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Both characters cannot co-exist in the same substance. Hence the urdhvatasimanya could be destroyed because things are not permanent.
As regards tiryaksamanya, that is also defective in character in his opinion. He says: if the universality were in the substance, the ghata ( pot) and pata (linen) or dadhi (curd) and ustra (camel) would be identical. Hence a shape or a water-pot should be found in cloth and a curdeater should consume a camel.181 Therefore Syadvada doctrine is false (mithyavada) in his opinion.
Thus Karnakagomin makes his refutation following Dharm. akirti's arguments, and tries to prove that the dual characteristic of an entity is not possible as it invites serious defects in the theory.
Jitari and Syādvāda
Jitāri, another Buddhist logician wrote a complete book Anekantavādanirasa to refute the Anekantavāda. Padmaraja summarizes its arguments as follows :
When the Anekantavidin maintains that dravya and paryuya are identical, owing to the identity of their nature, it means that he affirms nothing short of their total identity (ekarupataiva) Difference, based on (the secondary consideration) number etc. (sankhyadi ), will then be fictitious ( Kalpanamatrakalpitaḥ syāt). For, a real difference ( paramarthikobhedah ) between the two cannot proceed from the identity of their nature (na hi yayoh svabhavabhedah tayoh anyathā pāramar
thiko bhedah sambhavati 182
Or conversely, when the anekantavādin pleads that dravya and paryaya are different, it means that he affirms their unqualified difference. Identity will then be fictitious. For real identity (svabhavabhedah) cannot proceed from the difference which is their basic and total nature. The truth about the whole position, according to Jitari, is that one cannot have identity as well as difference by the same nature (na ca tenaiva svabhavena bhedascabhedaśca ).
