________________
( 152 )
scient. 140 Presenting the positive arguments in this way, Akalanka relies on the negative arguments that there is no contradictory pramuna141 to reject the established omniscience and therefore it is certain. He then substantiates this argument by examining the various so-called contradictory pramāņas.143
Dharmakirti and his commentator, Prajñākargupta, think that the Jaina conception of omniscience cannot be accepted for want of Sadhaka-badhakapramana145 (assisting and contradicting evidence). Akalańka replies this criticism by saying that one cannot establish the non-existence of omniscience without being omniscient. He further says that there is no badhaka pramana to refute omniscience in Jainism, and the absence of badhaka pramina is itself a sidhaka pramāņa. 145
As regards Anuṣṭhanagatajñāna urged by Dharmakirti, Vadirāja, a commentator of Akalanka, questions "By which pramāņas does the Buddha perceive the Anustheyagatavastu? Neither can Pratyakṣa Prāmāṇa be helpful in this respect, otherwise what will be the use of Anusthina? Nor will the Anumuna (inference) pramana will solve our problem, because it depends on the pratyakṣa. Thus the Anusṭheyagata Jina in itself has no importance. 143
So far as Kitasankhya-parijñana and its puruşartho payoga are concerned, he says that it is essential to include Kitasankhya-parijñana as an integral part of omniscience, as caturaryasatya implies the Duhkhasatya of creatures living around. If the Buddha has not grasped the Caturaryavedanatva, how could he preach to his disciples convincingly? He then remarks that if the Kitasankhya-parijiana serves no useful purpose, what then is the use of Bhiksu-sankhya-parijñana in Buddhism.148 ?
Thus the Jainas established the theory of omniscience, whereas the Buddhist refuted it in Nigantha Nataputta. According to Jainism its adherents could aspire to be omniscient. But it was only Nigantha Nataputta who attained this
