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(i) Who knows whether there is an arising of psycholo gical states ! ( Sati bhiootpattin ko vetti )?
(ii) Who knows whether there is no arising of psychological states ? ( Asati bhavotpattih ko vettih ) ?
(iii) Who knows whether there is and there is no arising of psychological states? ( Sadasati bharotpattih ko vettih)?
(iv) Who knows whether the arising of psychologica) states is inexpressible ? ( A vaktarg'o bhāvotpattih ko vettih )?
These questions are similar to first four Syadvāda predications. The main difference between the Predications of Sceptics and Jainas was that the former doubts or denies the logical problems altogether whereas the latter asserts that they are true to a certain extent,
Makkhali Gāsāla and Syādvāda
Makkhal Gosāla, the founder of the Ājivika sect and an earlier companion of Nigantha Nātaputta, has contributed to the development of the Syadvada conception. He considered problems through the three-fold standpoints, called Trirašis, a short version of Sapta-bhangi.
On the basis of the Nandi sūtra commentary, Basbam observes: "The Ajivika heretics founded by Gosāla are likewise called Trairasikas, since they declare everything to be of triple character, viz. : living, not living, and both living and not living : world, not world, and both world and not world; real, unreal, and both real and unreal, in considering standpoints (naya regarding the nature of substance, of mode, or of both. Thus since they maintain three heaps (rāśi) or categories they are called Trairāśikas". Further he says "the Ajivikas thus seem to have accepted the basic principal of Jaina epistemology, without going to the over-refined extreme of Saptabhangi, as in the orthodox Jaina Syadvada and nayavada."100
This reference indicates that the Ajivikas were aware of the Saptabhaigi of the Jaina logic and they reduced them to three. Dr. Jayatilleka remarks on this reference : "But jud
