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be known by other means. There would be the incongruity of "mutual interdependence" anyonyasrayadoṣa), if the definite cognition of the Probandnm followed from the Probans. Hence, the cognition of one would be dependent upon the cognition of the other.212
Regarding the third alternative, Śantarașita says that if the probans were known as exisent in the Corroborative Instance, that would not bring about the cognition of the probandum in the Minor term, since its invarible concomitance will not have been definitely cognised all over.218 He then refutes the instances214 put forward by Patrasvamin in the course of his arguments.
For instance, in regard to the first instance concerning Syamaputra, he says that "One is dark, because he is the son of so and so" is not the natural reason (svabhavahetu), as "being product" kṛtakatvam) has a character of non-eternality. The Syamatva, in his opinion, is the aggregate of five ingredients (pañcopādānaskandha). Nor is the probans based on the effect (karyahelu), as there is no causal relation between his son and darkness. Nor is it of the nature of the non-perception ( anupalabdhi) is the probans cannot prove the negation of complexions other than darkness.215
Further Santarakşita criticises the theory of Patrasvamin on the grounds of other inferences and concludes that the one-featured probans is really an importent theory (klibüstenaikalakṣaṇaḥ). He then tries to prove that three-featured probans has no such defects,
This refutation of the theory of one-featured probans is based on the asiddha, viruddha and anarkāntika defects ( hetvabhāsas). However, the Jaina philosophers like Prabhācandra and Anantavirya say that these defects are really not on the side of the one-featured betu of Jainas, but on the side of the three-featured hetu of they Buddhists, because it can be applied to even Hetvābhāsas. They finally conclude that the -one-featured hetu is the shortest and the simplest route to make an inference regarding anything.218
