purified soul itself without the assistance of sense-organs or any other external internal instruments. That is the reason why it is called the perfect lucid perception ( visada pratyaksa ). It is of two kinds : Sakala pratyaksa ( complete direct knowledge ), and Vikala pratyaksa (incomplete direct knowledge ) Kevalajñana (perfect knowledge or omniscience ) comes under tbe former, and the Avadhijñalla ( visual knowledge ), Manah paryāyajñana ( mental knowledge ) under the latter.
Avadhi ñana, as its name indicates, is limited by dravya ( substance ), Kşetra (place) Kūla ( time) and bhāva (emotion). It is of three kinds--dešavadhi ( partial visual knowledge ). paramävadhi (high visual knowledge ), and sarvavadhi ( full visual knowledge ). Viewed from another aspect it is divided into Bhavapratyaya ( birth-born visual knowledge ) and gurepratyaya (acquired by merit). The former is possessed by those in heaven and hell by birth,111 while the latter can be
10

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secured by human beings as well as five-sensed sub-human beings after destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant kärmic veil (Kṣayopasama-nimitta ).112 Only the forms having shapes (rupin) can be known by avadhijñana.118 The formless, such as soul (jiva, dharma ( principle of motion), adharma (principle of rest). kasa (space), and Kala (time) are not within its scope of perception. It can penetrate infinite. number of cycles, both past and furure.
Manahparyya jana reveals the thoughts of human beings. It is of two kinds, viz. rjumati ( simple direct or mental knowledge) and vipulamati ( complex direct or mental knowledge). Umäsvāmi distinguishes them on the ground that the latter is purer and everlasting, while the former has less purity and infallibility.11 Pujyapada,115 and Akalanka116 support his view. But Jinabhadra is of somewhat different view viz. that manaḥparyaya jñāna knows the states of mind directly by intuition, but the external objects thought of by the mind can only be inferred.117 Later Acaryas followed both these views.
Umasvami makes a distinction between avadhi and manahparyaya. He says that (i) the former is less pure than the latter, (ii) the former can extend to the whole universe, while the latter is limited to the centre of the middle world. (iii) The first can be secured by all beings possessed of mind; while the other only by saints having supernatural powers, and (iv) the subject matter of the first is gross, while that of the latter is very subtle. Rut Siddhasena Divakara does not recognise any distinction between avadhi and manah paryaya, since "subhuman organisms possessed of two or more sense-organs are also found to strive by means of attraction and repulsion, and thus are possessed of minds and as such it will be proper to extend the scope of manahparyaya to the minds or the objects of the minds of them as well, or otherwise it will be improper to postulate manaḥparyaya as a separate category of knowledge.118 It can however, be considered a specific type of Avadhijñāna.

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Kevalajauna is perfect knowledge of all substance and their modifications. It is generated after complete destruction of the veil of the Mohaniya karma ( delusing) which is the most powerful in the Karmic matter. Hence the soul comes to perceive all things past, present and future. When a person achieves perfect knowledge, he is called Omniscient.
According to Jainism, no one can be a teacher (Tirthankara) without being omniscient. This perfect knowledge can be obtained by the purified soul which has consiousness cetana or upayoga) as its sole characteristic.119 The term Upayoga is used to denote the darśana and jñana which are the main features of the soul. Darsana is perception and jñāna is knowledge.120 Soul, its knowledge, and its intution all these are identical and hence each can reveal the self as well as nonself.121 Akalanka is of the view that when the soul cognises the object, it is called Jñana; and when the soul perceives itself, it is called Darsana,122
It is apparent now that at the destruction of Jaunavaraṇa, Darsanavarana; Mohaniya, and Antaraya, the soul obtains inner illumination and becomes omniscient.
According to Jaina philosophy, each and every entity is somehow related to all other entities in the universe. Such relations are called modes or paryayas of the entity. If one knows an entity completely, these modes will also be known completely. That is why it is said that one who knows one, knows all, and one who knows all, knows one. In the Pravacanasara, Kunda-Kunda says: One who does not know simultaneously the realities of past, present and future, and the three worlds, cannot know even a single object with its infinite modifications, if one does not know all objects, how will he be able to know one? For instance, if one is inclined to have a knowledge of ghata, he should have knowledge of its intrinsic nature as well as ghata itself, since knowledge reveals all the objects. As the soul has infinite capacity to know all the objects, when one attains such power, he has to know all the ob. jects.124 severe penance with Right vision, Right knowledge,

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and Right conduct is required to attain such purified stage of soul.
The early Pali Canon as well as the latter Buddhist philosophical literature criticised the view of Jainas that their Tirthankaras were omniscient. In the Majjhima Nikāya the Buddha. says to Sandka Paribrājaka that "Some teacher, all-knowing (sabbaññī), all seeing (sabbadassādi) claims all-ernbracing knowlledge and vision ( aparisesarn ñanadassanan ), Saying whether I am walking or standing still or sleep or awake, knowledge and vision are constanly and perpetually ( satatam samitam before me" Further the Buddha says, "he enters an empty place, and he does not receive alms and a dog bites him, and he encounters a fierce elephant, and he encounters a fierce horse, and he encounters a fierce bullock, and he asks a woman and man their name and clan, and he asks the name of a village or market town and the way'. So if any one asks him why he need question in this manner if he is omniscient, then he replies this : "I had to enter an empty place, therefore I entered 225''
At another place the Buddha says to Mahānāma that he had seen the Niganthas performing severe penance at Rājagaha on the Isigili kālasılā. He then asked them "why do you people do so ? They replied that the Nigantha Nataputta was onniscient and he had said that by severe penance all past deeds would be destroyed and the new deeds would be prevented. In this way, they would attain salvation. Then the Buddha asked them "Do all of you know the past and the future of yourselves and your deeds. He went on to say "You do not know whether you did an evil deed like this or that You do not know the getting rid of unskilled states of mind, the uprising of skilled states." Getting the reply "no" from them the Buddha remarked "these beings, revered Nigaộthas, do those who are born again among men in the world, and are wrathful ( luddha), blood handed ( lohilapanino ), dealing in cruelty ( kururakammanta ) do these go forth among the Naganthas.''126 Likewise Udāyi Paribrājaka says to Gotama

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*'the all-knowing omniscient (Nigantha Nataputta ), on being asked a question by me concering the past, shelved the question by asking another, answered off the point and evinced temper and ill-will and sulkiness, ( purimani, bhante, divasäni purimatarani, sablariu sabbadassavi......so maya pubban. tam arabbha panhan puttho samano aññenaniam paficari, bahir. ddhū katham apanamesi, kopari ca dosari ca appaccayam ca pātvakasi ).127
The Dhammapada Atthakutha presents a very interesting story regarding the dialogues that took place between Sirigutta and Garaladinna, the followers of the Buddha and the Nigantha Nātaputta respectively. Garahadinna, a follower of the Nigantha Nātaputta said to Sirigutta that the Niganthas are omniscient; they know the past, present and future. Afterwards, Sirigutta, a follower of the Buddha decided to try the boastful claim of the naked ascetics ( Niganthas). He got a ditch dug between two houses and liad it covered. Niganthas were then invited to alms. When the Niganthas came, they fell into the pit and their bodies were covered with mud and filth. Then it is said that he had beaten them with sticks and brought humiliation upon them. After a similar trial lie proved that Buddhist monks were omniscient 126 It may be noted here that all the Nigaņthas are not said to be omniscient, but only a very few who could attain the perfect knowledge after performing the required duties. This story, however, refers to the Jaina tradition that its Tīrthaņkaras and some prominent monks were omniscient. 129
Likewise, later Buddhist philosophical literature also referred critically to the Jaina conception of omniscience or Kevalajñāng. Dharmakirti, in the course of establishing the “Dharmajñatva" in the Buddha, points out the superfluity of Jaina view of omniscience and says that the anusthanagalajñana ( a knowledge that has a bearing on life or practice ) is more important, than having a knowledge of the number of bacteria (kitasankhya ), which is of no use at all for hu

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man beings. The real tattvadrastā (knower of scripture in the opinion of Dharmakirti is one who knows what is to be abandoned and what is to be accepted and not everything. It is immaterial whether one knows everything or not, but what matters is whether he knows the essentaial thing, that is. what he ought to know. If the mere range of knowledge was valuable in itselt, without its bearing on life, why not worship vultures who soar in to the atmosphere and thereby get a long range of sight.130 Thus he asserts the view that a absolute purity in life and not unlimited knowledge is the essential characteristic of a Teacher.
Prajñākaragupta, the commentater of Dharmakirti also supports Dharmakirti's view, but he goes one step further and establishes the omniscience of the Buddha. He also says that it can be attained by any spiritual aspirant, who masters the art of subduing passions.131
Thus it is only for the sake of argument that this conception of omniscience had been recorded in the Pali Canon as well as in later Buddhist philosophical literature, since no Jain vieu regarding this problem is correctly and completely mentirned. It was therefore not possible to give an accurate picture of the Jaina theory of omniscience. This much, however, we can say that the conception of omniscience in Jaina Tirtharkaras is not a new one. It might belong to Pissvanātha or the period prior to that tradition, since the Niganthas, whom the Buddha saw performing severe penance on Risigiri Kālasilā at Rājagaha would be the followers of Pārs. vanātha or an earlier tradition.
The whole Jaina literature seeks to establish the fact that Jaina Tirthankaras are omniscient, while denying the omniscience of any other. The Bhagavatı Setra (9.32 ) says that the Nirgranthas who belonged to the Parsvanātha tradition did not accept the Nigantha Näta putta as a porphet or head of a Jaina sect unless it was proved that he was all-knowing and all-seeing 192

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Later cāryas such as Kundakunda, Samantabhadra, Akalanka, Vidyānanda try to establish omniscience on the basis of inference. We have already mentioned Kundakunda argument in this connection. Then Samantabhadra says that there are three kinds of entities, viz. the subtle ( sahşma ), proximate ( antarita ), and remote (dpravarti ). They must be perceived simulataneously by somebody, since all objects are to be perceived. Hence there must be some one omniscient. 184
Virasena presents another argument in support of omniscience. He says that Kevalajñāna ( omniscience ) is innate in the soul. Due to destruction-cum-subsidence of karmas, it functions as matijnana. The self-cognised mati implies the fractional kevala jijāna, just as the observation of a part of a mountain leads us to the perception of the mountain itself. 135
The Jaina philosophers did not emphasise Dharma jflatva like Dharmrakirti or early Buddhist tradition, but they endeavoured to point out that a person is omniscient when he is both Dharmajñia as well as Sarvajña, because Dharma jñātva depends on sarvajñatva.
Akalanka presents another argument which is also referred to by Dharmottara, a Buddhist philosopher in the Dharmotlara-pradipa. 196 His argument is that if we deny supersensorial knowledge, how can astrological divinations be made ? Hence, it must be accepted that there is a faculty of super-sensorial knowledge which is nothing but Kevalajñana or omniscience. 137
After the destruction of the evil of kaimic bondage one can attain the inherent capacity of his own soul, and perceive all things. 138 The very progressive gradation of knowledge implies the highest magnitude of knowledge attained by man. If one has no capacity to know or perceie all things at once he will not be able to do so even by mcans of the Veda, 139 Hence we have to accept that one can become omnisceint. Impossibility of omniscience cannot be established unless one has knowledge of persons of all times. Consequently, one who rejects omniscience for all times must himself be omui

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scient. 140 Presenting the positive arguments in this way, Akalanka relies on the negative arguments that there is no contradictory pramuna141 to reject the established omniscience and therefore it is certain. He then substantiates this argument by examining the various so-called contradictory pramāņas.143
Dharmakirti and his commentator, Prajñākargupta, think that the Jaina conception of omniscience cannot be accepted for want of Sadhaka-badhakapramana145 (assisting and contradicting evidence). Akalańka replies this criticism by saying that one cannot establish the non-existence of omniscience without being omniscient. He further says that there is no badhaka pramana to refute omniscience in Jainism, and the absence of badhaka pramina is itself a sidhaka pramāņa. 145
As regards Anuṣṭhanagatajñāna urged by Dharmakirti, Vadirāja, a commentator of Akalanka, questions "By which pramāņas does the Buddha perceive the Anustheyagatavastu? Neither can Pratyakṣa Prāmāṇa be helpful in this respect, otherwise what will be the use of Anusthina? Nor will the Anumuna (inference) pramana will solve our problem, because it depends on the pratyakṣa. Thus the Anusṭheyagata Jina in itself has no importance. 143
So far as Kitasankhya-parijñana and its puruşartho payoga are concerned, he says that it is essential to include Kitasankhya-parijñana as an integral part of omniscience, as caturaryasatya implies the Duhkhasatya of creatures living around. If the Buddha has not grasped the Caturaryavedanatva, how could he preach to his disciples convincingly? He then remarks that if the Kitasankhya-parijiana serves no useful purpose, what then is the use of Bhiksu-sankhya-parijñana in Buddhism.148 ?
Thus the Jainas established the theory of omniscience, whereas the Buddhist refuted it in Nigantha Nataputta. According to Jainism its adherents could aspire to be omniscient. But it was only Nigantha Nataputta who attained this

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spiritual height at that time. However, the masses considered all Niganțbas to be omniscient, because some of them gained various powers of insight. The Buddha, apparently under the impression tbat this was the actual claim of Jainism, criticised it. The later Buddhist philosophers also followed him. Latern, on the imitation of Jainism, the Buddha is also made an omniscient in Buddhist Literature.147
2. Paroksa Pramāṇa ( Indirect Knowledge )
Non-distinct ( avisada ) knowledge is faroksa, and it unlike pratg akşa, dependent on others. It is of five kinds, namely, smarana, pratyabhijñana, tarka, alumiina and agama. Out of these pramānas in Jaina logic, only the anumāua pramāna has been discussed in Buddhist philosophical literature. Yet it is helpful to get a brief picture of other pramāṇas also, since the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophers vary in their attitudes to other pramāṇas on account of the different stand-points they had adopted. Smrti pramāna
Smrti is the remembrance of a thing perceived or known before and it is a source of knowledge of a particular thing in association with earlier experiences. Therefore, it is regarded on Pramana by Jaina logicians. But the Vedic philosophers are not ready to accept it as an independent pramāņa on the ground that it depends on the vaildity of earlier experience (grahitagrahitva ).148 The Buddhists joined hands with the Vedic philosophers like Kumārila. 149 and rejected the validity of smrti.150 Their main argument, like that of the Mimānsakas or the Vaiseşikas, is that the validity of smrti is conditioned by previous experience and it is wholly dependent on experience.181 As a matter of fact, the question of memory being treated as a pramāņa does not arise in a system like Buddhism where all knowledge-involving-thought (vikal pa jnanamātra ) is considered no pramāna.162
On the other hand the Jaina logicians unanimously accept the validity of smrti pramäņa. Their main argument is that

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the Sad skäras recall for any particular purpose the things experienced in the past. The memory of such things is a source of knowledge gainend through senses. Therefore smrti is declared to be a Pramana, since it is tiue of facts samvadın just as perception. The validity of pramāna cannot be ascertained merely by relation to its depedence or independence of experience. If this argument is accepted even pramäua will cease to be a pramana, for inference also depends on knowledge already acquired through direct emprical perception.135
While examining smrti pramina, we may also discuss Dhinat ühika pramāna ( continuous cognition ). The Dhārāvā. hikaji ina is accepted as a pramāņa by the Nyāya-Vaiseşikas154 and the Mimārnsakas.155 In Buddhist tradition only Aracata accepts it.156 He says that only the Yogin's dhārāvähika Iñina is pramāņa, because it involves awareness of Saksmakalakala ( minute divisions of time ), while ordinary man's continuous cognition is not a pranāna, because it does not involve such awareness.
The Jain logicians have two traditions regarding dhārāva. hika Pramana. According to the Digambara tradition, 157 it is valid provided it produces a visista pramāņa. a knowledge of special objects ), while the Svetambara tradition accepts the dhirugihika ñina as a praināņa without any conditions 158 Pratyabhisana
Pratyabhijñana (recognition ) is the result of perception and recollection. Its nature is of tadevedam (that is definitely this ), tatsadrasan ( it is similar ), tadvilak sanın (it is some. what dissimilar ), and tatpratiyogi ( it is different from that ), which are avisamvadir ( non-discrepant ) and therefore are pramāņas themselves. 159
Kumārıla160 as well as Jayanta 181 includes pratyabhijfāna in pratyaksa. But the Buddhists do not accept it as a separate pramīņa. In support of their theory, they advocate the idea that pratyabhijñina is nothing, but only a combination or recollection or remembrance and perception. Further they urge that a thing is momentary ( ksanika) if it dismisses the

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permanence of entities that are corelatəd with
pratyabhi
jRana, 182
The Jainas, on the other hand, uphold the view that because the pratyabhijñüna presupposes an entity in its antecedent and subsequent model condition, it should be recognised as a separate pramāņa, like smrti. 169 Tarka pramāna
Tarka or inductive reasoning is an essential feature to have the concomitance of an entity 164 which is the instrument of inference, Pratyak a, smarana and pratyabhijñāna are associative reasons to originate tarka. It decides the inseparable connection ( avinabhava sambandha ) among the objects known through inference and agama. Akalanka is the first to fix the definition and subject of tarka in Jaina philosophy,
Mimārskas do not accept Tarka as a separate pramāņa. The word Uha used by them 165 in the sense of reasoning is synonymous with the Tha of matijñāna of Jainas 160 The Buddhist, also deny its validity on the ground that tarka can oniy help one to know further an object which is already known through perception.167
Akalanka recognised tarka as a pramāņa, since concomitance cannot be known without tarka.168 If we do not accept the validity of tarka, we will not be able to accept either, as they both ( inference and tarka ) depend on the same basis for their validity as pramānas. 169 Agama Pramāna :
The words of an Apta are called agama. Apta means a person of superior intellect and character, who is non-discrepant ( avisarnvädin ) in his respective subjects. 170 The Jainas believe that their prophets were Aptas and therefore they accepted agamas as an independent pramāņa. The Jainas did not restrict the definition of Apta to the field of spiritual experiences and attainments. An Apta may, according to Jaina logicians, be any authority on the subject even if it is only a secular subject.

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The Vaiseşikas and the Buddists include ägama in infe Tence. But as a matter of fact, it should not be considered as a part of anumana, since, unlike anumāna, it arises without 'having perceived signs and their concomitance. It may be noted here that the Jainas as well as the Buddhists rejected the claim of the Vedic philosophers that the Vedas are apauriseya (not of human authorship but of devine origin ) 171
Thus smrti, pralyabhajnana, tarka, anumana and agama are accepted as separate pramāras in Jaina philosophy and included into paroksa pramāna. That means, according to Jainas, there are two pramīņas, viz. pratyaksa and paroksa, while the Buddhists assert the reality of pra- tyaksa and anumāna. 172
Anumāna Pramāna
Anumana means a cognition which takes place after some other cognition, specially perception (anu vyaplir nirnayasya pascadbhavi manani ).178 The Vedic thinkers may have been the first to attempt a definition of anumāna and their definition influenced both the Jainas and the Buddhists, although there was no unanimity among them as regard the exact nature of this pramāna.
Diināga ( 5th A.D.) a great Buddhist philosopher, is among the earliest to oppose the Vedic tradition. He offered a new definition which was latter adopted by his disciples. This Buddhist definition influenced the Jaina logicians like Siddhasenadivākara 5th .1. D.), Akalaika ( 8th A.D.), and Vidyānanda ( 9th A. D.)
In the Jaina tradition Acārya Akalaika presents a comprehensive definition of anumina as follows:
Cognition of Sathya ( what is to be proved) or major term produced by the Sadhana (the instruments to prove the sadhya) is called Amumuna which follows linga-gralana (apprehension of the predicate of proposition) and vyapti-smārana (remembrance of invariable concomitance). He emphasises that because it is avisamvadin (non-discrepant) in its own subject and remo

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ves the defects arising due to doubt ( sari saya ), perversion (vi paryaya and indecision (anadhyava saya ), it should be recognised as a pramana.174
Vyapti ( invariable concomitance ) is the main feature of apumāna. Avinabhava anyathauu papanıratua, vi pakşavyavịtti, and niyata sahacarya are well-known charctetistics, of vyapti. Sahabhavaniyama ( having co-relation) and kramabhava-näyma ( having successive relation ) are the main factors of Vyāpti,175 Sahabhāva-niyama is understood as a character of the probandam (vyāpākadharma) like rūpa (form) and rasa. ( taste ) and kramabhāva-niyama is understood as a character of the probandam ( vyāpakadharma ). This definition indicates that anumāna is not restricated only to the tādaimya ( identical nature ) and tādutpattı (fdentical cause of origination ) but it can also be applied to those things which do not possess of the tadātmya and tadutpatti relation, For instance, we can make an inference about the taste of something looking at its form, which has no tādātmya relation. Likewise, the rise of Saketa can be inferred by looking at the rise of krttikā. 176
Sūdhya and sidhana are also two of the other main features of anumāna. A thing which is to be perceived is called sādhya and a thing which is related positively with Sadhya, is called sādhana 177
Anumāna is of two kinds, viz. Svīrthinumāna (inference by one's own self ) and Parūrthūnumina (inference by others). The former is valid knowledge which arises in one's own mind from determinate sādhana, while the latter is a result of reasons standing in relation to invariable concomitance (vyāptí) with sädhya.
The organs or Svūrthinumāna are said to be three in purber, viz. dharma, sādhya, and sādhana. Paksa ( minor term) and hetu middle term are also prescribed as its organs. Here, sādhya and sadhana are included in pakşa. The remaining one is dharmi which is to be proved by pramānas (prasiddha). 178

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As regards the types of Hetu, the Vaiseșika seira (.9.2.1) refers to fives kinds such as kārya, kürana, sainyogi, samavui and virodhi. The Buddhists accept only three hetus, viz. svabhīva, kūrya, and anuplabdhi. The Jainas, on the basis of definition of avinžibhava, recognise svabhūva, vyi paka, kūrya, karana, purvacara, urtaracara and Sahacara. Upalabdhirupa and anupalabdhirūpa are also said to be the types of betu.
Regarding the organs of pärarthūnumūna, there is no unanimity among the philosophers. The Naiyāayikas have laid down five organs, viz. pratoña (proposition ), hetu (reason) udīharana ( Example ), upannya ( application) and nigamana (conculusion ),170 The propositions, according to them, would be as follows:
(1) There is a fire on the inountain (pratrjñi ). (ii) Since there is smoke (hetu ), (iii) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire ( wdūhayana ). (iv) There is smoke on the mountain (upanaya ), and (v) Therefore there is a fire on the mountain (nigamana )
The Sankhyas 180 and the Mimāniskas181 do not accept the last organs, viz. Upanaya and Nigamana.
In the field of Buddhist Logic, Acārya Dingnäga appears to have accepted three organs such as, Pakşa, Hetu, and Drstanta, 182 while Dharmakirti includes Paksa in Nugrahasthana, and divides Hetu into three types.183 According to him, the three Hetus are, (i) Paksadharmațva ( its presence of the reaason in the subjects totally ), (ii) Sapakşdsatva (its presence in similar instances, althugh not in their totality ) (ii) Vipakşvayāvsttatva (its absence in dissimilar instances in their totality). These reasons are also called the Ayogavyavaccheda, (impossibility of absence ), (ii) Anyayogavyavaccheda, ( impossibility of otherness in similars, but not in the totality of the similars ), (in) Atyanti yogavyavaccheda (impossibility of others completely ), i. e. absence of totality of the dissimilar instances): For instance,

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(i) whatever is sat, is ksauika ( Pakşadharmatva ). (ii) the pot is sat, therefore it is ksaņika ( sapakşdsatva ). (iii) because all entities are sat (vipaksavyavrtattva ).
Thus, here the Paksa and Nigamana are denied and Drstanta and Upanaya are indirectly accepted. Hetu is the main feature according to the Buddhist view (vidus imvācyo hetureva hi kevalari ).184
On the other hand, the Jainas accept only two organs, Pratijña proposition ) and Hetu ( middle term-reason ). They urge in support of this theory that without accepting the pratijñi or pakļa what is the use of the hetu, and for what would it be utilized. 165 Hence, they say that Udaharana is necessary and deny that Upanaya and Nigamana are conclusive factors. 186 For instance :
(i) there is a fire on the mountain (pakşa ). (ii) since there is smoke (hetu ).
The above view of the Jainas is recorded in Buddhist literature. Both Dharmakirti and Santarakṣita criticised this theory, Dharınakırti examines the Jain propositions with the following example :
(i) trees are sentient beings-cetanás taravah (pratijña). (ii) because they sleep (hetu ).
He then refutes this theory stating that this instance is fallacious, since sleep which is manifested by closing of the leaves at night is found only is some trees, not in their totality.187 The same thing is explained in the Darmottarapra. dipa by Dharmottarara.
Santaraksita referred to a view of Pätrakeśari with regard to the conception of types of hetu. He puts a number of exam. ples to establish his own view showing that there are only two organs, Pratijna and hetu. For instance : 1. (a) the hare marked (śasa-lañchana ) is the Moon ( paksa
or pratijña ), (b) because it is spoken of as the Moon (hetu). Likewise :

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2. (a) the pain of mine has been caused by the falling
insect ( paksa ). (b) because its appearance was felt on the touch of the
falling insect. (hetu ). 3. (a) the soul, jar and other things are somehow essenti
ally non-existent ( pratijña ). (b) because they are somehow inpprehensible in any way,
like the horns of the hare ( hetu ). In the last case, there is no Corroborative Instance of diss!milarity. The jar and other things include the entire group of Positive Entities and they have been mentioned in the Proposition as essentially non-existent. And the negative entity has been put forth as the Instance. Apart from the Positive and the Negative, there is no third category wherein it could be pointed out that the exclusion of the Probandun implies the exclusion of the Probans. Therefore, according to Patrasvāmin, there are ouly two organs of hetu, wherein other organs can casily be merged. This is the shortest and most well-defined way of making inference.
As a matter of fact, the Janias are of the view that the number of steps in a proposition cannot be fixed as it depends entirely on the level of competence of the hearer.101 Manikyanandi recognizes pratijri and hetu as the minimum essential steps, but he concedes that other steps may also be required in dealing with certain types of hearers, 102 Hemacandra198 is also of the same view. Vădideva's view, however, is somewhat different. He accepts, like the Buddists, one step for the particular type of hearers and two, three, four, and five for other general hearers.104 But Pätrasvāmin's view is more important in this respect as he does not go beyond the two steps of Pratijña and Hetu.
Santaraksita, following in the foot-steps of Dharmakirti criticises the theory of Patrasvāmin. He says that being spoken of as the moon is present also in thihgs where the Probandum ( sa paksa ) is known to be present. It is also

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sometimes present in the Man (who is spoken of as the moon) or in Camphor, Silver and such other things which are also called moon. 195 Likewise, in the second instance Santarakşita points out as a defact that there is no distinction between the probans ( the pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect), since the proban is a part of the Proposition itself. The same fact is asserted in different words in the Probans.196 Similarly, he indicates defects in other examples197 put forward by Patrasvamin and tries to prove the two steps of Pratijña and Hetu to be inadequate and incomp
lete.
This criticism is based on the conception that Jainas recognize only hetu Dh armakirti includes Paksa in Nigrahasthana and then divides hetu in three categories, viz. Paksadharmatva, Sapakṣasatva, and Vipakṣavy vṛtti. These are called Train@pya helu. Both, Draştanta and Upanaya are included in the Hetu of the Buddhists. But patrasvamin does not accept this view cn the ground that the Trirupa can also be found in Hetvābhāsa (fallacious middle term). Further he asserts lakṣa and Hetu as steps of hetu. Since he establishes Anyath inupapatti as the definition of hetu, how could he include the Pakṣa or Pratijn into other organs as Dharmakirti did? It was essential to him as well as other Jaina Acaryas, therefore, to recognise Pratijfia as a separate organ of Hetu.198
As regards the aspects of the nature of a probans, the Buddhists, like the Vaisesikas199 and Sankhyas, 200 assert that there are three aspects of a probans, vis. pakṣasativa (presence in the subject ), sapakṣasattva (presence in a homologues), and Vipakṣāsattva (absence from hetrologues). The Naiyayikas accept, in addition to the above three, two more aspects of the nature of probans viz. abadhitavisaytva (absence of a counter-balancing probans), and asatpratipakṣatva.201 Both. the Buddhists and the Jainas criticise the view of the Naiyayikas.202 The Buddhists include the abadhitaviṣaz atra in paksa and show the superfluity of asatpratipakṣatva. The three aspects of the
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Buddhists are also called the Sadhananga, wherein the asiddha, viruddha and the anaikantika are all included.
On the other hand, the Jaina tradition admits that only the anyathanupapanntva, also called avinabhāva, or vyāpti, or vipaksavyavštti, is the essential characteristic of a probans (hetu ).
Pakşadharmastadansena vyāpto 'pyeti hetutan. Anyathanupa pannatvam na cettarkena laksyate,203
Jainas, however, are not so strict upon this view, and allow any number of aspects in particular places, even though these aspects are actually details. Pātra svāmin is the first to establish this view in Jaina tradition. The earliest mention of his position is found in Tattvasangraha of Santaraksta, where his view is mentioned and then refuted. The gist of Patrasvimin's theory is that anyathanu papannatva in only one feature of hetu since it is the shortest way of making an inference. It has capacity to absorb and assimilate all other aspects of probans,
This conception of Jainas is criticised by the Buddhist logicians, Dharmottara, a commentator of Dharmakirti, says that according to Anhrikas, the inference proceeds from onefcature hetu (ekalaksanajamanumanam )204 which is called ekasapya or anyathanupapannatta, It indicates that anyathāno papannatva should not exist apart from the probans.
Sāntarakṣita, the distinguished commentator of Dharmakirti, has also refuted this view. He quotes a well-known kārika205 of Pātrakeśarin which, though not extant, is mentioned in the works of other writers. He is first mentioned in the Tattaasangraha and the Pramana vārtika Svavýttifikā by the name of Patrasvamin. Acārya Anantavirya says that this kārikā belongs traditionally to Pātrakesari wbo wrote a philosophical treatise named Trilaksana kadarthanari 206 The Sravanavelagola inscription also supports this view of Anantavi
rya, 207

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Santaraksita and his commentator explain the view of Pātrasvāmin with regard to the various aspects of proban. They say that according to Pátrasvāmin, the probans is valid only when it is found to be otherwise impossible and not when it has the three features ( anyathanu papannatva eva sobhano helună punastrilaksanah). This view is elaborated as follows: Patrasvāmin justifies that anyathanupapannatva is the principal characteristic of a piobans. Through presumption (arthapatya ) the same characteristic implies three features, viz, Pakşadharmatva, Sapahșa sativa, and Vipak sa vyāı rattatva, but the 'ipaksavyavştli or anyathanupa patti can imply all other features which do not serve any useful purpose. As a matter of fact, the relation of invariable con-comitance (uvinalhava ), which is, the heart of hetu, is not present in the three-featured reasons (trarrapya hetu ), but found in the one featured ( ekarūpya hetu ).208
Santaraksita then quotes a renowned karikā of Pātrasvāmin from the Trilaksanakadarthana as follows:
anyatlānupannattvam yasya tasyaiva hetuta. diastāntau dvāvapi stām vā ma vā tau hi na kārañar nānyathānupapannatvan yatra tatra trayena kim. anyathānupapannatvam yatra tatra trayeņa kim.
It means anyathānupapannatva is the only probans. There may be three corroborative intstances, but really they cannot be depended upon. If the anyathanupa pannatva is not there, what is the use of three features ? and if the anyathanu pa pannatva is there, what is the use of the three features (trairūpya ) ? He illustrates this point saying that the man who has three sons is called ekajutraka on account of having one good son ( Suputratvat ). Similarly in the case of the three featured probans only feature would be useful in making inferences.
Patrasvāmin has tried to prove that there can be no anyathanupapannatva hetu in the three-featured probans. For instance, "one must be dark ( pakşasatva ), because one is the son of so and so ( sa paksasatva ), whose other sons are found to be dark ( vipaksasatvavyāvstt,". This example contains

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the three-featured probans, Even then it cannot lead to any valid and definite knowledge and conclusion. For there is Do avinabhava-sambandha (relation of invaribale con-comitance) between his son and his darkness. The climate and eating of vegetables by his mother during the pregnancy is real cause. Therefore, the Trairūpya is not a correct theory,
Sa syāmastasya putratvāddrastā Syāmā yathetare, Iti trilakxano heturna niscityai dravartate 209
Patrasvamin again pointed out that the one-featured probans has the requisite capacity of leading to valid knowledge. It has no external corroborative instances, either of similarity or of dissimimilarity, either in the form af statment or in the form of actual things, because all things have been included under the subject or paksa ( minor term ) Positive and Negative entities ( bhavabhaviitmakaera sarvapadārthasya paksikrlattvat ), and there is nothing apart from these. As regards the character of "being present in the Minor term", this is the anyathanupapannatva hetu and noting apart from the latter. Hence the probans here is one-featured.210
But the Buddhist philosophers do not accept this view and they try to criticise it. For instance, Santrakṣita questions whether Patrasvamin's definition of betu refers to the general position or to a particular subject on which knowledge is sought or to a particular instance, If the first alternative is accepted, then, what would be indicated, would be the existence of the probans in the object where the probandum is present; and it would not accomplish what is sought to be accomplished,211
If Pātrasvämin's definition of the Probans is that Anyathamipaparntva hetu is found in the Minor term (dharmi ) only, the same means of cognition, which has made the Probans known, would make know Probandum ( sūdhya ), also. Both these depend on each other. If the Probandum does not become known, the Probans also cannot become known. Thus. the probans would be useless, and the Probandum would

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be known by other means. There would be the incongruity of "mutual interdependence" anyonyasrayadoṣa), if the definite cognition of the Probandnm followed from the Probans. Hence, the cognition of one would be dependent upon the cognition of the other.212
Regarding the third alternative, Śantarașita says that if the probans were known as exisent in the Corroborative Instance, that would not bring about the cognition of the probandum in the Minor term, since its invarible concomitance will not have been definitely cognised all over.218 He then refutes the instances214 put forward by Patrasvamin in the course of his arguments.
For instance, in regard to the first instance concerning Syamaputra, he says that "One is dark, because he is the son of so and so" is not the natural reason (svabhavahetu), as "being product" kṛtakatvam) has a character of non-eternality. The Syamatva, in his opinion, is the aggregate of five ingredients (pañcopādānaskandha). Nor is the probans based on the effect (karyahelu), as there is no causal relation between his son and darkness. Nor is it of the nature of the non-perception ( anupalabdhi) is the probans cannot prove the negation of complexions other than darkness.215
Further Santarakşita criticises the theory of Patrasvamin on the grounds of other inferences and concludes that the one-featured probans is really an importent theory (klibüstenaikalakṣaṇaḥ). He then tries to prove that three-featured probans has no such defects,
This refutation of the theory of one-featured probans is based on the asiddha, viruddha and anarkāntika defects ( hetvabhāsas). However, the Jaina philosophers like Prabhācandra and Anantavirya say that these defects are really not on the side of the one-featured betu of Jainas, but on the side of the three-featured hetu of they Buddhists, because it can be applied to even Hetvābhāsas. They finally conclude that the -one-featured hetu is the shortest and the simplest route to make an inference regarding anything.218

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But as a matter of fact, the thre--featured probans are more convenient for the middle-term (hetu ). For, even without knowing the words homologue and hetrologue everybody can easily understand the major and the middle term.
With regard to the importance of this reference we are in a position to say that the earliest mention of Jaina con. ception of anythanu papannatva as an aspect of a probans has. been made by A cārya Dharmakirti. Afterwards, Sāntarakşita referred to it and proceeded to examine it critically. There he mentioned Patrasvāmin as the holder of this view. For the sake of Jaina philosophical history, this reference to Pātrasvāmin and his view is very important. Prmāṇasmaplavavāda
Pramūnasama plava is an application of more than one pramāņa to one object (prameya ).217 Jainas are appropritely called Pragmanasari plavavādın218 in the Hetubindu Tika This is because the theory of relativity of knowledge ( anekūntavāda ) is the basis of Jaina philosophy. It means that an entity is not in perpetual flux, but it is relatively eternal and having universal and particular characters (sámányavisesõitmaka ).
A thing consists of infinite attributes which cannot be apprehended by one by merely superficial knowledge. Other Pramānas, therefore, have clear scope to know the un apprehended elements of a particular thing. In the definition of pramana Acāry Aklanka added a word anadhi gatārthagrahi which itself indicates that pramanasam plava can be accepted provided there is wpayoga-višeşa to determine the definite or indefinite part of an entity.219 The Naiyāyikas bave on such term in their definitions of pramāna. But they accept the pramanasamplava in each case.
But on the other hand, Buddhist philosophy does not recognise the validity of pramūnasam plava. According to its theory, an object is in perpetual flux : it cannot last for more than a moment. One object cannot have two validi

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ties, simultaneously. On this ground the Buddhist logicians criticise the Jaina and other systems. These criticisms will be analysed in the next chapter where, Anekāntavāda of Jainism will be discussed. Conclusion
From this brief survey of the epistemological and logical concepts of Jainas as recorded in the Buddhist philosophical literature; we have seen that
(i) Among the ancient thinkers, the Jainas were classified as a group of philosophers who attained higher knowledge on the basis of personal experience.
(ii) Knowledge and vision were two characters of self. of these, vision ( darasna) was originally considered to be the revealer of self (atmaprakāśaka ). This idea was developed in logical form and darsana, like Jñina, was considered to be valid knowledge.
(iii) Knowledge (jñana) was classified as Canonical or Agamic, and Philosophical or Dāršanic. The five kinds of knowledge, namely, mati, sruti, avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevalajñana were based on the former, while Pratyaksa and Paroksa are devolopments of the latter. Pratyksa was divided into samuyavaharika and pāramārthika, while paroksa into smrti, tarka, pratyabhijña, anumāna, and ūgama. Unlike Buddhism, paramarthika pratyaksa was savikalpaka ( determinate ). Summati's theory was referred to in the Tattvasangraha in this connection.
(iv) Pure self could attain omniscience. Hence Jaina Tirthankaras achieved this stage of complete purification and became omniscient.
(v) The idealogy of omniscience was gradually developed in Buddhism as a result of Jaina influence.
(vi) Pratijña and hetu were the only organs of Pararthanumāna. Pātrakefari's view was referred to by Santaraksita in the Tattvå sangraha in this connection,

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It was also mentioned there that anyathinopapalti was the essential characteristic of Hetu, and
(vii) Apart from the knowledge of each other's epistemo logical theories, the Jainas and the Buddhists, through centuries mutual criticism, contributed substantially towards the enrichment of philosophical speculation in India and added to the sum total of human experience in its quest for the Truth.

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Chapter-V
The Theory of Anekantavada 1. The Nature of Reality ( Anekantavāda )
Anekantvada is the heart of Jaina philosophy. Reality possesses infinite characters which cannot be perceived or known at once by an ordinary man. Different people think about different aspects of the same reality and therefore their partial findings are contradictory to one other. Hence, they indulge in debates claiming that each of them was completely true. The Jaina philosophers thought over this conflict and tried to reveal the whole truth by establishing the theory of non-absolutist standpoint ( anekantavāda ) with its two wings, Nayavīda and Syadvada.
There are two mutually distinct and fundamental standpoints from which all things can be considered. They are universalization and particularization. Universalization starts with the observation on a synthetic basis of similarities, and gradually reacts the level where distinction exists and finally concludes that any object of consciousness is in reality an element. On the other hand, Particularization is based on observation of dissimilarities which finally leads one to the conclusion that the universe is but a conglommeration of completely dissimilar existences.
These two standpoints have given rise to several other conceptions in Indian Philosophy. They can be classified into five principal categories as follows:
(i) the conception of identity. (ii) the conception of difference. (ii) the conception of subordinating difference to iden
tity. (iv) the conception of subordinating identity to diffe.
rence and (v) the conception of identity-indifference.

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(i) The conception of identity
The conception of identity means that all things are permanent, homogenous and universal as in Vedānta. Here the Brahman is considered to transform itself into the universe and to re-absorb the universe into itself. It is called the Brahmadvaitavāda or ekatvavāda, vikaravada or Brahmaparināmavāda, which realized brahman as the basic realty. Later on, Sankara established a theory called vivartavada which means that an effect is a false or apparent transformation. According to this, the brahman is the sole reality and universe is intrinsically unreal (Withya ).
(ii) The conception of difference
The Buddhist pbilosopby represents this view. It asserts that everything is impermanent, soulless and a cause of pain (sabbar aniccam, sabb am anattam, sabbam dukkham ). The conception of anattā or nairātmya establishes asatkāryavada. Reality is momentary and flexible since it transforms into modes in a moment. The imagination (kalpana ) is the cause of the co-relation of modes which leads to casual efficiency (arthakriya ). The Sunyavāda, Kşanikavāda etc. are co-related with this doctrine. (iii) The conception of subordinating difference to identity
The Sankhya upholds the view of subordinating difference which means that the nature of reality is a plurality of the statically permanent ( katasthanitya ) and the dynainically constant (parinamanitya ). The Puruşa (sell ) is hūțasthanitya, while the Prakşti is pariņāmanitya. Owing to different combinations of three guņas ( sat, rajas, and tamas ), Prakrti: is transformed into modes, while the Purusa ramains unchanged. The causes and effects are not entirely identical, but different in certain respects. Its fundamental principal Satkaryavada, that affirms the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, is based on the non-distinction ( abhedavada ), whcih is considered to be different from the arambhavada of the Nyāya-Vaiseşika.

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( 171 ) (iv) The conception of subordinating identity to difference
The Nyāya-Vai esik as hold the view that the Vijesa ( the particular ) is the prominent feature that distinguishes the elements, and the samavāya (intimate relation ) is the cause of relation between two inseparable ( ayutasiddha ) substances and their modifications.
(v) The conception of identity-cum-difference
Conflicting views and heated arguments about the nature of reality confused the minds of the people to such a degree that it became essential to reconsider this burning philosophical question in a conciliatory spirit. This important step was taken by the Jainas and the result was the theory of Anekantavāda, which postulates a theory of manifold methods of analysis (Nayavada ) and synthesis (Syūdvada ).
According to Jaina Philosoply, as we have already seen, an entity consists of infinite characteristic which cannot be perceived all at once. Therefore one who perceives a thing partially, must be regarded as knowing one aspect of truth as his position permits him to grasp. Even though he is not in a possession of the entire truth, the aspect he has come to know cannot be altogether disregarded or ignored. The question arises as to how the whole truth of reality could be known. According to Jaina standpoint, all the theories contain a certain degree of genuineness and hence should be accepted from a certain point of view; but the nature of reality in its entirety can be perceived only by means of the theory of manifoldness ( anekantavada ). The Jaina philosophers synthesize all the opponents views under this theory.
The nature of reality, according to this theory, is permanent-in change. It possesses three common characters, viz. utfada ( origination ) vyaya ( destruction ) and dhrauvya (permanence through birth and decay ), It also posesses the attributes (gunas) called anvayi, which co-exist with substance ( dravya ) and modifications paryayas called vyatireki, which

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succed each other. Productivity and destructivity constitute the dynamic aspect of an entity and permanence is its enduring factor. This view is a blended form of the completely static view held by the Vedāntins and the completely dynanic view held by the Buddhists.
Jaina literatures mentions three different views with regard to the relation of guna and paryaya with a substance (dravya). viz. the bhedaváda, abhedavāda and the bhedābhedavāda. The bhedavada represents the view that the attributes and the modifications are a combination with the substance which gives birth to the triple characters ( dravja, guna and paryżya ) of an entity.4 Both, guna and paryāya are two distinctive elements in this view. The former is called sahabhavi or intrinsic, while the latter kramabhuvi or extrinsics. This ideology was promulgated by Kundakund, and supported by Umāsvāmi, Samantabhadra and Pujyapada.
According to abhedavāda, the guņas and the paryāyas are synonymous ( tulyarthau ) signifying the conception of change inberent in which are both external and internal modificattions of all realities without creating any contradictory position. Siddhasena Divākara is the chief supporter of this view and he is supported by Siddhasenagani, Haribhadra and Hemachandra.
The third view hledabhedavada held by Akalaikadeva has been accepted by all his cominentators and followers such as Prabhachandra, Vādırājajsūri and Anantavırya. This view appears in a more developed and hormonized form and clarifies further the relation between guņa and paryāya. While commenting on the Sūtra Guna paryayavaddravyan of the Tattvärtha sūtra, Akalanka suggests that gunas are themselves a distinct category from, as well as identical with, paryayas?. It means gupas always exist with realities and their modifications which follow one after another, Prabhachandra® in the Ngayakumudacandra gives a more critical and comprehensive explanation.

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( 173 ) All these three views are not fundamentally different from one another, since they unanimously accept the common factors, utpāda, vyaya, and thrauvya simultaneity (sahabha. vitva) and modifications with successivity ( kramabhavitva ). The Buddhist philosophers are familiar with the first and the last view, but they do not make any distinction between them,
Anekantavāda in Buddhist literature
The rudiments of the theory of anekantaviida can be gleaned from early Pali literature. The Brahmajala Sutta pointed out the sixty-two Wrong views ( Micchaditthis) according to the Buddhistic standpoint. Out of them, the Ucchedavada ( nihilism) and Sassatavada (Eternalıms ), Buddhaghosa says, were taught by Nigantha Nataputta to two of his pupils, just belore his death
This account of Buddhaghosa cannot be accepted as true since he had quite understandably misunderstood the teachings of Nigantha Nataputta. Buddhaghosa had not been fully conversant with all aspects of anekāntavāda and he had thought that Nigantha Ņātaputta had taught contradictory doctrines. This is quite understandable because the theory of permanence in-changa which forms the basis of the Anekantavāda is completely at variance with the Buddhist theory which accepts only change. Due to this difficulty thoughts of Nigantha Nataputta are considered in Pali literature under the headings Sassatavīda and Ucchedavüda.
Rudiments of Anekāntavāda are traceable in the Buddhist approach to questions : Pali literaturelo describes how he answered a question in four ways. The four ways are :
(i) Ekansa-vyñ karaniya ( answerable categorically ). (ii) Pați pucchävyäkaraniya ( answerable by putting ano
ther question ) (iii) Thapañiya ( question that should be set aside ). (iv) Vibhajjavyākaraniya ( answerable analytically )

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The Buddha, who adopted these techniques in answering numerous metaphysical and ethical questions put to him by various disciples and disputants, himself claims to be a Vibhajjvadin.11 The Sutrakṛtanga of the Jainas requires the Jaina monk to explain a problem with the help of Vibhajjavada,1a It shows that the Jainas as well as the Buddhists followed the analytical method of explanation. It is possible that the earliest division of the above questions was divides into ekaṁsavyakaraniya-panha, and (2) anekaṁsavyākaraṇiya-pañha corresponding to the Jaina classification of two kinds of statements (ekamsika dhamma and anekamsika dhamma ). Leter, the latter class would have been sub-divided into the (i) vibhajja-vyakaraniya and the (ii) thapaiya. Patipucchā-vyākaraṇiya is a subclass of ribhanja-vyakaraniya,19
A point to be noted here is that the Buddha used the word anekamsa in his preachings, For instance, in reply to a question asked by Potthapada, the Buddha says "I have taught and laid down doctrines of which it is possible to make categorical assertions and I have taught and laid down doctrines of which it is not possible to make categorical assertions" ekaṁsikā pr......maya dhamma desila paññattal, anekamsikū p.....maya dhamma desita paññatta). Here arekani sika, like Vibhajjavada, is similar to Anekantavada of Jainas. The etymology and meaning are also similar. But the difference between these two theories is that the Jainism accepts all statements to possess some relative ( anekāntika) truth, while the Buddhism does not accept that all non-categorical statements (anekam sika) can be true or false from one standpoint or another. Anekantavada, unlike anekamsikavada, conceives of the possibility of knowing reality from one or more standpoints. Pandita Durvekamiśra, in the Hetubindutikaloka, summarized this concept as follows: Syacchabdo 'nekantavacano nityatosti tena syadvādo anekāntvado yadva syādakṣaṇikah syadkṣanika ilyadi......) 15 A developed form of this doctrine is referred to in a later Sanskrit Buddhist philosophical literature. As we have already seen, this theory continued develop still further up to the time of Kundakunda.

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After Kundakunda, Samantabhadra tries to explain it further with the help of examples. This is referred to by Karnakagomin in the Pramūnavārtika Svarsttiţikalt and Durvekamiśra in the Hetubinduţikaloka. According to Samanta. bhadra, the triple characters abide with a substance at one and the same time. They are not mutually independent. Utpada can never exist without vyaya and dhraurya. The other two characters too are mutually dependent. Samantabhadra uses an example to clarify this view. If a jar made of gold is turned into a crown it will please a man who has an attachment to the crown, but it will displease a man who dislikes the crown, wlule the third man who is netural about the crown but is interested in the gold, will have no objection to it at all. Here origination, destruction, and permanence abide in one reality. Another example is presented to make this controversial point clearer. He says : he who takes a vow to live on milk, does not take curd, he who takes a vow to live on curd, does not take milk; and he who takes a vow to live on food other than supplied by a cow, takes neither milk nor curd. Thus Sanatabhadra cancludes that utpāda, vyaya, and dhrauvya inay exist in a relative sense, 17 Kundakunda has also given such example in this conneetion. 18
The etymology of the word dravva itself indicates that a thing is permanent-in-change taking a new form simultaneously with the disappearance of the previous form. 19 This view was also accepted by Durvekamióra according to Krdanta section.20 Santaraksita21 and Arcata22 lave also recorded this conception in their respective works.
Trayatmakavāda and Arthakriyavāda,
in Buddhist Literature The arthakriyakāritva ( causal efficency ) is the essence of the doctrines of Bheda vāda, Abhedavāda, and Bhedābhedavāda. The Satkūryayada of Sankhyas, A satkāryavada of Naiya. yikas and Buddhists and Sadasatkāryavāda of Jainas are wellknown to us in this respect. Here we are concerned only with the views of the Buddhists and Jainas.

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The Buddhists assert that the "Particular is the only real element of an entity charactersed as svalakṣaṇa ( thing-in-itself). It is supposed to be momentary and a congregation of atoms. A thing accordingly is born and immediately after. wards it is destroyed 28. The substance is nirhetuka (devoid of causes) in the sense that it originates without the assistance of cause other than its own cause of origination. Each moment produces another moment destroying itself and thus it presents a sort of continuisyly of existence. Thus it manages to maintain a cause and effect (kāryakāraṇabhava) relationship.
According to Buddhism, Momentariness (kṣaṇabhangurata) and causal efficiency (kārya-kūraṇabhūva) are inseparable. It treated momentariness, efficiency, causality and reality as synonyms, and hence argued that an entity is momentary because it was efficient and it was efficient because it was momentary. On the basis of this idea, the Buddhists criticise causal efficiency in a permanent thing. They say that entities come into Being either simultaneously (yugapadena) or successively (kramena). But in a permanent thing, both these ways cannot be effective, since they are not able to originate it immediately due to the non-proximity of a cause. In the first alternation, the substance should originate all the possible effects in the very first moment of its existence, As regards the type of causal efficiency that takes place simultaneously, a permanent thing cannot have any effects, because it can be neither perceived nor inferred. As Santarakşıta says, after having brought about all the effects simultaneously, the nature of a thing comprising its capacity for effective action, disappears, and therefore the momentary character of a thing is an essential factor for causal effeciency. Furthermore they point out that auxiliaries (sahakuri) must follow the things with which they are connected. These auxiliaries, as a matter of fact, cannot abide with permanent things, because the peculiar condition produced in a thing by auxiliaries would neither be simailar

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nor dissimilar. Ib they make any difference, the efficiency of the permanent thing in producing the cause is compromised and becomes dependent upon other things in order to be efficient. If, on the coutrary, they are not able to make any difference, the arguments for inoperative and ineffective ( akiñcitkaru ) elements in a thing have no meaning. The Buddhists, therefore, conclude that causal efficiency is the essence of the simple and unique moments each of which is totally differents from the others.24
On the other hand, the Jainas believe that a substance is dynamic parināmi ) in character. It means a thing is eternal from the real standpoint ( 11śc ayanasena ) and momentary from a fractical vitu point ( vyavahūranayena). Causal efficiency, according to them, is possible neither in a thing which is uf the static nature ( kapusthanitya ) nor in a thing which is incongruous with the doctrine of momentariness (kxanikavada, but it is pos: íble only in a thing which is permancnt-in-change. To make a clarification of this view, they say that efficiency takes place either successively or simultancously. Both these alternations cannot be effective in the moneptary existence, since the spatial as temporal extension which requires the notion of before and after for efficiency are absent from the momentary thing of the Budd. hists. Santana (continuous series ) 'is also not effective in this respect, since it is not momcntary in the opinion of the Buddhists 25
This view of the Jainas is recorded by Durvekamisra in the Hetubindutikaloka. The writer of the Vadanyaya called Syadvadakesari who is supposed to be the same as Akalankadeva, is said to have defeated the opponents and established the Jaina Nyāya. According to Syādvāda keśarı, Durvekamiéra says, every entity is anaikāntika (having infinite characters ), which is the basis of arthakriya ( casual efficiency ). Kulabhūsana, a commentator on the vadan yaya, explains this view that the anyathanupapatti is the main character of reality, and arthakrija is possible only in that character.26 He, then,
12

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on the basis of the above view, tries to point out defects in the theory of absolute momentariness and absolute eternalism stating that causal efficiency is possible in either of these theories of reality. Clarifying his own position, Kulabhūsana asks whether momentary character has causal efficiency during its own existence or in another. If the first alternative is accepted, the entire universe would ex ist only for a moment. The effect produced by a certain cause during its own existence would be a cause of others, despite being caused itself and this sereis will never end. The argument "Cause makes an effect during its own existence and an effect comes into being during the existence of others is not favoured since an effect is supposed to be originated during the existence of its own cause and not of another". Otherwise, an effect cannot take place and there will be the defect of “Samanantara padavirodha''26, according to which the effects would emerge in the distant future. The next moment is also not powerful to generate the thing, since it is not a creator. Otherwise what would be the difference between sat and asat, and hșanika and aksanike We could conclude therefore, that arthakriya is possible only in permanent-in-change character. 28
Afterwards, Durvekamiśra tries to criticise the view of Syādvādakesari not by advancing arguments but by merely hurling insults. As a matter of fact, whenever the Buddhist philosophers came across people whose views were different to theirs, especially when they could not refute their theories, they resorted to the practice of rediculing them by means of ironical speech. It is in this manner that the arguments of the Jainas against the theory of kşanikaviida came to be dismissed by Pandit Durvekamióra with cursory remarks that a wise-man should disregard the above objections raised by the above Anhrikas or Digambaras (yadi namanhrikoktira pek sanıya preksavatanz )29. He then tries to show that only the momentary character has a capacity of casual efficiency.
sāntarakṣita also refers to view which seems to belong to the Jaina tradition, but it is attributed to Bhadanta Yoga

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sena, who is claimed by certain scholars to be a Buddhist philosopher. For instace, Bhattacarya says in his introducţion to the Tattvasangraha that "nothing definite is known about Yogasena; he is not mentioned in the Nanjio's catelogue of the Clunese Tripitaka nor in any of the Tibetan catalogues". He then tries to prove that Yogasena was a Buddhist philosopher on account of his appellation Bhadanta saying "But the word Bhadanta is always used in the Tattvasangraha to denote a Buddhist, or more preferably a Hinayāna Buddhist. Our authors have not made a confusion in this respect anywhere in this book, and on this ground we can take Yogasena to be a Buddhist 30
But Šantaraksita has not indicated anywhere that the word Bhadanta should be limited only to the Buddhist Acāryas. It has been widely used in Jaina literature as a term of res. pect to elder Bhikkhus. It is, therefore, not impossible that Yogasena was a follower of Jainism or was influenced by its conceptions, as his views against K şani kavāda represent the Jajna standpoint.81 Further Šāntarakṣita did not mention anywhere explicitly the criticism made by Jainas against the Kşanı kavida. Moreover, it is unlikely that in such a comprehensive work he should forget to mention the refutation of the Buddhist theory of momentariness by the Jainas, when the Jainas were their greatest opponents.
Some schools of thought opposing the doctrine of momentariness ( Kşanabhangavāda ) were rising even within Buddhist system. For instance, Śāptarakṣita refers to the view of Vatsiputrijas who classified things under two headings momentary and non-momentary,32 The conception of soul, according to them, has also been refuted by Santaraksita. Stcher batsky mentions the Vātsīputriyas who admitted the existence of a certain unity between the elements of a living personality. In all probability they have been influenced by the Jaina views as their arguments are very similar to the Jaina arguments raised against the view of Ksanikavada and analmavāda.

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There are, however, two important points of difference between the Buddhist and the Jaina in the meaning they attach to dravyavāda in their common denunciation of the view which connects this notion of arthakri yakaritva with dravyavada. First, the Buddhist is against dravyavāda, Secondly, the Buddhist's attack actually turns out, whatever his profession may be, to be on the hypothesis of the static (kaf sthanitya) drayya whereas the Jaina's attack is also on the same hypothesis but only as a contrast to his own theory of the dynamic (pariņāmi ) dravya.84 We have already discussed the Jainas view against ekantadravyavāda. Dual character of an entity
Some systems of thought accept only the Universal ( Samanya character of reality. Advaitavādins and the Sankhyas are the typical representatives of this view. Some other schools led by the Buddhists recognise only Particular (Visesa) character of reality. The third school of thought belongs to Nyāya-Vaisesikas, who trcat Universal and Particular ( Saminya and Visega) as absolutely distinctive entities.
Santara kşita first establishes the Jainistic view on the nature of reality. He says that according to Jainism, an entity has infinite characteristics which are divided into two categories, viz. Universal and Particular. Just as different colours can exist in a lustrous gem without conflicting with each other, so the universal and particular elements could abide in a reality.85
We find two kinds of existence in an entity, viz, existence of own nature (Svaru pastiva ) and existence of the similar nature of others ( Sadraśyāstitva ). The former tries to separate the similar ( sajūtiya ) and dissimilar ( vijatiya ) substances and indicates their independence. This is called Vertical Universal (ürdhvata sumūrya ), which repiesents unity ( anugatapratyaya ) in plurality of different conditions ( vyavsttapratyaya ) of the same individual. In other words, the permanent character of an entity is called ürdhvatāsāmänya.96

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( 181 ) Sadiiyāstitva, the so-called Tiryaksamanya (horizontal ), tep resents unity in the plurality of different individuals of the same class. 87 The word cow is used to denote a particular cow and it also refers to others of the same class, because of similarity.88 Likewise, Visesa is also of two kinds. Parvliva and Vyatireka. The former distinguishes the two modes of Same entity, while the latter makes a distinction between the two separate entities.
Thus each and every reality is universalized-cum-particularzed (samūnya.visesatmaka ) along with substance with modes (drávya paryayātmaka ). Here dravya represents the universal character and paryaya represents the particular character of a thing. The adjective Samanya-višeşītmaka indicates the apprehension of Tiryak samanyatmaka and Vyatirekasāmanyätmaka, while Dravyaparyāyātmaka points out the ürdhvatāsā mūnyūtmaka and Paryāyaviseşītmaka character of a reality. Though the qualily of sūmanyaviseşātmaka is included in the dravyaparyāyātmaka, its separate use indicates that no entity is beyond the limitation of dravyaparyāyalmakatva of utpadaryaya dhrauvyātmakatva. While Sāmīnyaviseşatmaka 'indicates the character of reality, the dravyaparyāyātmaka shows its dynamic nature. Thus in Jainism an entity is of a dual nature. Both these types of sāmānya have been dealt with by Santarakṣita, Karnakagomin and Arcața. They take the traditional example of a jar (ghata ) made of gold which can be changed into several modes, while preserving gold as a permament substance. 39
Another example has been given by Buddhist philosophers on behalf of Jainas. They say that the identical-in-difference (bhedabheda ) between the substance and the modes is accepted by the Anhrikas as the nature of reality.40 When a substance is spoken of as one, it is with reference to space, time and nature; when it is spoken of as different, it is with refe. rence to number, character, name and function. For instance, when we speak of a jar and its colour and its other attributes, there is difference of number, and name; there is also also a

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difference of nature, inasmuch as an inclusiveness or comprehensiveness is the nature of the substance of the jar, while exclusiveness or distributiveness is the nature of successive factors in the form of colour and so forth. There is also a difference of function; inasmuch as the purposes served by the two are different. Thus the substance is not totally undifferentiated, as it does become differentiated in the form of the successive factors. 41
Kamalasīla explains the Jaina view as to why it stresses. on the universal-cum-particular character. He says, as the Jainas assert : "If the above doctrine is to be denied, all: things would have to be recognized as one. If a certain thing spoken of, for instance, as a jar was not different from other things, such as cloth, then there would be no difference between the jar and sky-flower (i. e. sky-flower is a thing that does not exist at all-hence an absurdity ( akaśd-kusuma)). Likewise a thing that is always differentiated from all other things, can have no other state save that of the sky-flower. Consequently, the general character in shape of universal entity, has to be admitted.2
Kamalýīla further explains the Jaina conception of the particular characters of an entity. He says that if the same entity, jar, was devoid of dissimilarity, then the jar could not be regarded as anything different from the cloth etc. in the form of this is jar, that is cloth, but in fact it does differ from other things. Therefore the particular character is always present in reality.48
As the Buddhist do not admit the universal character of an entity, the Jainas endeavour to convince them that the universal character is merged in the particular character of an entity. They set forth the argument that if any entity is not similar to other things, it ceases to be entity. For, that which is excluded from an entity, could have no position, but nonexistence, as in the case of a sky-flower. 44
In support of the aforesaid view, another argument is presented, on behalf of the Jainas, that is, if an entity were not

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similar to or different from every other entity, how then is it possible that the common idea of "being an entity" is found to appear only in connection with the jar and such things, and not in connection with the crow's teeth. It is so because the said restriction is due to a certain capacity in their natures. Though, according to Jainism, all things in the form of entities are not different from one another, their capacity may be regarded as the required "commonality. This is also called the Niyatavṛtti. Without accepting this limitation anything could be transformed into any-thing else.
Later the Jainas dealt with the difference among things. They say that if a jar were entirely devoid of dissimilarity to those other things, then there being no difference between them, the jar could not be anything different from those things. This would involve a self-contradiction. When one is ready to accept some sort of difference among things, he has also to accept dissimilarity as a particular character.46
Thus according to the Jainas' view, like the gleaming Sapphire, every entity, while being one, has several aspects. Of these, some are apprehended by inclusive notions, and others by exclusive notions. Those that are apprehended by inclusive, and hence spoken of as Common, while others, which are apprehended by exclusive notions, are exclusive and hence said to be Particular. The inclusive notion appears in the non-distinctive form of "This is an Entity'', while the exclusive appears in the distinctive form "this is jar, not cloth". Vastvekatmakamevedamanekākāramiṣyate.
Te canuvṛttivyavṛttibuddhigrahyataya sthitaḥ. Adya ete'nuvrttatvātsāmānyamiti kirtitāḥ, Viseṣastvabhidhiyante vyavṛttatvättato 'pare.47 Nature of relation of an entity
The nature of an entity is also a controversial point among the philosophers. For instance, the Naiyayiikas, the extreme realists, think that relation is a real entity. According to them, it connects the two entities into a relational unity through conjunctive relation ( samavaya sambandha ). Conju

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nction is a subject of quite separate, while the other relates with inseparable realities. Samavaya is said to be eternal, ( nitya ), one ( eka ) and all-pervasive ( sarvavya paka ).48
The Vedāntins and the Buddhists, the idealists, are against the view of the Naiyāyikas. The Buddbists assert the subjective view of relations. A relation, according to Dharmakirti, is a conceptual fiction ( sambandhah kal panīkştah ), like universal, and hence it is unreal. He also rejects the two possible ways of entertaining a relation in universal. They are dependence (päratuntrya sambandha ) and interpenetration ( rūpaslesa sambandha ).50
On the other hand, the Jainas, on the basis of non-absolute standpoint, try to remove the extreme externalism of the Naiyāyikas and the extreme illusionism or idealism of Buddhism and Advaitism. They maintain that a relation is a deliverance of the direct and objective experience. Relation is not merely an inferable but also an indubitaly perceptual fact. Without recognising relation, no object can be concrete and useful and atams would be existing unconnected.51
As regards the rejection of two possible ways of relation, the Jainas say that they should not be rejected. For, paratantrya-sumbandha is not mere dependence, as the Buddhists ascribe, but it unifies the relata52. Rūpaślesa is also untenable for purpose.58 The two points are here to be noted : the first is that according to Jainism, the relata never lose their individuality. They make internal changes having consistent internal relation with the external changes happening to them. In adopting this attitude the Jainas avoid the two extremes of the Naiyayikas' externalism and the Vedāntins internalism. Another point is that the Jainas consider Telation to be a combination of the relata in it as something unque or sui generis (jāt, antara ). It is a character or trait in which the natures of relata have not totally disappeared but are converted into a new form. For instance, nara-simha is a combination of the units of nara ( man ) and simha (lion).

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They are neither absolutely independent nor absolutely depen-dent, but are indentity-in-defference. Hence the Jainas are of the view that relation is the structure of reality which is identity-in-difference.54
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2. The Theory of Nayavāda
Nayavada or the theory of partial truth is an integral part of the conception of Anekantavada, Which is essential to concieve the sole nature of reality ( vastu nayati prapayati samvedanākoțimārohati). It provides for the acceptance of different viewpoints on the basis that each reveals a partial truth about an object. Naya investigates analytically a particular standpoint of the problem 55. But if the problem is treated as the complete truth, it is not Naya, but Durnaya or Nayabhasa or Kunaya. For instance, it is is Naya, and it is and is only is durnaya, while "it is relatively (syat )" is an exampie of Syadvada
Nayas can be as many as there are ways of speaking about a thing. This infinite number of nayas has been reduced to seven, viz. Naigama (figurative), (ii) Sangrha (general or common), (ii) Vyavahare (distiributive), (iv) Ṛijusūtra (the actual condition at a particular instant for a long time), (v) Śabda (descriptive ), (vi) Samabhirudha (specific), and (vii) evambhata (active). The first four nayas are Sabdanayas and the rest are the Artha Nayas, for thoughts and words are the only means by which the mind can approach reality. These seven Nayas have been also divided into two categories, Dravyarthika or Samanya (noumenallor intellectual intuition relating to the substance), and Paryayarthika or Viseşa (phenomenal view relating to the modifications of substances). The first three nayas are connected with the former division and the rest with the latter. In the scriptural language these are named the Niscayanaya (real standpoint) and the Vyavharanaya (prartical standpoint). The Tattvarthavārtika (1·33) mentions the Drvyāstika and the Paryayastika in place of drvyārthika and paryāyārthika.

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As regards mayābhāsa, the Nyāya-Vaibesika systems are called in Naigamūbhasa, as they hold the absolute distinction in the characters of a thing, The Sāňkhya and the Advaita schools are enumerated under the Sangrahābhasa, the Cārvaka under the Vyavharnayābhasa, the Buddhist conception of Kşanabhangavāda in the Rjusatranayabhäsa, the Samabhirndhanayabhasa and so on.
The theory of Naya in Buddhist literature
Pāli literature indicates some of the characteristics of Nayavīīda, The Buddha mentions ten possible ways of claiming knowledge in the course of addressing the Kālāmas. The ten (i) anussavena, (ii) paramparāya, (iii) itikirāya, (iv) pitakasaripadaya ( v ) bhavyarūpatāya ( vi ) samaņo na guru, (vii) takkihetu, ( viii ) nayahetu, (ix )ākāraparivitakkena, and ( x ) ditthinijjhanakkhantiya 58 Out of these, the eighth way, viz. Nayahetu is more important for our study. Here Naya is a method of statement which leads a meaning to a particular judgement 59 The Jātaka says that the wise man draws a particular standpoint.60 In about the same meaning. Naya is used in Jaina philosophy, as we have already seen, This Nayahetue of Buddhism appears to indicate the Jaina influence of Naya, and it would have been made a part of its own in the form of two types of Saccas, viz. Sammutisacca and the Paramatthasacca,61 which are used in about the same sense as Parydyarthi kanaya and Dravyarthikanaya or Vyavaharanaya and Niscayanaya. The words Sunaya and Dunaya are also found fn Buddhism used in identical way.c2
The Suttanipata indicates that the Sammutisacca was accepted as a common theory of Recluses and the Brahamanas,63 and the Paramattha sacca was treated as the highest goal 64 These two Saccas are characterised as Nitattha (having a a direct meaning ) and Neyyattha (having an indirect meaning ).65 The Commentary on the Anguttara Nikiya says that there is no third truth ( tatiyam n'apalabbhti ). Sammuti ( conventional statement is true because of convention and

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Paramattha is true because of indicating the true characteristics of realties :
Duve saccāni akkhäsi Sambuddho vadatam varo. Sammutim paramatthañca tativam n' ūpalabbhati. Paramatthavacanam saccam dhammānam tathalakkhanarh68
On the other hand, it is also said that there is only one truth, not second ( ekan hi saccam na dutiyamatthi ).67 This contradictory statement appears to give the impression that even in Buddhism the nature of things is considered through some sort of relativistic standpoint which is similar to the theory of Nayavada of Jainism,
Buddhism was aware of the conception of the Nayavāda of Jainism, since the Anguttara Niki ya refers to the several Pacceka saccas ( individual truths ) of the several Recluses and Brāhmanas. If it is so, the conception of Paccekasacca ( Partial truth ) of Buddhism is definitely influenced by the Nayavada of Jainism. There is no doubt that Jainism founded this theory earlier than Buddhism. 3. The Theory of Syādvāda
We have observed in our discussion on Nayavada that it is not an absolute means of knowing the nature of relaity. The further examination of truth is attempted by the theory oi Condtional Dialecitc or Syadvada. The Nayavāda is analytical in character, while the Syadyāda is a synthetical in method. The latter investigates the various standpoints of the truth made possible by naya and integrates them into a constent and comprehensive synthesis. Dasgupta describes the relation between these two methods as follows: "There is no universal or absolute position or negation, and all judgements are valid only conditionally. The relation of the naya doctrine with the syūdvada doctrine is, therefore, this, that for any judgement according to any and every naya there are as many alternatives. as are indicated by Syadvada. 69"}
The prefix Syāt in the Syadvāda represents the existence of those characters which, though not perceived at the mom

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ent, are present in reality ( nirdiśyamanadharmavyatirikta" šesadharmüntarasarosūcakena Syat yuktovūdo'bhipretadharmavacanari Syūdvādah ). Syädvāda reveals the certainty regarding any problem and not merely the possibility or probability. It is a unique contribution of Jainism to Indian Philosophy. Syädvadin is a popular appellation given by later philosophers to Jainas. Dharmakirti, Arcata and Santarakşıta used this term for the Jainas in their respective works.
Syat is generally rendered into English as "may be" or "perhaps" which is far from appropriate. As a matter of fact, there is no appropriate word for Syat in English, but we can translate it with the term relatively which is closer and more suitable to convey the significance of the theory. The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of relatively as having mutual relations, corresponding in some way, related to each other”. 70 H,G.A 71 Van Zeyst writes: "When a function indicates some difinite relationship in which the object stands to some other object, the term must be described as "relative". There is a word Kathañicit in Sanskrit literature which is used as a substitute for Syāt by Jaina as well as non. Jaina philosophers. These connotations tally with the inner meaning of Syāt.
Further Syidvāda makes an effort to respect other doctrines by warning us against allowing the use of eva or only to proceed beyond its prescribed limits and penetrates the truth patiently and non-voilently. The uniqueness of Syadvāda as the most peaceful and non-violent means of arriving at the Truth through argumentation is emphasised by Tatiya in his assessment of Syādvada in Jaina Philos phy. "It is the attitude of tolerance and justice that was responsible for the origin of the doctrine of non-absolutism (anekantavāda ). Out of universal tolerance and peace-loving nature was born cautiousness of speech. Out of cautiousnes of speech was born the habit of explaining a problem with the help of Siyavāya ysyädvāda ) or Vibhajjavaya. This habit again developed into a non-absolutistic attitude towards reality.72

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It would be helpful to remember that the nature of realityis determined in Jainism by refering to the dravya ( matter Kşetra (place ), kala ( time) and bhava ( state ). This is the positive factor. The negative factor is that of refering to the negative counterpart ( nisedia-pratimukha ) or a particular object such as the absence of ghatatva (jarness ) in cloth and. vice versa. This negative factor constitutes the full-fledged. nature of the Jar as the positive one.
According to the conception of Syādvūda, both identity and difference must exist in reality. But opponents categorically deny this claim on the ground that a dual character can never exist in an entity. The critics of Syädvāda object to it on the basis that Syādvāda gives rise to the following erroneous results78 : (i) Virodha or self-contradiction, like hot and cold, (ii) Vaiyadhikaranya or absence of a common abode, (iii) Anavastha or regressus ad infinitum, (iv) Sankara or confusion. (v) V yatikara or exchange of natures, (vi) Samsaya or doubt. (vii) A pratipatti or non-apprehension, and (viii) Uvayadosa or fallacies on both sides. Out of these defects Virodhadosa is considered by them to be the most glaring. The Jainas do not accept that there is any sell.contradiction in Syüdväda. They put forth three possible forms in which virodha can occur :
(i) Vadhyaghatakabhava or destructive opposition, like mongoose ( nakula) and the serpent ( ahi ).
(ii) Sahānavasthanabhūva or the non-congruent opposition, like $yama and pita in a ripe mango.
(iii) Pratibadhya pratibandhakabhāva or the obstructive oppo. sition, like the moonstone which protects the sun's rays. And they maintain that these forms of virodhas cannot effect their theories of reality. They also say that an entity is anantadharmatmaka (having innumerable characters ) which cannot be perceived at once by ordinary men until and unless, we conceive the problem through negative and positive aspe. cts (bhavabhāvātmakatattvena ), identity-in-difference (bhedabhedena) eternality-in-non-eternality (nityānityatmakenal

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universal-cum-particular elements ( saminyavišeşatmakena ), or substance-in-modes ( drauyaparyāyāimakena ). Each and everything is related to the four-fold nature of itself (svadrayacatufaya ) and is not related to the fourfold nature of the other than-itself (paradravyacatustaya ). For instance, the jar is the jar in itself, but it is not the jar in relation to others, as cloth, fruit, etc. No one can deny this dual characteristic of a thing, otherwise its negative aspects or non-existing characteristics would disappear and their modes would commingle. 14
According to the Jainas, the non-existences ( abhāvas ) are of four kinds, viz. Prágablāva, Pradhvarasābhāva, Itar elar. ābhāva and Anyonyabhāva.
( 1 ) Prāgabhāva means the non-existence of an effect in the cause.75 The substance is eternal which can neither be newly created nor completely destroyed.76 The effect accordingly does not exist before its own existence, which is a result of causes. The substance in itself is an effect and the modes are the causes. That means the pre-modes are the pragabhāva of post-inodes. The clay or the curd is the Prāgabhāva of jar (ghuid ) and butter (ghrta ). If this previous negation were not there, the product clay or curd would always exist in their elfects jar or butter.
(ii) Pradhvams.ibhāyr means the non-existence of an effect after destruction.?? Prāgabhāva is the upādāna ( material cause ) and Pradhv am sābhāva is the Nimitta (determining cause ). The first destroys then the other originates. If this negation were not in an entity, milk would still be there in curd.
(iii) Itaret arābh iva or Anyonyābhāva means mutual no2existence. Each entity exists in its nature which cannot be transferred to others. The cow cannot possess the form of the horse.78 If this mutual negation were not in entities, the horse would become every other thing.
(iv) Atyantābhāva means the absolute non-existence of an entity. As for instance, the sky-flower ( ākāśa-kusum )

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( 191 ) or Sada-vişāna ( horns to the hares ), which have no existence at all.79
On the basis of above exposition, the Jainas endeavour to answer the objections raised by opponents through the different aspects of the nature of reality. They are dealt with below : The Identity-in-difference ( bhedabhedātmaka )
The identity-in-difference is the main figure which guards the Jaina standpoint against the attacks of opponents. The exposition of this central idea has been a necessary talk to the Jaina Acāryas. They postulate a theory that a substance is neither absolutely different than other things, nor absolutely alike. Otherwise how could the quality ( gana ) and qualified ( guni ) be distinguished ?
An entity is characterised by birth (utpāda), death (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya ). All entities are included in this definition Sat or substance is abheda and guņas are bheda. Apart from guņas or paryāyas, there is no existence. There. fore, reality is called the identity-in-difference. Eternal-cum-non-eternal aspects (nityānitātmaka )
In the same way the substance can be nither absolutely eternal nor absolutely non-eternal, but it is eternal-cum-noneternal. If we do not accept this, causal efficiency (arthakriya ) would not be possible with an entity and all the transaction would fail due to the static or perpetual fluxive character of thing. Pre-existence would be 'dis-connected with the post-existence. How then could the doer and enjoyer be recognized ?
Likewise, reality is universalized-cum-particularised, onecum-innumerable, etc. from real and practical standpoints. There is no self-contradiction in this recognition, since the nature of reality is conceived relatively. Saptabhangi or a theory of Sevenfold predication
Saptabhangi or the theory of sevenfold predication is a method of cognition to apprehend the correct nature of reality

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through a sevenfold relativist dialectic method. It is treated as complementary to the Syādvāda doctrine. Akalanka thinks of it as a way which considers the modes of a thing in, a positive ( vidhimukhena ) and negative (misedhamukhena ) manner without incompatibility in a certain context. The sevenfold predications are as follows:
(i) syadasti oi relatively it is, (ii) syanna sti or relatively it is not. (iii) syūdasti nästi or relatively it is and is not. (iv) syadavaktavya or relatively it is inexpressible. (v) syādastyavaktavya or relatively it is and is inexpressible. (vi) syārnastyavaktavya or relatively it is not and is
inexpressible. (vii) syädastinästyavaktavya or it is, is not, and is inexpr
essible. Here the radical modes of predication are only three in number-syādasti, spīyānnasti, and syadavaktavya which construct other predications by combining themselves. The first two modes represent the affirmative or being ( astitva ), and the negative or non-being (nastitiva ) characters of an entity. The third is a combination of both being and nonbeing. The fourth is inexpressible in its predicate. The remaining three modes are the combined forms of the first, second, and the third. The first two and the fourth predications are consequently the assertions of simple judgements, and the remaining four of complex judgements. According to the mathematical formula, the three fundamental predications make seven modes and not more than that.
The first mode represents the existence of the jar (ghata ) and the non-existence of cloth pata ) in the jar. The second predication shows the negative aspect of jar that it does not exist as cloth or anything else. There is no contradication here, since the predication asserts the relative and determinate abstraction. The third mode offers a successive presentation ( kramar para ) of negative and positive aspects of an entity, while the fourth one offers a simultaneous presenta

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tion ( saharpaga ) of the two concepts. According to Jaina conception, one word represents one meaning. The relation between a word and its meaning is described by Jaipas as Vacyavacakaniyama. The characters of being ind non-teing in the jar cannot be expressed at once (Jugapat ). Therefore this predication is designated as inexpressible ( avaktavga ). The remaining are the combined modes derived from bringing together the first, second and the third with the fourth one, which express the complex judgements.
Each of these modes contains one alternative truth while altogether contain the complete truth Observing the importance of this method Padmarajiah says : "The whole method, therefore, may be said to be one which helps a patient inquiring mind in its adventure of mapping out the winding paths running into the faintly known or unknown regions of reality and bringing them within the bounds of human knowledge."80 Syadváda conception in Buddhist literature
The rudiments of the Syädvāda conception are found in Vedic and Buddhist literature. It appears to have originally belonged to the Jainas, if we accept Jainism as pre-Vedic religion, and all the subsequent thinkers adopted it as a common approach to the nature of reality. That is the reason why various forms of Syādvada are found in the different philosophical schools.
Vedic literature records negative and positive atti. tudes towards problems. The Rgveda which is supposed to be of the earliest period, preserves the rudiments of this doctrine in the Nasadiga Sekta. It manifests tbe spiritual experience, of the great sage, who describes the nature of the universe as:
Nāsadasinno sadāsīt tadänīm nāsidrajo no vyomāparo yat. Kimābarībah kuba kasya sarmannambhak kimāsidgahanat gabhiran. Na mộtyurāsidamtam na tarhi na rātryā ahna ăsit praketa h Anidavātam svadhayā tadekam tasmāddhânyanna parah kim canāsa.
"There was not the non-existent nor the existent, there not the air nor the heaven which is beyond. What did it
13

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contain ? Where? In whose protection ? Was there water, unfathomable, profound ? There was not the becon of night, nor of day. That one breathed, windness by its own power. Other than that there was not anything beyond". 81 This indi. cates inexpressibility ( anirvacani yatva ) about the nature of the universe,
The Upanişadic period presents this speculation in a more concrete form by taking positive steps. The Chandogyopanizados represents the idea that Being ( sat ) is the ultimate source of existence, while some Upanişads uphold the view that Nonbeing is the source of Being ( asad va idan agra asit. talo vai sat ajāyato ),88 On the other hand, some Upanişads assert that it is both, Being and Non-being (sadasadavarenyar ), 84 and some later Upanişads maintain that Non-being cannot be expressed by using a particular name and form ( asad avyāksta nimarüpan ).85
Thus the concept or Syadvada found in Vedic literature commences from polytheism and goes on to monotheism and is later replaced by monism. This indicates that the theory was not rigid. The later developed Vedic philosophical systems were also influenced by this idea and they concived the problems from different standpoints with the exception of that of complete relativism.
The Naiyāyikas, 86 though they used the word anekanta,87 could not support the Anekāntavada entirely and they accepted the atoms, soul, etc. as having absolute unchangeable characters. The Vedānta philosophical attitude also runs on the same lines. Even considering a thing through empirical ( vyävahārika ) and real (paramārthika ) standpoints, it asserts that all standpoints are inferior to the standpoint of Brahman.88
The Syadvūda conception is found in a more developed form in Buddhist literature. The Brakmajalasutta refers to sixty-two Wrong-views ( micchaditthis) of which four belong to the Sceptics. They are known as Amardvikkhepika ( who

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being questioned resort to verbal jugglery and eelwriggling) on four grounds 89 The Commentary of the Dighanikaya presents its two alternative explanations. According to first, Amaravikkhepika are those who are confused by their endless beliefs and words. The second explanation gives meaning that like a fish named amara, the theory of Amaravikkhepikā runs hither and thither without arriving at a definite conclusion.90
The first of these schools is defined thus: "Herein a certain recluse or brahmin does not understand, as it really is, that this is good (kusalan ) or this is evil (akusalam). It occurs to him: I do not understand what is good or evil as it really is. Not understanding what is good or evil, as it really is, if I were to assert that this is good and this is evil, that will be due to my likes, desires, aversions or resentments. If it were due to my likes, desires, aversions, or resentments, it would be wrong. And if I were wrong, it would cause me worry ( vighuto) and worry would be a moral danger to me (antarayo ). Thus, through fear of lying ( muṣāvadabhaya), and the abhorrence of being lying, he does not assert anything to be good or evil and on questions being put to him on this or that matter he resorts to verbal jugglery and eel-wriggling, saying: I do not say so, I do not say this, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny the denials (I do not say, "no no" ).91
According to this school, it is impossible to achieve knowledge which is a hinderance to heavan or salvation (Saggassa c'eva maggassa ca antarayo ).92 The second and the third school of sceptics do not assert anything to be good or evil through fear of involvement (upadanabhaya) and a fear of interrogation in debate (anuyogabhayā).
The fourth school of Sceptics followed the philosophy of Sanjaya Belaṭṭhiputta who fails to give a definite answer to any metaphysical question put to him. His fourfold scheme or the five-fold formula of denial is based on the negative aspects which are as follows :98

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(i) wam pi me no ( I do not say so ). (ü) tathapi me no (I do not say thus ). (iii) anlathapi me no (I do not say otherwise ). (iv) no ti pi me no (I do not say no ). (v) no no ti pi me no ( I do not deny it ).
This formula is applied with regard to the answering of several questions as :94
(i) atthi paro loko ( there is another world ). (ii) natthi paro loko ( there is not another world ). (iii) atthi ca natthi ca paro loko (there is and is not another
world ). (iv) Natthi na natthi paro loko ( there neither is nor is not
another world ). The commentary offers two explanations of the meaning of this formula. According to the first explanation, proposition ( 1 ) is an indefinite rejection or denial (aniyamitavikkhepo ). Proposition ( 2 ) is the denial of a specific proposition, e. g. the eternalism (sassatavāda ) when asked whether the world and the soul are eternal. Proposition ( 3 ) is the denial of a variant of ( 3 ) e. g. the rejection of the semi-eternal theory ekaccasassatari ), which is said to be somewhat different from (annatha ). Proposition (4) is the denial of the contrary of (2), e. g. the denial of the nihilist theory (ucchedavādami ) when asked whether a being (tathā gato) does not exist after death. Proposition (5) is the rejection of the dialectian's view ( takkivādam) of a double denial, e. g. denying the position if asked whether a being neither exists nor does not exist. after death.
According to the second explanation, Proposition (1) is the denial of an assertion e. g. if asked whether this is good, he denies it. Proposition (2) is the denial of a simple negation, e. g, if asked whether this is not good, he denies it. Proposition (3) is a denial that what you are stating is different from both (1) and (2) e. g. if asked whether his position is different from both (1) and (2) (wbhaya annathā ) he denies it. Propo

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sition 14) is a denial that you are stating a point of view different from the above e. g. if" asked whether his thesis (laddhi) is different from the three earlier points of view (tividhena bi na hoti ), he denies, it. Proposition (5) is a denial of the denials, e, g. if asked whether his thesis is to deny everything ( no no te ladhhi ti) he denies it. Thus he does not take his stand ( na tiffhati) on any of the logical alternatives (eka. smin pi pakkhe ).
Both these explanations show that the fifth proposition of Sanjaya's philosophy is the rejection of denial. Therefore only four propositions of the theory remain. They can be compared with the first four predications of the Syädvāda theory of Jainas:
(i) Syādasti (relatively it is ). (ii) Syānnāsti ( relatively it is not ). (iii) Syādasti nāsti (relatively it is and is not ). (iv) Syadavaktavya ( relatively it is inexpressible ).
Observing this similarity, several scholars like Keith® are Teady to give the credit to Sanjaya for initiating this four-fold predication to solve the logical problems. On the other hand, some savants like Jacobi think that in opposition to the Agnosticism of sa õjaya, Mahāvīrā has established Syādvada. Miyamoto asserts in his article "The Logic of Reality as the Common Ground for the development of the Middle Way" that Saijaya's" system is quite close to the Buddbist standpoint of the indescribable or inexpressible."97
These views are not quite correct. As a matter of fact, the credit should not go only to Sanjaya for the adoption of the four-fold scheme, since there were other schools of sceptics who also accepted a similar scheme. Silańka referred to four groups of such schools Kriyāyādins, Akriyāvādins, Ajñānavādins, and Vaineyikas. These are further sub-divided into 363 schools based on purely the nine categories (nava padārthas ) of Jainism.98 These schools were mainly concerned with four quesitions. They are as follows:

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(i) Who knows whether there is an arising of psycholo gical states ! ( Sati bhiootpattin ko vetti )?
(ii) Who knows whether there is no arising of psychological states ? ( Asati bhavotpattih ko vettih ) ?
(iii) Who knows whether there is and there is no arising of psychological states? ( Sadasati bharotpattih ko vettih)?
(iv) Who knows whether the arising of psychologica) states is inexpressible ? ( A vaktarg'o bhāvotpattih ko vettih )?
These questions are similar to first four Syadvāda predications. The main difference between the Predications of Sceptics and Jainas was that the former doubts or denies the logical problems altogether whereas the latter asserts that they are true to a certain extent,
Makkhali Gāsāla and Syādvāda
Makkhal Gosāla, the founder of the Ājivika sect and an earlier companion of Nigantha Nātaputta, has contributed to the development of the Syadvada conception. He considered problems through the three-fold standpoints, called Trirašis, a short version of Sapta-bhangi.
On the basis of the Nandi sūtra commentary, Basbam observes: "The Ajivika heretics founded by Gosāla are likewise called Trairasikas, since they declare everything to be of triple character, viz. : living, not living, and both living and not living : world, not world, and both world and not world; real, unreal, and both real and unreal, in considering standpoints (naya regarding the nature of substance, of mode, or of both. Thus since they maintain three heaps (rāśi) or categories they are called Trairāśikas". Further he says "the Ajivikas thus seem to have accepted the basic principal of Jaina epistemology, without going to the over-refined extreme of Saptabhangi, as in the orthodox Jaina Syadvada and nayavada."100
This reference indicates that the Ajivikas were aware of the Saptabhaigi of the Jaina logic and they reduced them to three. Dr. Jayatilleka remarks on this reference : "But jud

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ged by the fact that the three-fold scheme of predication is simpler than the four-fold scheme of the Sceptics and Buddhists and the corresponding seven-fold scheme of the Jainas, it would appear to be earlier than both the Buddhist and the Jain schemes, with which the Ajivikas could not have been acquainted when they evolved theirs," Further he says, "In fact, it can be shown that in the earliest Buddhist and Jaina texts the very doctrine of the Trairasikas, which seems to have necessitated the three-fold scheme, is mentioned, thus making it highly probable that it was atleast earlier than the Jain scheme". He accounts for this view by saying that "while the earliest stratum of the Pāli Nikayas knows of the four-fold scheme, one of the earliest Books of the Jain Canon, the Sutrakṛtanga, which makes an independent reference to this Trairasika doctrine, does not mention the seven-fold scheme, although it is aware of the basic principles of Syādvāda, 101
Here Jayatilleke tries to prove that that three-fold schame appears to be earlier than the Jaina scheme. He gives a reason in support of his view that the Satrakṛtanga does not mention the Seven-fold scheme. I too hold the three-fold scheme had come into existance earlier than the four-fold scheme. Dighanakha pribrajaka, who seems to be a follower of the Parsvanatha tradition, also maintains, as we have already found, this scheme.
As regards the absence of the reference in the Sutrakṛtanga, it should be remembered that it is not totally unaware of the basic principles of Syadvada, as Jayatilleke himself accepts. It is said that "the wise man should not joke or explain without conditional propositions."10% He should "expound the analytical theory (vibhajjavāyayṁ ca vyagrejja) and use the two kinds of speech, living among virtuous men, impartial and wise.108 Further it does not deal with the Jaina philosophy. It is a concise compilation of the Jaina doctrines as well as others of that time. It was, therefore, not essential to deal with Syadvāda in detail. Kundakunda, who flourished in the first

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century B. C. or in the beginning of the Christian described to the Saptabhangi, himself in the Pañcastikayasara. He says that "Dravya can be described by the seven-fold predication: (1) siya atthi or syādasti, (ii) siya nathi, or syannāsti, (iii) siya uhayam or syadastinasti, (iv) siya-avvattavva or syaduvaktavya (v) siya atthi-avvatavya or syädastyavaktavya, (vi) siya natthi avvattavva or [syännästyavaktvya, and (vii) siya atthi natthi avvattavva or Syadstinastyavaktavya :
Siya atthi natthi uhayam avvattavvam puno ya tattidayath. Davvam khu satta bhangam adesavasena sambhavadi,104
This means that the Sy advada and its predications were well known at the time of the Buddha, and upto the time of Kundakunda they were developed still further. This Buddhe and Syādvāda
era,
During the Buddha's time there were certain philosophical points which became the subjects of violent debate. Having realised the futility of such debates the Buddha became an analyist, like the Jainas.105 In the Dighanikaya the Buddha is reported to have said that he had taught and laid down his doctrines with categorical (ekan sika) and non-categorical (anekamsikā) assertions. 108 The theory of Four-Noble-Truths is an example of the former, and the theory of Avyakatas is
of the latter.
Here the term ekamsiku and anekamsika are very similar to ekantavada and anekantavada. The former is concerned with the non-Jaina philosophies and the latter with the Jaina philosophy. The difference between the Buddha's and Nigantha Natputta's standpoints is that according to the former's conception the non-categorical assertions are not true or false, from some standpoint or another, unless we analyse them; while the latter upholds the view that all the statements are relatively (syat) correct, i, e. they contain some aspect of the truth. The theory of Avyakata does not consist of any such quality.
The Buddha adopted the four-fold scheme to answer the logical questions of that time as outlined below:

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( 1 ) attki ( it is ). (ii) matthi ( it is aot). (iii) attki ca natthi ca ( it is and it is not ), and (iv) i'ev'atthi na ca natthi ( it neither is, nor is not ).
This four-fold scheme has been used in several places of the Pāli Canon. For instance : (i) Channan phassāyatanananasesaviraganirodha attk
aññam, kinci ti ? ( is there anything else after complete detachment from and cessation of the six spheres of
experience ? ). (ii) Channan... natth' annan kifici ti ? (iii) Channan...atthi ca n'athi c'anñan kinci ti ? (iv) Channar n'ev'atthi na n'atth' annan kiñci ti ?
Miyamoto observes that the seven-fold scheme of the jainas is equivalent to the four-fold scheme of Buddhists in the following manner : (i) Syādasti
1 (ii) Syāndāsti (iii) Syädastināsti
I11 (iv) Syādavaktavya (v) Syādastyavaktavya (iv) Syānnāstyavaktavya - IV (vii) Syādastinástyavaktavya
But this observation is not perfectly right, since the Jainas pondered over the prblems more profoundly than the Buddhists. It would be more appropriate if we think of the first four propositions of the Buddhists; But there are differences between the Jaina and the Buddhist schemes. According to the Jaina scheme, all the seven propositions could be true from relative standpoints, while in the Buddhist scheme only one proposition could be true, the propositions are not considered logical alternatives in Jainism as considered in Buddhism
It is more probable that the Buddha's Catuşkoti formula has been influenced by the four-fold formula of Sanjaya,
11

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(202) although there are also traces of the influence of the seven-fold formula of the Jainas, Such formulas, it must be remembered, were commonly accepted at that time by teachers with different attitudes. Nigantha Nātaputta and Syādvāda in Pāli Literature
The Pali Canon considers Anekantavada or Syadvada a combination of both Uccedavāda and Sassatavāda. As we have already mentioned, Buddhaghosa was of the opinion that Nigantha Nātaputta presented his views in contradictory ways, 108 We have seen how this was due to the fact that Buddhaghosa could not understand the real nature of Syadvada.
We know that Jaina Philosophy considers problems neither by absolute eternalism nor absolute nihilism, but erernalismcum-nihilism. Apart from the confusion regarding Sassatavada and Uccedavada, there are no explicit references to Syadvada in the pāli Canon. The absence of direct references does not mean that the Syadváda conception was not a part and parcel of the doctrines of the Nataputta at that time. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that Buddhist books appear to be aware of some characteristics of Syadváda, which might have belonged to the tradition of Pārsvanatha.
In the course of a discussion, the Buddha says to Saccaka, who was a follower of the Parávanātha tradition and converted later to the Nataputta's religion, that his former statement is not keeping with the latter, nor the latter with the former (na kho te sandhiyati purimena va facchiman pacchimena vā purimam). 109 Here attention is drawn to self-contradictions in Saccaka's statements. This might have been an early instance of adducing self-contradiction ( svälmavirodha ) as an argument against Syadvada. This has been an oft-repeated criticism against Syādvāda by opponents of different times.
Likewise in the course of a conversation held between Nigantha Nätaputta and Citta Gaha pati, the latter blames the former for his self-Contradictory conception. He says; If your former statement is true, your latter statement is false, and

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if your latter statement is true, your primer stateppent is false. (saca furiman saccari, pacchimam te miccka, sace pacchimarts saccan purimam te miccha ).110
Another reference found in Pali literature helps us to understand the position of Syādvada. The Dighanahha of the Majjhima Nikaya mentions the three kinds of theories upheld by Dighanakha Paribbājaka. They are as follows :111
(i) Sabbarij me khamati ( I agree with all ( views ), (ii) Sobban me na khamati ( I agree with no ( views ). (iii) Ekhaccom me khamati, ekaccara me na khamati ( I agree
with some ( views ) and disagree with other ( views ). The Buddha criticises Dighanakha's views in various ways, and expresses his own views towards the problem. Dīghanakha's views are similar to the predications of Syādvada, and represent its first three bhangis as follows: (i) Sabbam me khamati
= Syādasti, (ü) Sabban me na khamati
= Syāpnāsti. (iii) E kaccam me khamati: ekaccam
me na khamati = Syādastināsti.. Now the problem is to consider to which school of the ught Digbanakha belonged. According to the commentary on the Majjhima Nikaya, he is said to be a holder of the view of Ucchedavāda,112 which is a part of Syādvāda school in tbe opinion of Buddhaghosa. He might have belonged to Sañjaya's. of Paribbājakas who were followere of Parsvanātha tradition converted later to Nātaputta's religion before he joined the Buddha's order. 118 Dighanakha was a nephew or Sanjaya. It seems, therefore, that he was a follower of Jainism, This. inference may be confirmed if Dighanakha can be identified with Dighatapassi of the Upalisutta of Majjhima Nikāya, who was a follower of Nigantha Nātaputta.
In the above propositions of Saccaka, Cibua wathapard and Dighanakha Paribbājaka, we can trace the first foor predications ( including Syadavaktadya) of Syādvada concoption of Jainism.
It is not impossible that the term Syat had been used by Jainas in the beginning of each predication justly correctly

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the others' views on the basis of non-absolutism. The word Syat (Siya in Pali), which indicates the definite standpoint towards the probelems, is also used in the Cala Rahulovadamutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, where the two types of the Tejodhatu are pointed out in definite way. 114 It seems that the word Syat originally belonged to the Jainas and was later used by the Buddhists in a particular sense. The defect of self-contradiction in Syadvāda conception of the Jainas is a criticism levelled against it by the Buddhists. It happened so, only because of ignorance of the meaning of Syat. As a matter of fact, the Jainas had concentrated their attention on the controversial points in different theories of then philosophers and had tried to examine their views from different standpoints. By this method the Jainas could figure out the real nature of reality and consider the problem in a non-violent way. The refutation of Syadvāda in Buddhist literature
The Buddhist Acāryas at different times criticised the Syadvada conception of the Jainas on the grounds of selfcontradiction, commingling, doubt, etc. The main arguments of the foremost Buddhist logicians were as follows: Nāgārjuna and Syādvada
Acārya Kundakunda and Umāsvāti were among the earliest who established clearly the theory of the triple character (production, destruction, and permanence) of reality in Jainism, Nagārjuna ( about 150-250 A. D.), the propounder of Sanyavāda made the charge that the theory of triple character is itself a self-contradictoy formula, as it cannot be associated with reality, since such a thesis is faulty on account of anavasthadosa (regressus ad infinitum ).115 Dharmakirti and Syādvāda
In the Pramāna-Vārtika ( svavrtti) Dharmakirti remarks that the Anekantavāda is mere non-sensical talk ( pralāpamatra ). He says in the course of refuting the Bhedabhedavada theory that the Digambaras ( Jainas-Anhrikas ), who present

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their doctrines in a fantastic way, could be refuted in the same way as the Sankhya philosophy, which thinks of the nature of reality as absolute difference (atyantābheda). He then men. tions that the Jainas hold a view : "All is one, and all is not. one sarvath sarvatmakan na sarvam sarvatmakari ).116
Dharmakirti tries to clarify his remark by presenting a traditional example of the Jainas. The Jainas explain their theory of the nature of reality with the illustration of a golden jar ( svarnaghata ), where gold is considered the general, and not the particular, character. Here Dharmakirti points out why the Jainas do not recognize the jar or pot itself as a general character, since Dravyatva is in all of them according to. Jainism.
Dharmakīrti is of the view that the Jaina theory of dual character, viz, universal and particular, is so formulated that the character of particularity is relegated to the background and made less significant. He explains this with reference to the famous example of camel and curd. If the particularity which distinguishes camel from curd or vice verse is not an important factor, he says one may as well eat a camel when he wants to eat curd. He tries by this argument to demolish the Jaina theory as he understood that curd is not only curd by itself (Svara pena ) but also camel in a relative sense (pararapena ). According to Dharmakirti, there cannot be a universal character between camel and curd and even if such a character exists, their mutual difference or particularity is all that matters for both identification and use. 117
Against the Jaina conception of the universal character of a thing, he says : if all realities are sat (being or isness), there would be no difference between knowledge and word (dhi and dhvani ) that imparts a knowledge, which is quite impossible.
Therefore Syādvāda conception in Dharmakirti's opinion is defective, 118 Phalĩakaragupta and Syadvada:
Praikäkaragupta (660-720 A. D.), the well known commentator and a pupil of Dharmakīrti, also refutes the Jain theory

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of reality. His criticism is very similar to the criticism of Nagarjuna. Prjñākara says: origination, destruction, and permanence cannot exist together. If is destroyed how can it be a reality; if it is permanent, how can there be destruction, and if it is permanent, it should always be in mind. He then argues that the reality cannot be realised as both eternal and non-eternal. It should be accpeted as either eternal or noneternal.110 Here Prajñākara pointed out that the triple character of a thing is a self-contradictory theory.
Arcaṭa and Syüdvāda :
Samantabhadra's view mentioned in the "dravyaparyayayoraikyaṁ” and “saṁjñāsaṁ khyāviśeṣāśca" has not been refuted by Dharmakirti. Whatever may be its reason, it is criticised by his commentator Arcata (about the seventh century A. D.) who followed the arugments of Nagarjuna.120 He says: origination and destruction cannot exist together in one dharmi, since they are contradictory in character. The argument "they take place relatively" would not solve the question, because in the course of origination and destruction, perma. nence would not be there, and likewise in the presence of a permanent character the other two would be absent. Therefore, a triple-charactered nature of reality as the Jainas assert, is not possible according to Arcata's way of thinking, 121
An another place he tries to refute the Bhedabhedavāla { identity-in-difference) conception which means the substance and its modes cannot be separated from a realistic stendpoint, but they are different in name, number, nature, place, etc, from a practical viewpoint. It appears as if he does not see much difference between ubhayavida of Vaisesikas and bhedabheda of Jainas. That is the reason why he conceives the substance as being completely different from its modes.
He refutes the view first in prose under the heading "Anhrikadisammatasya dravyaparyayah bhedabhed apakṣasyanirāsaḥ" and then the same arguments are repeated in fourty-five stanzas, The gist of them is as follows:

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The difference between substance and its modes by the name, number, etc. and unity of them into one by place, time, and nature, is not possible as the nature of reality, since an entity cannot assume more than one character. 122
He further points out that samjia is the cause of an intimation ( sanketa) which depends on desires. How then can one differentiate it by name, since it is also one, not two? Words are fictitious, the difference therefore, would be imaginative, Sankhyabheda also is not possible as there is a difference between vacya (to be spoken ) and vacaka ( speaker ), which is also kalpita (imaginative ).
Further be points out that without the destruction of a substance there would be no destruction of its modes. Hence, they can be identified neither as bheda nor as abheda. If the modes are different from the substance, words would not be connected with them. If they are accepted as non-different, their natures would be one. How then could th- Laksa. nabheda be applied ? Karyabheda is also not possible as there is no difference in nature,124
The theory "substance and its modes are not different (abheda ) in place, time, nature" is also defective in Prajñakara'sviews. He says : "position, the form, smell, juice, touch etc. are different in modifications. If the nature stays with substance and modes in the form of destruction and otherwise, the substance would be two as ghata and pața, not one which removes abhedatva with them. Further he says, if the bhedabkeda is accepted, the bheda ( difference would be fictitious due to not leaving the abheda ( identity), and hence abheda would be proved as false in character. Here Arcata thinks in terms of ubhayavāda that if the substance and mode are completely different, all the evils of both the "identity. view and difference-view" will lay upon this conception, 124
Arcaţa refers to the Jaina's view that they analyse reality. through sui-generis (Jatyantara ) which exposes the combination of identity and difference, although it makes a distinction

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between the particular and general character of reality. For instance, Narasimha is a combination of man and lion, which is not self-contradictory because of the theory of sui-goneris.
Opposing this theory, Arcața points out thāt Narasimha is a compendium of atoms which cannot be transformed into narasimha. Due to a combination of the forms which is called labalar pa, a place of existence of diverse naturas. How thea could a unity in nature be proved ? Arcața finally remakrs that this is the philosophy of block-heads ( darsanaklo' yan viprāyaso madhamatinań ):
This criticism is based on the understanding that the nature of reality is completely in two different forms. Tbis is the view of Vaiseşikas, not Jainas, This criticism made by Aranyakas is answered by the later Jaina philosphers such as Vădirājasūri, Anantavīrya, Prabbācandra. Santarakṣita and Syadvāda
Santarakṣita examined the Syādvāda doctrine of the Jainas in a separate chapter of his Tattvasangraha. The main defects, according to him, are as follows:
If the oneness between substance and modes is real ( agauna ), then the substance also should be destructive like the form of the successive factors or those successive factors themselves should be comprehensive ( anugatatmaka ) in their character, like the substance. Therefore it should be admitted that either there is absolute destruction of all characters or it consists of the elments of permanence, exclusiveness and inclusiveness, which can-not exist in any single thing, 126
Hence he turns to the universal and the particular character of an entity. He says: there would be a comingling (saskarya) and a confusion ( Sandeha ) in the dual nature of reality, the result of which would not be belpful to decide which is general and which is particular ( parasparasvabhavatve syatsamānyavisesayob, sūrkaryatattvuto nedaro dvaitapyamupapadyate ).127
If the general and the particular are regarded as nondifferent from one and the same thing, how could there be

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any diference in the nature of these two characters And being aon different why should it not be regarded as one PT
The diversity of properties ( dharmabheda ) also cannot be accepted there, since the diversity or plurality cannot be one. As regards the potencies ( faktinām ), their diversity is merely a creation of the speakers' desire to speak. As it is crystal clear that both, affirmation and denial, cannot exist in one thing. we bava to regard the self-contradiction between unity and plurality. Hence, he observes that any diversity of properties of a single entity can only be a creation of fancy (kalpita ). 188
In diversity ( stage of an entity which is excluded from several like and unlike things to this and that ) even a single thing may be assumed to have numberless diverse forms; but in reality no single thing can reasonably have two forms.
Santaraksita further gives a traditional example of Naris in ha. He says : such entities as nara ritha and others which have been described as possessing dual characters are also not real but conceptual ( kalpita ). These arguments of Santarakṣita resemble those of Arcata. 129
Thus he arrives at the conclusion that duel character of a thing is figment of mere imagination. Karņakago min and Syādvāda
Karnakagomin in the Pramanavārtikasvavfititika refers to the Digambaras' theory of relativity, according to which they accept the mutual negation ( anyonyabhava) to distinguish the realities, so that they should not be confused. He then starts, to criticise the view that the distinction among things, cannot be identified by mutual Degation, which is possible in entities. produced by non-different causes. If they originate from. different causes, how does anyonyābhava come into existence 7180
Further he tried to show the defects in the Jaina's theory of universal-cum-particular character of urdhuatāsāmänyatmaka and tiryaksamanyātmaka vastu. He then rejects the theory saying that there should be either abheda or atyantabheda

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Both characters cannot co-exist in the same substance. Hence the urdhvatasimanya could be destroyed because things are not permanent.
As regards tiryaksamanya, that is also defective in character in his opinion. He says: if the universality were in the substance, the ghata ( pot) and pata (linen) or dadhi (curd) and ustra (camel) would be identical. Hence a shape or a water-pot should be found in cloth and a curdeater should consume a camel.181 Therefore Syadvada doctrine is false (mithyavada) in his opinion.
Thus Karnakagomin makes his refutation following Dharm. akirti's arguments, and tries to prove that the dual characteristic of an entity is not possible as it invites serious defects in the theory.
Jitari and Syādvāda
Jitāri, another Buddhist logician wrote a complete book Anekantavādanirasa to refute the Anekantavāda. Padmaraja summarizes its arguments as follows :
When the Anekantavidin maintains that dravya and paryuya are identical, owing to the identity of their nature, it means that he affirms nothing short of their total identity (ekarupataiva) Difference, based on (the secondary consideration) number etc. (sankhyadi ), will then be fictitious ( Kalpanamatrakalpitaḥ syāt). For, a real difference ( paramarthikobhedah ) between the two cannot proceed from the identity of their nature (na hi yayoh svabhavabhedah tayoh anyathā pāramar
thiko bhedah sambhavati 182
Or conversely, when the anekantavādin pleads that dravya and paryaya are different, it means that he affirms their unqualified difference. Identity will then be fictitious. For real identity (svabhavabhedah) cannot proceed from the difference which is their basic and total nature. The truth about the whole position, according to Jitari, is that one cannot have identity as well as difference by the same nature (na ca tenaiva svabhavena bhedascabhedaśca ).

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Padmarajah then says : "the entire argument, from the Buddhist side, may be said to have been grounded on the basic truth of the fundamental Buddhist dictum : "It cannot be right to affirm and deny a thing at once, affirmation and denial being mutually contradictory,"188
Likewise the same arguments are found in the Vijkaptimatratasiddhitika According to that, both the affirmative and Degative aspects cannot exist in one thing.134 Evaluation
To sum up, in very ancient days there was a three-fold or four-fold common predication to satisfy the burning philosopical questions of 'mind. Pali. as well as Jain Prakrt literature, mention them as Scepticism or agnosticism, The Anekāntavada (non-absolustic standpoint ) which strives to incorporate the truth of all systems, has two main organs that of Nayavāda (the doctrine of standpoints), and Syadvada ( the dialectic of conditional predication ). The whole theory is more renowned by the name of Syädvāda and its apprehenders are called Syādvadinah or Jainas.
The nature of reality is the main problem of philosophy. On the basis of Syādvada the Jainas established the dual character of reality. In the medieval period of logic the non-Jaina philosophers, especially the Buddhists, such as Nāgārjuna, Dharmakirti, Prajñākara, Arcața, Sāntarakṣita and Jitāri attacked the theory and blamed the Jainas for several defects and ultimately called their theory Mithyävada and Jalmakalpita,
The Jaina philosphers tried their best to explain the theories which these critics held to be defective. Akalarka ( 720-780 A. D. ), who can be hailed as the propounder of the Jaina logic, answered the opponent' arguments. The entire Jaina tradition appears to have more or less followed him in their endeavours to refute the objection brought agajnst Jaina conceptions.
The main arguments of the Buddhists to reject the Syādvāda doctrine, as we have already mentioned, is that the two

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characters cannot exist together in one reality. Otherwise there would be a self-contradiction of affirmative and aegative characters. Other defects to be mentioned are confusion and commingling that follow self-contradiction.
As a matter of fact, the Buddhist philosophers misunderstood the theory of Syādváda, since they treated the dual characteristic of the nature of reality as absolutely different from each other. This theory originally belonged to the vaibeşikas, and not the Jainas, The theory of the Vaiseşikas, called Ubhayavada is criticised by the Jainas themselves, who observed in it the defects of self-contradiction, commingling, doubt, etc. The Buddhist philosophers have found the very same defects in the Jainas' theory of Syädvāda.
The foremost argument against this doctrine is the violation of the Law of Contradiction, which means that "be" and not be cannot exist together. But the Jainas do not accept this formula in toto. They say that the validity of the Law of Thoughts should be considered by the testimony of experience samvedana ) and not by pre-conception. Experience certifies that the dual character of entities exists in respect of its own individuality and does not exist apart from and outsitde this nature ( saruamasti svartpena parar peņa nāsti ca ), as we have already seen. In relativistic standpoint both, being and non-being, can exist together. Everything is real only in relation to and distinction from every other thing. The Law of Contradiction is denied absolutely in this respect. The point is only that the absolute distinction is not a correct view of things, according to Jainism.
As regards the triple character (origination, destruction, and permanence ) of reality, the Jainas support it through anyathanupapannatvahetu as explained before. The Buddhists themselves are of the view that a thing perishes immediately after its originatior, and this continuity never ends. The continuity of moments or similar moments (sajatiyakşanas ) is considered the material cause (wpadana karana ). This is

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in fact nothing but only thrawoya or a permanent feature of the Jainas and the Santana continuity of the Buddhists. Without accepting dhraupya or santana, memory (smpti ), recognition (pratyabhijñāna), bondage-salvation (bandhamoksa), etc. would disappear from field of experience. Therefore, the permanent element is essential for the circulation into the modes.
The permanent element possesses the character of identity in-difference (bhedabhedavāda). Identity is used in the sense that the substance and its modes cannot be separated from a realistic standpoint, and difference in the sense that they are different in name, number, etc. from a practical viewpoint.185 In other words, the modes are not absolutely different from substance, as in that case, the modes would not belong to the substance. With past reflections the substance is transformed into present modes and proves itself as a cause of future modes that are necessary for the understanding of the permanent character of an entity. To understand the difference between gugas and paryayas, the terms sankhya, lakfaga, etcare used. From a realistic standpoint there is no such difference which could indicate the separation between them. After refuting the objections of Arcața, Vādirāja comments that the latter is not capable of finding defects in the Syädvada by his powerful
voice. 186
To preserve the unity of terms in relation to different characters, the Jainas assert an element which is called sātyantara ( sui generis or unque ). They maintain that a reality is a synthesis of identity-in-difference and each synthesis is Tatyantara, 187 This is illustrated by the instance of Narasimha which is criticised by the Briddhist philosophers. Prabhācandra says to response to the Buddhist criticism about narasimha that it is neither nara por simha, but because of their similarities they are called Narasimha. While having mutual separation they exist non-differently in relation to substance and like waves in water they emerge and sink in each other. 16 Thus,

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there is no self-contradiction in dual characters of an entity in relative sense, as the Jainas assert.
Dharmakīrti urged with regard to the universal-cum, particular character of reality that this theory compelled one to recognize the curd and camel as one entity. In connection with the fallacious middle term ( hetvabhasa ) Akalanka points out. that the Buddhist philosophers discover defects to censure the Jainas on the basis of invalid arguments (Mithyūjati ).139 For instance, Dharmakirti ignores the form ula sarvobhāvā stadatatsvabhavah and tries to establish equality between curd and camel. Hence he questions why one who intends to eat curd, does not go to eat a camel in place of curd, since according to Jainism, both have the universal character, 140
Akalanka tries to disarm critics like Dharmakirti by pointing out the deffinition of sāmánya and višesa. Vădirāja, a commentator of Akalanka, explains that the similar transtormation of a thing into its modes ( sadrasapariņāmo hi sāmānyan ) is called Samanya.141 According to this definition, the modes of curd and camel are not similar, they are really completely different, as well as similar. How is it then possible that these elements. are mixed ?
Another argument used for the refutation of the Buddhist standpoint is that the identity is only among the modes of, curd, as hard, harder, hardest, etc., but they have never any sort of relation with the modes nf camel. Hence, they can never be mixed with each other. Vadırāja refers to a traditional fiction that Dharmakīrti proved himself as a Vidaşaka (jester) because he did not possess a good knowledge of the opponents theory. 142
Akalan ka again criticises the view of Dharmakirti saying that if the argument tbat "the atoms of curd and camel may bave been mixed sometimes before and the atoms of curd have still the capacity to be transfered into the modes of camel" is. to be raised, it would not be advisable. For the past and the future modes of an entity are different, and all transactions and

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transformations run according to present modes. The curd is for the purpose of eating, while the camel is for riding. The words for them are also completely different from each other. The word "curd" can be applied only to curd, not camel. It is the same case with the word "camel" too.
Akalanka further points out if in relation to past modes, the unity between curd and camel is derived, then Sugata was mrga (deer) in his previous birth and the same Mrga became Sugata. Why then should Sugata only worshipped and Mrga be considered edible p148
1. Sugato'pi mrgo jato mrgo'pi Sugataḥ smṛtaḥ, Tathāpi Sugato vandyo mṛgah khadyo yatheṣyate. Tathā Vastubaladeva bhedäbhedavyavasthiteḥ. Codito dadhi khadeti kimuṣṭramabhidhāvati.
Thus he tries to prove that as the transformations of sugata and Mṛga are quite different, and their being worshipped and eaten are related to their modes, all substances have the capacity to be transformed only to their possible modes, not to others. Therefore the identity between the modes of curd and. camel cannot lead to the truth. Their transformations do not have the Tādātmyasambandha and Niyata-sambandndha.
In fact, Akalanka and other Jaina Acaryas tried to meet the arguments of the Buddhist philosophers in forceful words. The innumerable examples of scathing attacks against Buddhists. can be seen in Akalanka's and other Jaina Acāryas' works. The caustic remerks' such as jādyahetavah, ahnikalakṣaṇam, paśulakṣaṇam, etc. made by Dharmakirti himself on opponents' views. are criticised by Akalaňka in the Pramana-saugraha.145
Thus the Jaina Acaryas do not accept any self-contradiction in the Syadvada conception. Likewise, the other defects such as confusion, commingling, etc. which are based on the selfcontradiction, are also proved as "mithyadosaropana". And, according to them, the criticism made by the Buddhists or others is not effective in this context. As a matter of fact, in their opinion, Syadvada has no defects provided it is clearly understood.

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Conclusion
From these comments we may conclude that :(i) The rudiments of sgādpāda conception of Jainas can
be gleaned from early Pali literature, Vil) Syadvada conception originally belonged to Jainas
and all the subsequent thinkers adopted it in a somewhat different way as a common approach to
conceive the nature of reality. (iii) Syadvāda is neither Ucchedavada nor Sassatavada
as Buddhaghosa understands, but is permanence-inchange. According to this theory, the triple characters, viz, origination, destruction and permanence, can abide
with a substance at one and the same time. (iv) Arthakriya ( causal efficiency ) is the essence of
Syādvāda conception. According to the Jainas, the arthakriya is possible in only the dynamic ( pariņāmi)
substance, (v) The nature of reality is universal-cum-particular;
and the nature of relation of an entity is deliverance
of the direct and objective experience, vi) There is neither self-contradiction nor any other defect
which the Bubbhist Acāryas tried to point out.

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NOTES
CHAPTER I
Aatiquity of Šramana System 1. Upadhye, A. N. Mahavira and his Philosophy, Lord
Mahāvira and his Teachings, Bombay, 1961. 2. Eliot, Sir Charles, Hinduism and Buddhism, Vol.
1. p. 53. 3. Williams, s. M. Sanskrit-English Dictionary (s. v.
Brāhmana ), p. 741. 4. See the Upanişad and Vedānga literature. 5. Chaup. Viii. 7. 1. 6. Dasgupta, S. N., A History of Indian Philosophy.
Vol. 1. p. 22. 7. Rgveda, 10. 90. 12. 8. A. i. 167: D. iii. 16; S. i. 45; Dhp. 164. 9. Sanskrit. English Dictionary ( Williams), s. v. Sra
mana, p. 1097. 10. Samacariyā samaņo ti vuccati, Dhp. 388. Cf. Samitā
pāpattā Samaņā, DhA, iii. 84. 11. Mahabhasya, 2. 4. 9. 12. Jetly. Historical Position of Jainism, Ahimsa and
Jainism, Bombay, 1959-60. 3. Deo, S. V., History of Jaina monachism, p. 56; also
see R. Garbe, Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 12. :
Jainism, Mrs. N. R. Guseva. P. 4-18. 14. Vrätya ăsidiyamāna eva sa Prajāpatim samaisyat......
Atharavaveda, 15. 1-4; The Pāli literature ( Theraga tha ) also refers Vrātyas. Confer; Ananda Guruge, Vidyodaya Lipi, Colombo, 1962, p, 71, where arguments are adduced to prove that Vrātyas of an Eastern Indian were the survivals of Indus Valley Civili. sation,

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( 218 ) 15. Caturo samaņā na pasicamatthi te te avikaromi Säkk
haputtho. Maggajino maggadesiko ca, magge jivati
yo ca maggadūsin, Sn. 83-4. 16. Yama assa vadam parihānamā bu, apahatam pañha
vimānskesū. Paridevati saccati hinavādo, upaccago mam'ti anutthunanti. Sn. 827: Ete vivādā samaņesu
jātā, Sn, 828. 17. 54, 151, 786 etc. 18. Ye kec'ime titthiya vādasila, ājivikā vā yadi vā
Naganthā. Pañjāya tam nātitaranti sabbe, thito
vajantat viya sighagamini. Sn. 381. 19. Shastry, N. Aiyasvami, śramanas or non-Brahmanical
Sects, The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. 1. p. 389 ff. p. 949, 342 b.
21. ibid. p. 949. 2. Cf. yato, kho, Kassapa, bhikkhu averan avyapajjam
mettacittan bhāveti, āsavānam khayā anāsavam cetovimuttim paññavimuttın digtheva dhamme sayari sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati, ayam vuc
catı, Kassa pa, bhikkhu, Samaño ti, D i. 170. 23. Hirottappani, parisuddho kāyasamācāro.........M. i.
271; D. i. 170. 24. Op. cit. Vol. I. p. 386 ff. 25. Op. cit. p. 45. 26. Samvāyānga, 10.1.
27. ibid. 12.2. 28. v. i, Pārājika.
A. i. 229 29. The sixty two Micchadiţthis as mentioned in the Brā.
hmajäl sutta are as follows in chief eight heads : viz. Sassatavādin, Ekaccasassatavādikā, Antānantikā, Amarāvikkhepikā, Adhiccasamuppannika, Uddhama
ghātin, Ucchedavādin and the Ditthadhammavādin. 30. The Sūtraktatānga refers to 363 views under four
main sects, viz. Kriyāvāda, Akriyāvāda, Ajñānavāda
and Vina yavāda, 1. 1 12 ff. 31. Lalitavistara, ed. Lesmanna, Vol. 1 p. 380 ; Maha
vastu, 32. Saddarma Pundarika, (Kern ), pp. 275-6. 33. Brahatkathākoša, intro. p. 13. 34. See the Buddhist literature; Sn., Selasutta.

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43.
( 219 ) 35. A. 276.
36. Utia. Chap. xxv; 37. Uvasaga. pp. 108, 38. Dialogues of Buddha, U, intro., p. 165, 99. Op. cit. 40. Cf. D. i. 5; ii. 150; A. i. 110, 173 sq; Iti. 64 :Sn. 189 :
V. ii. 295. 41. Upadhyaya, B. D., Sanskrit Sahitya kā Itihasa, p. 148. 42. Mahabhi sya. 2.4 9.
Kalasi Rock. Edict, 11; Girinara Rock Edict, IV, VIU,
etc. 44. Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India, p. 49; The
Buddha and Five Year After Centuries, p. 3. 45. History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas, p. 10. 46. D. i. 49. 47, Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, pp. 275. 48. History and Doctrines of Ajivikas. p. 10. 49. Pūraņa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosala, and Sañjaya Bela
tthiputta are referred to in Jaina Literature. 50. Kārato kho kārayato.... panam atimāpayato...natthi
poñiñassa agamo. D. i. 52. 51. Pre-Buddhist Philosphy, p. 279. 52. Sūkļ. 1 1 12. 15. v. p. 209. 53. Early Monustic Buddhism, Vol. 1. p. 35. 54. S. jii, 69; V. 126. 55. A. iii. 383; also see J. v. 227. 56. A. iv. 428.
57. DA. i. 142. 58. DhA; Cf. Divyavdana, Pratihāryasūtra, pp. 100. 59. Bhavasangraha, 175-179. 60. D. i. 53.
61. M. i. 513; Milindapanha, 4-5. 62. Darsanasūra, 176. 63. I. Cf. Sükr. 2. 1. 345. 64. A. i. 33.
65. A. i. 289. 66. DA. 1. 166 f. 67. Mahābhasya, 5. 1. 154. 68. Sutra, 216. 69. N'tthi ayam lako ti pataloke ţhitassa pi ayam loko
n'atthi, n'atthi paraloke ti idha loke thitassa pi paraloko n'atthi. Sabbe tattha tattha'eva ucchijanti ti dasseti. Swm.Vil. i. p. 165,
70

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(220)
70. op. cit. P. 166.
Also see Uttaradhyayang (SBB ), p. 62.
Modgalāyana was also a name of Jaina clan:, Şükr 7-8 71. N'atthi...... dinnam, n'atthi yittham, n'atthi hutam,
.....ucchijjanti vinaseanti, na hontiparam marana. (Digha, I, p. 55. A remarkable parallel to this passage is to be found in the Satrakstanga ( II. i. 9 Fol. 375 FF. I. SBE, XIV. II. i. 15-17; History and doct. rines of AjivikasBasbam. PP. 15-16. DA. i. 144., MA. i. 422-3. Satt' ime......kāyā akatā akata-vidhā animmitā animmātā vañjhā kūtatthā esika-tthāyi-tthitā. Te na iñjan ti na viparināmanti na afnam-aħnam vyābā - dhenti n' alam anbaaññassa sukhāya vā dukkbāya va sukkha-dukkhāya vā. Katame sattā ? Pathavikāyo āpo-kāyo tejo kāyo vāyokāyo sukhe dukhe jivesattme.....Tattha n'tthi hantā vā ghātetā vā sotā vā Sāveta vā viññātā vā viññāpetā vā. Yo pi tinhena sat thena sisam chindati na koci kiíci jīvitā voropeti, sattaññam yeva kāyānam antarena sattha-vivaram anupatati. D. i. 56. Compare with the Satrakstānga 1.1. 10, fol. 280 ff. SBE. XIV, i. 20-4. History and
doctrines of Ajivikas, p. 16. 74. DA. i. 144. 75. "Atthi paro loko ?” ti iti ce tam pucchasi," atthi paro
loko" ti iti ce me assa, "atthi paro loko" ti te mam vyäkareyyān. Evarh pi me no. Tathā ti pi me no. Aññathā ti pi me no. No ti pi me no. No no ti pi me
no....D. i. 58. 76. V. i. 42, 391. 77. Kuştaḥ śrīvīranāthasya tapasvi Maudgalāyanah.
Sișyah Śrīpārsvanāthasya vidadhe Buddhadarśanamh. Suddbodanasutam Buddharh paramātmānambrabit. AS, 6.
78. DPPN, P. 1000. 79. Tarhyastīti na bhanāmi, nāstiti ca sa bhaņāmi, yadapi
ce bhaņāmi, tadapi na bhaņāmiti darşanamastviti kascit, so 'pi pāpiyãn...... Affasahatri, p. 129.

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82.
80. Dighawi kaya, Brahmajālasutta. 81. Sabbavariyuto ti sabbena papavāranena yutto. Sab
baväridhuto ti sabbena pāpavāranena dhutapäpo. Sabbavāriphuţtho ti sabbena papaväranena phuttho...... Catatto ti koțippattacitto. Sum. Vü. 1. p. 168. Nigantho cātuyāmasamvarasamvuto hoti. Katha ca... Nigantha sabbavārivẫrito ca hoti, sabbavầridhuto ca. sabba phuttho ca. evaņ kho, Mahārāja, Nigaạtho...... Ayam yuccati, Mahārāja, Nigapt ho gatatto ca yatatto
ca thitatto ca ti. D. i. 37. 83. Jaina Satras, pt 11. SBE. xiv. intro. pp. xx xxi. 85. D. i. 58.
84. S. iv, 317-8. 86. A. iii, 276-7. 87. Milinda Panha,:59 FF. Sum. Vil. i. 168. 88. A. ï. 199.
89 M. i. 374. F. 90. v. i. 233. F.; A. iv. 179 F, See also the Telovada Jataka.
91. M. ii, 31, A. i. 220. F. 92. M. ii, 31; A. iii, 74. 93. Early Monastic Buddhism, Vol. 1 p. 40. 94. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism (s. v. Ajivika ), p. 330. 95. M. i. 238 96. Ye keci 'ime titthiya vādasilā Ājīvikā vā yadiva Niga
ņthā. Paññāya tamn nätitaranti sabbe thito vajantam
iya sīghagāmin. 321. 97. Sandakasutta.
98. DHA. I, 309. 99. ibid. pp. 390.
100. p. 427. 101. Sugiura, Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan,
Philadephia, 1900, p. also see ERE, i. p. 269. 102. Abhidhāna Ratnamāla, ii. 189; Vaijayanti, Ed.,
Oppert. p. 202, v, 16. 103. ERE. i. pp. 266-7. 104. History and Doctrines of Ajivikas, p. 184. See, Jaina
Sahitya ka Itihāsa : Purvapithika, pp. 463 for refuta
tion of the theory of Hoernle. 105. Te Gosālakamatānu sārinā Ajivikādayah (sic)
Boţikā vā. Söky. Com. i. 3. 3. 14. fol. 92. Eke ye

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parasparopakārarahitam darśanamāyantark ayaksatakakalpah, te ca Gosalakamatānusārinā Ajivika
Digambarā vā, ibid., 3. 3. 8. v. p. 91. 106. ERE: i. p. 262. 107. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, pp. 332 f. 108. Varahamihira in his Bșhajjūtaka ( 15. 1. ) also refers
to the Ājivikas. For a full discussion of this reference see Ajaya Mitra Shastri, Barahamihira's reference to
the Ajivikas, J. 0. I. Vol. xii, p. 44-50. 109. Samyagdarsanajñānacāritrāņi moksamārgah, Tsü. l. 1;
Cf. Majjhima Nikaya, Sammadifthi Sutta. 110. Majjhima Nikāya, Mahamalunkya Suttam. w Bandhahetvabhāvanirjarābhyam krtsnakarm avipra
mokṣo mokşah, Tsū. 10. 2; SS. p. I. 112. Gataddhino visokassa, vippamuttassa sabbadhi.
Sabbag anthappahinassa, pariļāho na vijjati. DhP. 90. 113. M. i. 03; ii, 214 ff. 114. The Buddha condemned the Niganthas as unworthy
in ten respects: they were without faiths, unrighteous, without fear and shame, they chose wicked men as friends, extolled themselves and disparaged others, were greedy of present gain, obstinate, untrustworthy, sintul in their thoughts and held wrong views., A.
v. 156. 115.
IA. IX. 162; quoted by Kamata Prasada, Bhagawana Mahavira, P. 263 fn. 4.
2. Jainism And Its Literature
There are two great cycles (kalpas) Utsar pani (Evolution) and Apasar pani (Involution ). Each of these is divided into six periods; (i) Sukhama sukhamå or the period of great happiness. (ii) Sukhama or the period of happiness, (iii) Sukhama dukkhama or the age of happiness and some misery, (iv) Duhkhamāsukhama or the age of misery and some happiness, (v) Duhkhama or the age of misery. The present era is the fifth one

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( 223 ) which is to last twenty-one thousand years. Two thousand and five hundred years have already passed.
The present Kalpa is Utsarpani, in which twentyfour Jain Tirthanikara appeared: (1) Rşabhadeva (2) Ajitabātha (3) Sāmbhavanātha (4) Abhinandananātha (5) Sumatinātha (6) Padmanātha (7) Saparávanatha (8) Candaprabha (9) Puspadanta (10) Sitalanátha (11) Sreyānsanātha (12) Vāsupujya (13) Vimalanātha (18) Arahanatha (19) Mallinātha (20) Munisuvratanatha (21) Naminātha (22) Neminātha (23) Pārsvanātha, and (24) Māhāvira ( Vardhamāna ) or Nigantha Nata
putta of Pāli literature. 2. Kalpasætra, SBE., xxii., pp. 281-285 : Harivaruša-Pur.
āna, 8. 15. Mahapurana of Puşpadanta, Sandhis 1-3. Atharvaveda, Chapt. xv.; They may be purified with the vrātyastoma method and treated as follower of Vaidic religion. ( Kātyayana and Apastambha Srauta. sutra ). Munayo vātarasaņah pisanga vasate malā (Rgveda, 10. 136, 2-3), Kesyagpiñ kesi visarh (ibid. 10. 136. 1), and Kakardave Kraşabho yukta asid ( ibid. 10. 102.6 ) etc. are the references to prove the
antiquity of Jainism. 4. Rgveda, 10. 102. 6. 5. Visu Porāna (ed. Wilson ), 2. 1. p. 163; Bhagavat
Purana, 5. 3. 6.; Markandeya Purānā,50; Kurma Purāna 41; Agni. 11; etc. Jain, K. P., JA. Vol. 1 No. ii., 1935, p. 19. Also see Modern Review, August, 1932-Sindhu Five Thousand Years Ago. Ramchandran, T, N., Hadappa and Jainism,
Anekānta, October, 1972. pp. 159. 7. JBORS. iii. 465. 8. The Philosophy of India, p. 60. 9. Weber, ( Indische Studian, xvi. 210; Jaina Itihāsa
Series, No. 1. p. 6; Jainism in North India, introduction. ) adduces four points of coincidence, which, according to his opinion, prove that Jainism, has branched off from Buddhism, ( Indische Alterthumskunde,

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( 224 )
iv. p. 763 ). This theory has been refuted by Jacobi.
See Jain Sūtras, 1. intro, xxi. 10. IA., Vol. ix. p. 163. 11. The Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist terms, p. 184. 12. Mañjusrimülakalpa, 45. 27, ed. Ganapati Shastri,
Trivendram, 1920; Buddhist Sanskrit Dictionary,
(3. v. Nirgrantha ); Mahavastu, vol, 1. p-369. 13. p. 286.
14. ThegA., i. 68. 15. S., ii, 192.
16.1., i. 36. 17. ThegA., i. 335; Ap., i. 287; see also, iii. 70, and
PV A., 75. 18. Ap., i. 50.
19. Bu., xxi. 122. 20. J., vi. 133 ff. 21. M. iii. 70; Ap., i. 107. 22. Ap., i, 205; ThegA. i. 115. 23. Dhammajataka. 24. p. 212. 25. DPPN., S. V. Dhamma, 26. A., iji. 373. 27. Isigilisutta. 28. Dialogues of the Buddha, iii p. 60. 29. Paccesanti paká-senti tatolā tattala tatotla.
Ojasi tejasi tatojasi sūro rājā Ariţth Nemi. D., iii. 291. 30. Mhv., trans, 72. n. 3. 31. Mhu., x. 63-72. 32. A., i. 290; ii. 11, quoted by J. C. Jain, in the Life in
Ancient India, p. 19; also see .Kalpasūtra 6.149; Schubring, Die Lehre Der Jainas, p. 24.
Jacobi, SBE., xiv. pp. intro., xiv-xxi; Dasagupta, History of Indian Philosophy. I. p. 173. 33, p. 236.
34. A., ii. 196 ff. 35. M., i. 371 ff. 36. ibid., 392 ff. 37. ibid., 237 ff.; MA., i. 450. 38. ibid., 371. ff. 39. S., iv. 312 ff. 40. Ninkha ( Nika) is a Deva .who visits the Buddha in
the company of several other Devas and utters a verse in praise of Niganţha Nataputta: Jegucchi tapako bhikkhu Cātuyāma susamvuto. Nittham sutam ca ācik kham na bi nūda kıbbisi siya.

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1. Mahāpagga
42. S. i. 65. f. 43. J. iü., 1.
44. M. i. 371 ff. Jaya Dhavalā, Vol. i. p. 78. 46. Tiloyapannatts, 4. 550. 47. Acāranga, 2. 3. 402,; Kalpasūtra, 110. 48. According to the Svetāmbara tradition, however,
Mahāvira was married. But the tradition is now challenged by the result of researches done by Shri Parmananda Shastri, Sec, Anekanta, kirana 9, March,
1955, p. 233. 49. SnA. ii., 432; Tiloya Paņņatti, 4.550. 50. MA., 423; Cf. MV., 1.113.5; Mahavyutpatti, 3550;
Sp., 276;3; Divya., 143.12; AS., i. 231.5; LV., 380.12 Bodhisatyabhumi, 246.6; Cf, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, p. 300. The Dharmottarapradipa and the Tattvasangraha refer to Nigantha Nätapuļta as
Vardhamāna, 3.11. 51. See in detail my article "Bhagavana Mahavira aura
Mahatm7 Buddhake vyaktigata samparka", published
in Jaina Milana, Vol. I. 1968. 58. D. i. 57. 4. D.. jii. 119 ( Pasādika Sutta ); M., ii, 244 ( Samagama
Sutta ); Here the Buddha is referred to have seated at Sāmagāma among the Sakyas; D., iii, 209 f. Here
he is said to have seated at Pāvā. 55. SBE., Vol. xxii, intro., P. xxvii. 1884. 56. SBE., Vol. xxii. intro., p. xxxvii. 1894. 57. Evam ca Mahāvīramukte varsasate gate.
Pañcāsadadbike Candragupto bhavenușp ▸ 8.339. 58. 1A., 1914, pp. 118; also see the Cambridge History of
India, Vol. i. pp. 139-140, Charpentier here thinks that the Vikrama era commences 410 years after the
Mahävira's death, 527-60-467. B. C.). 59. History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas, p. 74. 90. ibid., 75.

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( 226 )
61. An Advanced History of India, pp. 85-6. Jacobi also
seems to have supported this view later on, see his
article Jainism, in ERE., 7. pp. 465. 62. Uvāsagadasão, ii. p. Iu, n; History of the Ajivikas.
p. 76. Vikkamarajjarambhā parao siriviranibbu bbaniyā. Sunnam muniveyajutto vikkamakalau Janakale. Vicārasreni.
IA., Vol. 43. 65. Cunningham, A. Book of Indian Eras, p. 49. 66. Sattari cadusa djutto tinkālā Vikkamo havai jammo.
Athavarsa bālalilā sodasavisehi bhammie dese. Nandisangha's second Prakrita Pattabali. This verse is also found in the Vikramı Prabandha : see, JSB,
kirana, 4, p 75. 67. Subhasitaratnasandoha of Amitag ati. 68. IA., 1914, pp. 118. 69. Acarungasutra, SBE., Vo. xxii., intro., p. xxxvii. 70. Jam rayanin sıddhig 10 arahā titthaikaro Mabāviro.
Tam rayaạimavantie abhisıtto pālao rāyā. Pālagaranno sattho para panasayam viyāņi mandina. Muriyānam saţthisayam tisā puna pūsamittäņart.
-Titthogali Paifraya, 620-621. 71. Epitom of Jainism, Appendix A, p. iv. 72. Trisast aśālākī purişacaritra, 10. 12. 45. 73. An Advanced History of India, p. 202, 74. Mahavira aura Buddhaki Samasa mayskata, Anekūnta,
16. 1-4. Agama aura Tripitaka: Eka Anušilana,
pp. 47. 75. Vir Nirvana Samvat aura Jaina Kala Ganana, 1930. 76, Jaina Sahitya kī Itik īsa ( PQrua-pithika ), p. 336-7. 77. Chronical Problems, Bona, Germany, 1934; Jaina Bha
ratiya, Varşa 10, anka, I. p. 5-21. 78. Tirtharkara Mahīvira, Bombay, 1963, Vol. 11. p. 319
324,

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( 227 ) 79. JBORS 1. 203. 80. Hindu Sabhyatā ( Hindu Civilization ), pp. 216. 81. Bhagawana Mahāvira aura Mahatma Buddha, pp. 100. 82. Prasasti Khandya, padya, 1. 83. Law, B. C; Some Jaina Canonical Satras, p. 178. 84. Bharatiya Vidva. Var a, 3, arka, 1. 85. Darsana Digdarśana, p. 444, fn. 3. 86. Jain Sahitya aura Itihasa, Pp, 424. 87. Majjhima Nikaya 88. Kalpasūtra, 128. 89. M. ii, 243 F.; D. iii, 117, 210. 90. Dialogues of the Buddha, iji. p. 112. 91. DA, ii, 906; MA. 11, 51; 851; DPPN., S.V. Niga
ntha, 92. Avūšyaka mül., bhā., v. 127. 93. Jain, Jyoti Prasad, Bhāratiya Itihīsa : Eka Drasti,
Khanda 1. 94. MA. i, 423. 95. DPPN. Pt. II. p. 64. 96. For detailed discussion please see my article "Schism
in Jaina Order". Jain, M. K., Jaina Darsana, p. 14. It is to be mentioned here that the Digambaras relate their scriptures to Gautama Ganadbara, the first and direct disciple of Mahāvira, while the Svetämbaras relate to Sudharma Svāmi, the successor of Gautama Ganadhara.
Tiloya Pannatti, 4. 1476-90. 100. See Jaina Sahitya ka Byahad Itihasa, Vol. 1-5 101. History of Jajna Monachism. 102. Jaina Šilālekha Sangraha, Vol. 1. p. 1. 103. The Svetambara tradition believes in his coming
back to Magadha and then going to Nepal for Mahā.
prāņadhyāna, Parisistuparvan. 104. Samacaritataka of Samayasundarigani, c. Doshi,
Vechar Das, Jaina Sāhityamām Vikāra thavathi thayeli bani, , ;
97
98.
99.
Tina

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( 228 )
105. Winternitz, M. A.; History of Indian Literature, Vok
ii. p. 434-5. 106. History of Jaine Monachism, p. 22. op. cit., p. 22. 107. Sükr, v. 136. p. 253. 158. Milinda Panha, p. 19. (Bombay edition); Dha. Vol.
i. p. 129. 109. Eliot, Sir Charles, Hinduism and Buddhism, Vol. i.
p. 117; A History of Jaina Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 170. 110. Winternitz, M. A., History of Indian Literature, Vol.
ii. p. 426. 111. Sarvithasiddhi, I. 20. 112. Tiloga pannatti, 4. 1476-90. Also see the Harivansa
parana, Dhavala, Jayadhavala, Adipuriña, and Sruta
vatara; Jayadhavala; Vol. i. intro. p. 47 50. 118. Dhavala, Vol. i. intro., p. 23-30.
11. Syadavada parikšā. 115. iraja referred to Sanmati in the Parsvanathacarita
as a Commentator on the Sanmati which would be the Sammati Prakarana of Siddhasena. Another contribution made by him is referred to in the Mallisena. prasasti of Sravanavelagola. There is mentioned his
work "Sumatisaptaka" which is not available. 116. EL., Vol. xxi. intro, p. 45, 117. TS. intro. p. 92. 18. Nanyathanupapappatva yatra tatra truyen tin.
Anyathānupapannatvaro yatra tatra trayeņa kim.
ibid. 1369. 119. NVVI. Vol. ii. p. 234. 120. SVT.p. 371; TSV. p. 205; Pramānaparikşa, p. 72;
JTV. p. 135; SKT. p. 225. 121. "Dbarmkiti ke Trilaksanahetupara Pátrakeśarikā
Akramana", Bharatiga Prachina Vidysa, 12. pp. 71-80,
History of Indian Logic. p. 187. 123. Shastri, K. C., Svāmi Pattakesari aura vidyāpanda,
Anekants, Varsa l. P. 67.; NKC. 1. intro. p. 76
122.

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( 229 ) 194. ibid. p. 75.
125. EC. Vol. vüi, No. 39. 126. SVT. Vol. 1. intro. p. 86. 127. Jaina Darsana, p. 23. 128. VBH. 95.
129. SVT. Vol. i, intro. pp. 53-62. 130. sid. p. 69-70. 131. D. i. 47 f., M. ii. 2 f. 032. Mi, 31. 380.; A. i. 220 f. 133. ibid. 371 ff. 134. ibid, 392 ff. 135. S. iv. 312 ff. 136. Dutt, N. Early Monastic Buddhism, Vol. I, p. 145. 437, S. . 68; M. i. 205; 400, 426. 138. DPPN. (s. v. Migara ). DhA. i. 387 ff.; AA. i. 220;
MA. i. 471. 139. A. i. 25; AA, 1i. 482 1,
40. M. i. 91 fi. 141. M. ii. 214 ff; M. ii. 31; A. i. 220; M. 92 B. 142. A. ii. 196 ff. 143. Jaina Sutras, Vol. xxii. p. 194. 144. M. i 234; MA, i. 450. 145. MA. i. 450. 146. A. i. 220-ff.
147. V. 233. f; A. iv. 179 f. 748. M. ii. 243. ff; D. iii. 117, 210. See Early Monastic
Buddhism, p. Vol. I. pp. 145 ff. 149. Mahavamsa, 10. 53-99 ( tram). 150. Mahavamsa, pp. 67. 151. ibid. 10. 65.
152. ibid. xxxiii. 43-44. 153. ibid, xxxiii. 79. 154. Mahavamsati ka, p. 444. 155. See, Harivamsaputāna; Pauma Cariu, etc. 156. Vividhatirthakal pa, pp. 93. 157. ibid. p. 102. 158. Brahat kathākośa of Harišeņa, p. 200. 159. Karkandu cariu, pp. 44-69. 160. Mahamayari, ed. by Sylvian Levi, JA. 1915, pp. 40;
cf. The Society of the Ramayana, p. 68. 161. J aina Šilalekha Sangraha, p. 133 162. Pre-Buddhist Religious Beliefs, JRAS. (Ceylon),
Vol. xxxi, No. 82, 1929, P. 325,

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( 230 ) C. Buddhism And Its Literature : 1. See my article Historicity of the Buddha published in
the Mahabodhi Journal,
Buddha, Trans, by Hoey, p. 6. 3. Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 142-3.
Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfange des Buddhism, p. 296. Referred by T. W. Rhys Devids in his book Origin
and Growth of Religion, p. 27. 6. Studies in the Origin of Buddhism, p. 547. 7. Bea), Life of Buddha, SBE. Vol. xix. p. 141; Buddhi
stic Studios, pt. 11; p, 118 8. M. ii. 77. 9. So...... ...sa to va abhikkamami sato patikkamami,
yava udabindumhi me dayā paccupatthita hoti, ma 'ham khuddaka pane visamagate sanghatam apadessan ti, M. i. 78. Also see Early Buddhist Theory of
Knowledge, p. 465. 10. M. i. 238.
11. Darsanassa, 6-9. 12. According to Buhler, Pitaka is a hasket, in which
manuscripts were preserved (Indian Studies, iii, 2nd Ed., Strassburg, 1898, p. 86 ff ), Rhys Davids, ( SBE Vol. 35, p. 28 ) and Trenckner (JPTS. 1908 p. 119 f.) think that Pitaka does not mean "recep. tacle" but rather tradition". See also Winternitz's
Indian Literature, Vol. i. p. 8. in l. 13. Mahā vamsa, 14. Kern : Manual of Indian Buddhism, p. 2. In the opi
nion of Franke, the Maharagga and Cullavagga of the Vinaya Pitaka would be later then the Dighanikaya (PTS. 1908, pp. 8ff , 58 fl. See Indian Literature,
p. 21 fn. 3. 15. D. ii. 42. cf. DHP. 185. 16. Rhys Davids, Buddhism (American Lectures ), p. 62

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( 231 ) 17. M. i, 133; Müindapafiha, 345 etc. According to ren
cords of Mabāyāna Buddhism, there are twelve Adgas,
Manual of Indian Buddhism, p. 7. 18. Childers, Dictionary of Pali Language, under there
words. 19. Buddhist India, pp. 121-2. 20. A History of Pali Literature, Vol. i. p. I. 21. ibid., p 42. 22. Milindapanha, ( Trenckner Ed.), pp. 13, 190, 21 13;
A History of Pali Literature, p. 12. 23. A History of Pali Literature, p. 12. 24. DA. iii. 117, 220 25. MA. ii. 243.
CHAPTER II
Jaina Philosophy
1. Ghosal, S. C., Pañcastikāg'a, intro. p. xxix. 2. Utpådavyayadhrauy ayuktam sat, TSa. 5. 30. 3. PK. 10.
4. ibid. 13. 5. ibid. 8.
6. ibid. 10-11. 7. DS. 23.
8. ibid. 25. 9. PK. 7.
10. ibid. 104. 11. DS. 24–48. 12. ix. 113. 9. 11; x. 14. 3-10; A History of Indian Lito
rature, p. 2. 13. xviii. 2. 27. 14. vi. 2. 2. 27; 6. 3. 1; xi. 7. 2. 23; A History of India
Logic, p. 2-3. 15. BUP. iv. 4. 19; cf. KUP. i1. 4. 10-11. 16. 1. 1. 20; 1. 2. 18-19; 1. 2. 22; History of Indian Literan
ture, p. 3. 17. Agamadastra, 111. 18. sankhya Bhagya, Brahmasītra, 11.1.9.; Studies in Jaina
Philosopky, p. 125. 19. Studies in Jaina Philosophy. p. 125-8.

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( 232 ) 20. Sātkhya Kārika, 62. 21. Nydgaspirabhāsya and Vratti, 1.1. 10; Pratasta padon
bhasya, p. 643-44. studies in Jain Philosophy. 22. Milinadapatha, pt. 1. 23. TSK. I. 4; 1. 2. 24. Samayasara, 38.
25. ibid. 49. 26. DS. 2.
27. TSü. 5. 23. 28. ibid. 5. 24-25.
29. PK. 15. 30. ibid. 77.
31. TSi. 6.2. 32. ibid. 10. 2.
33. SS. p. I. 34. PK. 90-96.
35. DS., 19-20. 36. PK., 107-108., DS. 21. 37. Atthi kho vo Niganthā, pubbe päpakammam katar
tam imaya kațukāya dukkarakärikāya nijjir etka; yarh panettha etarahi kâyena samvuta, vācāya sain vatā, manasā samvutā, tam āyatini papāssa kammassa akaranam; iti purānamh kammānam tapasā vyantibhavā, navānarh kammānamh akaraņā, āyatim apavas
savā kammakkhayā, kammakkhayā dukkhakkhayo, dukkhakkhyayā vedanākkbayo, vedanākkhayā sabbant dukkham nijjin anh bhavissati 'ti. Tarh ca panamba kam ruccati ceva khamati ca. tena camham attamana'
ti. M.i. 93; cf. M. ii. 31; N. ii. 214 FF; also.see A. i. 220. 38. D. i. 31-39.
89. ibid, i. 32. 40. ibid. i. 31-39.
41. ibid. 1. 32. 42. Udāna, p. 67.
43. D. i. 187; M. i. 431; 44. Cf D. i. 195; S. ii. 60. Dharma Sangraha, 137. 45. DS. 2. 16. Arūpa-samāpatti-nimittam pana atta ti samāpatti
saññañ c'assa sangi gahetvā vā Nigantho-ādayo panmāpeti, viya takkamattena eva vā, arūpi attā sanni
ti nam, Sumangala Vitāsinī. p. 110. 47. D. i. 186-7.; ii. 137. 48. The Place of Buddhism in Indian Thought, Journal
of Vidyodaya University of Coylon, Vol. i. No. l., P. 25. 49. Bhaskarabhāsya: Baudhadarlana tatha anya Bharatiya
darsana, p. 824; Cf. Sandakaswita of Majjhimanikdya.

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( 233 ) 50. Vija ptimatratasiddhi, p. 7. 51, Catukšataka, 10-10. .52. TSa, 5. 16; DS. 10. 53.
digambarasta eva prāhūh, cillakşana evātmā sa ca dravyarūpena sarvāvasthāsvabhinnatvāt anugamātmakah, paryayarūpena tu pratyavasthanh bhinnatvāt vyāvrtyātmakaḥ etacca pratyakşatah eva siddhamā. țmano dvairūpyamiti na pramāṇāntaratah prasādh
yam. tathāhi TSP p. 118, Kā. 311. . 54. TS, 313-315.
55. ibid. 325. 56. HBT, p. 98-104. 57. TS. 312. 58. ibid. 316-18. 59.327.
Dravyaparyāyarūpatvāt dvairūpyam vastunah khalu. Tayorekā tmakatve'pi bhedah sağjnādibhedatak. Indriyajñānanirbhāsi vasturüpath hi gocarak.
Sabdānāih naiva, tat kena saħjnabhedād vibhinnatā. 61. Tao danda pannattā, tam jahā-manadande, vayad.
ande, kāyadande., Samavayānga, 3.1. seyyathidam-kāyadaņdam, vacidaņdam, manodandar ti. imesam kho, āvuso Gotamo, tiņpam daņdā. nadevam pațivibbattānamh evam pațivisitthānam kāyadanda Nigantho Nataputto mahāsavajjataran paññāpeti pāpassa kammassa kiriyāya pāpassa kammassa pavattiyā, no tathā vacidandam, do tathā
manodaņdam 'ti., M., i. 372. FF. . 63. Bhāvā rabino sijjhai jai vi tavam carai koikodio.
Jammar tarai bahuso lambiya hattho galiyayațțho. • 84. PSU., 51.
aham bi siha, akiriyām vadāmi kāyaduccaritassa vaciduccaritassa manoduccaritassa; anekavihitānam pāpakamānarh akusalānam dhamm änarta akiriyar vadämi......kusalānām dhammānam kiriyart vadāmi, A., iv. 182 f. tran. by Thomas. The Life of the Buddha,
p. 207. · 66. Lavayasankinah Lokāyatikah Śākyādayasca. Teşām
atmaiva nāsti kūtastatkriył tajjānito vá karmavan
65.

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( 234 ) dha iti.........asthitänām kūțah iti Akriyāvāditvam.
12. 4. v. p. 218. 67. Law, B. C., Some Jaina Canonical Sūtras, p. 189. 68. SBE., xiv. p. xxv. quoted in the Heart of Jainism, p.
90. Jacobi is also of such opinion, SBE., Xiv., P. 316, Fn. 3. Attāņa jo jāņāti jo ya logam gaim ca ja jāmai ņāgaim ca. Jo sāsayamh jāna asāsayam ca jā. tim ca maranam ca janovavāyan. Abo'vi satta a viutthaņām ca jo āsavam jāņati samvaram ca. Dukke ham ca jo jāņati nijjaram ca so bhāsiumarihai kiriyā. vādam. SK. 1. 12. 20-21. kriyāvīda is of 180 types
and Akriyavada 84, ibid, 1. 11. 119-121. 69. M.i. 93; ii. 31; 214 f.; A. i. 220. 0. Jataka Stories, v. pp. 116. Compare to the story of
four councillors in the Uttarapurana of Gunabhadra where the Karma has been accepted as a main causefor having birth in a high or low class. 46. 112-118. Savve puvvapibaddhā du paccayā santi sammadiţthassa. Uvaogappãogamh bandhante kammabhāveņa.
Samayasara, 173. 72. Jataka Stories, V. p. 118.; Jataka ( Nagari ), Vol. ii. v.
145-7. p. 53. 73. M. ii. 31, 214 f; M. i. 93; Cf. A. i. 220. 74. DS. 9.
75. SKr. 1. 12. 5. v. p. 215. 76. A. i. 174. 77. Tena āyasmanto pāņātipātino bhavissanti pubbeka.
tähetu, adinnādāyino musavādino abrhmacārino...pisun. avācā...pubbekatan kho pana, bhikkhave, sarato pacchāgacchatar na hoti chando vā vāyāmo idam vā kar. niyan idam ca akaraniyam ti. iti karaniyākaraḥiye kho pana saccato thetato anupalabbhiyamáne matthassatīnarh anārakhānamh vihartamh na hoti paccattart..
sahadhammiko samanavādo...... ibid., i. 174 f. 78. Samayasara, 173. 79. M. ü. 214. 80. A. iii. 383 f. cp. DA. i. 162.; S. iti, 210.; D. iii. 250 F.

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(235) 81. SS. 2. 6. 82. 4.7. .,83. A. fii., 195 f..';
AA., *.559 says he was the Buddha's unde (culapita)
and a Säkyan rājā. DPPN., S. V. Vappa. 85. Gradual Sayings, Pt. i., P. 207. 86. (Käyena samvutā: Vācāya samvutā, manasā sart
vutā tan āya tim papassa kammassa akaranarhi iti pur
āņarit kammānam tapasa vyantibhāvā......) 87. A. iii. 276-7. 82. D. i. 57. . 89. M. ii., 214. 90. A , iii. 276-7. 91. M. i. 93.
92. PK. 157-8. 93. D. i. 23 FF. 94. Sumangala Vil., i. 115. 95. Is., 112-2. 26. TSP., P. 66. 97. SüKr., 1. 2. 12. Vratti. 98. Tulyani rūpam yadā grāhyamatulyam naiva grāhyate...
Anünām dvyarūpatve tadā kin nopapadyate. Tatsamānyaviseşātmarūpatvātsarvava tunah. Tulyatulyas varūpatvadvirüpa anavah smrtah. Samanam tatra yadrūpam tadaksajñānagocaram. Ekākārmatojfānamaņuşvevopapadyate. Asmānam tu yadrūpam yogipra. tyaksmisyate. Iti durmatayah kecit kalpayanti sanā.
kulam-TS. 1980--83. 99. NKC.. p. 134; NVV. pt. 1. p. 344; SVT., pt. pt 1. p.
158; PKM., yt. i. p. 25. 100. Dve hi rūpe katham nāma yukte ekasya vastunan.
Dve tadā vastuni prāpte aparāspararūpatah.
Parasparātma tāyāmtu tadvairūpyam viruddbate. 101. See, chapter, v. of the book, 112. TS., 2310. 103. PV., 3. 296-7. 104. NKC., p. 565; LT., 26-29; 64-65. 105. PK., 80. 106. ibid., 81.
107. ibide., 8. 108. Io. 5. 24.
109. Alfhsalini, 1. 3. 16. . 110. TSP, P. 605, 2133-84. Cf. PR., 97 ff; DS., 19 ff.. 111. TS., 2567 1 12. ibid. 2548. 113. Abhidharmakosa, 1.5.

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( 236 )
214. Atghasilini 160; Diologues of the Buddha, pt. i. p. 36
fo. 2. akasante'smin dravyāni Svayarp vā käsata ityakasam. Jivādini dravyāni svaik paryāyaih avyatirekena yasminnäkāśante. prakaśante tadakaşam svayam cătmiyaparyāyamaryādaya akabata ityākāśam. Avakngadanādva. 22. athavā itareşam dravyānam avakásadānādākāśamiti prşodarādişu nipātitah sabdah. Kundakunda defines ākasa :Savvesirp Jivanam sesăņām tahāya puggatānam ca.
Jam dedi vivaramakhilam tam loe havadi āyāsam. 115. Iv., 5. 1., 21-22. 116. A kāśasyavagāhaḥ, TSū. V. 18. ākāsa sya......Sāvaya
vatvam ghațădir ivopapannam sävayavamākāsam
himavat-vindhyāyaruddhavibhinnadeśattvat, 117. TBV., p. 641; Jaina Theory of Reality and Knowledge,
p. 277. CF. PKM., p. 563; NKC., 245.
CHAPTER III
Jaina Ethics 1. Himsā' nộtāstej ābrahmaparigrahebbyo viratirvratar,
TS0., 7.1. 2. ibid.; 7. 4-8. 3. Maitripromodakārunyamadhystbāni ca sattvaguņā.
dhikaklisyamāna' vinayeşu, TSi., 7. 11. 4. Thapariga, 4.1 (fika). Udakapedalaputta (Sütrakytā
nga, 7th Addhyana ), Kājāsavesiyaputta (Vgāhāpan. nati, Ist sataka ), ect, are referred to in the Jaina Agamas who renounced Cāturyāmadharma of PärsvaDātha and accepted the Pancamahāvratas of Maha
vira. 5. Asibandhakaputto Gamani Nigantha-sāvako yena
Bhagavā tena upasankami......tam ca bhagavā uvācaKo nu kho Gamani Nigantho-Nataputto sāvakāgam dhammam deseti ti ? ( Gåmaņi uvāca ).-evarha kho

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( 237 )
6.
bbante Nigantho Nắtaputto sāvalna dhamma doseti-yo koci panarti atipateti sabbo so Apayiko nerayiko, yo koci adinnam adiyati sabbo so āpayiko nepayıko, yo koci kāmesu miccbă carati sabbo so āpayiko perayiko, yo koci musā bhanati sabbo 80 ā payiko nerayiko. yam bahulan yait bahulath viharati tena tenniyati, 'ti.-S., iv. 317. Pascabi bhikhave, dhammebi samaonāgato Nigantho .. devadhammiko yathābhatam pikhatte evam niraye. katamehi pañcamehi ? pāņātipāti hoti, adinnā. dãyi hoti, abrahmacäri hoti, musāvādi hoti, surāmeraymajja pamādatthāyi hoti. A. jj. 276-7, Krtakāritānumatairvākkāyamanobhirişvate. Autsargiki nivrttirvicitrarūpāpavādiki tveşā.
PSU. 76. 8. ime kho avuso Gotama, tiņñar daņdānan evarh
pativibhattānam evan pațivisitthānam kāyadandam Nigantho Nataputto mahāsīvjjatara paũũápeti pāpassa kammassa kiriyāya papassa kammassa pavattiyā, no tathā vacidandan, no tathā manodandam ti.
M. i. 372. 9. The danda is synonyamous with "duccarita'' which
means a rong behaviour in body, speech, and thought. and which afflicts injures and brings to trouble and distress. SHA.. 63. ND. ii, 293, quoted by Horner in
the Middle Length Sayings, ii. p. fn. 3. 10. tam kim maññasi gahapati, idhassa Nigantho abā.
dhiko duhito bā lahagilāno sitodakapatikkbitto uņhodakapatisevi. so sitodakam alabhamāno kalankar. eyya. imassa pana, gahapati, Nigantho Nātaputto kathūpapattin paññāpetti 'ti .... asa ñcetanikam, bhaate, Nigantho Nātaputto no mabāsāvajjam pañía
peti......, M, i, 377. 11. PSU. 45–47. 12, Himsāyāmaviramanamh limsopariņamanamapi bhavati
hinsa.

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Tasmāt pramattayoge prāņavyaparopañam nityanti. Sūkņmāpi na kbalu hinhsā paravastanibandbanām bha
vati punsah. Himsāyatanānivịttik pariņāmavisuddhaye tadapi
kāryā; PSU., 48-49. 13. Pahuda 14. tena kho pana samayena sambahulam Niganthā Vesä
liyan rathikāya rathikam...baha paggayha kandantiajia Sihena Senāpatin à thūlam pasum badhitva Samanassa Gotamassa bhattam katam, tam Samaño Gotamo jānam uddissa katam māņsam paribhuñjati paticcakammann' ti. Mahīvagga (Vinaya Pitaka ).
237. 15. M., i, 368 f: DPPN., s. v. Jivaka Sutta. 16. DPPN., s. v. Devadatta. 17. Na vina prisivighātānmamsasyotpattırisyate yasmāt.
Mārsain bhajatastasmātprasaratyanivāritā himsā. Yadapi kila bhavati munsam svayameva mrtasya
mahişāvrsabbadeh. Tatrápi bhavati hinsä tadāritanigodanirmathanāt. Āmäsvapi pakvā vapı vipacyamanasu mansapesisu. Sãtatyenotpadastajjātinām nigodanām. Amām vā pakvāri vā khādati yah sprsatı vă piita
pesir. Sa nihanti satatatanicitan pindam bahujivakotinām.
PSu. 65-68. 18. Madyain mäinsan k audram paficodumbaraphalāni
yatnena. Hinsävyuparatikāmairmoktavyāni prathamameva, 61. Yonirudumbarayugmain plaksanyagrodha pilapha
lāni. Trasajıvānam tasmāttesam tadbhaksane himsă.
shid. 72. 19. Atthi, Visakhā, Niganthā nāma Samanajitikā,
Te sävakan evam samāda penti_ebi tvar ambbo par iso, ye puratthimāya disāya pana parar yojanasatare

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( 234 )
tesu dandam mikkhipāhi, ye pacchimāya;. ye uttarāya.........ye dakkhiņāya......'ti. Iti ekaccānamh pananamh anud dayāya anukampāya samadapenti.
A., i. 206. 20. Digpracyādih tatra prasiddhairabhijñānairavadhim
krtvà niyamadan digvratih. SS., p. 176.: also see
TV., p. 547. 21. PSU., 138. 22. SD., 53-4. 23. Jaina Salras, Uttaradhyayana, p. 414, v, 26. ff. 24. Jaina Satras, Pt. 11. SBE, Vol. 45., intro. xviii. 25. D. iii. 9. F. 26. Basham, A. C. History and doctrines of the Ajīvikas,
D. 104
27. SU., 141. also see, SD., 5. 12. 28. M. i. 372 FF. 29. Cūladukkhandha Sutta, 30. A. 1, 206.
31.A. i. 207. 32. ibid. 33. Katyāyana Srautasetra, 4. 15. 35. 34. SD., 5. 34-35. cf. Bhagawati Sataka, 12. 1. 35. Bhagawat Sataka, 8.5. 36. Jain Sūtras, SBE., Vol. 45., intro. P. xviii. 37. S. D., 7.7.
In a Commentary on the Ratnakarandasrūvakācūra, Acārya Prabhācandra also referred to this rule :-see, Bhagwana Mahavira aura Mahatma Buddha
p. 207. 38. A., iii. 277. 39. Niganthā eka sāta kā ti vadati. Lohitābhigāta nāma,
ibid., iii. 383 f. cf. Sumangala Vitasini. i. 162. 40. Lati Samhita, 55. 41. D. i. 166. cf. M. i. 77. 2. Pravacanasära, 3. 15. According to A. N. Upadhye,
this is the interpolated verse. 43. Thānaga, p. 164. Cf. Mahavagga (N. H. Bhagavata's
ed ). pp. 108-109. 44. Malacāra, 4. 155.

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( 240 )
45. ibid., 10.92. 46. Byhatkal pakathabhasya, 2780. 47. ibid. 492-93. 48. Mulācāra. comm. Val.i p. 133; 49. Paiyasadda Mahannava, p. 358 : 50. TSe., 9.22. 51. Mülacara, 5. 107-109. 52. ibid. 10. 17-18. 53. Samavayaéga, 27-1. 54. See, Malācara and Anagäradhrmāmsta. 55. ibid., Pindatuddhyadhikāra. 56. Pañcaya mahavvayāem samidio panica jiņavaruddiţthā.
Pancevindiyarohā chappi ya āvāsayā loco. Accelakamanhånam khidisayanamadantaghamsapar
ceva. Thidibhoyaņeya bhattari mūlaguņā aţthavisā du.
Mülācāra, 1. 2-3. 57. D. i. 49. 58. Dasuar kalika, cū., 2.9: Deo, S. V; History of Jaina
Monachism., p. 145. f. 59 Ts. 6. 24. 60. D. i. 49. 61. Brhatakalpakat hūbhasya, vịtti on 2780, Vol. ini. 62. ibid. Vğiti, on 1443, Vol. ii. 63. Piyadhammo dadhadhammo samviggo'vajjabhīru par
isuddho. Sangahanuggakusalo sadadam sarakkhanajutto. Gambhiro duddhariso midavādi appakoduhallo ya. Cira pavvaido gibidaţtho ajjānam ganadharo hodi.
-Malacara, 4.183.-4. Tena kho pana samayena chabbaggīya bhikkhu vassan upggantva antarāvassam cãrikam caranti. manussā tatbeva nijhayanti khipyanti vipacenti-katham hi nāma samanā sākyaputttyā hemantam pi gimbam pi vassam cärikam carissanti, haritani tiņādi sammaddantā, ekindriyam j van vihethentā, bahu khuddake pāne angigbetarh āpādentā. Ime hi nāma aññstitthiya durahkl atadhammā vassāvāsam alliy issanti
sankasayiseanti...V , i. 137 F. 65. Mülacara, 3. 35–36. 66. ibid., 10. 18.

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16
( 241 )
67. V., i. 138.
68. p. 308 b. 69. Accellakam loco vosattasariradā ya padilihānam Eso hu lingakappo caduvvidho hodi ņayabbo.
-Malicira, 10-17 70. MA., 1. 423; DPPN., sv. Nigantha; Dictionary of
Chinese Buddhist Terms, p. 428 71.-Pravacanasdra, 3. 3-5, 21; Jain, C. R., Sanyasadharma,
pp. 45-46; Deo, s v; History of Jaina monachism p. 341, 72. Vikāre vidusan duero navikāränuvartane. Tannagrative pi sagotthe no Nama-dueşa-kalmarah.
-utāsakadhyayana., 131. p. 35. 73. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, p. 175. Also see Barua,
B. M.; A History of Pre-Buddhistic I ndian Philosophy, p. 297. Basham. A. C.; History and Doctrines of the
Ājivikas, pp. 96, 107. 74. V. v. 19-21, 39-40. 75. DhpA., Vol. I. pt. 11., 309. 76. ibid. vii. 489. 77. DhPA., Vol. ). pt. ii. pp. 400; Buddhis! Legend, Vol. 29.
p. 70 ff. 78. Buddhist Legend, Vol. 29. pp. 74. 79. D. i. 166.
81. M.i. 77. 81. ibid. i. .38. 82. Uggama uppādana esaņari ca sarjojanam pamā
pam ca. Ingālıdhū.na kāraņa atthavihā piùdasuddhi du.
Mülācāra, 6.2. 83. Jacobi, utt arīdhyyana, intro. p. xxxi. 84. Vrahatkal tabhūsya. Vol. 1. 532 ff.; Jitkalpa, 35., Bhasya.
1087-1719. 85. Desatti ya savvatti ya duvinam puņa abhihadam
viyānābi. Aciņnamaņāciņım desāvihadanı have duvihan.
-Mülūcara. 6. 19. 86. Pindaniryukti, 219-242. 87. Jāvadiy am oddeso pasandotti ya have samuddeso.
Samanoiti ya ādeso nigganthotti ya have samādeso

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( 242 ) Mülācāra, 6. 7.; Acaränga, 11 1.6.8 (p. 104). Dasavas,
5.1.55. *38. Cf. l'indiniry'ukti, 271-77; 279-84. - 89. Mülācira, 6. 10. 11, also see, Dsv., 5. i. 31.
90. Ch. Pindaniryukti, 285-91; 303–15. 91. Mülücāra, 6. 15, 17. 92. 11d. 6. 20. 93. Dasvat. 5. 40-41. 94. ibid. 5. 42-3. 95. Mülācira, 6.50, 52; also see, Dasavaikalı ka, 5. i. 43.
5-46. 96. A saņam jadi vā panam khajjam bhoj am ca lijja pej
jam vā. Padilehiūnı suddham bhuñjati panipattesu.
Mulchra, 9. 54; 1. 34. 97. pasak' dhyyana, 133 4. p. 35. 98. Addhamasana-si savvim janassa udarassa tadiyamu
dayelid. Vāū simcaraṇattharii cautthamavasesaye
bhikkhū. --Milicara, 6. 72; also see, ibid, 5. 153. 99. See, for detail, History of Jaina Monachism, p. 196. f, 100. Avasvuka Nirukti, 766 1f. Pinda Niryukti, 427. 101. See, Deo, s. v. History of Jaina Moncism, p. 298,
Pinda. N1. 494-99. 102. Nisiha Carni, 4. p. 375. Brhat Kalpakathi Bhasya,,
Vol. III. 2681. 108. JA., Vol. 13. No. 2. p. 2. 204. zbid., Vol. 12-13, No. 2, p. 2, 68. Such magical prac
tices can also be secn in the Agamas. See, History of
Jaina Monachism, p. 420. 105. Book of Discipline, Vol. 5. p. 151. 106. D. i. p. 57; M., i. 377. 107. Yogaśistra, 2.30 108. Jana Sñtras, introduction. 109. Rockhill, th. life of the Buddha, p. 99 f. History and
Doctrines of the Ajivikus, Basham, A. C.; p. 21. f. 110. History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas, p. 23. 111. Babırdh maithunam parigrahaviseşah ādānanh ca
parigrahah tayordvandvaikatvamathavā adiyat ityā. dipam parigrāhyani vastutacca dharmopakaranamapi

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( 243 ) bhavatityat āha, bahistāt dharmopakaraņād babiryaditi, iha ca maithunam parigrahe ‘ntarbha vati,
Thananga, 4. 1. Tika. 112. Abhayarajakumarasutta. 13. Dharmärthan putrakāmasya Svadāresvadhikātinah.
Rtukále vidhänena doşastatra na vidyate. Sekr. 3. 4. 9-13, V. p. 98. At the same place, it is saidSadanusthānāt pāréve tişthantiti pārsvasthāh (Pāsatthā ), svayūthya vā pārsvasthāvasannakusiladayah striparişahaparājitāh. te vadantiPriyādarśanamevāstu, kimanyairdarśanāntaraih. Präpyate yena nirvanam, sarāgenāpi cetasa.
ibid., 3. 4. 9. V. p. 98: 114. Sūkļ, V. 102, p. 177; 102. Nir. vrtti. 115. Pancamahavvayā pannattā-tam jahā-savvão pāņā
tipāta sayvão veramaņaın, savvão musāvāyao veramanani, savvão adinnādānão veramaṇam, savvão mehuņāo veramanam, savvão pariggahāo veramanan,
Samarāyanga, 5. 2. 116. Abhayarajakumārasutta. 117. Cf. Pesunnahā sakak kasa paranindāppappasainsavi
kahadi. Vajjita saparahiyan bhāsāsamidi have kuhanan.
--Mūlīcāra, 1. 12. -108. Ekamidālaro, Mahanāmā, samayani Rājāgale vibi
rami Gajjhaküte pabbate. Tena kho pana samayena sambahulā Niganthä Isigili" " āsa napatikkhutā, opakkamika, dukkhā ubbā klarā katukā vedana veda
yanti......M., i. 93; cf. M., 1, 31,214 f. 119. Mülação, comin. p. 1. p. 491. 120. Viyatiyacaukamänt loco ubbassarlajjhinajahanpo. Sap.dikkamoue divase uvajāse. i. lāji vie.
cara, i. 20. 121. M., i. 77. 122. Mūlācīra, i. 36. 123. M., i. 77. 124. Manavacakayapautti bhikkhū sāvajjakajjasamjuttā. Khippam nivārayanto tjhain du gutto havadi eso.
- Mülacara, 5. 134

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( 244 )
125. M., i. 372 f. 126. See for the place and nature of Meditation in Jainism,
Studies in Jaina Philosophy by Tatiya. p. 261 f. 127. TS2., 9. 28: Pare mok ahetuh, ibid., 9. 29. 128. Dhyana Sataka, 30-34.
CHAPTER IV Jaina Epistemology 1. Pratyaksa Pramāņa ( Direct Knowledge ) 1. Ete vivādā samanesu jātā. Sn. 4. 8. 63. 2. Ye kecime Brahmanā vādasilā, ibid, 2. 14. 162 3. Ye kecime Titthiya vadasilā, Ajivikā vā yadi vā
Nigantha, ibid., 2. 14. 161. 4. ibid. 2. 14. 162.
5. D. i. 16. 6. na takkikā sujjhanti, Udana, 6. 10. 23. 7. A. i. 189. 8 A.1. 11. 305.
9. Tatparokşan, TSū. 1. 10. 10. Bhagavatisútra, 336; 11. Thāņāngasūtrā, 309-310; History of Indian Logic,
p. 162. Caraka Samhita, 3. 8. 6. 25. 12. Sn. 4. 8. 59, 60. 62; 411. 94. 13. ibid. 4. 8.60-1. 14. ibid. ii, 76.
15. Nyū ya Satra, 4. 2. 50-9 16. Vadanyaya, p. 1.
17. NV. 2. 384. 18. Astašati Astasahasri, p 87.
Bhāsappayidako, panditavādo, sadhu samma to bahi
janassa, M.. 227. 20. ibid. 23. 4. f.
21. ibid. 312. 22. S. iv. 323 ff
23. ibid i. 176; ii. 122. 24. M. i. 393; S. iv. 32 3 25. NV. 2. 384. 26. D. 1. 162
27. D. i. 163 f. 28. M. i. 403 ff.
29. SV. 5, 2; TSV. 380. 30. M., 11. 211; Jayatilleke, R. N. Early Buddhist theory
of Knowledge, p. 171

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( 245 )
31, Nigantho, abuso, Nataputto sabba nū sabbadassāvi
aparisesan jñānadassanan pațijāniti, carato...samitam jñānadassanalfi paccupatthita, M., i. 92-3'
A., j. 220-221. 32. Samyagdarśana jñānacāritrāņi mokşamārgah,
TSH , 1.1 33, TSū. 1. 4.
34. A. IV. 429. 35. Cillaksana evātmā, TSP. P. 118, Jiyo upayogamao...
DS. 2; T V.2. 8. 36. IV, 1.6. Cf. Dharala Tiki, P, 149. 37. Niyamasara,
60, 161-9. 38. Dha:alii, 1. 1. 4; ST. P. 2. 1. 39. 1. 1. 4. 40. STP. 2. 1.
41. SV T. intro. (Hindi), p. 40. 42. SS. 1 15.
43. STP T. p. 458. 44. Plu, 6. 1.
45. Pramānanaya Tattraloka,
6. 25. 46. Saman jānadi passadi viharaditti, Prakrti Anuyoga;
Janamane evaii ca natú vibarai, Acaranga Saira. 47. STP. 11; VBH. 3089-3135, Studies in Jaina Philo
sophy, p 75 ff. 48. NS. 159;
49. 7'Sū. 2. 9: 50. SS. 2. 9.
32. Aştaşa, 101, Astasaha:ri. 53. LT. 1. 3, SVT. 1.3, see intro. p. 97. 54. Pramānamavisamvādi jñānamanadhi... Asfasati-Asta
sahasri, p. 175. 55. Jam pardo Viññānan tarii tu parokkhati bhaiidama
tthesu. Jam kevaleņaņādam havadı hu jiveņa
paccakhham. PS., 58 -56. aksnoti vyāppoti jinātītyakņa ātmā, ss., P. 59;
PM4., 6.1 57. Adyeparok-ali, Tsa, 1. 11: Pratyaksamanyat.
ibid., 1.11 58. LT. 4; ViBh. 95. 59. 1. 13. -60. Pratyakasamanyat, 1. 12. 61. NA. 1. 62. Aşašati Asfasahasri, p. 175; Pramana Mimomsa. 63. TSu 1. 15.
64. Pravacana sāra, 23-4;

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(246)
65. VSu. 3. 18. NSu. 1. 1. 4; SK. 5. SSu. 1. 89: Yogabha
sya, 1. 7, JSa. 1. 1. 4; Carakasam hita, 11. 20; See, Am Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics. 66. YSu. 3. 54; SK. 64. 67. Vsu. 9. 1; 13-15.
68. N. B. 1. 11,
70.
TS. 1983.
72. SV. 1. 39.
74. TS. 1983.
76. TSa. 2. 9.
69. Tantravärtika, p. 240.
71. PSg.1.3; NP. p. 7; NB.1.4
73. PKM. 1. 3.
75. ibid.
77. Aṣṭasati Astasahśri, p.
275.
78. Adye parokşamı, Pratyakṣamanyat. TSū. I. II. 12.
79. Pratyakşam visadam jñānam mukyasamvyavahāratah Parokşam sesavijñānam pramane iti sangrahaḥ.
80. TS. 1214; PSg. p. 8.
81. TSP. p. 394; NKC. p. 46. NVV. p. 13.
82. TSP. p. 379, ka. 1265. 83.
ST. p. 457.
84. TS. 1. 15; LT. 6
85. TSP. p. 379.
87. TSP. p. 379.
90. 1. 1. 4.
86. Visayavisayisannipatasamanantara madyam grahaṇamavagrahah, TV. 1. 15. 1.
88-89. ibid. p. 389.
91. NA. p. 43; Tatparyavṛattiṭikā, p. 145; NM. p. 100.
92. PSg. 1. 37.
93. TS. 1224.
94. ibid. 1270.
95. TS. 1274-6.
96. Bhedo vaisiṣṭamukṭam hi na visesanasa gatih. Bhinnamityapi tadvācā nānuviddham pratiyate,
ibid., 1272. Astasati Aştasahasri, p. 175. 1.4; TSV. p. 185; LT. 1. 3.
98.
97. ibid. 1269. 99. NV. 1. 158; Also see, SV. PKM. p. 8; NKC. p. 47. 101. SVT. p. 13.
100.
102. Astasahasri, p. 75. 103. TS. 1273.
104.
Viseātmātirekena naparam bhedalakṣaṇam. Tadrupasparsane teşu grahanan kathamucyate. Tadrupasparsane capi bhedantaravibheditah. Grabita iti vijñānam praptameṣu vikalpakah
Ts. 1280-1

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105 Vibhanga. 323
106. TS, 1981-83.
( 247 )
107. SM. P. 111-2.; notes. p. 196.
108. idid. notes. p. 195.
109. Dve bi rūpam katham nāma yukte ekasya vastuna.. Adve tada vastuni prapte aparaspararupataḥ Parasparätmatāyām tu ta dyair upyaṁ viruddhyate. Viśeşaścopalabhyeta cakṣuradibhirindriyaih. TS..
1984-5.
110. Na camūny arthadūṣaṇāni syādvādādinām vidyate,.
SM., p. 111.
111. TSu. 1. 29; ST Su 71.
113. TSu. 1. 27.
115. TSu 1. 25.
117. TV. 1. 23.
112. TSu, 22.
114. NSũ. 16.
116. SS. 1. 24. 118. ViBH. 814.
119. Niścayadvātrimśikā, 17, quoted from Jñanavinduprakrana by Tatiya in Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 69, fn. 3. bhāvā jivadaya jivaguṇā cedana ya uvaogo.. PKS. 16.
120. Upaoge khalu duviho ṇāṇena ya dansṇena samjutto. PKS. 40; DS. 4 121. Appāṇam viņu nāņam nāṇām viņu appago e sandoho. Tamhū saparapayasam ṇāṇam taha damasṇam hodi. NS. 170.
122. Bāhyābhyan tarehe tudvayasannidhaneyathāsambhavamupala bdhuscaitanyānuvidhayi pariņamah. TV. 2.B. 123. Je egam jāņai te sabham Jāņai, je sebham jāņai te egam, janai, pravacānasira. Also sse, AS. 1. 3. 4: ViBh. 320.
124. Jam takkāliyamidaram Jāṇadi Jugavamh samantado. sabbam... PS. 1. 47-9.
125. idha, sandhaka, okacco sattha sabbaññū cabbadaeṣāvi aparisosaṁ ñanadassanaṁ paṭijānāti-carato ca me tiṭṭhato ca suttassa ca jāgrassa ca setatam samitam ñanadassana paccup atṭhitam ti, so ahuaññampi agārampi pavisati, pindam pi na labhati, kukkuro pi

Page #267

( 248 ) dasati, candena pi hatthinā samāgacchati, candena pi assena samāgacchati, candena pi goņena samāgacchati, itthiyā pi purisissa pi nāmam pi gottam pi pucchati, gāmassa pi nigamassa pi nāmam pi maggam pi
pucchati, 'm. i. 529 126. ( tkamahaham mahānāma samayam rājagahe viharằmi
gishakute pabbate. tena kho pana samayena Nigantlā katuki vedanā vedayanti... Nigantho Nātaputto salbaññü sabbadassāvi: kim pana tumhe. no lidam. ev.m sante āvus. Nigantlıā, ye loke ludddā lohitapānino kuiūrakammanta manussesu paccājātā
te Niganthesu pabbajanti 'ti). 127. M.il 31; M. Savings. ii. p. 228, 1. 250. 128. Buddhist Legend Dhamma padaţthakatha ), Vol. 29. p.
74 ff. 129. M. i1. 31, 214 ff; M. i. 921; A. 1. 220; A. iii. 74; S. iv.
398. 130. tasm idanıştheyagatam jānamasyavicīryatām.
kitasankhyāparijñāne tasya nah kropayujyate. heyopadeyatattvasya Sabhyupāyasya vedakah yah pranānamasāviste na tu su vasya vedakah. dūram pasyatu vā mā vā tattvaminţiimtu pasya tu. pramāņm
duradursi Cedehi grdhrānupasmahe. 2. 31-33. 131. (tato'sya vitarāgātve Sarvai thajñānasambhavah.
samahitasya sakalam cak istīti vini citam. sarveşām vitarāgāņāmetat kasmānna vidyate.răgădikanayamātre hi tairyatnasya pravartanāt. punah kālāntare teşām sarvajñagunarāgiņām. alpayatnena sarvajñatvasiddhi
ravāritā. 132. Bhagavati satra, 9.32.
133. Ps. l. 47-49 134. sūkşmantaritadūrārthah pratyak sah kasyacidyatha.
Anumeyatvato' gnyādiriti sarvajñasamsthitih. AM. 5. 135. Jayadhavala ţika. 136. Dharmottara Pradipa, p. 245, 248. 137. yadi suknme vyavahito va Vastuni Buddhiratyanta
parokse na syātkatharh tarhi jyotirjñanavisamvādah?

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( 249 )
jyotirjñanamapi hi sarvajñapravartitameva, etasmadavisamvada.....
Aklankenapi :
Dino jyotirjñānātsarvajatvasiddhih Taduktam. Dhiratyantaparokşerthe na cetpumsam kutaḥ punah. Jyotirjñānavisamvadaḥ srutatvāccetsadhanantaram. -SVT. p. 526; quoted by Dharmottar in the Dharmottara Pradipa, p. 245, 248: compare-NV. 414; Sastravārtāsamuccaya,
2. 3.
138. Jñana syatiśayat sidhyedvibhutvam parimāṇvāt. 139. ibid. 8. 3. 140. ibid. 8. 10-14.
141. ibid 8 12-18.
142. SI'. 8 6
144. ibid. 8. 6-7.
143. PVA. 4. 91. 145. NV. 37-40.
146. NVV, 50-52.
147. See my article "The Buddhism" appeared Appendix. III.
Conception of Omniscience in in VSMP 1968. Also see the
148. Tattvavaisaradi, 1. 11. 149. Anu. 160.
151. SV. 3. 2.
150. PVM. 2. 5. 152.
TS. 1298.
153. PVM. 2. 5. 154. Tatparyavrttițikā, p. 21. ; Kandali, p. 61; 155. Prakarana Pañjikā, p. 42-3; Vṛhati Pa. p. dipikā, p. 121.
156. Hetubinduţīka.
158. PM. p. 4-5.
157. TSV. 1. 10. 78; PKM. p. 16. 159. PMu. 3. 5.; Pramanapari kṣā, p. 60.
164. PM. 3. 11; SVT. intro. 165. Sabarabhāṣya, 9. 1. 1. 176. TS#Bh. 1. 15.
168. LT. 11.
NM, 22, etc. 103; Sastra
160. SV. 227.
161. Nyaya Vārtika Tatparya Țika, d. 139.
162. PV. 3. 502-7.
163.
LT. 10. 19. 21.
167. PV. p. 7.
169. SV. 3. 8. 9; Lt. 12.
170. Aṣṭasati Aṣṭasahaśrī, p. 236. 171. NKC. pp. 724.

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172. See in detail for this subject "The Advanced Studies:
in Indian Logic and Metaphysics" and SVT. introduc
tion, etc. 173, NVV. pt. 11. p. l. 174. NV. 170. 175. Sahakramabhāvaniyamo 'vinābbāyah, PM. 3. 16. 176. SV. 6. 16.
177. NV. 21. 178. PM. 3. 22.
179. Nyayas@tra, 1. 1. 32. 180. SK. ( Mathuravștti ), p. 5. 181. Prakarana Panjika, p. 83-5. 182. Nyāya Praveś, pp. 1. 183. Vådanyāya, p. 61. 184. PV, 128.
185. Sv. 6. 17; 186. PMú. 33-40. 187. Cetapāstaravah iti sādhye sarvatvagapaharane maran
am prativādyasiddhan vijnanenadvatiyayurnirodhala-- kṣaṇasya maraṇasya nenābhyupagamät, tasya ca taru
svasambhavāt; NB., 59. 188. Digambarāstu sādhyena vsaptamavyāptam vã ma
rañari...... p. 190-1. 189. Candratvedāpadi tannicandrah Sašalāňchanah.
Iti dvilaksano hefurayam căpara ucyate. etc. TS.,
1372-1379. 190. TSP. 1375. 191 Advanced Studies in Indian
Logic and Metapaysics, p. 86. 192. PMu. 3. 37-40. 193, Pramāna Mimimsa. 194. RVS. p. 548. 195. TS. 1395. 196. sid. 1397. 197. ilid. 1398-1429. 198. Nyāyāvatāra Vārtika Vrtti, Prastāvanā, p. 76-8. 199. Prašasta padabhagya, p. 200, Vassesi kasatra, p. 203. 200. SK ( Matharavrtti), 5. 201. NP. 1; NB. 2-5;.
HB. P. 4; PS. 1362. 202. Tatparyatika, 1. 1. 5; NM. p. 110. 203. SV. 6. 2.. 204. Dharmottar-pradipa, p. 35 205. Pātrasvāmimatamāśaukate :
Anyathā' nupapannatve napudrastā ścahetuta. Näsati tryamsakasyāpi tasmātklibāstrilaksanah. Anya thānupapanpatvam yasyāsau he turisyate. Ekalaksanakah so rthasheturlaksanako pa vā.

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206. Tena tadvisayatrilaksanakaderthanam uttarabhāşyam
yatak krtam, SVT. p. 371. 207. Mahimā sā. Pātrakeśariguroh param bhavati yasya
bhaktyäsit. Padmāvatisahāyā trilakžanakadar thanam kartum.
- Jaina Silalekha Sangrah, Pra. Le. 54. 208. TS. 1364-5.
209. ibid. 1370. 210, TSP. p. 406, Kā. 1371. 211. TS. 1380-1. 212. ibid. 1386-8.
213. ibid. 1389. 214 sbsd. 1395-1429.
215. ibid. 1416. 216. NKC. p. 440; SV T. 6. 16. 217. HBTA. p. 290. 218. HBT. . 37.
219. .4$tasahasri. p. 3.
CHAPTER V
Anekantavāda
1. The Theory Of Apekāatavāda This classification excludes the less important conceptions such as hetuvāda, ahetuvāda, bhäravada, abhovavada, daitavada purus irthavuda, and so on. See in detail, Darsang aura cintana and Jāina theory of reality
and knowledge. 2. Ut pādavyayadbrauvyayuktar sat, Tsü 5. 30, Gunaparayayavaddravyanı, TSü, 5. 38.
Kumārilabhatta also maintains the nature of reality to be of three-fold character. His view is almost identical with that of Jaina philosophy (see Slokavārtika Kūrikā, 21-22. But the difference between the views of Kumārila and Jainas is that the former adheres to a "middle position" ( madhyasthata ). between the two extremes of the bheda (anya) and the abheda ( ananya ), each of which (ekāntikart )s is characterised as fallacious (mrsā ), while the latterrecognizes them to a certain extent as right and not.

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fallacious. Whitehead (PrR. p. 318), Frauwallner and Kant The Philosophy of Kant Explained, by John Watson, Glasgow, 1908, p. 199) are also of about the same view. Hegel, (Hegel's science of Logic, tr. by W. H. Johnson and L. G. Struthers, 1929, London, Vol. 1 p 195), Bradley (Principles of Logic, by F. H. Bradley, Oxford, 1940, Vol. 11. p. 487), Bosanquet (The essentials of Logic, by B. Bosanquent, London, 1903, p 134) too are of the close views to the Jaina view of reality. See in detail, Jaina theories of reality and knowledge, pp. 131.
3. See, Jana Theories of Reality and Knowledge, pp. 258. 4. Atho khalu davvamao davvāņi guṇappagāni bhaṇidāņi. PS., 119.
5. Pravacanasara. Jayasena's commentary, p. 121.
6. STP. 2. 9-14; 7V. pt. I. . 428.
8. NKC. 1.363.
9. Avuso tvani mama accayena Sassatam ti, ganhapesi. Evam dve pine cka laddhike akatva bahu-nānānihari na ugganhapetva kalam akasi. Te tassa sarirakiccam katv sannipatiti aññhi aññam pucchinisu"kas-' avuso canyo saram acikkhi ?" ti "Sassatam" 11. Aparo tam patibähetva "Mahyam saram acikkhi ti' aha. Fvam sabbe: Mahyam saram acıkkhi,.... DA, 11. 906-7. MA., 11. 831.
7. TV. 5. 37, 2--4.
10. A., 11. 46; Millinda Panha, iv. 2. 5. Also see, A.,
1. 197.
11. M., i. 46.
12. Vibhajjavayam ca vagarejee, Sūtrakṛtanga, 1. 14. 22. 13. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 292.
14.
Di. 191.
15. HBT. p. 284.
16. 11'S. r. 333; HBT. p. 369.
17. na samanvatmanodeti na vyetivyaktamanvayat...... -AM., 59-61. quoted in PVST., by Karņakagomin, p. 333; Durve kuniéra quotes one more karika in the Hetubindutikaloka p. 371.

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Na našena vină soko potpädena vinā dhrtih. Sthityā vina na madhyasthyam tasmāt vastu
trayātmakan. 18. pravacanasūra, 17-18. 19. Lt., 30; PM., p. 24. 20. Dravyasabdena dravati paryāyena gacchati ti p. 337.. 21. Tattvasangrah, Atmapariks 7. 22. HBT.p: 28 23. Prameyarat mala, p. 4, also see, the VIIIth chapter of
the Tattvasangrah 1 ). See, TS., 350-516. Also see, HBT, P. 213. The Syadvada-Mañjar (p. 19) refers to a stanza in this respect : Yo yatraiva sa tatraiva yo yadaiva tadaiva
sah. Na desakālayorvyāptirbhāvānāmiha vidyate. 25. Purvanù nasvarācclaktātkāryani kinnāvinas varat.
Karyotpattiviruddhyeta na vai kāraṇasattatayā. Yad yadā kāryamutpitsu tattadottpādanātmakam. Kāranari kārya bhedena na bhinnani kşamikani yathā. -SV., 3 11-12. Also see, NKC., p. 379. etc. Jaina
Theories and reality of knowledge. 26. HBTA. p. 373 4 27. Tanna tāvadaksaņiko bhāvah karyam kartum saknoti,
tasya kramayaugapadıābhyāmartha kriyāvirodhāt nāpi kşaņīko bhāvah kāryam prabhavati. tathāhi kim kşaņiko bhavah svasattakāle kāryakāranasyabhāve' thânyadā. yadi prathamavikalpastadā tadaiva kuryāt. svasattākşane ca kāryakrtau saivam jagadekalaksanavarti prāpnoti. tatlāhi karana ni svasattākşaņa eva yat kāry amakita tadapyanyasya kāranamiti tadapi tadaiva
svakāryam kuryāt ... ibid. p. 371. 28. Tarhi kāryamapı të daivot pādye ta’nyada tatkālan.
paribrtya kāryot pattırvirudhyeta .... ibid. 29. ibid. p. 374.
30. IS., intro. p. 1. 31. Ullaradhyayana, 20-15; 23. 28; 26. 9; 28. 16; 28. 19.
Bhagavatisütra, 73. 209; Dusvaikalikasutra, 4. etc. 32. TS. 352.
33. bid. 336-349.

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34. Jaina Theory of Reality of Knowledge. p. 173. 35. Nanvanekātmakaṁ vastu yatha mecakratnavat. Prakṛtyaiva sadādīnām ko virodhastatha sati. -TS., 1709. -36. Tasu tasu hyavasthāsu sa evayam nara iti anuvṛttipratyayahetor naratvajäterūrdhvatāsāmānyasabdabhilapyastasu cavasthãsu......HBTA. p. 343. CF. Paraparavivartavyapi dravyam urdhvata mṛdiva sthāsā. disu, PM. 4.5 ekasmin dravye kramabhāvinaḥ parinamaiḥ paryayaḥ ātmani harṣaviṣādivat, PM. 4. 8. HBTA, p. 343; PM., 4.5.
37. Tiryaksamanyavyavṛttipratyayaheto
HBTA., p. 343. Cf. Sadrasipariņāmastiryak khaṇḍamuṇḍādiṣu gotvavat.
PM., 4. 4.
38. PM., 4. 9.
39. PVST. p. 333; HBTA. p. 369. etc. 40. HBT. p. 98.
41. Desakalasvabhavanamabhedadekatocyate............ Sankhy alaksanasanjñārthabhedat bhedastu varnyate. Rūpadayo ghaṭaścetai sankhyasamjña vibhedita. Karyanuvṛttivyavṛtti lakṣanāärthavib hedită. Dravyaparyayayorevam naikāäntenä 'višeṣavat. dravyam paryayarūpeņa višeṣam yati cet svayam. -TS., 313-315; also see, HBT., pp. 98.
42. kiñcidvivaksitam vastughaṭādi,..
yadi ghatadirbhavaḥ paṭādina bhavantareṇatulyaḥ sy at-tato yadi vyāvṛttak syāt, tada khapuṣpānna tasya visesah syat, sarvatha vastvantarādvyāvṛttavat, na ca vastvantarādvy avṛttasyanyagatiḥ sambhavati, khapuşpatām muktva. tasmattasya vastunah khapuspatulyatvamabhyupagacchata bhäväntaratulyatvam vanama samanyamabhyupagantavyamiti siddham sāmany atmakam -TSP., p. 487.
stutva
43. TSP. P. 487. 45. ibid. 1714-16. 47. ibid. 1720-21.
44. TS. 1712-13, 46. ibid 1718-19.
48. Türkabhasa, pt. T. p. 5

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49. PV., 3. 237.
50. Pärtantrayam hi sambandhaḥ siddhe ka paratantrata. Tasmat sarvasya bhavasy sambandho nästi tattvatal. -quoted in TV., p. 146, NKC. 305. 51. Rūpaśleṣo hi sambandhaḥ dvitve sa ca katham bhavet. Tasmat prakrtibhinnānām sambandho nãsti tattvatah. -quoted in the TSV., p. 148. cf. NKC., p. 306; PKM.,
p. 149.
52. Jaina Thories of Reality and Knowledge. p. 232. f. 53. Dravyakṣetrakālabhāvakrta hi pratyāsattiḥ ekatva. pariņatisvabhāva pāratantryapariņāma sambandho' rthānāmabhipreto Jainaik. rūpaśleso hi. NKC., p. 307.
NKC., p. 369. Jaina Theories of reality and knowledge, p. 283.
54.
2. The Theory of Nayavada
55. Nayo jñātirabhiparāyah, LT., 55. Anirakrtapratipakso vastvan agrāhi jnaturabhiprāyo nayah. PKM. p. 676. 56. Sadeva sat svät saditi tridhartho,
miyet durnitinayapiamāṇaik, SM., 28.
57. See. TV. 1. 33; Epitom of Jainism.
58.
A. ii. 191-3.
59. Nayena neti, S. ii. 58; anayena nayati dummedho, J. iv. 241.
59. Nayam nayati medhavi, J. iv. 241.
61.
Dve satye samupäsrit ya buddhanamh dharmadeśana. Lokasamvṛtisatyam ca satyam paramarthataḥ, -MK Arya. 8.
62. A. iii. 178; Netti. 21. J. iv. 241.
63. Ns., 897, 904, 911. cf. Milinda Parka, 160. 64. Sn. 68, 219.
65. Dve'me Tathāgatam Abbhacikkhanti Katamam dve ?
Yo ca Neyyattham suttantam nitattho suttanto ti dipeti; yo ca nitattham suttantam nevyattho suttanto ti dipeti,
A., i. 60.
66. AA., i. 95; Cf. Kathavatthu, Atthakatha, 34.

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( 256 ) 67. Sn 884.
68. A. ii. 41; v. 29. 3. The Theory of Syadvada 69. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 111. 70. SV. p. 1027. 71. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Fascicule : A-Aca-P.
p. 142. 72. Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 22. 73. PKM. 526. 74. Sarvamasti svarūpena pararūpena nästi ca. Anyatha sarvasattvam syāt svarūpasyapyasambhavah.
SM., 14. 75. Vastvasankarasiddhiếca tatprāmāṇyaṁ samasrita. Kxiradadhyádi yannāsti prágabhavah sa ucyate
NKC., P. 467. 76. PKS., 9. 77. Nastita payaso dadhai pradhvamsabtávalaksanam,
-NKC., p. 467. 78. Gavi yo'svadyabhavastu so' nyonyabhāva ucyate.
NKC., Vol. II. p. 467. 79 ibid., Vol. 11. p. 467; Jaina theories of Reality and
knowledge, p. 350. 80. Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge, p. 363. 81. Rgveda, x. 129, Tr. Macdonell, A Vedic Reader for
Students. p. 207-8. 82. vi., 2.1-8. 83. Tup. 2. 7; Also see the CHU p. 3. 19. 1. 84. MUP. 2. 2. 1.
85, ChUp. 3. 19, 1. 86. Sankhyaparovacanabhasya, p. 3 87. Nyāyabhasya, 2. 1. 18. 83. Vedantasära, p. 25. 89. Santi...eke samanabrāhmana amarāvikkhepika, tattha:
tattha pasham putthā samaņa vācāvikkhepam
apajjanti amaravikkbepam catūhi vatthüni, D., 1.24. 90. DA. 1. 115. 91. Idha...ekacco samaño va brahmaṇo vă idam kusalam
ti yathābhūtam pappajänati, idam akusalam ti yath

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bhūtam nappajāpati. Tassa evarn hoti. Abam khom idarta kusalamh ti yathabhūtamh nappajänāmi, idam. akusalam ti yathabhūtam nappajānami. Abañ c'eva kho pana idam tiyathabhūtam appajānāto, idam. kusalam ti yathābhūtam appajānato idam. kasalamh ti va vyakareyyam, idam, akusalam ti vă vyakareyyam, . tattha me assachando vă rago vá doso vā pațigho va tam mam' assa musā. Yam mam' assa musā so. mam'assa vighāto. Yo mam'assa vighäto so mam'assa antarayo ti. Iti so musavā dabhaya musavadaparijegucchã n'ev idah kusalam ti vyākaroti na pana idam akusalam ti vyākaroti, tattha tattha panham puttho samaņo vācā vikkhepan āpajjati amarāvikkhepar : Evain ti pi me no. Tathā ti pi me no. Aññathā ti pi me no. No ti pi me po. No no ti pi me no ti.
D, i. 24-5. 92. DA., i. 155. 93. idha, bhikhave, ekacco samano vā brāhmaṇo vā
mando hoti momūho. So mandatta momūhattā tattha tattha pasibani puţtho samāno vācāvikkhepam apajjati amarăvikkhepam-Attbi paro loko ti...evan ti pi me no, ti. tathā ti pi me no, aññathā ti pi me no, no no ti pi me no ti. Natthi paro loko ti pe...atthi ca natth! ca paro loko pi . nevatthi na natthi paro loko pi.; atthi satta opapātikā pi, natthi sattā opapātikā, nevatthi na natthi satta opapātikā; atthi sukatadu. kkhatādam kammānam phalam vipāko, nattbi... vipāko, atthi ca natthi...vipāko, nevatthi na natthi... vipāko. Hoti tathāgato param maraņā, na hoti...
maraṇam, neva hoti na na hoti... mar ana. D. 1. 27. 94. D., i 58-59. 95. DA., s. 115; see, Jaytilleke, Early Boddhist Theory of.
Knowledge, p. 136. 96. Keith writes-he ( sañjaya ) seems as an agnostic to
have been the first to formulate the four possibilities.

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of existence, non-existence, both and neither..." Buddhist Philosophy, p. 303 : Raju, P. T. also supports this view stating the principle seems to have been first used by Sanjaya"-an article "The Principle of
Four Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy." 97. Buddhism and Culture, cd. Susuma Yamaguchi,
Kyoto, 1960 p. 71. 98. Asiyasayam Kriyānami Akriyavāena hoi culasie.
Annaniya sattatthi veniyana ca vattīsa. Sakr. Vo.
I. fol. 212. 99. Ibid. 1. 3. 11-34; Vğiti, p. 45-6; Vavisam suttaim
tikanaiyaim terasia sutta parivadie, Samaviyanga
22. 4. J00. Tatbā te eva Gośála-pravırttitā Ājivakih pasandinas
Trairāśikā ucyante, yatas te sarvam vastu tryātmakam icchanti tad yathā jivo jivājīvās ca loko' loko lokālokāsca, sadasat sadasat. Naya-cintāyāni drvyāstikam paryāyāstikam ubhayāstikam ca, Tatas tribhi Tāsibhis caranti iti Trairāsikah Nandi comm., lol. 113, quoted by Weber Verzeichniss, ii, p. 685. Cf. Samavaya comm., fal. 129. History and doctrines of the Ajivikas.
p. 275. 101. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 156. 102. Na ya vi panne parihāsakujjā, ņa yā' siyāvāya viyā.
garejja, Sūkļ. 1, 14. 19.
103. Sankejja ya' sarkitabhāva bhikkhū, vibhajjavāyath
ca viyagarejja, bhāsādukam dhammar-samuţthitehin
vyāgarejjā samayi supanne. ibid. 1. 14. 22. 104. PK. 14. 105. Vibhajjavāyath ca viyagrāejja, sükr. 1. 14. 22. 106. Ekamsika pi...mayā dhammi desitā pannatta, ane
kartsikā pi desitā, paññattā, D. . 191, ; Cf. vibhajjavado...aham...nähamh ..ekathsavādo, M. ij. 197.

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107. "The Logic of Relatively as the Common Ground for
the Development of the Middle Way". Buddhism and
Culture, ed. Susuma Yamaguchi, Kyoto, 1960, p. 80. 408. MA. ii. 831; DA. iii. 906. 109. M. . 232. 10. S. iv. 298-9.
111. M. i. 498 ff. 412. MA. iii. 204.
113. DPPN., sv.
Dighanakha. 114. Katamo ca Râhulo tejodhātu? tejodbātu siyā ajjha
ttikā siyāvahirā, M., Cularāhulovūdasutta; Also see the Bodhirajakumarasutta of the same Nikāya, p. 330
( Nagari edition ). 215. Utpādādyastrayo vyastā nālar laksanakarmani.
Sariskstasya samastasyu rekatra kathamekadā. Utpadasthitibhaogramanyat sarskrtalaksanam.
Asticedanvasthaivannāsti cette na samskrtah. Mk.45-6. 116. Etenaiva yadahrikah kimapyaśl lamākulam. Prala
panti pratikşiptamh tadapyekanta sambhayāt. Digambarānām idam ca kimapyayuktam aslılamabeyopādeya. mapatinisphänāt ākule "syādustro dadhi na syaditi" vairuktam te' pi etenaiva praksiptah. bhabenaiva ekäntabhedāt. PV. 1. 183. Sarvasyobhayarūpatve tadviseşanirākşteh. Codito dadhi khadeti Kimurtram nabhidhāvati. Athāstya-tisayah kaścit yena bhedena vartate. Sa eya dadhyonyatra nās'ityanubhayart puram. ibid
1. 184-5. 18. Sarvātmatve ca sarveşām bhinnau syatám na
dhidhvanih. Bhedasambaravädasya tadabhāvādasam
bhavah, ibid., 1. 185-6 A 19 Athotpadavyayadbrauvyayuktath yattatsadişyate.
Esāmeva na satvach syāt etadbhavadhiyogataḥ. etc., PVA., p. 142. Yada vyavastadasatvam katha tasya pratiyate. Purvam pratites atvam syat tada tasya vyayah katham.

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Dhrauvye'pi yadi násmin dhih katham sitvam
ratiyaten Pratiterevasarvasya tasmatsattvam kuto' nyatha. Tasmānnityānityasya vistunah sambhavah qvacit. Anityam nityamathavastu ekantena yuktimat.
PVA, p. 142. 120, HBT., p. 233. 121. "Utpadavyayadhrauvya yuktaın sat” ityetadapyayu
ktam, dhra uveņotpāda vyayayorvirodhāt, ekasmin dharmiņyayog at. kathancit utpadavyayau kathancit, dhrauvymiti cet. yathotpadau na tathā dhrauvyayam, yathā ca dhrauvyam na tathotpadavyayayayaviti
najkarh vastu yathoktalaksanaṁ svát. ibid. p. 146. 122. Drvyaparyāyarūpatvāt dvairūpyam vistunah kila.
Tayorekātmakatvépi bhedah. samjñadibhedath ibid.,
f. 104. 123. ibid. v. 4-5.
124. ibid. v. 7-12, p. 105. 125. ibid., v. 20 & 25. p. 106. 126. TSP. p. 421. 127. TS. 1722
128. ibid. 1723. 129. ibid. 1720-30
130. cf. ibid. 1733 35. 131. yo'pi Digambaro manyate-Sarvatmakameyedam
syadan yapohavyatikrme tasmăd bhedt evānyathā na syādanyabhávo bhāvānām yadi na bhibediti, sopyanena nirastah. abhävena bhavsbhedasya kartumasakyatvāt. nāpyabhinnänām hetuto nişpannādamanyonyabhavah sambhavati. bhinnāscennispannah,
kathamanyonyabhavah sambhavati? PVST. P 109. 132. tena yo'pi Digambaro manyate...sopyatra nirākşta.
eva drastavyah. tadvāti sămányavisesavati vastunyabhyupagamyamáne atyantenabhedabhedau syatam... atha samanya višeşayoh katbañcidabbeda isyate......
mithyávada eva syadvādah. -PVST., D. 332- +2. 133. Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge, p. 22-23. 134. Sadbhūtā dharmah sattādidharmaiḥ samānā
bhionaścāpi yatha Nirgranthādinām. Tanmatam na

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"samanjasan. kasmät ? no pūrvavat bhinnābhinnayordoṣābhāvāt......ubhayorekasmin asiddhatvat......bhidanabhanakalpenā na sadbhutam nyayāsiddham satyābhāsam grahitam. 2.2. 35. Gunaved dravyamutpadavyadhrauvādayo gunah. Dudrāva dravati drosyatyekanekam svaparyayam. Bhedajñānāt pratiyet prădurbhāvatyayau yadı. Abhedajñānataḥ siddha sthitiramsena kenacit. NV.,
bhinnäbbinnāmete'pi
117-8.
236. Arcaṭacaṭaka tadasmāduparama, dustarkapakṣabalacalanät. Sy advädäcalavida lanacuñcurna nayacañcuh. -NVV., 1087.
40.
137. AJP. Vol. I. p. 72.
438. Na naraḥsim harūpatva na simho nararūpatah. Sabdavijñākayāṇām bhedät jatyantaram hi tat Nanaro nararyeveti na simha simha eva hi. Samanadhikaranyena narasimhaḥ prakirtitah. Dravi at svasmadabhinnaśca vyavṛttaśca parasparam. Unmajjanti nimajjanti jalakallolavat jale. -NKC, p. 369; also see APT., p. 15. 39. Bhutadoṣasyodbhavayitumašakyatvena asaddūṣaṇenodbhāvanam sa jatih, NVV., Vol. 11. p. 233.
tavāsti
Tatra mithyottaram jātiḥ yatha' nekantaviiviṣām. Dadhyuştrāderabhedātvāprasargādekacodanam. NV.,
2.203
W41. NVV., Vol. II. p. 233.
142. Pür vapakṣamavijñāya dūṣako' pi prasiddhaḥ. NVV., Voil. i1, p. 233
vidūṣakaḥ iti
At another place Dharmakirti is called 'Kathamunmātto' NVV., p. 17 Kutsitmäsamsamanah ayam prasiddho Dharmakirti kenäpi Dignāgādina vañicitaḥ (SVT., p. 365 etc.)
43. NV., 2. 204-5. Like-wise at another place Akalanka,

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commenting on the Buddhist Ācāryas, especiale Dharmakirti, says: Dadbyādau na pravarteta Bauddha tadbhuktaye. Janah, Adrasyam saugatim tatra tanum
Dadbyadike tathā bhukte na bhuktarh kañcikadNam.. Ityāsau vettu no vetti na bbuktā saugati tanok.
--Siddhiviniscayasvavrtti, 6, 37. 144. Sthūletatākārayorāpyevamanyonyabhede satyapi.
dravyeņaikena tādātmyopapatteravaya vino Jainābhi. matasya suvyavasthatvāt, NVV Pt, ii. p. 172
Sadradatmânak santo nivatarttayah. Ibid pt. ii. p. 52. 145. PSg. p. 115-6.

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APPENDICES
1. The Date of Buddha.
2
Buddhist Councils,
3. The Conceptions of Omniscience
in Buddhism.

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APPENDIX 1
The Date of Buddha
The chief landmark of Buddhist chronology is the year and date of the Buddha's parinibbana which is said to lie according to two main traditions, somewhere between 487-477 B. C. and 543-544 B. C
Charpentier, Max Muller, ard General A Cunningham asserted 477-478 B. C as the date of the Buddha's demise. According to them, the year of Chandragupta's accession was 315 B C. and it is now proved to be an erroneous premise.
Oldenberge favours 481 B. C. while V. A. Smith prefers 486 B. C Smith depends on the so called "Cantonese Dotted Record". It is said that Bhiksu Sangha bhadra sent news of the Buddha's parinibbana to China. Since then an arrangement of reckoning the Buddha's death by marking a dot each year had been made in Canton, and this dotted record continued upto the year 489 A. D. All the dots were counted in 489 A. D., and their total number reached 975, which suggests 486 B. C. as the year of Buddha's death. It is not easy to recognize the dotted record as being trust worthy unless other strong evidence supports it.
Raychaudhuri accepts 486 B. C, while Kern places it in 488 B. C On the other hand, Muni Nugaraj' mentions 502 B C. as the year of the Buddha's parinibbana. But all these conceptions do not carry weight as they do not take into account all the evidences
Another date 483 B. C., which seems more reliable, is supported by several non-traditionalists or 1eformed traditionalist scholars. Sylvain Levis pointed out from the Chinese accounts that 483 B. C. was reckoned as the Buddha's demise up to the 4th century in Ceylon, while E. R. AyrotonR, the Jate Archaeological Commissioner of Ceylon, and Wickrema

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singhelo try to prove the acceptability of this date from the beginning of the 4th century up to the 11th century, Geiger also warmly accepts this view.
John M. Seneviratne established his theory that "The era reckoned from 483 B, C. remained not only up to the lith century but up to the end of the 15th century, when the new tradition that the Buddha died in 54+ B. C.-came in and soon. oasted the old, are creating no little confusion, not so much during the transitionary stage as in our own time.11
The scholars, who accept 483 B. C. as the date of the Buddha, urge that 218 years after Buddha's death, Asuka's consecration took placc. They quote the Dipavamsals, and Mahavamsalt in support of their theory. As regards Asoka's consecration, they say that his predecessors Bindusara andi Candragupta ruled for 28 and 24 years, according to the Ceylonese chronology.15 And Asoka was consecrated four years after he had already reigned over the country.16 This means Candragupta would have ascended the throne 162 years (218-4-214-28+24=162) after the Buddha's nibbana.
Fortunately they could say with almost certainty that Chandragupta's accession took place in 321 B. C., since Alexander the Great died at Babylon in the same year and this fact has been amply recordea 17. From this they conclude that the Buddha's death would have taken place in 483 B. C. ( 321 +162 = 433 ).
Hoerale, on the otherband, accepts 482 B. C. as the"Practically certain" date of the Buddha's parinubbāna. He supports his view by the evidence that Bimbisara was murdered by his son eight years before the Buddha's nibbāna. 18 Though there is no great difference between the dates, 483 B. C. appears the more dependable one.
As regards the traditional date of Buddha, it is yet to be asertained, since the tradition itself is not accepted with unanimity. According to the Buddhist Chronicles of Cevlon and Burma, the Nibbāna took place in 514-543 B. C., wbile

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( 267 ) the Northern Indian traditions place it at a very early datetip danningham 15 refers to some of them. In the time of Hwena Thasadg. A. D. 680-645, the Buddhist schools held widely different opinione, varying from 900 and 1000 years up to 1200. 1300 and even 1600 years prior to that datelo, which would place the Nibbana of the Buddha either in 250, or 350, or 550, or 650 and 850 B. C. The same extravagant antitquity was. also asserts in the time of Fa-Hian, who places the Nibbina during the feiga of Ping-Wang, Emperar of China, in B. C.. 770.71921. A similar antiquity was still claimed as late as the Twelth Century A. D. during the reign of Asoka Balla Deva. Two of his inscriptions are dated in the years 51 and 74 of the Lakşmana Sena era, or in A.D. 1159 and 1180. A third inscription, which is dated in the year 1813 after the Nibbāna. of Buddha shows that at that time, Nibbana was believed tohave occured between about 656 to 633 B. C.
But all the traditional views, except the traditions of Ceylon and Burma, do not have sufficiently strong evidances in their support. According to the Mahāvamsa, Parākramabāhu. I was crowned when 1696 years had el ipsed since the Buddha's. death, that is, in the year 1697 A. B. The Ceylɔnese era falls. this year 1153 A. D.22 This is supported by an independant source, viz. a South Indian Insription at the Temple of Tiruvalisvara in Arpakkama According to the Cūlavamsa, 56.16 foll., the predecessors of Paräkramabābu, from Parak rama Pandu onwards, reigned 107 years. Thus the accession of the last-named prince falls at 1590 A. D. Moreover, this date is confirmed by the South Indian Minimangalam inscription, which is dated the same year23 All this shows that for the second half of the twelfth century the existence of the Ceylon era, reckoned from 544; is established with certainty.
In support of this view, we can now put forward another evidence. An inscription has been recently discovered near Arruradhapura in Ceylon which detineates the various kinds. of donations made by king Upatissa 1, the elder brother andı

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predecessor of the king, for the benefit of the Bodi-shrine, S. Paranavitana, on the basis of this earliest inscription so far found in which a date is given in the Buddhist era reckoning from the Pariairvāņa of Buddha along with the regnal year of the king reigning at the time, has been able to say that the Budhist era reckoned from 544 B C. was prevalent in the reign of king Upatissa l (368-410 ). A. D25.
It is to be noted here that some scholars think of 483 B. C. as the Ceylones: traditional era of the Buddha's Nirvāņa. M. De. Z. Wickremasinghe, however, tried to establish the view that till the 11th Centuary A. D. the tradition of counting the Buddhist era from 433 B. C. was prevalent both in India as well as in Ceylon. He suggested that the mistake imight have occured in regard to the length of reigns assigned to the several kings who preceded the great Vijaya Bāhu 1. His reason for suggesting it is that it was a century of foreign domination for about 86 or 96 years, the Cholians over-Tan the Island, carrying destruction every-where. If a mistake did really occur in this chronology, it is most probable that it was due to such difficult circumstances.26
Senaviratne27 too has attempted to prove that the death of Buddha took place in the year 483 B. C., on the strength of the conclusion arrived at by Fleet and accepted by Geiger and Wikramasinghe. He says that the correctness of Fleet's date is beyond question. According to him, the above date continued till the time of Parākramabāhu VI when it was corrupted by the addition of 93 years; and a few centuries still liter a Buddhist monk at kandy dropped out of this 93, when the era assumed its present date.
But these views are refuted by other eminent scholars. E. Hultzsch 28 pointed out that the above view, that of reckoning the era from 483 B. C. is based on an erroneous translation by Wijesinghe of passage in the Calavamsa ( Chapter, 53.v, 44 ), H, W. Codringron2 remarked on the paper of Seneviratne that the Kalyani inscription indicated that the "Sakarāja" era as that used in Burma and dating from

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A, D. 638, according to a Burmese inscription, is dated sakarāja 657 at Bodhigaya." "This date”, he says " however, shows that the Buddhist era, as used in Burma in the fifteenth centuary was 544 B. C". E. M. Abhesinghe, 30 on the basis of Jaina literature, criticising the view of Seneviratne, says that" We know that Buddha was countemporaneous with Bimbisāra, and it with the Jainas, we identify Swāmi Gautama or Gautama Indrabhūti with Lord Buddha, the first disciple of the Jaina Tirthařkara Mahāvīra, we can approximately fix, from both these sources, the date of the great demise at 544 B. C. '31
In connection with Abhesinghe's conclusion I would like to make a few comments. His suggestion, in support of 544 B. C. being date of the Buddha's demise, that Gautama Indrubhūti and Gautama the Buddha are identical, is incorrect. They were different personalities. One was the Ganadhara or Explainer of Mabāvira's preachings, while the other was the founder of Buddhism. One died at Gunāvā in. Rājagraha at the age of ninety two, 12 years after the attainment of salvation by Malāvīra, while the other died at Kusinārā at the age of eighty and attained nibbāna.
In the light of the aforesaid evidences we can now conclude that the most probable date of the birth of Buddha therefore, is 624-623 B. C. We make this deduction as he is supposed to have lived for 80 years, as he himself says in the Mahaparinibblinasutta of the Dighanikaya before his death that he was of 80 years of age ( athititaro me vayo vattati ). Thus the date of the Buddha's parioirvāni may be decided at 544 B. C. ( 624-623 B. C.-89-544-543 B. C.).

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APPENDIX 11 Buddhist Councils
The Buddha's parinibbāna was a critical moment for the Dhamma and its followers. How the Buddha's teaching could be preserved for the future, was a problem for his prominent disciples. Some disciples, like Subhaddal, felt that, with the death of the Buddha, they could interpret the Dhamma according to their own wishes. This attitude was viewed with alarm by the more loyal and erudite disciples who immediately thought of summoning a council where the word of the Buddha could be established and where steps could be taken for its preservation and propagation. The task assigned to this Council was to decide the Dhamma and Vinaya of the Buddha2
Arrangements were made for this to be held at Rājagaha, near the Saptaparni cave under the presidency of Mahākassapa commencing from the second month of the Vassāva season, i.e. in the fourth month after the Buddha's deaths. Five hundred Arhat bhikkhus participated in it. Ananda, who was yet a bajkşa, attained arhathood ( Isaikņa ) just on the eve of the Council, and he played a prominent part in the establishment of the texts of the Sutta Pitaka.
The decisions at this Council were not altogether unanimous. For instance, Gavāmpati, a senior arhat of the time, abstained from approving or disapproving the decisions of the Council, while Pūrana denounced the Council's decisions and urged the incorporation of the seven Vinaya rules. Whatever that may be, the accounts of Gavāmpati and Pūraña indicate the germs of schism in the order even at that early dateR.C. Majumdar says "This was a danger signal for the Church.''

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The sources of the First Council are (i) The Cullavagga, XI, of the Pali Vinaya, (ii) The Dipavarasa, (iii) The Mahavamsa, (iv) Buddhaghosa's introduction to the Sumangalavilasini, (v) Mahabodhivam sa, (vi) Mahāvastu, (v) Manjusrimulakalpa, (vi) The Tibetan sources :-Bu-ston's Chos. Bbyung (History of Buddhism), translated into English by Obermiller, and Taranatha's History of Buddhism, (vii) Chinese sources but derived from the Sanskrit sources: The Vinaya of Mahisasakas, Dharmaguptas, Mahāsanghikas, Sarvästivādins, Kayapa samgitisūtra (Kai-ye-kie-king), Aśokāvadāna (A-yu-wang-king), Mahaprajñāpāramitāśāstra, Parinirvana-sutra. and Hiuen Tsang's Record of western
countries.
As regards the authenticity of the First Council, the Russian savant I. P. Minayeff appears to be the first to investigate and establish the historicity of the event in 1887. Oldenberg refuted his opinion in 1898 and said that the First Council was nothing but pure fiction. His argument is that Subhadda's account is referred to in the Cullavagga and Mahā parinıbbūnasutta (Digha. 2. 3) but the latter is silent about the Council. This silence, according to him, "is as valuable as the most direct testimony: it shows that the author of the Mahaparinibbanasutta did not know anything of the First Council. "He then concludes "that it is not a fact, "but pure invention, and moreover an invention of no very ancient date."8
Rockhill reviewed Oldenberge's view in 1884 on the basis of Tibetan sources and remarked that "the authenticity of the council of Rajagaha has been doubted on insufficient grounds. But T. W. Rhys Davids seems to have uphelp Oldenberg's view. He says "The conclusion drawn by oldenberg is atleast the easiest and readiest way of explaining the very real discrepancy that he has pointed out10. R. O. Franke declares emphatically against the Furst Council that "the two accounts in the Cullavagga xi, xii, are but air

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bubbles."11 Among later scholars, Sukumar Dutta expresses his view thus--"The account of the First Council is only a legend of this invented character, seizing, as a peg to hang on the Subhadda story in the Maha pa rinibbana narratively,
But all these views are one-sided and based on merely the absence of any reference to it in the Mahaparinibbanasutta. As a matter of fact, the Mahä parinibbanasuita is concerned with the account of the Buddha's parinibbāna and not the history of the Order. The l'inava, of course, is related to the history of the Buddhistic order and therefore an account of the First Council has a legitimate place in it. Likwise the Ditavamsa mentions the First Council, but not Subhadda's account. Tibetan Dulva also does the same
Finot19 pointed out that chapters XI and XII of the Cullavagga, which contain an account of the two councils, have such an abrupt beginning unlike the other chapters of the Cullavagga that they could not have been originally a part of this work. He further points out that the Mahapariniblianasutta also differs from the other Suttas of the Dighanikaya in the nature of its contents, being more historical in character, and that the Mahaparinibbānasutta and the two chapters ( XI, XII) of Cullavaggi are so similar in nature that they must have been originally parts of one and the same work. In support of this contention of his, he refers to a work entitled Samyuktavastu ( Nanjio 1121 ), the Vinaya of the MolaSarvâstivadins, which contains the account of both farinibbūna and the Councils, and concludes therefrom that the Therevādins too had a work corresponding to the Samyukta-vastu, and that it was disembered at a later date by the ancient editors of Nikāyas and Vinaya14
Ohermille115, Poussin 26, Prazyluski17 also support the authepticity of the First Council Jacobi urged that it was. not essential for the Maha parinibłanasulta to go out of its way to describe the Council. He then remarked that mera ar 2meniam ex silentio cannot be accepted against the historicity." of the First council.18

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18
( 273 )
Assessing the different viows of scholars regarding the authenticity of the First Buddhist Council of Rājagaba, we find that no reliable evidence is available to reject its validity. The Gavāmpati and Purana accounts contain the parts of the Buddha's teaching which they accepted. We cannot therefore think of it as a pure invention. Thus all accounts favour the acceptance of the First Council as a historical event.
As regards its cotribution to the evolution of the Pāli. Canon, it is, however, difficult to accept the traditional conception, which asserts that the whole Dhamma and Vinaya were recited in the First Council. The Sumaganlavilasini19 further adds that not only Dhamma and Vinaya, but also the Abhidhamma was finalised in this very Council. How was it possible to. compile the whole of tbe Sutta and Vinaya along with the Abhidhamma within about two months ?
Poussin is inclined to thihk that the Council could not but be regarded as an enlarged Patimokkha assembly 20
Minayeff asserts that the accounts of the Council contain two clearly distinguishable parts, of which the one that speaks. of the compilation of the Canon must belong to a period posterior to the rise of the sects.21 Nalinaksa Dutt is of opinion that the Council was summoned to decide the less important rules of discipline ( khuddakānukhuddakāni sikkhåpadani which were sanctioned by the Buddha himself.22
The Disarāmsa presents a more probable aocount : "The Bhikkhus composed the collection of Dhamma and Vinaya, by asking the Thera called Ananda regarding the Dhamma. There Mahākassapa and the great teacher Anurudha, Thera Upāli. of powerful memory, and learned Anauda, as well as many other distinguished disciples who had been praised by the Buddha....made this council.” Here the Dhamma and Vinaya.. mean selected groups of the original Suttas and doctrines, not the whole present Pali Tipitaka. (b) The Second Council
Hundred years after the death of the Buddha (vassasataparinibbute Bhagavati), the Second Council was held in

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Vesali to recite again the Dhama and the Vinaya. Seven hundred monks participated in this council. It is also therefore called Saptasatikā. The accounts of the Second Council
The accounts of this council state that Yasa Thera was shocked when he came to know about the relaxing of monāstic rules and the acceptance by some monks of the ten heretical practices (dasa vatthüni)23. But as Yasa Thera opposed thcm, he was excommunicated (patisāraniyakamma). Yasa then went in search of monks who would agree with his views. He further tried to bring the dispute to a peaceful end. For this purpose Council was summoned at Vesali in Valikärīna under the presidency of Thera Revata. All these ten points were considered unlawful according to tradition. This council lasted eight months during which the Dhamma and Vinaya were discussed. The heretical monks then arranged a separate council called Mahāsamgiti making a different redaction of the Canonical literature.24 Main Sources
The main sources of the second council are: (1) the cullavagga of the Vinayapitaka, (ii) Dipavamsa, (in) Malāvansa, (iv) Samanta pasadiki, (v) Hiuen Tsang's Record of Western countries (vi) Tibetan Dulva, Tárānātha's Geschichted's Buddhismus in Indien, ubersetz von Schifener, and other Chinese sources such as Fa-bian and Hiuen-Thsang's records. These sources differ in some respects, but the Cullavagga's record is the oldest one and the others appear. to be based on it. Historicity of the Council.
The historicity of this council is now accepted unanimously by the scholars. Kern raised an objection saying “We could not discover in these accounts anything but dogmatic fictions for which didactic mythical stories of older times have furnisbed the materials25. But in another work he altered his conception stating "The council on Vinaya in Vaibali has an

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historical base."26 Oldenberg, who denied the First Council, -accepted the Second Council. He says: "It is an account, which with all its pedantic snatching after trifles, bears the stamp of being in the highest degree trustworthy.27
It should be noted here that the debatable points were settled after discussions, most probably on the basis of some authoritative works. But Majumdar is of the view that the present Vinaya could not have been compiled before the Second Council was held, or otherwise the dispute over the monastic rules could not have arisen among the monks at that stage.
We are inclined to accept the traditional view that both the Dhamma and the Vinaya were recited at the Vesali Council. The Dhamma comprises the Nikayas which are the earliest and most reliable sources of the Buddhist doctrines. Whether any finality was reached regarding the structure and contents of the Pitakas ar not, we may not be able to decide due to the lack of necessary evidence available to us. But it is most unlikely that a Council summoned to settle a dispute in monastic Order, which was threatening the unity of the Buddhist Order, was concluded without a review of the body of doctrines preserved by the monks. The Third Council
Up to the time of Asoka Buddhism became very popular and easier to follow than the original teachings of Buddha. It is said that the heretics in monk's robes used to live in Buddhist monasteries and preach their own dhamma in the name of Buddhism. Under such circumstances the monastic rules were slackened and the Uposatha and the Pavāraṇā could not be held for about seven years. The Great king Asoka somehow came to know of this corruption among the Buddhist monks and then sent a religious officer to conduct Uposatha and Pavarana ceremony. He found that some bhikkhus failed to carry out the king's order. He then ut throats of several monks. Aśoka was much disturbed by this Moggaliputta, Tissa, however, came into contact with Asoką and a solution was found.

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This was the background for the third council held in Pataliputra under the presidency of Moggaliputta Tissa. It is referred to in the Dipavamsi, Maharamsa and Samantapāsādikā. It is recorded in the Tibetan Dulva and some Chinese sources. too. But the Cullaragga does not give an account of the third Council. Asoka's inscriptions also make no reference to it. Historicity of the Council
Some scholars like Minayeff, Keith, Franke, etc. deny its historicity. Their main argument is that it is not mentioned in the Cullavagga, one of the earliest scriputures and in the Asoka's inscriptions. Keith, for example, says: "It is incredible that it ever took place without receiving some mention in the numerous records of A soka."28 In the Buddhist Philo-sophy he says: "the only verdict of scientific history must be that the council was a figment of the pious or fraudulent imaginings of a sect, which desired to secure for its texts, and espcially for the new Abhidhamma, a connection with the greatest Buddhist sovereigns, and that the northern tradition docs well to ignore the Council entirely."29 He even thinks of Tissa in a "Suspicious aspect."30
As regards the absence of any record in Asoka's inscriptions, it can be said that Asoka would have preferred to attach the name of Moggaliputta Tissa to this council since it was the result of his invaluable efforts. Asoka was only the supporter and provider of the purpose.
Actually some of his edicts indicate that this Council did take place. In one of his edicts, for example, King Asoka decrees that heretical monks and nuns shall be excommunicated. 91 G. C. Pande rightly suggests that Asoka might not have been "as intimately connected with the Council as the Pali tradition would have us believe."32
It was only the Vibhajjavadins or the Theravadins who attended this Council. A rift in the Buddhist order took. place after the Second Council and by the time of Asoka it was divided into eighteen sects99, which were refuted byVibhajjavadins in this great Council

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Thus on the basis of above literary as well as inscriptional evidences, we cannot deny the historicity of the Third Council held in Pătaliputra under the presidency of Moggaliputta
Tiss.
Other Councils
Other Councils also were summoned for various purposes at different times. The Fourth Council was held under the auspices of Kaniska in about 100 A. D. According to the Mahavamsa and Other Ceylonese traditions, three Councils were held in Ceylon. The First was held during the reign of king Devanarupiya Tissa ( 247 207 B C.) under the presidency of the Venerable Arittha Thera. The Second Council was held during the time of King Vattagamini Abhaya (about 101-77 B. C. ) under the presidency of Mahāthera Rakkhita and the Canon was reduced to writing. It was held at the AluVihara in the village of Matale in Ceylon. The Third Council was conducted in 1865 at Ratnapura in Ceylon under the presidency of the Venerable Hikkaduve siri Sumangala. Two Councils have been held in Thailand (Siam ). Some Councils were summoned in Burma too. The so-called Fifth Council held in Mandelay is very important, as the text of the Canon fixed at this Council was engraved on marble slabs which for the last so many years had proved to be the most reliable record of the Buddhist Canon. The Sixth Buddhist Council was inaugurated in May 1954 in Rangoon with the collaboration of the various countries of the Buddhist world.

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APPENDIX III The Concept of Omniscience
In Buddhism
The Buddha is said to have declaimed omniscience in the sense of knowing everything at once and all the time as. claimed by Nataputtal, though he never denied the possessing of supernatural power. The Buddha himself said that he had a three-fold knowledge ( 11sso vijja ). He has remarked that "those who say that the Rucluse Gotama is omniscient and all-seeing and professes to have an infinite knowledge and insight, which is constantly and at all times present to him, when he walks or stands, sleeps or keeps away--are not reporting him properly and misrepresent him as claiming what is false and untrue." On being asked how he could be reported correctly in this matter, he replied “in proclaiming that the Recluse Gotama las a three-fold knowledge ( tisso vijjā 2. It is said therefore that whatever is well-spoken is the word of the Buddha (yam kiñci subhasitiin, tam tassa bhagauato racanan).3
The very familiar Abhiññā in Buddhist literature has an "older and wider meaning of special supernatureal power of a perception and knowledge to be acquired by training in life and thought. "It has been interpreted as the following six powers called Chalābhiññā attained by the Buddha :
(i) Iddhividha (psychokinesis). (ii) Dibbasotadhatu ( clairaudience ). (iii) Cetopariyañña ( telepathic knowledge ). (iv) Pubbenivāsanussatiñlāna (retrocognitive knowledge ). (v) Dibbackkhu ( clairvoyance ) also known as cutupa
pātañāna (D. i, 82 ) or knowledge of decease and survival of beings, and

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( 279 ) (vi) Asavakkhayañana ( knowledge of the destruction of
defiling impulses ). All these six powers have a close relation with the five knowledge of Jainism. The first two are similar to Matijñana and Srutajñāna. The fourth and the fifth correspond to Avadhijñana, the third to Manah paryaya jñana, and the last to Kevalajnana of the Jainas.
On the basis of possessing the Pubbenivasanussatinana and Dibbacakkhu, the Buddha claimed to see and know the decease and survival of beings and their karmas. Anuruddha, who is said to have attained the dibbasotadhiitu, is believed to have the power of "seeing a thousand worlds."'7 All the characters of these two abhiññas resemble the dvadhijñina of Jainism.
Manah paryayajñana corresponds to Cetopariyañana in. Buddhism. The general and particular characters of another's mind can be known through this jvana. The Anguitora Vikaya gives four ways by which another's thoughts can be known viz. (i) by observing external signs (nimittena), (ii) by getting information from others or from an intermediate source, (iii) by listening to the vibration ( uppharasaddam ) of the thoughts ( vitakka ) of another as he thinks and reflects (vitakkāgato vicãrayato ), and (iv) by comprehending with his mind the mind of another and observing how the mental dispositions are placed in the mind of a particular individual ( manosankhāra panihita imassa antara ) on the part of one who. bas attained the state of concentration free from cognitive and reflective thought (avitakhan avicaram samadhim). Here the third and the fourth seem to be identical with rjumati and vipulamati of manal paryayajñana.
The sixth abhinna Asavakkhayañana is a knowledge acquired for the destruction of defiling impulses. Almajñana! (attanīva. janeyatha ) is essential for destroying the impulses and then for the attainment of salvation20, The Buddha is also called the flanaradin in the Nikayas11 The power of knowing and Perceiving everything (jónāti passata ) is a distinguishing

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characteristic of the Buddha?2. This knowing and perceiving is connected with the Four Noble Truths ( ariyasaccani avecca passat:18). After being eliminated the five impediments (pañcanivaranepahaya14 ) the Buddha is said to have known and perceived the Four Noble Truths with the last three ahhiññas. He knows "this is the truth of suffering, this is 'the cause of suffering, this is the cessation of suffering, and this is the path leading to the cessation of defiling of impulses 15
The Buddha is one who has knowledge and insight into all realities ( sabbesu dhammesu ca fianadassi ),16 which can be comprehended by mental concentration (samidhi ). Through this insight the Buddha could know that Sunakhatta would die after seven days, and that of epilepsy and on dying he would be reborn as one of the Kalakanjas, the very lowest of the Asura group 17, Once when the bhikkhus were conversing in his absence, he was able to say that they hed been discussing18. In the Kevaddha Sutta he is said to have claimed to answer a quesion which even Brahma was ignorant of19.
All these references indicate that because of some short of insight the Budddha could know and perceive things. He is said to have a three-fold knowledge (tisso-vnja ),20 six intellectual powers (cha imāni..........Tathii gatavalini ),21 ten intell. ectual powers ( dusa balans )22 and so forth. He is therefore considered sometimes an omniscient. Keith refers to a passage from the Anguttarani haya28 where the Buddha is compared to a granary, whence men every good word, and points out the same view.24
These are the negative references to the Buddha's omniscience. They have been the stepping stones to establish omniscience positively in the Buddha in later Pāli as well as Buddhist philosophical literature. The Pafisambhidāmagga says in this respect that the Tathāgata's omniscience consists in knowing everything conditioned and unconditioned, and also knowing everything in the past, present and future.

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Further it tries to prove omniscience in the Buddha, and says that he knows everything that has seen heard, sensed, thought, attained, sought and searched by the minds of those who inhabit the entire world of gods and men.25 "Likewise, 'the Kathāvatthu describes the two epithets "sabbania" ( omniscient ) and "sabbadassīvi" (all-seeing ) as occurring in a list of eight epithets of the Buddha.28" As a matter of fact, the Buddha never claimed himself to be omniscient. His discipline explained his supernatural power or threefold knowledge as omniscience and supplemented some references to establish it in the Buddha at the compilation of the Tripitaka, especially the Abhidhamma. This happened so because of saddha or faith and bhatti or devotion in the Buddha,
The Pāli Canon refers to saddhā as synonymous with bhatti ( devotion ), pema ( affection) and pasūda (propitiousness) or appreciation27. The Milinda panha28 and the Atthesalini29 show that the saddha has two characters, appreciation (saw.upasīdanalakkhana) and endeavour (samupakkhandanülakkhana ). Datta observes that "saddha carries two distinct meanings (1) one is faith (pasada ) producing piti (pleasure ), and ( 2 ) the other is self confidence proving virya (energy 30. Likewise, Jainism sraddasi, bhakti32, anuri gä6,98 sevā94, and vinaya35 are said to be indentical words.
The conception of Damman ina (knowledge of ariyasaccūni) in the Buddha was gradually developed in Buddhist philosophical literature. Dharmakrirti supports this view that the Buddha was a Dharmajña as well as Mārgajña in the sense that he was knower of Caturaryasatya, but he did not deny the omniscience of the Buddha. He said that spiritual knowledge should be recognised as an essential element of a Teacher, 36
Prajñākaragupta, a disciple of Dharmakīrti further observes that omniscience is possible, if one has destroyed all worldly attachments. This requires great effort. 87

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Santarakṣita emphasises sarvajñatva more than Dharmajñatva. He says that an omniscient being can know everything that he intends to know, since he has already destroyed all the obstructions of knowledge 38. He then refutes the view of Kumārila, and establishes complete omniscience in the Buddha. The later Buddhist Philosophers followed śāntarakṣita's view.
In the sixth century B. C. omniscience was considered one of the essential characteristics of a Teacher or Prophets. The Buddha criticised this view and said that no one can know and perceive everything at once. But his disciples were anxious to give their teacher a position of greater recognition, and gradually went on to establish the theory of the perfect omniscience of the Buddha on the basis of the superhuman powers. There is no doubt that this was done with a view to stand the Buddha in the line of other Prophets,

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NOTES
APPENDIX 1
The Date of Buddha 1. IA., 1914, pp. 126. 2. Introduction to the Dhammapada, SBE., pp. xliii-xlvii.. 3. Book of Indian Eras, p. 34.
Vinaya Pițaka, SBE., Vol. xlll p. 28
Political History of India, p. 227. 6. Kern, Buddhism, 11. p. 63.
Agama aura Tri pigake : Eka Anusilana, P. 114. 8. Journal Asialique, 1900, pp. 316; Eng. trans, by J. M.
Seneviratne, JRAS ( Ceylon Branch, Vol. xxiv.,
No. 68, pp. 82-102. 9. Date of the Buddha's of Ceylon from a Chinese Source",
JRAS, 1911, pp, 1142- 1144. 10. Epigraphia Zeylanıca, Vol. 1. pp. 79-80, 122-124, 155
157. 11. A1 ahāramsa, intro. pp. xxii. 12. JRAS. (Ceylon Branch), 1914, Vol. xxxii, No. 67,
p. 143. Dve satāni ca vassāni atthārasa vassāni ca. Sarů buddhe parinibhüte abhisitto piyadassano. Dip.,
vi. 1. 14. Jinanibbanato paccă pura tassābhisekato.
Satthārasan vassasatadvayan even vijāniyam.
Mahi Vamsa, v. 2i. 15. Dip., v. 101; Maha , v. 16-18. 16. Dip., vi. 21-22; Mahi., v. 22. 7. Smith, V.-A; The Early History of India, pp. 38-9,
Roychaudhuri accepts 323 B. C. 18. ERE., 1. pp. 260-261. 19. Book of Indian Eras, pp. 34-5. 20. Ulien's Hwen Thsang, 11.335. 21. Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms, translated by Giles,
C. vii.

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(284) 22. Epigraphia Zeylanica, Vol. 1. p. 155 & p. 123; See also
Galvihara Inscription of Polonnaruwa, 11. 1-4 (Ed.
Muller, Ancient Inscription of Ceylon, pp. 87. 120). 23. Hultzsch, South Indian Inscription iii. no. 27, p. 53;
Epigr. Zeyl. pp. 80, 155, 24. Geiger, Mahāvansa, intro. p. xxix. 25. University of Ceylon Review, Vol. xviii. Nos. 3 & 4,
pp. 131. 26. Epigraphia Zelanica. Vol. 1. pp. 79-80, 122-124, 155-57. 27. The date of Buddha's death and Ceylon chronology,
JRAS, Vol. xxiii. No. 67, 1914, pp. 143. 28. Ibid., P. 253. 29. Contribution to Sinhalese chronology, JRAS. 1913,
P, 517-531. 30. JRAS., (Ceylon Branch), Val. xxiii. No. 67, 1914. 31. IA., Vol. xi. 1882, p. 246 (for the particulars about Indrabhūti Gañadhara ).
APPENDIX 11 Buddhist Councils Alam āvuso, ma socittha, ma paridevittha, Samutta mayam tena mabāsamaņena, upaddutā ca homa, idam vo kappati idam vo na kappati. idāni pana mayanl yami icchissama tam tam karissām. yam na icchissām tam na karissām. Dighani kāya, Mahāpari. nibbana-Sutta ; Vinaya Pitaka, Culla, Pascasatika Khandhaka. Pure adhamo dippati, dhammo pațibabiyati. avinayo dippati.
3. Mahavamsa., ij.2.2 There is no uganimity regarding to inclusion of Ananda in the First Council. See, Le Councile de Ragaha, p. 225. Prof. La Valiee Poussin has traced some of these rules in the Mahavagga ( vl. 17-19-20). Purana says "The dhamma and the Vinaya bave been wel sung by the Theras. Nevertheless, tven in such manner
2.

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as it has been heard by me from the mouth of the - Blessed One, in that manner will I bear it in memory." Vinaya Pitaka, iii.341-Culla, XL. i. i., quoted by S...
Dutta in The Buddha and Five After Centuries, p. 103. 6. Buddhistic Studies, p. 44. 7. Recherches sur le Bouddhisme, 1887, translated from
Russian into French by R. H. Assier de Pompognan,
1824. 8. Buddhistische Stuaien, ZDMG, 1898, pp. 613 ; Iotro
duction to the Vinaya pitaka, Vol. 1.xxy-xxix. 9. The life of the Buddha, p. vii. 10. General introduction to the Buddhist Suttas, SBE.
Voi. XL. P, xiii. 11. J.P.T. S., 1908, pp. 1-80. 12. The Buddha and Five After Centuries, p. 102, 13. IHQ., Viii. pp. 241-6. 14. Early Monastic Buddhism. N. Dutta, Vol. 1. p. 337. 12. IHQ., VIII. pp. 781-4. 16. Le Mouseon, VI. pp. 213-323, tr. into English in the
Indian Antiquary, 1908 ; See also ERE., sv, Councils. 17. Le council de Rajagrha, by Jean Przyluski. 18. Z.DMG., Vol. xxxiv ; 1880, pp. 184 ff. 19. Tata anantaram-dhammasangaņi-vibha'ganca,
kathāvatthusca Puggalaın, Dhatu-yamaka-patthānam. abhidhammāti vaccati. Evam samvaņņitam sukhamayānagocaram, tain sangāyitva idarp abhidhammapitakam námāti vatvā pāñca-arhantasatäni sajjha.
yamakansu. Sumaigalavilāsini, Nidānakatha. 20. 2 Cf. Early Monastic Buddhism, Vol. 1. p. 339.
1. Recherches sur le Bouddhisme, pp. 35-36. 22. Early Monastic Buddhism, Vol. 1. p. 339. 23. Mahavamsa, 5.
The Tibbetan and Chincse accounts give a quite. difierent reason. They relate this dissension with Mahadeva's dogmas, which are as follows:
(i) An Arhat may commit a sin by upcounscious

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temptation. (ii) One may be an Arbat and not know it. (iii) An Arhat may have doubts on matters of doctrine, (iv) One cannot attain Arhatship without a teacher., and ( v ) The noble ways may begin by a shout, that is one meditating seriously on religion may make such an exclamation as how sad ! How sad' and by so doing attain progress towards perfection-the path is attained by an exclamation of astonishment.--2500 years of Buddhism, p. 98. Di pavamsa, 5.30 foll. names it Mahāsaniigiti, while the Mahavamsa, 5. 3-4, calls it Mahăsăughika. Historic di Bouddhisme Dans, 1. Indc : Buddhistic
Studies, p. 26. 26. Manual of Buddhism, p. 109. 27. Introduction to the l'inaya pitaka, p. xxix. 28. Buddhist Philosoplıy in India and Ceylon, Vol. 11. pp.
265 6.
Buddhist Philosophy, p. 19. 30. Ibid. 31. Hultzsch, E., Inscriptions of Ashoka, ; Corpus Inscrip
tion Indicarum, Vol. 1. Oxford, 1925, pp. xliii. ff; p 160. No. 5. Studies in the Origin of Buddhism, p. 8. The Vajjiputtakas established the Maha-Säughika sect in the Second Council. It was divided later on into five sects and become six, Viz. Mahāsānghika, Ekabbobārika, Gokulaka, Paññattivādı, Bahulika, and Cetiyavādi.
29.
APPENDIX III The Concept of Omniscience
In Buddhism 1. M. i. 529; ii. 31; Buddhist Legend ( Dhammapadattha
katha ), Vol. 29. p. 74 ff. M. i 482.
3. A. iv. 164. 4. PTS. Dictionary. 5. D. i. 83.

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6. So dibbene cakkhunā visuddhena atikkantamāpusakena
satte passati cavamane upapajjamāne hine paoite suvanne dubbanne sugate duggate yathā-kammupage. D. i 82.
7. M.i. 213. 8. A. i. 170-171; Early Buddhist theory of Knowledge
p. 440. 9. A. ii. 191.
10. M.i. 167. 11. D. iii. 12; A. i. 340. 12. M. i. M. 13. Sn. 229,
14. M. i. 347. 15. So iman dukkham dukkham ti yathābhūtam pajānāti,
ayam dukkhasamudayo ti.....ayam āsavanirodhagāmi
nipatipadā ti, D. i. 84. 16. Sn. 478. 17. Dialogues of the Buddha, iii. p. 12. 18. ibid. ii. p. 4.
19. D. i. 223. 20. Unlimited retrocognition, unlimited clatrovoyance,
and knowledge of the destruction of the inflowing
impulses, M. i, 482. 21. In addition to the three-fold knowledge : (i) the
Buddha knows, as it really is, what is possibe as possible and what is impossible as impossible, (ii) the Buddha knows as it really is the effects according to their conditions and causes, of the performance of karma in the past, present and future, and (iii) the Buddha knows, as it really is, the corruption, perfection and arising from contemplative states of
release, concentration and attainment, A. iii. 417. 22. In addition to the six rbhiññas the following four
added : (i) The Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the mode of a life leading to all states, (ii) tbe Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the world with its various and diverse elements, (iii) the Tathāgata knows, as it really is, the various predilections of beings, and (iv) the Tathāgata knows, as it really is what goes on in the senses and faculties of other beings and individuals, M. i. 71. Vibhanga, 335-44. Early Budelhist Theory of Knowleage.

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23. A. iv. 173 ff.; Smith, Asoka, p. 154.
24. Buddhist Philosophy, p. 33.
25. Sabbam sankhatam asan khatam anavassam jānāti ti......atītam......pacuppannam sabbam jānātī
ti,
Patisambhidāmagga, 131.
26. Kathāvatthu, 228.
27. A. iii. 165.
28. Milindapanha, 34.
29. Atthasalini, 304.
30. Dutta, N., Place of Faith in Buddhism, IHO. Vol. 16,
p. 639.
31. Pae-sadda-mahannava
Vol. in. p. 796; Prakrita Vyakarana of Hemachandra. d, Pishel, Bombay, 1900, p. 159. Belief in the seven categories (saptatattvas) as ascertained in Jainlsm is called Right Belief (Samyag-darśana) which paves a way to attain
salvation.
32. Sarvarthasiddhi; 6.24.
33. Yasastilaka and Indian Culture, p. 262, N. 3. 34. Paearsaddamahannava, Vol. iii. p. 796.
35. Abhidhanarăjendrakoṣī Vol. X.
36. Heyopadeyatattvasya sabhyupayasya vedakah. Yaḥ pramaṇamasīvisto na tu sarvasya vedakah. Brahm pasyatu va na va tattvamiṣṭam tu pasyatu. Pramanam durdarşi cedeha gradhrānupasmahe.
Pv. 2.32-33. Tato vitaragatve sarvartha jñanasambhaḥ punah kālantare tesām sarvajña-gunaragiņām, alpayatnena sarvajñatvasiddhiravartta...PVA. p. 329.
38. Ydyadicchti boddhum va tattvavetti
37.
niyogatah.
Saktireyam vidha-hyasya prahinavarano hyaso.
TS. 3628.

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19
5.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
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gita, Varanasi, 1971, 194. Vidyabhusana, S. C., A History of Indian Logic,
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Varanasi, 1970. 196. Weber, A History of Indian Literature, London, 1878. 197. Winternitz, M. A., History of Indian Lilerature,
Vol. 11, Calcutta, 1933. 198. Rhys Davids; C. A. F., Buddhism, London, 1931. 199. Rhys Davids, T. W., Buddhist India, 1917.
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Orissa Research Society. 203. Epigraphia Indica. 204. Epigraphia Zeylanica. Journal of the Royal Asiatic
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Page #318

INDEX
Abhayadera sūri 133. Abhayarāja Kumāra 127. Abhayaraja Kumara sutta 127 Abhiiva, Kinds of 190 Abhidhamma Pitika 55 Abhidharmakośa 91 Abhinna 278 Acarangasara 26, 34 Acārya 39, 46, 51, 63, 70, 74.
8! 86, 87, 88, 93, 100. 109, 114, 125, 132, 133, 137, 139, 142, 142, 156,
158, 179. Acelakatva 84, 114, 115, 123,
124. Adipurane 94. Agama 36, 79, 84, 101, 133,
155, 167. A hetukavada 86. Ahimsa 19, 99, 101. Ajātsattu 9, 26, 27, 28 Ajita Kesa Kambali, 12. Ajivikas 4, 11.16, 102, 104
105, 106, 114, 116, 130
1 8. Ajñānovada 14. 197. Akalanka 214, 215. Akasa-Kusuma 182, 190. Akriyadda 10, 13, 75, 76, 80,
197. Amaravikkhepavada 14. A marhīvikkhepika 194-5.
Amrtacandra 100, Ananda 26, 32, 81. Anarthadand uvrata 102, 103. Anekantavada 39, 42, 63, 145,
67, 69, 71, 73, 74, 85, 88, theory of 163, Methods of 171, in Buddhist literature
173, Rudiments of 173. Anekarısikā 200. Anga 34, 56. Anzabāhya Śruta 38. Angapravista 38. Anguttara Nikiya 6, 10, 15,
24, 54, 75, 79, 82, 83, 84, 95, 100, 106, 107, 108, 131,
186, 187, 28). Anhrikas 181. Annmīnapram ina 156. Anuradhāpur 267. Anurrata 93, 105, 109. Arcaţa 72, 206. Arhanta 104, 109. Aritthanemi 24. Arthakriyit 175-80. Aryadeva 87. Asatkāryavāda 170, 75. Ascetics (terms for) 6, practices
115. Affhakathās 58, Atyantabheda 209. Avya kata 200. Barua 9, 10. Basham 18, 27, 30, 102, 121.

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( 301 )
Bavaltarim Kalao 22.
Chalabhiñña 278. Bhadrabihu 35.
Charpentier 26, 27. Bhagavati Sataka 106, 107. Cheyasattas 35. Bhagawati sütra 27, 125, 150. Ceylon 46, 265. Bhandarkar 106.
Cittagahapati 202. Bhavanas 4
Codringron, H. W. 268. Bhedabheda 172, 175, 131, 189, Cullavagga 53, 57, 271. 272, 191, 206. 213.
274, 276. Bimbisira 23, 43.
Cunningham 266. Bodhisatva 78.
Danda 73, Tridaņda 73. Brahmacarya 94, 122.
Darsana 131, 32'. Brahmajalasutta 4, 6, 7, 13, Darśanasāra 12. 67, 85, 92, 173, 194.
Dešavrata 102. Buddha 9, 12, 16, 27, 32, 50, Deo, S. V. 3, 5, 217. date of 266.
Dhamampada 11, 17, 37, 55, Buddhaghosd 12, 13, 59, 70, 57, 108
91, 108, 115, 121, 173. Dharmabheda 209. Buddhism 27, 33, 50, 87, 89, Dhammapadattthakatha 33.
113, 115, 176, 186, Source Dharmakirti 137, 149, 150, of 5.
151, 158, 160, 166, 204, Buddhist 184.
205. Buddhist Councils 52, 53, Dhyana 123, kinds of 123. 270-7.
Digambara 109, 114, 133, 154, Buddhist Literature 50, 52, 178. 56, 85, 92, 111, 148, 150,
Dighanakha Paribbājaka 199, 173, 186 Pāli 52, Sanskrit 59. 203. Cārvāk 13, 70, 136.
Digha Nikaya 24, 54, 59, 94, Canonical school 34, Literature 101, 120, 200.
34, Development of 35. Digurata 101. Carpentier 265.
Dipavamsa 266. Cattari ariyasaccani 19. Dravyas 60, Jiva 61, Catuhsataka 70, 87.
Pudgala 63, Dharma and Caturyamasamvara 14, 25, 44, Adharma 65, Akasa 66, 94, 120, 124.
Six Drayas in Catuskoti 2012
Buddhist literature 66.

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( 302 )
Jiva (Soul) 66, Ajiva (Karma)
73,Moksa 84, dual character of 180-83, Nature of re.
lation of 183. Discipline ( moral ) 110-11. Divyavadana 17 Dutta, Nalinaksha 10. Dutta, Sukumara 8, 16. Durvekamiśra 177, 178. Ekamsika 200. Eliot 217. Epistemology 125, evolution
of 129. Ethics 93, 95. Fa.Hian 267. Fasting 119. Finot 272. Ganadharas 31, 106, 109, 269. Gavāınpati 270. Gosāla 27. Gunauratas 100. Gupti 123 Haribhadra 172. Hemachadra 29, 145, 160, 72. Heretical Teachers 8. Hetuvinduţiki 72, Aloka 177. Hetvábhasa 214. Hinayāna 59, 179. Himsii 99, 100. Hoernle 17, 266. Hultzsch 268. Jacobi, H. 15, 25, 27, 29, 101,
106, 107, 117, 121. Jain, K. P. 223. Jain, Jyoti Prasada 227. Jain, M. K 227.
Jain Philosophy 59; 60, 84;
92, 138, 143, 147, 167, 171,Literature, 33, Canonical 34, Development of 35, Resemblenceto 36. Anekānta School 39, Pramana School
41. Jainism 27, 33, 79, 88, 89, 95,
99, 113, 138, 143, 145, 152, 179, 189. Antiquity of 22. Origin of 21, Spread of 43, After Mahāvīra 46. in
Ceylen 46, Jaiswal K. P. 30. Jātaka 37, 55, 57, 59, 86. Jatyantara 207, 213. Jayatilleke 198.
Mahābodhi 13, 79. Jetly 217. Jinasena 94. Jitāri 210. Jiva 61, 66. Joãna 131, Cetana 131, kinds
of classification of 31. Kalpasalra 26, 29, 31. Kalavīda 64. Kamalasila, 87, 91, 182. Kapilavatthu 44. Karkandacariu 49. Karma 65, 73, 78, 79, 84, 92,
114.
Karmic matter 65. Karņakagomin 209. Karyabheda 207. Kathavathtu 53, 55.

Page #321

( 303 )
Kayotsargo 22, 103, 120, 122. Majumdar R. C. 127, 270. Keith 50, 197.
Makkhali Gosālaka 4, 9, 11, 16, Kern 230, 266.
77, 106, 198. Khandaka 53.
Manjusrimülakalpa 23. Khuddaka 51, 55.
Maxmuller 266. Knowledge, Classification of
Micchadithi 4, 6. 7, 20, 194. 134.
Milinda panilha 24, 56, 58. Kosala 44.
Minayeff 273. Kriyavada 76, 192.
Mithyapāda 210, 211. Kşanikavāda 170, 77, 78, 79.
Mimamsaka 89, 91. Kumārapāla 30 Kumārila 138, 139, 153, 154.
Miyamoto 197, 201. Kundagrama 25.
Momentariness 176, 179, Kundakunda 74, 80, 84, 90,
Monachism 53, 109, 111, 119. 93, 114, 132, 147, 174, 175, Monastery 43, 49, 190
Monk 122, 149. Lalitavistara 6.
Requisites of 114-15, mode of Laksanabheda 206.
cating 118, quality of Lesya 81.
food 119, Circumstanees Loca 123.
119, Fasting 119, SuperMagadha 43.
natural powers 120, Daily Mahābodhi Jātakd 77, 78.
routine of 120, Loca 123, Mahākasgapa 270,
Acelakatva 123, Triguptis Mahāvagga 7, 25, 53, 54, 57. 123. Mahavamsa 46, 266.
Mulācāra 113, 117, 119, 242. Mahavarisa Țika 48.
Milagunas 94, 110. Mahavibhanga 53.
Mülasüttas 35. Mahāvira 15, 21, 23, 25, 26,
Muni 51, 118. 27, 33, 46, 106, 127. Mahāvrata 93, 101, 110-11,
Naiyāyikas 194.
Nandisūtra 198. Mahayāna 59.
Nālandā 97, 98. Majjhima Nikaya 12, 17, 24, Nagarjuna 204, 266.
51, 54, 59, 74, 77, 79, 84, Narasimha 72, 208, 209, 213. 96, 97, 114, 122, 127, 129, Nāsadiya Sūkta 193. 148, 203.
Navatattva 16.
120.

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( 304 )
Nayavida 185-87, definition of
187, number of 185, theory of Naya in Buddhist Lit
erature 186. Nibbūna 19, 27, 32, 45. Nigantha Nxtaputta 1, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 20, 23, 25, date of 26, of place death 31, 33, 41, 54, 58, 69, 80, 94, 108, 111, 115,
128, 130, 148, 173, 202. Niganthas 4, 108, 112, 115,
121, 148. Nikiyas (five) 54, 96, 1 7. Niyatasambandha 215. Nayatıvada 11, 64. Nyāya-Vaisesikas, 62, 77, 180. Nityanıtyatmaka 191. Non-violence 15. Oldenberg 50, 266, 275. Padartha ( substance ) 60, 85,
92, 171, 172. Padmasrājah 210, 211. Pakudha Kaccāyana 13. Panicapapa 93. Pafcauratas 93. Pāli Canon 22, 23, 85, 94, 108,
111, 114, 120, 148, 150, 173. Pali Tripitaka 30. Pancūstikāyasara 200. Pani avatthu 52. Patakramabahu I 267. Paranavitana 268. Paribbrājakas 85, 108. Parigraha 95, 96, Pafisambhidāmagga 280.
Parşvanātha 22, 24, 44, 48,51,
94, 96, 121, 127, 150, 203. Pätimokkha 53, 57. Pavā 27, 30, 31, 45. Pavāraņā 5.2. Penance 17, 51, 92, 123, 124, Perception 142, 145. Prabhacandra 213. Potthapāda 70, 174. Poussin 272. Promana 41, 143, 152, 153, 154. Prajnakaragupta 205, 206, 281 Pramana, etilogy of 134 kin
ds of 135, 136, different cou nception of 136, Savikalpa
136-15. Pāruārthika 145, 53,
Parokya 153, Smiti 153. Pratyabhijnana 154, Tarka 155, Agama 155, Apumāna 156-166, Pramāṇasamplav.
avada 166, organs of 158. Pratima C3, 108, 109. Pramāņavārtikā 204, Svavřtti
Tikā, 209. Pravacanäsara 107. Prayascittas 109, 110. Premi, Nathuram 31. Proşadhopavā sa 31, 84, 103. Pudgala ( matter ) 63, 73. Pujyapāda 63, 146, 172. Pūraña 270. Pūraņa kassapa 9, 10, 80 Puşpadanta 132. Rai chaudhary 27 Rahul Sankrityana 31

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( 305 )
Rājgaha 43, 120, 128, 150, Ratnakaranda Śrāvahācāra 74. Raychaudhari 266. Rgveda 193. Rhys Davids' T. W. 3, 7, 56 Rockhill 242, 271. Rşabhadeva 21. Saccaka 127. 202 Sabda 90. Sadiváyaks 122. Saddhartua pundari ka 6. Saketa 44 Salvation 11, 19, 24. 84. Sāmagamasūtta 32. Samaņa 80, 107, 116. Samannaphala Sutta 9, 11, 14,
25, 26, 120, 121. Samantabhadra 206. Samavāyanga 5. Sāmāyika 103, 106, 120. Samitt 111, 122. Samyutta Nikaya 10, 54. Sarhyukta vastu 272. Sandeha 208. Sangha 100, 112. Sanjay Belaţthiputta 14, 195,
197. Sankara 208. Santāna 213. Santarakṣita 71, 72, 86, 87,
88, 89, 91, 134, 137, 136, 139, 140, 143, 144, 159 164, 165, 166, 175, 176.
178, 179, 180, 208, 282. Saskhya 180.
Saptabhangi 191. Sassatavāda 13, 32,59, 68, 69,
92, 173, 196, 202. Satkaryavada 170, 75. Satkhandagama 89, 132. Sávatti 44, Schism 31. Jain order ) Senaviratne 266, 268. Shastri, Aiyaswami 5. Shastri, K. C. 228. Silanka 10, 18, 77, 79, 192. Skandha 90. Smith 266. Sramaņa 2, System 2, classifi
cation 3, Common features
4, importance of 6. Sramanism 16. Sūdras 2. Sumati 136, 38, 39, 140, 143,
138. Syayavada 170. Sürakstāäga 6, 12, 18, 37, 75,
76, 87, 124, 174, 199. Sutta Pitaka 53, 54, Sutta Nipata 3, 17, 125, 36. Svabhāvabheda 210. Svabhūvavada 64, 86, 87. Svetāmbara 4, 115, 133. Syādvāda 14, 16, 19, 42, 43,
59, 73, 169, 171, 185, 187, 188, 189, theory 187, opponents on 139, kinds of dosas 189, Saptabhangis of 191, Syadvada Conception in Buddhist Literature

Page #324

3
193-216, in Vedic and Upanisa lic period 193 4. Buddha on 200, Makkhali, on 198, Pärsranatha tradition 202, refutation of 204, Dharmakirti on 204, Prjñā Karagupta on 205, Arcata on 206, Santarakṣita on 208, Karnakagomin on 209, Jitari on 210, Evalu
ation 211.
Syadvadamañjari 143. Sylvain Levi 265. Syat 204.
(306)
Tādātmyasambandha 215.
Takki 130. Tathagata 127.
Tatuas (seven) 67, 92. Tattvärthasaradipika 107. Tattvarihasutra 172. Tattvasungraha 40 71, 86, 89, 91, 134, 162, 167, 179, 299. Teacher (six) 8-9,
Thananga 4, 34, 37, 54, 74. 113, 125.
Theragatha 55, 56. Theravada 59.
Tharigatha 55, 56.
Thinkers 130, Kinds of 13). Tipitaka 37, 53, 56, 58, 96, Tirthankaras 21, 23, 33, 47, 51, 111, 112, 127, 147-50. Tiryakasamanyātmaka 209, 210. Titthiyas 4. Trairātikas 198, 199. Trayatmakavāda 175-80. Ubhayavada 206, 207, 212. Ucchedavada 13, 32, 59, 68, 69, 92. 173, 196, 203, 303.
Ujjaini 29. Umaswami 93, 146, 72.
Universe 85.
Upadhye Dr. A. N. 6, 217.
Upali 82, 83. Upalisutta 74. Upanga 35. Upanisadas 194. Upatissy 267.
Upoṣatha 58, 101, 104, 105, 106, Kinds of 103, Gopalaka 103, Niganth 104.
Urdhasamanyātmaka 209, 210. Uttaradhyayana 35, 36-37. Uvasagadasão 12, 34. Vada 126.
Vädirāja 203, 219. Vadanyaya, writer of 177. Vaisali 25, 45, 99, 101, 102. Vaiseşıka 62, 77, 206, 208, 212. Vappa 82.
Vassāvāsa 53. 113. Vasuvandhu 70.
Vedic literature 1.
Society 1. System 1, 2. Vibhajiavaya 118, 199. Vidūşaka 214. Vijñānavāda 1 4, 145. Vimanvatthu 55, 57. Vinaya Piṭaka 53, 99, 114. Visakhā 101, 103, 115. Vivartavada 170.
"
Vividhatirthakalpa 30. Vratyas 3, 217.
Wickremasinghe 260, 268. Wijesinghe 268. Winternitz 3, 37,

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P.
Line
( 307 ) ERRATA Incorrect Niganth is birth on the of river
Nignth anonical cannon Other Pramárias Candelas Tejapur Vifbavada Know as is the
Correct Nigantha his birth on the bank of river. Nigantha Canonical Canon Other pramānays Chandelas Terapur Vijñānavāda Known at
is
TO
The 3-4 P, M.
18 Noon
26
27
Ksaņābhanga vada sāntarakisata Dunnaya
Kşanabhangavāda Santarakṣita Durnaya
178 179 179 185 186 187 187 187 193
Nayovada
Nayavida
Oi
of
191
192 194
Nāya Pradhvamsābhāyr Acāryas Spayānnasti Or Brāhma Jayatilleka Jatyantarā Ydyadicchati
Naya Pradhvamsābhāva
Ācāryas Syaonăsti of Brahma Jayatilleke Jatyantara Yadyadichati Va
194 198
207 288 288
Va

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