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The Vaiseşikas and the Buddists include ägama in infe Tence. But as a matter of fact, it should not be considered as a part of anumana, since, unlike anumāna, it arises without 'having perceived signs and their concomitance. It may be noted here that the Jainas as well as the Buddhists rejected the claim of the Vedic philosophers that the Vedas are apauriseya (not of human authorship but of devine origin ) 171
Thus smrti, pralyabhajnana, tarka, anumana and agama are accepted as separate pramāras in Jaina philosophy and included into paroksa pramāna. That means, according to Jainas, there are two pramīņas, viz. pratyaksa and paroksa, while the Buddhists assert the reality of pra- tyaksa and anumāna. 172
Anumāna Pramāna
Anumana means a cognition which takes place after some other cognition, specially perception (anu vyaplir nirnayasya pascadbhavi manani ).178 The Vedic thinkers may have been the first to attempt a definition of anumāna and their definition influenced both the Jainas and the Buddhists, although there was no unanimity among them as regard the exact nature of this pramāna.
Diināga ( 5th A.D.) a great Buddhist philosopher, is among the earliest to oppose the Vedic tradition. He offered a new definition which was latter adopted by his disciples. This Buddhist definition influenced the Jaina logicians like Siddhasenadivākara 5th .1. D.), Akalaika ( 8th A.D.), and Vidyānanda ( 9th A. D.)
In the Jaina tradition Acārya Akalaika presents a comprehensive definition of anumina as follows:
Cognition of Sathya ( what is to be proved) or major term produced by the Sadhana (the instruments to prove the sadhya) is called Amumuna which follows linga-gralana (apprehension of the predicate of proposition) and vyapti-smārana (remembrance of invariable concomitance). He emphasises that because it is avisamvadin (non-discrepant) in its own subject and remo
