Samayasara

Author(s): A Chakravarti
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith

Page 32

SAMAYASARA
be true in other cases. Thus even mathematical propositions according to Humé are only highly probable statements but not necessarily binding on the human intellect to be absolutely true. This sceptical result obtained by Hume was the starting point of idealism. Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher admits that he was roused from his dogmatic slumber by Hume. According to Kant, Hume's result though logically inevitable from the empirical assumptions shows the frustration of reason. Neither the dogmatic philosophy of Descartes nor the sceptical philosophy of Hume would be a satisfactory solution of the metaphysical problem. Kant therefore attempted to reconstruct metaphysics in such a way as to avoid both these extremes. As he himself confesses, "The starry heavens above and the moral law within always fill me with awe and reverence", his task as a philosopher therefore is to explain nature and constitution of the cosmos and understand and explain the significance of the moral Law. The former he takes up in his first book of Pure Reason and the latter he takes up in his second book of Practical Reason. His attempt to salvage metaphysics from Humean scepticism constrains him to examine first the foundations of mathematics. Are the mathematical propositions really necessary and true or are merely contingent and probable statements? He is not prepared to accept the latter alternative. Hence he concentrates his attention to find a suitable explanation for the necessary truth of mathematical proposition. According to Kant, the typical mathematical proposition is associated with geometry. Hence for him space is the foundation of mathematics. The problem therefore resolves itself into the study of the nature of space and its properties. Locke's attempt to give space an independent existance in the external world proved to be futile in the hands of his successors, Berkeley and Hume. If space therefore is assumed to be an external entity then we have to get ourselves entangled in the inevitable scepticism of Hume. Hence Kant is compelled to adopt a new method. The external world no doubt is the region of sense stimuli. But the object perceived by the sense is the result of a combination between the stimuli supplied from the external source and the shape given to it by the mind itself. The contribution which the mind makes in the process of perception is the form of space. Space and time according to Kant are the forms contributed by the mind while it is engaged in the process of perceiving external objects. The external world as seen by us thus the result of two different factors, one the sense stimuli from an external source, the other the space which the mind impresses upon these sense stimuli. Thus no object can become an object of perception for us unless it is compelled to take the form of space. Since it is the combined product of sense stimuli and space-form it necessarily follows that all objects perceived by us must necessarily have the form of space impressed on the materials by the mind itself. Spatial quality therefore becomes a necessary property with all perceived objects in our sense-presented experience. This world of experience therefore must necessarily conform to spatial form and hence the objects of experience must necessarily be in conformity with spatial properties. If spatial form is indispensable and neccessary concomitant of physical objects, the space properties are similarly inevitable and necessary in a sense-presented experience.