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spiritual height at that time. However, the masses considered all Niganțbas to be omniscient, because some of them gained various powers of insight. The Buddha, apparently under the impression tbat this was the actual claim of Jainism, criticised it. The later Buddhist philosophers also followed him. Latern, on the imitation of Jainism, the Buddha is also made an omniscient in Buddhist Literature.147
2. Paroksa Pramāṇa ( Indirect Knowledge )
Non-distinct ( avisada ) knowledge is faroksa, and it unlike pratg akşa, dependent on others. It is of five kinds, namely, smarana, pratyabhijñana, tarka, alumiina and agama. Out of these pramānas in Jaina logic, only the anumāua pramāna has been discussed in Buddhist philosophical literature. Yet it is helpful to get a brief picture of other pramāṇas also, since the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophers vary in their attitudes to other pramāṇas on account of the different stand-points they had adopted. Smrti pramāna
Smrti is the remembrance of a thing perceived or known before and it is a source of knowledge of a particular thing in association with earlier experiences. Therefore, it is regarded on Pramana by Jaina logicians. But the Vedic philosophers are not ready to accept it as an independent pramāņa on the ground that it depends on the vaildity of earlier experience (grahitagrahitva ).148 The Buddhists joined hands with the Vedic philosophers like Kumārila. 149 and rejected the validity of smrti.150 Their main argument, like that of the Mimānsakas or the Vaiseşikas, is that the validity of smrti is conditioned by previous experience and it is wholly dependent on experience.181 As a matter of fact, the question of memory being treated as a pramāņa does not arise in a system like Buddhism where all knowledge-involving-thought (vikal pa jnanamātra ) is considered no pramāna.162
On the other hand the Jaina logicians unanimously accept the validity of smrti pramäņa. Their main argument is that
