Jaina Epistemology

Author(s): Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/006738/1

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P. V. Research Series No. 50 Editor Prof. Sagarmal Jain JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri sacca logammi sArabhUyaM pArzvanAtha vidyAzrama zodha saMsthAna,vArANasI-5

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P. V. Research Series No. 50 Editor : Dr. Sagarmal Jain 7 JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY By Late Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri M.A. Ph. D. SINDDMUND 5. -za--- VARANASI 5 P. V. RESEARCH INSTITUTE VARANASI-5

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Published by : P. V. Research Institute I. T. I. Road, Varanasi-5 Rh. No. 311462 First Edition : February 1990 Price Rs. 150.00 Printed by: Divine Printers B. 13/44, Sonarpura Varanasi.

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Publisher's Note We feel immense pleasure in presenting this valuable work 'Jaina Epistemology' by Late Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri in the hands of the scholars. Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri was the second Research scholar of P. V. Research Institute. He was awarded Ratan Chand Memorial Scholarship by this Institute to work on the Epistemology of Jaina Agamas. He was awarded Ph. D. Degree by B. H. U. Though there are various independent works on Jaina theory of Reality, Syadvada, Jaina Metaphysics etc, but we don't have any work on Jaina Epistemology or Pramana Mimamsa. It is gratifying that this subject has been for the first time exhaustively dealt by Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri. The present work not only covers the epistemological concepts of Jaina Philosophy but it also includes their comparative studies with other systems of Indian Philosopby. As a matter of fact the author has made a remarkable contribution to Indian Epistemology in general and Jaina Epistemology in particular. We are extremely sorry as this work could not be published in his life time due to certain unavoidable reasons. After his demise his eldest son Dr. Satya Suman Shastri approached Dr. Sagar Mal Jain, Director, P. V. Research Institute and expressed his desire to see it through the press. While going through the manuscript it was realised that the pattern of references and diacritical marks adopted in thesis left much to be desired. It required a thorough scrutiny. Dr. Shastri, the author having left for heavenly abode it was the sole responsibility of the Institute as a publisher to prepare a correct press copy. We are happy to note that our academic staff Dr. Sagarmal Jaina, Director, Dr. Arun Pratap Singh, then Research Associate and Dr. Ashok Kumar Singh, Research Officer undertook this responsibility and corrected copy was given to the press.

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( iv ) We are thankful to the heirs of Dr. I. C. Shastry esp. Dr. Satya Sumap and Sneha Suman who took keen interest in publication and also made a donation of Rs. 2100/- as a publication grant for this work. We are again thankful to Dr. Sagar Mal Jaina and Dr. Ashok Kumar Singh who have been instrumental in its publication. We are also thankful to Sri Mahesh Kumar, Divine Printers for its speedy printing. B N. Jain Secretary P. V. Rescarch (ostitute

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Born: May 27, 1912 Expired November 3, 1986 Late Prof. (DR.) INDRA CHANDRA SHASTRI M. A. Ph.D. SHASTRACHARYA, VEDANTA-VARIDHI NYAYATIRTHA Ex. Head of the Department of Sanskrit Institute of Post-graduate Studies University of Delhi.

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Author's Note I have discussed in the present work the problem of epistemology as depicted in the Jaina canonical literature. Originally, it was planned to have two parts; the Agama-school and Tarkaschool; and thus, embrace the entire field of Jaina epistemology as well as logic. But, the volume of first part became so large that it surpassed the reasonable limit of a thesis. Consequently, the second part has been left for further presentation. The field of Jaina philosophy remains, more or less, unexplored. Very few scholars have tried to present it critically. We can mention in this respect Dr. S. Mukarjee and Nathmal Tatia. The edition of Syadvadamanjart by Principal A. B. Dhruva covers all the points relating to Jaina metaphysics. It has discussed a few topics of epistemology also. Dr. P. L. Vaidya's edition of Nyayavatara is definitely a valuable contribution to Jaina logic. Dr. Upadhye has translated Pravacaaasara and edited it with a critical introduction. But, he could devote only a few pages to philosophy. Principal Chakravarti's contribution towards metaphysics is valuable. Messrs J. L. Jaini, Ajit Prasad and S. C. Ghosal, are old names; but, their main contribution consists in translations. Their independent works are merely iatroductory. Pt. Sukhlal, Prof. Mahendra Kumar and Prof. Dalsukh Malavania have contributed a lot towards philosophy, epistemology and logic; though in Hindi. Their critical editions have helped me a lot in preparing the present work. But, none has tried so far to present the problem of Epistemology in its totality and an independent study. I humbly beg to say that this is the first attempt in this respect. The present thesis is divided into six chapters. In addition, it includes an introduction, containing a brief survey of the works on the topic. It presents a summary of Jaina authors

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( vi) and their works, covering a period of two millenia. The different trends resulting from natural development or external influences also have been recorded at their proper places. The first chapter treats the definition of knowledge. It has three sections : the metaphysical position, the function and the object. Its introductory part shows the fundamental principles of Jaina epistemology traced from the original Agamas. The first section is a comparative study of the metaphysical position of knowledge. The second deals with the function of knowledge, i. e. the relation between subject and the object. The third treats the nature of the object of knowledge. It ascertains the positions of three psychological functions of knowing, feeling and willing; criticizing the Buddhist view of their identity. The second chapter presents a historical survey of the division of knowledge with its seven stages; beginning with the Bhagavail Sutra right upto Akalanka. It shows the aspects of subject, object, cause, appearance and the like, accepted by different systems as the basis of division. At the end it dwells upon the twofold division of direct knowledge (pratyaksa ) and indirect knowledge (paroksa ) as held by the Tattvartha. The third chapter deals with mati and sruta, the two types of indirect knowledge. The conception of sense-organs, position of mind, their contact with the objects, successive stages and such other topics of real epistemological interest are discassed with matijnana. The controversy about the position of avagraha is fully discussed. The question of samjnis also is included in it. The conception of sruta undergoes three developments. In the first stage it is confined to the canonical literature. In the second stage it is knowledge derived from speech or scriptures. In the third stage it is identical with mati. All the three stages have been discussed in detail. The fourth chapter treats Avadbi, Mapahparyaya and Kevala, the three types of direct knowledge. It begins with the conception of superpormal knowledge as held by other systems

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(vii) with occasional comparative remarks. Yogipratyaksa, Siddhapratyaksa and Arsapratyaksa as admitted by the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems, have been compared with the corresponding Jaina notions. All the varieties of avadhi with its proportional developments have been shown in their true perspectives. The controversy about the object of manahparyaya, the views advocated by Jinabhadra and Akalanka have been already stated. In the discussion of Kevalajnana the question of omniscience has been special attention. It shows that the knowledge of reality and omniscience are two different things. The notion of omniscience comes as a necessary equipment of the creator or a religious preacher. This is supported by the Buddhist conception of ten bhumis and paramitas. The fourteen stages of spiritual development beginning from three karanas (feats) and granthibheda (unlosening the knot of karmic bondage), right upto the attainment of kaivalya, have been described. The question of identity or difference in knowledge amongst the three stages of kevala with yoga, kevala without yoga and the kevala with liberation has been discussed in the light of other systems. The fifth chapter treats Darsana, the inarticulate cognition. Several notions regarding the nature of darsana, beginning from the stage of soul's inclination right upto the general apprehension of an object have found a place here. The controversy between Virasena and the logical school has been fully discussed. I have also shown how the first view of soul's inclination changed into the popular view. The problems of succession, simultaneity, or identity between kevalajnana and kevala darsana also have been properly dealt with. It shows how the question of omniscience is the root-cause of this controversy. The sixth chapter discusses the problem of Ignorance (ajnana), in its four aspects of illusion, perversion, absence of knowledge and its cause. The question of jnanavarana and darsanavarapa, with their subdivisions is fully discussed.

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(viii) The reader will find in comprehensiveness this work and a comparative outlook in the treatment. A thought is like rainwater stored by different traditions into their own pots and given different names. No topic is the exclusive property of a particular system. One cannot have its full view by visualizing it in a particular pot. I have tried here to give the views of different systems fully, as to make them clearly understandable. In a way, it is a study of the entire topic rather than a single system. The present work, the result of my studies as a Ratan Chand Jaina Fellow, has kept me engaged for several years. I owe a deep sense of gratitude to the trustees of the above Fellowship for their generosity. I am highly indebted to Dr. P. L. Vaidya, Mayurbhanja Professor of Sanskrit, Benares Hindu University, under whose able guidance I have worked and completed the thesis. His instructions and timely encouragement have been a source of inspiration to me. Prof. Dalsukh Malavania has gone through some chapters and given valu. able suggestions. His deep scholarship in the field of Jainism has been a great asset to me. Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri

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CONTENTS PREFACE CHAPTER 1-History and Sources 1-52 The period 1, The traces before Mbavira 1, Purva Literature not a myth 1, Other ground of its antiquity 2, Conclusion 3, The field unexplored 3, The last Author 3, Two -schools 4, The literature of the Agamic School 6, The present state of Agamas 7, Three Councils 8. Agamas according to Digambara Tradition 11, Agamika Literature on the theory of knowledge 13, Literature of the Tarka School 19, Kundakunda 22, Siddhasena 23, Samantabhadra 28, Akalarka 32, Haribhadra 35, Vidyananda 37, Anantavirya 40, Anantakirti 41, Man kyanandin 41. Kulabhusana 42, Abhayadeva 42. Prabhachandra 43, Vadiraja 43, Jinesvara 44, Chandraprabha Suri 44, Anantavirya 44, Deva Suri Vadin 44, Syadvada Ratpakara 46, Hemachanda 46, Santyacarya 47, Ratnaprabha 48, Mallisena 48, Gunaratna 48, The introduction of Navyanyaya 48, Yasovijaya 49, Vimaladasa 50, Survey of the three periods 52. CHAPTER II-General Conception of Knowledge 53-195 The dominating spirit of Indian Philosophy 53, Clarification of some terms : Upayoga, Darsana or Nirakara Upayoga, Jnana and Ajnana, Jnana and knowledge 55. Canonical Approach to the Conception of knowledge 56, Absence of proper definition 56, Metaphysical position 57, Identity between Instrument and Agent 61, Ethical Position or Value of knowledge 61, Epistemological Function of knowledge 64. Four Fundamentals 65. The problem of knowledge analyzed into three parts : metaphysical position; function and object 66-71. Metaphysical

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position of knowledge 71, Jaina Conception of Reality 71-72, Categories and Realities 72, Dravya, Guna and Paryaya 73, The Vaisesika view compared 78, Epistemological Function of Gunas 80, Two stand-points based on Dravya and Paryaya 81, The Vertical Universality and the Notion of Oneness 82. Classification of Reality 84, The Agamic Treatment of Soul 86, Metaphysical evolution 86-87, JIvasamasa 87-88, Marganas 88. The Self, Consciousness and Cognition : a comparative view 90, The Materialistic view 90-92, Its criticism 92.96, Other Schools of Materialism 96. The Nyaya and Vaisesika 97, Nature of soul 97-98, Its qualities 98, Its number 98, Dimension 98, Cognition 99, The Self and Consciousness 99, Tw) types of consciousness 100. General condition for consciousness 100, Consciousness in sleep 100, Consciousness and cognition 102, The Jaina position compared 103, The Nyaya View criticized 104, Theory of God 107, Absence of Consciousness in the state of liberation 108, Dimension of the self 109. The Mimamsa 111-117 The Self II, The Consciousness 114, Mimansaka Criticized 115, The Sankhya 117, The Self 117, Two types of Consciousness 118, The Sarkhya view criticized 119, Consciousness as an Independent Reality 120, As passive observer 121 As an unchangeable reality 124, Consciousness and Cognition as Related to different entities 124, Purusa and bliodness of knowledge 124, Purusa without any quality 125, Sankhya Theory of Cognition 125-127, Difference between Vacaspati and Vijnanabhiksu 128. The Advaita Vedanta 128-135 Brahma or Pure Consciousness 128, Comparison with Sankhya and Jainism 128, The Empirical Self and Cognition 130, Number of Souls 131, Three types of knowledge 1.33.

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(xi) The Idealist-School of Buddhism 135. Soul or Consciousness (Citta or Alaya Vijnana ) 135.. Empirical Consciousness 137. The Realist School of Buddhism 138. Consciousness or Soul 138. Cognition 140. The Jaina View fully explained 142, Soul 142. Definition 142. Two types. of definition 143, it is Agent as well as experient 146.. it has an infinite plurality 147. it is co-extensive with the body 148. Aspects of the self-the views of Kundakunda, Brahmadeva and Yasovijaya on its all-pervasiveness 152. Two aspects of liberated and soul 153. The Nature of Consciousness 154. Pure Consciousness and Jainism 154. The objects and content of knowledge 156. Functions of Consciousness 158. Bliss is not feeling 159. Feeling in the state of Arhatship 159. feelling: and knowledge 160, Consciousness and Upayoga 162. The definition of Siddhasena Ganin, Pujyapada and Akalanka. Two Upayogas do not occur simulteneously 166. Identity between. Upayoga and soul 166. Relation between Subject and Object 169-176 The existence of subject and object 170. The views of Vedan ta 171. Yogacara 171. Madhyamika and realistic systems 171. The Idealist view criticized 71. Subjective and objective ap. pearances 171. Relation between subject and object 172. Representation Theory 172. Direct presentation 173. Contact: and Ksayopasama 173. Kundakunda's view explained 175. The Object of knowledge 177-181 The views of other systems: Nyaya 177. Bhatta 178. Prabhakara 179; Murari 179. Advaitavedanta 179. Jaina. stand-point clarified 181. Reality is not confined to the existence only 181. Generality and Particularity 182. Knowledge True and false 182. Personal experiences explained 184. Jaina and different forms of objectivism 186. Jaina and Primitive. objectivism 186. Jaina and common sense objectivism 188.. Jaina and New Objectivism 190. Jaina and Kant 193. Experience Cognises Universal as well as particular. 194. Emergence of concept 194.

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(xii) CHAPTER II--"The Division of knowledge 196-226 Historical Survey 196, The Division according to Bbaga. vatIsutra 202, The Division according to Sthanarga 205, Division of knowledge : Third stage 207, Division of knowledge : the Fourth and subsequent stages 208, The Basis of the Division: A Comparative view 211, The Basis of Jaina Division 217, the Definition of Perception 218, the Nyaya Theory of Perception (pratyaksa) 218, the Definition of Paroksa 226. CHAPTER III Indirect knowledge (The Types of Indirect knowledge 227 Mati jnana 227, Two Connotations 227, the Range of Mati Jnana 228, the Division of Mati : Instruments 229, the Psychology of Mati Joana 230, the Senses : their nature 231, the Function of Senses 232, Dravyendriyas 233, Bhavendriyas 235, the Blind and five senses 235, Relation between senses and the object 236, The Object of Senses 240, the conditions for sensation 243, the Perception of substance 244, Fast and Slow Processes of Sensation 245, The Mind (Manas) 246, The Function of Mind 249, The First division 249, the Second division 250, the Problem of Samjnin and Asamjoin 251, The Object of Mind 252, The Division of Mati 254, Sruta-Nisrita and Asruta-Nisrita 254. Some Historical Ramarks 257, The Division of SrutaNisrita 258, Avagraha (Sensation) 261, Vyanjanavagraha (the contact between senses and the object) 263, Types of Vyanjana. vagaha 266, Arthavagraha (the first apprehension) 267, Naiscayikavagraha and Vyavabarikavagraha 270, Iha (speculation) 271, iha and Doubt (samsaya) 272, Avaya (Judgement) 273, Apaya and Avaya 273, Dharana (Retention) 274, Other senses and Avagraha etc., 275, the Order of Avagraha etc., 276, the Division of Mati concluded 276, Mati divided into three hundred and thirty six types 276, Matijnana and Samsaya etc. 278, the Duration of Avagraba etc. 280, the Order of causation of Avagraha etc. 280.

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( xiii) Sruta jnana (Scriptural Knowledge) 281, Three stages 281, The First Stage : Sruta as scriptural koowledge 282, The tradition of Mabavira, 284, The Order in the composition of Dvadasangi, 285, The Literature known as Agamas 286, The Present classification 288, Gamika and Agamika 288, Amgapavittha and Anamgapavittha 288, Further Division 289, Comparison with the Vedic Tradition 290, Modern Classification 291, Classification according to the Subject-matter 293, The Digambara division 293, the Second Stage : Sruta as knowledge 294, the Definition of sruta 295, Difference between Mati aod sruta based on causation 299, Dravyasruta preceded by Mati 300, Difference on the basis of Division 301, the Senses as the Basis of Difference 301, the Definitions of Dravyasruta, Bhavasruta and Ubhayasruta. 302, Mati and Dravyasruta 303, Difference between Mati and Sruta due to expressibility and inexpressibility 304, Conclusion 305, the Illustration of Bark and Rope 306, the Difference of Articulation and Inarticulation, 306, the difference between the two based on Silence and Eloquency 307, Fourteen Categories of Srutajnana 308, Aksarasruta and Anaksarasruta 309, The Division of Aksara ruta 310, Two kinds of Labdhyaksara 310, Akalanka's interpretation of Aksara and Apaksara 311, Samjnasruta and Asamjoisruta 311, three types of Samjorsruta 312, Samyak Surta and Mithya sruta 313, Sadi Saparyavasita sruta 313, Gamika and Agamikasruta 316, Angapravista Angabahya 316, the subject matter of Sruta jnana 316. CHAPTER IV-Direct Knowledge 317-422 The Nyaya Theory of Supernormal Perception 318, the contact through the knowledge of generic character 318, the contact through association 319, the contact produced by Meditation 320, Yogic Perception and Divine Perception 320, The Division of Yogipratyaksa 321, Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka stage in Yogi-pratyaksa 323, Arsajnana (Intution Produced by austerities) 324, Siddha Dargana

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(xiv) (Occult perception) 326, Kumarila's objection 327, The Sankhya Theory of Supernormal Perception 328, Yoga and Supernormal Perception 330, The Vedanta and Superoormal Perception 333, The Buddhist and Supernormal Perception 334, the Jaioa theory of Direct knowledge .338, Avadhijnana (Clairvoyance) 339, the types of Avadhi 340, the six varieties of Bhava Pratyaya avadhi 341, Two varieties of Anugamika 342, the area cognized by Avadhi 343, the four measurements of Avadhi 344, the Proportional development of avadhi in respect of Time and Space 344, the scope of Avadhi in respect of substance 345, the Object limit of Bhavapratyaya--Avadhi 348, three stages of Desavadhi, Pramavadhi and Sarvavadhi 348, Manahparyayajnana (thought reading) 350, the Object of Manahparyaya 350, Critical examination of the views represented by Akalanka and Jinabhadra 352, The cause of Manahparyaya 337. Manahparyaya and Avadhi 358. The Nandi and Manahparyaya darsana 360, Two types of Manahparyaya 362, Kevala Jnana (Omniscience) 365, The meaning of Kevala 365, Definition 366, The problem of Omniscience 367. Two Types of Omniscience 370, the Arguments for omniscience 37!, the Path leading to kevalajnana 373, Omniscience and Buddhism 374, the position of Omniscience in the Buddhist Ethics 376, Kaivalya and Advaita Vedanta 381, the way to realization 383, the Vedantic theories compared with the Jainas 387, the Vedantic theory of Jivanamukta criticized 387, Omniscience and Saokhya 390, Three States of Realization 390, Praksti layas 391, Omniscience and Yoga 392, Yoga and the conception of God 393, Yoga and Development of Knowledge 394, Conception of Tarka stage in Yoga 398, Kevala jnana and the Nyaya and Vaibesika Schools 399, Jainism and Omniscience 399, Three Karanas and granthibheda 401, Fourteen Gunasthanas (the ladder of spiritual journey) 402, Four Dhyanas (contemplations) 405, Lesya (thought-paints) 407, the

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( xv ) way to Liberation concluded 408, three places of kevalajnana 409, the Kevalin and Mind 413, Kevala and Feeling 416, the Kevalin and other Activities 416, the other differences between an Arhat and ordinary Kevalins 417, the Kevala and other types of knowledge 418, Kevala and speech 420, the Object of-Kevalajnana 421, Kundakunda's view 421, Argument for Omniscience 422. CHAPTER V-Darsana (Inarticulate Cognition) 423-460 Darsana as Attitude 423, Epistemology and Darsana 424, Darsana in the Jaina Epistemology 428, Dhavala and Akalanka 438, the Criticism of Dhavala 439, Two senses Reconciled 448, The of self cognition 440, the two views Popular view criticised by Virasena 443, Darsana as Cit and Jnana as Prakasa 446, Dargans and Pramana 448, Division of Darsana 450, Kevaljnana and Kevala Darsana 453, Historical survey of the three views 453, Arguments for each view 456, The unity between Kevalajnana and Kevala darsana 459, General Remarks 460. CHAPTER VI AJNANA (IGNORANCE) 462-483 Four Meanings of the Term of Ajnana 462. Ajnana as wrong knowledge 463, The cause of wrong knowledge 463, Ajnana as perverted attitude 464, Difference between Jnana and Ajnana in respect of appearance 465, Four types of Illusion (Viparyaya) Two denotations of sat and asat 467, Four bases for calling the knowledge of Mithyadrsti as Ajnana 468, The Objective view of Vidyananda 468, Eleven types of Aharya and sahaja etc. 469, Other systems compared 470, Ajnana as absence of knowledge 474, The Jaina theory of Avarana 478, Division of Avarana 478, Sarvaghatin and Desaghatin 479, Keval jnanavarana and Kevaladarsanavarana Bibliography 484

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About the Author Late Prof. (Dr. ) Indra Chandra Shastri, Shastracharya, Vedantavaridhi, Nyayatirtha, was a great and renowned philo-1 sopher, an exceptional scholar, author and exponent of the country endowed with a truely versatile genius. Shunning the lime light of publicity, he made outstanding contribution in various fields of knowledge creating social awareness with human consciousness. His contributions are pioneering and have blazed a new trail. His work is by all accounts monumental and is of fundamental value. Distinquished by notable academic achievements his scholarship encompasses Religion, Philosopha (eastern and western), Culture, Indology, History of Indo-European languages, Grammar, Linguistics and Philology, Sociology, Poetics, Logic, Epistemology, Sanskrit, Prakrit inculuding Pali and so on and so forth. His role was that of a social reformer, a savant as an iconociast, which he successfully performed through his writings, lectures, public utterances and direct contact with students and people all over the country. At a minimal estimate in the career span of 60 years he wrote nearly 70 books, more than 600 research papers and articles, delivered a few hundred public lectures and speeches all over India reflecting on healthy and positive aspect of religion with emphasis on social reform and national integration. Throughout his life he carried on an effective campaign against obscurantism, superstitions and religious dogmas. .. Dr. Shastri was a philosopher-thinker in his approach. He made dispassionate, critical analysis of thought currents which have prevailed over the centuries. In doing so, he does not follow any tradition but argues and writes independently with rare imagination, combined with abstract thinking, thus giving a fresh dimension to thought. His entire effort can be epitomised as individual spiritualism (he owes much to the Anekanta of Jainism), supplemented by the scholosticism of a genius. He has contributed on diverse literary subjects like Sanskrit poetics, Philology and Jain literature but his forte has been Religion, Philosophy and Culture.

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( xviii ) Firmly grounded in Sanskrit literature, Oriental Philosophy and learning with a Doctorate from Banaras Hindu University, he had been a student of reputed scholar, Pt. Bal Krishna Mishra and had close association with Mahamana Madan Mohan Malaviya, the then Vice-Chancellor of the University. His doctoral thesis was adjudged as the best treatise on the subject till then. He received his M.A. in Sanskrit from Agra University, securing first position. He was also Shastracharya in Vedanta (first position) from Banaras Hindu University, Shastri from Punjab and Nyayatirtha from Calcutta. Along with an original thinker, eminent educationist and reformer, he was also a social activist. In 1940, inspired by Mahatma Gandhi's freedom movement, he actively participated in it. In Bikaner in 1942, he organised a small group of four hard-headed youths who looked after passengers at the local railway station, especially coming from Delhi and motivated them to be united and struggle against the British rule. And in the same year he successfully campaigned against the henious practice of 'Bal-Deeksha' (forcible adoption of male and female children of indigent parent in Rajasthan countryside by Jain ascetics). Consequently, a public bill against the evil practice was piloted through the Bikaner State Assembly and was passed. It was a revolutionary step at that time and was appreciated by national leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Vijay Laxmi Pandit along with other Jain and non-Jain eminent personalities such as Acharyajin vijya Muni, Pt. Sukhlaji Sanghvi and others. While working as Head, Deptt. of Hindi & Sanskrit, Vaish College, Bhiwani during 1945-48, he addressed students and people and inspired them to rise against the British rule. He also hoisted the national flag and publically made a bonfire of foreign clothes. After partition in 1947, be organised Social Worker Refugee Relief Camp, Group 'o' Bhiwani and also helped them in many other ways. He launched and edited several reputed journals like 'Bharatiya Sanskriti', was founder-Secretary Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Sahitya Sammelan' from 1954-58 and successfully organised All India Oriental Conference (Delhi) in 1958 as Secretary. At that time, he was being sent to Jamaica Uni

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(xix ) versity (West Indies) as a Visiting Professor of Indology but an attack of Glaucoma resulted in his complete blindness. He was a living profile in courage and dedication, who despite his complete blindness in the last 26 years of his life, worked indefatiguably and undeterred, almost single-handed, for a cause. Though blind he had a rare vision. He lost his eyesight in 1961 at the age of 49, when he was Head of Sanskrit Deptt. in the Institute of Postgraduate Studies, University of Delhi. After that (1961-69) he did intensive research work on the project 'Religion and Modern Man' as Professor Emeritus under University Grants Commission and produced many important works with the help of assistants. During these years he also delivered scholarly lectures all over India. By that time he had a nationwide formidable reputation for his contribution in the field of learning and social work. Publication and propagation of his distinguished writings of outstanding merit are of immense use not only for the academic world, but will specially provide the younger generation a new insight, rational and healthy approach with modern outlook towards religion, culture and tradition, the need of the hour. Born on May 27, 1912 at Dabwali Mandi now in District Sirsa of Haryana, Dr. Shastri was a selfless and simple man who never cared for publicity, recognition or official favours. Only a few months before his death on Nov. 3, 1986 he was given official recognition in the form of 'Certificate of Honour', but he himself was not alive to receive it. The Lt. Governor of Delhi conferred upon him 'Sahitya Seva Samman' for the year 1984-85 on May 29, !986 on behalf of Hindi Academy, Delhi. The academic world and the society in general owe him a big debt. His genuine and integrated approach with endless zeal for creating social awareness was almost unique. He strengthened and promoted the fundamental democratic values of citizenship through socio-religious aspect. Born in a family of ordinary means, Dr. Shastri left home and parents at the age of nine and came to Bikaner for education. He composed Sanskrit slokas at the age of 13, almost a miracle. The spark within took him to far off places like Banaras, Madras, Calcutta, Bombay and finally he settled in Delhi. For

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(xx) him knowledge was a passion and his life remained a quest for truth and learning, a reflection of his ideas. It was an ideal blend of commitment, dedication and action. Positions held : 1. Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Institute of Post-graduate Studies, University of Delhi (195661); 2. Director, Prakrit Vidyapeeth, Shri Jainendra Gurukul, Panchkula, Ambala (1977-78); 3. Lecturer and Reader, Department of Sanskrit, University of Delhi (1953-59); 4. Research Scholar, Parshwanath Vidyashrama. Banaras Hindu University (1948-53); 5. Head of Department of Sanskrit and Hindi, Vaish College, Bhiwani (1945-48); 6. Lecturer, General Editor-Publications, Sethia Jain Sanskrit & Prakrit Academy, Bikaner (1938-44); 7. Secretary, Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Sahitya Sammelan, Delhi (1954-58); 8. Secretary, All India Oriental Conference, Delhi session 1957; 9. Editor-'Bharatiya Sanskriti Bharatiya Sanskriti Sammelan, Delhi (1954-55); 10. Editor'Jain Prakash', A.I.S.S. Jain Conference, Bombay (1952-53) 11 Founder Editor --Shramana' Parshwanath Vidyashrama, Banaras (1 949-52); 12. Assistant Editor--- Nav Yug' daily (now Nav Bharat Times), The Times of India group, New Delhi (1950). Dr. Shastri has been chief speaker at World Religious conferences at Ujjain, Rajgir; Mahabodhi Society, Delhi; Gandhi lecture series, Rajghat; Gandhi Hindustani Sabha, Rajghat; Ahimsa Seminar, Delhi; Gita Seminar, Amravati; Jain Yuvak Sangh, Bombay, Rotary Club, Bombay and Bikaner; Lions Club Beawar etc., also invited him. Besides he also delivered lectures on his favourite subject Religion and Modern Man' in different years at Bombay, Calcutta, Bangalore, Madras and other places. Dr. Shastri's services as teacher have been highly valued by the student community. A number of students guided by him for Ph. D. are now holding high positions in Sanskrit and other departments of colleges and Universities. Books Published : 1. Sanskrit Kavya Shastra Ka Itihas (553 pages, demy size), an adaptation of P.V. Kane's History of Sanskrit Poetics, 2. Bharat ki Arya Bhashaen, 3. A Study of Nyayamanjari by Jayant Bhatta (a UGC project, 368 pages in type). 4. Pali Bhasha aur Sahitya--translation of Geiger's

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(xxi ) Pali Language and Literature and the portion of Pali Sahitya written independently, 409 pages, demy size). 5. Shri Jaina Siddhanta Bol Sangraha (a compilation in eight volumes, about 500 pages each), a mine of information on Jaina doctrines 6. Loktantra ka Lakshya (awarded by the Uttar Pradesh Hindi Sansthan). 7. Mahabharata ke Sukti Ratna. 8. Hamari Parampara 9. Manava aur Dharma. 10. Jainism and Democracy, 11. Dhyan aur Manobal. 12. Dharma aur Rashtra Nirman. 13. Mahavira ki Jeevan Drishti. 14. Upasak Dashangsutram (preface of 72 pages). 15. Katha Sarovar and 16. Kanton Ke Rahi (both collections of Jaina stories). 17. Sanskrit Sudha Part I & II. 18. Solah Satiyan (collection of stories). 19. Aalok aur Unmad and 20. Sanskriti ke Bhoot (both collections of critical philosophical essays on religion and culture). 21. Bharatiya Sanskriti ki do Dharaen. 22. Tathastha ki Pukar (translation of C. Rajagopalachari's Noice of the Uninvolved,. 23. Bal Deeksha Vivechan etc. Along with ten booklets about 400 research papers and articles have also been published in important journals, national dailies and magazines. Manuscripts: 1. Drishti Sristi Vadah (Sanskrit); 2. Dashvaikalik Sutra ek Manan (Jaina Aagamo ka manthan); 3. Praman Mimansa (Jaina Dharma-Etihasik Prishthabhoomi); 4. Shadavyashak athava Pratikraman (dainindin Jainaanush than); 5. Samayik Ek Jeevan Drishti; 6. Bhagwan Mahavira ka Karma Siddhanta; 7. Samajik Parivartan-Ek Vaigyanik Adhyayan; 8. Vyakti aur Samaj; 9. Vyakti aur Parivartan; 10. Loktantra aur Samaj; 11. Samajik Sansthan aur Parivartan; 12. Netritva; 13. Dharma Sanstha ki Manasik Prishthabhoomi; 14. Vishwa Dharmik Paramparaen; 15. Bharatiya Sanskriti; 16. Tap aur Bharatiya Sanskriti; 17. Dharma Sanstha aur Vartman Manav; 18. Manav ka Bhavisya; 19. Dharma Sanstha ke Vardan aur Abhishap; 20. Manavata ka Punargathan (translation of Sorokin's 'Reconstruction of Humanity'); 21. Ahinsa-Ek Manovaigyanik Vishleshan; 22. Jaina Sadhana; 23. Jaina Parampara; 24. Jaina Kathaen; 25. Jeevan Patheya (collection of poems); 26. Kalidasa; 27. Bharatiya Darshan; 28. Bharat ka Rashtriya

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( xxii ) Dharma; 29. Bharatiya Sanskriti me Naari; 30. Mahapurushon ke Vicaar;; 31. Gitanjali (Hindi translation) etc. 200 research papers and articles are unpublished. He had long association with and was highly admired by contemporary eminent personalities like late Mahamana Madan Mohan Malaviya, late Kaka Saheb Kalelkar, late Ananthasayanam Ayyanger, late Smt. Rameshwari Nehru and late Shri Brijlal Nehru; late Dr. Hazari Prasad Dwivedi, litterateur; late Shrimannarayan, ex-Governor Gujrat; Dr. P.V. Kane, late Prof. V.V. Narlikar, late Shri Jainendra Kumar, late Dr. P. L. Vaidya, late Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, late Pt. Balkrishna Mishra, late Dr. Mangal Dev Shastri and late Pt. Badrinath Shukla, Dr. D. S. Kothari, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, Dr. Mandan Mishra, Dr. Prabhakar Machwe, Dr. Nagendra, Prof. Dalsukh Malvaniya, Shri Akshaya Kumar Jain, Shri Laxmi Chand Jain, Shri Yashpal Jain. Shri Sobhagyamal Jain,Prof. Sube Singh Rana; Dean (Colleges); Dr. Ramchandra Pandeya, Dr. Vijayendra Snatak and Dr. U. B. Singh; Dr. Kewal Krishna Mittal, and Dr. P. V. Bapat, Many national English and Hindi dailies along with magazines carried long articles on Dr. Shastri at different occasions. Not only Jain community but the academic world particularly University of Delhi, Banaras Hindu University, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Arya Samaj with whom he remained closely associated and the society at large feel grateful for Dr. Shastri's contributions.

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CHAPTER I HISTORY AND SOURCES The Period The development of the Jaina theory of knowledge extends over a long period of 2600 years. The idea of knowledge and its various types can be traced as early as the history of Jainism begins. Not only Mahavira, but the tradition of his predecessor Parsvanatha also bears clear marks about the conception of knowledge. The traces before Mahavira 1. The NandIsutral refers to a list of fourteen purvas. It is believed, on certain grounds, that this literature belonged to the tradition before Mahavira, as the very name suggests. In the Bhagavat1 sutra2 the ascetics belonging to the order of Parsvanatha and others of pre-Mahavira order are described as obtaining the knowledge of fourteen purvas; while those belonging to the order of Mahavira are described as obtaining the knowledge of eleven Angas. This and certain other statements confirm the above view. Out of the fourteen books recognised as Purvas the fifth one is Jnanapravada. The very name suggests that the entire book was devoted to the treatment of knowledge. Jayadhavalas and other works of the latter period describe its contents also; which testify to the same fact. Purva-literature not a myth It cannot be said that the existence of Purva literature is 1. Nandr 56 2. Bhagavatr 11, 11. 182 3. Jayadhavala vol. I, p. 141

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Epistemology of Jainas merely a myth. We still inherit some fragments of them which are a clear proof for their existence. The Visegavasyakabhasya? contains two verses, which are attributed by Maladharin to the Purva literature. Prof. H. R. Kapadia2 provides a big list of the extant works that are taken from or based upon the Puryas. The present karma literature also constitutes a part of it. The Prabhitas literature of Digambaras and some Svetambarat Agamas are held as the fragments of them. Other grounds of its antiquity 2. In Rajaprasniya, Kesi Kumara, a follower of Parkvanatha explains five types of knowledge to king Pacsi. 3. The discussion between Kesi and Gautama points out all differences that existed between Parsvanatha and Mahavira. But, it does not refer to the theory of knowledge. Such an important point could not be left untouched had it been a new introduction by Mahavira. 4. The Jaina theory of karman? also supports the above view. It has been already stated that the karma-literature stands as a part of the Purva-literature. The first two types of the eight fold division of karman are exclusively based on the theory of knowledge. The five types of jnanavaranlya and the first four types of darsanavaraplya strictly follow the corresponding types of jnana and darsana. 5. The unity between svetambara and Digambara sects regarding the theory of knowledge further confirms the above view. The fundamental difference between the two sects lies in respect of garments. According to Digambaras, a muni should 1. V. BH. pp. 76-77, 82, 83. 2. H. C. L. J. p. 88 3. Dhavala Int. p. 71 4. H. C. L. J. p. 88 5. Rajaprasniya 165 6. Uttaradhyayana XXIII 7. Karmavipaka 4

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History and Sources not wear clothes, while Svetambaras allow them in the case of Sthavirakalpa, a lower stage of ascetic order. The higher stage known as Jinakalpa, where clothes are not allowed, they say, has become out of practice since Jambu Svamin. 2 The tradition of Parsvanatha allowed garments for all munis; while Mahavira laid emphasis on neckedness. On this basis it is held that Svetambaras carried mainly the tradition of Parsvanatha and Digambaras that of Mahavira. But, there is no mentionable difference between the two sects regarding the theory of knowledge. It shows that both of the Tirtharkaras were unani mous in this respect. Conclusion The above mentioned factors definitely prove that the Jaina literature on theory of knowledge existed long before the birth of Mahavira. If it is associated with the age of Parsvanatha, we can say that it is not later than 800 B. C. The field unexplored If we follow the Jaina mythology it reaches a hoary past. But, as in the case of Puranas, mythology may help in tracing the history of the burried past; it cannot be accepted as it is. The construction of the history of thought on the basis of mythology, though interesting, requires an independent effort. At present we are confined to the period which is not so obscure. The study of Jaina thought on the basis of non-Jaina literature, as the Vedas, Upanisads, Puranas and the Buddhist Pitakas also may give some valuable information; but that also stands as a subject for independent study. The Last Author The last notable author on the problem of knowledge was Yosovijaya Upadhyaya, who flourished in 1800 A. D. Thus, the development of the idea of knowledge covers a period of more than two and a half millenia. The development though 1. V. Bh. G. 2593

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Epistemology of Jainas variod does not leave the central point. It is interesting to note how the idea made its journey through various phases; someti-- mes pure and genuine, keeping its chastity undisturbed; than mixed with the external influence, again taking its original form and recasting itself in a new model. Below we shall give a brief account of the main landmarks in the development of literature related with the theory of knowledge. THE TWO SCHOOLS The Jaina literature on epistemology can be classified into two schools? i. e. [1] Agama-School and [2] Tarka-School. The main difference between them does not lie in any principle or the fundamental conception, but in the way of treatment. The following points may show the characteristics of each school: 1. Literature : The Agama School is mainly based on the canonical literature and the post-canonical literature developed as commentaries. There are very few independent works related with the Agama-School. Tarka-School is mainly based on independent works dealing with the subject logically. 2. Age : Originally the Agama School begins with the age of Parsvanatha; but the extant literature related with this school starts from 300 B. C. and continues upto 1000 A. D. Though the contribution of Yasovijaya is not insignificant; yet, he stands all alone, after an interval of eight centuries. The Tarka-School begins with Siddhasena or Samantabhadra (600 A. D.) and lasts upto Hemacandra (1100 A. D.). Yasovijaya contributes to this school also but he cannot be included into the age as he comes all alone after a long interval. 3. Dominant idea : In Agama School the dominant idea is ethical aspiration and liberation from bondage of the world. The factor of knowledge stands here, as one of the constituents 1. J. S. S. Vol. 3, p. 127.

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History and Sources of the way to salvation. It does not figure as the central theme. The five types of knowledge stand as the spiritual powers manifested gradually as the self aspires higher and higher. They are landmarks of the spiritual development. In the Tarka-School knowledge is a means to ascertain reality. The criteria of validity, methods of its ascertainment, the sources of knowledge and its relation with the object are the main problems of this School 4. External influence : Agama-School is a secluded development without any outside influence. Tarka-School is an occurrence necessitated by the outside influence. It is an attempt to defend the Jaina views from external attacks and at the same time to refute the non-Jaina views. The terms of discussion with others compelled the Jaina scholars also to reshape their views in the logical style maintained by other systems. This necessitated change in grouping and the method of presentation. 5. Style : Agamic literature is marked with simplicity and natural flow. The Upanisads, the Pitakas and the Agamas have a direct appeal to the heart. They are far away from the hairsplitting wrangling of the logical period. 6. Language : We may add to the above list an external factor of the language also. The original part of the Agamic literature was written in local dialects with a view to make it understandable even to the common people. Sanskrit was naturally neglected. This tendency is found in the Buddhist literature as well. The logical literature took its birth from the discussions with Brahmanical thinkers, who took to Sanskrit for their philosophical discussion. It became the language of scholarship as well as that of the court. The Jaina Scholars also, in order to stand with non-Jaina thinkers and to get an access in the scholarly world took to Sanskrit as their medium of philosophical treatment. ... 7. Faith versus Reason : Faith is the dominant feature of the Agamic literature. There is no appeal to reason. The canonical discussions are confined only to the interpretation of scriptural texts. The logical literaturc solely depends upon rea

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Epistemology of Jainas son. It does not support or reject any point on the basis of merely the scriptural authority, but takes reasoning as the ultimate support. 8. Motive : The Agamic discussions are motivated with preaching of the path to liberation. They were meant for every person, laymen as well as scholars. Spoken language, simple and lucid style, informative outlook and such other factors make the Agamic literature a literature of the people. While the logical literature motivated with the desire for defeating the opponents in discussions, naturally, it meant for Pandits or learned scholars. Over and above the sincere and faithful reasoning, it adopted verbal wranglings also. 9. Right and Wrong: The notion of right (Samyak) and wrong (Mithya) in the Agamic School is based on ethical position of the cognizer. If the cognizer is a person with right attitude (Samyagdrsti), every cognition is right; if, on the other hand if the cognizer is a person with perverted attitude (Mithyadssti) no cognition is right. The value of cognition is measured, in the Agamic school, with the scale of ethics. In the logical school rightness and wrongness have no concern with subject or the cognizer. They are related with the object. A cognition is right, if it corresponds with the object, otherwise wrong. 10. Upayoga and Pramana : The epistemology of the Agamas means the theory of upayoga; its definition, divisions and subdivisions. But, the epistemology of the tarka-period means the theory of pramana, or the problem of objective validity. THE LITERATURE OF THE AGAMA-SCHOOL The Works known as Agamas According to Jaina tradition the Agamas are neither eternal, nor composed by any superhuman being or God as the systems of Mimamsa and the Nyaya, respectively, hold in the 1. Tat. Su I. 32-33, p. 56.

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History and Sources case of Vedas. In essence they were propounded by the Tirthankaras and compiled into book form by Ganadharas, the chief Desciples. In addition to the composition of Ganadharas, some other works also were accepted as Agamas and held in that esteem. The sages who possessed the knowledge of all the fourteen Purvas, were known as Sruta kevalins and were ranked next to the kevalins as far as their religious knowledge was concerned. The works composed by them also, were included into the cavonical literature. Next we come to dasapurvins; the sages possessing the knowledge of entire ten Purvas. Their works also were credited as Agamas. The main reason for this view is that a sage having the knowledge of complete ten Purvas must be a samyagdrsti. A mithyadrsti, cannot study the tenth Purva completely. He can go up to the ninth Purva completely and to the tenth Purva in a part. He is liable to speak untruth also. On the other hand a person with a minimum knowledge of entire ten Purvas, being decidedly a samyagdrsti cannot speak untruth. The credit of scriptural validity can be attributed to a samyagdrsti only. The other person cannot be accepted as an undisputable authority. Vattakera svamin adds to the above list the works of Pratyeka Buddhas also, who have attained perfect knowledge not as Tirthankaras but as the ordinary sages. The Present State of the Agamas We cannot say that the present works, known with the name of Agamas, are the same as they were composed in their original form. The present works cannot claim to be the very words of Tirthankaras or Ganadharas. Slippings and interpolations are natural in the course of time. Many of the works are totally lost. The remaining ones have gone through consi 1. Ava. Nir G. 90-92 2. V. BH. G. 3. Nandy. 41 4. Mulacara p. 80 5. Ibid. 7

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Epistemology of Jainas derable changes. Yet, they cannot be discarded in whole-sale as without any authenticity. They cannot be assigned to an author of the latter period, as a whole. Though disfigured, they contain a lot of genuineness. Even in their present form they preserve the ancient lore and tradition to a great amount. We can safely hold that the present canonical literature has the nearest approach to the words of Tirtharkaras and Ganadharas. They are the only means to understand the founders of the system in their original words. Three Councils (Vacanas) It is said that the followers of the Buddba held three councils (sangitis) for arranging the sermons of Lord Buddha. Similarly, the followers of Mahavira also held three councils (vacanas) in order to arrange their canonical literature. 1. The Council of Pat ali putra-One hundred? and sixty years after the death of Mahavira, Northern India was engulfed in a long famine, lasting for twelve years. The Jaina sadhus left Magadha and scattered themselves over the region, where alrns were easily available. The study of canonical literature, which was being carried through oral tradition, met with a serious set back. When the famine was over the learned monks assembled at Pataliputra and restored eleven angas; but none could recite the fourteen Purvas completely. The only Srutakevalin at that time was Bhadrababu, who had gone to Nepal for practising yoga. The sangha sent Sthulabhadra and some other monks to study the Purvas. Out of them only Sthulabhadra was able to learn ten Purvas with explanation and the remaining four in mere reading. At the same time he was forbidden by his preceptor not to impart further the knowledge of those four Purvas. Sthulabhadra died 215 years after the death of Mahavira. 1. Av. Curni II 187 2. Vira Nirvana p. 94 3. Ibid. p. 62

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History and Sources According to the radition of both Svetambaras) as well as Digambaras,2 Bhadrabahu was the last Srutakevalin. According to Svetambaras he died 170 years after the death of Mahavira. The Digambara tradition maintains his death eight years earlier. Thus, we conclude that 170 years after the death of Maha. vira the knowledge of the last four Purvas was nearly lost. Sthulabhadra possessed it partially and that also to keep it to himself only. According to Svetambarass the tradition of ten Purvas ended with Vajrasvamin who expired 584 years after the death of Mahavira. According to the Digambarat tradition the last ten-purvin was Dharasena. He passed away 345 years after the death of Mahavira. The difference between the two traditions regarding Srutakevalin was insigoificant. But, in this case they differ not only in pame but in time also, and hold a considerable difference of 239 years. Vajra was followed by Aryaraksita. The latter was Yugapradhana (Chief of the era) for 13 years and arranged canonical literature into four anuyogas. They were : 1. Caranakarananuyoga -- Ethical literature. 2. Dharmakathanuyoga - Didactical stories. 3. Gaaitanuyoga - Literature on Geography and Mathematics. 4. Dravyanuyoga - Literature on metaphysics Aryaraksitae himself knew nine Purvas and only a part of the tenth Purva. Amongst his desciples only Durbalika Puspamitra? was able to learn the nine Purvas. He also forgot 1. Vira Nirvana p. 62. 2. Dhavala Int. p. 26. 3. Merutunga Vicara. Vira Nirvana, p. 64 4. Dhavala Vol. I, Int. p. 26 5. Ava Nir. G. 763-777, V. Bh. G. 2284-2295 6. V. Bh. G. 2511 tika 7. Ibid.

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10 Epistem ology of Jainas the ninth one in absence of revision. Gradually, the knowledge deteriorated and 1000 years after the death of Mahavira there was none to preserve it, even to the extent of complete one Purva. According to Digambarass this situation arose earlier i.e. 683 years after the death of Mahavira. This is a brief account, how the Purva literature was lost. 2. The Council of Mathura : Eight hundred years after the death of Mahavira there was another famine lasting for 12 years. When it was over the learned monks assembled at Mathura under the presidentship of Arya Skandila. They arranged Kalikasruta in this council. According to another version Skandila was the only person, at that time, to know anuyogas. In the council he imparted their knowledge to other sadhus. Skandila was yugapradhana between 826 and 840 years4 after the death of Mahavira. The same time can be assigned to this council also. The speciality of it was that it introduced writing for preservation of the Agamas. 3. At the same time when Skandila held his council at Mathura, Nagarjuna held another council at Valabhi. He collected all the literature that was prevalent in oral tradition, arranged it systematically and put it on the paper. These two councils slightly differ from each other in their readings. The reading of Mathura is known as Mathuri-Vacana and that of Valabhi goes with the name of Nagarjuna. The Edition by Devardhi Gamin About 150 years after these two councils, Devardhi Ganin held another council at Valabhi. He attempted at the preservation of miscellaneous literature which was not arranged so 1. Bhagavatt 2.8, Sattarisayathana, p. 327 2. Dhavala Int. p. 27 3. Nands Curni, p. 8 4. Vira Nirvana, p. 104 5. Ibid., p. 110 6. Ibid., p. 116

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History and Sources far. He also tried to compose the differences between two readings, as far as it was possible. But important differences were accepted as they were, which are still referred by the curnis and tikas. Many short treatises? which were not so far assigned with canonical authority, got that position in this council. The present Agamas are believed to be the redaction of this council. If we accept the list given in the Nandysutra as the arrangement of this council, it is clear that many works have been lost even after that. The extant works also do not possess the same size as it is given in the NandIsutra. The Agamas according to Digambara Tradition According to the Digambara tradition Satkhandagama, Kasayaprabhita and Mahabandha are the only works that are directly related with the words of Mahav Tra. The other agamas have been lost in the course of time. Dr. Hiralal4 gives the following account of the Satkhandagama being reduced to writing : "The teachings of Lord Mahavira were arranged into twelve angas by his pupil Indrabhuti Gautama, and they were handed down from preceptor to pupil by word of mouth till gradually they fell into oblivion. Only fractions of them were known to Dharasena who practised penances in the Candra Guha, of Girinagara in the country of Saurastra (modern Kathiawara). He felt the necessity of preserving the knowledge and so he called two sages, who afterwards became famous as Puspadanta and Bhutabali, and taught to them portions of the fifth Anga Vivahapannatti and the twelfth Arga Ditthivada. These were subsequently reduced to writing in Sutra form by the two eminent pupils. Puspadanta composed the first 177 sutras and his colleague Bhutabali wrote the rest, the total being 6000 sutras". 1. Vira Nirvana, p. 112 2. Dhavala Int. p. 71 3. Ibid., p. I 4. Ibid., p. II

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Epistemology of Jainas According to the account given by Indranandin1 in his commentary of Srutavatara, Satkhandagama had six commentaries. The first known as Parikarma was written by Kundakunda. The remaining commentaries are attributed to Samakunda, Tumbulura, Samantabhadra and Bappadeva. Dhavala is the most popular of them, it is as big as 72000 metres. 12 The commentary of Virasena, in addition to its logical and penetrative treatment, is important in other respects also. It quotes a big number of gathas from the Agamas, still prevalent in the Svetambara tradition; which no other Digambara work has quoted. These quotations serve as a common heritage for the two traditions. There is another number of references which are not found in any older work. It points to a treasure of cultural development which is entirely lost. Virasena refers to two different schools of thought on certain points of disagreement and designates them as the Northern school and the Southern school. This reference points to the traditions of Svetambaras and Digambaras respectively, and indicates their different regions of the development. Kasaya Prabhrta was written by Gunadhara, a contemporary of Dharasena. It also possesses the commentary of Jayadhavala by Virasena. In addition to the above two works, Mahabandha also is placed in the category of Agamas. It is an expansion of the sixth chapter of Satkhandagama by Bhutabali himself. It is also known as Mahadhavala. Thus the Digambara tradition recognizes Dhavala, Jayadhavala and Mahadhavala as the three siddhanta-granthas, based on Satkhandagama, Kasaya Prabhrta and Mahabandha. Two Traditions supplementing each other The above three works are mainly related to the Purva literatures. It it interesting to note that according to the Svetam 1. Dhavala Int. p. III 2. Mahabandha, Int. p. 1 3. Jayadhavala Int. p. 1.

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History and Sources 1.3 bara tradition Dsstivada, the twelfth Anga; which has the Purvas as its one part, is lost entirely. On the other hand the Digambara tradition, though maintains all the Argas as lost; yet, the above mentioned three Siddhantas are accepted as fragments of the Purva literature, Thus, in a way they supplement each other. AGAMIC LITERATURE ON THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE Original Agamas The first half of the Acarangasutra is accepted as the oldest portion of the extant Jaina literature. It contains a significant remark expressing identity between the cognizer and the cognition. Vivahapannattia and Thanargas clearly express the five types of knowledge with its divisions and other points related to the problem. Uttaradhyayanat enumerates the five types in its 28th Chapter. In Pannavanas there are two full chapters dealiog with the subject. Its Pasyatta-Pada has no parallel any where else in the Jaina literature. Anuyoga-dvara? by Arya Raksita (100 B. C.) starts with the five types of Agama-school; but, later on elaborately discusses the logical conceptions. Nandi (400 A. D.) is fully devoted to the theory of knowledge. Amongst the Digambara Agamas all the three works of Satkhandagama, Kasaya Prabbota and Mahabandha provide a valuable information in this respect. 1. Acaranga I 5.5.5 2. Bhagavait VIII, 2.17-103 3. Sthananga 463 4. Uttaradhyayana XXVIII 5-6 5. Pannavana pada p. 30 6. Ibid., 29 7. Anuyogadvara 1 8. Ibid., 144.

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14 Epistemology of Jainas Commentaries After the original Agamas we come to the commentaries. The Svetambara Agamas are associated with the following four types of commentaries: (1) Niryuktis (Pr. Nijjutti), (2) Bhasyas (Pr. Bhasa), (3) Curnis (Pr. Cunni) and (4) Tikas. The first three are in Prakrta and the last in Sanskrit. The first two are in the metrical form while the latter two in prose. The number of Niryuktis is ten. The major part of them was composed by the second1 Bhadrabahu who lived in the 5th century A. D. The Niryukti on the Dasavaikalikasutra discusses the ten parts of Syllogism2 and the different types of debates (kathas) which are very important in the history of Indian logic. The Niryukti on the Avasyaka sutra provides a valuable material for the study of Jaina epistemology. The Bhasyas come next in the order of commentaries. They are eleven in number. The fifth Chapter of Avasyaka niryukti, known as Samayika niryukti contains a big commentary known as Visesavasyaka Bhasya by Jinabhadra Ksamasramana (7th Cent A. D.). It is an encyclopeadic work related with all the topics of Jaina philosophy. The first 836 gathas of it are entirely devoted to the theory of knowledge. It covers all the points and views discussed in the previous literature and stands as a land-mark in the development of Agamic philosophy. The VBh is further commented by Jinabhadra himself, Kotyacarya (8th Cent. A. D.) and Maladhariya Hemacandra (12th Cent. A. D.). The Bhasyas on the Vyavaharasutra and Brhatkalpasutra also discuss some epistemological points here and there. They are said to be the composition of Sanghadasa Ganin. In Bhasyas, the Agama school reaches its highest stage of development. The subsequent works do not contribute anything new but present the old views in new form. 1. Jnana Bindu Int. p. 5 2. Dasa Niryukti, 52. 3. Dasa Nir. 4. Ava Niryukti, 51-79.

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History and Sources: 15 The Curni literature developed in the seventh or eighth century A. D. The Curnis are an abridged form of the Bhasyas. Their speciality consists in the introduction of stories like Jatakas of the Buddhist literature. Jinadasa Mahattara is very popular amongst their authors. He wrote a curni on the Nandi sutra, which is entirely devoted to the problem of knowledge. Haribhadra was the first Sanskirt commentator of the Agamas. He lived in the eighth century A. D. His commentaries are more or less a translation of the curnis. After Haribhadra we have Silankacarya, who died in the 9th cent. A. D. He was followed by Santyacarya, who wrote Bshattika on the Uttaradhyayana sutra. After him we have Abhayadeva who commented the nine Angas. He lived in beginning of the Ilth century. Maladharl-Hemacandra lived in the twelfth century. He has commented on Anuyogadvara and annotated the Nandi and Avasyaka. His commentary on VBh. is well known. At the end we come to Malayagiri, but his commentaries supersede all the previous authors, in their excellence and scholarly treatment. He has dealt with every topic scholarly and masterly. His style is clear and fluent. His commentary on the NandIsutra is a valuable contribution to the subject. He also lived in the twelfth century A. D. Amongst Digambaras we have already referred to the six commentaries of Satkhandagama; but, leaving Dhavala, none of them is traceable. Dhavala occupies the same place in Digambara literature as VBh in the Svetambaras. It forms an independent school in the conception of knowledge. Virasenacarya finished this work on the 8th October, 816 A. D.1 the Wednesday morning. Kasaya Prabhita contains the curni by Yati Vrsabha. We also have the commentary Jayadhavala on it by the author of Dhavala. It is also a valuable contribution. Mahabandha is mainly related with Karma theory. Though it is an expansion of the sixth chapter of Satkhanda 1. Dhavala Int. p. 1.

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Epistemology of Jainas gama it is placed amongst the Agamas, owing to its antiquity and the authorship which goes to the authors of original Agamas; namely, Bhutabali. The Tatvartha and its commentaries 16 The Tatvartha sutra is an independent work presenting the substance of Agamas in Sutra style. Though, it does not come directly in the tradition of canonical literature; yet, advocates the Agamic view faithfully. Umasvati (Umasvamin according. to the Digambara version) dated fourth century A. D. has put in it the metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, cosmology and other topics of the Agamas in aphorism, which was the style of that period. He deals with every subject logically and systematically. The Tatvartha sutra with its commentaries stands as a valuable literature on Jaina religion and philosophy. The Bhasya and Tikas: Umasvati has himself written a Bhasya on it; but, some Digambara scholars are doubtful about its genuineness. The Bhasya is commented upon by Siddhasena Ganin, also known as Gandhahasti. Siddhasena (9th Cent.) His copious references, grammatical explanations and the statements of different views prevalant at that time, give a valuable information on all the topics. The commentaries of Haribhadra and Yasovijaya are further mentionable in this context. They are not found completely. Sarvarthasiddhi, Rajavartika and Slokavartika: The Digambara tradition holds Sarvarthasiddhi by Pujyapada as the first commentary of the Tatvartha. Pujyapada was a great scholar of grammar as well as of logic and philosophy. Sarvarthasiddhi is a logical explanation of the Tatvartha. It is believed that Samantabhadra also wrote a big commentary on it, which was known as Gandhahasti. Mahabhasya, and the present Aptamimamsa, also known as Devagama stotra, served as mangalacarana at its beginning. But this tradition is not supported on the historical ground. Pt. Sukhlal1 holds that the Bhasya of Siddhasena has been wrongly associated with Samanta 1. Sukhlal, T. S. Int. p. 42

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History and Sources bhadra and the same is known as Gandhahasti-Mahabhasya, after the title of its author. Sarvarthasiddhi is commented upon by Akalanka, the great logician. His work known as Rajavartika stands as a monumental work in the history of Jaina thought. It is a unique contribution. After Akalanka we come to Vidyananda, the author of slokavartika. Though based on the Tattvartha Slokavartika is more related with the Tarkaschool. Vidyananda has no parallel in the minuteness of discussions. While establishing the Jaina conception, logically he criticises the other systems also, which is not usual with the Agama-school. Other commentaries : The Tattvarthasutra contains a commentary of Srutasagara also, which has recently come out. The commentary of Malayagiri would have been a valuable contribution; but, it exists in references only. The names of Yogendradeva, Yogadeva, Laksmi-deva, Abhayanandin, etc. also are mentioned as the commentators of Tattvartha. Some of them are in Kannada. * Independent Works : Apart from Umasvati, Kunda kunda occupies the first place as an author of independent works related with the Agama-school. He is said to have written eighty-four Prabhrtas, ten Bhaktis, a Tika on Satkhandagama and many other works. Mulacara also is attributed to him. His Rayanasara and Barasa-Anuvekkha are related with religious duties and ethical reflections respectively. His Niyamasara, Pancastikayasamgraha, Samayasara and Pravacanasara are valuable contribution to philosopy. They are widely read by the Digambaras. He has contributed some new topics to the theory of knowledge. Pravacanasara, Bodhapahuda and Srutabhakti are mainly related with the subject. Siddhasena, though accepted by Svetambaras as the father of Jaina logic, excercised a great influence on the Agamic thought; particularly on the conception of knowledge. His Sanmati-tarka and certain Dvatrinsikas give a new interpretation to the theory of know1. Pravacapasara Int. p. 24. matspada.

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Epistemology of Jainas ledge. Jinabhadra's Visesanavati deals with the problem of Kevalajnana and Kevala darsana at a considerable length. 18 Yasovijaya, though last in the chronological order, occupies the front position for his contribution. He has written numerous books on different topics. His versatile genious has greatly enhanced the stand of Jaina philosophy in the field of logic as well as ethics. His small treatise Jnanabindu sums up the epistemology of the Agama-school while Tarkabhasa does so in the field of Tarka-school. Bhagavati aradhana by Sivarya (5th cent. A. D.) also deals with the topic in its chapter on Jnanavaraniya. Harivamsapurana and Adipurana discuss it in their introductions. Lokaprakasa also is a valuable contribution in this respect. Gommatasara and Dravyasamgraha of Nemicandra Siddhantacakravarti also play an important role. The latter has a commentary by Brahmadeva which gives a logical explanation to the views, appearing contradictory to one another. The above statement is not a comprehensive list of the works related with the topic. Many works of minor importance have been left out. Similarly the recent works in English or modern languages are not taken into consideration. Still we have mentioned the main landmarks in the history of Agama-school. The Karma literature: The literature on the theory of karman also throws a considerable light on the problem of knowledge. The problem of ignorance, perversion and many other topics cannot be clarified without resorting to the discussion of karmans. The tradition of karma-literature begins with the Karmapravada, the eighth Purva. It was entirely devoted to the theory of karman. In addition to the above a part of the Agrayanlya and the Jnanapravada Purvas also was devoted to the discussion of karma-theory. It is believed that the following works which discuss the theory of karman are based on the fourth Prabhrta of fifth vastu of the Agrayani Purva :

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History ard Sources 19 1. Satkhandagama 2. Karmapraksti 3. Sataka 4. Saptatika. The Kasaya-prabhita also discusses the same topic. It is based on the third Prabhita of tenth vastu in the Joanapravada. Karma-praksti was composed by Sivasarma Suri in the 4th century A. D. The Sataka and Saptatika or Sittari are known as the fifth and sixth karmagranthas respectively. We are not sure about their authorship. According to one view they are composed by Sivasarma Suri The other view attributes them to Candrarsi-Mahattara (6th cent.) The latter is known as the author of Panca-samgraha also, which is an important work on this topic. In addition to the above, there are four other works by Devendra Suri (1220 A. D.). They are generally known as four Karma granthas; but, their actual titles are as follows :(1) Karmavipaka, (2) Karmastava, (3) Bandhasvamitva and (4) Sadasitika, Devandra Suri has himself written a commentary on them; where he refers to the four old karma-granthas as the basis of his own. They also had the same title prefixed with Bshat. They were composed by Garga Rsi, about whom nothing is known. LITERATURE OF THE TARKA-SCHOOL Mutual Influence : The present treatment is confined to the Agama school only. The development of the Tarka-school is beyond its scope. Yet, the Agamic treatment, in its later stages, is not free from the logical influence. Many scholars have contributed to both the schools to a considerable extent. It is, therefore, essential to have some acquaintance with the main trends of the logical development. Beginning of the Tarka-School : The tarka or reasoning is a human instinct. It begins with the history of human race. The earliest literature of India is full of logical discussions. We cannot say that the Brahmanas, the Upanisads and the Pitakas pursued their debates without any system. They must

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20 Epistemology of Jainas have followed certain principles to conduct their discussions, which are highly developed. In the Brahmanas, their field was. the interpretation of Vedic injunctions, in the Upanisads they were applied to the spiritual field, and in the Pitakas they were adopted also for refuting the different philosophical views. The Jaina Sutras also clarify many points in the form of discussions. These discussions are carried generally between Mahavira and Gautamal or between Sudharman and Jambu.2 Some discussions were held with the followers of other systems also. In Uttaradhyayana Gautama holds a discussion with Kesi, the follower of Parsvanatha3. In Rajaprasniya Kesi had a discussion with king Prasenajit on the enternity of the soul.4 In addition to the above discussions we have some references showing the existence of logic as a science at that time. The Bhagavatt and Anuyogadvara 6 sutras refer to four sources of knowledge accepted by the logical tradition. The Bhagavati refers to them apart from the five types of knowledge and designates them as pramana to distinguish from the latter, while the Anuyogadvara combines the both. Tle Sthanangasutra? refers the same as hetus. The theory of nayas shows a highly developed state in the field of reasoning. The Sthananga describes various types of debates also, which were held in those days. But, we do not come across any independent work on the science of reasoning earlier than the Nyayasutra of Gautama. 1. Bhagavati 5.3. 191-192. 2. Vipakasutra 1.1 3. Uttaradhyayana XXIII 4. Rajaprasniya. 164-200 5. Bhagavati 5.3. 191-92 6. Anuyogadvara, 144. 7. Sthananga, 338 8. Ibid., 189 and 282

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History and Sources Application of the term 'Nyaya': In the early period of Indian philosophy the term 'Nyaya' was not applied in the sense of logic which was recognised as Anviksikr. The Mimamsa system applied this term to the established rules governing interpretation of the Vedic texts. Later on the grammarian applied to the proverbs, utilised for the interpretation of their aphorism. That was the age of authority and the discussions were carried within a limit. To question the authority of ancient scriptures was regarded as an act of sacrilege. But later on, when the orthodox and heterodox systems faced each other, the question of violating the authority lost its importance. The word that was coined for the rules of controlling the Vedic injunctions or interpreting the aphorisms of grammar was applied to general rules controlling all types of discussions. Thus, from the religious field it came to the secular field. The Uttaradhyayana1 refers the term 'Nyayamarga' which is interpreted as the way to liberation. As a matter of fact it means the way to righteousness. Logic also is nothing, but the way of right thinking. 21 Like grammar the science of reasoning also is a general science. It has no relation with a particular system or school of thought. But every system has codified the rules of logic in the light of its own metaphysics. Gautama was the pioneer in this respect. He, for the first time, as we know from the extinct works, wrote an independent treatise on logic and codified the science of reasoning in the light of Vaisesika system. This gave impetus to all the systems, particularly the Buddhism, and thus the era of logic was ushered in the field of Indian thought. Beginning of the Jaina logic Three Periods The Jainas were, more or less, self-centered upto the time 1. Uttaradhyayana II, p. 9

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Epistemology of Jainas of Devardhi-Ganin. They were devotes of their own literature and disregarded the non-Jaina literature as mithyasruta.1 But as the time passed, they could not keep themselves aloof from the external influence. The main currents of the era clearly reflect in the works of that period. This state continued upto Siddhasena Divakara and Samantabhadra. As the time passed, the external influence got more and more momentum; till independent works on logic came into existence. We may call this period as the period of creative logic. The second period begins with Akalanka and lasts upto Hemacandra. It is the period of real logic. The third period is the contribution of a singular genious namely Yasovijaya Upadhyaya. He introduced Navyanyaya in the field of Jaina logic and made it up to date. Below, we shall try to give a brief sketch of each period with its contribution to the Jaina logic. The Creative Period : We have mentioned above the certain logical conceptions as expressed by the Agamas. The division of knowledge as stated by the Anuyogadvara? is a clear influence of the logical period. The Niryuktis and Bhasyas show a further development in this matter. They have adopted the logical style also. But, as far as the subject matter is concerned their treatment is predominantly Agamic. In the independent literature we see a gradual adoption of the logical subjects also; which have served later on as the basis of proper Jaina logic. KUNDAKUNDA Kundakuna (Ist cent.) defines pratyaksa3 and paroksa and enumerates the seven 4 categories of speech. Umasvati (4th cent.) gives four synonyms of mati which are interpreted 1. Nandi 41. 2. Anuyogadvara 144. 3. Pravacanasara I 54-58. 4. Ibid. II 23

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History and Sources 23 as the four types of paroksa, as accepted in the Tarkaschool. He also divides the five types of knowledge into pratyaksa and paroksa, but excludes sense-cognition from the category of pratyaksa.2 Thus he adopts the logical terms but interprets them in the way of Agamas. In the Bhasya3 he mentions the four fold division of pramana, which is a clear reference to the logical conception. The Nandisutra (5th cent.) includes sense cognition also in the category of pratyaksa. 4 The above mentioned works, though refer to the logical conceptions, do not indulge in their discussions. They do not refute the other systems. Though logical influence is clear in them; yet, the proper logical period does not begin with them. The real period of logic begins when we have discussion with other systems, and it gets perfection when the Jaina logic is codified. The advent of Nagarjuna (300 A.D.) started a revolution in the Indian thought. The age of tradition and authority gave way to free thinking. Mutual discussion led to deep and systematic deliberation. Apart from the metaphysical considerations the science of reasoning itself became a subject for discussion, The Jaina thinkers, so for indifferent, began to feel their existence in danger. They also felt the necessity of codifying their logic of defending their conceptions from the outside attacks and getting a befitting position in the world of scholars. As the result of this necessity two illuminaries appeared in the horizon of Jaina philosophy. They were Siddhasena Divakara and Samantabhadra, Both of them flourished between 500 and 600 A. D. SIDDHASENA: Siddhasena, though a great logician, did not accept logic as 1. T. Rajavartika I 13 2. Tattvartha I 10 3. Tattvabhasya I 10 4. Nandi 3

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24 Epistemology of Jainas the final authority on all matters. He has explicitly recognised its limitations and has expressed in clear terms that logic has no right to go beyond its seope. There are certain matters where reasoning has no approach. Logic can neither confirm nor reject then?. They can be known through the Agamas only. We can compare this view with the Acarangasutra, which relates about reality, that the tarka cannot approach it and the intellect cannot grasp2 it. The same thing is repeated by the Upanisada, the Sarfrakabhasya and the Buddhist literature of pre-scholastic period. Siddhasena was not a critic of the Non-Jaina systems only. He examined the Jaina conceptions also logically and suggested many changes in the traditional notions. He did not find any difference between Jnana and Darsana in the stage of omnisciences, between mati and sruta4 and also between avadhi and manai par yaya.5 Regarding the theory of knowledge he hasattached more importance to the objective side. His three folde division of pramana and distinction between jnana and darsana on the basis of nayas? testify to the above. He explained logically that gunas and paryayas stand in the same relation to dravya on the ground of two Nayas. His contribution towards the theory of nayas also, is remarkable. His works : Siddhasena wrote Sanmatitarka, Nyayavatara and 32 Dvatrimsikas as the tradition goes. The Sanmati is an entirely new and systematic exposition of the doctrine of Anekanta; which is the central theme of Jaina philosophy. It has been discussed by Siddhasena in a logical style. He has tried to assign Jaina philosophy a deserving place amongst the contemporary systems of Indian thought; to indicate the relation of 1. Sanmati, III 43-45 2. Acaranga 15.6.2. 3. Sanmati II 3. 4. Niscayadva. 19 5. Ibid. 17 6. Nyayavatara 2 7. Sanmati II, 1. 8. Ibid. III, 10

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History and Sources 25 Jaina Sastras to other rival systems of philosophy; to discuss other systems arising out of Anekantavada ; to interpret the different views and doctrines occuring upto date in other systems from Anekanta point of view; and to base the new currents of thoughts on the broad basis of the established doctrine of Aneka nta; and thus popularise them amongst the learned pandits. The original work of Sanmati, from its very birth came to have a wonderful influence on Jaina literature. From 7th century right upto the present time it has been described by Svetambaras as well as Digambaras as a supreme work of genious. Some have copiously drawn upon the verses of Sanmati in support of their own thoughts. Many have written commentaries thereupon while many others have composed entirely new works basing their own views on Sanmati. Some have written elaborate and profound works to refute these views of Sanmati with which they did not agree; others have enhanced the reputation of Sanmati harmoniously synthesising its views. In short, it can be said that the place of honour given to the system of logic in Jaina philosophy is to a great extent due to Sanmati. It is really the foremost composition expressing clearly the logic of Mabavira as the name suggests. The language of the text is Praksta. It consists of 167 verses as found in the printed copies of mere text, or 166 as can be confirmed on the basis of commentaries. Like Pravacanasara of Kundakunda it is divided into three chapters, named as Kandas. Pandit Sukhlal has assigned these kandas the names of Naya-Mimamsa, jnana Mimamsa and Jneya Mimamsa in keeping with the contents of the chapters. Dvatrimsikas : The number of Dvatrimsikas, available at present, is twenty one. With Nyayavatara the number becomes twenty-two. From view point of the subject matter the available Dva. can be classified under three heads. First to fifth, the eleventh and the twenty first are eulogies; the 6th discusses the problem of Apta

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26 Epistemology of Jainas and the 8th is a critical exposition of Jalpakatha. The rest are given to philosophy and to the discussion of reality according to various systems. We are not concerned with the eulogistic compositions. Amongst Dva. of critical character the sixth deals with the nature of Apta (the men of authority). It reminds one of the Apta mimamsa by Samantabhadra and Apta pariksa by Vidyananda. But the method of their exposition is quite different. In the 8th Dva. there is a critical discussion of Jalpakatha employed for the sake of rivals defeat and one's own victory. Siddhasena has exposed the hollowness of such tricks of debate which end in sheer fatigue of one's own tongue and sleepless nights for the defeated as well as the victor. Amongst Dva. dealing with the systems of philosophy and the nature of things the 7th ends with the name of Vadopanisad, giving a brief survey of the art of debate, the tricks employed. there and the qualities needed. The 9th Dya. has in it such a subtle vein of disapproval regarding the Upanisadic doctrines that it is quite possible that it might have been written to refute the famous Upanisadic doctrines. It speaks highly of the deep scholarship of the author and his intimate knowledge of Indian philosophy. Dva. from 12 to 15 deal with Nyaya, Samkhya, Vaisesika and nihilistic school of Buddhism respectively. Dva. dealing with ancient Indian logic testify to the profound study of this system on the part of Siddhasena. In the 19th Dva the famous trinity of Jaina philosophy that of Jnana, Darsana and Caritra is first mentioned as a means of liberation. Then comes a very subtle analysis of Jnana. Incidentally some other pbilosophical things also are analysed. The subject matter of the 22nd Dva. (Nyayavatara) will be discussed separately. The Nyayavatarasutra is the first composition completely devoted to Jaina logic. It is very small in size, consisting 32 stanzas only, but has put all the points relating to the Jaina logic into nutshell. This is why it is called a sutra. Later scholars have composed voluminous works on the foundation of its

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History and Sources 27 one or other sentences. The whole edifice of Jaina logic stands on the system depicted in it. In certain aspects Nyayavatara resembles Nyayapravega of Dinnaga and in other respects Nyayabindu of DharmakIrti. Prof. Malavania has discussed it by giving ample quotation from the original works in Appendix No. 1 of Nyayavatarasutravartika. It shows that Siddhasena, though keeping in view the Jaina point, has amply followed Dinnaga in his definitions. In the Agamic literature the Jnana and Pramana stand as altogether separate subjects. Umasvati combined them by dividing the five types of Jnana into two Pramanas. Siddhasena also has twofold division, but does not follow the Agamic tradition. He takes into consideration the Pramanas only. In the definition of perception he includes both, experience as well as intuition. In Paroksa he includes inference and verbal testimony. Thus, Siddhasena does not follow the Agamic conception of pramana; but that of the Sankhya or the old Buddhists. Indian logic mainly deals with the four aspects of knowledge, namely pramana, the source of knowledge; pramata, the cognizer; prameya, the object and pramiti, the cognition. Siddhasena has discussed in the present work all of these aspects according to the Jaina point of view. The definition of pramana its divisions and subdivisions and the parts of syllogism have been discussed in a short but precise manner. He has taken up the question of Nayas also and has tried to refute other systems. He generally follows Dinnaga in the wording of definitions, but at the same time rejects his views of idealism and Trilaksana. Some of the stanzas of Nyayavatara suggest to the existence of another work on logic before Siddhasena; but it is difficult to ascertain whether they refer to the Jaina or non-Jaina work. Siddharsi (9th and 10th cent.) wrote a valuable commentary on the Nyayavatara. It explains the text in its proper setting and at the same time gives valuable information of the views of

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28 Epistemology af Jainas Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. It can be said, as in the case of many other commentaries, that it is as important as the text itself. Siddharsi is the author of Upamitibhavaprapancakatha and the commentary known as Heyopadeya on the Upadesamala, a Prakrta work in verse-form of Dharmadasa. There is one more point that enhances the value of this commentary, it is one of the few works representing the school of Siddhasena who differs from Akalarika in classification of pramanas. SAMANTABHADRA: Samantabhadra is recognised as a eulogist (stutikara) by the later scholars. His works are mainly eulogies in the praise of Tyrthankaras. But they are so pregnant with philosophy and logic that it would be wrong to class them merely with the devotional literature. He has criticised all the absolutists minutely while eulogising the propounder of nonabsolutism. He has applied the theory of non-absolutism to the Agamic as well as logical conceptions. It appears, that by this time logic had become a separate science and was treated as an independent subject. Samantabhadra is recognised as the author of four works1. Svayambhustotra, 2. Yuktyanusasana, 3. Aptamimamsa and 4. Stutividya. (1) Svayambhustotra is a eulogy of twenty-four Jaina Ticthankaras. It occupies very high place in the stuti-literature. Eulogy of every Tirthankara refers to one or the other system of thought allegorically. (2) Yuktyanusasana also is a philosophical eulogy. It points out the defects of other systems, and asserts that the teachings of Jina are free from them. The virtues of Jina, it claims further, are not found anywhere else. (3) Aptamimamsa is the master-piece of Samantabhadra. The examination of apta, the person whose words can claim indubious validity, is the theme of this excellent composition. External pomp and show, he says, can be found in a juggler

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History and Sources 29 also. Such things cannot make a person reliable. The criterion of an apta is this, that his views are not contradicted by reason or authority, 1 The absence of contradiction is further ascertained through the fact that his words do not go against the established facts. The preachers of nor-Jaina systems are not apta because their views are contradicted by the established facts. Samantabhadra also, like Siddhasena, places all the three sources of knowledge on the same footing. He holds that the reason, the experience and the authority possess the same amount of validity.' Thus, he rejects the views of the Nyaya, the Carvaka and the Mimamsa systems which attach more importance to reason, experience and the authority respectively. He fixes the premises of reason where the speaker is not a reliable person and a thing is established through the sign (hetu) only. On the other hand, where the speaker is reliable and a thing is established on the ground of his words only, it is the premises of agama. 4 Thus, Siddhasena and Samantabhadra, though great logicians, do not recognise tarka as the ultimate authority in all matters. Like Siddhasena, Samantabhadra also devotes his work of the establishment of non-absolutism. He is very emphatic on Syadvada, the theory of relative existence. Though he has not written any independent work on logic or epistemology; yet his occasional remarks are a valuable guide to the future logicians. We can sum up the contribution of Samantabhadra in the following points : (1) He fixed the nature of Syadvada and Saptabhangi, which are the essence of Jaina pbilosophy; and showed their applicability to all the scholastic controversies. 1. Aptamimamsa 6 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., 76-77 4. Ibid., 78

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Epistemology of Jainas (2) He defined pramana and its phala, which was unanimously followed throughout the logical period. (3) He defined Syadvada as Sruta-pramana and nayas as its parts. 30 (4) He, for the first time, associated the term Nyaya with Saptabhangy. The commentaries of Akalanka and Vidyananda, which we shall take up shortly, have considerably enhanced the value of Aptamimamsa. MALLAVADIN AND SIMHA-GANIN (1) Mallavadin (6th cent.) was a contemporary of Siddhasena. He was a great logician. It is suggested that his proficiency in debate brought him the title of Mallavadin (The champion-debator). He wrote a commentary on Sanmatitarka, which is not available. His remarkable genious and penetrating vision can be seen in his independent work, Dvadasaranayacakra. He has presented in it the theory of Syadvada in the form of a wheel, every absolutistic system representing one spoke of it. In a moving wheel one spoke is turned down by the second and this process goes on for ever. There is neither beginning nor end to it. At the same time one cannot say that one spoke is weaker than the other. Similarly, Mallavadin has arranged all the systems in the form of a wheel. One system is disproved by the other. None is weaker than its opponent which also meets the same fate. None is left unopposed. The complete wheel represents the comprehensive view of Syadvada. Mallavadin was a Svetambara; yet he was held in high esteem in the Digambara circle also, Akalanka shows a great respect for his Dvadasaranayacakra. He has recommended it for the knowledge of Nayas.1 (2) Simha-Ganin has written a big commentary on Dvadasara nayacakra. He flourished not later than 700 A. D.; as he 1. Nyayaviniscaya III 91

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History and Sources 31 quotes Dinnaga and Bhartphari, but not Dharmakirti or Akalanka. PATRAKESARIN (8th Cent.) : Another luminary in this era was Patra kesarin or Patrasvamin as referred in many works. He wrote a purely logical work named 'Trilaksana-kadarthana' refuting the theory of Trilaksana accepted by Dinnaga, the establishing Anyathanupapatti (logical impossibility of one in the absence of other) as the only criterion of middle term. Nyayavatara also defines hetu in the same manner. It may be observed here that Nyayavatara and Trilaksanakadarthana are the only works of this age which can be regarded as independent contribution to proper logic. Out of them the latter is not available. The other works of this period mainly discuss the principles of Naya, Syadvada and Anekantavada. Pt. Sukhlal and Prof. Malavania have coined this age as the age of the establishment of Syadvada.1 Another scholar of this period is referred as Sridatta. He is attributed with the authorship of Jalpanirnaya. But his work is not available. Acarya Sumati, with the authorship of a commentary on Sanmati is referred by Santiraksita in his Tattvasamgraha.? But this work also is not available. THE PERIOD OF ACTUAL LOGIC The contribution of Buddhist thinkers towards Indian logic cannot be overestimated. The history of logic and philosophy is nothing but the history of attacks and counter-attacks between the Buddhists and the other systems. Asanga and Vasu. bandhu propounded the theory of idealism. Dirinaga supported it by refuting the validity of Pramanas on which the edifice of realism stood. He was the father of Buddhist logic. Alongwith the refutation of objective realism accepted by the Nyaya, 1. Jaina Sahitya Samsodhaka Vol. 3, p. 127 2. Tattvasam graha p. 379

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32 Epistemology of Jainas Vai esika, Sankhya and Mimamsa etc. he exploded their theo ries of pramana also. Prasastapada, Udyotakara, Kumarila; Pujyapada, Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Mallavadin, SimhaGanin, Isvarasena etc. repulsed his attacks and pleaded for their own theories. Then came Dharmakirti with his unique glamour. He not only gave a befitting reply to other systems but also made some improvement in the contentions of Dinnaga. Thus, the Buddbist logic got a solid foundation. After that on one side he was supported by Arcata, Dharmottara, santiraksita, Prajnakara, etc.; who defended him and tried to consolidate the Buddhist position. On the other hand he was attacked by Prabhakara , Umbeka, Vyoma-siva, Jayanta, Sumati, Patrasvamin and Mandana Misra etc. This philosophical warfare continued for four centuries and enriched our philosophical literature with precious jewels. AKALANKA (778 A. D.): Akalarika was the first scholar to systematize the Jaina theory of knowledge logically. He is regarded as the father of Jaina logic. Akalarka-Nyaya has become a by-word amongst the later Jajna scholars. He wrote two commentaries and four independent works. (a) Commentaries : (1) Rajavartika on Tattvartha (2) Astasati on Aptammamsa (b) Independent works : (1) Nyaya viniscaya (2) Siddhi viniscaya (3) Laghiyastraya (4) Pramana samgraha (1) Tattvartha Rajavartika : It is a monumental commentary on the Tattvartha. We have referred to it in the Agama school also. It covers all the topics of Jaina Epistemology, Ontology, ethics, cosmology and geography. It follows Sarvarthasiddhi not only in purport but generally uses its sentences as Vartikas

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History and Sources and develops them in the Bhasya. It discusses all the problems on the basis of Anekanta. There is no topic or sutra, except a few, which does not contain the Vartika 'Anekanta' meaning that the problem can be solved through Anekanta. Rajavartika, as we have already mentioned, is an encyclopeadia of Jainism. Its method of dealing with the subject is logical. It does not propound anything on the basis of mere faith. Its first and fifth chapters treat philosophical problems while the remaining portion is connected with the ethical, geographical and other conceptions prevelent in the Agamic school. Some topics are his special contributions; which are not found any where else. Its first chapter deals with the problems of epistemology, specially the sutras 9-13 and 20-22. 33 (2) Astasati: It is a commentary on Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra. The name Astasati refers to its size being as big as 800 Anustubh metres. In his dealings with the philosophical topics Akalanka is very terse. His style is more suggestive than expressive. It suggests the central idea and leaves other things for speculation. Deep sense, few words and logical acumen are the specialities of his style and they are more distinct in Astasatt. It is due to Vidyananda, that we are able to grasp it. Apart from the topics dealt within Aptamimamsa i.e. the refutation of all absolutistic notions, AstasatI throws light on many more points which were not discussed by Samantabhadra. Regarding the theory of knowledge also its contribution is very important. Akalanka discards the Buddhist notion of absolute rationalism, and at the same time the MImamsa notion of absolute dependence on the Vedas. He establishes the principle of omniscience as against the notion of Carvaka and Mimamsa, and at the same time asserts that the propounders of non-absolutism only can be the omniscient and not Buddha or the preachers of other systems. In the first Karika he proves tarka (hypothesis) as an independent source of knowledge (pramana). The seventh karika criticizes Dharmakirti in his definition of Nigrahasthana. The thirteenth states 3

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34 Epistemology of Jainas that Svalaksana as held by the Buddhist is not absolutely devoid of connotation. In the commentary on thirty sixth Karika he defines pramana as the uncontradicted consciousness apprehending a new object i.e. not cognised before. The 101th Karika defines pramana as the cognition of reality and recognizes simultaneity of jnana and darsana in the case of omniscient. The above mentioned two works are commentaries. But they are more important than any original work on Jaina philosophy. They are widely read in the Jaina institutions. All the independent works of Akalanka are devoted to epistemology and logic. This has made him the father of Jaina logic. These works, though small in size, are pregnant with subtle thought. The influence of Dharmakirti is quite distinct in these works. (1) Laghiyastraya : It is a composite work containing three small treatises (prakaranas) viz. (i) Pramana-prayesa (ii) Nayapravesra and (iii) Prayacana.pravesa. The first book consists of four chapters, the second of one and the third of two. In all, there are seven chapters. There is a small commentary (vivsti) on them by Akalarka himself. It is in the form of notes, some times adding altogether new things to the original. (1) Pramana pravesa contains four chapters (i) Nature of Pramana, (ii) classification, (iii) object and the (iv) result, Napa.pravesa is devoted to the description of Nayas, Pravacana pravesa, though begins with the definition of pramana, naya and niksepa; deals mainly with Sruta jnana; its divisions and subdivisions. Laghiyastraya has a big commentary known as Nyayakumudacandra by Prabhacandra. (2) Nyaya Viniscaya : Nyaya Viniscaya is exclusively devoted to logic. It appears that Akalanka has arranged it in the style of Pramana Viniscaya by Dharmakirti. It has three chapters of perception, Inference and Authority res. pectively. Like Laghlyastraya it also contains a small commen

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History and Sources 35 tary by Akalanka himself. Vadiraja the great logician, has written a big commentary on it. (3) Pramana samgraha: It is a sort of supplement to Nyaya Viniscaya containing eighty seven and a half stanzas divided into nine Prastavas on the following subjects : (i) Definition of perception, Sruta preceded by perception, inference or authority; result of pramana, the definition of real perception and other topics related with it. (ii) Memory, Recognition and Tarka as divisions of mediate cognition. (iii) Inference and the parts of syllogism with other allied topics. (iv) Refutation of the three factors (trilaksana) admitted by the Buddhist as essential conditions for a valid hetu and confirmation of anyathanugapatti; the different types of hetus. (v) Hetvabhasas or fallacies of the middle term. (vi) Rules and kinds of debates. (vii) Agama and the Omniscient. (viii) Saptabhang and naya. (ix) Naya and niksepa. (4) Siddhiviniscaya : In its original form it is not available. A commentary of it is found in manuscript only. Unlike Astasati and Vivarana, this commentary does not quote the original text. It is, therefore, impossible to restore the original work. The commentary contains twelve prastavas dealing with various topics pertaining to logic and ontology. Some other works like Nyayaculika, Svarupasambodhana, Akalankastotra etc. are attributed to Akalanka; but, their authenticity is doubtful. HARIBHADRA (813-883) Haribhadra lived just after Akalanka or must have been his younger contemporary. He was a versatile genious with

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36 Epistemology of Jainas allround scholarship. His impartial attitude bas brought him a good name in the non-Jaipa circle also. No other Jaina scholar, in the domain of philosophy, has attracted so many Indian as well as the Western scholars as Haribhadra has done. His Saddarsanasamuccaya expresses the catholicity of mind. The old tradition attributes Haribhadra with a fabulous number of 1444 works. Prof. Kapadia has given a list of eighty seven works in his Introduction to Anekanta-Jayapataka; which can be classified into two categories of inde. pendent works and commentaries. We may mention the following works as related with logic or epistemology : (1) Anekanta-Jayapataka. (2) Anekantavada pravesa. (3) Sarvajna siddhi. (4) Sastravartasamuccaya. (5) Saddarsanasamuccaya. (6) Lokatattvanirnaya. (7) Anekanta praghatta. (8) Anekanta sidddi (9) Syadva a kucodya paribara. (10) Nyayaviniscaya. The last four works are not available. We can add to the above list a numb:r of commentaries, written on the works related with our subject : (1) Anuyogadvaravrtti (2) Prajnapanavetti (3) Tattvarthavstti (incomplete) (4) Nanditika (5) Nyayavataravstti (not available) (6) Avasyaka laghuvitti (7) Avasyaka bihadvstti (8) Caityavandanavstti. He has also written a commentary on the 'Nyayapravesa" of Dinnaga which shows his impartiality and love for learning; without sectarian bias. His works on Yoga, Astrology, Ethics and other subjects also are held in high esteem. He is one of the few Jaina scho. lars, who have made a valuable contribution towards secular subjects also

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History and Sources 37 His Dharmasangrahant is a composition in Praksta, discussing the philosophical topics. His Astakas and Sodasakas i. e. minor works of eight or sixteen stanzas, also are pregnant with philosophical thoughts. His speciality lies in the presentation of all the systems faithfully and finding out a way to compromise in them. VIDYANANDA (9th cent.) : After Akalanka we come to Vidyananda as a great logician, philosopher and original thinker. He was a profound scholar of all the system of Indian thought, particularly Mimamsa and Buddhism. His style is elegant and clear. Unlike Aka. lanka, he is not a miser in words. His clarity of expression, vast study and deep thinking assign him a very high place in Jaina philosophy. Vidyananda wrote three commentaries and six original works :(a) Commentaries : (1) Tattvartha-sloka-vartika with Bhasya. (2) Astasahasri or Devagamalankara (3) Yuktyanusasanalankara. (b) Independent works : (1) Apta pariksa. (2) Pramanaparikna. (3) Patra parlksa. (4) Satyasasana parlksa. (5) Sripura Parsvanathastotra. (6) Vidyananda Mahodaya. (1) Slokavartika : It is a commentary on the Tattvarthasutra; but supersedes many independent works for its originality, deepness and scholarly treatment. The Rajavartika is generally confined to the Agamic views; but the slokavartika indulges in philosophical discussion and criticises the non Jaina systems bitterly.

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38 Epistemology of Jainas Rajavartika is in the form of prose, like the Nyayavartika of Udyotakara. Slokavartika, on the other hand, is in metrical form like the vartikas of Dharmakirti, Kumarila and Suresvara. Vidyananda was a South Indian. He was born in the age when philosophical controversies were ripe. He had to meet the attacks of all the non-Jaina systems, particularly the Nyaya Mimamsa and Buddhism. In Slokavartika he critisises the vartikas of Dharmakirti, Kumarila and Udyotakara. It is probable that the presence of these three vartikas might have urged him on to write a vartika on Jaina philosophy. Vidyananda does not indulge in unnecessary wrangling of words. His arguments are sound and logical. They make an appeal to the intellect as well as the heart. Nearly half of the Slokavartika is devoted to the theory of knowledge. It throws light on many obscure points and stands as a valuable contribution to the subject. Vidyananda discusses the topics of Jnana as well as pramana. Thus, it is indispensible to the study of both the schools. His minute observation, supreme genious, profound knowledge and accuracy of expression have raised the Jaina philosophy to a high position. The Slokavartika covers all the topics mentioned in the Rajavartika and adds many more, meeting the need of the time. (2) Astasaharsri: Vidyananda wrote Astasahasri after the Slokavartika. It is a commentary on the Astasati of Akalanka and occupies very high place in the Jaina philosophical literature. It is due to this excellent exposition that we are able to understand the idea of Akalanka who is not easily accessible. Vidyananda brings into light many new points also. It is claimed that "One should study Astasahasrs only. There is no need of going through many scriptures. This single composition is sufficient to show the heart of all the systems." We cannot say that the above claim is an exaggeration. Vidyananda has discussed nearly all the new develop

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History and Sources mcnts of Indian philosophy. The importance of Astasahasri regarding the theory of knowledge also is second to none. It throws valuable light on the distinction between knowing and feeling; the problem of ultimate validity, the question of omniscience and such other obscure topics not discussed any where else. (3) Yuktyanusasanalamkara : It is a middle sized commentary on Samantabhadra's Yuktyanusasana; being a clear exposition of the text. 39 (4) Pramana pariksa: It is based on the small treatises of Akalanka; which discuss the theory of knowledge. Pramana pariksa deals with the logical side only. It brings the theory of knowledge into a final shape. The definition of Pramana, the divisions, the types of immediate and mediate cognitions; inference; recognition; and the varieties of affirmative and negative hetus, are some of the points discussed in it. (5) Patrapariksa: It is a small work on the science of debate. The Indian systems hold different views regarding the parts of syllogism to be applied in a debate. Vidyananda asserts that the first two are sufficient in a debate conducted for victory over the opponent. But, where the purpose is not victory, and the discussion is carried for ascertaining a fact or for explaining a point to the pupil, all the parts can be utilised according to necessity. Patra pariksa is the smallest composition of Vidyananda. (6) Apta pariksa: Vidyananda has written it after the style of Apta mimamsa. The Digambara version of the Tattvartha contains a stanza at its beginning, by way of benediction. It describes the virtues of an apta, a person whose words can be relied upon. This stanza serves as the theme of Apta pariksa. Vidyananda states in it, that these virtues are found in an Arhat only. Kapila, Kanada, Buddha or others do not possess them and therefore, they are not apta. The superhuman beings like Isvara of the Nyaya, Brahman of the Vedanta, and other gods like Siva etc., either do not exist at all, or they are devoid

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40 Epistemology of Jainas of those virtues. They also cannot be included into the category of an apta. Apta pariksa contains 124 karikas. The karikas from 87 to 109 discuss the question of omniscience. (7) Satyasasana parisa: This is an unpublished work, thought to be the last composition of Vidyananda. It begins with a promise of examining the different monistic systems holding soul, sound, consciousness or mind as the only reality; the systems of Carvaka, Buddha, Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Bhatta Prabhakara, Tattvopaplava and non absolutism; but ends with an incomplete description of Prabhakara. It appears that Vidyananda could not complete the remaining portion. It is one of the most important works on comparative philosophy. Vidyananda has composed it after a ripe experience and balanced views. It is unfortunate that such an excellent work was lying unnoticed so far. Its publication would add a precious jewel to the treasury of not only Jaina but, Indian philosophical literature. The above mentioned four critiques and the two commentaries are a great asset of Jaina philosophy. We can say that Vidyananda's contribution towards Jaina logic and epistemology is superseded by none. (8) Sripura Parsvanatha stotra: It is a philosophical eulogy by Vidyananda, like the eulogies of Samantabhadra; containing 30 stanzas. (9) Vidyananda Mahodaya: It is not available except in references. ANANTAVIRYA (9th cent.) : He is known through his commentary on the Siddhiviniscaya. He has made the composition of Akalanka easily accessible. Vidyananda and Anantavirya are regarded as the highest authorities on Akalanka; but there is a lot of difference between the two. The commentary of Vidyananda is not merely an explanation of the original text, it is also new contribution. We can compare him with Vacaspati Misra in his Bhamatt on

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History and Sources 41 Sarkarabhasya. His works deal with the subject independently and can be classed with original works. Anantavirya's commentary is merely an explanation. It is a simple and authoritative exposition of the ideas already existing in the original text adding nothing new of its own. ANANTAKIRTI (11th cent.): He was a contemporary of Vidyananda and composed three works, which are based on the Siddhiviniscaya of Akalanka. His two works named as Laghusarvajn asiddhi and Bshatsarvajnasiddhi appear to be based on the eighth chapter of Siddhiviniscaya. This chapter is known as Sarvajnasiddhi. The third work is based on the chapter of Jivasiddhi and bears the same title It is not available. MANIKYANANDIN (900 A.D.): Pariknamukha is the only work attributed to Manikyanandin. But, it has immortalized the author. It is the first aphorism on Jaina logic. Manikyanandin has put in it the logic of Akalanka in clear and precise terms. It has two commentaries of Prameyaratnamala and Prameyakamalamartanda which are widely studied in the Digambara institutions. They serve the purpose of elementary and detailed studies respectively. Pariksa nukha exercises a great influence amongst the logicians, both Svetambaras as well as Digambaras. It is divided into six chapters of Pramana, Paroksa, Prameya, Phala and Pramanabhasa. Manikyanandin introduced the condition of 'apurva' (not already cognized) in his definition of Pramana and thus excluded the repeating cognition (dharavabt jnana) from the category of pramaga. He might have followed Akalanka in this respect, who adopted it under the influence of Kumarila. But, it was accepted by all the later Digambara scholars while the Sveta mbaras did not concede to it. This is the only point in the definition of pramani that differentiates the two traditions. Manikyanandin has also criticised Prajna kara for his theory of the effect existing before the cause. Pariksamukha

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42 Epistemology of Jainas leaves into the Agamic treatment entirely as far as the theory of knowledge is concerned. It does not refer to the five types of knowledge with their subdivisions of avagraha etc. any where. It divides pramana into pratyaksa and paroksa with their subdivisions as suggested by the logic of Akalanka, including the Agamic types in various categories. It follows Akalanka also in defining the terms of syllogism. Vidyananda and Manikyanandin are staunch followers of Akalanka and therefore have striking resemblance in their definitions. KULABHUSANA (10th cent.): He wrote a commentary of the Vadanyaya of Syadvada Kesarin. Though the work is not available at present, yet it is clear that it was widely known in the non Jaina circle. Durveka Misra, in his commentary of Hetubindu, refers to him.2 ABHAYADEVA (11th cent.) : Abhayadeva has written a colossal commentary on the Sanmatitarka. The name of this commentary, according to the author, is Tattvabodhavidbayini, but it came to be recognised as Vadamaharnava (the ocean of debates) owing to its lengthy discussions and critical style. Abhayadeva shows his talent more in criticising others than in explaining his own views. But, unlike the other critics he does not represent the other systems. in a twisted form. He puts forth every thought faithfully. His style is clear and informative. The volume of this commentary supersedes all the previous works on philosophy written by Jaina or non-Jaina scholars. The Jaina literature did not possess. any work on any topic of such a big size before it. It is as big as 25000 metres. The gradual increase in the bulk of philosophical work seems to culminate in this commentary. Like Sanmati it is also divided into three kandas and discusses those very subjects. The whole of its 2nd chapter is devoted to the problems of jnana and darsana. 1. Hetubindu p. 378

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History and Sources 43 PRABHACANDRA (1037-1122): He is well known as the author of Prameyakamalamartanda and Nyayakumudacandra. The former is a commentary on the Pariksamukha and the latter on Laghiyastraya. It appears that Prabhacandra wrote a commentary on the Tattvartha also. The authorship of Sakatayana-Vyasa also is ascribed to him; but it is not confirmed as yet. The subject matter of Prameyakamalamartanda is the same as that of Pariksamukha. It criticises all the non-Jaina systems at great length. Its style of refutation is rather destructive. Only a small portion of its treatment can be considered as a real contribution. The remaining portion is merely the wrangling of words. One cannot place it at par with Vidyananda or Akalarka. Nevertheless, the composition represents the tendency of that age. Its influence on Devasuri, in his Syadvada Ratnakara is clear. Nyayakumudacandra is written in a fluent and clear langue age. The author has tried to follow Vidyananda and Anantavirya in it, but how far he has succeeded is a matter to be judged; unlike Vidyananda he does not try to clarify his own view but indulges in refutation of others by creating a labyrinth of alternatives; a big number of which is useless. Unlike Prameyakamala, Nyayakumudacandra is not written on any definite plan. The discussion of one and the same pro. blem is scattered over many places. Dr. S. Mukerji writes : "As regards Prabhacandra's work, they are literally formidable for their abstruse array of arguments and their forbidding language which has neither grace nor literary charm. 1 VADIRAJA (11th cent.): He is known as the author of Nyayavipiscayavivarana. It is a lucid and scholarly commentary on the Nyayaviniscaya 1. Pramanamimamsa Introduction.

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44 Epistemology of Jainas by Akalanka. Its originality, authenticity and profoundness lies in the numerous references from other systems. No direct influence from any other Acarya is discernible in Vadiraja. His elegant style, minute observations and clear cut analysis can be seen no where else. He does not say anything which he has not mastered himself. He does aot represent the other systems incompletely as is the case with many critiques of opponent systems. He is quite faithful to them also. He alludes to authoritative works only for his references and refutations, His arguments are sound and convincing. We have already stated the arrangement of subject matter and chapters in Nyayaviniscaya. Vivarani also follows the same. JINESVARA (1095 A. D.): He is the author of a Vartika known as Pramalaksma. It is the first Vartika in Svetambara literature. It refutes the defini. tion and divisions of Pramani as held by other systems and establishes his own views. This is another work representing the school of Siddhasena. CANDRAPRABHA SURI (12th cent.) : He has written a small treatise known as Prameyaratnakosa It defines the philosophical terms in a brief form. ANANTAVIRYA (13th cent.): He is a contemporary of Candraprabha. He has written a commentary on ParIksamukha, with moderate size. The work is known as Prameyaratnamala. Its style is lucid and clear. It is very useful to understand the logic of Akalarka in a simple and easy way. DEVASURI VADIN (1087-1170) : Though Siddhasena had laid the foundation of the Tarkaschool by his composition of Nyayavatara; his views, as expresed in it, did not get much following. No later scholar except Siddharsi has commented upon it. The independent works that

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History and Sources 45 can be quoted as representing his views, are Pramalaksma and the vartika of Santyacarya. There is no other work supporting him by way of a commentary or an irdependent composition, which can be placed in this gap of 400 years. On the other hand, the logic of Akalarka became a by word amongst the Digambaras. He was followed by a chain of successive highranking scholars. We can assign three reasons to this phenomenon. Firstly, Siddhasena proposed certain things which went against the Agamic conceptions; consequently, he was opposed bitterly. Akalanka did not suggest any change; but suggested only a reshaping of the Agamic theories. So, he did not get any opposition. Secondly, the Svetambaras loved their canonical literature more ardently, as they were in possession of an uninterrupted tradition. On the other hand the Digambaras had lost the tradition of Agamas and had no cause to stick to any one more than the other, on the ground of mere tradition. Thirdly, the South India was a great centre of philosophical discussions at that time. Sankara Kumarila, Prabbakara, Dinnaga, Dharmakirti and many other stalwarts of different systems flourished in that part. Consequently the Digambara scholars, who mostly belong to that region, came into contact with other systems, and felt a necessity to systematize their own logic and criticize others. On the other hand the Svetambaras were confined to the tradition of their Agamas and enriched that literature with various types of works connected with the Agama-school. By the end of the tenth century they also came into clash with Digambaras as well as the non-Jaina systems, Thus, they also felt the necessity to systematize their logic: and refute others. This is, how Devasuri desired to write Pramananaya-tattvaloka. It is a treatise on logic in the form of aphorism. Though sty led after Pariksamukha, it is not without its own originality. It surpasses the latter in the discussion on hetus and many other respects. It contains two more chapters of naya and the system of debate, which are lacking in Parlksamukha.

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46 Epistemology of Jainas It should be stated here that Devasuri also does not follow Siddhasena for his logic. He generally follows the views of Akalanka. He accepts the Akalarka nyaya with slight variations, and introduced it in the tradition of Svetambaras also. This introduction consolidates further the position of Akalanka, as the father of Jaina logic. SYADVADA RATNAKARA Devasuri has himself written a commentary on Pramananayatattvaloka, known as Syadvadaratnakara. It is in words of Dr. S. K. Mukerji? an encyclopeadic work both in size and scope. Its treatment is lucid and elegant. It treasures not only all the developments in Jaina logic and philosophy upto the time, but also records the criticism of Jainism in other systems. His sense of collection is so keen and knowledge so profound that this only work suffices to know all the currents of Jainism, Pt. Mahendra Kumar3 writes that one need not study Martanda and Kumudacandra after the study of Ratnakara. They are completely covered by it. Devasuri was a great debator. It is said that he met with Kumudacandra in a long debate on the salvation of women. This brought him the title of Vadin; and he was known as Vadideyasuri. He refutes Akalanka in his view of the invalidity of repeating cognition and Vidyananda in his definition of pramana as power (labdhi). HEMACANDRA (1089-1173) : He was a contemporary of Devasuri. He was born two years before his birth and died three years after his death. He was an alround genious. There is no branch of learning to which he has not contributed. We can mention Pramanamimamsa and two Dvatrinbikas as his works on philosophy. 1. Pramanammamsa. Int. 2. Prameyakamalamartanda Int. p. 48.

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History and Sources 47 Pramanamimainsa : It is a composition in the form of Sutras, with the self-commentary. Dr. S. K. Mukerji in his preface to the above work gives the following account : "The Pramanamimamsa of Hemacandra occupies an important position in the philosophical literature of India in general and in the Jaina philosophical literature in particular. It is a standard text book on Jaina logic and epistemology. It is quite natural that Hemacandra is deeply indebted to the previous writers both of Jaina and non-Jaina schools and a fastidious critic will find in Hemacandra's texts reproduction. But this need not detract from the merits of the work, since Indian writers do not make a fetish of originality either of thought or of language provided the views expressed therein accord with their philosophical position. The Pramanammsamsa is written on the same pattern of Sutra and commentary as the celebrated work of Vadideya Suri. But it compares favourable with the latter in that it avoids the unremitting elaboration of arguments and prolixity of expression. It contains all the arguments that are necessary to elucidate a problem and the range of information is not substantially inferior to that of the more ambitious works referred above." Unfortunately, this work is not available in its completeness. The extent portion is critically edited by the renowned scholar Pt. Sukhlal; which in itself, has become a valuable contribution to Jaina philosophy. Hemacandra's two Dvatringikas are Anyayoga-vyavaccheda-dvatrimsika and Ayogavyavaccheda-dvatrimsika. The former is a devotional prayer addressed to the last Tirthankara Mahavira. But in reality it is a criticism of the Brahmanical and Buddhist systems. The latter also is a eulogy in praise of Tirtharkaras. The former has a commentary known as Syadvadam anjari by Mallisepa. SANTYACARYA (12th cent.): He was a younger contemporary of Hemacandra. He has

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Epistemology of Jainas written a Vartika and its commentary on Nyayavatara. He has refuted Akalanka and supported Siddhasena. RATNAPRABHA (1181 A. D.): He has written a moderate-sized commentary on Pramananayatattvaloka. The commentary is named as Ratnakaravatarika meaning that it is a small treatise to understand the ocean like Syadvadaratnakara. Its bombastic style sometimes surpasses the limits of a philosophical work. Nevertheless, it is a handy work for the student of Jaina philosophy. MALLISENA (1229 A. D.): The commentary known as Syadvadamanjari by Mallisena occupies very important position in the Jaina logical literature. It is widely read. Like Hemacandra, Mallisena also does not like unnecessary expansion. He deals with every subject precisely, covering all the essential points. It is a summary of the Jaina philosophical conceptions. Its account of other systems is. lucid and faithful. GUNARATNA (1400 A. D.): He wrote a Vytti on Haribhadra's Saddarsanasamuccaya. It was first published in 1905 by the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal. The work gained a considerable popularity among the eastern as well as the western scholars. It is highly useful to have a comparative view of the Indian systems of philosophy. Gunaratna is very accurate and faithful in giving the account of all the systems. Its faithfulness can be judged from the fact that it is quoted by way of referenee to represent the views of all the systems. At the same time it is so clear that certain obscure points, which the works of those respective systems have left unexplained are easily understood tbrough it. The Introduction of Navyanyaya The Indian logic took a new turn with the advent of Gangesopadhyaya in the beginning of the thirteenth century. He laid

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History and Sources foundation of the Navyanyaya-school by writing Tattvacintamani on four pramanas. Its commentators like Mathuranatha, Jagadisa, Gadadhara and others made the discussions so subtle and deep that the old definitions appeared as inaccurate. Later on, the new science was adopted not only by the philosophical systems but in the discussions of grammar and prosody also. Its current was so powerful tiat no body could claim to be a logician, philosopher or even a grammarian without knowing it. It became an essential part of the debates on all the subjects. YASOVIJAYA UPADHYAYA : By the end of the 17th century, after a lull of five hundred years, there arose a new illuminary in the horizon of Jaina philosophy and literature. It was Yasovijaya Upadhyaya. He was a superb genious, who drank deep in all the systems of thought and was a profound scholar of all the new as well as the old developments of logic and philosophy. Nothing comes out of his pen which is not properly digested. His account is authoritative, logical and scholarly. His presentation is accurate and clear. His discussion is minute and comprehensive. He does not indulge in unnecessary wordy-warfare to increase the volume of composition. He is precise and to the point. Yasovijaya has written on all the topics related with the Jaina ethics, logic, epistemology and other subjects. Pt. Sukhjal gives a list of his works which number seventy two. Out of them forty are completely available, seven are incomplete and twenty-five have been lost. His pen runs with equal force in Samskyta, Praksta, Gujarati and Hindi. His Jnanabindu and Tarka-bhasa are entirely related with the theory of knowledge. The former work deals with the Agamic conceptions while the latter is devoted to the logical school. These compositions, though small in size, are very important to understand the subject. Yasovijaya is an adept in diving deep and bringing out the inner essence. Regarding the Agamic views he leans towards the school of Siddhasena. His

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50 Epistemology of Jainas Adekantavyavastha deals with the theory of Anekanta in Navyanyaya style. Astasahasrlvivarana is a commentary on Vidyananda's Astasahasri. Nyayakhandakhadya is styled after the Khandanakhandakhadya of Sriharsa and criticises all the non-Jaina systems. Nyaya loka also comes in the same category. These three works show that while Yasovijaya could write digests like Jnanabindu and Tarkabhasa, he was also adept in writing full-fledged classical works, which are very hard to master. The works having 'Naya' in their title speak themselves of the subject matter. Bhasarahasya deals logically with an Agamic topic; namely, the basis of distinction between the true and false speech as given in the Prajnapanasutra; the remaining works are not related with the subject. VIMALA DASA : We may add to the period of Navyanyaya one more work. It is Saptabhangitarangips by Vimaladasa. It is a treatment of the Saptabhangi logic, in new style. Smaller works : We have given above a short account of the important authors who have contributetd to the system of Jaina logic and epistemology. Below, we give a list of works, which are minor in size as well as importance. Svetambara Works Authors Works 1. Sricandra (1150 A. D.) Utpadadisiddhi-prakarana 2. Devabhadra (12th Cent.) Nyayavatara tippana. 3. Padma Sundara (1675 A. D.) Pramanasundara 4. Muni Candra (12th Cent.) Anekantajayapataka tippana 5. Rajasekhara (1157 A. D.) (i) Syadvadakalikatippana (ii) Ratnakaravatarikatippana (iii) $addarsanasamuccaya 6. subhavijaya (1610 A. D) Syadvada-bhasa

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History and Sources 51 7. Muni Sundara (1398 A. D.) Traividyagosthy 8. Malayagiri (12th cent.) Dharmasamgrahanitika Digambara Works 1. Deyasena (10th cent.) (i) Nayacakra (ii) Alapapaddhati 2. Dharmabhusana Yati (i) Nyayadipika (15th cent.) (ii) Pramana Vistara 3. Prabhadeva Svamin (i) Pramitivada (ii) Muktivada (iii) Avyaptivada (iv) Tarkavada (v) Nayavada 4. Jagannatha Muktivada 5. Narendrasena (14th cent.) Pramanaprameyakalika 6. Abhinava Caruksrti Panditacarya : (i) Prameyaratnamalalarkara (ii) Prameyaratnakalika Prakasika 7. Bhavasena Traividya Visvatattvaprakasa 8. Vadiraja Vedamanjari 9. Vadisimha (i) Pramananauka (ii) Tarkadspika 10. Srutasagara Suri Tattvarthavrtti 11. Virasena Pramananauka We cannot claim that the above list is comprehensive. Many new works have come into light as the old collections are perused. The dates are not exact but approximate. Two currents in the logical school One more point to be stated here is the existence of two logical schools to which we have occasionally referred. The first school may be enshrined as Siddhasena-school. Siddhasena, Jinesvara, Siddharsi, Abhayadeva and Santisuri come under this school; while the other logicians belong to Akalankaschool. Yabovijaya supports Siddhasena in the Agamic concep

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Epistemology of Jainas three Pratyaksa he is tions. But, in the logical views, he follows Akalanka. The main difference between these schools lies in the division of Pramana. Siddhasena divides Pramana into Pratyaksa, Anumana and Agama. In includes experience (sense-perception) as well as intuition (supersensual perception ). This division more akin to the Samkhya and Nyaya systems, and does not follow the Agamic tradition. Akalanka divides Pramana, first, into two, Pratyaksa and Paroksa. In Paroksa he includes all the types of mediate cognition viz., Memory (smrti), Recognition (Pratyabhijnana), Hypotheits (tarka), Inference (anumana) and Verbal testimony (agama). He coins the name Samvyavaharika pratyaksa for sense-perception and Paramarthika pratyaksa for the Intuition; which is further divided into Sakala (complete) and Vikala (incomplete). 52 Survey of the three periods: It can be observed here that the history of the Jaina logic: passed through three periods. The first is dominated by Siddhasena, main Samantabhadra and Mallavadin. The current of this period was not the systematization of logical notions but the defence of non-absolutism against the attack of absolutistic systems. The theories of Anekanta and Naya with their identity and difference with other systems is the principal topic of discussion. -: The second period begins with Akalanka and lasts upto Vadideva Suri. It was necessiated by the attacks of Dinnaga. and Dharmakti on the traditional notions of the sources of knowledge. All the systems arranged logically their theory of knowledge just to reply the Buddhist attack. The great scholars like Akalanka, Vidyananda, Haribhadra, Vadiraja and Vadideva Suri are the specialities of this period. The third period is the contribution of Yasovijaya Upadhyaya. He interpreted the Jaina logic and philosophy in the Navyanyaya style and made it upto date.

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CHAPTER 2 THE GENERAL CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE The Dominating Spirit Philosophy in India does not begin as a science of ascertaining facts but as the quest for values. Fundamentally, it is Moksasastra, the science of salvation. The theory of knowledge is not an exception. The highest knowledge in the Upanisads is the knowledge of Brahman, the knowledge that leads to liberation 2 Maitreyi discards everything which does not help in attaining immortality.3 The discussion between Narada and Sanatkumara, 4 the distinction between Paravidya and Aparavidyas and the avowed futility of the Vedic lore stress upon the same point repeatedly. It can be asked here, that according to the Upanisads Brahman is the only reality and therefore, knowledge of Brahman alone can be claimed as the knowledge of reality, and one may try thus, to assign a logical validity to the conception of Brahman, but this type of notion is a later development, related with the scholastic period. Upanisads in themselves did not aim at the logical validity. Their main objective was to show the path to liberation, which they hold, as the only standard of valuation. The Sankhya system promises complete cessation of all sorrows 1. Mundaka 1.1, 3-5 2. Isa 11 3. Brhad 2.4.3 4. Chandogya 7.3 5. Mundaka 1.1.4 6. Ibid., 1.2.7; Gita II, 46

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54 Epistemology of Jainas as its chief aim.1 The Yoga is entirely devoted to the attainment of kaivalya. Gautama2 in his Nyayasutra enumerates sixteen categories and asserts that their knowledge would lead to the attainment of the highest purpose i.e. liberation. In the category of prameyas (object) he enumerates only those objects as are important in the attainment of apavarga. The Vaisesikat system begins with the interpretation of dharma as the means for attainment of the worldly as well as transcendental wellbeing. Mimamsa,5 the strict devotee of the Vedas, does the same by explaining dharma as injunction of the Vedas. The Buddhists6 aim at the nirvana i. e. removal of passions, which are the chains that keep the soul in bondage. The spiritual development achieved through the removal of karmic matter is the main theme of the Jaina scriptures.? The early discussion on the Jaina theory of knowledge also is dominated with the same spirit. The path for spiritual progress, aiming at the final goal of liberation is the central tone of the Agamas.8 Knowledge in this period is not valued on the merit of logical validity but as a means for the ethical progress. Jnana (knowledge) is one of the constituents of the path to Moksa,' and the knowledge which does not help in achieving that goal is discarded as ajnana or mithyajnanalo (perverted knowledge). The difference between jnana and ajnana or mithyajnana is not objective but subjective. It The cognition 1. Sankhyakarika 1 2. Nyayasutra 1.1.1 3. Nyayasutra 1.1.9; Nyayamanjari, p. 428 4. Vaisesikassutra 1. 1 5. Mimamsasutra 1.1 6. Abhidharmakosa IV 127 7. Uttaradhyayana XXVIII, 36 8. Ibid. XXIX, 59 9. Ibid. XXVIII 1-3 10. Nandi, 25; Tattvartha I 32 11. Bhagavati 8.2.81

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The General Conception of Knowledge 55 of a samyagdesti (the person with right view-point) whether it is logically correct or incorrect is always samyagjnana. Similarly, the cognition of a mithyadssti (the person with wrong attitude) is always ajnana or mithyajnana. The division of 'Nani' and Annani' in the Bhagavati? and the subsequent Agamic literature is based on the condition of the self being Samyagdrsti or Mithyadrsti. It is held that the cognition of a Mithyadssti is no more useful to the attainment of liberation and therefore useless. It does not serve the purpose of knowledge, and therefore, it is no more knowledge.2 On the contrary, the cognition of samyagdrsti, who is a true aspirant, is always useful for the above purpose; and therefore, it is jnana or samyagjnana. The Agamic literature is dominated with this pragmatic attitude. Clarification of Some Terms Before, we proceed further, it is necessary to have clear idea of certain technical terms related to the subject. There is a number of terms in the Agamic literature which express a sense quite different from the one expressed in the logical period or in non-Jaina systems. Below we give a few of such terms: 1. U payoga : It is a general term comprehending all activity related with consciousness. Literally, it means application, attention or coordination of the subject and the object. It is the application of the faculty of knowing possessed by the soul. It is attention of the soul when the latter knows an object, coordination also carries the same sense. Here, we use the term cognition for upayoga. It is divided into Nirakara Upayoga or darsana (inarticulate cognition) and Sakara upayoga or Jnana (articulate cognition). 1. Bhagavati 8.2.81 2. (Sukhlal), Tattvarthasutra 1.38 3. Tattvathabhasyatika II 8.

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Epistemology of Jainas 2. Darsana or Nirakara Upayoga: Inarticulate cognition or sensation preceding every articulate cognition is known as Darsana. It should be noted here that darsana precedes the sense-perception as well as the supersensuous perception or intuition. In the domain of ethics the term darsana means attitude, where it is known as drsti also. 56 3. Jnana and Ajnana: The articulate cognition gets the designation of jnana or ajnana according to the faith of the knower. But, in the Nandi and the later literature the term jnana is also used in a general sense. We have used it in a general sense and have prefixed it by samyak (right) or mithya (wrong) to show the distinction. 4. Jnana and Knowledge: One more thing to be noted here is that the term jnana of the Indian philosophy is generally translated into English as knowledge. But the term knowledge implies the idea of truth in itself. It is always valid. The Jaina Agamas also use this term in the same sense, but in the logical period they are not exactly synonyms. Jnana of the Indian systems is true as well as false. Wrong apprehension also is jnana. I have followed the traditional path of using the term knowledge in the sense of jnana to cover all its aspects. The Canonical Approach Absence of Proper Definition: We do not find any complete definition of knowledge in the Jaina canonical literature. Whenever a question is asked, "What is knowledge' it is answered by enumerating the five types of knowledge.1 Gautama also, in his Nyayasutra does not define Pramana in general; but, goes direct into the divisions. Perhaps, this method was based on the principle that if parts are known the whole would come into light by itself. But it does not mean that the Agamas leave the problem altogether unexplained. We have mentioned in the 1. Bhagavati 8.2.18 2. Nyayasutra

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The General Conception of Rnowledge introduction the vast literature dealing elaborately with the topic of knowledge. The lack of precise definition is neither an oversight nor a deliberate omission; but a speciality of the period. Systematic logical definition and the development of syllogism were of a later origin. The Upanisads, the Pitakas and the other literature of that period testify to the above. The Upanisads express high philosophical thoughts in a simple style. The dialectics of the Mahayana school of Buddhism with their hair splitting discussions were rooted in the lucid and direct style of the talks of Buddha. Similarly the highest principles of Jainism have been stated in the Agamas in a simple style. Precise definition was an outcome of the discussions with other systems. The problem of knowledge has three aspects; viz. metaphysical, ethical and epistemological. The metaphysical aspect is related with the subjective side of knowledge. There is sufficient material in the Agamas showing the position of knowledge in regard with this subject. The ethical aspect relates with the question of valuation. Regarding this topic also the Agamic view is very clear. The epistemological aspect discusses relation between subject and the object. The theories of direct presentation, representation, subjectivism, objectivism and such others are related with this aspect, which was not so developed in the Agamic period. Still, there are certain references in the Agamas where one can find the seeds of the scholastic development in this respect also. We shall try to show some scattered fragments on which the whole edifice of Jaina epistemology is built in the early period of Agamas. Metaphysica! Position: The Bhagavatisutra eight types of soul according to its different states : (1) Dravyatman-Soul qua substance (2) Kasayatman-Soul qua passions (3) Yogatman-Soul qua activity (4) Upayogatman-Soul qua cognition (5) Jnanatman-Soul qua articulate cognition 57 enumerates

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58 Epistemology of Jainas (6) Darsanatman-Soul qua inarticulate cognition (7) Caritratman-Soul qua conduct (8) Viryatman-Soul qua energy. Dravyatman means the soul as a substance, which is responsible for the notion of unity or continuity in all its modes. This is a natural and permanent state. Kasayatman means the soul in the modes of passions. This state is the result of karmic influence i.e. the rise of Mohaniya karman; which continues upto attainment of the twelveth stage of spiritual development (gunasthana)1 Yogatman is activity of the soul carried through the mind, speech or body. It is an effect of the Nama-karman and lasts upto the thirteenth stage. In the fourteenth stage though Namakarman is not destroyed, yet, the movement (yoga) of all the tbree types does not last any more. So yogatman does not exist in that stage. The two states of yogatman and Kasayatman exist with the souls that are under bondage of the karmic matter. They do not last after liberation. Upayogatman means the state of conscious activity. It is not the effect of karmans. On the contrary it is effected by the removal of karmic influence, totally or partially. Upayoga increases or decreases in scope, according to the thinness or thickness of the karmic obscurance. Thus, this state is influenced by the karman in negative aspect only. It is found in all souls whether liberated or in bondage. It is related with two of the four natural Infinites (ananta catustaya) recognised as the very characteristics of the soul. Jnanatman, here means the state of articulate cognition related with a samyagdisti.2 Jnanatman is effected mainly by the removal of Jnanavaraniya and Mohaniya. The removal of the latter is necessary by way of creating the right attitude, which is a condition for jnana. It is also a natural state of the soul but becomes samyak or mithja according to the action or inaction of mithyatva mohanlya. In case 1. See the chapter on Kevalajnana. 2. Bhagavati XII, 10

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The General Conception of Knowledge 59 the term jnana is taken in a general sense without the subjective distinction of samyagdrsti or mithyadssti, it is coexistent with Dravyatman and upayogatman. Darsanatman means the state of inarticulate appearance. It is caused by the removal of Darsanavaraniya. It is also a natural state of the soul and common to all. Caritratman is the state of the soul self-concentrated or turned away from the worldly activities. In this state the inflow of new karmans is stopped and the soul strives for destroying the existing ones. It develops fully when the Mohaniya is completely destroyed. According to Jainism, there are two grades of the ethical conduct. The higher grade is called caritra, sarvavirati or Samyama. It is practised by those who have renunciated the family life and embraced asceticism. The lower grade is known as caritracaritra, Desavirata or Samyamasamyama. It is observed by the layman or grhastha. In this grade rules of conduct are such as allow concession (sagara). Partially it is caritra and partially not. It stops the inflow of karmans in a part only. Caritratman is mainly related to the higher grade. Viryatman is the state of the soul related with energy or power. It is also a natural state but gets its full development when Antarayakarman is removed. It is also found in every soul. Out of the above mentioned eight aspects the six, leaving Kasayatman and Yogatman, are natural. Upayogatman is a general term for the two states of jnana and darsana. Dravyatman is the basis of all. The remaining four states represent the four Infinites (anantas) which are the very characteristics of every soul. They are infinite knowledge (Ananta Jnana), Infinite Perception (Ananta Darsana), Infinite Bliss (Ananta Sukha) and Infinite Energy (Ananta Virya). Infinite Bliss is the natural development of caritratman. The remaining three are the developments of corresponding aspects. Thus, we come to the conclusion that cognition, with its two aspects of jnana and darsana, is a permanent feature of the soul. It is not an accidental phenomenon produced by the external factors. Here, we can notice the difference from the

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(60 Epistemology of Jainas Nyaya, holding buddhi as an accidental phenomenon, occasioned by the conjunction of certain external and internal causes; and disappearing the next moment automatically and altogether absent in the states of sleep and liberation. According to Jainism it is not knowledge but the obscurance of knowledge that depends upon the external cause i.e. karmic matter. The knowledge is natural. Every soul is omniscient as far as its nature is concerned. This point is further confirmed by the Nandisutra1 which states that in no state of the self, knowledge disappears totally. Even in the state of Nigoda2 where the karmic veil is the thickest, a slight portion of knowledge remains unobscured. "If that also were covered" states the Nandy, the soul would become non-intelligent (Jada) like matter (Pudgala)", and it is an impossibility. The position is further clarified in the following discussion between Lord Mahavira and Gautama3 : Gautama asks : Lord replies : "O Lord the soul is jnana or ajnana"? "O Gautama! the soul is jnana as well as ajnana, but jnana is positively soul." It should be recalled here that the terms jnana and ajnana are used in the senses of samyagjnana and mithyajnana. Ajnana should not be mistaken here, as absence of knowledge. The above statement shows a relative identity between knowledge and the soul. The Uttaradhyayana1 and the Bhagavat[5 sutras state upayoga as the definition of JIva. Sthananga 1. Nandi 42 2. The kingdom of Nigoda is generally stated to exist in scum on the water-surface. It is the lowest stage of biological evolution. It consists of the minimum degree of conscious ness. 3. Bhagavati XII, 10. 468 4. Uttaradhyayana, XXVIII, 10 5. Bhagavatt II, 10 6. Sthananga 441 6

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61 The General Conception of Knowledge specifies upayoga as the characteristic of JIva. This shows that knowledge is the only factor that distinguishes soul from matter. Identity between Instrument and Agent: Uttaradhyayana1 describes knowledge as the instrument of cognising objects. It can be objected here that an instrument is always different from the agent. In the case of cognition the soul is agent; while senses etc. are instruments. It goes against the theory of identity between the two. Acarangasutra2 replies to the above objection by proposing identity between agent and the instrument as far as the present case is concerned. It says that the soul is cogniser as well as the instrument of cognition. The conception of this identity is the speciality of Jainas. According to them soul is the only real cause of cognition. The senses, light, object, contact between the senses and the object etc. are only helping causes, required occasionally. They are not essential. The same soul plays the part of instrument as well as the agent. This identity should not be confused with the Vedantic conception of changeless absolute consciousness or the yogacara conception of the mere flow of the successive cognitions. The Jainas differ from both of them. They accept neither absolute change nor absolute permanence. Change with continuity according to them is the essence of existence. Cognitions change every moment; but, at the same time there is some continuity also The two factors of change and permanence are two phases of the same reality. The idea of the eight souls, as stated above is based on this principle. Ethical Position or Value of Knowledge: The Uttaradhyayana speaks of knowledge as an instrument of knowing the object. But. this is not the dominant idea on which the value of 1. Uttaradhyayana XXVIII, 35 2. Acaranga 1.5.5 3. Tattvartha V. 30 4. Uttaradhyayana XXVIII 35

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Epistemology of Jainas knowledge is judged. The real value of knowledge, as has been already stated lies in its ethical utility. There are three virtues that pave the path to liberation"; (i) Right Attitude (samyagdarsana), (ii) Right knowledge (Samyagjnana) and (iii) Right conduct (samyakcaritra). Uttaradhyayanaz adds austerity (tapas) also to the above list; but, it is virtually included into the conduct. Right-knowledge, as has been stated before, is not possible without Right attitude; and the conduct is not right unless it is accompanied by right knowledge. Without right conduct deliverance from the worldly miseries is impossible and without perfect deliverance from miseries, no permanent happiness can be achieved.3 Thus, knowledge plays an important part in constructing the road to deliverance (moksa). Righl faith is generally defined as the firm belief 4 in the words of Jinas, those who have conquered all passions and have attained omniscience; faith in the efficacy of their teachings as the only guide for spiritual progress and deliverance. The teaching of Jinas is arranged in nine categories 5 (tattvas) and six substances (arthas). The function of Right-faith is to divert the attention of a jiva, from worldly affairs to spiritual progress. As soon as an aspirant gets his attention diverted towards the spiritual progress, his knowledge and all other activities are directed towards the attainment of that very goal, and therefore, become samyak or purposeful. Thus the utility of right faith is confined to the diversion of attention only. It is not related with the development of any characteristic of the soul. Right knowledge and right conduct are the real attributes of soul; which increase with the spiritual progress and get their full manifestation at the stage of liberation. This is why 1. Uttaradhyayana XXVIII. 30; Tattvartha 1.1 2. Ibid., 2 3. Ibid., XXVIII, 30 4. Ibid., 15 5. Ibid., 146. Sthanarga, 665

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The General Conception of Knowledge Vadideva Suri in his Pramananayatattvaloka1 mentions these two only as the means for liberation and includes Right faith into Right knowledge as its necessary pre-requisite. Thus, knowledge and conduct are the only factors essential for liberation. Further, ignorance (ajnana) and attachment (moha) or passions (kasayas) are the only vices that obstruct the soul in its spiritual journey. Ignorance is removed by knowledge and attachment by conduct; which induces the soul to self concentration. Out of the four destructive (ghatin) karmans, that are responsible for putting obstructions in the development of spiritual qualities, the first two i. e. Jnanavaraniya and Darsanavaraniya are related with knowledge, and the remaining two i. e. Mohantya and Antaraya are connected with conduct. Thus, according to the theory of karman also, only the two factors of jnana and caritra are mainly concerned with the path of liberation. Out of the twin of knowledge and conduct none can be said, as more important than the other. Both enjoy the same status. The Dasavaikalika2 sutra states at one place that knowledge has primacy over the conduct, the latter has no possibility without the former. At another place it compares a person of learning, but without practice, with a donkey who carries burden of sandle-wood. As the donkey bears the burden; but, has no share in the wealth of his load; similarly the person without practice, merely bears the burden of his knowledge. He cannot enjoy the spiritual progress, which is the real fruit of knowledge. The Avasyakaniryuktis states that knowledge is useless without conduct and conduct is useless without knowledge. Thus, the Jaina Agamas attribute equal importance to both of them. 1. Pramananayatattvaloka VII 2. Dasavaikalika IV 3. Avasyakaniryukti 101 63

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Epistemology of Jainas The Epistemological Function of Knowledge: For the present our main concern is to ascertain the position of knowledge in relation to its function of cognising the object. The Agamas do not provide much material in this respect. We have already alluded to a passage from Uttaradhyayana1 which describes knowledge as the instrument of cognising objects. But, it does not throw much light on the relation between the subject and the object. 64 Avasyaka niryukti2 defines knowledge as an illuminer, from this idea two points of fundamental importance come to our mind. Firstly the function of knowledge is only to illumine the object which is already in existence. Knowledge does not create anything new. The Indian thinkers hold three views in this respect: (1) The idealists like Yogacara hold that the external objects do not exist apart from the ideas. Knowledge, according to them does not illumine the existing objects; but appears itself in the form of objects. (2) The Buddhists like Sautrantika, hold that the thing-initself exists independent of mind; but, it is not the object of conception. It is merely perceived. All the concepts are mental creations which are associated with the percepts. (3) The Nyaya, Sankhya Vaibhasika and other realists hold that our senses or mind does not create anything new. Our knowledge only illumines the already existing objects. The Jainas line with the third conception. They are realist in toto. Every quality, according to them, that becomes the object of knowledge is a reality and as such is already in existence. The second point, that emerges from the above extract of Niryukti, is this, the objects are presented to the soul directly. 1. Uttaradhyayana XXVIII. 35 2. Avasyakaniryukti 1069 5

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The General Conception of Knowledge 65 The Jainas do not accepi the theory of representation as the Buddhist or Sankhya holds. There are two views regarding apprehension of the object. The Sankhya-system holds that the object is reflected into the mode of buddhi; and the latter grasps that refle-tion only. It has no direct apprehension of the real object. The Sautrantika also holds the same view with a different version. He maintains that consciousness assumes the form of the object; which he expresses as tadakaratata (coordination); and thus the object is not grasped directly These two systems follow the theory of representation. On the other hand the Nyaya, Mimama and other systems maintain that the object is presented to the subject directly. There is no other via media between the two. They maintain the theory of presentation. The Jainas also accept the latter view. The doctrine of illumination supports it. As the representation is not illumination of the object itself it is reflection or coordination as the case may be. Four Fundamentals : The conclusions drawn from the above passages of the Agamas and Niryukti can be summed up under the following heads : (1) Knowledge is identical with the self, but the self is not identical with kaowledge as it contains certain other qualities also. (2) The function of knowledge is to illumine the objects. It does not create anything new. (3) The soul is the instrument as well as the agent of cognition. (4) The objects are presented to the subject directly. These four factors, constitute the foundation of Agamic theory of knowledge, which developed later on in the numerous branches and in huge literature. In the present chapter we shall discuss these points and try to show their further development.

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66 Epistemology of Jainas Full Treatment The Problem: Yasovijaya defines knowledge as the special quality of soul; which illumines the object and itself.1 This definition can be analysed under the following three heads : (1) Its first part deals with the metaphysical position of knowledge and holds that it is a characteristic of the soul. (2) The second part is related with the function of knowledge, and holds that it is illumination. (3) The third part is connected with the object. It is the knowledge itself (sva) and the external things (para). The Indian systems hold divergent views regarding the above three points and go from one extreme to the other. According to Carvaka knowledge is a passing phase of the four material elements. He does not believe in any permanent intelligent entity known as soul. Regarding the other two points we have no sources as to ascertain his position precisely. Generally it is believed that he holds the common-place view and attaches more importance to the sense observation, rather than inference etc. But we cannot say that he is totally irrational. His rejection of inference and the other sources of indirect knowledge as devoid of independent validity has a sound logic behind it; as can be discovered from his only available work i.e. Tattvopaplava simha. Sriharsa, in his Khandanakhandakhadya has adopted the same arguments to refute the dualistic conceptions. The Nyaya system believes in a permanent entity known as soul; but maintains that it is not naturally intelligent. Knowledge is a phenomenon; which occurs at the collocation of certain internal as well as external means. As far as the fun. ction of knowledge is concerned the system agrees with the Jainas and holds that it is illumination. But, the views regar 1. Jnanabindu p. 1 2. Karikavaly 57; Nyayavartika II. 1.21

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The General Conception of Knowledge ding the process of that function are not the same in these systems. The Nyaya is a firm believer of the theory of contact. The Jainas do not regard it essential. Regarding the object also the Nyaya differs from the Jaina. It contends that knowledge cannot illumine itself. Even an expert dancer cannot climb over his own shoulders. The first cognition is related with the external object only. If one desires to know that cognition also, the second cognition is needed, which has the first cognition as its object. Further, a third is required if the second one is to be apprehended; and this process goes on till the cogniser is satisfied and gives up further desire or effort. The Sankhya maintains that the soul is intelligent by nature. But, it is entirely passive;1 all activity is restricted to praksti. In the function of knowledge also the soul does not play any active part. All the business is done by buddhi" which is an evolute of praksti (marter) and therefore, non intelligent (jada) But, it is intellicized 4 through the reflection of purusa. This intellicized buddhi, according to Sankhya, is the reals cognizer. Regarding the function of knowledge, the Sankhya does not believe in illumination. It proposes the theory of refle. ction (pratibimbavada). The object is reflected into buddhi and that reflection is enlightened by the reflection of purusa into buddhi.? Thus, buddhi is a double reflector. 8 The same buddhi modified according to the reflection of the object is known as jnana. So, knowledge means, to catch reflection of I Sankhya karika 19-20; Yogadarsana, II. 20 2. Sankhyatattvakaumudi K. 5 3. Ibid. 4 Sankhyakarika 20 5 Sankhyatattvakaumudy K. 5 6. Yogasutratattvavaisaradi. I. 6 7. Yogavartika p. 22; Outlines Ind. Phil. p. 284 8. Ibid. 9. Sankhyatattvakaumudi K. 5

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68 Epistemology of Jainas the external object. Regarding the object, the Sankhya holds that transcendental intelligence, i. e. purusa, is consciousness without any object. It is pure irtelligence, me, e awareness or sentience. The discursive knowledge, i.e. the mode of buddhi also does not have the thing in itself as its object. It apprehends the reflection only. The existence of thing in itself is a matter of inference 2 Regarding self cognition the Sankhya goes with the Nyaya and holds that the same cognition cannot cognise itself. It requires another mode of buddhi where it reflects and then apprehended. 3 The Mimansaka goes very near to the Jaina conception of soul. The only fundamental diference between the two systems is that Mimamsa holds soul as all-pervasive. 4 According to Jainism it is coextensive with the body it occupies. According to the Mimamsa, knowledge is a mode of the soul.5 The function of knowledge is to generate the quality of manifestedness (jnatata) in the object. Regarding the subject matter of knowledge the Prabhakara school of Mimama agrees with the Jaina. He also believes in the self-luminosity of the cognition.? But Kumarila contends that all knowledge is beyond perception. It is inferred through the quality of manifestedness which is generated in the object.8 According to Sankara, there are two types of knowledge, transcendental and discursive. The transcendental knowledge is the soul itself, which is otherwise known as Brahman. It is Pure Intelligence, Pure Existence and Pure Bliss It is free from the 1. Yogadarsana, 11. 20; Outline Iod. Phil. p. 279 2. Outline of Indian Philosophy p. 283 3. Ibid., 4. Ibid., 303 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Prakaranapancika p. 63 8. Bhattacintamani p. 15

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The General Conception of Knowledge 69 three kinds of difference? i. e. (1) the difference due to the existence of another object of the same class, (2) the difference due to the existence of an object of dissimilar class and (3) the difference due to the existence of parts in its own body. This means that the Vedanta holds not only the unity of soul, but denies the status of reality to everything else. All external appearances, according to it are illusion. But, when we come to the level of discursive knowledge it also maiatains theory of cognition like the other systems. Cogniser, according to this theory, is the soul limited by or reflected into the mind-substance? (antahkarana). At the time of cognizing an object the antahkarana goes out through the senses and transforms itself into the shape of the object.3 This mode (vitti) of antahkarana is recognised as jnana er krowledge. 4 According to Vedanta5 Avidya or ignorance has two fold function. Firstly, it obscures the reality. Secondly, it projects new impositions. The Jaina also believes in the theory of obscurance (avarana) but, the avarana of the Jaina is related with the cognizer only. Regarding the subject matter the two systems agree with each other and hold that knowledge illumines the object as well as itself simultaneously 6 According :o the Sarvastivada school of Buddnism the soul is known as citta. But, it is not a single unit nor an everlasting individuality. It is a composition of many elements. Generally it is split into two parts, the subjective part or the mind viewed as a receptive faculty, is represented by one element called, indiscriminately, citta, vijnana, or manas.? It represents pure 1. Sarkara on Chandogya 6.2.1 2. Vedantasara p. 10 3. Vedantaparibhasa p. 46 4. Ibid., 29 5. Vedantasara p. 13 6. Vedantaparibhasa 262 7. Central Conception of Buddhism p. 15

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70 Epistemology of Jainas consciousness, or pare seasation, without any content. Its content is placed in the objective part which contains the definite sensation (sparsa), feelings (vedana), ideas (samjna) volitions (cetana) and various other mental phenomena up to the number of forty six elements. So, it is that feelings come to be viewed as objects of mind. According to the Buddhism every thing is a momentary flash. So, there is nothing to move towards the other, no contact, no seizing grasping or reflection of any sort. Because, all of these phenomena presume continuity for more than one moment. The phenomenon of knowledge, 2 according to Buddhism, is a compound phenomenon, resolvable into a number of elements simultaneously flashing into existence. According to the laws of interconnection (pratityasamutpada), some elements invariably appear accompanied by others arising in close contiguity with them. A moment of colour (rupa), a moment of the sense of vision matter (caksuh) and a moment of pure consciousness (citta) arising simultaneously in close contiguity, constitute what is called a sensation (sparsa) of colour. The element of consciousness according to the same law never appears alone, but always supported by an object (visaya), and a receptive faculty (indriya). When we say that consciousness cognises its object it does not mean that consciousness has to perform some function. It simply appears in coordination (sarupya) with its objective elements. It is, properly speaking, doing nothing. Regarding the self-cognizability of knowledge the Buddhism agrees with the Jaina. The Yogacara school of Buddhism totally denies the existence of external things. It holds consciousness as a series of reflexes appearing one after another. It proposes that citta itself appears into the forms of different objects. So, there is no cognition of the object existing independently. 3 1. Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 37 2. Ibid., p. 35 3. Suzuki, Larkavatara

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The General Conception of Knowledge 71 We have given above some conceptions regarding knowledge and its objective, prevalent in Indian Philosophy. In the fore. going pages we shall examine them in comparison with the views held by the Jaina. The Metaphysical Position of Knowledge We have analysed the problem of knowledge into three parts. The first part is related with the metaphysical position. It is a corollary of the problem of reality. We shall give below the Jaina conception of reality and try to ascertain the position of the soul therein. The Jaira Conception of Reality : The fundamental notion of reality as held by the Agamas is expressed in the three Matckapadas. They are held as mother words giving birth to the whole system of Jaina philosophy and constitute the central theme of the entire Jaina philosophy and metaphysics. Their importance can be further estimated from the tradition,2 which holds that the Tirtharkaras speak these three words only. The Ganadhara samplify them and erect the whole structure of Jaina canons on their foundation. The Sthanangasutra3 also refers to them. They are stated in the following order. It originates, it perishes it continues. The Tattvarthat describes them as the definition of reality. These three conditions of reality are not caused by any external factor. They are natural and the very essence of every existence. Hemacandra5 explains that everything beginning from the flickering of a candle upto the sky, possesses the same nature i.e. change with permanence. 1. Dasivaikalikatika by Haribha tra, Githa 8 2. Visesavasyakabhasya Gatha. 3 Sthananga X 4. Tattvartha V 30 5. Anyayoga vyavacchedadvatrimsika. 5

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72 Epistemology of Jainas The main ground for this contention is this, that a reality must have some purpose to serve. A reality without any utility is inconceivable. The Jainas do not believe in mere existence as the Vedanta does. The object, which is permanent without any change, or which perishes every moment without any continuity, cannot serve any useful purpose. Purposiveness must have action as its pre-requisite necessity; which is not possible both in the conditions of change without permanence or permanence without change. Action means an order of successive stages of the beginning, the middle and the completion. AO absolute permanence cannot have these stages without invitiog some sort of change. Similarly, a thing with absolute change cannot go through these stages, as it cannot last even for two moments, 1 Categories and Realities : The Vais: sikasutra? describes six categories (padarthas) and three realities 3 (arthas). It distinguishes artha (reality) from padartha (category) in this, that the former inheres existence in it and the latter does not. 4 The artha has an external existence and can be perceived through senses or yogic perception.5 On the other hand the categories are conceptual. They are the analytic interpretations of external and internal phenomena. The Nyayasulra admits sixteen categories; 6 whose knowledge leads to the highest good. Vatsyayana? divides reality into the four epistemological types of pramana (source of knowledge), pramata (cognizer), prameya (object) and pramiti (cognition). It means that the question of reality is related with epistemology while that of category with the spiritual progress. The Jaina also admits the two types as 1. Syauvadamanjari K.5 2. Vaisesikasutra 1.1.4 3. Ibid., 8.2.3; Vaisasikabhasya 8.2.3 4. Vaisesikasutra 1.2.7; Karikavali, 14-15 5. Dinakari p. 40 6. Nyayasutra 1.1.1 7. Vatsyayanabhasya

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The General Conception of Knowledge 73 tattva or tathya and dravya. Vatsyayanal explains tattva (category) as the true nature of an object. If the object is real, its tattva is reality or existence. If the object is unreal its tattva is unreality or non-existence. The Jainism also holds the same view. The Uttaradhyayana enumerates the following nine kinds of tathyasa : Jiva (soul), Ajiva, (not-soul), Bandha (bondage), Punya (virtue), Papa (vice), Asrava (inflow of the karmic matter), Samvara (stoppage of the inflow), Nirjara (destruction of the karmans already stored), Moksa (salvation). A real faith in these nine categories is known as samyaktvas (the right attitude), which is one of the constituents of the way to liberation. The same sutra describes dravya, guna and paryaya as the objects of knowledge which constitute the objective reality. The Tattvartha+ substitutes tatt va in place of the tathya and describes their number as seven, instead of nine. It includes punya and papa in the category of asrava. The Uttaradhyayana describes the six dravyas as loka5 (universe). It means that the six dravyas with their gunas and paryayas constitute the entire external reality. In the Nyaya system all objective reality is included in the second category of prameya. According to the Jainism all the three realities of dravya, guna and paryaya are included into the first two categories of jiva and ajiva. Dravya, Guna and Paryaya : Dravya is defined as the abode of gunas. The Tattvartha? and the later scholars add paryaya 1. Vatsyayanabhasya p. 2 2. Uttara. XXVIII, 14. 3. Sthauanga, 65. 4. Uttara. XXVIII, 14; Tatvartha 1.1-5 5. Uttara. XXVIII 5-8; Tattvartha 1.4. 6. Uttara. XXVIII, 6. 7. Tattvartha V. 38.

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74 Epistemology of Jainas also as located in the dravya. But that does not constitute a definition of the latter as paryayas exist in gunas also.1 According to the N. V. systems also dravya is the abode of guna (quality) and karman2 (motion). As far as gunas are concerned they agree with the Jainas. But, the conception of karman is altogether different from the conception of paryaya. Karman is a motion and exists in the dravyas which have a limited dimension. The paryaya of the Jainas means change which exists in all the dravyas. Guna and paryaya are the very characteristics of a dravya. Guna : It is an attribute that continues in all the successive stages of a dravya4. For instance, consciousness is the guna of jiva (soul). It exists constantly in every jiva. It may undergo changes according to the object or the karmic influence but never disappears totally, Par yaya : The successive stages through which a dravya passes are known as paryayas. The different forms of the soul as man, animal, the being of the heaven or hell are paryayas. In the case of pudgala (matter) colour, taste, smell and touch are gunas; but, the different forms of jar, cloth etc. and different shades of colour such as black, white etc. are paryayas. Relative Identity and difference between drayya and the other Two: The gunas and paryayas are relatively different as well as identical with the dravya. Yasovijaya explains this differeace by citing the example of a pearl necklaces. The necklace differs from the pearls as well as their brightness. In the same way a dravya differs from its gurias as well as paryayas. He explains the identity by citing another example. The gold is not different from its brightness and the different forms of ear ring, 1. Uttara. XXVIII, 22. 2. Vaisesikasutra 1.1.15 3. Vai esika Upa. 1.1.17 4. Dravyagunaparyayanorasa p. 118. 5. Ibid., 11.12.

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The General Conception of Knowledge 75 bangle etc. which it undergoes. In the same way dravya is not different from its paryayas and gunas. Difference between Guna and Paryaya : Uttaradhyayana makes the distinction between guna and paryaya by stating that gunas exist in the dravya only, while the paryaya exists in dravya as well as gunas.2 Consciousness is the guna of a jiva. It is found in all the jivas. The different states of men, beasts, etc. are the paryayas. They are related with Dravya. But the different forms of cognition also are paryayas. They belong to a guna i.e. consciousness. Similarly the qualities of colour etc. are gunas, found in the pudgala dravya. The different forms of jar, cloth etc. are paryayas of the same dravya. But, the different shades of colour etc. are paryayas of guna. The difference between guna and paryaya can be further explained in this way. A golden jar and an earthen jar are. different from each other in respect of gunas. In respect of the paryaya they are identical. On the other hand the successive states of gold as a ring and as a bangle are different from each other in respect of paryaya and identical in respect of guna. Gunas are related with the qualities of the stuff, which is the material cause of a thing. Paryayas are different forms of the same stuff. The above example should be taken as a rough estimate only. The difference between earth and gold can be explained as the difference in paryaya also, if pudgala is taken as dravya. The above consideration holds good only when gold and earth are taken as dravyas. The distinction between these two things does not depend upon their forms, which are paryayas, but on their natural qualities. The Above Difference is only Relative : In contrast with dravya, guna and paryaya both stand as differentia. Guna distinguishes one dravya from the other dravya and paryaya distinguishes one state from the other state occurring succe1. Dravyagunaparyayanorasa 1.28 2. Uttara. XXVIII, 7.

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76 Epistemology of Jainas ssively. A cloth is different from jar: because, they possess different qualities. This difference is based on gunas. The jar is different from the lump of clay; because, it is a different successive stage. Here, the difference is based on the paryaya. But, it is only a rough estimate. On minute observation the difference between the two becomes insignificant. There is no difference of qualities between two jars of similar size and material; nor they are successive stages of the same matter. Still they are different from each other. This numerical difference is attributed to gunas. But, both of them are two paryayas in relation to the stuff i.e. clay. The cloth and jar also are two paryayas in relation to pudgala dravya. On this ground one can say that the difference between guna and paryaya does not hold any sound basis. The Jaina view is very clear in this respect. It agrees that guna and paryaya are not two different entities as the Nyaya system holds. They are two aspects of the same reality. One is related with numerical difference, while the other with temporal. They are interchangeable in different relations. Siddhasena Divakara1 does not recognise any difference between the two. The Agamas also express both the aspects by the term paryaya. In the Jaina epistemology unity or uniformity is represented by dravya and difference, numerical as well as qualita. tive, by paryaya, gunas, being mainly a differentia, are included into paryaya. But, the difference between the two types of qualities is not negligible. The qualities represented by the gunas are constant. They last as long as the substance does. The qualities represented by the paryayas are changeable and successive. They appear one after another. Secondly, gunas are the qualities of dravya only; while paryayas exist both in gunas as well as dravya. Colour is a guna but different shades of black, white, red etc. are paryayas of it. Similarly, taste is a guna but different tastes of sweet, bitter, sour etc. are its paryayas. In the case of jIva consciousness is a guna, but different 1. Sanmati III. 12

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The General Conception of Knowledge 77 cognitions are its paryayas. Similarly, the change of stuff into different shapes or forms is dravya-paryaya, just as the change of lump into the form of a jar. The change of soul into various biological kingdoms also is dravyaparyaya. One more point that can be raised in this connection is this, that a jar possesses the particular shape just as the particular colour. The shape is known as paryaya while the colour is a guna. Is there any reason behind this discrimination ? The Jaina replies that all varieties, whether qualitative or numerical, related with space or time, are paryayas. The shape and the colour both are paryayas. But, there is a set of paryayas which distinguish one substance from the other; they are called gunas. The colour distinguishes pudgala from the other substances, but the particular shape does not. It can be held commonly by jiva as well as pudgala. The paryaya is related with different modes or states of the same dravya. The difference between gana and paryaya can be further ascertained on the ground that paryaya is a differentia based on change. It is parinama. Gunas are not parinama. Out of the three synonyms of paryaya the two, ii e. paryaya and visesa are common to both guna and paryaya. The third synonym parinama is peculiar to paryaya only. Darvya and Paryaya : A Relative conception : The conception of dravya and paryaya is not fixed. The same thing pointing to diversity is paryaya and that to unity is dravya. The clay is paryaya in respect of pudgala, as it points to one state of the latter. But, the same is dravya in respect of its substate of lump, jar etc. Dravya means the stuff or material cause, Paryaya means the effect. The same thing is effect in one respect and cause in the other. Gunas are generally accepted as to continue in all the stages of their respective dravya. Brightness is the guna of gold and it continues in all the stages of bangle, necklace etc. When we talk of a guna, we meana

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78 Epistemology of Jainas quality that exists in the material cause and continues in its different modes. This is why, gunas are related with dravya only. Moreover, g'ina does not change with the change of paryaya. The necklace and the bangle possess the same gunas. The Jaina does pot admit the destruction of all gunas with the destruction of a dravya and the emergence of all the gunas a new with every new dravya, as the Nyaya holds. In consideration of pudgala as dravya, colour, taste, smell and touch are gunas, The various forms of cloth, jar are dravyaparyayas and the different shades of colour are gunaparyayas. When gold is considered as dravya the notion of guna and paryaya will change accordingly. Then, we shall not consider the qualities that distinguish pudgala from the other substances; but, those which distinguish gold from the other objects. These qualities last as long as the substance subsists. The qualities of colour etc. are eternal because, they are related with an eterpal substance, i.e. pudgala. The question of gold is different its qualities are not eternal; because, gold is not eternal. Eternity of gunas means only the existence, as long as the substance exists. The difference between eternal and temporary dravyas is based on the conception that eternal dravyas are not interchangeable. The matter cannot be transformed into soul. The non-existence of one eternal dravya as the other is recognised in Jainism as atyantabhava, which is eternal. On the other hand the temporary dravyas are inter-changeable. The atoms constituting a jar are liable to be transformed into a cloth. The nonexistence of one temporary dravya into the other is anyonyabhava; which is temporary. The Vaisesika view compared : According to Jainism the criterion of existence is causal efficacy. The Vaisesika does not support this view. It hoids existence as a separate category and a thing is existent when it inheres in that category. On this very ground the Vaisesika distinguishes a reality from other categories. He holds the first three categories, i, e. dravya, guna 1. Vaisesikasutra 1.2.7

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The General Conception of Knowledge 79 and karman as realities. They inhere in the category of existence. The other categories of samanya (universality), visesa (particularity), samavaya (inherence) and abhava (non-existence) exist by themselves. They are not realities. Kanada calls the reality as artha and category as padartha. The artha has objective existence. It is open to perception, sensual or supersensual. Padartba is merely a logical conception. Prasastapadal observes : They (padartbas) have their sole being within themselves and have the intellect as their indicator. They are not effects, not causes, have no generality or particularity, are eternal and are not expressible in the term 'thing'.2 According to Jainism the categories also are as objective as the realities. The only difference is that the former have no substantial existence. They are included in the very existence of their respective drayyas. As a matter of fact the first two categories of Jainas, i. e. Jiva and Ajiva, include the entire world of reality. The remaining seven categories are different phenomena related with the soul and its progress towards the final goal. They are not logical but ethical categories. The categories of the Vaisesika are important in the field of epistemology. We cannot conceive an object without them. But, the Jaina categories have no bearing on the problem of epistemology. They are related with the ethical position of the soul. According to the Vaisesika, guna and karman inbere in the Dravya. According to Jainism they are related in the relation of identity-in-difference. The Vaisesika holds them as separate entities; which inhere in the existence. According to Jainism they are not totally separate from dravya. Guna and paryaya along with dravya constitute the three obiective aspects of the same reality. According to Vaisesika, the first moment of a dravya is free from guna and karman; according to Jainism they are the very ingredients of a reality. 1. Prasastapadabhasya p. 19 2. Vaisesikasutra. 1.1 4 and 8 2.3.

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80 Epistemology of Jainas Epistemological Function of Gunas : The term dravya is used in two senses. In ontology it means the substance or reality which has guna and paryaya as its other two aspects. In the field of epistemology it means the concept, which is responsible for the idea of generality or continuity. Below, we propose to discuss the epistemological significance of all the three. Generally, it is held that a quality distinguishes one class or person from the other class of person. It is the differentia, on wbich the classification of substances is based. But, on examination we can see that it is the basis of uniformity also. It differentiates one class from the other; at the same time unites two or more members of the same class with one another and groups them together into one unit. For instance, conciousness is a quality of the soul. It distinguishes the intelligent existents from the non-intelligents; but, at the same time shows a uniformity amongst all the living heings. Thus, gunas perform the double function of pointing out the difference as well as the unity. But, this doubleness does not mean that gupas contain two different natures. Both functions are carried by the same nature. They are two sides of one and the same category. The positive side is related with unity; while the negative with discrimination. In relation to paryayas, qualitative as well as numerical, gunas serve as the uniting link and show the existence of a substantial continuity. The same soul passes through many modes of divine, human, beastly or bellish kingdoms, but stil) there is a substantial continuity in all of them. This continuity is based on the consciousness, which is a quality of the soul. We recognise all these stages of qualitative modes, occurring successively in the same person as soul, on account of consciousness. Similarly, in different persons also the uniformity of being soul is understood on the basis of consciousness. Corporeality (rupitva) inter-links all the successive stages as well as the different numerical units of table, chair, jar etc. related with the same material stuff.

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The General Conception of Knowledge 81 Two stand-points based on Dravya and Paryaya : The Jainism maintains seven stand-points? (nayas), according to which a thing is judged. The first three of them are Dravyarthika-nayas and the remaining four are Paryayarthika-nayas. Dravyarthika-nayas point to universality while Paryayarthikas to particularity. The first group carries the idea of one in many and the second that of many in one. These two stand-points do not contradict each other but represent two aspects of the same reality. Each of the ideas of generality and particularity can be further discussed in two relations i. e. (i) in relation to time and (ii) in relation to number. The same clay undergoes many successive stages of lump, jar etc. The idea of the unity of clay in all these stages is based on vertical universality (urdhvatasamanya). It generates the idea of unity in many successive stages of the same object. The units that are linked together by this universality are not simultaneous but exist one after another. The experience of cowness in all the numerically different units of cows is due to horizontal universality (tiryaksamanya). Individual cows though different in number, possess a uniting link of cowness. Corresponding to these two types of universality ther: are two types of particularity also. Both types of universality are presented by dravya. A reality is called dravya both when it stands as one in all the tempoTally or numerically different units. The stand-point representing dravya is known as the dravyarthika-naya. In the case of particularity the successive stages of temporal diversity is represented by paryaya and that of space or number is represented by guna. But, the stand-point representing the both, guna as well as paryaya is Paryayarthika. There is no Gunarthika. This means that paryaya is a comprehensive term which includes both types of difference. There are many references in 1. Anuyogadvara 139 2. Prameyakamalamartanda, p. 466

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82 Epistemology of Jainas the Agamas, where numerical diversity also is expressed as paryaya.? We meet with numerous instances where the above standpoints are expressed in both the aspects.2 When all the six categories of Dharma, Adharma, Akasa, Pudgala, Jiva and Kala are considered as dravya or loka it is a case of horizontal universality.3 The statement of the Sthanangasutra4 expressing the soul, the universe, the knowledge and many other things as one also stands in the same class. The Bhagavati and Prajnapanasutras mention many stages of jyva and pudgala. They are the instances of vertical universality.5 The Vertical Universality and the Notion of Oneness : We have stated above that the substance or dravya is recognised as horizontal universality in contrast with numerical difference and it is vertical universality in contrast with temporal diversity. In both the cases it generates the notion of oneness. As far as the vertical universality is concerned the systems of Nyaya and Jainism agree with each other. Both of them hold that the universality which continues in the successive stages unites them and generates the notion of oneness. But, in the case of horizontal universality the tarka-school of the Jainas holds a slightly different view. It maintains that the latter does not generate the notion of oneness but that of similarity; while the Naiyayika holds that the universality of cowness (gotva) is one in all the temporally or numerically different units of cows. The Jaina Agamas also differ from the tarkaschool in this respect. They hold that both varieties of the universality produce the notion of oneness. We have mentioned 1. Bhagavati 25.5 and 25.2; Prajnapana 5 2. Ibid. 7.2.273; 14.4.512; 18.10 3. Sthananga 458 4. Ibid., 1-2 5. Bhagavati 14.4; Prajnapana 13 6. Prameyakamalamartanta, p. 467

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The General Conception of Knowledge above, the Sthanangasutra expressing the soul as one.1 Samantabhadra also states all things as one on the basis of existence.2 There is no reason why the one type of universality should generate the idea of oneness and the other that of similarity. Nothing can unite two other things which itself is not one. Two links would require another link for their own unity. If the link is one and exists in both of them why the united members should not be admitted as one in relation to that link? Dr. S. Mukerji gives the following remarks on it: "According to Akalanka, Vidyananda and later logicians upto Yasovijaya, universality is rather a qualitative aspects of the individuals, numerically different in different individuals. The unity of universals is set forth as more or less a conceptual figment, which they seek to equate with similarity. Individuals belonging to a class are similar to one another and the similarity though numerically different, is accorded the status of universal. Thus the universal qua similarity is numerically different discrete in different individuals and so the universal as a unitive self identical principle asserted to be an ontological fiction."'S We may assign one reason to the above differentiation. Ontologically, the numerical difference is permanent. The number of atoms or the souls will remain the same as it is or as it was. No individual atom or soul-unit loses its individuality, inspite of phenomenal modifications. On the other hand the temporal state is not a permanent feature. It appears and disappears leaving nothing behind. The individuality of a state is not permanent individuality. So, it does not obstruct the idea of oneness which is related with a permanent aspect. The individuality related with number is a permanent individuality. It does stand as an obstruction in the idea of oneness. So, in this case the universality means similarity and not unity. 1. Sthananga 1 2. Aptammamsa 3. Non-Absolutism

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Epistemology of Jainas Classification of Reality We have understood the nature of reality, also known dravya,' with its two aspects of guna and paryaya. Now we come to its division. The Bhagavati, Sthananga, Samavayanga and Anuyogadvara divide it into two2 : Jiva (soul) and ajiva (not-soul). We can compare this division with the Sankhya conception of Purusa and Praksti. But the two systems differ in the line of demarcation. According to Jainism the psychological functions of knowing, feeling and willing belong to Jiva, while according to Sankhya they are the functions of Prakrti. We shall point out other differences between the two systems later on. Ajiva has been further divided into five dravyas, but, at present we are not concerned with that division. There are four views regarding the division of reality. According to the materialistic view the whole universe is composed of matter only and ultimately there is no distinction between the conscious and unconscious existences. The very combination of certain material elements produces consciousness and there is no eternal entity known as the self. Modern scientist also holds the similar view, but it maintains that the primary stuff of which the world is composed, cannot be classed either as matter or as mind. Russell says, "The stuff of which the world of our experience is composed, is, in my belief, neither mind nor matter; but, something more primitive than either. Both mind and matter seem to be composite, and the stuff of which they are compounded lies in a sense between the two, in a sense above them both, like a common ancestral*'. 3 1. Bhagavati 1.8.9: Tattvartha 5.29 2. Bhagavaty 7.10.305; Sthananga 251; Samavaya 149; Anuyoga 141 3. Analysis of Mind p. 10

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The General Conception of Knowledge 85 James views that the raw material out of which the world is built up is not of two sorts, one matter and the other mind, but that it is arranged in different patterns by its interrelations, and that some arrangements may be called mental, while others may be called physical. In Indian philosophy there is the well-known school of Carvaka which holds matter as the ultimate cause of the sentient and insentient world. This conception is as old as the history of thought. The Sutrakrtangasutra refers to it that a certain class of Sramanas and Brahmanas maintain that this world is composed of earth, water, fire, air and ether. The soul originates from the combination of these elements and perishes in them.2 Brhadaranyaka also states the same fact.3 There is another materialistic school described in the Sutrakstanga which holds that this body is identical with the soul, or the soul is not different from the body.4 Another materialist is described as holding four elements only.5 In the Buddhist scriptures Ajitakesakambalin is stated to hold that this man comes from four material elements and perishes therein. There is no eternal soul lasting after the body and taking another birth.. The second view, on the other extreme, is held by the idealists holding the mind or spirit as the only fundamental principle of reality, which splits itself into the world of objects and the world of minds as its necessary stages of development or self-expression. So that, the finite minds and objects are not two essentially different realities without community; but, are essentially the same in kind. 1. Analysis of Mind 2. Sutrakstanga 1.1.1.7-8 3. Behadaranyaka 2.4.12 4. Sutrakstanga 1.1.1.11-12 5. Ibid., 1.1.1.18 6. Brahmajalasutta

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86 Epistemology of Jainas The above is the general formulation of Absolute Idealism accepted by Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhaver, Bradley, Bosanquet and Royce; all of whom agree in holding the entire universe as rooted in one universal Mind, Spirit, Will, Experience or Self and that the mind of man is of the essence of this universal spiritual principle and, therefore, shares in its spiritual qualities though on finite scale, but has the potentiality of infinitude. Instead of being absorbed by matter or being an accompaniment of it, mind is the primordial stuff of which all else is made. In the Indian systems Advaita Vedanta and the Yogacara school of Buddhism believe in consciousness or mind as the ultimate stuff or the only reality. The third view is represented by the Descartes, Locke and Kant etc. who hold mind and matter as the two ultimate realities. In the Indian systems this view is held by the Sankhya, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa and Jainism. They hold that the reality is divided ultimately into two groups viz., intelligent and non-intelligent. These systems hold soul as a separate and ultimate entity quite distinct from the matter. The fourth view is proposed by the nihilist holding that there is no ultimate reality at all. The world is mere phenomenal appearance having no real substratum. The Agamic Treatment of Soul Metaphysical Evolution The Jaina Agamas discuss the problem of soul in three aspects. The first aspect is known as Jiva-Samasa (classes of souls). It divides the soul on the basis of different bodies obtained in the different kingdoms, and expresses the evolution of life. The second aspect is known as Margana (soul-quest). It comprises of other inner differences in species, sex, passion, knowledge, conation in the embodical condition of the soul. The third aspect is Gunasthana (spiriiual stages). It discusses the inner progress of the soul, and describes the stages of the

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The General Conception of Knowledge 87 soul from ignorance and delusion to the state of perfection. (1) Jiva-Samasa (Soul classes): From protoplasm of the germ-cell to a full-blown human being, there is an infinite number of mundane souls or living beings in the universe. The protoplasm has no senses other than the touch. The human beings have all the five senses and the mind. The beings that come in middle of these limits possess two, three, four or all the five senses. Thus, they can be divided into six classes :-- The evolution of senses occurs in the order of the senses of torch, taste, smell, sight and hearing. The mind comes at the last. The one-sensed beings will have the sense of touch only. The two-sensed will have those of the touch and the taste. The three sensed will have the sense of smell also. The four-sensed gets one more, i.e. the sense of sight. The five-sensed have all the five. Some of them possess mind while the others do not. Those with mind are known as samjnis while others are asamJnins. All the animals having less than five senses are asamjnins; while the five-sensed are both samjnins as well as asamjnins. The one-sensed beings are again divided into fine (suksma) and gross (badara). They have another division of Pratyeka (one soul with one body) and sadharana (many souls with one body). One-sensed animals are further divided into five kingdoms of earth, water, fire, air and vegetables. Some mundane souls when attacked or in fear of something or some.one, can voluntarily move from one place to the other place. A man attacked with a sword can run away. Similar is the case with many other beings like dogs, ants etc. But a tree cannot move from its place. The ability to move voluntarily from one place to the other place divides the souls into two classes of Mobiles (trasa) and Immobiles (sthavara). All the one-sensed animals are immobiles. According to another view, fire and air are mobiles. All the animals having more senses are mobiles. There are four kingdoms through which the soul passes. The three kingdoms of hell, human beings and divine beings possess generally all the five senses with mind. In the sub

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88 Epistemology of Jainas human kingdoms we have all the six stages, begioning from the one-sensed animals, going upto the samjnins. The kingdom of hell is divided into seven narakas; where the beings suffer the result of their sins. The division of subhuman kingdoms is already shown above. The human kingdom is divided into Karmabhumi and Bhogabhumi. The inhabitants of Karmabhumi are engaged in three kinds of profession for their livelihood i. e. the profession of fighting (asi), the profession of education (masi) and the profession of cultivation (krsi). They have fifteen islands to dwell in. The inhabitants of Bhogabhumis do not adopt a profession for their livelihood. Their requirements are supplied by trees. They have thirty dwellings. In addition to it there are fifty-six antardvipas (the islands in the ocean). They also are bhogabhumis. There are fifteen places of the spontaneous birth of human species; who are without mind and do not get full development. They are called sammurochima, projected spontaneously without the sexual intercourse. The inhabitants of divide kingdom are divided into four classes of Bhavanapatis, Vanavyantaras, Jyotiskas and Vaimanikas. Jo Navatattva jivas are divided into 563 varieties. This division is generally based on the Prajnapanasutra. In the Digambara literature the same is found in Jivakanda of Gommatasara. (2) Marganas (Soul-quests) : There are fourteen marganas or the ways in which we search the mundane souls : (i) Gati (kingdoms or conditions of existence) : They are four in number; viz. Naraka (hellish kingdom), Tiryac (subhuman kingdom); Manusya (human kingdom) and Deva (divine kingdom). (ii) In:Iriya : (Sense-quest): It is divided into five types of beings having one, two, three, four or five senses. (iii) Kaya (groups or classes); There are six kayas comprising one each of the five types of one-seased animals and one of the trasas; two-sensed and onwards.

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Epistemology of Jainas (iv) Yoga (vibration); The vibration of body mind and speech is known as yoga. It has fifteen types. The vibrations of mind and speech have the following four varieties each: 1. Satya 2. Asatya 3. Misra 4. true false a mixture of the both neither of the two Asatyamrsa The vibration of body i e. kayayoga has seven varieties. The Jainas hold five types of bodies: (i) Audarika Sarira--the gross body of the animals of human and sub-hnman kingdoms; which contains flesh and blood. (ii) Vaikriya Sarira - Astral body of the beings of hellish and divine kingdoms and also the Yogic bodies in the human kingdom. They are free from flesh and blood and can be transformed into various forms. 89 man (iii) Aharaka Sarira-The assimilative overflow : a like white form of one cubit with soul units emanated by a saint from his head. (iv) Taijasa Sarira-The electric body. (v) Karmana Sarira -The karmic body. The first three bodies individually and mixed comprise two varieties of kayayoga each. The seventh type consists of karmic body. (vi) Veda-Three types of sexual desires related with the male, female and the third (hermaphrodite). (vii) Kasaya (Passions) - They have twenty-five types i.e. the four types of Anger, conceit, crookedness, and Greed multiplied into four degrees of each, and nine nokasayas (non-passions). (viii) Jnana-Eight types of knowledge: five jnanas and three ajnanas, (ix) Samyama-Five varieties of self-restraint. (x) Darsana-Four types of inarticulate cognition.

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90 Epistemology of Jainas (xi) Lesya-Six types of thought intensity, expressed through six types of colour. (xii) Bhavyatva-Capability of attaining liberation. (xiii) Samyaktva- Faith, right, wrong or mixed. (xiv) Samjna--Rationality. (xv) Ahara-Assimilation of diet, (3) Gunasthanas (Spiritual stages) : There are fourteen spiritual stages showing the progress of soul. We shall discuss them in the chapter of Kevalajnana. The Self, Consciousness and Cognition : a comparative view We have stated above knowledge at the main feature that distinguishes one class of reality from the other. The class which possesses it is recognized as intelligence, soul, spirit or the salf, while the other as non-intelligent, non-soul, matter or body. The question of knowledge, apart from its logical or epistemological considerations, has three aspects. (i) The first aspect is, whether there is any permanent entity as the abode of knowledge. (ii) The second is related with knowledge as a faculty. (iii) The third is concerned with knowledge as cognition or function We shall discuss these three aspects in the foregoing pages and have a comparative view. The Materialistic view : The materialist, known as Carvaka in Indian philosophy, maintains that the whole Universe is composed of four elements, and believes in perception as the only source of knowledge. The other sources are either invalid or secondary. They cannot claim interdependent validity. The apparent world can be divided into physical bodies, senses and the lifeless objects. All of them are compositions of the four elements. Consciousness also is an outcome of them when transferred

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The General Conception of Knowledge 91 into the physical body. Though individual elements do not consist of that power; yet, their combination does; just as a peculiar mixture of certain herbs produces the power of intoxication, or the mixture of white and yellow produces red colour. This conception of the materialist is found in the oldest scriptures of all the Indian systems. dhe Sutrakstagnasutra and Brahmajalasutra state many varieties of them. The BIhada - ranyaka Upanisad describes the materialist conception as follows: "The mass of consciousness rising from these material elements disappears into them. qhere is no consciousness after death."1 There are two views regarding the emergence of consciousness. Some hold that it is produced as something new while others maintain that it is only a manifestation of the thing which was lying dormant in the constituent elements. It is generally argued against the Carvaka, if there is no eternal soul taking successive births and having consciousness as its characteristic, why there is a difference in the status. Some persons are happy while others miserable. This cannot be explained without admitting previous life. To this Carvaka replies that this difference does not necessarily imply the exisience of previous life and a permanent soul. The difference in status is just like bubbles in the ocean. There is no ethical cause behind it. The lack of certain element in the body hampers its full development. The result is diseases and other miseries. All the phenomena of happiness and misery have physical or material causes at their root. The idea of 'I'ness also cannot prove the existence of a separate self. It is related with the body just as in the case of 'I am fat.' Moreover, all the activities attributed to the self are invariably connected with the body. We do not see anything which can postulate a separate existence of the self. There is 1. Btbadaranyaka

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92 Epistemology of Jainas no reason to discard the visible cause and postulate invisible one, whose existence cannot be otherwise proved. It can be argued; if the four elements are sufficient to manifest or produce the power of consciousness, why it is not generated in jar etc. The Carvaka replies that it depends upon the peculiar combination of elements as it is in the case of intoxicant herbs. Only a peculiar variety of herb, compounded in a peculiar way can produce intoxication and not otherwise; similarly the elements put in a peculiar way with a definite proportion and combination can generate the power of consciousness. The Materialist view criticized Vidyanandal advances the following arguments against the materialist theory : The existence of the self is proved on the basis of introspection. Every body feels. "I am happy"; "I know" "I desire" etc. This notion of 'I' refers to the self without any contradiction or doubt. This should not be confused with the physical reference of 'I am fat'. Introspection is internal appearance while the latter is external. There is a clear distinction between the two appearances of 'I am fat' and 'I am happy'. The former depends upon the external senses while the latter is purely mental. Secondly, the introspection is always followed by 'l' representing to something internal while the physical cognition appears as 'this' also, and refers to something external. Thirdly, the object of introspection is confined to the individual. Caitra cannot perceive the pleasure or pain of Maitra. But the object of external appearance is common to every-body. The fatness of Caitra can be seen by Maitra as good as by Caitra. These factors show a clear line of demarcation between the two. The experiences of 'l' am fair coloured, I am fat' etc., on the basis of which the Carvaka tries to connect the notion of I with the 1. T. slokavartika, p. 28-31.

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The General Conception of Knowledge 93 body, are not introspections; as they depend on external senses. They refer to something external and they are not personal. Moreover, the soul and the body are separate entities as they are different in nature like fire and water. The nature of the soul is consciousness, while that of body is tangibility. The soul is self-luminary and incorporeal. The body is cognised by something other than itself and it is corporeal. The separateness of the self from the body is further proved on the basis of their different cognizability. dhe self is experienced internally through introspection while the body is known externally through senses. If the self is accepted as a product of the physical elements it should be the object of senses. Though, the cognition of the external objects also is assisted by the mind; yet mind is not the only instrument there. The mind does not work there until the object is presented by the senses. In the case of soul external senses are helpless. Moreover, the consciousness according to Carvaka, is either manifestation of the physical elements or their production. In the first case the soul is automatically proved as an eternal entity. Manifestation implies that it is not actually produced. One can say that manifestation is not necessarily a contradictory to production. A jar is produced as well as manifested. The Jaina replies that the jar is manifested only when it has been already produced. It is not manifested in respect of its existence. Manifestation is related with its appearance only. But, the consciousness if accepted manifested in all cases it cannot be held as generated, and the factor of always manifestedness would prove the self of consciousness as an eternal entity separate from the body and physical elements. The second alternative that the elements produce consciousness also does not stand the logical test. In this case the elements are either material cause (upadana karana) of consciousness or the auxiliary cause (oimitta karana). In the latter case, one will have to seek for the material cause some where else;

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Epistemology of Jainas without which the auxiliary causes have nothing to operate upon. They are helpless. Where, the visible material cause is not found we have to postulate invisible one, as in the case of sound and lightening etc. In the case of sound the different parts of mouth are auxiliary caus?s, giving articulation to the sound; but they are not the stuff of whicb the sound is constiluted. We, therefore, postulate a material substance which changes itself into the form of sound. Similarly, in the case of sciousness also if body or the physical elements are simply auxiliaries we would have to postulate some material cause also of which the consciousness is constituted; and this would lead to the existence of soul. The Carvaka argues : when visible cause is available there is no reason for postulating the invisible one. In the case of sound also we need not go out of the perceptible cause. One should be satisfied with the visible cause, whatever it may be. The Jaina replies that the Carvaka contention that one should satisfy merely with the visible cause, and should not postulate the visible one goes against his own conceptions. The fire is produced from the pieces of wood (arani) rubbed together. In this case the Carvaka himself postulates some invisible fire as material cause of the visible fire. Otherwise his system of causation would collapse. According to his theory of causation fire and earth are different elements. They do not act as the cause and effect mutually. Consequently the fire cannot be produced from the wood as the latter belongs to a different element i.e. earth. If fire is accepted as the effect of wood, it would lose its position of being a separate entity. Similarly, the pearls are produced from water as far as visible cause is concerned. Consequently, they would lose their connection with the element of earth and would become a part of water, which is not accepted by the Carvaka also. Similarly, the water oozing out of the moon stone will lose its relation with the element of water and come into the category of earth. Thus the whole system of causation and the conception of

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The General Conception of Knowl.dge elements would collapse. On the other hand, if some hidden cause is postulated in the above instances which belongs to the same class of element as the effect does; the same principle should be applied to the case of consciousness also. As, none of the physical elements possesses the nature of consciousness. If the Carvaka accepts some subtle element as material cause of the consciousness, he would have to explain whether it belongs to the same class as that of consciousness or different one. In the former case the existence of the self is established automatically. It does not matter if it is given a different name. If the subtle element belongs to same different class it cannot be held as the material cause of consciousness, just as fire in the case of water. dhe Carvaka argues: It is not essential that the cause and the effect must belong to the same class. We see a scorpion being produced from cowdung. There is no similarity between the two. The dung is lifeless while the scorpian is with life. 95 The Jaina replies that cowdung is the material cause of body only; and both of them belong to the same class of the corporeal substance (pudgala). The self of the scorpian has another conscious entity as its cause. In the case of body also, it is not produced from the cowdung but from the elements which are capable of being transformed into a body. It is another thing that such elements are found abundantly in cowdung. It can be argued that the subtle elements also belong to the same class as that of consciousness as far as both are substances or existents. The Jaina replies that this similarity has no value in the system of causation. Otherwise the four elements also would become similar and have mutual causation, as all of them belong to the same class in respect of being substances or existents. If this type of similarity is accounted, one can ask further whether the elements are mutually included or not. If not, the

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95 Epistemology of Jainas consciousness also on the same ground cannot be included in the four elements and must stand as a separate entity. If the elements are mutually included, the doctrine of four elements becomes baseless. The subtle element admitted as the material cause of consciousness, therefore, must be different from the unconscious elements and at the same time continued in all the conscious activities. Such an element is nothing but the soul, which is free from the material qualities of colour, taste etc.; is the object of self-cognition as well as inference. Other Schools of Materialism We have discussed above the theory of Carvaka holding physical elements as the cause of consciousness. There are some other notions also associated with the system. They show a gradual development in conception of the self. (1) There is a view that consciousness is produced by the physical body. Vidyananda refutes it on the following ground : If physical body is the only cause of consciousness, why the latter is not found in a dead body. If it is said that the dead body lacks in the element of air, it is an acceptance of some thing other than the body as the cause of consciousness. Moreover, what is the cause of consciousness, body as a whole or its parts? In the first case there should be no consciousness in a person whose hand or leg is cut oil. In the case of parts there should be a plurality of consciousness in one body without any controlling factor. Further, we see that the body is always changing. It undergoes an absolute change when a child becomes an old man. But we remember the experiences of boyhood in old age also. It implies that there must be some permanent factor continued in all the stages; which does not change with the body; and serves as a link in different stages. That factor is soul. (2) Another school identifies the self with the senses. It is

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The General Conception of Knowledge 97 refuted on the following grounds : (a) If there is no cognizer separate from the senses the cognition should disappear with disappearance of the senses. But, the cognition does not disappear even when the eyes are closed. It lasts in the form of a concept. (b) Secondly, even when the senses and the object are in close contiguity the cognition does not occur if the mind is absent. During sleep, our sense of touch is already in contact with the bed, but its softness is not experienced. (c) Thirdly, all the senses have their limited sphere of objectivity. The eye cannot go beyond the colour or form. The nose is limited to smell only, and so on. There must be some organ which coordinates the findings of different senses. In some cases we examine the same thing with different senses and then come to a decision. This function of coordination cannot be performed by the senses individually or collectively, It postulates a separate principle which is nothing but the 50ul. (4) Another school holds mind or Buddhi as the cause of consciousness. We shall discuss it with the system of Sankhya. The above discussion is related with the ontological position of consciousness as held by the Carvaka. Regarding his specific theory of the psychology of feeling, willing or knowing no material is available. Tattvopaplava Simha is the only available work related with that system. But it is mainly confined to criticism of the logic of other systems. It does not explain its own conceptions. The Nyaya and Vaisesika The Nature of Soul : The Nyaya? and Vaisesika2 systems go one step further 1. Nyayasutra 1.1.10 2. Vaisesikasutra 3.2.4

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98 Epistemology of Jainas and admit the soul as a permanent reality. They define it as substratum of knowledge and other psychic qualities which means that consciousness resides in the self through the relation of inherence. Unlike Jainas they do not hold the two as identical, but accept their existence as separate entities. The Nyaya maintains two types of soul : Supreme and Common. The supreme soul is God. It is one and eternally Omniscient. The common souls are many and possess the quality of knowledge as an adventitious phenomenon. Both types of souls are allpervading and eternal.1 Every individual body is assosiated with a separate soul. Its Qualities God has eight qualities 2 of number (Samkhya), dimension (parimana), severally (prthaktva), conjunction (samyoga) disjunction (vibhaga), consciousness (buddhi), desire (iccha) and effort (prayatna). The common soul contains six mores viz., pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), merit (dharma) demerit (adharma), aversion (dvesa) and predisposition (bhavana.) The Number of the Selves The common souls are many in number; otherwise, the NV. says, difference in experiences of different bodies cannot be explained. One person is happy while the other miserable. This difference cannot exist in one and the same self. The individual soul experiences pain or pleasure and occupies different bodies in different births, according to the merit or demerit.4 Dimension of the Self The soul has the extreme magnitude. It is all-pervading.* If it is admitted as atomic, the Nyaya argues, it would occupy 1. Karikavali 51 2. Ibid., 34 3. Ibid., 35 4. Prasastapadabhasya p. 73; Nyayakandall p. 86 5. Prasastapadabhasya p. 70; Nyayakandali p. 88

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The General Conception of Knowledge 99 only a minute spot in the body and thus, cannot experience pain or pleasure occuring simultaneously in different parts. If it is as big as the body it occupies, it would become perishable. It will have to increase or decrease according to the size of the body, for adjustment. Knowledge oj the Self According to Vaisesika the self is the object of inference? only. It argues that the existence of the organs of senses and their appropriate objects imply a distinct knower who can use them. The activity of organs must have an agent to account for it, for every instrument requires an agent to handle it; as for instance; the axe requires a cutter in the act of cutting. Some of the Naiyayikas hold that the common self is capable of being perceiveda also while the supreme soul is only inferrible. The common soul is also inferrible as substratum of the eight qualities of consciousness, pleasure, pain etc. The Self and Consciousness The qualities of knowledge etc. are accidental phenomena appearing in the physical bodies only. There is nothing in the intrinsic nature of the self which is spiritual as that word is ordinarily understood. The point in respect of which it differs from other entities, whether atomic or all-pervading, is this, that it comes to possess knowledge, feeling and volition; while the rest can never do so. In other words, the self is the basis of psychic life, but that life is only adventitious to it. The knowledge or experience here is neither essence nor a constant feature of the self, but that it only appears when certain external factors, none of which is spiritual, cooperate. It will be seen that the Nyaya system in this regard is not far from materialism. All the special qualities of soul disappear in the state of 1. Karikavall, 50; Prasastapadabhasya 69; Nyayakandall, p. 71 2. Nyayamanjari p. 429-34

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Epistemology of Jainas liberation. There is nothing positive in that state, which can distinguish the soul from the other categories. The Vaisesika, asked about the distinguishing factor in that state, replies that the souls differ from one another as well as from other categories on account of Visesa (particularity) which is another name of mere numerical difference. There does not exist any difference of kind in that state. 100 Two types of consciousness In conformity with the two types of soul the Nyaya admits two types of consciousness also. The consciousness of the Supreme soul i.e. God is permanent, self-luminary and all apprehending; we shall compare this type of consciousness with Kevalajnana of the Jainas. The actual theory of consciousness or cognition, as propounded by the Nyaya, does not apply in the case of God. Contact between Mind and Soul as the General condition for Consciousness It has been stated above that consciousness in the common self is an adventitious phenomenon. It is generated by the collocation of certain internal and external means. The soul being all-pervading and immovable cannot do anything by itself. For this purpose the Nyaya admits the existence of another eternal entity known as mind (manas). The mind is atomic in size and moves from one place to another, and the same is responsible for the phenomenon of consciousness. The contact between mind and the soul is a general condition for all consciousness.2 Consciousness in the State of Sleep, a Difficulty But there is a difficulty on the part of Nyaya, which is hard to explain. All-pervasiveness means a contact with all the 1. Prasastapadabhasya, p. 281; also Kandall on it 2. Prasastapadabhasya p, 89; Karikavali 57

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The General Conception of Knowledge objects having smaller size. It means that the self is always in contact with the mind. When the both entities are eternal, their contact also is eternal. Eternity of contact would involve the eternity of consciousness. This would render the state of sleep an impossibility; which, according to Nyaya, is without consciousness. The Nyaya tries to explain this difficulty in various ways; but, none of them is convincing. According to one explanation, in the state of sleep the mind enters into an artery known as puritat; and thus breaks contact with the self. Dinakar gives an account of this disjunction, but fails to explain the fundamental difficulty. It does not give any explanation to the objection, related with the size of the self, when it is all-pervasive, how the mind can go beyond it? A modern school of the NV. holds the contact of mind with the tactual sense as the general condition for consciousness. The tactual sense is an airy composition occupying the whole body. The artery of purftat is free from it. Thus, when the mind enters into the puritat the contact with tactual sense is Jost, and there is no consciousness in that state. 1. Muktavali p. 129; Karikavali 26 2. Prasastapadabhasya, p. 186; Muktavalf, p. 246 3. Dinakari p. 248 This explanation also is not free from fault. If the mind, in the state of consciousness, is always in contact with tactual sense, the tactual experience also should appear constantly, besides the other experiences. An explanation is given to this difficulty that although tactual experience occurs with every other experience, it is not felt as the other cognitions inhibit it. According to another view, associated with Paksadhara Misra, the contact between mind and skin, not the tactual organ, is the general condition for consciousness. But this 4. Prasastapadabhasya p. 186; Muktavali p. 246. 5. Dinakari 248. 6. Vaisesikasutravrtti 3.2.1 7. Ibid. 4 101

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102 Epistemology of Jainas explanation is merely a fancy. It is not supported sound by logic. Moreover, one more fundamental difficulty remains unsolved. All souls are all-pervading. Thus, no particular mind and particular body can be assigned to a particular soul. Thus, all experiences should be common to every body. The Nyaya tries to explain it on the basis of destiny (adrsta); but, the latter also stands in the same relation to every soul. Consciousness and Cognition The systems of the Vedanta, Sarkhya, Jaina and Buddhism make a distinction between consciousness and cognition. consciousness, they say, is the power or nature of the self and cognition is its effect, generated through a certain process. The Nyaya does not recognise any difference between the two. It holds that there is no consciousness when there is no cognition. It is an advocate of asat-karyavada holding that effect does not exist in any form before its production or emergence. It is produced quite a new. In the state, wben cognition is absent, the soul remains almost like a dead. It does not possess any power that can develop into cognition. The responsibility of producing a cognition is equally shared by all the members of collocation. The soul is distinguished only by the fact that it inheres in the knowledge while others do not. In addition to the general factor noted above, there are some other factors also responsible for particular types of knowledge. In case of the perception of external objects fourfold contact is essential.1 the self unites with the mind, the mind with the senses also and the senses with the object. The object, light senses etc also stand as members of the collocation by implication. The qualites of soul as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion knowledge and effort are cognized by twofold contact of the soul with the mind. In the case of inference the middle term is 1. Prasasta Padat Bhasya 187 2 Ibid.; Karikavali 57

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The General Conception of Knowledge 10; necessary. In analogy comparison plays the important role, and in verbal testimony the verbal knowledge is essential. These special causes are held by the Nyaya as pramanas or the sources of koowledge. 1 The Nyayamanjari admits entire collocation as pramana. But, later on the Nyaya splits the members of collocation into two groups of the general causes and the special causes known as karana and karana respectively. Only the special cause or karana is recognised as pramana. This problem is mainly related with the logical development. The Jaina Position Compared The Jaina disagrees with the Nyaya in the following points : (1) According to Jainism consciousness is not a separate entity; it is the very nature of the self. It is connected with the self not through the relation of inherence but that of identity-in-difference. (2) The Jaina does not recognise the existence of God as a permanent entity, naturally different from the common selves. All selves stand on equal level as far as their intrinsic nature is concerned. Every self is capable of being liberated, which is the state of perfection. (3) In no state the self remains without consciousness. During sleep also it is not absolutely unconscious. In the state of liberation it is freed from all contamination and attains the perfect consciousness. (4) According to Jainism the self is coextensive with body. The eternity of the self does not mean total absence of change, but change with permanence. (5) According to Jainism all consciousness is self-luminary. 1. Muktavalt p. 233 2. Nyayamanjarl p. 12

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104 Epistemology of Jainas The Nyaya-view Criticized (1) Relation between the self and consciousness If consciousness (buddhi) is supposed to be absolutely distinct from the soul, the consciousness of A is in the same position to his soul as the consciousness of B. That is to say, both consciousnesses would be equal strangers to the soul of A and there is no reason why his consciousness should serve him better than the consciousness of any other person, in determining the nature of things; in fact there is no such thing as his consciousness, all consciousness being equally foreign to him. (2) Inherence does not solve the Difficulty : The Nyaya tries to explain the above objection by introducing the theory of inherence (samavaya). But, the relation of inherence also being one, eternal and all-pervasive, helps very little in this respect. It cannot fix any limitation that the thing which is related with A cannot relate with B through the same relation. Moreover, according to the Nyaya, the soul also is all-pervasive. There is no reason why the consciousness gene. rated in the soul of A is not in the same relation with B or others. Eternity of the soul challenged : Further, the Vaigesika (pilupaka) holds that the quality of a substance never changes, without destruction of the substance. When the colour of a jar changes, it does not change by itself. The old colour is destroyed only when the jar also containing it, is destroyed; new colour is produced after the new jar has come into existence. If the same principle is applied in the case of consciousness the soul will become perishable. The Nyaya will have to accept the destruction of soul alongwith the destruction of consciousness. Another difficulty : Even, if it is accepted that inherence unites consciousness

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The General Conception of Knowledge 205 with the particular self there is another difficulty whick cannot be explained. The inherence is itself a separate category and bence one would have to explain the relation between consciousness and inherence. Why inherence should work on a particular consciousness? If there is another relation to unite consciousness and inherence the question can be put about the second relation also; ultimately it would lead to ad infinitum. If the first relation of inherence is self-united and does not require any other relation to be united with consciousness; where the same principle is not applied to the case of consciousness and soul also. They also can be accepted as self-united. The Naiyayika generally cites the example of light, which illumines the object as well as itseif. Similarly, he says, inherence is capable of uniting the objects as well as itself. The soul and buddhi do not possess that capacity; because, they possess a different nature. The Jaina raises the same objection in the case of light also. If the light and illumination are two separate things, why the illumination is a function of light only and not that of other things. When we say natural capability, it cannot be explained without accepting a relation of identity between the two. The relation of Inherence is defective : As a matter of fact a substance without quality or action, and a quality or action without substance, are inconceivable. They are essential aspects of one and the same reality. The difference between them is not physical but logical. The Nyaya view that they are separate entities related by a third entity cannot explain the position. Sriharsa in his Khandanakhandakbadya has refuted the Nyaya theory of inherence very strongly. If an entity and its function are held as separate, the inherence and its function of uniting the two objects also will have separate existences. They will require a second inhe. rence for their unity. The Jaina holds that a substance and its quality are self-related in a tie of identity-in-difference, and no third category is required to unite them.

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106 Epistemology of Jainas Difference between Agent and the Instrument : It can be proposed here that the agent and the instrument are always different from each other. In the action of cutting a tree the scythe is instrument while the cutter is a gent. Both of them have different positions and different existences. Similarly, in the act of cognition the soul is agent and the consciousness is instrument. Both of them cannot be held as one and the same thing. The Jaina replies that merely the grammatical use of instrumental case does not establish onc's absolute difference from the agent. There are numerous instances where the instru mental case is used for a category identical with the agent. We say that a serpant makes a coil with his body. In this case the serpant is agent, his body is instrument and the state of coil is effect. But, we cannot say that they are absolutely different from one another. The Vedantic example of the spider, weaving its web by itself is well-known. Two Types of Instruments : On examination, one can find two sets of instrumental cases. In a number of cases the instrument is separate from the agent; as in the case of scythe and the cutter. But in other cases it is identical with the agent. The instances of the serpant's coil and the spider's web come into this class. It can be further illustrated : when we say "Rama goes by a car', the car is a case of the external instrument. But when we say, "Rama goes on foot"' the foot is a case of internal instrument. The foot is a part of Rama. It is not totally different from him. It can be argued that difference between instrument and the agent, in the case of internal instruments, is imaginary. But, this argument has no ground. We see that the state of coil in the snake is different from the state of straightness. No body can say that these states are imaginary. The agent transforming himself into these states must do so with some instrument. The Nyaya holds that an agent without instrument, and an instrument without agent, cannot function. Mere imagination cannot

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The General Coriception of Knowledge 107 put anything into different states. The pillar cannot take the form of coil, however strong the imagination may be. The Inherence of Consciousness in the self, against experience : Further according to the Nyaya the soul is not conscious (cetana) by itself, but becomes so through the inherence of consciousness. This is against experience. Every body feels consciousness as nature of the self. Moreover, if the soul is not conscious by itself, what is it? The Nyaya has no reply to this question. If the soul is by itself without consciousness, .e. jada, it cannot possess the later through inherence any more than a jar can do so. By itself there is no difference between jar and the soul. Location and the located : The Nyaya argues that the experience "I am conscio a shows that the soul is an abode of consciousness just as the earth of a jar. The location and the located are always different from each other. Similarly, the soul and consciousness also are mutually different from each other. The Jaina replies to this that the experience of location and the located is possible in one and the same object also. We say, 'The head on the body' even when the head is not different from the latter. Theory of Cod : Another point of controversy is the admittance of God by the Nyaya. It is related more with ethics than the theory of knowledge. Still, some points deserve mention for the present also. According to the Nyaya God is omniscient. His knowledge and other qualities are eternal. Jainism also holds liberated souls as omniscient, but their knowledge is eternal in the sense that once produced, never disappears. According to the Nyaya there is a fundamental difference between two souls. God is omniscient and one, the common soul is ignorant and many. God is the creator and Master of the Universe, the other is a slave and toy of the fate (adssta). One is entirely free from

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108 Epistemology of Jainas pleasure and pain, the other is subject to all transient passions. Almost every attribute that can be predicated to one is necessarily denied to the other. Knowledge, Will and Volitions are the only factors on which both are classed as soul. In this respect also the difference is not insignificant. The qualities of God differ from the soul fundamentally. In the case of God they are eternal while in the ordinary souls they are evanescent. The theory of contact, which is the essence of the Nyaya conception of knowledge, does not apply to God. Unlike the common souls, His knowledge is self-cognitive. The Jainism does not recognize any qualitative difference between the bound and the liberated souls. In the first case the same qualities are limited on account of the karmic veil, in the latter case they are fully developed. Absence of Consciousness in the state of libeation The third difference between the two systems is this, that the Nyaya holds that there is no consciousness in the state of liberation.1 According to Jainism the self attains perfect consciousness in that state. This difference owes its existence to the positions assigned to conscionsness. According to the Nyaya it is an adventitious phenomenon. An adventitious phenomenon cannot occur when its cause is absent. In the state of liberation which is a permanent and pure state without any possibility of returning back, the causes that produce knowledge are no more possible. The liberated souls do not possess the body any more and without body the contact with mind is not possible. Consequently, there is no knowledge. The Jainas hold consciousness as a natural state. By nature, every self is omniscient. That nature lies dormant as long as the karmic obscurance exists. As soon as the karmic veil disappears the soul comes into its full bloom of perfect knowledge. The Jaina contends, if there is no consciousness in the state of liberation, nobody 1. Prasastapadabhasya 281; Nyayakandali

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The General Conception of Knowledge 109 would covet for that position. Moreover, it wipes out the difference between intelligent and non-intelligent realities. According to Jainism the state of sleep also is not absolutely without knowledge. If the person in sound sleep, the Jaina argues, cannot receive any impression; is without the power of sensation or cognition, he cannot be awakened by shouting or even pouring water; because, he cannot feel the sensation of anything. He can wake up only when the slumber disappears by itself and the contact of mind with the soul is re-established. Dimension of the Self The fourth difference between the two systems is regarding the dimension of the soul. The Nyaya advances the following reasons to support his view : (i) The merits or demerits (adrsta) of a person serve as the causes of the objects, which are going to affect his life. Thus, the merits of Devadatta function as a cause in the birth of his would be wife. The causation is not possible unless the cause is present, where the effect is produced. It implies that the merits of Devadatta must be present at the spot where his would-bewife takes birth. The merits are qualities and they cannot stay without the substance. It implies the presence of Devadatta's soul also at the spot of his merits i.e. the place of the birth of his would-be-wife. The presence of Devadatta in the distance place where his wife takes birth is impossible if he is confined to his body. This causation can be explained only by admitting the soul as all-pervading. (ii) According to the Nyaya the first motion in atoms, upward flames of the fire, oblique motion of the air and such other motions are caused by the adrsta of animals. It implies the presence of adrsta and consequently that of the soul, whereever that function occurs. (iii) The soul attracts the atoms; which are the constituents of the body to be occupied by it. Without admitting the soul as all-pervading it cannot attract them from far and wide.

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Epistemology of Jainas The Nyaya advances the following arguments against the Jaina theory of intermediate dimensions : 110 (1) If the soul is co-extensive with the body it must have parts and thus will lose its eternity. (2) It will become murta and cannot enter into the body, because mutual obstruction is the nature of murtas. According to Jainism a murta means possession of corporeal qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch. According to Nyaya it means the possession of lesser magnitude, other than the supreme one. (3) When the soul of a child transforms into the size of a youth, it has to leave its former position and adopt the new one. This strikes at the very root of the eternity of the soul. The Jaina Criticism of the theory of all-pervasiveness The Jaina advances the following arguments against allpervasiveness of the self. (i) All the special qualities of soul are found in body only. The feelings of pleasure, pain etc. do not cross the physical boundaries. This is a clear proof, that the soul does not exist beyond it. One cannot postulate a thing where its qualities do not exist. (ii) The ethical reasons advanced by the Nyaya do not stand in the present case. Firstly, the Jainas do not admit adrsta as a quality of the soul. It is a material substance which sticks to the soul. Secondly, the Jainas do not admit co-presence of the cause and effect as an essential condition of the law of causation. An event, which has passed long ago, generates its memory. The Law of causation depends upon the capability (yogyata) of an entity to produce a particular effect. All other conditions are non-essential. (iii) The Nyaya objection that the soul will become perishable if its dimension changes according to the body, also does

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The General Conception of Knowledge 111 not hold good. Eternity, according to Jainism, as has been stated before is not absence of change, but the change with continuity. A snake changes its positions from coil to straightness; but, it cannot be said as generated anew with every new position. Similarly, the soul, though changing its positions according to the body, is not produced anew. According to Jainism corporeality (murtatva) does not depend on the size; but on the possession of corporeal qualities. Moreover, if the soul is all-pervasive the system of particular soul in possession of particular knowledge, will collapse. It has been already discussed in the foregoing pages. (iv) The fourth point of eternity of the soul is connected with the general problem of the Jaina conception of reality. It also has been already discussed. Self consciousness The fifth point of difference between the Nyaya and Jaina is related with the nature of consciousness. According to the Nyaya consciousness apprehends the object only. It depends on subsequent cognitions for self-illumination. We shall discuss this question in the section on the object of knowledge, The M[mamsa Theory of the Self The Mimamsa conception of the self depends upon the Vedic texts which speak of the sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements proceeding to heaven. The function of proceeding to heaven is not possible in the physical body; so there is some incorporeal entity which ensouls the budy and proceeds to heaven.2 The presence of such an entity is inferred from the phenomena of breathing, winking of eyes and the like; 1. Sastradipika p. 118 2. Ibid. p. 119

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112 Epistemology of Jainas which cannot belong merely to the body, as they are not found in a dead body. Such phenomena as the feelings of pleasure, pain and the like are cognised by the person himself only, while the qualities of colour, taste etc, which belong to the physical body are cognized and perceived by others also; who have no direct cognition of the feelings of other persons. This shows that there are certain qualities in the person which are directly cognisable by himself only. From the fact of there being certain qualities of the person which differ radically from the qualities that belong to the physical body, we conclude that the entity spoken of as going to heaven is other than the physical body. (compare with the arguments given by Vidyanapda). Moreover the act of cognizing, desiring and the like presuppose an agent, which is the self Atman.2 According sabara the actual nature of the self cannot be described in positive terms. It can be described negatively in the style of Upanisads- Neti-Neti, but its existence can be felt through introspection or inferred in the case of others.3 This soul is everlasting; a person or personality apart from the feelings and cognitions. It is in the terms of Brahmanas indestructible, not liable to disruption, but it comes into contact with perishable things, like sense organs, merit (dharma) demerit (adharma) and so forth.4 According to Prabhakara the self is the basic cause of cognitions5 which are produced when other auxiliary causes assemble. 6 He, generally, follows the Nyaya conception. But, cognition according to him is an act (prayatna) of the soul and not a quality as the Nyaya holds. He does not admit soul 1: Sastradipika p. 119 2. Idid., p. 120. 3. Sabarabhagya Tra. p. 26-31. 4. Satapatha Bra, 14. 7-3-15. 5. Prakaranapancika p. 147 6 Ibid. 149

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The General Conception of Knowledge 113 as the object of introspection. Ku narila maintains that the soul is something distinct from the body, the sense organs and buddhi. It is eternal, imperishable and is the real doer of action; agent of acts, as well as the experiencer of their results and reactions. It is also all-pervading It is of the nature of pure consciousness, and not qualified by the limitations of time and space. It is the soul that passes through the experiences of pleasure, pain etc. and yet, it never renounces its own character of consciousness; it forms the constant factor in all those variable and varying experiences. The self experiences the reactions of its acts. If the self consists of consciousness, not in its eternal form: but in the form of feelings and cognitions; then it would not be possible to account for the different activities of the man, or even the phenomenon of rebirth. It is, therefore, necessary to regard the soul as being of the niture of consciousness. The Nyayavaisesika systems did not admit any action in the self-neither change of place (spanda), nor change of form (parinama). Kumarila though denies the former, admits the latter.3 That is, he recognizes the possibility of model changes in the self. In spite of these modifications it is regarded as eternal for Kumarila rejects the view that even internal change militates against permanence.4 Experience acquaints us with many thing changing almost constantly; yet, maintaining their identity. The Jaina system goes one step futher and accepts the change of place also. The fundanental difference between the Jaina and Kumarila regarding the self consist in the size only. The difference regarding the change of place is its natural issue. The change of place is not possible in an all pervading object. 1. Prakarana pancika 151 2. S. V. Atmavada 75. 1. SV. Atmavada 74 2. SV. Pratyaksavada 53.

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Epistemology of Jainas Kumarila also regards the soul as partly conscious and partly unconscious. It is conscious in the part where the act of cognition is produced. In other parts it is unconscious. In this view the Mimamsa goes very near to the Nyaya conception. Roughly seen the Jaina does not favour this view. He says that the soul is an indivisible unit having consciousness as its essential character. It cannot be said that it is conscious in one part and unconscious in the other. But, the Jaina theory of avarana renders this difference insignificant. The Jaina also accepts that the avarana is removed partially. When we see through the eye the avarana is removed only from that part of the soul which is occupied by the pupil. The other parts remain obscured. This is why generally the cognitions through all senses do not occur simultaneously. 114 Regarded from this point of view, the difference is significant in the ethical plane only. When the soul is liberated or the avarana is totally removed; the soul, according to Jainism, becomes omniscient. The question of partial obscurance does not arise in that state. According to the Mimamsa system partial consciousness is a natural state. It is not caused by any external matter as the Jaina maintains. This is why Mimamsa does not believe in the theory of omniscience. Mimamsa Theory of Consciousness Cognition, according to Kumarila is a mode of the self. It is described as an act (kriya) or process (vyapara). This change or disturbance which takes place in the atman brings about a certain relation with the object known. The self, being by hypothesis omnipresent, is necessarily in relation with all the existents; but, that relation is not the same as is required for knowledge. If it were. Jnana would arise in respect of all objects. The relation that produces jnana is unique. It is described as a sort of comprehension. To know is a transitive verb.2 1. Sastradipika p. 56 2. Ibid.

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The General Conception of Knowledge The act of process of knowing is viewed as an act with object (a kriya with karman). The result of the transitive verb is not found in the agent. It rests in something other than the doer. It is manifested not in the doer but in the object. The act of cooking for instance, is seen in the agent, but its result, of softness (vikleda) is found in the cooked material, i. e., rice, grain etc. The former is the subject, the latter the object. When Jnana arises in the self, relating the self to an object, the latter is affected in a particular way, so that the experience is not wholly a subjective manifestation; but, also an objective modification corresponding to it. The object becomes illumined (prakasavisista) thereby; and it being thus, illumined or made known (prakata or jnata): its jnatata serves as a sign for our inference that Jnana must have arisen in the self. Prabhakara disagrees with Kumarila and holds that the self does not suffer any change. He follows the Nyaya conception in this respect. Action, according to Prabhakara, is not movement or change but merely the sense expressed by a verb. 115 Kumarila's view criticised In the domain of philosophy the term act kriya) or process (vyapara) is full of confusion. According to the N. V. systems kriya means five types of motion which necessarily implies the change of place. This sort of action is not possible in the self which according to the Mimamsa system is all-pervading. The Vaisesika also denies this sort of action to any all-pervading substance. The other kind of action is modal change or parinama. It is both, automatic as well as implemented by the external cause. But, Kumarila cannot explain this short of action also in a permanent all pervading substance. According to Jaina the self is as big as the body it occupies. It increases and decreases according to the size of the body. At the same time it can move from one place to another place. So, both, types of changes viz. the change of place (spanda) and change of form (parinama) are possible in it. But, they are not feasible

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116 Epistemology of Jainas in an all-pervading substance. The modal change also implies the change of place. Jayanta has traced the act theory of knowledge to a grammatical prejudice, a confusion between knowledge as a manifestation and the verb to know which denotes an action. When we hear the expression "I know? I cognize' we are apt to be misted to the idea that knowledge or cognition is an activity or process which implies some motion or physical change. But this only shows how in philosophy the vague expressions of ordinary language are inisleading On observation it will appear that all verbs do not imply a change or action on the part of the agent. In cert.in cases the veros express the very existence of the agent. When we say, 'the moon shines' it does express any change of the part of the moon. It is an expression of the very existence of a luminary, Similarly, when we say, 'the mirror reflects', at the removal of a veil covering it we do not mean any positive action on the part of the mirror. It simply means the removal of obscurance and existence of the mirror. In the case of knowledge the Jaina also does not mean any positive action. It is simply removal of obscurance which automatically results into the manifestation of an object. According to Parthasarathil the conception of agent does not imply movement. Even the omnipresent soul is the agent of sacrifice, knowledge, volition, desire etc. without the possibility of any movement Action in these cases means, merely the sense expressed by a verb. In the case of movements also, he argues, the soul is agent, merely on the basis of its being commandant. The movement is possible in body only and not the soul. According to Nyaya also it is not action but a quality which is generated through a certain contact. The same is knowledge. The Mimamsa conception of knowledge as an activity is comparable with the conception of mode (vstti) held by the Sankhya and the Vedanta. 1. Sastradipika p. 119

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The General Conception of Knowledge 117 According to Kumarila knowledge is not the object of perception. It is only inferrible. Sabara? also holds the same view. Prabhakaraon the other hand is an advocate of triputi pratyaksa, maintaining the perception of object, knowledge and the soul in one and the same appearance. His views are generally accepted by the Jaina also.3 The Sankhya Theory of the Self The self, according to Sarikhya, is pure consciousnes Though it is an improvement on the Nyaya theory; yet for practical purposes, it does not provide any better explanation. The Purusa4 of Sankhya is static, admitting change of neither place nor time. It is absolutely passive, identified more with feeling or the effective side of the psychic phenomena than the cognition or active side. It cannot know or desire anything unless assisted by the mind (buddhi) and sense-organs. Though it is the very essence of sentience, yet all its psychic life is due to its association with the evolutes of Prakrti (matter).5 That which constitutes the activity of the subject, as commonly known to us is due to the physical element which enters into its make up. In respect of the intrinsic character of purusa the Sankhya resembles the N. V. system. Both are equally gospels of sublime isolation. The only difference being that the self in that condition, according to Sarkhya, continues to be sentient or rather sentience. The Nyaya, on the other hand, holds that the self is without any sentience or consciousness in that stage. But, this 1. Sabarabhasya 1.1.4 2. Prakaranapancika, p. 52-53. X 6.5 3. Pramananayatattvaloka I 4. Sarkhyakarika 19 5. Ibid., 20 6. Samkhyapravacanabhasya 2.36-38

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118 Epistemology of Jainas distinction is merely theoretical. Because, according to Sarkhya also, the self in that stage is without any knowledge, owing to the lack of appropriate means like the internal organ and the senses. The pure consciousness does not serve any practical purpose in that stage. According to Nyaya the self is like an image made of earth; which gets motion when drawn by a horse. According to the Sankhya it is like an invalid person who, inspite of his power to move, is practically helpless. The Sankhya splits the power and its application into two different entities. Two Types of Consciousness Carvaka denied the existence of the self as a separate entity and explained the phenomenon of consciousness as based on the physical elements. The Nyaya held the self as a separate entity and explained consciousness as an adventitious quality. Prabhakara followed the Nyaya in respect of the self but maintained consciousness as an act. These systems regarded the self in itself as unconsci: us. According to them cognition and consciousness do not make any difference. They are one and the same phenomenon, which appears at the collocation of certain causes, and disappears in their absence. Kumarila is an advocate of energy or power as a separate entity; which manifests itself into corresponding actions. He contends that if the soul does not possess consciousness i.e. the power of generating cognition as its nature, there is no difference between a jar and the soul. The latter also cannot produce cognition just as the former. It is therefore essential to admit the faculty of consciousness as nature of the soul, which is transformed into the act of cognition. He introduces the theory of consciousness and cognition as separate categories. The Sarkhya, in his view of the soul, stresses upon the point of consciousness and leaves the problem of cognition entirely on the matcrial substance known as buddhi. Thus he hold them not only as separate categories, but also as belonging to separate realities. The two factors of consciousness and cogni

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The General Conception of Knowledge 119 cion are recognised in the Sankhya system as pure consciousness and empirical consciousness respectivley. Pure Consciousness The soul is pure consciousness It cannot be described in positive terms. It has no change, no forin, no motion, no quality no impurity. It is all-pervading and pure seatience. It is distinct from the forms of knowledge, the ideas and the images. We cannot have its mental picture as we can have of other things. It is a transcendent principle whose real nature as such is beyond the empirical sources of knowledge. But, it is this principle in onnection with which the whole plane of consciousness is interpreted as the experience of a person, in cur ordinary ways of mental analysis we do not detect that beneath the forms of knowledge there is some other principle, which has no change, no formu; but, which is like a fight which illumines the nute, pictorial forins; which the mind assumes. The pure consciousness is nothing but this light. Without it all knowledge would be blind. This principle of pure consciousness (cit) cannot be separately perceived, but the presence of this principle in our for.ns of knowledge is distinctiy indicated by inference. The Jaina systein contrasted with the Sankhya The following points should be observed in the above description of pure consciousness; which are not accepted by the Jaina : 1. The consciousness in itself is an independent reality and exists by its own right. 2. It is not active agent but passive experierit. 3. It is a permanent unchangeable reality. 4. It is quite different from the forms of cognition; yet enlivens them.

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120 Epistemology of Jainas 5. It is like a light without which all knowledge would be blind. 6. It is without any quality. We shall discuss the above points and explain the Jaina views regarding them. (1) Consciousness as an Independent Reality Jainas also hold consciousness as essence (svatattva) of the self and in a way identical with it, but they do not agree in absolute identity. As a matter of fact this difference between the two systems is a natural result of their respective metaphysical positions. According to Jainism consciousness is the essence as well as a faculty of the soul which is neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical with its substratum. The Nyaya system stood on one extreme and advocated absolute difference. The Sankhya stands on the other extreme and proposes absolute identity. It holds that faculty is nothing but cause in the form of unmanifested effect. It is included in the very conception of the cause. The difference between sand and an oilseed does not lie in the fact that the latter possesses a faculty of producing oil while the former does not; but the very nature of oil-seed differentiates it from the sand i. e, one contains the oil in upmanifested form while the other does not. The Jaina contends that a faculty is not absolutely same as the cause. We see the same cause producing various effects. The same mango fruit produces different cognitions of colour, form, taste etc. If there is only one cause and not separate faculties giving effect to separate cognitions, the difference in effects cannot be explained. Similarly, the same lamp produces different effects of burning the wick and sucking the oil. Consciousness is only one of the many faculties of the self; the others being Bliss and Power. They cannot be included in consciousness. These faculties cannot exist without a substratum and that substratum is soul. In this respect, the soul is not merely a faculty or an aggregate of them but a separate factor connecting all the faculties and qualities.

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The General Conception of Knowledge 121 As a matter of fact the difference between Jaina and the Sankhya conceptions is very subtle. It owes more to their different theories of causation and the nature of reality than to the actual position of consciousness. The Sankhya does not accept any thing being produced a new or vanishing in the course of time absolutely; the states to interlink which the acceptance of a third category of continuity and a relation of identity in difference between them may be necessary. Moreover, the locus of action is the agent only; and not the experient, which is simply a passive observer. The question of change, therefore, does not arise in the case of Purusa, who is absolutely passive. According to Jainism every reality as has been stated above consists of the three factors of rise, decay and continuity. The Sankhya believes in the factor of continuity only as far as Purusa is conceroed and attributed the factor of change to Prakrti. In the case of Purusa, therefore, no other substratum, representing the factor of continuity is required. The Jaina contends that these two factors cannot be separated as belonging to separate entities. Every reality is constituted of all the three factors. The Jaina does not favour the Sankhya division that the noumenal consciousness, with the factor of continuity is represented by Purusa and the phenomenal consciousness with the factor of change, which is also known as cognition or ideation, is connected with Buddhi. (2) The Consciousness : a passive observer The second point of difference is this that according to Sankhya Purusa is mere passive observer or simple awareness. This notion is the basis of the Sankhya theory of representation. According to it, our consciousness does not observe the objects directly. The external objects are never apprehended by the cogniser. It is only their images, reflected into the pure substance of buddhi, that are the objects of apprehension. According to Sankhya, cognition means the creation of these images, forms or concepts This function is done by Buddhi which is transformed into these images. But these images are

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122 Epistemology of Jainas evolutes of material unconscious substance, however fine it may be. They cannot be intellicized unless connected with an intelligent being This function is done by Purusa. In the process of cognition buddhi plays the active part; because it constructs the images. In the process of intellicizing of buddhi also, Purusa does not play any active part. According to Vacaspati Misra Buddhi receives the reflection of Purusa also and according to Vijnanabhiksu it is reflected into Purusa after getting the reflection of the object. The moon does not play any active part wben it is reflected into water. It exists just as it was before the reflection. It is the purity of water substance that is responsible for getting reflection. The moon is the same for the object where it is reflected and where not. Vijnanabhiksu cites the example of mirror, which also knows no change whether anything is reflected into it, or not. The Jaina criticises this view on several groupds : Firstly, the dualistic theory of representation is merely a fancy. There is no proof supporting the theory of images or modes as proposed by the Sarkhya. The Jaina believes, that our cognitions directly apprehend the external objects. Cognition does not mean creation or reflection, but simply illumination of the already existing objects. Secondly. cit has no form or corporeal qualities, and therefore, it cannot be reflected into Buddhi. Reflection is possible in a thing which has colour or form. Thirdly, the absolute division of the entities as active and passive has no basis. There is nothing which is entirely passive. Simple awareness also implies some action on the part of the person holding it. It is a reaction of the external effect, and must attribute the reactor with some activity. In the case of reflection also we cannot say that the reflector is absolutely inactive. Had it been so, there would be no difference between a lump of clay and the glass. There is no reason why the latter should receive the reflection and not the former, when other

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The General Conception of Knowledge things are equal in both cases. The example of the moon also does not explain the difficulty. If existence of the moon does bring some novelty in the water, we cannot say that it is inactive. Action does not necessarily mean physical movement. It means any kind of change or causation. There is a difference between the mirror with reflection and one without it. This difference implies a change and change implies activity. Fourthly, the Purusa cannot establish the contact with buddhi without any activity on his part. The impression of prakrti on Purusa is impossible without a change on the part of Purusa also. Mere presence of prakrti cannot bring any change in Purusa unless the latter also plays some active part. And the moment it is admitted, that the original character is lost and a new one acquired, the function of losing one and acquiring the other is an action, which makes Purusa also an agent; and it is contrary to the Sankhya tenets. The analogy of the crystal also points in the same direction. If it be not due to a certain action in the crystal that it catches a reflection how is it that an opaque stone does not catch it? Therefore, it is plain that cit is agent as well as experient, i.e. a karta and bhokta directly, and not through prakrti. 123 Fifthly, the notion of prakrti as the agent and Purusa as the experient is also against the principle of ethics. If Purusa is not doer or responsible for action he cannot be charged with the responsibility of bearing the fruit. The fruit of good or bad deeds must be borne only by the person who is responsible for doing them Moreover, Prakrti, according to Sankhya, cannot work without the reflection of Purusa. Buddhi, the first effect of Prakrti is not evolved till Purusa does not reflect into it. If independence is the main characteristic of an agent, Buddhi does not enjoy that credit. Similarly, Purusa also cannot be held as absolutely free from the responsibility of doing The relation of Prakrti and Purusa in the Sankhya system is compared with lame and the blind. Purusa is lame and Prakrti the 1. Sankhyakarika 21

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124 Epistemology ef Jainas blind. Both of them are interdependent. In that case none can be distinguished as agent. Both are doers and hold equal responsibility. (3) Consciousness as an unchangeable reality The consciousness is not absolutely free from change on the ground stated above. Moreover, all the functions of consciousness, just as knowing, feeling and willing must have some object to deliberate upon. We have awareness of something. This something is the content of awareness. Awareness without content is an impossibility. It must have some content and change with the change of content. Further a reality without change cannot serve any purpose and that which does not serve any purpose is no more a reality. (4) Consciousness and cognition as Related to different Entities The Sankhya conception that the activities of knowing, feeling and willing etc. are related with the matter, while consciousness is pure intelligent, constituting a separate entity; also is untenable. The psychical activities are the very functions of consciousness. A function and the energy producing it, cannot have separate entities as their substratum. Otherwise, they cannot have the relation of cause and effect. The earth and jar cannot belong to separate entities. Moreover, if conscious activities are associated with matter, the ultimate difference between mind and matter does not stand any more. It would render the Sankhya a materialist. Moreover, to be consciousness and devoid of cogoition is an absurdity. The term cit cannot be explained without admitting knowledge as its nature. (5) Purusa and Blindness of knowledge The fifth point that without Purusa, all knowledge would be blind, depends upon the conception of knowledge. According to Sankhya, as has been stated above, knowledge is a transformation of non intelligent substance. It, therefore, requires the help of an intelligent being. Jainism does not recognize such a distinction between knowledge and inietlligence. Every cognition is a function of consciousness or intelligence. The

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The Geneval Conception of Knowledge question of being blind, therefore, can not arise in the present case. The notion of knowledge being the product of a nonintelligent substance also is plausible. 6 Purusa without any quality The sixth point that Purusa is without any quality, is fundamentally against the principle of metaphysics. There can be no reality without quality. It is a mere conceptual abstraction. Existence means the possession of some positive quality. The Sankhya Theory of Cognition We have stated above that according to Sankhya cognition is a modification of buddhi, which is an evolute of prakrti, dominated by sattva. Buddhi, through the contact of senses with the object, takes form of the latter. This taking form or modification is known as jnana, adhyavasaya or vrtti i. e. the cause of knowledge.1 The reflection of Purusa or pure consciousness in vrtti is recognized as prama or knowledge. It may be observed here that the Sankhya maintains both buddhi and jnana as insentient. Prama, though insentient as far as its material cause is concerned, appears as if possessing sentiency through the reflection of Purusa. It is described as consciousness reflected in mode of Buddhi or Buddhi Vrtti possessing the reflection of consciousness.2 According to Vacaspati Misra3 Vrtti is like a double-faced mirror, where the citsakti is reflected on one side and object on the other. Thus, there is an exchange of qualities between the buddhi and Purusa. Buddhi takes the qualities of Purusa and appears like a sentient entity. Purusa takes the impress of buddhi and appears like the experiencer of pleasure, pain, knowledge etc. as its own;4 while actually they are the qualities of buddhi. But the impress of buddhi does not affect 1. Samkhyatattvakaumudi p. 72-73 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Sankhyakarika, 36, 37. 125

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126 Epistemology of Jainas the pure cit, it works on reflection only. We observe this phenomenon in the ordinary reflectious. The reflection of the sun into water affects the latter by imposing its brightness and such other qualities as exist in the sun. On other hand, the water affects reflection and not the sun with its motion and other specialities. This reciprocal impression completes the essentialities of knowledge. Thus, it should be observed, that according to Sankhya consciousness and knowledge have two different substratum. Consciousness is the characteristic of Purusa and knowledge that of Buddhi. The part played by consciousness in generating knowledge is confined to reflection only. Vijnanabhiksu? holds a slightly different view regarding this process. He maintains : First of all buddhi takes the form of object. In the case of perception it is done by going out through the senses, in inference by koowledge of the middle term, and in the case of comparison by analogy. In the case where Vstti is generated by the contact of seoses with the object, the buddhi takes along with it, the sense-material also for its transformation. In such cases the mode or Vrtti is a blend of Buddhi and sense-material. This is why the mode or reflection does not invariably correspond with the object. A jaundiced eye looks white object as yellow, this yellowness does not come from buddhi which is a pure material; but, from the sense of vision, which goes out along with buddhi and carries the yellow substance through its rays. Thus, buddhi with its different forms of the objective reflections is reflected into Purusa, and he is able to apprehend Vitti as well as the object reflected in the latter. Vacaspati holds that it is Purusa that is reflected and not the Vstti, which is the recipient of the relections both of Purusa as well as the object. Vijnanabhiksu holds the quite opposite view and maintains that Vgiti is reflected into Purusa and not vice versa. As a red flower does not make any real 1. Samkbyatattvakaumudi, p. 85 2. Samkhyapravacanabhasya I, 87

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The General Tonception of Knowledge 127 change into the crystal; yet, makes it appear as red through the reflection: similarly, Vstti makes the Purusa appear as the knower or experient without making any real change. This reflection of Vstti into Purusa is mere uparaga or abhimapa.1 Patanjalia describes Purusa as a pratisamvedin (reflection) of Buddhi. As echo of the sound is called pratidhvani, similarly, reflection of knowledge is called pratisamvedana. Buddhi takes the mode of object and the same modified Buddhi reflects ioto purusa. According to Vijnapabhiksu the object is known by Vitti and Vitti by Purusa. It can be asked here if coordination (tada. karata) with the object is an essential condition of a cognition, how it is possible in the case of Purusa. Vstti can coordinate, the object as it is a changable object. But Purusa is unchangea. ble. How can it know the Vstti without any transformation ? The objection is replied by Vijnanabhiksu by expliniting the term coordination in two ways. In the case of Buddhi coordinations means a real transformation. In the case of Purusa it is mere reflection. It means, according to Vijnanabhiksu, the object can be apprehended either thiough taking its form or through its reflection. Purusa, though all.pervasive, does not know all objects. His cognition is limited to reflections only. Buddhi also is all-pervasive but Vitti is confined to certain conditions of external or internal senses. This is why Vstti also cannot grasp all objects. The difference between Vijnanabhiksu and Vacaspati regarding the conceptions of the knower (pramata), the knowledge (prama) and the source of knowledge (pramana) can be ascertained in the following table : 1. Samkhyapravacanabhyasya I. 87 2. Yogadarsna p. 45-46 3. Sao khyapravacanabhasya I 87

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128 Epistemology of Jainas Vacaspati Vijnanabhiksu 1. Knowledge : Purusa reflected into Vrtti reflected into (prama) Vitti or vstti with the Purusa reflection of Purusa 2. The source Vstti Vstti of knowledge (pramana) 3. Cognizer Buddhi Purusa (pramata) We have ylready discussed the Jaina criticism of these views. The Advaita Vedanta : Brahman or Pure Consciousness According to the Vedanta the soul is not only a substratum of all psychic phenomena; but, also the ultimate cause of the physical world. It is known as Brahman or pure consciousness. It is the light of all lights, foundation of all cognitions and the only ultimate reality. The external world of phenomenal appe. arance springs forth from it.? The Vedanta distinguishes pure consciousness from empirical cognitions by holding the former as absolutely real, while the latter as illusions, which are indescribable in the terms of existence (sat) or non-existent (asat),2 Comparis n with the Sankhya According to the Sarkhya all varieties of empirical consciousness pertain to a reality separate from Purusa, who is a mere spectator. According to the Vedanta, Brahman is the only reality. There is no parallel reality having separate existence. The ideations and concepts, known as the cognitions of the external world, are illusory forms (vivartas) of Brahman. Though the Vedanta also admits Maya, just as the Praksti of Sankhya; which is the material cause of the world; yet, it is 1. Mundaka 1.1. 6- ; Vedantasara 19-21 2. Vedantasara 6.

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The General Conception of Knowledge 329 not a reality. It is a universal illusion or ignorance. The pure consciousness, according to the Vedanta has three characteristics of Existence (sat) consciousness (cit) and Bliss (ananda). According to Sankhya Bliss is identical with pleasure, which is a quality of Praksti. Further, according to Sankhya the number of the selves is iofinite. According to the Vedanta it is one. Comparison with the Jainism According to Jainas the self in its pure form consists of four infinities; viz., (1) Infinite Knowledge (Ananta jnana), (2) infinite Perceptioa (Ananta darsana), (3) Infinite Bliss (Ananta sukha) and (4) Infinite Energy (Ananta virya). The first two Infinites resemble cit of the Vedanta. The remaining two factors correspond to the Vedantic Bliss and Existence. But, the Jainas differ from the Vedanta in the nature of these attributes. According to the Vedanta nothing can be said aboui these attributes in positive terms. Consciousness, here, means the absence of non-intelligence. Similarly, Bliss means absolute negation of misery; and Existence means the absence of nonexistence. According to Jainism they are positive terms. Darsana and Jnana are the cognitions of real objects. They are not without content as the Sankhya or the Vedanta maintains. Similarly, Virya also is something positive. It is the energy with its capability of manifestation into various acts. Sukha is the contentment resulting from reflection on the self The Jaioa does not identify sukha with pleasure (salvedaniya) yet, holds it as a positive quality. Moreover, the world of appearance, according to Jainas, is as real as the consciousness itself. Nothing can appear, they say, which does not exist. According to the Vedanta the individual souls also are illusory manifestations of one Supreme soul or pure consciousness, the Brahmnan. According to the Sarkh ya and Jaina they are real and many in number. But, the individual self of the Sankhya, though many in number, is just 1. Siddhaatalesasamgraha p. 79-134

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130 Epistemology of Jainas like Brahman of the Vedanta as far as its intrinsic character is concerned. It is in the case of empirical self that the Vedanta and Saikhya have some comparison with the Jaina. The Empirical self and cognition Like Sankhya the Vedanta also admits cognition as a mode of Antahkarana.2 In the perception of an external object the mind goes out to the object through the senses; which act as vehicles of the movement of antahkarana, towards the object. On reaching the object, antahkarana is transformed into the latter; just as water, going out of a tank through a drain to a tub, assumes the form ol the tub after reaching it. But, the mere fact of antahkarana assuming the form of the object does not explain the knowledge of an object. Antahkarana is a material, or unconscious substance. So, the modification of antahkarana, by itself, cannot amount to knowledge. The vitti or the mode of antahkarana is illumined by the self, the cit, which is there as the observer (saksin) of all changes. In all empirical experiences the antahkarana and the atman remain idenitified or fused together, just as in a red (hot) iron ball, fire and iron remain indistinguishably blended together. Hence, every change of antahkarana enjoys the light of t e self that is indistinguishably identified with it, and thus, knowledge becomes possible. In case of the non-perceptual knowledge, antahkarana does not go outside but, transforms itself into mental images of happiness, pain, object etc. as the case may be.2 The empirical self of the Vedanta does not differ from that of the Jaina as far as its function is concerned. But according to the Vedanta and Sankhya it is not an imperishable reality. According to the Vedanta it is the pure soul conditioned by or reflected into the ajnana. After realization, when the condition (upadbi), limiting or reflecting the absolute soul, is removed, there is no empirical soul. It exists as long as the condition 1. Vedantaparibhasa p. 46 2. Vedantaparibhasa p. 68

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The General Conception of Knowledge 131 exists. The difference between the two souls is not real but caused by the external condition. The exponents of the theory of condition as the limitation clarify the point by comparing it with space. The space conditioned by a jar, in reality, does not differ from the infinite space. It exists as long as the condition i.e. jar exists. The theory of reflection is explained by citing the example of the sun reflected into water. The absolute soul is like the real sun, while the empirical soul is like his reflection into water. The reflection exists as long as the reflector i.e. water exists. Thus, according to Vedanta the absolute soul is real, the empirical self is unreal. The former is unlimited and eternal, the latter is limited and perishable. The former is neither agent nor experient, the latter assumes both the positions. The Sankhya holds the empirical soul as a reflection of Purusa into Buddhi or the assumption of the qualities of prakrti by Purusa as his own, as Vijnanabhiksu maintains. As far as the material cause is concerned the empirical self is a group of the evolutes of Buddhi. The reflection of Purusa into buddhi executes an inter-change of qualities between the two. In the case of Purusa only the reflection is effected and not the real purusa. This blend is ego or self of the Sankhya. As soon as this egoistic existence is removed the empirical soul vanishes. Looked in this way, Sankhya also is an advocate of the empirical soul as a perishable phenomenon generated by the illusion. The number of souls In the Advaita Vedanta transcendental soul is absolutely one.1 It is away from the three kinds of difference, i. e. (1) the difference due to the existence of an entity of the same class, (2) difference due to the existence of an entity of another class and (3) difference due to parts in his own person. Regarding the number of empirical souls there are two schools. 1. Sankara on Brhad. 2.51

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132 Epistemology of Jainas The school of Suresvara maintains the unity of Jiva ? On toe other hand, the Vivarana-school admits plurality? The main objection forwarded against the unity of jiva is that if there is only one soul, why there are different activities in different bodies. If all the bodies are pervaded by the same soul, why there is a difference in status. One is happy, the other is miserable. One is educated, the other is unlettered. We cannot say that the qualities like happiness and knowledge belong to the body as can be said of the fatness or thinness. Moreover, the scriptures say that many souls like Suka etc. have freed themselves from bondage of the world and attained liberation, while others are still in bondage. If there is only one soul this distinction cannot be explained. The upholder of one jiva explains these difficulties in three ways-(1) Brabman is one and therefore, Jiva also is one, and there is only one body associated with it. Other bodies are without any Jiva, just as the bodies of dream-land. The whole world is an illusion of the same soul. The apparent difference is like the difference appearing in the dream. The story of the liberation of Suka etc. also is a dreamy phenoDienon. All points of difference and other difficulties are to be explained by the same simile of dreams. This view is held by Mandana Misra and other followers of Drsti Srstivada They hold that Ajnana, though one, possesses the power of generating different kinds of things just as sleep in the state of dream projects various objects. There is one soul and one ajnaoa and therefore, jiva also is one. In this conception liberation becomes and ideal that can never be achieved individually. (2) The second interpretation is based on the srutis propo. unding Isvara as creator of the universe. It holds that the reflection of Brahman in Maya is known as isvaia and that is the only soul. It is known as Hiranyagarbha also. The other jivas 1. Naiskarmyasiddhi III. 53-54 2. Vivarana prameyasangraha p. 265

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The General Conception of Knowledge 133 are reflections of Isvara. They are like the painted clothes worn by the pictures on a painted convass. In this conception there is one jIva with many reflections. As a matter of fact, this view admits the existence of many jivas and many bodies. But, there is a difference of status between Isvara and them. This view is held by Vivarana and other followers of Srsti Drstivada. (3) The third interpretation is that there is one soul known as Hiranyagarbha subsisting in all the bodies. It can be asked, if one soul subsists in all the bodies why there is no interchange of experiences; why Caitra does not enjoy the pleasures as are enjoyed by Maitra. The Vedantist replies that body is the regulator in this matter. The experiences of previous lives are not felt in the present life, because, bodies have changed inspite of the unity of soul. Similarly, inspite of the unity of soul Caitra and Maitra have different experiences on account of their different bodies. This explanation, also makes the attempt for liberation, on the part of individual selves, a futile effort 1 The above mentioned difficulty does not arise in the plurality of souls as accepted by the vivarana-school, Three types of Knowledge according to the Vedanta The Advaita Vedanta maintains three stages of soul and asserts three types of knowledge corresponding with them. They are Brahman, Isvara and Jiva. Brahman is pure consciousness. It is devoid of all objectivity. It is self-luminative. Isvara is the consciousness attached with Maya; with the function of projection only, and not that of Avarana. Consequently, Isvara knows everything in the form of subject-object. He is the cognizer and the whole world is his object. Jiva is limited by or reflected into antahkarana. His cognition is a dependent vrtti, which removes the Avarana of consciousness conditioned by the object. It is limited and perishable. on I. Advaitasiddhi p. 539; Siddhantalesasamgraha p. 370

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Epistemology of Jainas The Jainism does not admit the first type. It holds that every knowledge must have something as its object. In the case of self-lumination also self appears as the object. The knowledge of Isvara can be compared with that of a Kevalin, when the Avarana is removed completely. The only difference is this, that the Vedantic Isvara cognizes the objects which are his own projection; while according to Jainism they exist independent of the kevalin. In the case of JIva the two systems hold different processes. According to Vedantavrtti, which is a mode of Antahkarana, removes avarana from the object and thus, manifests it temporarily. According to Jainism Vrtti is not required. The Avarana is removed by the presence of certain external and internal factors and the object is illumined. 134 Kundakunda incorporates the first two types of consciousness by resorting to two stand-points (nayas). According to the discursive stand-point, he says, a kevalin knows and sees all the objects; but, from the real stand-point the omniscient perceives and knows his self only. But, these stand-points do not contradict each other. They are only different ways of expression. Every knowledge according to Jainism, illumines the object as well as itself. The knowledge of kevalin is not an exception. But unlike Nyaya, the object does not enter into the class of causation. The knowledge is an illumination. It is a natural phenomenon, occuring by itself, irrespective of the object. When a lamp is lighted it spreads the light without any dependence on the object. It will illumine the jar if the latter exists in its proximity, otherwise not. But, the absence of the illumination of jar does not make any difference in the function of the lamp. Similarly, the soul begins to cognize the object and itself as soon as the obscurance is removed. The object, if comes in the arena, is presented to the soul, otherwise not. It has nothing to do with the function of the soul. This is why the real standpoint leaves the object altogether. On the other I. Niyamasara Gatha 158

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The General Conception of Knowledge 135 hand, the discursive stand-point takes it into account. This view is explained in another way also. Really, the soul is selfluminary. The objects are reflected into it. Thus, the apprehension of the soul means the apprehension of objects also, which stands as reflected into the soul. But, this explanation goes against the theory of illumination. The Idealist School of Buddhism The Theory of Soul or Consciousness The Yogacara divides consciousness into four categories : Citta, Manas, Manovijnana and the five sense vijnanas. In its general sense, the term citta covers all varieties of consci ness; but, in its specific significance it is the principle of unification, by which all the activities are understood as issuing from one centre. The Mapas is a discriminating agency by which the homogeneous, undifferentiated citta is divided into two parts, the one as the seer and other as the seen; the one as grasping ego and other as the object grasped. The manas is not only intellective; but, also a conative principle. The Vijnana, that is Manovijnana is separated from the Manas, only in retaining the latter's intellective function, and may be translated as the intellect; in which case the manas may be regarded as corresponding to the will and the affection. The five Vijnanas are thus, the five senses which discriminate a world of individual forms, each within its own sepse-fold. 1 The citta in its specific sense is known as Alaya vijnana and resembles the soul or Pure consciousness of other systems. But, Alaya vijnana of the Yogacara is not an abstract principle devoid of content, as the Sankhya Purusa. According to Lankavatara it is rich in content, and just because of this inner richness, it is able to evolve out of itself a world of infinite multitudinousness. It is, indeed, an inexaustible reservoir of seeds (bija) which have been accumulated therein since 1 Suzuki : Lankavatarasutra p. 248.

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136 Epistemology of Jainas the beginningless past. So, the definition follows: of citta is as "Cittera ciyate karma". That karma is accumulated by citta means that the latter takes in all that goes op in the mind and also that is done by the body. Technically stated, every deed (karman), mental or physical, leaves its seeds behind. which are deposited in citta, and citta has been hoarding them since time immemorial. It is the rich repository of all the thoughts, feelings, desires, instincts etc., no matter how they have come to act, that is, whether merely stirred up in the inmost recesses of or es consciousness, or carried out by the body into deed, or checked in the incipient stages of their activity. Psychologically, the citta may thus, be regarded as corresponding to subconsciousness. We have seen above that Sankhya admitted the Purusa as pure consciousness, because it has nothing to do with the formation of ideas. The conception of purity in the Vedanta depended on the Absolute reality of the Brahman. The purity the Alaya vijnana is the logical purity, i. e. absolute freedom from the dualistic way of reasoning, which is a function of manas; a disturbed state of the citta. Lanka vatara says "From the Alaya are stirred up all the mental activities like waves; with habit energy (vasana) as cause, they are born in accordance with the law of origination. This disturbed state is recog. nized as Vyavrtti or Pravrtti. The Vedanta held Brahman or the uodisturbed state as the reality and the disturbed one as illusion. The Yogacara holds both the states as real. As a matter of fact this difference is based not on real positions of the two factors, but on the different views regarding the conception of reality. If those views are taken into consideration the apparent difference will become insignificant. According to the Vedanta whatever originates or perishes is pot real. It, therefore, proposes that Brahman is the only reality while the lower stages, which are produced later on, are illuion. According to Yogacara, every reality is momentary. It

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The General Conception of Knowledge 137 holds change as the essence of reility or existence. It, therefore, cannot deny the status of reality to any thing, merely on the basis of its being generated or open to destruction. Yogacara also holds citta as an avyaksta (unexpanded) form of the apparent ideas and concepts. The Jaina conception of soul has a remarkable affinity with Alaya vijnana, particularly, in its ethical side, where it is known as Tathagatagarbha. The fundamental difference lies in the Buddhist denial of the factor of continuity; without which the problem of recognition cannot be explained. Another point of difference between the two systems is that according to the Jainism, karman does not mean merely predispositions or samskaras of the past mental and physical activities; but also material substance, which sticks to the soul according to the activities, and stays there according to the intensity of the passions. The Theory of Empirical Consciousness We have stated above that Alaya vijnana or citta is the repository of all consciousness. Its calm state is free from the dualistic way of reasoning. When stirred, it undergoes various changes. These resultant changes known as paryayas are called pravstti-vijnana or empirical consciousness. We have stated above the four stages of citta, such as citta, manas, manovijnana and five sense-vijnanas. The Manas, in this system, is not an independent agent acting on the cita from cuisice as the Njaya holds. It is a creation of the citta itself Depending upon the Alaya the Manas arises; allied with the citta and Manas the Vijnana ari:es. Again, with the ciita as its cause and supporting it, the inanas walks along depending on the citta. The Citta is caused to move by the Vijnana, and there is an interdependence between them. From this it is evident that the Manas depends 1. Suzuki : Lankavatara p. 248

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138 Epistemology of Jainas on the citta for its existence, and at the same time citta takes manas for the object of its activity. Without manas, there will be no mentation; and without mentation the very existence of citta will not be known. The one thus, gives support to the other, and at the same time is supported by the other. The business of Manas is thus two-fold : (1) to reflect on the citta and (2) to make citta visualise itself as object. This is called 'arranging' (vidblyate), or putting in order (vidiyate) or reflecting (manyate), which is the function of Manas. It is again described as walking in two ways, which means the dualistic character of the manas as against absolute unity of the citta. One citta has now been differentiated into citta and Manas, and this latter particularises that citta is no more neutral, non-discriminative and non-functioning; for all the karma seeds, hitherto lying dormant in the absolute citta, have now begun to sprout out in full vigour. These germinating seeds are now distinguished as discriminated by the Vijnanas known Manovijnana, by the aid of the five senses, wherewith creating a world of individuals. The latter is called the seen' or what is presented (drsya) which is now recognised as real and substantial, and from this arise all kind of spiritual tribulations. The Realist School of Buddhism Consciousness or Soul According to the realist school of Buddhism, consciousness is an element like elements of the material world. According to Abhidharma philosophy mind is split into two chief parts. The subjective part, or mind viewed as a receptive faculty is represented by one element called, indiscriminately, citta, vijnana or manas. It represents pure consciousness, or pure sensation, without any content. It is defined as "Vijnanam 1. Central Conception of Buddhism p. 13

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The General Conception of Knowledge 139 prativijnaptih' i.e. consciousness is an intimation of awareness in every simple case. But, this awareness cannot appear in life in its true separate condition, it is always accompanied by some secondary mental phenomenon. These constitute the second part of Mind and are known as citta, dharmas. Although, quite undifferentiated in itself, the pure sensation is, nevertheless, distinguished from the stand-point of its origin and its environment i. e. the elements by which its appearance is accompanied. From this point of view there is a set of six different kinds of consciousnesses corresponding to a set of six receptive faculties (indriyas) and a set of six kinds of objects. We thus, have six categories of consciousness beginning with visual sensation or precisely, pure sensation, arising in connection with some colour and ending with consciousness associated with supersensous objects, not percievable by senses. Consciousness has been compared in Milindaprasna with a watchman at the middle of the crossroads beholding all that come from any direction. Buddhaghosa in Atthasalini says that consciousness means that which thinks its object. If we are to define its characteristics we must say that it knows (vijnana), goes in advance (puvvangama) connects (sandhana) and stands on Namarupa (namarupapadasthanam). When the consciousness gets a door, the objects of sense are discerned and it goes first as the precursor. When a visual object is seen by the eye, it is known only by consciousness, and when the dharmas are made objects of mind, it is known only by the consciousness. Buddhaghosa also refers here to the passage in the Milindaprasna we have just referred to. He further goes on to say that when states of consciousness rise one after another they leave on gap between the previous and the latter, and therefore consciousness appears as connected. When there are the aggregate of the five skandhas, it is lost; but there are the four aggregates as Namarupa. He further asks, is this consciousness the same as the previous consciousness or different

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140 Epistemology of Jainas from it? He answers that it is the same. Just so, the sun shows itself with all its colours etc., but he is not in reality different from those characteristics; and it is said that just when the sun rises, its collected heat and yellow colour also rise then, but it does not mean that the sun is different from these. So the citta or consciousness takes the phenomena of contact etc. and cognizes them. So, though it is the same as they are; yet, in a sense it is different from them. Vijnana or consciousness means according to Buddhaghosa, both the stage at which the intellectual process starts and also the final resulting consciousness. It is generally held that Buddhists are Anatmavadins or deny the existence of soul. But, as a matter of fact, they hold that atman or self is not a real and ultimate fact, it is a mere name for a multitude of interconnected facts, which, in the Buddhist philosophy are recognized as elements (dharmas). Buddhism never denies the existence of a personality, or soul, in the empirical sense, it only maintains that it is not an ultimate reality. It is a stream of inter-connected facts. It includes the mental elements and the physical ones as well, the elements of one's own body and the external objects as far as they constitute the experience of a given personality. The representatives of eighteen classess (dhatu) of elements combine together to produce this interconnected stream. There is a special force, called peripi, which holds these elements combined. It operates only within the limits of a single stream and not beyond. This stream of elements kept together, and not limited to present life, but having its roots in past existences and its continuation in future one-is the Buddhist counterpart of the soul or the self of other systems. Sautrantika Theory of Cognition Stcherbatsky1 gives the following account of the theory of cognition as admitted by Sarva stivadin and the Sautrantikas : 1. Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 55

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The General Conception of Knowledge 141 "Their explanatioa of the origin of kaowledge was in perfect agreement with their ontology, i. e. with the theory of a plurality of separate, though inter dependent, elements (dharmas), resolvable into a number of elements simultaneously flashing into existence. Being conceivei as momeatary flashes, the elements could not move towards one another, could not come into contact, could not influence one another, there could be no seizing, or grasping of the object by the intellect. But, according to the laws of interconnection (pratitya-samutpada) prevailing between them, some elements are invariably appearing accompanied by others arising in close contiguity with them. A moment of colour (rupa), ai moment of the sense of vision-matter (caksuh) and a moment of pure consciousness (citta) arising simultaneously in close contiguity, constitute what is called a sensation (sparsa) of colour. The element of conscionsness acoording to the same laws never appears alone, but always supported by an object (visaya) and a receptive faculty (indriya). Summary of the above views Pandit Sukhlal sums up the above views in two tendencies. The first tendency is found in the Sarkhya and the Vedanta systems. They hold that consciousness (cit-sakti) and cognition (jnana) have separate substratum. Consciousness lies in Purusa or Brahman while the cognition is a mode (vrtti) of antahkarana or buddhi, which is a material substance. The second tendency is found in Buddhism and Nyaya etc. They say that the above of consciousness as well as cognition is one and the same and they are related in a tie of cause and effect. Bauddhas admit that citta known as 'nana' is the above of consciousness as well as cognition The Nyaya and some other systems accept permanent soul as the abode of the two. The Jaina also accepts a permanent soul. The same is called consciousness (caitanya) in the form of cause and in the form of effect it is called cognition. 1. Jnanabindu, Int. p. 3.

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142 Epistemology of Jainas The Jaina view fully expiained Soul or Jiva Amongst the Agamas the soul is knows as jiva. Literally it means one that porsesses life, prana.1 The term prana is not confined to breathing only. It includes all the faculties that are the sign of life. The five senses, the faculties of thinking, speaking and moving; breathing and the period for which a being is going to live, all constitute one prana each. The mundane souls possess the pranas according to the status of their evolution. But, the term jiva is not to be taken in that sense for the present. It is a general term applied to all the states of soul, liberated or in bondage. Definition of Jiva The Bhagavaty and Uttaradhyayana4 sutras state Upayoga as the definition of jiva. Tattvarthas also supports the same view. Upayoga means attention or application of consciousness (caitanya); which is the essence (svatatva) of Jiva. 6 Vidyananda points out the difference between essence and definition (laksana) in this, that the essence is a definition as well as the definee. It occupies both the positions; while mere definition is not necessarily given that position. The consciousness itself is jiva. It is a power, known through application only. Upayoga, therefore, serves as definition better than consciousness. The separate existence of jiva is proved on the ground of Upayoga or the function of consciousness. 1. Tattvarthaslokavartika 318. 2. Gommatasara Gatha 129-30. 3. Bhagavatt II, 10 4. Uttaradhyayana 28, 10 5. Tattvartha 2.8. 6. Tattvarthaslokavartika p. 318 7. Ibid.

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The General Conception of Knowledge Two Types of Definition The main function of a definition is to discriminate the definee from other things. This purpose can be served by a thing or quality which is inseparable from the definee as well as by one which can be separated. The quality of heat in fire comes into the first category. It cannot be separated from the fire. The staff, in the case of a man-with-staff, belongs to the second category. The staff though helps in discrimination of the person from others, is not an essential part of the men. On the basis Vidyananda classifies the definition in two types. The first is essential (atmabhuta) and the second non-essential (anatmabhuta)1. Upayoga is an essential definition of the self. We cannot separate it from the latter. There is no soul without Upayoga and there is no Upayoga without soul. Yet, we cannot say that they are absolutely one and the same thing. Upayoga is only a part of the psychical function. Other functions are feeling, willing etc. which according to Jainism are not included into Upayoga which is the activity of cognition only, a particular expression of consciousness (caitanya) which covers the entire range of psychical life. This is also one of the reasons for regarding it as the essence and upayoga as the definition of jiva. 143 Nemicandra defines the jIva as follows: It is characterised by upoyoga, is formless, and an agent, is co extensive with the body, is the experient of the fruits of karman, exists in Samsara. the siddha has a characteristic of upward motion,2 Kundakunda also agrees with the same.3 Devasuri indicates the same thing by pointing out a contrast with other systems. We shall discuss the above points one by one. 1. Tattvarthaslokavatika, p. 318 2. Dravyasangraha, 2 3. Pancastikayasamayasara 27 4. Pramananayatattvaloka VII, 55

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144 Epistemology of Jainas It is a changeable yet everlasting Reality Reality according to Jainism, as we have already stated, consists of three factors; origination, decay and permanence. This principle holds good in the case of soul also. Every soul undergoes various changes. It moves from one place to another place, takes different shapes and forms and passes through successive lives. Yet, does not lose its permanence. In the case of soul, permanence means both with reference to substance as well as person. The soul is an intelligent substance and cannot become non-intelligent. At the same time no soul loses its individuality by merging into or com. bining with the other souls. According to the Vedanta jyvatmans have a conditional existence. When the condition is removed they merge into the great soul of Brahman. The Jainas do not favour this view. Both, Jiva (soul) and pudgala (matter) are many in number; while other substances are without plurality. Permanence with reference to substance is common to all of them. No substance loses its nature and transforms into the other. The question of individual permanence is concerned with jiva and pudgala only. Jiva is an ultimate unit. It may have smaller or bigger size according to the physical body; but, it does nct depend upon any external help for expansion or diminution. Neither it combines with other souls for expansion nor cuts away some. thing from its own person for diminution. The number of prades is the units of space) remains the same in both conditions But, this is not the case with pudgala, which has atom as the smallest individual unit. The bigger units of physical structure are not conposed merely by that individual ato n. It is assisted by other atoms to compose a bigger structure. The number of atoms increases with the increase of dimension. The diametrical expansion of the soul without additional equipment is the point which is attacked by the non-Jaina systems. The only explanation that the Jainas give, is that the soul is immaterial, and the principle of meterial objects cannot be applied to immaterial things.

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The General Conception of Knowledge 145 In the case of atoms the Nyaya maintains a fundamental classification. The atom of earth cannot change into the atom of water. But, the Jaina does not hold such distinction as fundamental. He maintains that earth and water are groups or combinations of atoms. The atoms in themselves do not possess any of these distinction. The atom, which at present is a part of earthly body, can become a part of the body of water. Further, all the atoms possess all the four qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch. But, they are not entirely similar. The colour, taste, smell and touch of one atom are different from those of the other. The condition of these qualities changes according to the combination and external influence. But, they are not without distinction in their pure state also. The case of jivas is different. In their pure state, though they exist as separate units, they are not different in quality. All the souls possess the same attributes in equal measure. The qualitative difference between the jivas is caused by the karmic matter which is external. As soon as that impure element is removed all the souls acquire their pure state in which there is no difference of quality. Dissimilarity between two atoms is natural but in two souls it is due to karmic influence. In the state of liberation all souls exist in the same position without any qualitative difference. But, their individuality is not affected thereby. Even when two souls occupy the same unit of space, they are not one and the same. Perhaps, this factor has led to the conception of Tiryaksamanya as the cause of the appearance of similarity and not that of unity. Regarding the dimension of the soul in the state of liberation the Jainas hold that it is as big as two thirds of the physical body, lastly occupied. These factors show a materialistic tendency on the part of Jainas. We have already discussed the various notion regarding the permanence of soul. The Jaina is a non-absolutist. He favours neither absolute permanence nor absolute momentariness. The

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146 Epistemology of Jainas feelings of pleasure and pain, the system of bondage and liberation, ethical notions of virtue and vice with their good and bad results, presuppose a change with permanence. The abso. lutist standing on either extreme, cannot explain the above phenomena.2 It is Agent as well as Experient The Vedanta held that the soul in its essence is neither agent nor experient. The phenomenon of doing something and bearing its fruit appear on the lower level of existence. The Jivatman which stands on the same level as t hose phenomena, is both the agent as well as the experient. It acts and bears the fruit. The Sankhya maintains Praksti as the agent and Purusa as the experient. Jainism along with other systems holds that the soul is both, agent as well as the experient. As a matter of fact the soul by itself is inactive in all the systems. Generally, it is assisted by the external matter for doing something. In the Nyaya-system it is assisted by the physical body or mind. In Jainism also the soul does not undergo any change, either that of form or that of space, without the assistance of karmic matter. In the case of liberated soul it is held that as soon as it is freed from the karmic bondage it goes up, till the top-end of the universe, as it consists of the nature of going upwards. But, leaving that movement, which is a matter of faith only, all movements related with the soul are effects of the karmic influence. The influence of karman on the soul according to Jainism is as powerful as that of Praksti on Purusa in the Sankhya system. The only difference between the two systems is that the Jaina does not divide the responsibilities of doing and bearing the fruit in two entities. It holds that the soul mixed with karman is the doer and the same is experient. Further, it should be noticed that the purusa of Sankhya is inactive, doing nothing by himself. The function of liberation also is done by praksti. 1. Syadvadamanjari, Karika 25

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The General Conception of Knowledge 147 The soul of the Jainas is not so dependent. It exercises a full control over the karmic matter and can adjust it in his own interest. The Jainas are not fatalists. They provide ample scope for free activity. Further, the Jainas hold that the functions of an agent as well as the experient continue in liberated souls also. But, that is merely a theoretical consideration. The Siddhas, as the liberated souls are known, do not move from one place to another place. Similarly, they do not suffer the modal change also. They will remain in the same position and form as they have come to possess once, at the first moment of their liberation. It is said that the cognition of Siddhas changes according to the change of object, and Siddhas also suffer the change as their quality of cognition changes. But, this point does not prove the existence of any real change in them. Moreover, when they are onniscient, knowing all the objects of the past, present and the future simultaneously, the question of change in cognition also does not hold any reason. The only purpose of stressing upon the principle of change in Siddhas is simply to apply the three factors of reality in their case also. Moreover, it is controversial whether Siddhas cognize the objects in the same manner as the persons with imperfect cognition. It has an Infinite Plurality Gautama asks in the Bhagvattsutras : 0 Lord ! How many souls are there ? their number is numerable, innumerable or infinite ? The lord replies : "O Gautama ! they are infinite in number." The original text of the above talk maintains the term paryaya in the sense of numerical diversity. Gautama asks the number of paryayas and Mahavira replies that it is infinite. Thus, the Jaina is an exponent of plurality of souls.

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148 Epistemology of Jainas The mundane souls are divided into two groups of Vyavahara rasi and Avyavahara rasi. Avyavabara rasi means the multitude of souls which bave not come out of their lowest state of consciousness. The kingdon where they are lying from the time immemorial. It is a reservoir of souls living in infinite number with one body. It is never exhausted. The Vyavabara rasi means the multitude of jivas that have come out from that reservoir and are wandering up and down in the world. They occupy one body each. The conception of avyavahara rafi is comparable with the state of equilibrium of Praksti in the Sankhya and undisturbed state of Alayavijnana in Buddhism. It is co-extensive with the Body : We have already discussed different views regarding the size of soul. There are meny other conceptions, which are as old as the Upanisads. They show that the Jaina is not the only upholder of the middle size. Below, we give a brief survey of these views : (1) The Kausitaki Upanisad refers to the view that the soul is co-extensive with the body it occupies. 1 It states that just as a sword pervades the sheath and fire the fire-pit so the soul pervades the body upto nails and hair. Jainas also hold the same view. (2) Bihadaranyaka mentions that the soul is as big as a grain of rice or barley.2 (3) Kathopanisad state, another view that it is as big as the thumb.8 (4) Chandogya holds it as big as the span of thumb or the fore-finger.4 1. Kausitaki 4.20 2. Brhadaranyaka 5.6.1 3. Katho 4.12 4. Chandogya.

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The General Conception of Knowledge (5) The majority of Upanisads state it as all-pervaqsive. The above mentioned conceptions in the Upanisads, except the last one, are related with the empirical self only. The transcendental soul is without any size. In the scholastic period roughly, we have three views related with the extension of the soul. According to the Vaisesika, Nyaya, Sankhya, Yoga and the Sankara school of the Vedanta soul is vibhu or contains the biggest dimension. With Nyaya and Vaisesika the biggest dimension means state of being in contact with all the objects having lesser size. According to Sankhya and Yoga it means all pervasiveness and according to Vedanta it means the state of being above the considerations of size and other limitations. Thus, the above systems, though one in not admitting any smaller size in the soul, disagree in the conception of the biggest size also. Nevertheless, they also admit the psychic activity as confined to the body; and they postulate one or the other factor to explain this phenomenon. 149 Ramanuja, Madhva and Vallabha are on the other extreme. They hold the discursive self (jIvatman) as having atomic size, i. e. anuparimana, while attribute God with all-pervasiveness. The Jaina favours the middle position. It holds the soul co-extensive with the body. When occupying the body of an ant it is as big as the ant; and when pervades the body of an elephant it expands to that extent. Thus, according to Jainism the soul does not contain any fixed size. It can contract itself and become atomic. It can expand itself and become all-pervasive. But, one thing is fixed. It has innumerable space-units (pradesas). Their number is always the same. It neither increases nor decreases. The same number accommodates itself in a smaller or bigger area. Thus, in contrast to the abovementioned two views, we can say, the Jaina does fix any size. He holds it variable and flexible. On this very point he is attacked by other systems that it would render the soul perisha

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150 Epistemology of Jainas ble. But the Jaina conception of permanence is quite different from that of other systems. Yasovijaya states, that the Jainas are not totally against the all-pervasiveness of the soul. The conception of Samud. ghata (astral projection) explicitly supports that the soul is allpervasive as far as its power is corcerned. In the NyayakhandaKhadya he confirms that the soul can pervade the entire universe and on the basis of this capacity we can hold it all-pervasive. But, as far as its activities are concerned it is confined to the body. If we compare this view with the Nyaya and other systems the disagreement becomes insignificant. The supporters of allpervasiveness also hold that the activity is confined to the body only. According to the Vedanta the antahkarana, which is a centre of all psychic activities, is coextensive with the body. The Sankhya also holds the empirical self as limited to the body. The mind (manas) of the Nyaya is atomic and here, we can say, it differs from the Jaina conception. The Buddhist also agrees with the Jaina. Brahmadeva incorporates the views in another way : He says that in respect of Kevalajnana the soul is all-pervasive and in respect of pradesas it is coextensive with the body. Thus, we have three aspects concerned with the size of the soul. (1) It is coextensive with the body in respect of general condition of pradesas. (2) It pervades the whole universe (loka) in respect of the capacity of pradesas. (3) It pervades loka as well as aloka in respect of kevalajoana. 1. Nyaya-Khandakhadyatika, Karika, 70 page 648-649 2. Dravyasamgrahatika.

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The General Conception of Knowledge 151 The first aspect can be compared with the conception of empirical self of other systems. The second aspect is comparable with the Nyaya view of all-pervasiveness. The third view resembles the Vedantist conception of without any limitation. Kundakunda supports the conceptions of all-pervasiveness as well as that of the middle size on the basis of two different aspects. In respect of knowledge the soul is alle pervasive. He says : "The soul is coextensive with knowledge; knowledge is said to be coextensive with the objects of knowledge; the object of knowledge comprises the physical and non-physical universe, therefore, knowledge is omnipresent. He, who does not admit the soul to be coextensive with knowledge, must indeed concede that the soul is either smaller or larger than knowledge. If the soul is smaller, the knowledge, being insentient, cannot know; if larger, how can it know in the absence of knowledge ? The great Jina is everywhere and all the objects in the world are within him, since the Jina is an embodiment of knowledge and since they are the objects of knowledge. I Ontologically, the soul consists of the middle dimensions. He cites the example of a sapphire to support this view. The sapphire thrown into milk, occupies a limited span of space; but affects the entire milk with its colour. Similarly, the soul physically occupies the body only, but can illumine the whole universe. He states in clear terms : "The knower has the knowledge, for his nature and all the objects are within the range of knowledge; just as the objects of sight are within the ken of the eye; though, there is no mutual inherence. The knower, who is beyond sense-perception, necessarily knows and sees the whole world, neither entering into nor entered into by the objects of knowledge, just as the eye sees the objects of sight. The knowledge operates on the objects, just as a sapphire, thrown in the milk, pervades 1. Pravacanasara, I. 24-26

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152 Edistemology of Jainas the whole of it with its lustre. If those objects are not within the knowledge, knowledge cannot be all-pervasive; the knowledge is all-pervasive, how the objects are not existing in it: The omniscient lord neither accepts nor abandons nor transforms the external objectivity, he is all around and knows everything completely". 1 Thus, we can see that the views of Kundakunda and Brahamadeva are based on the theory of omniscience. They generally exhibit the Vedantic influence. On the other hand Yasovijaya explains the all-pervasiveness in the light of Nyaya theory. The Aspects of the Self According to the Vedanta there are three aspects of soul : JIva, Isvara and pure consciousness of Brahman. Brahman is the absolute reality. JIva is personal soul and Isvara is universal soul. The latter two are the effects of avidya; yet, they are included into the six categories admitted as beginningless. 2 The other categories are : Pure consciousness (Brahman), Difference between Jiva and Isvara, Avidya and Relation between Avidya and Pure consciousness. But, the absence of beginning does not give them the status of permanence. All of them, except the pure consciousness are perishable. The Vedanta-conception, in this respect, resembles the Jaina conception of the relation between soul and the karmic matter. It is also beginningless, yet perishable. The Nyaya divides the self into two : JIva and Isvara. Both of them are eternal realities. Isvara is creator of the universe. JIva experiences the fruit of his doings according to adrsta. The only difference between the Nyaya and Vedanta conception is this, that the Nyaya holds them as permanent realities while the Vedanta does not recognise anything as permanent except Brahman. Isvara of the Nyaya is free from the laws 1. Pravacanasara I. 27-32 2. Jivah Isah visuddha cit tatha jivesayor bhida / Avidya taccitoryogah sa dasmakamanadayah ||

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The General Conception of Knowledge 153 that govern common souls. The knowledge, will and activity of the common souls are momentary, while those of isvara are permanent. Common souls know the object through a contact of sense with the object. Isvara perceives them directly. The knowledge of ord nary souls apprehends the object only, while for self-apprehension they require another cognition. i. e. anuvyayasaya. The knowledge of isvara is self-revefatory, Ordinary souls lose their knowledge and other special qualities in the state of liberation, Isvara holds them permanently. The Yoga does not recognise Isvara as an ontological reality, but holds it a mere hypothesis for the practice of yoga. The Sarkhya and probably the Vaisesika system before PraS istapada do not recognize the existence of God. They hold that all souls are similar in status as well as nature. The yoga system holds Isvara as a soul with eternal purity. It was never associated with ignorance or passion. It is the highest ideal of human aspiration. The Jaina also does not recognize any existence of God. It holds that all souls are fundamentally similar and enjoy the same status and nature. Only the karmic influence, which is a foreign matter, makes them different. The theory of evolution, according to Jainism, is the theory of different grades of the karmic influence. The states of the Liberated and the Bound Generally, all the systems, except those of Carvaka and Mimamsa, recognise two states of the common soul. According to the Nyaya and Vaisesika the liberated souls are dispossessed of all the special qualities that distinguish a soul from other objects. 1 According to Sankhya and the Vedanta the real soul is always free. The state of bondage is merely an illusion. According to the Buddhist the soul is a stream of 1. Prasastapadabhasya p. 281.

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754 Epistemology of Jainas successive psychical appearances. Liberation means the dis.. continuation of that stream. 1 Nirvana, as they recognize the liberation, is an extinction. According to Jainism moksa or liberation means freedom from the bondage of karmic matter. The person, who, once breaks the contact with karmic matter, is not associated with it again. This state is attained througii gradual progress attained by samvara and nirjara.? The liberated souls attain four perfections which were lying suppressed so far. The nature of Consciousness (Caitanya) According to Jainism consciousness is the very nature of the self, continued in every state under liberation of bondage. It is found in the lowest stage of the psychical evolution as that of Nigoda as well as in the omniscient. It is preseni in sleep3 also; otherwise the pleasing experience of sound and comfortable sleep, in the subsequent waking state, cannot be felt. This conception is based on the logic that the soul and non-soul are fundamentally different. They cannot be interchanged. If the soul, at a certain moment, has no consciousness, it would become non-soul; which is against the fundamental conception of dualism. Moreover, the object, once without consciousness cannot possess it, as it is in the case of matter. The consciousness though rot generated quite a new, is open to change and gradation. It is not an unchangeable eternity like cit of the Sankhya and the Vedanta. The Jaina differs from Buddhism also, which does not hold the factor of continuity in the successive conscious phenomena, The Jainas hold that consciousness is not merely a chain of successive momentary fiashes but a constant factor undergoing various changes. It is a permanent faculty with various manifestation. have clearly discarded Pure Consciousness and Jainism In the logical period the Jainism 1. Asvaghosa 2. Tattvartha 10.2 3, Tattvarthaslokavartika. p. 49

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The General Conception of Knowledge the existence of pure consciousness. They hold that consciousmess must have something as its object. In the case of self cognition also they regard self as the object. But in the agamic period we have certain references where the existence of pure consciousness is recognized. (1) The Prajnapanasutra divides upayoga into Nirakarapayoga (inarticulate cognition) and Sakaropayoga (articulate cognition). The term Nirakara is explained in the logical period, as samanyamatra-grahana or the cognition of mere existence. But generality also is an Akara. On this ground Virasena interprets Nirakara as appearance without any object. We shall discuss it in the Chapter of Darsana. (2) Akalanka states that consciousness has two forms,5 the cognition-form and the object-form. Cognition-form is like the mirror without any reflection. The object form is like that with reflection. Cognition-form is common in all apprehensions; but the object form is different with every appearance. The cognition form is pure consciousness. But the conception of pure consciousness according Jainism is merely a logical analysis. It is not a metaphysical state, as in the Sankhya and Vedanta systems, which hold it a permanent reality. But on discursive level, they also hold that pure consciousness cannot appear alone. Appearance is a mixed phenomenon. Another difference between Jaina and other systems, in this respect is related with the substratum of these two types of consciousness. According to Sankhya there are two separate entities supporting them. According to the Vedanta the former is real and self-supporting while the other is unreal, merely an illusion, based on the former. The Yogacara admits former as the support of the latter, while the former is self-supported. According to the Sautrantika 1. Sastravartasamuccaya 387-402 2. Prajnapana Upayogadvara 262 3. Pramananayatattaloka II. 8 4. Dhavala p. 38-82. 755

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156 Epistemology of Jainas they differ in time only. Pure consciousness appears at the first moment and the other in fater stages. According to Jainism both of them exist in one eternal, but changeable reaJity and both are equally real. The objects and content of Knowledge The above discussion leads us to another controversial point of great significance. There are two kinds of verbs : transitive and intransitive. To know is a transitive verb just like to cook' or 'to illumine'. A transitive verb must have some object to operate upon. Cooking is not possible unless there is some meterial to be cooked. An illumination is not possible unless there is something to be illumined. The object also is one of the means that helps in operation of a transitive verb. The Mimamsa system follows a quite realistic attitude in this respect and admits the object, not only a means of knowledge, but also holds that knowledge operates on the object and generates in it a quality of manifestedness (prakatya), just like in the act of cooking the quality of moisture (vikleda) is produced in rice or grain. Other non-Jaina systems also do not find any difficulty as they admit object also as one of the means of knowledge in one or other way. The Jaina explanation to this problem is this, that knowledge must have something as its object. But, it is not the same as the physical object. We may call the object of knowledge as its content, inorder to distinguish it from the material object. The jar which qualifies the cognition of jar (ghatajnana) is not the same as the material jar. The cognition of jar (ghata jnana) is a mental phenomenon, while the external jar a physical. The difference between mental and physical worlds is clear in other cases also. The physical approach to an object is quite different from the mental approach. The mental approach does not possess the external object as its destination, while the physical approach does. The destination of mental approach is the mental image. The same is

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The General Conception of Knowledge 157 the cause of memory. After sensation the mind begins to construct images, corresponding to the external object. These images are modifications of consciousness called jneyakara. Akalanka explains it in the following way: The reflection in a mirror is just like its prototype. But, the latter is not the content of mirror. The mirror contains the reflection only. Similarly, knowledge contains the images or concepts only. They distinguish one cognition from the other; and not the physical objects. It is immaterial whether those concepts resemble the external objects or depend upon them. We have the concepts of past and future objects also. Some of them are real, others mutilated or disfigured, others are merely fanciful. The theory of the two forms of jnanakara and joeyakara needs further elucidation just to avoid confusion with other systems. The Yogacara admits that the knowledge itself appears into the forms of subject and object; and the external objects do not exist at all. The Jaina view is different from it It holds that the external physical objects exist as they appear. But, they do not appear as the content of knowledge. The contents of knowledge are subjective while the material things are objective. The Sankhya and Vedanta systems hold vstti as taking the form of object. But, that is a real physical transformation. The antahkarana of the Vedanta and buddhi of the Sankhya are material objects. The consciousness or caitanya of the Jaina is not material. It is not transformed in the shape of the object. Jneyakara means the state of being qualified with the content. It is just like the mirror with reflection. The Jaina position differs from the coordination (tadakarata) of the Buddhist also. The Sautrantika holds that the jnana is coordinated with the object. The Jaina admits that it is mere attention of the object. The Vedanta and Sankhya hold pure consciousness and vittijnana as representing the jnanakara and jneyakara respectively. But, according to Jainism they are not two separate entities. They are one and the same thing. The division of two forms is merely logical.

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158 Epistemology of Jainas Thns, the eontent of the knowledge is not something different from knowledge itself. It is the qualification of knowledge. The Vedanta and Sankhya accept a separate existence of consciousness, which is pure and unqualified. The Jainas do not favour this vicw. They hold that conscionsness must have some content or qualification, in all its states. If we leave aside the grammatical conventions, which sometimes lead to confusion in the domain of philosophy, the question does not arise at all. It arises only in the act theory of Mimamsa, which has its own explanation. According to Jainas different cognitions are mere states or modes of the soul; just like coil and straightness of a snake. Those states may refer to particular object at a particular moment, but do not requirc the object as an essential cause. Mere reference cannot confer upon the obj:ct the credit of causation. Functions of Consciousness The modern psychology divides consciousness under three functions : knowing, feeling and willing. Gautama in his Nyayasutra enumerates six functions as the sings of the self.1 Out of them jnana is same as knowing in the modern psychology. Sukha (pleasure) and Duhkha (pain) are included into feeling; and Iccha (desire), Dvesa (hatred) and Prayatna (volition) are only different modes of willing. Abhidharma divides these functions into four skandhas or groups : They are Vedana (feeling) Samjna (ideas) Samskara (volition) and Citta Vijnana (pure consciousness, without content). The Jaina division, to some extent resembles that of Buddhism. The Jaina technical term for Citta or pure sensaction is Darsapa, for Samjna it is jnana, for samskara it is Moha. Vedana is the same as in Abhidharma. Cetana or Caitanya is the common cause of all these functions. According to Jainism these four funetions are related with the self 1. Nyayasutra 1.1.10; Vaisesikasutra 3.2.4 2. Stcherbatsky Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 15

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The General Conception of Knowledge 159 while according to Buddhism they are separate elements grouped together as Skandhas for convenience. They do not come from or belong to any common entity. Out of these four functions Darsana and Jnana are natural characteristics of the soul and exist in the state of liberation also. The remaining two functions, that is Vedana and Moha are the result of karmic influence. They exist in the state of bondage only. Mohaniya is included into four ghatikarmans; which effect the natural qualities of soul. Vedaniya is placed into aghatin karinans, which do not have any direct bearing on the virtues of soul. They are mainly concerned with the physical body. Desire, will etc. are the result of Moha. They are accompanied by pleasure or pain. Vedaniya is mere feeling. It is congenial or reverse according to the physical adjustment. The agreeableness or disagreeableness when accompanied by Moha, becomes intense. Bliss is not a Feeling: We have stated before Infinite Bliss' as one of the four Infinites, existing in the liberated souls. But it is not the same as pleasure. They differ from each other fundamentally. Pleasure results from the attainment of external objects which are desired or liked or which are congenial to our physical existence. Bliss is not produced. It is natural in the soul manifesting itself at the disappearance of Mohaniya karman. It corresponds to the pure Ananda in Brahman of the Vedantist, and pleasure corresponds to the result of Dharma (adrsta) as accepted by the Nyaya. Bliss is more of a negative nature, resulting from the destruction of worldly pains. Pleasure has a positive nature, resulting from the worldly gains. Feeling in the state of Arhatship: There is one more point that requires clarification. In the

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160 Epistemology of Jainas state of Arhatship or Jivanmukta, Mohanlya disappears totally while Vedanlya contiues, which can prodnce pleasure and pain in that state also. If it is said that pleasure and pain are generated by the presence of the desired and undesired ohjects respectively; they are not possible in the state of an Arhat, who has no desire at all on account of total destruction of Mohaniya. For this, our reply is, that congeniality or reverseness to the physical structure also sometimes produces pleasure and pain. An Arbat also feels the pain of pricking a nail intu his body and the pleasure of soft touch. The only distinction between him and a layman is that he is not affected er delighted on such occasions, while the latter does. The distinction between knowing and feeling, in the case of an Arhat, is very minute. We can explain it in the following way : The feeling of pleasure and pain can be divided into two types : mental and physical. Passion, hatred, love, anger and all other psychical states produce the first kind of feeling and it is the result of Mohansya karman, which does not exist in Arbats. The feeling generated by the effect of bodily states, such as disease, heat or coldoess, burt etc. constitutes ihe second type; which results from the presence of Vedaniya karman. This feeling exists in the case of Arhats also. It is inevitable with the existence of body. An Arhat knows the pricking of nail in the body of other person as well as in his own. But, he does not feel it which is confined to his body only. This constitutes the difference between feeling and knowing. Feeling and Knowledge Dharmak Irti identifies feeling with knowledge. He says that knowledge and feeling are not different from each other as they are produced by the same cause. In his view the difference in effect must have difference in the cause. The Jainas hold 1. Pramanavartika II 251

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The General Conception of Knowledge 161 that knowledge and feelings are two different modes of the same soul. They are not identical. Dharmakirti's view is mainly based on the principle that unity of cause must have the unity of effcct. The Jainas regard that this principle does not hold good in all cases. When a jar is broken, the cracking sound and the broken parts are produced simultaneously by the same cause. But, thay are not one and the same thing. - More over, it is wrong to hold that there is no difference in the cause. Feeling is produced from the presence of Vedaniya while knowledge is the result of the removal of Jnanavaraniya and Darsanavaraniya. No doubt, soul is the common cause in both cases; but that does not constitute the entire causation. There are many other factors involved in it. Knowledge and feeling differ in their appearance also. Fee:ing appears in the form of pleasure or pain while knowledge appears in form of experience of an object. Feeling is the object of liking or disliking as the case may be; knowledge in its pure state is above from these subjective considerations. Further, knowledge follows the object. A jar cannot be known as a cloth. In the case of illusion also certain objective qualities play:n important role. But, this is aot the case with feeling. It is not objective, but subjective. Fire produces happiness in a person shivering with cold; but, the same is unpleasant to a person perspiring with scorching beat. It follows that feeling does not depend upon the object but on the experient. As a matter of fact feeling is the subsequent stage of knowledge. When our body is touched with a hot iron the awareness of heat is not feeling, it is knowledge. At the second stage we feel it unpleasant or pleasant as the case may be. Sometimes we are indifferent. This feeling of pleasantness, unpleasantness or indifference is beyond the scope of knowledge. 1. Astasahasri p. 78

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162 Epistemology of Jainas The Nyaya? and Vaisesika2 also accept the difference between feeling and knowing. They are separate qualities inhering in the soul. Buddhi is a phenomenon resulting from the contact of senses with the object. Pleasurable and painful feelings are the results of Dharma and Adharma known as Adrsta. Adrsta also inheres in the soul; but according to Jainism the soul itself takes the modes of different feelings. The difference between the two notions is the same as exists regarding the position of soul and knowledge. The Sankhya also holds feeling as the effect of Praksti, but, different froin knowledge. As far as the ontological position is concerned no system holds any material difference between knowing and feeling. But, all the systems, except the Sautrantika, admit a difference between them, in the case of functions. In the ancient Buddhism also this distinction is clearly stated. Majjhimanikayas illustrates the distinction in the following way : In case of two sticks rubbed together, heat is produced simultaneously, so Veda:a takes place simultaneously with sparsa, for they are produced from the same cause. Consciousness and U papoga * The first two functions of consciousness, namely perception (darsana) and ideation (jnana) are known in Jaina terminology as Upayoga. It is a mode of the soul related with consciousness4. The term Upayoga literally means a relation by coming near; expressing the relation of the object with knowledge by coming into contiguity.5 This relation is not a contact as the Nyaya holds. According to Jainism the only thing that is required is the removal of obscurance. The soul is by nature an illuminer. The object is by nature open to be illumined. This relation of 1. Karikavali 145 2. Ibid. 3. Majjhimanikaya 4. Sarvarthasiddhi 2/8-9 5. Tattvarthabhasyatika ( S. S. Gaoin ) II. 8.

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The General Conception of Knowledge 163 the illuminer and illuminated is obstructed by the karmic veil. There is no other sort of distance between the two but, the obstruction of karman. As soon as it is removed, they come into natural relation. Upayoga means the establishment of this relation. The soul does not require any external means to illumine the object. They are helpful in removing the obstruction only. It means, Upayoga is the removal of this obstruction. In its positive sense it is nothing but the soul. Fire is naturally possessed of the power of burning. But the application of that power depends upon the coming of fuel into contact with it. Fuel does not generate the power or anything else. Similarly, the object does not generate consciousness or upayoga. Siddhasena defines upayoga in two ways? : (1) Firstly, upayoga means possession. It is possession of the stages of jnana and darsana in their limited sphere of objectivity by consciousness. The consciousness, which is a constant characteristic of the self, manifests itself into the stages of jnana and darsana. This manifestation is upayoga. But, this definition does not include the upayogas of kevalajnana and kevaladarsana as they are always manifest. They are constant. Siddhasena G. gives another definition for the inclusion of constant upayoga. (2) According to this definition Upayoga means attention of jnana and darsapa towards the object. This definition can be applied to the case of constant cognition also. Pujyapada defines upayoga as the mode of consciousness caused by two categories of means 2 Akalankas developing the idea of Pujyapada states that it is a mode of the cognizer, related wi h the consciousness; 1. Tattvarthabhasyatika II. 8 2. Sarvarthasiddhi II. 8 3. Tattvartharajavartika II. 8

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Epistemology of Jainas occurring at the possible presence of external and internal means. Akalanka stated all the factors pertaining to Upayoga. The first question is, what is upayoga? Akalanka replies that it is a mode of the cognizer. We have already stated that Jainism classifies reality in two fundamental categories; viz., Jiva and Ajiva. The three categories of Pramana, Pramata and Pramiti, stated by Vatsyayana come into the category of Jiva and the fourth cate: ory of Prameya is Jiva as well as Ajiva. The Jainas hold that it is one and the same thing that undergoes different modes and takes the positions of agent instrument and the result of knowledge. The second question is, "Do the Jainas admit every mode of the soul as upayoga?" Akalanka replies in the negative. Every mode is not upayoga, but only that which is related with consciousness. As a matter of fact consciousness or caitanya is power and upayoga is its application. This is exactly what is meant by the literal sense of the term. The third question is, "what are the causes of Upayoga ?" Akalanka replies that there are two types of causes External and Internal. Each of them is further divided into two Inseparable and separable. Thus, there are four types of sources: 164 (1) External inseparable (bahya atmabhuta)-Physical senses. They are external, because they are material and different from the soul. They are inseparable because they cannot be separated from the body, which is one with the soul as long as it is not liberated. (2) External separable (bahya anatmabhuta)-The object, light etc. which are external as well as separable. (3) Internal separable (abhyantara anatmabhuta)-The matter constituting physical mind which is the material cause of thinking etc. It is internal yet separable from the soul. (4) Internal inseparable ( abhyantara atmabhuta )-Bhavayoga or psychical activity of the soul resulting from partial or complete destruction of the obscuring karmic matter.

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The General Conception of Knowledge 165 All the above mentioned four types are not essential every where. In certain cases all are necessary, in others, three, two or even one can do. The fourth is essential everywhere. The same is the efficient cause or jnana. Vidyananda' refers to the two varieties of upayoga; viz , ksayika, resulting from the total destruction of obscurance and ksayopasamika, resulting from partial destruction. The first variety does not require any external or separable means. It solely depends upon the fourth type of causes, which is always present. On this ground the two types are described as permanent cognition (nityopayoga) and impermanent cognition (anityopayoga) ksayika upayoga is permanent, once appeared it never vanishes, ksayopasamika, on the other hand is impermanent. It appears and vanishes according to the external and internal conditions. But, it should be noted that this temporariness does not mean total disappearance. It only means a change in respect of objectivity, intensity, kind etc (as to depends on the proportion of the Karmic veil). These two types can be compared with the light of the sun and that of a candle respectively. The light of the sun pervades the whole region simultaneously. It does not require any movement from one place to another place for illumiping the objects. On the other hand the candle light is capable of illumining the objects placed in a narrow region. If we want to see the things outside that region, either we have to move the candle or bring the objects within that region. It can illumine those objects gradually. The Ksayika upayoga is like the sun. It is generated at the total destruction of karmic veil. The soul with its nature of consciousness begins to illumine all the objects simultaneously. It does not require any order to reach them. It is unlimited or infinite. Ksayopasamika upayoga is limited. It reaches the objects generally by order and has to leave the first object before reaching the other. This is why it is held as changing while the former as constant. 1. Tattvarthaslokavartika II. 8.

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166 Epistemology of Jainas Two Upayogas do not occur simultaneously All the systems agree that two cognitions do not occur at one and the same moment. But, they give different explanations for it. The Nyaya system explains it on the ground, which is atomic. It cannot contact two objects simultaneously. The Vedanta and Sankhya explain it on the ground of Vrtti (mode). The Bauddha also admits the theory of tadakarata (co-ordination), which explains the above fact. According to Jainism an omniscient apprehends all the objects in one upayoga. He does not require further upayogas to cognise other things. The objects of all the three times and the entire universe appear in one and the same cognition. But, the case of imperfect knowledge is different. It cannot focus on two objects simultaneously.1 One cannot have the attentions of cold and hot at one and same moment. It does not mean that two things are beyond the scope of one attention. We can have the attention of army which includes all the parts of it. But, the attention of army as related with collective noun is quite different from that individual parts. One cannot have the elephants and borses as the objects of one attention individually. Similarly, one object having the characteristics of hot and cold can be focussed in onc attention, but not the two characteristics considered individually. The principle of single upayoga at a time is not confined to the cognitions generated by the senses or mind only. The supersensual cognitions of avadhi and manahparyaya also have single focus at a moment. The case of omniscient also is not exempted from this rule. Kevalins also; are generally accepted as holding one upayoga at a time. But, the objective sphere of that upayoga is so vast that the above rule becomes insignificant. We shall discuss this problem in the chapter of kevalajnana. Identity between Soul and its function We have already discussed the question of identity between 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G 2439-43.

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The General Conception of Knowledge soul, i.e. the agent and the instrument of knowledge. It points out to the fact that soul is the only essential cause of cognition. But, that identity is not confined to the agent and instrument only. The Jainism holds it between the cause and effect also. Thus, knowledge is not totally different from the scul. We have stated before that the Jaina does not believe in pure existence or the existence as a separate category attributing other things with the status of existence. According to Jainism, existence means association with some purpose. Purposiveness is included into the very nature of every existent. The soul is associated with the purpose or activity of knowledge. Thus, the very existence of soul means its function of cognition. For instance, the existence and illumination are not two separate things in the case of light. They are identical with each other. The apparent difference is based on different relations. In relation to itself the light exists. In relation to an object it illumines. Similarly, the soul exists in relation to its own person, and it cognises in relation to objects. The same act is recognised as shining when related with the personal appearance of a luminary but, it is illumination in relation to the things under it. The same utterance is preaching as well as speaking in different relations. Burning is not different from the very existence of fire. Similarly, the existence of soul means the act of knowing. Further, cognition is a manifestation of the self. It is its self expression. Every thing manifests itself into this or that form. The earth manifests itself into the form of jar, cup etc. Those forms are not different from the earth. Similarly the cognitions of jnana and darsana are manifestations of the self. They are not separate from the latter. Akalanka stresses upon this identity on the basis of Evambhuta naya;1 the view-point that regards actual function denoted by a particular connotation, as an essential condition for that particular designation. According to it, a student does not 1. Tattvartharajavartika 1.1.26, page 6 167

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168 Epistemology oj Jainas deserve that calling when he is on leave or not actually engaged in study. A fire is not fire unless it produces heat or burns something. Similarly, a soul is not soul unless it knows something. Vidyanandal maintains that term Jnana has three senses--- Apprehension, the power of apprehension and the cogniser. Ontologically, they do not differ from one another. But, when considered epistemologically or with a view to point out some distinction, they are relatively different. He cites the example of fire. There are three aspects in it. The fire as substance, the fire as power of burning, and the fire as act of burning. We say, "The fire burns". The fire is agent, its power of burning is instrument and burning is action. Similarly, the soul is agent, consciousness or the power of knowing is the instrument and knowledge is the act. This explains the experience of difference among the three categories, actually they are one and the same thing. Vidyananda's expression of "svavivartavivartinoh" is very significant in this respect. It shows that the soul or consciousness does not leave its original state while engaged in the function of cognition. A snake is always snake whether it is in coil or straight. Similarly, a consciousness is always so, whether it knows a jar or cloth. The word vivarta is not used here in the Vedantic sense of the difference in reality; but, in the sense though both states stand on the same level of reality; one is changing and the other is continued. Jinabhadra gives three derivations of the term jnana which explain its different positions ultimately leading to their identity with the soul.2 According to the first derivation jnana means the process that leads to apprehension (janati iti ). It is that function of soul which leads to the appearance of an objecta 1. Tattvarthsslokavartika p. 58 2. Visesavasyakabhasya p. 80-81

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The General Conception of Knowledge 169 The same is known as upayoga. Vidyananda holds that the jnana is power ( labdhi ) and not upayoga'. Devasuria rejects this view and holds that labdhi cannot be the efficient cause of knowledge. The efficient cause ( karana ) means that which has the effect as its next stage. The labdhi and knowledge are not successive stages. They are mediated by upayoga. So, the upayoga only can claim to be the efficient cause of knowledge. But, the above objection is not very serious. Upayoga is the function of consciousness; and a function is not considered as an intervention between cause and the effect. The later logicians have changed the definition of karana accordingly. They hold that efficient cause is karana only when it is functioning. However, the function known as jnana is not different from the soul. The second derivation points out to the cause of knowledge (jnayate anena ). It is interpreted as the ksaya or ksayopasama of the corresponding obscurance. In its positive sense, it is also not different from the soul. The third derivation points out to the substratum (jnayate asmin ). It is nothing but the soul, where the quality of cognition subsists. Thus, jnana in its all the three aspects is nothing but soul. Relation between Subject and the Object or Proper Epistemology The definition of knowledge was analysed into three parts. The first part was related with the metaphysical position of knowledge, which has been already discussed. We have known that knowledge is a function of consciousness, that is, the soul. Now, we shall try to know what sort of function it is. In other words we shall try to find out how a subject comes in relation with the object, and thus, we enter into the second phase of the problem; which is the problem of epistemology proper. 1. Tattvarthaslokavartika 2.18.1, p. 327 2. Syadvadaratnakara p. 49-50.

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170 Epistemology of Jainas The relation between subject and object presupposes the existence of both the factors. But, the Indian as well as the Western systems hold different views regarding it. Some of them hold subject as the only reality, while others resort to the object only. There are others who hold both of them as real or unreal. The second point of controversy is, whether the subject is related with the object directly or through a via media. Amongst the Indian systems epistemology follows metaphysics. First, they fix up a particular notion regarding the nature of universe and then explain the subject object relation in consonance with their metaphysical conceptions. Epistemologicaily, we can divide the Indian systems as follows: Knowledge Realism Realism Idealismo Direct presentation Representation Nyaya mimarasa Jalina Sankhya Sautrantika Vedanta Yogacara T'he Existerice of Subject and Object : Before discussing the relation between subject and object we have to ascertain the real nature of these two notions. As far as phenomenal appearance is concerned both of them appear distinctly. There are no two views regarding it. But, regarding their real nature there is a lot of controversy. (1) The Advaita Vedanta holds that external objects do not exist independent of the subject. They are illusary projections

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The General Conception of Knowledge 171 subsisting in the latter. The subject has a real existence while the object has phenomenal existence. (2) The Yogacara maintains that the object does not exist at all. The subject itself appears into the two forms of subject and object. (3) The Madhyamika holds that the subject and object both are phenomenal. (4) The realistic systems on the other hand, hold independent and a real existence of both the suhject as well as object. But, they also hold divergent views regarding their actual nature. According to the Buddhist the object is absolutely particular without any mixture of generality which is purely subjective. According to Sankhya it is general. The others hold it as a combipation of both. The Jaina holds that the object exists independent of the subject and possesses the characteristics of generality as well as particularity relatively. The main objection against the idealist systems is this, that the apparant diversity in cognition can not be explained without diversity in the objects. If the objects do not exist at all or do not possess real existence, where from this diversity comes ? The example of dream also cannot explain it; because, the dreams are not absolutely unconnected with the objective reality. The world of dream is composed of only these objects as are already experienced. The only difference is that they appear in the relations different from their real existence. The past impressions also cannot explain this diversity as the diversity in impressions also must have some cause behind it. Ultimately, we shall have to admit some external cause responsible for diverse congnitions and impressions. Further, we observe a lot of difference between the subjective and the objective appearances. The appearance of pleasure pain etc. is subjective. It differs with the subject, No two persons feel alike. But, the appearance of jar, i. e.

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172 Epistemology of Jainas objective appearance is one and the same, in spite of the difference in cognisers. Objective appearance changes with the change of object. The subjective appearance, on the other hand, changes with the change of subject. The idealist cannot explain this difference between the two appearances. The Jaina is an empiricist. He holds that everything that is apprehended must have objective existence. He differs from the realistic Buddhism also, which holds the notion of class as merely conceptual. On the other hand he discards the Sankhya view also, which holds the notion of parucularity as merely conceptual. The Jaina holds that the aspects of generality and particularity, both are real and objective. Both of them exist in each and every object. Now, we come to the question of relation between the two. According to the Advaita Vedanta the object is related with the subject through the mode of antahkarana. The antahkarana goes out through the medium of senses and transforms itself into the form of object. This mode of antahkarana destroys the obscuring ajnana, lying with the consciousness conditioned by the object. "This results into the appearance of jar which was projected by avidya. According to Yogacara this relation means appearance of the subject in the form of object. Amongst realists the Sautrantika and Sankhya are the advocates of representation theory. The Sautrantika holds that jnana takes the form of object. This he calls tadakarata (coordination). Thus, cognition of jar mears the coordination of jar by jnana. The latter does not reach the object directly, but gets its coordination and can infer the existence of object, through it. The Sankhya holds that the object is reflected into the mode of buddhi. Cognition means the apprehension of that reflection only. In the vrtti of Vedanta the contact with the object is real. In the case of Sankhya it is merely a reflection. Thus, the buddhi is not able to reach the object directly.

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The General Conception of Knowledge The other realistic systems do not believe in the theory of representation. They hold that the object is presented to the subject directly. But, the presentation is not one and the same in all systems. (1) The presentation according to Nyaya means physical grasping. The term upalabdhi used by Gautama, Vatsyayana and Vacaspati signifies the idea. Udayana his substituted it by paricchitti (measuring) which also denotes the same thing. The Nyaya is very particular about its theory of contact. Cognition means the contact of the soul with the object through mind. The soul, according to Nyaya is all-pervading. It is always in contact with the objects far and near. But, that kind of contact is not sufficient for cognition. The contact that results into cognition must be through the mind. The soul is united with the mind, the mind with the senses, and the senses with the object. Thus, in the case of perception it is a four-fold contact. In the case of feelings it is two-fold, i.e. the soul is united with the mind. But, the contact between senses and the object is not same in all the cases. In the perception of a substance it is unity (samyoga). In the perception of gunas it is united-inherence ( samyukta samavaya ). In the case of generality existing in the gunas it is united-inherent-inherence (samyukta sama veta samavaya). In the cognition of sound it is inherence. In the case of generality existing in the sound it is inherent-inherence (samaveta samavaya). In the cognition of non-existence it is merely a qualification (visesanata ). Though the Naiyayika is very particular in establishing some short of physical contact between subject and the object; yet, his theory of six-fold contact is so generous that it can establish the contact anywhere. 173 - The MImamsaka also supports the theory of contact and all-pervasiveness of the soul. But, his idea of knowledge is different from the Nyaya, He holds knowledge not as grasping

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174 Epistemology of Jainas but as generating the quality of manifestedness (prakatya) on the object. The Jaina, in accordance with his notion of limited size of the soul, does not believe in the theory of contact or grasping. He contends that the soul is confined to the body, while knowledge can cover the whole universe. The relation with the object means simply illumination of the object. The sun while sticking to its own place illumines the earth. It is not necessary for him to stay with the object of its illumination. Similarly, the soul does not come into direct contact with the objects; nor they are represented by via media, but illumined by the soul when the obscurance of karmans is removed. Thus, according to Jainism knowledge means the removal of this obscurance which paturally results into the illumination of an object. Further, this illumination is not a quality generated in the object as the Mimamsaka holds. The knowledge is totally a subjective phenomenon. Illumination also is the function of soul. The Jaina term for it is upayoga (attention). The main objection against the Mimamsa is this, if the quality of manifestedness is produced in the object, the latter should be apprehended also by the person who is not attentive. On the other hand the effect of manifestation by a particular subject is confined to that person only. In the case of light where the illumination is an objective phenomenon, the illumined object is open to the vision of every body. The objective phenomenon of touc'i is open to everybody's apprehension. But the quality of manifestedness generated by A is not open to B. It is therefore, purely subjective. This Jaina position is uuique in this respect. It admits neither reflection, nor modification. The illustration of the sun also does not explain the position fully. Kundakunda cites the example of sapphire placed into milk. The sapphire makes the milk appear green without pervading the entire area. But, this example also does not explain the phenomenon of illu

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The Gen, ral Conception of Knowledge 175 mination as an individual factor related with the subject only Kundah unda's View Explained Kundakunda maintains that whatever knows the object, is knowledge. It modifies itself and all the objects stand in knowledge. The two commentators, Amotacandra and Jayasena take different courses to explain it. Amotacandra takes the position of Sautrantika and holds that knowledge takes the form of object. This change in form is caused by the object; and consequently the latter stands in knowledge. Standing in know edge according to this interpretation is to be reflected in knowledge. But this view goes against the Jaina position in two ways, Firstly, the Jainas do not admit the knowledge as taking the form of object. The Jaina logician have criticised the Sautrantika bitterly, on this very issue, Jneya kara, as we have already stated, is not a mode of jnana but, the state of being qualified. Secondly, the Jaina does not admit object as the cause of knowledge, to which the above interpretation naturally leads. Jayasena's interpretation is more logical. He holds that the statement that all bjects stand in knowledge should not be taken in literal sense. It is only an allegorical statement just as we say that mirror contains the jar. As a matter of fact the mirror does not hold the jar but, only gets its reflection. Similarly, the object does not stand in knowledge. It is only manifested in it. He only means that a cognition never appears without having an object as its data'im. Whenever there is a cognition it must be associated with some object. Thus, an object in the form of datum must stand in knowledge. It does not mean that Kundakunda is in favour of the theory of representation. This confusion rises from the Jayasena's simile of mirror. Bat, we should note that Jayasena writes "adarsa bimbamiva" and not "pratibimbamiva'. He does not say that the object stands in knowledge just like the reflection of an object. He says that the object itself stands in the mirror.

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176 Epistemology of Jainas The reflection is only a via media. Similarly, the object itself stands, in knowledge through its via media of objectivity. The word 'vyavaharena' is significant here. He means by it that the above view can be held in a discursive way only. Actually, the position is quite different. Kundakunda himself bas stated the actual position by saying "The knower has knowledge for his natvre and all the objects are within the range of knowledge, just as the objects of sight are within the ken of the eye, though there is no mutual inherence" "The knower, who is beyond sense perception necessarily knows and sees the whole world neither entering into nor entered into by the objects of knowledge, just as the eye sees the objects of sight. "The knowledge operates on the objects, just as sapphire. thrown into milk, pervades the whole of it with its lustre."2 As a matter of fact, Kundakunda analyses the roblem in two aspects. The knowledge as power and the knowledge as function. As far as the knowledge as power is concerned it is confined to the body only, and we cannot say that objects stand into knowledge. But, as regards the function it is not limited; just as a lamp has its function of illumination beyond the place it occupies; knowledge also covers the entire universe with its function. It can be further asked that knowledge is either instrument or agent. In both cases its operation is possible only at the spot of its existence. When the soul has a limited size the cognition of distant objects is not possible. This question does pot arise in the case of Sankhya, Vedanta, Nyaya and Mimamsa, because they hold soul as omnipresent and maintain different theories to establish its real contact with the object. Kundakunda analyses the question in two view-points of popular aspect (vyavahara dssti) and that of real aspect 1. Pravacanasara I. 29.

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General Conception of Knowledge 177 (biscayadssti). According to the former the soul is co-extensive with knowledge and knowledge is co-extensive with the object. In the case of omniscient the object of knowledge comprises the whole physical and non-physical universe therefore, knowledge is omnipresent. He who does not admit the soul to be co-extensive with knowledge, must concede that the soul is either smaller or greater than knowledge. If the soul is smaller, knowledge being insentient cannot know, if greater, how can it know in the absence of knowledge ? The great Jina is every where and all the objects in the world are within him, since the Jina is an embodiment of knowledge and since they are objects of knowledge. In this view Kundakunda, under the influence of the Vedanta, has made an attempt to reconcile the Jaina view of the limitedness of the soul with the Vedanta. But it has resulted in a confusion and the Jina position regarding the theory of knowledge has become rather indefioite. None of the later scholars has appreciated this view and has supported the theory of presentation regarding knowledge. According to the real aspect the knowledge and object are separate from each other. They are defined differently. They are not co-extensive. They are related in a subject-object relation, without any physical mixing. The Object of Knowledge The third point in the definition of knowledge is related with its object. According to the definition of Yasovijaya the knowledge illumines the object as well as the self. The Nyaya holds that knowledge manifests the object only. It cannot reveal itself. The knowledge of a jar can be known by a second knowledge, which is called Anuvyavasaya or afterthought. The Nyaya theory is based on the contention that nothing is cognized unless it comes into contact with the soul through mind. This rule is equally applicable to the external as well as the internal objects. Even the attributes of soul, such

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178 Epistem ulogy of Jainas as pleasure, pain, desire etc. are not known until the mind comes into their contact. Knowledge, according to the Nyaya, as has been stated before, is grasping in the physical sense. This grasping implies difference between the object grasped and that which grasps. The factor of grasping which is another name of knowledge, can not be grasped by itself. It requires another knowledge to be grasped. The main objection against the Nyaya, advanced by other systems, is that the contention of after-thought leads to regress ad infinitum. If the cognition of jar requires another cognition to be cognized, the second cognition would require a third one and so on. The Nyaya replies to the objection that the judgement of the existence of jar stands in need of the apprehension of jar only. The second judgement, regarding the knowledge of jar requires another knowledge to apprehend it. It is not necessary for the first judgement that its knowledge must be cognized. The regress ad infinitum is applicable only if the first judgement is impossible without the second and second without the third. In the present case first judgement occurs with cognition of the jar without waiting for its own apprehension. The Jaina contends that no judgement can be confirmed unless its source is apprehended. The Bhatta school of Mimamsa goes a step further and holds that the knowledge of object i. e. pot, is not perceived even at subsequent moment. It is never directly known, either with the object or at a subsequent moment of reflection. The dictum runs, "Just as the tip of a finger cannot touch itself, so knowledge cannot know itself by itself". Knowledge is known, however, through inference. In order to explain the quality of manifestedness (jnatata) abiding in the object we must suppose, for want of any other explanation, that there was such a thing as knowledge of the object. Knowledge, therefore, is never known directly; it is inferred through the quality of knownness, that exists in the object and is experienced in the appearance of the pot.1 1. Bbattacintamani, p. 18

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General Conception of Knowledge 179 Prabhakara disagrees with Kumarila and holds every cognition as self.illuminative. He maintains that each and every apprehension is constituted of the three factors of knowledge, the self and the object. He calls it as triputr-pratyaksa.1 Murari Migra on the other hand holds that after the cognition of pot, there is an after-appearance which has the above mentioned three factors as its objects. The Advaitins do not accept any of these positions. Against Bhatta they argue : The Bhattas seem to think that, as a result of the knowing activity of the self the object (the pot) comes to acquire the quality of being known which is similar to its other qualities of size, colour, etc. and that the knowledge of the pot is to be inferred from this objective of quality. But, this theory is unintelligible; because, we cannot understand how the knowing activity of the self should be able to endow the object with the quality of knownness, which is to be conceived as objective like the properties of colour, size, etc. It is contradictory to think, as the Bhattas do, that knowledge is the activity of the self, and yet, the result of this activity (viz. knownness) is an objective characteristic on a par with colour, size, etc. The result of the activity of the self must be in the self and not in the object; that is, it must be subjective and not objective. The attempt to infer the knowledge of an object from any objective characteristic is, therefore, doomed to failure. Consequently, the theory of the Bhattas is untenable. As against the Naiyayikas, the Advaitins argue that the theory that knowledge known in a subsequent reflective knowledge involves a great difficulty. To suppose one knowledge to be the object of another knowledge is to hold that two states of knowledge exist together at the same time, which is inconceivable. It faces one more difficulty. The Nyaya holds that the subsequent reflective knowledge, in which the previous knowledge is known as an object, is a self-conscious judgement of 1. Bhattacintamani, p. 18. 2. Ibid,

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180 Epistemology of Jainas... the form, "I know the pot (ghatam aham janami)" or what is the same as "I possess the knowledge of pot" (ghata jnapavanaham). In such a case, the knowledge (of the pot) comes to be perceived as a quality inhering in the self. The self is directly perceived, and knowledge is perceived indirectly through perception of the self. In the Nyaya scheme of relations between the mind and the percept, already explained, the relation between the perceiving mind and this knowledge falls within the class of samyukta samavaya i. e. inherence in the conjoined. For, in this case first there is a direct connection of mind with the self, and then, through the self, with the knowledge inhering in it. But, this account of the Nyaya does not satisfactorily explain the knowledge of knowledge. The self according to the Nyaya has many qualities inhering in it and all of them are not held to be perceived in the perception of the self. As the attribute of a self is not necessarily perceiyed, therefore, in the perception of the self, it is of little help to say that knowledge is perceived as being an attribute of the perceived self. For, even then, to answer the question why the attribute knowledge should be perceivable, whereas some other attributes of the self are not perceivable, the Nyaya must say, because knowledge is an attribute of the nature of which is to be perceived. "If so, the Vedantist asks, wbat harm is them in supposing that it is the very nature of knowledge to be perceivable, they gain little by resorting to the round about way, of explaining that knowledge is perceived as an attribute inhering in the self, which is perceived by the mind. The Vedantins themselves hold tbat it is the nature of knowledge to be self-manifest. When the pot is known, the knowledge of the pot also becomes manifest at that very moment. The self manifesting the nature of knowledge is regarded by the Vedantins to be a natural subiective characteristic, which, therefore, cannot be classed under immediacy (pratyaksatva) as pertaining to objects. As Madhavacarya puts it.Things like pots are perceived as objects. But knowledge being self-manifest

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General Conception of Knowledge 181 cannot be regarded as an object of perception." The Jainas also hold knowledge as self-manifest. It is like the lamp which illumines the object as well as itself. The selfmanifestation and the manifestation of the object are not two functions. It is one function, where all the three factors of knowledge, the self and the object appear simultaneously. The Jina Stand-point clarified The theory of manifestation or illumination implies that our knowledge solely depends upon experience. Whatever we know is given, and enjoys an existence independent of the mind. Not only the substances or physical qualities but the relations, class concepts and all other categories have their objective existence. According to Jainism a thing is possessed of an infinite oumber of attributes and characteristics. Out of them certain qualities are natural (svabhava) while others are derivative (Vibhava) i. e. caused by external association. Consciousness in Jiva is a natural quality. It is neither produced nor destroyed. The Jiva does not depend upon any external factor for its possession. But the possession of divine or human body is not independent. The Jiva depends upon pudgala or other factors for their possession. They are not natural. Similarly, pudgala has corporeality as its natural quality. But, its transformation into a physical body is derivative. According to the Vedanta, the natural qualities are real, while others unreal. But, according to Jainism, there is no difference between the two as far as reality is concerned. Perishability or permanence have no value in this respect. Everything that exists, temporary or perm nent, natural or derivative, is on the same level as far as reality is concerned. All of them are objective and external. Reality is not confined to the Existence only Further, the Jaina does not believe that reality is confined to the existences only; which is only an aspect of it. The reality

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182 Epistemology of Jainas consists of many other aspects also in addition to the existence, The aspects of existence and non-existence are governed by four factors. They are: Substantiality (Dravya), Space (Ksetra), Time (Kala) and State (Bhava). Everything exists in relation to its own substantiality, space, time and the state. The same thing does not exist in relation to the substantiality etc. possessed by another thing. But, as far as reality is concerned, both aspects are objective and stand on equal footing. As a matter of fact they are implied by each other. Existence implies nonexistence in relation to the factors Other than governing the existence. Similarly, non-existence implies existence in different relations. One without the other is unconceivable. To say, that one is real and objective and the other as unreal and merely conceptual has no reason. The cognition of both the aspects is an experience, based on external reality. The Jaina differs from the Mimamsa also which holds that the cognition of absence (abhava) as purely mental. Generality and Particularity What has been said about existence and non-existence, applies to the question of generality and particularity also. The Buddhists like Dinnaga and Dharmaksrti hold that sense-experience is confined to particularity only. The class-concepts are purely mental and are added to the particulars afterwards. Kant also holds that the time, space, class and all other categories of understanding are supplied by the mind. According to Jainism generality and particularity, both are objective. Nothing is supplied by the mind. They are two aspects of the same reality rolled into one. The mind only arranges them. Knowledge : True and False It can be argued; if nothing appears in knowledge which does not exist objectively, the difference between true and the false would disappear; as both of them would refer to the objects existing externally. The Jaina replies that objectivity or subjectivity of a cognition has nothing to do with its truth or

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General Conceplion of Knowledge 183 falsehood. A cognition is false when the samething appears in the context other than its own. In the case of the conch-shell appearing as silver, the silver exists in relation to its own substantiality of silverness. It does not exist in relation to shelloess as it appears in the present case. Similarly, it exists in relation to its own space, i. e, the shop where it is sold, and not in relation to the space where it is appearing. The same is the case with time and state also. The Jaina does not hold that the silver is purely mental as the Vedanta or Yogacara does. He says the silver and shell both exist in relation to their contexts. A cognition is false when the context is disordered. False knowledge is that which represents things in relation in which they do not exist. When a rope, in a badly lighted place, gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion consists in taking the rope to be a snake i, e. perceiving the snake where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is no untruth in that. The error, thus, consists in this, the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a snake under relations and environments in which it is not then existing, is, what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake was later on contradicted and thus, found false. Falsehood, therefore, consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations to the objects of our judgement as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When I mistake the rope for a snake, the snake actually exists, though its relation with 'bis' as 'this is a snake' does not exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus, called Sadasatkhyati or misrelating the existents. The truth and falsehood of the context are ascertained by the subsequent correspondance or contradiction. The criterion of falsity is not subjectivity of the appearance, but its contradiction. If a judgement is contradicted by another judgement of unquestionable truth, the former is to be rejected as untrue.

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Epistemology of Jainas Subjective experience, as illustrated by dream, is rejected as false because it is contradicted by the waking experience. There is no intrinsic characteristic of falsity. The problem of falsity is thus, ultimately a question of experience. The problem of truth also is no less a matter of experience and a priori logic is absolutely incompetent to deal with it. We have discussed it further in the chapter on ajnana. The Personal experiences explained 184 Again, It can be asked; if the whole data of knowledge are supplied by the experience, how do you explain the cognitions based on personal attitude? The same person is cognised by one subject as his enemy, while by the other as his friend. If the attributes of enmity and friendship are possessed by the object, why they are not common to both the subjects. The subject holding friendly attitude does not see the object as an enemy and the subject holding hostile attitude does not perceive him as a friend. Moreover, if they are the objective characteristics; why they are not perceived by an omniscient? If they are perceived, how do you explain his attitude of indifference? The Jaina replies that the above notion has two aspects. It is concerned with knowledge as well as feeling. When both of them are intermixed, they result into a confusion There is a lot of difference between the appearances when we feel an enemy and when we know an enemy. The knowledge of enemy is totally objective while its feeling is subjective. Like all other judgements the judgement of 'He is an enemy' also is relative. None can say that this statement is unconditional. A person is enemy in relation to a particular person, time or occasion. Enemy means a person hatred or harmful attitude towards another. If a person really possesses such an attitude he is enemy of the person towards whom he holds such an attitude; and this judgement is not particular to any subject. Even a dispassionate person (vItaraga) can behold it. It does not, in any way, affect his own attitude towards the object of the judgement. He only knows his (of the object; attitude of

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General Conception of Knowledge 185 enmity towords a particular person. The omniscient himself is free to have his own attitude. He is not dependent in that respect. Similarly, a third person also can know the state of affairs as good as the persons involved in it. But, he is not affected with the results and, therefore, is free from the feeling of pleasure or pain. The feeling of enmity is a sort of mental pain, which is like all other feelings, subjective. It results from the intensity of hatred lying with the subject. If the hatred is not intense the feeling will be mild. An omniscient is absolutely free from it, and therefore, does not have such feelings. Similarly, a third person who is not attached with the result, is away from such feelings. An omniscient does not hold harmful attitude towards any. body; and therefore, he is anemy to none. Still, enother person can have hostile attitude towards him. He can feel the omniscient as his ememy and the question of its being right or wrong does not arise. It pertains to ethics and not logic. But, when a third person or he, himself, makes a judgement proposing the omniscient lord as his enemy he is wrong. Because, the factors that can establish the enmity do not exist in relation to the omniscient. One can explain this point in another way also. Three ladies perceive a person in different relations. For one, it is a perception of the son, for second that of the brother and for third that of the husband. It can be asked whether these qualities are actually possessed by the person so perceived, or they are imposed by the ladies concerned. If they are objective why they are not common to all of them ? The Jaina reply to this question also is the same as that of the former. As far as knowledge is concerned the judgement is common. Everybody can see a person as brother in relation to a particular lady. Even his wife knows that A is brother of B. But the pleasure that results from the sight of a brother is particular to that lady only to whom he is so related. The quali

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186 Epistemology of Jainas tjes of being brother, husband or son are as objective as those of being jar etc. Just as, we call a thing 'jar' in relation to a particular form etc., similarly, we call a person brother who stands in a particular relation to the other person Both connotations depend on the popular conventions. There is no ground in viewing one as objective and the other as subjective. The Jaina and Different forms of Objectivism With a view to have a clear vision of the Jaina position we can further compare it with the three trends of the objectivism prevalent in the western philosophy. The Jaina and Primitive Objectivism The inethod of primitive objectivism conceives of every object of experience as existing, and as existing independent of the fact that it is experienced. Just as a chajr can stand in relation of nearness to a table without depending in any way for its cxistence upon that relation, so from this most extreme of the realistic standpoint any object can stand in relation of being known by someone without being in any way affected thereby. Things are apart from us just as what they seem when experienced by us. This appears to be the standpoint of the child and the savage. It does not make any distinction between the events that appear in dreams and illusions, and the events that figure in waking life as common to many individuals. The illusory objects, instead of being regarded as mental or subjective, are considered by primitive realism to be merely queer and unreliable physical existents. The child does not think of dreamland as a place within his head, but, as a remote and fantastic realm, some how cut off from the world of waking life. And as it is with the dreamland of the child, so it is with the ghostland of the savage, which is populated in large measure with the products of his dreams, fancies and tribal legends. The Jaina does not admit physical existence of the world of dreams as it appears. Nevertheless, the constituents of the dreamland are as physical as those of the waking world.

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General Conception of Knowledge According to Jainism the knowledge of every being except that of the omniscience is alloyed with passions and other karmic effects; which disfigure or colour the vision like the coloured glasses. They do not allow the object to appear in its own context. This disfiguring sometimes amounts to a very high degree and we call it illusion. When the degree is not so high we consider it valid cognition. The difference between the two is that of degree and not quality. The cognition of a layman is valid to certain degree only. Nothing is absolutely valid or invalid. Even the appearance of the moon as two or with smaller size is valid as far as the existence of the moon is concerned. It is wrong in respect of the number and size which are not related with the object. It is caused by the external causes such as the displacement of the eyeball or distance. Dream is nothing but the memory revived. Its material is supplied by the past experience. On account of sleep (nidra) a variety of Darsanavaranlya, the memory does not appear in its own characteristic. Mohantya disfigures it through the forces of hatred, desire, passion, etc. and makes it appear in a queer form. We call the dream an illusion or invalid cognition because, the memory is so disfigured that it loses its ownself and the karmic effect comes into foreground. In the waking state also, when darkness, inner fear and such other factors pollute the vision, the rope appears as a snake. The difference between knowledge and the disfigurement is this, that the former is the result of the removal of karmic obscurance while the later results from the karmic rise (udaya). The first depends upon the object while latter on the subject. 187 Thus, the Jaina does not discard the subjective element altogether, but holds that it is not knowledge. We have already stated that feeling and willing, the psychical functions other than knowledge, are no doubt, subjective. But, as far as knowledge is concerned, it has nothing which is not given. We can further clarify this point by comparing it with a mirror. The mirror does not reflect anything which does not exist externally. But

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188 Epistemology of Jainas if there is some defect in the glass or polish the reflection is disfigured. This disfiguring is not reflection though it appears alongwith it. Similarly, the elements of illusion are not knowledge, though they appear with the latter. The primitive objectivism accepted every form of appearance as knowledge without any discrimination, while, the Jaina analyses such experiences into two parts; the one is knowledge and the other is feeling, a non-cognitive function of consciousness. The koowledge is a natural function of the same while the latter is a karmic influence. The primitive objectivism accepted the appearance of dreams also as having a corresponding physical world. According to Jainism it is worked out by memory plus karmic effects. The Jaina and Commonsense Objectivism The common sense objectivism regards the so-called unreal as merely subjective and exclusively inside the mind, while at the same time all that is physically real, is regarded as independent of, or external to the mind, although directly or immediately present in it. The technical weakness of the commonsense realism consists in the fact that the admittedly real objects of our experience can be shown to be (selectively) relative to the minds that know them, to exactly the same extent as the objects of the most fantastic dreams; and if (selective) relativity implies subjectivity in one case it should imply equally in the other. The difficulty in maintaining the modified realism of the common sense epistemology can be perhaps more clearly seen, if we take the stand-point of a bystander or uninterested observer who views the knowledge situation as it appears in relation to a mind other than his own. From this stand-point we find that another persons' report of what he experiences does not depend merely or primarily upon the nature of the objects themselves, as we experience them, but, upon the posi.

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General Conception of Knowledge 189 tion and general condition of the person who makes the report. To illustrate : If my neighbour and I are both looking at some common physical object, such as chair or a mountain, and if my neighbour presses his eyeball and reports the resulting movements in the object, which to me continues to appear motionless, then I see myself forced to believe that the object which he experiences, some how depends upon his action, and there it differs from the object which I experience, and which I assume to be independently real. In short, when my neighbour's experience of such things as chairs and tables differs from my own, by varying with his position and behaviour I explain the discrepancy by assuming that the objects of his experience exist only in his mind and not in the space that surrounds us. Thus, there comes to be formed the notion of a realm of 'mere ideas' or 'states' of consciousness dependent upon the knower and separate from the real objects to which they more or less accurately correspond. These secondary or subjective objects are at first conceived as residing only in the minds of others. We continue to think of ourselves as apprehending the external world directly and truly, even after we discover that our neighbours can apprehend it only indirectly in the form of subjective effects or images which it produces in them. This naively egotistic attitude, however, cannot long endure. The same reasons that made us believe that our neighbours perceived internal reflections or copies of things rather thao things themselves will be advanced by them as proof that we, too, are cut off from a direct consciousness of anything other than our own mental states. The Jaina does not draw any line between the true and false cognitions as far as their objectivity is concerned. The data of false cognition is as objective as that of the true. The only difference between them, as has been stated before, lies in their relative appearance. In true cognition a thing appears in the same relations as it persists. In false cognition it appears in a perverted form. The reality or pervertedness of an

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190 Epistemology of Jainas appearance is ascertained through subsequent correspondance or contradiction. We know the vision of a person as perverted when his knowledge is contradicted by the subsequent cognitions or other tests. On the contrary if cognition corresponds to the subsequent factors, the vision is true. The Vedanta and other schools of idealism argue that in the world of dream we see one dream holding correspondance with the other. The cognition of a person having jaundiced eye can be confirmed by another person having the same defect. We cannot say merely on the basis of this correspondance, that the preceding cognition was true. The Jaina replies that correspondance does not mean merely support by the subsequent factor, but a confirmation by a cognition or behaviour of unquestionable validity. According to Jainas the absolute validity can be obtained in the state of omniscience only; wbere a thing can be known in all its aspects. In the case of discursive knowledge the validity or invalidity depends on the subsequent behaviour. Ultimately, we have to accept an authority on which all the cognitions can be tested. If we question, Vidyananda says, even the validity of that fundamental standard, we can stay nowhere; and the system of entire philosophical structure will collapse. The difficulties that stand in the way of the common sense objectivism do not arise in the case of Jainism; because, it accepts a test of the validity, whose authority is final. The Jaina and New Objectivism The third form of the objectivism holds that concrete objects of perception owe their nature to the relations in which they stand to the individuals who perceive them. In order to clarify this point, let us consider the case of an apparent convergence of the parallel rails of the track as viewed from the rear platform of a train. The relativistic objectivist, would explain the appearance that the converging rails were as physical, external and objective as the parallel rails

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General Conception of Knowledge 191 themselves; but, that each pair of rails is relative to a context rather than independent and absolute. The same rails may in one context be parallel; in another, convergent; in still another perhaps, divergent. The whole situation can, moreover, be explained in terms of purely physical (optical) laws, without invoking any psychic factor or mind, where a photographic plate put in place of the human eye the result would be analogous, if not identical. The new objectivist explains the cases of dreams and outright hallucinations also on the same line as those of distorted perspective. The brain of a person suffering from hallucination must be considered in relation not only to the present, but also to those past events of the material world with which it has interacted and which constitute what we call its 'memories' or 'apperception mass'. The usreal objects which appeal to the diseased imagination as external, are external in that particular and highly complicated system that includes past events together with the present abnormal condition of the persons' blood and nerves. To express the whole view in technical terms we may characterize relativistic objectivism as the theory that the relations between two phenomena of experience are rarely dyadic, but are always at least triadic; that what appears to be a simple case of A. R. B. (A related in a given way to B) is in reality a case of (A-R-B.) R-C- (A related to B with reference to a given context C); and an important element in the context C will be the brain of the percipient. The first difficulty with this position consists in the fact that the diverse appearances of the same thing in different context always presuppose a single primary system of events, each of which occupies a single unequivocal position in objective space-time and it is by means of tbis single public and physical system that the variety of private and subjective perspectives can be explained and harmonized. Thus, to return to our illustration of the parallel train tracks : there are as many degrees of apparent or perspective convergence of the rails as

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Epistemology of Jainas there are points of observation in a straight line. But, despite these variations of perspective, the rails behave as if they were parallel, and the whole series merely perspective convergence can be explained as the simple optical effects upon differently situated recipients which would be produced by a single pair of really parallel rails. 192 The second objection is based on the fact whether or not we always ought to be content with apprehending facts and relations with the qualifying phrase "real for us" or true in this context', we are never thus content. Unless we are conscious of being deceived, every one of our cognitive assertions-the most immediate perception no less than the most reflective judgement claims to transcend the context in which it occurs and to confer upon its objects a status of universal and absolute existence. The Jaina also believes in relativity, but his conception of relativity is quite different from that of the new objectivist. According to Jainism the nature of a thing is not relative in the sense that it exists in relation to a particular point of vision only. A thing possesses innumerable qualities without depending upon the cognizer. In the case of derivativa (Vibhava) adventitious. qualities also we can only say that they are They are generated by a cause different from the self. But, while they are existing they are as real as the natural ones. The soul and the body constitute one unit in the form of a man. It may depend upon external factors for its birth, but once produced it stands by itself. Its existence does not depend upon the relation with the cognizer. It will exist, without consideration of being looked at from a particular point of view. At the time of expression we stress upon one point and ignore the others. It does not mean that it exists in relation to the very point of outlook. It exists in relation to the very nature of the reality. For, instance, a thing is external as well as evanescent. The eternity and evanescence do not depend

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General Conception of Knowledge upon any external factor. But, when a person wants to stress. upon one of them he expresses it in relation to this or that. factor. That existence does not depend upon the cognizer. The : cognizer is free to choose any of the qualities already existing : for his expression. He cannot impose anything new. Similarly,.. no quality exists in relation to him. Secondly, the Jaina does not say that all the qualities and! relations are physical. The existences are physical as well as non-physical. But non-physicality does not necessarily mean subjectivity. There are many non-physical objective qualities; such as knowledge, action etc. which are neither subjective. por physical. Thirdly, the Jaina would not say that the perception of the convergence of the rails is true. It emphatically denies the relation of convergence with the rails. It only says that all the factors of convergence and rails are supplied by the experience. The defective appearance is the result of the defective sight or angle of vision. We cannot say that the convergence or other relations exist as they appear. They are wrongly imposed there by the defective sight, passions or other factors. Thus, the Jaina is free from the difficulty which was faced by the objectivist. The Jaina does not place all the notions, true as well as wrong at the same lavel. According to him, both are: objective, but in the one case the context is real while in the other perverted. Moreover, subjective elements as those of feelings, passions and others also play an important part in such cases. They are generally a mixture of feeling and knowing. If we dissect the two elements clearly the difficulty will be removed by itself. The Jaina and Kant According to Kant our knowledge, no doubt, begins with experience, but is not wholly derived from experience. Knowledge consists of impressions derived from experience, together with other elements supplied by the faculty of knowledge from.

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194 Epistemology of Jainas within itself. "This leaf is green" is a piece of knowledge. The mere green impression of the sense represents no knowledge, till it is organized by the ideas of substance (leaf) and quality (green) supplied by the understanding. Our faculty of knowledge however, cannot work unless it gets its material from sense impressions. The Jaina agrees with Kant as far as be holds that experience and mind both cooperate in production of knowledge. But, the Jaina does not admit any element supplied from withio. No doubt, our mind organizes the material supplied by the experience, but it does not add anything new. The whole material comes from experience. The Jaina admits that the factors of universality and necessity, on which Kant propose certain categories of thought conceived as a priori, are not mental phenomena. They also are given. The Jaina does not find any reason why a portion of knowledge should be accepted as external and the other as internal. The ideas of substance and quality also are not purely subjective. They are also as external as the leaf. Experience Cognises Universal as well as particular There is another point on which the Jaina differs from the rationalists. Kant holds that sense experience can give insight into particulars only and the universal forms are contributed by thought or the mind. The Jaina does not see any reason why things should be particulars alone. Things are, according to the Jaina, both universals and particulars together. In the term of Hegel they are concrete universals. Reflective thought certainly enables us to analyse the two aspects in a concrete real, but that does not argue the inability of experience to take stock of reality in its universal character. A real is a particular which possesses a generic attribute. There is no reason why experience should fail to take cognizance of the generic aspect though it is present in it. Emergence of concept The Jaina does not find any difficulty in accounting for the

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General Conception of Knowledge 195 emergence of concepts. It is reflection, no doubt, which is necessary for the evolution of conceptual thought, but reflection is grounded in experience, which in its turn directly derives from reality. Experience furnishes unanalysed data with the universal and particular rolled into one. Reflection only distinguishes the two elements and this has been misconstrued to be the original contribution of thought. But thought does not impose the universal. It only discovers its existence in the real. If the universals were the subjective creations, our experience would have to be denounced as valueless, as particulars, even if perceived, would yield no knowledge, as Kant has proved. If experience be not unnecessarily condemned to take stock of particulars only, for which there is no logical necessity, and if again universals be not denied an objective status and basis, for which again there is neither warrant for justification, and if, in conformity with the plain verdict of experience, the nature of reals is admitted to be made up of both the elements, universal and particular and to be cognised as such.

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CHAPTER II The Division of Knowledge Historical Survey It will be interesting to note at the outset how the Jaina Theory of Knowledge passed through different stages of development. It is a story of the progress of a thought, which takes its birth from stray ideas scattered here and there, like a tiny stream from a few drops of water. In the way it is joined by other currents and becomes a mighty river appearing as a single unit. We cannot discriminate in that stage the contribution of particular current; but, it is already there. The Jaina theory of knowledge takes its birth from the stray ideas in the Agamas. In that stage the development is pure and unalloyed. In the stage of Niryuktis the idea of twofold division1 usurps in; which is an external influence, yet, the spirit of Agamas dominates. Then, we have Anuyoga where the fivefold division of the Agamas goes into back and the fourfold division of the Nyaya2 comes into prominence. Umasvati reverts to the position of Niryuktis and stresses upon the twofold divisions, which was finally accepted. In the Nandi another development is seen where the sense-cognition is included into pratyaksa*, following the common tradition. Jinabhadra5 and Akalanka designate it as Samvyavahara pratyaksa (perception according to the common usage) just to avoid its contradiction with the 1 Brhatkalpa Niryukti 4.3, 24-25. 2 Anuyogdvara, p. 211. 3 Tattvartha Sutra, I. 9-12. 4 NandI, Sutra 4. 5 Visesavasyaka Bhasya, 95. 6 Laghiyastraya, 3-4, see also vivrti

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Division of Knowledge Niryukti or Tattvartha. Manikyanandin1 and Vadidevasuri2 again adopt the logical division and try to formulate the Agamic conceptions into their own style. The logic of Siddhasenas divides pramana into three types only. The Agamic divi. sion more or less, is subjective. The division of pratyaksa and paroksa is instrumental in the Niryuktis and Tattvartha5; but, in the logical period it depends upon the clarity of apprehension. In the case of subdivision Umasvati takes all the factors of subject, instrument, object and clarity" into account. Later on the subject is dropped altogether. The clarity is confined to the division of pratyaksa and paroksa only. The logicians take into account the two factors of instrument and objects only. Out of them the latter is not so powerful as the former. But, Siddhasena keeps in view the object only.10 Thus, the development of the Jaina division of knowledge passes through various phases. Sometimes, free from the external influence, then slightly mixed with it, then losing its originality into the latter, again establishing its originality and then constructing a parallel syetem of logical development. Pandit Sukhlal has arranged these developments into seven stages11 (1) The first stage may be called purely Agamic or Karmasastriya. It divides knowledge into five types and subdivides each of them into various sub-types. One cannot trace any 1 Pariksamukha II. 1. 2 Pramananaya Tattvaloka II. 1. 3 Nyayavatara 1. 4 Bhagavat 88.2.317. 5 Tattvartha Sutra, I. 9-12. 6 Pariksamukha II. 3-4; Pramananaya Tattvaloka II. 2-3 7 Tattvartha Sutra I. 9-13. 8 Pariksamukha II. 5-12; III 2, 3, 5, 11, 14 & 99 9 Ibid, 10 Nyayavatara 2 11 Jnanabindu Int. p. 5. 197

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Epistemology of Jainas external influence in these divisions and sub-divisions. No doubt, parallel notions can be found in other systems also, but that is merely an accident. We cannot say that one system borrowed from the other. It might be a development of some common source existing before them. But, as far as the present literature is concerned the Agamic division seems to be an independent development. 198 The Agamic division is predominantly subjective; but, other considerations are not totally ignored in it. Mati and Sruta are common to all the mundane souls. Avadhi has two types. One is found in all the inhabitants of divine and hellish kingdoms. The other type is found in the beings of human or sub-human kingdoms, it is a super-natural power. Manahparyaya is possible in an ascetic (muni) only. The kevala dawns when the aspirant destroys the karmic obscurance completely. The three types of ajnana are confined to a mithyadrsti only. Thus, these types express different ethical status of the owner. The question of mati and sruta is rather complicated. The Tattvartha states sruta as a subsequent stage of mati resulting from the scriptural knowledge, confined to a fixed number of texts. The Nandy also holds a particular set of scriptures as samyak-sruta and another set as mithyasruta. It means that sruta is confined to the scriptural knowledge only. On the other hand it is held as common to all the beings with imperfect knowledge. But, we cannot say that the scriptural knowledge is possessed by one-sensed beings also. For this purpose sruta is described as the mental reflection associated with speech or articulation. In this respect, the demarcation between mati and sruta becomes, more or less, insignificant. We shall discuss these problems in the next chapter. At present we want to show the general trend of the Agamic division, which is mainly subjective. (2) The second stage is based on the Niryuktis, majority of which originated in the second century of Vikrama era. It shows some marks of the external influence. The Niryuktis

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The Division of Knowledge 199 divide knowledge into two types of direct cognition (pratyaksa) and indirect cognition (paroksa); and incorporate the five types by subdividing them into three and two types respectively. The two-fold division is based on the instrument. The direct cognition is based exclusively on the soul, while the indirect one takes into account the senses or mind also, as its instruments. We have already discussed that Jainism does not attach any importance to the senses or other helpers, as far as the instrument of knowledge is concerned. He holds the soul only as agent as well as the instrument. The division of direct and indirect does not hold any significance in this respect. On the other hand the Nyaya is keen on the instrument only. It divides knowledge according to the different causes effecting the apprehension of an object. The division of direct and indirect, as held by the Niryuk tis is an instrumental division; which is a new introduction in the Jaina system and shows a certain degree of external influence. The Niryuktis do not admit the Nyaya conception of sense.congition as pratyaksa. Thus, the influence is limited to the two-fold instrumental division only. Further, the mati is given certain synonyms which are indicative of the instrumental types as held by the Nyaya. Thus, the Niryuktis tried to accommodate the Nyaya division without moving an inch from the Agamic position. They held firmly the Agamic view and did not admit the Nyaya influence when it went against the former. (3) The third stage is represented by the Anuyogadvara which also dates the second century of Vikrama era. Arya Raksita, the author of Anuyogadvara gives prominence to the four-fold division as given by Gautama in his Nyayasutra. He divides knowledge into perception, inference, analogy and authority and follows the Nyaya system in sub-divisions of inference etc. In perception he includes the three varieties of intuitive cognition i. e. Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala as well as the sense-cognition. Thus, his division is an attempt to incorporate the Jaina view into that of the Nyaya; which might have gained a popularity at that time. Arya Raksita has foll

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200 Epistemology of Jainas owed the Nyaya system not only in the division of jnana but in the field of definitions also. The Bhagavats and Stbananga also refer to the fourfold division but there it is treated separately. It is designated as pramana in distinction to jnana. These Agamas show only the existence of a popular division which had no bearing on the Jaina theory of jnana. Arya Raksita for the first time combines them and gives prominence to the popular conception. (4) The fourth stage is the contribution of Umasvati through his Tattvartha and the auto-commentary. Umasvati lived in the fourth century of Vikrama era. He did not like the Anuyogadvara which left the original Jaina tradition and immerged into that of the Nyaya. He reverted to the Niryuktis and supported the two-fold division of Pratyaksa and Paroksa. Anuyoga tried to assimilate the Jaina tradition in the Nyaya; while, Umasvati tried to assimilate the latter into the former. He included all types of cognition as accepted by the Nyaya into Mati and Sruta. Perception, Inference and Analogy were included into Mati and Agama into sruta. In Bbasya, he refers to the fourfold division as a view held by some thinkers. His twofold division was later on accepted by all the Jajna scholars and the four-fold division lost ground. The general acceptance of Umasvati's view was affected by two reasons: firstly, because it supported the original Jaina tradition. Secondly because it incorporated the view of other systems and thus checked the temptation of leaning towards the popular view. He found out a logical way for accommodation of others without losing his own individuality, which was thrown into danger by Arya Raksita. The Nandi follows Tattvartha in its two-fold division, but includes sense-cognition into the category of pratyaksa. In this way the mati is divided into pratyaksa as well as paroksa. The sense-cognition is pratyaksamati and the types of mediate cognition are paroksamati. Leaving this innovation, in other respects, the Nandi follows the Tattvartha.

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The Division of Knowledge 201 (5) The fifth stage is the contribution of Siddhasena Divakara. He probably flourished in the beginning of sixth century. He has introduced revolutionary changes in the Jaina tradition, which were never before thought of. They appear to the logical intellect but, annoyed the devotional mind. This is why, Divakara remained neglected for a long period of one thousand years. No body cared to consider his theories sympathetically. It was, Yasovijaya Upadhyaya, in the 18th century A. D. whose love for reason compelled him not only to discuss the views of Siddhasena but also support them logically. Siddhasena introduced his new theories on the following four topics : (1) The unity between Mati and Sruta (2) Unity between Avadhi and Manahparyaya (3) Unity of Kevala jnana and Kevala darsana (4) Unity between Jnana and darsana (faith). Siddhasena threw a new light on the above mentioned four problems. The orthodox followers of Agamic tradition could not appreciate his views. Some of them openly opposed him while others remained indifferent. Jinabhadra opposed him strongly, but his opposition was confined to the topic of unity between kevala jnana and kevala darsana. No body cared to consider the other topics until Yasovijaya took them in his Jnanabindu. Siddhasena has discussed these topics in 'Niscaya dvatrimsika' and 'Sanmati Prakarana'. (6) The sixth stage begins with Jinabhadra. The speciality of this stage lies in supporting the Agamic views on the logical ground. Jinabhadra in his VBh. discusses all the topics touched by his predecessors and deals with them logically. He adopted logic for the sake of discussion only. Regarding the theoretical conceptions he did not go beyond the Agamic tradition. Pujyapada, Devanandin and Akalanka also supported the Agamic theories on the basis of logic. It is the speciality of this stage. The Tattvartha recognized sense-cognition as

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202 Epistemology of Jainas paroksa on account of its being a variety of mati. The Anuyogadvara and Nandy included it into perception. Jinabhadra introduced a compromise between the two views by calling the sense cognition as samvya vahara pratyaksa, i. e. perception according to the popular usage. This introduction was accepted by Akalanka and all the later logicians. (7) The seventh stage is purely logical. The main contribution of this stage is a parallel system of Jaina logic based on the Agamic conception. Akalanka was the dominating personality of this period. His contributions related with the Agamic problems can be summed up as follows: (i) Umasvati included inference etc., the sources of knowledge as accepted by non-Jaina systems, into both Mati and Sruta, Akalanka included them in Sruta only. (ii) Umasvati gave four synonyms of Mati such as Smoti, Samjna, Cinta and Abhinibodha. These were interpreted, so far as the different modes of the mental appearances without any special significance. Akalanka explained them as the four types of Paroksa adopted by the logical period. (iii) Umasvati divided the five types of knowledge into two Pramanas, and thus indicated that the theory of Pramana is. not different from the theory of jnana as expressed in the Jaina Agamas. Akalanka developed the idea and constructed a ful? system parallel to the non-jaina sysems, based on the Agamis convention. The Division according to Bhagavati sutra! Jnana Abhinibodhika sruta Avagraha ina Avachi Manahparyaya Kevala Avaya Dharana 1 Bhagavati 88.2.317

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Division of Knowledge 203 The present reduction of Bhagavats refers to Rajaprasniya for further development of this topic which in addition to the above diagram mentions two varieties of Avagraha and refers to Nandi for the further. The successive references to Rajapra. sniya and Nandi show on one side, that there was no difference between the two stages regarding further development, on the other side it puts one into doubt whether the first stage had developed to the extent of Nandi. The following points are noteworthy in the above division: (i) It mentions the term Abhinibodha in place of Mati, which got prominence in the later stages. Jinabhadra interprets Abhinibodha as the decisive knowledge bent towards the external object. This definition is more expressive of pratyaksamati. The Tattvartha gives Abhinibodha as one of the synonyms of Mati. Akalarka interpreted it as inference. But, in the karmic literature we do not find any mention of Abhinibodha. Joanavaraniya refers to Mati only in its first variety. Mati indicates the function of mind while abhinibodha, that of the senses. It is to be decided what was the actual idea expressed by the first type of knowledge. (ii) The NandIsutra divides Mati into Sruta-Nihssta and Asruta-Nihssta and then subdivides Sruta-Nihsrta into Avagraba etc. Bhagavatt leaves altogether the variety of Asruta Nihssta. (iii) The above varieties are confined to jnana only. The question of Ajnana and Darsana is not referred to. The Prajnapana Sutraz which is admitted as the Upanga of Bhagavati includes all the varieties and classifies knowledge asfollows : 1 Rajaprasntya Sutra, 165. 2 Prajnapana, 15 pada.

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204 Epistemology of Jainas Upayoga Nirakara Sakara Caksudarsana Acaksu D. AvadhiD. Kevala D. Mati Jnana sruta Jnana Avadhi J. Manahaparyaya Kevala Mati Sruta Vibhanga jnana ajnana ajnana ajnana The division of Prajnana also is purely Agamic. The second stage of division is found in the Sthanarga. Following the style of dyadic division, it classifies everything into two only.

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The Division of Knowledge 205 sruta Sruta _Paroksa Paroksa Asruta Nihssta Abhinibodhika Abhinibodhika Vyanjanavagraha Utkalika Vyanjanavagraha Angabahya Avasyaka-vyatirikta Sruta Nihssta Arthavagraha Arthavagraha Angapravista Avasyaka Kalika Kalika Jnana Ksayopasamika The Division According to Sthanangal Vipulamati Manahparyaya Nokevala Pratyaksa Bhava pratyayika Kjumati Kevala Avadhi The important speciality of this period is the introduction of Pratyaksa and Paroksa in the Agamic tradition. Pandit Sukhlal, as has been stated above, mentions, this stage as the 1 sthananga Sutra, 71

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206 Epistemology of Jainas .contribution of Niryuktis. Perhaps, he did not attach aoy value to the division of Sthananga, which follows its own plan and does not care for the objective basis for classification. Sometimes, it ignores essential factors simply to keep the har. mony of number. As a matter of fact the Sthananga is a collection which includes many notions of the later period also. In the logical period Pratyaksa is divided into Vikala and Sakala which means nokevala and kevala of the Sthananga. The following points deserve attention in the above division (i) It divides Srutanihssta into two varieties of Vyanjana. vagraha and Arthavagraha, while according to the general .conception it should be as follows: Sruta Nihssta Avargha iba Avaya Dharana Vyanjanavagraha Arthavagraha The ommision of four-fold division of Avagraha, iba etc. and its direct coming to the subdivisions of Vyanjapavagraha and Arthavagraha is accountable to its style of the chapter, where everything is classified in twofold division. We cannot assign it any philosophical significance. (ii) Secondly, it gives Arthavagraha and Vyaojanavagraha as the divisions of Asruta-Nihssta also. According to the commentary it should have the following order : Asruta Nihssta Indriya-Janya Anindriya Janya Avagraha Tha Avaya Dharana Parinamiki i Autpattik! Vainayik! Karmaja Vyanjanavagraha Arthavagraha

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Division of Knowledge 207 The four buddhis of Autpattikl etc. are purely mental. Vyanjanavagraha is not possible in their case. Consequently, the twofold division based on Vyanjanavagraha and Arthavagraha is possible with sense-cognitions only. So, the commentator has attempted for a regrouping; but, he also goes astray. In the Nandi, Avagraha etc. are confined to Sruta-Nihssta only. They are not connected with Asruta-Nihssta, which is divided into four Buddhis. (iii) Thirdly, it is doubtful whether the division of Sruta Nihssta and Asruta-Nihsrta is as old as the Angas. It is found in the Nandi only. The Digambara literature does not provide it. In Svetambaras also it is not found in the Niryuktis. Even Umasvati has left it altogether. In the Nandi also Mati is mentioned as having twenty eight varieties and the four buddhis are not included in them. If they are included the number would come to thirty two. Division of Knowledge : Third Stage This stage is represented by the Anuyogadvara. It refers to five types in the beginning by way of Mangala, but later on adopts the logical division and tries to adjust the Agamic division into it. He divides as follows? : Jnana Pratyaksa Anumana Aupamya Agama No-indriya-Pratyaksa Indriya-Pratyaksa 1. Srotra I. P. 2. Caksu I. P. 3. Ghrana I. P. 4. Jihva I. P. 5. Sparsa I. P. 1 Aouyoga p. 211 1. Avadhi 2. Manah Parayaya 3. Kevala Purvavat Sesavat Drsta Sadharmya

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208 Epistemology of Jainas Aupamya Sadharmyopanita Vaidharmyopanita Kincit 'sad Pada Sad Sarva sad Kincit 'Vaidharmya Pada Vaid. Agama Sarve Vaid. Laukika Lokottara Twelve Angas known as Ganipitakas or, Sutragama Arthagama Tadubhayagama: or, Aptagama Anantaragama Paramparagama. The Anuyoga gives the four divisions of Darsana also : Darsana Caksur Acaksur Avadhi Kevala The following points should be noted in the above divisions : (1) It leaves Mati and Sruta and replaces them by Indriyapratyaksa, Anumana, Aupamya and Agama. It does not mention smoti and tarka admitted by the later Jajna logicians as varieties of Paroksa. (2) The Agamic division of Mati-jnana has been left altogether. Division of Knowledge : The Fourth and subsequent stages : We have stated that the division of Anuyogadvara did not get much favour as it went astray from the Agamic tradition. So, Umasvati reverted to the position of Niryuktis and his division was established finally. In the further stages the theory was developed and discussed minute'y. No-body suggested any fundamental change except Siddhasena. By the Agamic division we understand either that of the Bhagavati as fully expressed in the Prajnapapa or that of the Stbanarga

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Division of Knowledge 20 9 as finalised in the Nandi', which refers first to the old tradition and then amplifies the second stage in the following order : Jnana (First classification) Abhinibodhika Sruta Avadhi Manahparyaya Kevala Jnana (Second classification) Pratyaksa Pratyaksa Paroksa Abhinibodhika Sruta Indriya (five types) Noindriya (three types of intuition) Sruta Ni. Asruta Ni. (Four types of Avagraha etc.) (Four buddhis) Vyanjanavagraha Arthavagraha We may observe the following points in the above : (1) Nandi, following the tradition of Anuyoga and feeling the pressure of non-jaina systems, included sense-cognition into Pratyaksa; but could not go against the old tradition also and therefore, described Mati as pratyaksa as well as paroksa. (2) It has tried to incorporate the nonjaina-conception in the old tradition, but does not try to explain the contradiction. (3) The Nandi as well Anuyoga does not say anything about the purely mental cognitions such as introspection etc. According to the Nandi they can be included into Paroksamati, while according to Anuyoga they can be adjusted nowwhere. 1 Nandi Sutra 4.

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210 Epistemology of Jainas (4) Jipabhadra clarifies the position of Nandi by stating sense cognition as the Samvyavabarika Pratyaksa. He stated that Avadhi etc. were purely Pratyaksa, and inference etc. purely Paroksa. The cognition generated by the mind and the senses are perception according to the common usage. It leads to the following conclusion : 1. Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala are perceptions in the real sense. 2. Sruta is entirely paroksa. 3. The Mati generated by the senses is pratyaksa, from the popular point of view while paroksa in the real sense. 4. Mati generated by the mind is entirely Paroksa. The Tattvartha does not favour the idea of including sensecognition into perception. He divides the five types into a clearcut division of two pramanas, viz., pratyaksa and paroksa. In our treatment we shall mainly follow the Prajna pana, but, also include the twofold division of Direct and Indirect as suggested by the Niryuktis. The Prajnapana has the following divisions :1 Upayoga (B) Nirakara (1) Caksur Darsapa (2) Acaksur Darsana (3) Avadhi Darsana (4) Kevala-Darsana (A) Sakara (1) Mati Joana (2) Sruta Jnana (3) Avadhi Jnana (4) Manah-paryaya-Jnana (5) Kevala Jnana (6) Mati-Ajnana (7) Sruta-Ajnana (8) Vibhanga Jnana 1 Prajna pana. 15 pada

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Division of Knowledge 211 In the terms of modern psychology we can divide the above types of follows: (1) The first two varieties of Nirakara may be known as sensation. (2) The first two varieties of A may be known as percep tion and Imagination. (3) 3-5 of A and 3-4 of the B may be known as intuition. (4) 6-7 are perception and imagination of a person with perverted attitude. (5) The 8th is the intuition of a person with perverted attitude. The Basis of the Division : A comparative view There are different views regarding the basis of the division of knowledge. The Nyaya and Vaisesika systems lay stress on the causal side. Sankara Misra in his Upaskara divides knowledge as follows : Jnana Vidya (valid cognition) Avidya (invalid cognition) Pratyaksa Laingika Smrti Arsa Samgaya Viparyaya Svapna Anadhyavasaya Sarvajalye Asarvajartya Yukta Viyukta Savikalpaka Nirvikalpaka 1 V. S. Upaskara p. 298.

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212 Epistemology of Jainas Vidya is defined as the knowledge produced by the faultless senses.2 Avidya is the cognition produced by the faulty senses and the faulty impressions (sarskara).. The above systems hold three types of causes that produce an effect, viz., samavayikarana (The inherent cause), asamavayikarana (the cause related with the inherent cause) and nimittakarana (the efficient cause). In the case of knowledge the soul is samavayikarana and the contact of soul with mind, senses and object, is asamavayikarana. The soul is a common cause to every type of knowledge+. The difference among the various types of knowledge is based on the asamavayikarana or nimitta karana. In the case of perception (pratyaksa) the differentiating cause is the contact between senses and the object.5 This contact has two varieties, viz., ordinary (laukika) and extra-ordinary (alaukika). The ordinary is divided into six varieties.6 Extra-ordinary contact has three types? : Jnanalaksana (intercourse through association), Samanyalakasana (The Intercourse through knowledge of generic character) and Yogaja (The Intercourse produced by meditation). The perception produced by Yogaja contact is known as sarvajniya also. The other two types of extra-ordinary contact, along with the ordinary contacts come into the category of asarvajniya. Thus, we can observe that the above classification follows the causal side of koowledge. The division of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka, of course, which is common with every system though not absolutely devoid of causal consideration is generally ascribed to the difference of appearance.8 1 Vai. Sutra 9.2.12 2 Vai. Sutra 9.2.10 3 Siddhanta Muktavali I 16-17 4 V. S. Upaskara p. 144 5 Ibid. also p. 300 6 Siddhanata Muktavali K. 59 7 Ibid, K. 63 8 Siddhanta Muklavali K. 58

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Division of Knowledge 213 Similarly, the distinction among laingika (inference). smsti (memory) and arsa (supernatural cognition) also is based on the cause. 1 Lairgika is defined as the cognition produced by the reflection on the middle term (hetu). Smoti is produced by the awakening of past impressions8 (Samskara). Arsa is produced by virtues4 (dharma). The Nyaya system and the later tenets of the Vaisesika school do not recognize arsa as a separate cognition. They include, it into the yogic perception. The division of avidyas is, however, mainly based on the faulty appearance. The samsaya differs from viparyaya in its undecisive character. Apadhyavasaya is indistinct appearance. Svapna (dream) is however, distinguished on the basis of sleep, which is a cause. The Nyaya classifies knowledge according to the following table : 1 Vaisesika Sutra 9.2.1 2 Ibid. 9.2.2-5 3 Ibid. 9.2.6 4 Ibid. 9.2.13 5 Vaisesika Sutra Upaskara 6 p. 298 6 Siddhanta Muktavali 1 K. 51

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214 Knowledge (buddhi) Presentation (anubhava) Memory (Smsti) Valid (prama) Nonvalid (aprama) True (yathartha) Faise (ayathartha) Doubt (sambaya) Error (viparyaya) Hypothetical argument Epistemology of Jainas (tarka) Perception (pratyaksa) Inference (anumana) Comparison (upamana) Authority (sabda)

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Division of Knowledge 215 There is no difference between the Nyaya and the Vaisesika regarding the subdivisions of perception. It can be observed here that prama and aprama of the Nyaya are not the same as vidya and avidya of the Vaisesika. According to the Nyaya Smoti is not prama while according to the Vaisesika it is vidya. The Jaipa also holds smoti as prama. Out of the four types of valid knowledge (vidya) maintained by the Vaisesika, the Nyaya rejects smoti as aprama. The arsa knowledge is included into perception of the yogin. Thus, the Nyaya sums up the four types into two and adds two more. The Vaisesika, on the other hand, reduces upamana and sabda to the category of inference. The Mimamsa, Sankhya and Vedanta systems also look to the cause for their division of knowledge. They hold different theories of perception; yet, are one in the conception of contact between senses and the object as the basis of ordinary perception. Regarding the division of non-perception they hold different views and also regarding number as well as definitions. The Prabhakara school of Mimamsa adds postulation 2 (arthapatti) to the list accepted by the Nyaya. The Advaita Vedanta and the Bhatta School of Mimamsa accept ponapprehension (anupalabdhi) also as an additional source of knowledge. The Sankhya is satisfied with three only, viz. perception, inference and testimony. But, this difference does ot hold much significance as far as the question of proper knowledge is concerned. It may have some significance in the domain of logic where the question of the sources of knowledge is discussed. There also the main attempt of the contending schools is two-fold. The schools having shorter division try to include the bigger one into their own arrangement; while the schools having bigger list try to establish independent existence of each and every member of their classification. The distinc 1 Prakarana Pancika v 2 Sarkhyakarika K. 2

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216 Epistemology of Jainas tion regarding appearance is confined to the pratyaksa on one side and other types on the other. There are different theories also regarding the supreme validity in case of disagreement. The Nyaya gives more importance to inference and holds that in case of dispute inference is more raliable than perception or other sources. The Mimaisa attributes ultimate authority to the Vedic texts in case of any dispute. But that authority is confined to the field of ethics only, where other sources have no approach. The Vedanta also is more emphatic on the teaching of Upanisads regarding the conception of transcendental reality. Regarding the discursive knowledge it follows the Bhatta. The Sarkhya attaches equal importance to all of them. As a matter of fact there cannot be any difference between findings of two sources of knowledge, if they are free from fault. The question of comparative reliability arises in the cases of discussion between two opponents. In such cases, generally inference is followed; if the disputants are not followers of the same scriptures. If they are, the testimony is supreme, The Buddhist has an altogether new basis for his division. He looks towards the object rather than the cause. He divides knowledge into pratyaksa and anumana enly. Pratyaksa is perceptual and anumana is conceptual. There are two types of objects : Svalaksana (thing-in-itself) and Samanyalaksana (thing as understood). The thing-in-itself is devoid of all concepts of name and class; and the same is the object of perception. All the conceptual knowledge, is inferential. Thus, the Buddhist holds two types of knowledge according to the two types of object. The other varieties of imperceptual knowledge, as accepted by the Vedic systems, do not differ from inference as far as their subject matter is concerned. According to the Nyaya and other systems the same object can be apprehended by two or more sources. Vatsyayana proposes abhisamplava (possibility of apprehension of the same object through many i Nyayabindu p, 21 and 24.

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Division of Knowledge 217 pramanas) in certain cases, and vyavastha fixed objectivity of one pramana only) in other cases. The Mimamsa confines the objectivity of dharma to scriptures only. In other cases he is pot particular. The Basis of Jaina Division The Jaina division of knowledge, as has been stated above, varies according to the amount of external influence. The basis of division also undergoes various changes accordingly. The first classification of the five-fold division is more or less subjective, which we have already discussed. But, the consideration of object also is already there. Mati is the knowledge of objects, which are within the reach of senses. sruta is the knowledge of objects expressed in scriptures. Avadhi is the cognition of material objects which are beyond the reach of senses. Manahparyaya is that of the mind and kevala is that which apprehends all objects. If we take into consideration the different types of Ksayopasama, this division can be said as causal also. But, it leads to reciprocity as the division of ksayopasama depends upon the division of effectual cognitive types. In case of distinction between incomplete and complete types of knowledge, no doubt, the criterian of ksayopasama and ksaya can hold good, without any confusion. The second classificacion is based on two factors. The Niryuktis and Tattvartha follow the cause only. They hold percep tion as the knowledge, depending, exclusively upon the soul as ! its cause. All knowledge that depends upon the sources other than the soul is paroksa. The logical period lays emphasis on the nature of appearance. The sense-cognition, which was paroksa in the Agamic conception becomes pratyaksa in the logical school owing to its distinctiveness. But, the basis of appearance is confined to the division of pratyaksa and paroksa only. For further classification the tenets of logical school also resort to the consideration of cause. The division of paroksa into smrti (memory), pratyabhijnana (recognition), tarka (hypothetical judgement), anumapa (inference) and Agama (testimony) is

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218 Epistemology of Jainas based on the different sources. The same is the case with the division of pratyaksa also as far as the ordinary perception is concerned. In other cases it is objective. The Definition of Perception In the division of knowledge perception occupies the most important place. The epistemology of a system mainly depends upon its theory of perception. Other types of knowledge are related with the problem of logic and not epistemology. We shall try to compare the Agamic view of perception with other systems. One thing deserves notice in the present context. Perception according to the Jaina Agamic theory, as has been stated above is confined to the supersensual cognition only. The sense-cogni. tion is regarded as paroksa. It is only in the logical period that sense-cognition comes into the category of perception. But, the case is quite reverse with other systems. Their older texts keep in view the sense-cognition only while definiog perception. The inclusion of eternal cognition of God and the supersensual cognition of yogins is a later development. The logic begins with the common sense knowledge and covers spiritual development when advanced. The Agamas start with the spiritual stages and later on cover the common knowledge. The Nyaya Theory of Perception (pratyaksa) The term pratyaksa is applied to a particular type of cogni. tion as well as its source, known as pramana. The latter is beyond the scope of our discussion. We are mainly concerned with the cognition itself. We have to judge here, in what respect the Nyaya differentiates perception from other types of knowledge. Gautama defines pratyaksa as "that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense-organ with the object, which is inexpressible in words; which is unerring and well-defined". The above definition expresses the cause as well as the nature of per1 Tattvartha I. 10-12 2 Nyayasutra 1.2.4

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Division of Knowledge 219 ception. If the question of cause is left aside, the first characteristic of its nature is that it is inexpressible (avyapadesyam). It is not simple to ascertain the exact meaning of this term. Jayanta, sums up his long discussion about it with the following remarks: "I have stated the views of different exponents on the basis of tradition. The scholars may accept, whatever appears them the right."l According to the interpretation of old Naiyayikas, he says, 'avyapadesyam' means the knowledge which does not fall as. the object of speech. We apprehend the form, taste etc. of an object without associating them with any name, as the apprehension of baby, who is ignorant of language. It is perception. But, when the same are associated with names, and we are conscious that it is the cognition of form or taste, and are in a position to convey them to others, we pass from the limits of perception to those of Agama. VBh. expressing the views of some Acaryas indicates the same thing hy way of pointing out the distinction between mati and sruta. According to it, every cognition before the association of name is mati, and sruta after the association. According to another interpretation 'avyapadesyam' means. absence of association with any other simultaneous sound-cognition, such as hearing the name of an object, uttered by some person, at the time when it is perceived. If by the moment, when we see a cow, a man says 'here is a cow', the knowledge of the sound as associated with the perceptual appearance is not considered as perception but as sound-knowledge (sabda-prama). This view is supported by the definition of sound-knowledge as. given by Gautama. According to the third interpretation the adjective 'avyapadesyam' is introduced in order to refute the conception of grammarians, who hold that there is no cognition without the association of speech. 1 Nyayamanjari p. 82

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220 Epistemology of Jainas Vacaspati Misral and later logicians of the Nyaya school interpret it as the expression of indeterminate cognition. Taey hold that the Nyaya accepts two types of pratyaksa , viz., determinate and indeterminate. Gautama bas specified both of them in his definitian through the terms of 'vyavasayi' and 'avyapadesyam' respectively. It is a matter of investigation how far the Buddhist notion of 'kalpanapodham' is comparable to the 'avyapadesyam' of Gautama. If we accept the last view as representative of the Nyaya theory, it can be concluded that the Nyaya does not attach any importance to the distinction between perceptual and imperceptual knowledge, as for as their appearance is concerned. Though the variety of indeterminate cognition is confined to perception only; yet, that does not cover the whole range of perceptual knowledge. The first and second views try to draw a line between perceptual and the verbal knowledge. The Jainas also deal with the same problem when making a distinction between mati and sruta. If a cognition, according to the first view, appears as associated with words, it is not perception, it is to be regarded as verbal knowledge. The Jainas do not endorse this view. They hold that mere association of words does not make an appearance a verbal knowledge. It is verbal only when it depends upon the speech uttered or distinctly remembered at the time of appearance. When a person learns from an authority that such and such object should be named as such, his knowledge is verbal. But, when the same is assimilated and appears in a form mixed with sepse-perception, it is not verbal or sruta. In the logical period it was regarded that every cognition is necessarily composed of three parts; viz, the cognition of the object, the cognition of the object-cognition and the cognition of the self. The cognition of jar is identical with the appearance of 'I know a jar'. Thus, the Jainas do not regard non-association of words as the criterion of perception. 1 Nyayavatara Dipika, p. 70

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Division of Knowledge 221 The second view is connected with the situation when senses. and the speech function simultaneously. If perception is limited to the apprehension not associated with dame, the association of name by the listner, in that case, is a clear instance of verba! knowledge. He associates that name with that particular form on the authority of speech only. If the same is done through the mental equipment, obtained through the past experiences, then the case is different. In that case the cognizor does not depend on outside authority. Thus, the second view does not differ from that of the Jainas. In the later period perception is defined in two ways. Some logicians bave paid attention towards the causal side while others are particular about appearance. Those who look at the causal side, generally regard the knowledge produced by the sense object contact as perception. But, this definition was found fallacious. Gangesa criticises Gautama's definition on several grounds : Firstly it is too wide, since every cognition is produced by the contact of mapas with the object which is also a sense-object contact. Secondly, it is too short, as it does not apply to the intuitive apprehension of God, who is without any sense. The modern Naiyayika, defines perception as the cognition not produced by any other cognition. Inference is produced by the cognition of middle term accompanied by the knowledge of universal concomittance, comparison and authority also have other cognitions as their cause. It is the perception only, which is not preceded by any cognition. Yasovijaya points out a defect in this definition also. He says that the determinate cognition is always caused by the indeterminate cognition. Consequently, it can no more claim to be a perception if the definition of Gangesa is followed. The Nyaya explains away this difficulty in his statement of the process of cognitive causation. The senses, the contact, the indeterminate cognition, the determinate cognition, and favourable or unfavourable attitude; this is the order of succession in the process of perception. The general system of I Muktavali, p. 235

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222 Epistemology of Jainas causation has four parts : The cause, its application (vyapara), the cognition and its result. If we consider these four stages in relation to the cognition, we have two central points. In case the indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka) is accepted as the main point the determinate (savikalpaka) perception would be accepted as the result (pbala), the senses as the source of knowledge (pramana) and the contact as its application (vyapara). In case the determinate cognition is regarded as the main point, the attitude is the result, the contact is the source, and the indeterminate cognition is the application (vyapara). The vyapara itself is not a cause and, therefore, the mediation of nirvikalpaka does not lead to the dependence of savikalpaka on a cognition. Bbasarvajnal defines perception as the cause of right and direct (aparoksa) experience. His definition is related with the cause of knowledge. Moreover, he does not define the term aparoksa which is merely another name of pratyaksa. Raghava, the commentator of Nyayasara, defines aparoksa as the cognition not produced by speech (sabda) or sigpo (linga). But, this does not serve as the criterion of perception. It only means that perception is that which is neither inference nor verbal knowledge. Bhasarvajna divides knowledge into three types only. He does not recognize comparison as a separate source of knowledge. Consequently, he excludes the above two only from the category of knowledge to discriminate pratyaksa. His definition does not help much in deciding the actual gature of perception. Prasastapadas points out two significant factors in the definition of pratyaksa. Firstly, he gives the derivation of pratyaksa, meaning that which depends upon aksa, the senses. Secondly, he says that pratyaksa is that cognition which is produced by the four-fold-contact. In the case of inference or 1 Nyayasara p. 2 2 Nyayatattvaparyadipika p. 71 3 Prasastapada Bhasya Kandali 186

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Division of Knowledge 223 other types of imperceptual knowledge the contact is two-fold. The soul is united with the mind. But, in the case of perception it is four-fold. The soul is united with the mind, the mind with the senses, and the senses with the object. But, this definition also applies to ordinary perception only. It falls short in the case of Yogipratyaksa and Isvarapratyaksa. It is also not applicable to the perception of internal qualities such as pleasure, pain etc. But, as far as the ordinary perception of external things is concerned, Prasastapada's definition represents the Nyaya-view clearly. The Bhatta theory of perception develops on the same line as that of the Nyaya. Jaimini defines perception as the cognition produced in the self by the intercourse of sense-organs with the object. This definition is practically the same as that of the Naiyayika. Prabhakara defines perception of direct apprehensiona (saksat pratitih). Kapila, in his Sankhya-sutra, defines perception as the cognition which takes the form of object, after being related to it. s Vijnanabhiksu elucidates that perception is the psychic function (buddhivrtti) which goes out to the object and is modified according to the form of object, to which it is related. 4 The object does not produce the psychic function itself; but, only modifies it. The mode inheres in the psychic function. The psychic function goes out, like the flame of a lamp, through the gateways of sense-organs, to the external object which is proximate to it, and is modified by the particular form of the object. Isvaraklsna defines perception as determinate cognition of an object, produced by its proximity to the sense-organ5. Vacas1 Mimamsasutra, 1. 1.4 2 Prakarana Pancika, p. 51 3 Sankhya Darsana, p. 49 4 Sankhya Pravacana Bhasya, p. 49 5 Sankhyakarika, K. 5

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Epistemology of Jainas pati states that the object transforms the mind into its own particular form, which is in itself formless. Thus, according to Sankhya transformation of the mental mode (buddhivrtti) into the form of object is the essential condition for perception. In the case of internal perception also, though vrtti does not go out; yet, the phenomenon of transformation occurs internally. In the case of yogic perception the same is performed through supernatural power obtained through the yogic practices. So, the Sankhya also does not differ substantially from the Nyaya. Where the Nyaya lays stress on the contact the Sankhya does so on the transformation or mode of the mind. 224 According to Sankara-school of the Vedanta, the eternal consciousness (Brahman) is modalized in three ways2. It is modalized by different objects and called as object-consciousness (Visayacaitanya). It is modalized by the mental modes and called as cognitive consciousness (pramana caitanya). And it is modalized by different minds and called as cognizing consciousness (pramatr caitanya). Thus, there is only one universal consciousness; it is determined by the mind or internal organ (antahkarana), the activities of the mind or mental modes and the objects cognized. There are the determinants of the universal light of consciousness. Perception means the identification of all the three types of modalized consciousness. The antahkarana goes out through the vehicles of senses and occupies the place of the object. Thus, the consciousness modalized by antahkarana (pramatr caitanya), the consciousness modalized by the outgoing antahkarana (vrtti caitanya) and the consciousness modalized by the object (visaya-caitanya) and identified. This identification does not take place in the case of imperceptual knowledge. In the above-mentioned definitions of perception one thing is common, that all of them recognize sense-object as the 1 Sankhya Tattvakaumudi, K. 5 2 Vedanta Paribhasa p. 44

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Division of Knowledge 225 general condition for perception. Further, they do not try to distinguish perception from the other types of knowledge on the basis of appearance. Salikanatha defines pratyaksa as the direct (saksat) experience. Some logicians of the Nyaya school also have defined it similarly. But, the idea underlying the term 'saksat' is a hard nut to explain. Nyayamanjari defines it as an experience after which one feels accordingly; or it is a cognition which is: not produced by any generated cognition.2 Another logician: defines it as the cognition produced by the senses. But, all! these explanations do not help much in knowing the nature of directness. As a matter of fact direct means the cognition where the cognizer and the object stand face to face without any mediation where the object is directly presented. In the Nyaya-theory thc self with senses is the cognizer. When the object stands in direct relation with the senses it is a case of perception. To the case of inference this relation is mediated by the cognition of middle term; in the case of verbal knowledge it is mediated by the knowledge of sound and in analogy by the perception of similarity. In these cases the object is represented by other cogaitioas. According to the Agamic school of the Jaioas the soul is cognizer without any assistance. In the three types of supersensual knowledge the object is presented to the soul directly. In the case of sense-cognition It is presenteu by the seases, therefore, it is held as paroksa. If in directaess is accepted as the criterion of perception, which is favoured by the majority of Jaina as well as nonJaina thinkers, the difference between Jaina and the Nyaya systems is accountable to the nature of cognizer. The Buddhist view is clear as far as the nature of pratyaksa is concerned. DharmakIrti holds that perception is always indeterminate or inarticulate.3 The stage of articulation of 1 Prakarana Pancika p. 51 2 Nyayamanjari p. 65 3 Nyayabindu p. 11

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226 Epistemology of Jainas determination is reached through ipference. He holds absence of articulation (kalpanapodham) as the criterion of perception. According to the logical school of Jainism the criterion is distinctiveness.1 The object appears clearer and more distinct in perception than it does in inference etc. This distinctaess cannot be described in words but can be experienced by everybody. A perceived object is more distinct than the one inferred or known through verbal authority. This is why one desires to perceive the object which has been already cognized by inference or verbal authority. This definition is common to the sense-cognition as well as supersensual cognition. The Agamic school defined perception on the basis of cause. The logical school defines the same on its intrinsic character. As far as the derivation of the term is concerned Jainas hold that aksa means jiva or the self. The senses according to them are something exterpal to aksa. Pratyaksa means the cognition presented to aksa or the self directly. The definition of Paroksa The term paroksa does not have any independent definition. All cognition other than pratyaksa is recognised as paroksa. According to the Agamic conception paroksa means indirect knowledge. The other systems do not propose paroksa as a different category in contrast with pratyaksa but go directly into its divisions. The above order of fivefold division places mati and sruta first and then the other types. We shall discuss in the same order. It has been stated before that according to the Agamic conception mati and sruta are paroksa or indirect. The next chapter therefore is titled as "Indirect Knowledge." 1 Parlksamukha II, 3. 2 Pariksamukha II, 4. 3 Pravacanasara I, 57; 58 Visesavasyaka Bhasya 89.99; Anuyoga Tika p. 149

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CHAPTER 111 Indirect Knowledge The Types of Indirect Knowledge Mati Jnana It has been already stated that out of the five types of knowledge the last three are related with pure intuition. They are attained as super-natural powers and not through psychological process. The second of the remaining two, i.e. sruta, is limited to scriptures. It also does not possess any importance as far as the psychology of knowledge is concerned. It is mati, that covers the whole range of cogoition as far as modern psychology is concerned. The entire process beginning with contiguity of senses and the object, upto the subconscious impressions which are capable of rising again in the form of memory; are included into this type of knowledge. All varieties of profane knowledge perceptual or conceptual, termed and classified differently by different systems are included in it. Two Connotations The Mati is known as Abhinibodhika also. This term is prevalant in the old Agamic literaturel, while the term mati is based on the karma literature which refers to the corresponding avarana as Matijnanavarana2 and not Abhinibodhikajnana. varana. In the division of Ajnana also only mati is found. VBh. explains abhinibodha as the cognition resulting from the presence of an object. The same thing is further confirmed 1. Bhagavati 88.2.317 2. Karmagrantha, I. 4

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228 Epistemology of Jainas in the statement that Abhinibodhika cognizes only the objects) that are present. This explanation limits the sphere of the first type of knowledge to sense-cognition only. In that case all types of mediate as well as mental cognition would go to fruta. Akalanka interprets abhinibodha as inferential knowledge. He wanted to propose that the logical division of paroksa is based on the four synonyms of Mati as given in the Tattvartha. But, it is doubtful whether his explanation is based on some tradition or is a new introduction. Siddhasena Gaoin interprets Abhinibodhika as the general term covering all types of perceptual and imperceptual cogni. tions. He clearly states that Abbinibodhika cognizes all the three times. On the other hand he confines mati into the present, which was a general term according to Jinabhadra and Akalanka, s As a matter of fact nothing can be said precisely about the clear significance of these terms. Roughly, it can be said on the basis of etymology, that mati is expressive of the mental function while abhipibodha that of the seosation of the present object. The Range of Matijoana Mati covers all types of knowledge related with the cpistemology and logic. It will be seen, as we proceed, how its subdivisions include all varieties of sensual as well as mental cognitions. Umasvati gives five synonyms4, explaining the range of Matijnana. He states that mati, smrti, samjna, cinta and abhinibodha are identical in sense. Accurately speaking they are not synonyms with the same denotation, but different regions. 1. Visesavasyaka Bbasya 80 2. Tattvartha Rajavartika Sutra 1.13 3. Tattvartha Bbasyatika Sutra 1.13 4. Tattvartha Sutra 1.13

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Indirect Knowledge 229 of the field covered by Mati. Umasvati means that none of the varieties of knowledge expressed by these synonyms goes beyond the sphere of Mati. All of them are covered by it. Siddhasena Gaoin explains the above terms as follows? : (i) Mati - The cognition generated by the senses and the mind and apprehending the present oply. (ii) Smsti - Memory, the mental revival of the past impressions. (iii) Samjna - Recognition. The cognition of the object already known, but presented again. (iv) Cinta - Hypothetical judgement. (v) Abhinibodha-The general term for all types of the above mentioned and other varieties. It cognizes all the three times. Akalanka interprets Abhinibodha as inference.2 In other respects he agrees with Siddhasena Ganin. The Division of Mati : Instrumental Mati is produced by senses or mind or boths. In case of the animals without mind, it is generated by the senses only. Such animals are known as asamjnins. Modern psychologist explains their activity as merely habitual or instinctive. The Jainas hold that such animals cannot think logically. Asamjnip does not mean total absence of mindo, but the absence of developed mind amounting to intellect of the modern psychology. The cognitions of the type of memory etc. are purely mental. They do not depend upon the assistance of the senses. The perceptual cognition of the animals with mind is based upon the senses as well as mind. 1. Tattvartha Bhasyatika Sutra 1.13 2. Tattvartharajavartika Sutra I. 13 3. Tattvartha Sutra 1. 14 4. See samjnas

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230 Epistemology of Jainas Umasvati in his Bhasya refers to one more type, i.e. Oghajnanal. Siddhasena Ganin interprets it as the cognition where the function of mind or senses is not explicit?. Where the only cause is Ksayopasama. For example the movement of a creeper towards the roof of a cave or tree. But, this type does not possess a qualitative difference, as that of degree. It is only a lower degree of undeveloped mind. The Psychology of Matijnana We have stated the senses and mind as the instruments of Mati. It is essential to know what is meant by this instrumentality and what is the position of the senses and mind in the Jaina psychology. The Jainas hold Ksaya or Ksayopasama of the corresponding Avarana as the only cause of cognition. In the case of Mati also this principle is equally applicable. The part played by the senses in a cognition is this, they help in ksayopasama, just like the external causes of light, object etc. The self is by nature conscious and can know everything without any external assistance. But, its power of knowing is obscured by the karmic matter. The only requirement of a cognition is, therefore, the removal of this obscuring matter. In the case of Matijnana this function is caused by the senses and the mind along with other external and internal causes. As a matter of fact the senses are instrument in the negative aspect only. We can compare them with the windows in a room. The man sitting inside the room naturally possessed the power of perceiving outside. But, the function of his power is obstructed by the walls. The only thing he requires is the removal of this obstruction, partially or totally. In the case of complete knowledge this obstruction is removed totally. In other cases it is removed partially. Just as the windows remove the obstruction of walls to a part and the man can see through 1. Tattvartha Bhasya Sutra I. 14 2. Tattvartha Bhasya Tika Sutra I. 14

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Indirect Knowledge such parts only; similarly the senses are the windows or the partial removal of the karmic matter. The windows do not help in perception in the positive sense; but they help negatively i.e. by removing the obstruction. Akalanka places the senses in category of external but inseparable cause in contrast with the object, light etc. which are not inseparable.1 The Senses: Their nature The Nyaya defines senses as the supersensual organ of knowledge having its locus in the animals organism. A sense cannot be itself sensed or perceived. It is only inferred as an organ necessary for the function of perception. The Vedanta and MImamsa also hold similar views. According to the Vedanta senses are the vehicle through which the mind goes out and transforms into the form of object. According to the MImamsa a sense is what produces a clear and distinct knowledge of the object, brought in contact with. According to the above-mentioned three systems the external senses are material substances constituted of the physical elements (bhautika) and localised in the different end-organs. Regarding the internal sense, i.e. the mind they hold different views which will be discussed later on. According to the Sankhya the senses are not physical bodies like the pupil of the eye, but modifications of subtle material principle called ahankara. He thinks that a physical (bhautika) element cannot account for the perception of a distant object. In perception the senses must have a direct contact with the oojects. But a physical organ cannot have direct contact with an object which lies at a distance or behind a glass. This is possible only if the sense-organ be all-pervading in character and not limited to physical substance. So the Sankhya thinks 1. Tattvartha Rajavartika II. 8 2. Tattva Kaumudi p. 3 3. Vedanta Paribhasa p. 46 4. Sastradipika p. 36 5. Sankhyakarika 25 231

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232 Epistemology of Jainas that the senses are modifications of a subtle and all-pervading matter (abarkara) and are themselves all pervading in character. The Function of senses According to the Nyaya the function of senses is to establish a contact between object and the mind. The Mimarsa and Vedanta also hold the same view with a different process. According to Sankhya also it is a vehicle of buddhi, which goes out and takes different reflections. This function cannot be performed by the visible physical structure, so something invisible with the capacity of performing that function is postulated and the same is the sense according to different systems. According to the Nyaya, Vedanta and Mimamsa that subtle element also is as physical as the body, but, its jogredients are finer than those of the latter. They do not take into consideration the outer structure which also is composed of the same element in grosser form. The Buddhist conceives sepse-organ (indriya) as a kind of translucent subtle matter which covers the body when it is living. 1 It is like the shining of a jewel which cannot be cut into two, cannot be burnt, has no weight and disappears without a residue at death. It is nevertheless atomic, and is represented by five different kinds of atoms. The atoms of the organ of sight cover in concentric circles of the eye-ball. The atoms of the organ of taste, or more precisely, that matter which is supposed to convey the sensation of taste, covers in concentric semi-circles of the tongue. The atoms of organ of touch cover the whole body. Being as subtle as the rays of a jewel, this matter cannot appear alone, it is supported by gross matter (mahabhuta) of wbich the eye-ball and flesh in general are constituted. 1. S. Muktavall p. 264

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Indirect Knowledge 233 The Buddhist holds five types of vijnana corresponding to the five senses. These vijnanas are not material but subjective. They are known as caittas, the mental products. To the above list we can add the faculty of intellect or consciousness (manas, indriya ayatana), Nonsensuous objects (Dharma ayatana or dharmas) and Nonsensuous consciousness (manovijnana dbatu), which are not material but included in the list of dhatus. Thus, according to the Buddhist there are six seases, out of which five are material and the sixth immaterial (arupin); and six vijnanas which are purely psychical. The Buddhist does not take into consideration the outer gross material structures. In Jainism the senses are described as mark of the JIva as well as the instruments of cognition. In the first sense they are related with entomology and in the second case with epistemology. The five senses in the former sense are known as five types of life (prana) possessed by animals according to the stage of their biological evolution. The Jaipa divides the living beings into five classes (jatis) on the basis of the number of senses possessed by them. These classes consist of the one-sensed animals, two sensed animals and so on upto the five-sensed ones. In the field of epistemology the senses are instruments of perception. They have two types--the material structure (dravyendriyas) and the psychical function (bhavendriyas). Dravyendriyas The senses as material structure are effected by the corresponding Namakarman. They are physical and made of the same stuff as that of the body. The Jaina does not regard a particular physical element as the cause of a particular senseorgan as the Nyaya holds. As a matter of fact the Jaina does not hold the earth, water etc. as the elements. They are them-selves compounds or bodies made from the combination of atoms. In the atomic state they are simply pudgala and canpot be differentiated as earth or water etc.

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234 Epistemology of Jainas The atoms are grouped together into eight varganas. according to their capability of being transformed into certain bodies. We have already stated the five types of bodies, which have corresponding five varganas for their constitution. The speech, mind and breathing also are material. They have one vargana each as their material cause. Our physical structure is constituted of audarika vargana and the same is the material cause of sense-organs. Dravyendriya is further divided into Nirvrtti and Upakarana. Nirvstti means the arrangement or form. It is again divided into Bahya (External) Nirvstti and Abhyantara (Internal) Nirvrtti. Bahya-Nirvrtti is the external forin and Abhyantara-Nirvrtti is internal form. The Prajnapana states that Bahya-Nirvrtti has innumerable forms according to the innumerable types of animals. We see a clear difference in the outer form of the ears between a horse and a man. But the Abhyantara-Nirvrtti has the same form in all the animals. The Prajnapana states that the form of the auditory sense is like the flower of the Kadamba. The visual sense is like the grain of masura (a kind of pulse). The olfactory sense is like the flower of atimuktaka. The gustatory sense is like the edge of a sword. The cutaneous sense possesses various forms. According to the Digambara tradition Bahya Nirvstti is the particular material form and Abhyantara is the part of the soul surrounded by the physical structure. According to the Svetambaras Bahya and Abhyantara, both are material; but silanka in his commentary on Acaranga supports the Digambara tradition. Upakarana is the power of grasping an object, possessed by the Nirvstti. The Digambara tradition holds that Upakarana means what assists. It is also a material structure without which the Nirvstti is incompetent to function. It is divided into two parts of external upakarana and internal upakarana. In the case of eye the pupil--the white and black substance-is internal upakarana and the eye-lids and eye-brows

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Indirect Knowledge 235 are external upakarana. Silanika also endorses the same view. It should be observed here that the Digambara tradition divides material structure of senses into three parts : (1) Bahya Nirvstti, (2) Abhyantara Upakarana and (3) Bahya Upakarana, The Svetambara tradition holds Upakarana not as the material structure, but, the power possessed by the material structore which is known as Nirvstti. According to the Digambara tradition Abhyantara Nirvstti is psychical, the the Svetambara holds it as material. The dravyendriyas are caused by the corresponding Nama-karman. Bhayendriyas The physical senses (Bhavendriyas) are not material but power or function of the self. They are again divided into Labdhi (power) and Upayoga (application). Labdhi means the partial destruction and the partial subsidence (ksayopasama) of the obscuring and the obstructing karmans. The application of labdhi, on a particular object, is known as upayogendriya. It results into the cognition of an object. It has been stated above that the living beings are divided into five classes according to the number of senses possessed by them. The animals possessing one sense only are recognised as ekendriyas. Those possessing two are known as dvindriyas and so on. The order of their possession is cutaneous, gustatory, olfactory, visual and auditory. The animal possessing the latter must possess the former also. The Blind and five senses It can be asked, whether a blind man is four-sensed or enjoys all the five ? In the former case he cannot be included into human beings, who necessarily possess all the five senses. In the latter case, there is no reason why he does not have visual perception. The Jaina replies that the number of senses in a particular being depends upon the class (Jati) in which he is born. The allotment of class is done by the Jati-nama-karman. None cap

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236 Epistemology of Jainas be born as a man if he is not under the influence of the Namakarman which equips an animal with all the five senses. Thus, under the effect of Namakarman a blind man, on account of his being a man, must possess all the five senses. The Ksayopasama required for the completion of psychical senses is already there. .He does not lack in the Angoparga-nama-karman and paryapti-nama-karman (the karmic matter which causes the completion of various limbs or the life in body) also. They invariably exist in a five-sensed animal, the state effected by Pancendriyajati-namakarman. But, the material sense of a blind man ceases to function owing to some defect. Thus, he lacks in upayoga of the visual perception. He cannot be placed with the four-sensed animals, merely for the absence of Upayogendriya. Moreover, in respect of Upayogendriya, all the animals are one-sensed; as there can be only one upayoga at a time. So, the classification of living beings should be considered in regard to Nirvsttindriya. As regards Labdhindriya all the animals are five-sensed; because, Matijnapavarana is common to all the senses. Its Ksayopasama is not separate for every sense. The difference in the cognition is based on other factors. A tree, which belongs to the class of one sensed animals, possesses all the five senses as far as labdhi is .concerned, Labdhi is attained at the very first moment when a jiva enters into a new life. The formulation of Nirvrtti begins as the effect of Argopanga namakarman and gets its completion through the effect of paryapti dama-karman. The Digambara do not admit all the five senses in every living being even in respect of labdhi. According to them there are separate avaranas for every labdhi. The type of Ksayopasama is not common to all the five senses. Relation between senses and the object According in the Buddhist, the senses function without direct contact with the objects of perception. They are all distance receptors (Aprapyakarin) and do not require imme

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Indirect Knowledge 237 diate cantact with their objects. This is especially seen in the case of the senses of sight and hearing. We see far-off objects that cannot have any direct or approximate contact with the eyes. We hear sound from a long distance. Similarly, the eye perceives objects much larger than itself and so incapable of being covered by it. Again, the eye and ear can perceive the distance and the direction of sights and sounds respectively. This they could not if like the senses of smell, taste and touch, they were in immediate contact with their objects. Lastly, many of us can, at the same time, see the same object or hear the same sound from different places. Conversely, one man can, almost at the same time, see two things or hear two sounds, fairly apart from each other. This shows that the senses of sight and hearing can function without actual contact with their respective objects. According to the Nyaya, Saokhya, and Vedanta systems, the senses can perceive only such objects as are in direct or indirect contact with them. This is obvious in the case of socalled lower senses, namely touch, taste and smell. Sensations of touch and taste arise only when the sense-organs are in immediate contact with their respective objects. To taste a thing means to place it in direct contact with the tongue. To touch a thing is to bring it in contact with the skin. Senseobject contact as a condition of olfactory sensation is no less real, although it may sometimes be less obvious. If the smelling object be in our immediate surrounding, there is obvious contact of it with the olfactory organ. If it be at a distance from us, then the odorous particles given off by the object are brought in actual contact with the sense-organ by currents of air. In case of the lower senses all systems of philosophy agree that there is a direct sense-object contact. It is also admitted that the senses of smell, taste and touch remain passive in their end-organs where they are met by their respective stimuli. The remaining two senses of sight and hearing also act in contact with their objects, although not quite as directly as the rest.

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238 Epistemology of Jainas According to the Vedanta, the sense of hearing travels to the sounding objects and gives us the sensation of sound. The Nyaya, holds that sound-waves sent by the object are recei. ved into the car-passage and perceived there as sound. According to both, the Nyaya and the Vedanta, the visual sense Teaches out to the object and gives us colour-sensations. This is way the eye and ear can perceive the distance and direction of their respective objects. According to the modern science visual sensation is believed to be due to the transmission of light-waves from the object to the eye; in the systems mention. ed above, it is explained by the emanation of light-rays from the eye to the object. Ordinarily, the colour-rays are not visible, but inferred as the medium of sense-object contact in visual perception. Still we may perceive them under special circumstances, as when they emanate from the eyes of cats and other animals in a dark night. The Mimamsa maintains Samprayoga as the essential condition of sense-perception. Bhavadasa, an ancient interpretor of the Mimamsasutra, means the actual contact by samprayoga. But, Kumarila did not endorse the above view. He altogether changed the meaning of samprayoga. He asserts that sampravoga means the act of senses. He maintains that it is not essential that a sense must have physical contact with the object to be compreheneded. The presence of the object, in a place within the range of the objectivity of a particular sense, and the capability of the sense-organ to perceive the object, is sufficient for a perception. Sam prayoga is nothing but the contiguity of the sense and the object. Though, Kumarila rejects the theory of contact as an essential condition, yet, practically accepts that all senses cog. nize the object after a real contact. Thus, he also sides with the Nyaya. The Jaina supports the former position of Kumarila. He also holds that the physical contact with the object is not an essential condition for sense-perception. He says that it is

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Indirect Knowledge mere capability (yogyata), that is needed for sensation. Yogyata, as we have stated in the case of labdhi, is nothing but ksayopasama of the obscuring matter. The upayoga depends upon many internal as well as external factors. The contiguity of physical senses with the object also is one of them. But, this contiguity does not necessarily mean a physical contact. In the case of four non-visual senses, the Jaina also admits real contact. He differs from the Buddhist in not accepting the auditory sense as a distance-receptor. He agrees with the Nyaya that the sound comes into a real contact with the ear before it is apprehended. But, the Jaina differs in the nature of that contact. According to the Nyaya the auditory sense is the space surrounded by the ear-cavity (karna-saskuli) and the sound is a quality of the space produced either by conjunction (samyogaja) or disjunction (vibhagaja) of two objects, or by the sound itself (sabdaja). The first sound is produced by the conjunction or disjunction. It produces another sound and this series goes on till they reach the ear-cavity. The contact between the auditory-sense and the sound is not a conjunction; because, it is possible in two substance only and the sound is not a substance. It is a quality which inheres in the auditory sense which is the spacesubstance. According to Jainism the sound is a material product, composed of Bhasavargana. The body of sound projected at its own place travels through the vehicle of air and strikes with the ear, a fleshy structure of the shape of kadamba which causes the sensation of sound. In the case of eye the Jaina agrees with the Buddhist and holds it as a distance-receptor. The Nyaya admitted the eye as a firy substance, which goes out and establishes a contact with the object. The Jaina does not favour it. 239 The Jaina, though denies the Buddhist view of Srotra as a distant-receptor (aprapyakarin), yet, does make a distinction between srotra and the other senses of this type. He holds that the senses of touch, taste and smell apprehend an object which is not only in contact (sprsta) but also fastened (baddha). The

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240 Epistemology of Jainas sense of sound apprehends the object which is sprsta only. It does not require the condition of being fastened also. It is so sharp (patu) that mere contact is sufficient. Thus, the Jaina holds three classes regarding the contact between senses and the object. The senses of touch, taste and smell apprehend the object which is in touch as well as physical grip (baddhasprsta). The sense of sound apprehends on mere touch only. The sense of sight apprehends the object which is neither in touch nor in grip. The Object of Senses According to the Nyaya the senses are constructed of one element each. The sense of smell is an earthly composition, the senses of taste is made of water, the sense of sight that of fire, the sense of sound that of space and the sense of touch that of air. These elements contain one special quality each; which is the object of corresponding senses. The Nyaya asserts that the quality apprehended by a sense must be possessed by its constituent elements. The olfactory sense (ghrana) is the organ of apprehending smell. It must have the quality of smell in it. As such, it is constituted of the earth, to which smell originally belongs as an attribute. The gustatory sense (rasana) is the condition of taste-sensation. It is constituted by physical element called water, because it is possessed of the specific attribute of that element viz. taste. The visual sense (caksu) is the cause of colour sensations and itself contains colour. It has its locus in the pupil of the eye. It is constituted of a luminous substance called tejas or light. The cuteneous sense (tvak) is the source of touch-sensation and temperature-sensation. It is constituted of the physical element of air; because, like air it manifests the quality touch. The Jaina does not approve of the Nyaya-view that a particular sense is constituted of the particular element. He holds that all senses belong to the same material cause, i. e. audarika vargana. The Nyaya contention that a particular quality is sensed by a particular sense-organ because the latter is constituted

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Indirect Knowledge 241 of the element holding the same quality, as its specific character, is not based on sound reasoning. The earth possesses the taste, colour, form and touch also along with the smell. The olfactory sense also must, according to the Nyaya contain all these qualities as it is constituted of the earth. In that case, there is no reason why it should sense the smell only and not other qualities. The Nyaya can argue that other qualities, are not its specific qualities, as they are found in other substances also. In that case, the Jaina contends, the elements of air, fire and water would have no specific quality, as they contain nothing which is not found elsewhere. Moreover, the physical elements possess some non-physical qualities also, as that of number, dimension, conjunction etc., but they are not admitted as object of the senses The only explanation for the regulation of objectivity, the Jainas say, is the Ksayopasama or natural capacity of the senses. Other explanations do not hold any sound basis. Ultimately, one has to resort to the natural capacity. The Jainas hold the five qualities as sensed naturally by the corresponding five organs. The organ of touch-sense is naturally capable of apprehending the quality of touch. The Jainas maintain eight kinds of touch, viz., hot and cold, soft and hard, viscid and rough, heavy and light. The Nyaya Vaisesika holds only the temperature sense as related with the touchorgan. He adds to the varieties of hot and cold, a third one of the temperature which is neither hot nor cold (anusnasita). The qualities of softness and hardness, according to the Nyaya, are not original but based upon the quality of conjunction (samyoga). If the conjuction of constituting parts is dense the resulting substance will appear as hard. If it is loose the object will appear as soft. The quality of viscidity, according to the Nyaya, is found in the element of water only. Roughness is nothing but its absence. He does ont accept them as the object of touch-organ. The qualities of heaviness and lightness also are not peculiar to the touch-sense. They are inferred through the factors down or its absence. The Buddhist enumer

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242 Epistemology of Jainas ates eleven categories as the object of touch-sense. They are the earth, water, fire, air, softness, hardness, heaviness, lightness, coldness, hunger and thirst. According to the modern psychology there are four classes of the cutaneous, namely the sensations of (i) touch proper, pressure or contact, (ii) those of heat and warmth, (iii) those of cold and coolness, (iv) those of pain. (2) Rasana--The gustatory sense reveals the five types of taste; namely astringent (tikta), bitter (katu), pungent (kanaya', sour (amla) and sweet (madhura). The Nyaya holds six types, adding saline to the above list. The Buddhist also follows the popular view, adopted by the Nyaja. Modern psychology reduces the list to four as the pure taste sensation, namely, sweet, salt, acid and bitter. It holds other tastes as a mixture of taste with smell or touch. (3) Gbrana--The olfactory sense apprehends two varieties of smell, namely, fragrant and nonfragrant. The Nyaya also holds the same view. The Buddhist adds two more viz. intense (utkata) and mild (anutkata). The modern psychology holds that there are many degrees of the intensity of smell. They are so vague and indistinguishable from one another, that is impossible to have an accurate classification. They also get blended with (a) tactual sensations of nostrils, as in the case of the smell-sensation of ammonia or of spuff; (b) organic sensations of the respiratory system, e.g. certain smells stimulate respirations and others have a choking, effect; and (c) common sensibility, e.g. some smells bave an exhilerating and others a depressing effect on the organism as whole. (4) Caksur--The sense of vision apprehends the five varieties of colour, namely, black (krsna), blue (plla), red (aruna), yellow (pIta) and white (sukla). The Nyaya terms black as nila and places green (barita) in the place of blue. He adds two more colours of tawny (kapota) and mixed (citra) and brings the list to seved. The Buddhist adds the form (samsthana) also

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Indirect Knowledge as the object of visual sense. He admits four varieties of colour and four of the form. In another way he mentions 20 varieties of rupa i.e. visual data. The modern psychology accepts seven varieties of colour with a complex system of sensation. The Buddhist inclusion of form (akara) in visual objects is not favoured by the Jaina and the Nyaya. They hold that it can be perceived by the sense of touch also. (5) Srota-The sense of sound apprehends three varieties of the sound; namely (i) produced by living being (sacitta), (ii) produced by the lifeless object (acitta) and (iii) the mixed (misra). Tattvartha divides the sound into two varieties of (1) produced after certain deliberate process (prayogika) and accidental (vaisrasika). The sound is divided in other varieties also, but, they are connected with its being an articulate, inarticulate speech and so on. They have no bearing on the objectivity of auditory sense. There is a fundamental difference between the Nyaya and the Jaina in the conception of sound. The Nyaya holds sound as the quality of space. The Jaina holds it as a material substance composed of Bhasa vargana. The Nyaya divides the sound into two varieties of inarticulate (dhvanyatmaka) and articulate (varnatmaka). The Buddhist divides the sound into two varieties of pleasing (manojna) and displeasing (amanojna); with four subdivisions of each. According to the modern psychology sounds are vibrations produced by certain physical action. 243 The conditions for sensation Sankara-Misra gives four necessary conditions for the perception of colour, viz. (i) large magnitude (mahatparimana), (ii) visibility (udbhutattva), (iii) not being overpowered (anabhibhutattva) and (iv) the property of colour (rupa). The Jaina recognizes the above conditions in different terms. He admits that an atom is beyond the visual perception. Amongst the waves of

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244 Epistemology of Jainas compounds (skandbas) also some are visible while others are not. The compounds of Abaraka Vargana, Taijasa Vargana, Karmana Vargana, Bhasa Vargana and Manovargana are not visible. Though the conception of udbbuta rupa and anudbhuta rupa is not found in Jainism; yet the acceptance of visibility of one compound and the invisibility of others comes to the same. Similarly, the invisibility of atoms resembles the Nyaya conception of atomic magnitude as unperceivable. When the Jaina resorts to natural capability or incapability in such cases, the Nyaya attempts to classify the grounds as such. The conditions of light, object and contact etc. accepted by the various systems as necessary for visual perception are not favoured by the Jainas. He holds them useful for particular cases but, does not include them in the systems of general causation. According to the Nyaya every material substance does not possess all the physical qualities. The air possesses the quality of touch only. The fire has two; namely, touch and colour, The water has four with an addition of taste and fluidity (sneha), The earth is without fluidity; but, has smell in its place. The Jaipas hold that every material substance contains all the physical qualities. In some they are manifest while in others they are unmanifest. The air is not without colour. but it has it only in upmanifested condition. Similar is the case with taste and smell also. The condition of manifestation or the reverse also, according to Jainism, is not absolute. It is related with the subject. In darkness the colour of a jar is unmanifest to human beings, but the same is manifest to owl and cat. The Perception of Substance According to Nyaya the substances are perceived by two senses only, i.e. of sight and the touch, the remaining three organs are limited to their respective qualities. The Jaina and 1. Tattvarthasutra, Pt. Sukhlal Sanghvi, p. 34

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Indirect Knowledge 245 Buddhist do not make this distinction. According to Buddhism the substance is nothing but a collection of qualities. Abhidbarma says that the earth is nothing but the colour and form. 1 The Jaina holds that the quality and substance are not quite separate. They are different as well as identical. The sensation of one cannot be differentiated from that of the other. So, all the senses apprehend quality as well as the substance. Fast and Slow Processes of sensation The Jaina admission of the visual sense as a distance-receptor and the other senses as contact-receptors gives rise to the .conception of two speeds in the process of cogaition. The senses working after close contact begin their process from Vyanjana vagraha (the contact between sense and the object). The amount of knowledge is so scanty, at this stage, that one does not feel as cognising anything. This state is compared with the first drop of water thrown on a new earthen-ware, just out from the even.9 The first drop disappears totally without deaving any apparent mark; yet we cannot say that it went without any effect. A series of similar drops produces a clear effect. Had the first drop been without any effect the subsequent drops also could not produce any effect. Similarly, when we call a sleeping person, the first call goes unheeded; but, when called repeatedly, he wakes up. We cannot say that the first call was absolutely ineffective. It also had its effect, though not distinct. The speed of the above process is slow as compared with that of the visual sense. This is recognized as manda-krama. The same is the case with other senses recognising the object after contact. 1. Visesa, G. 149 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid.

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246 Epistemology of Jainas The process of the visual perception does not start from the contact between sense and the object. It grasps the object without any contact and reaches the stage of arthavagraha directly. It is compared with the reflection in a mirror, which reflects the object in contiguity, at once. The speed of this process is swifter than the former, and is kpown as patukrama. After avagraha both types of the senses have the same speed and the procedure. As a matter of fact the subsequent stages or concerned with the arrangement of the data already supplied. The outer senses play little part in that arrangement. Which is mainly a mental function. The Mind (Manas) In Western philosophy the mind means both, the self as well as the totality of conscious states; where the self gets its manifestation. In both cases it corresponds to the soul or the psychic activity of Indian systems. It is never applied to the instrunient of those activities as the manas is generally conceived in Indian thought. In our treatment, we have followed the common tradition of accepting the mind and manas as synonyms. According to the Nyaya and Vaisesika mind is an internal sense. It is atomic in size and moves around the external senses. Its contact with the soul is an essential condition for knowledge and thus, it controls the non-occurrence of many cognitions at a time.1 Unlike the other senses it is not made of any of the physical elements. It is an eternal substance having an independent existence. 8 It is beyond the sensual perception and can be known through inference only. The mind does not possess any of the physical qualities, consequently its objectivity is not confined to any of them. It is a common instrument for all types of knowledge. But, the subjective qualities of 1. Vaisesika sutra, 3.2.1 2. Ibid, 3.2.2

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Indirect Knowledge 247 pleasure, pain etc. are directly perceived by the mind. Doubt, dream, memory, inference and other types of indirect knowledge are purely subjective, and therefore apprehended by the mind. According to the Vedanta magas is not a comprehensive term. It is a particular state of antahkarana, which includes all types of mental states. The Antahkarana is an evolute of avidya and occupies the entire body. It involves the empirical self of the Vedanta, a condition of pure consciousness, limiting the latter into body and thus constituting the person of jiva. It goes out through the senses and establishes the three.fold identity. The qualities of pleasure, pain etc. are apprehended by antahkarana itself. According to another opinion they are directly perceived by the (modalized) consciousness ( kevala saksibhasya ) Antahkarana has five conditions with five corresponding names. The condition of suspense (samsaya) is expressed by manas; that of judgement (niscaya) by buddhi; vanity (garva) by aharkara, consciousness by citta and recollection by smeti 2 According to the Sankhya mind is an evolute of praksti coming after ab ankara (ego). It is all-pervading and is intellicized through the reflection of Purusa. In other respects the Saokhya resembles the Vedanta. In the Buddhism Mind is split into two chief parts.3 The subjective part, or mind viewed as a receptive faculty, is represented by one element called, indiscriminately, citta, vijnana or manas. It represents pure consciousness, or pure sensation, without any content. Its content is placed in the objective part which contains the definite sensation (sparsa); feelings (vedana), 1. See-Vedantasara and Vedanta Paribhasa. 2. Vedanta Paribhasa p. 76 3. Sankhyakarika 22,23 4. Central Conception of Buddhism p. 15

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Epistemology of Jainas ideas (samjna) volitions (cetana) and various other mental phenomena. upto the number of forty-six separate elements. So, it is that feelings come to be viewed as objects of the mind. Out of the 75 elements known as dharmas in Buddhism, 64 belong to the mental group (caitta dharmah). To this we can add citta or the mind as a receptive faculty. The remaining ten are five senses and the five objects. They are differentiated from the mind and mental elements as being material (rupinah) while the latter are immaterial (arupinah). Besides the fortysix mental phenomena the mind contains fourteen elementary forces (viprayukta samskara), the element of character (avijnapti) and the three elements which are eternal (asamskrta): among the latter is Nirvana, the chief dharma. The common feature of all these elements is that they are apprehended by the intellect directly without any intermediate agency of the senses. In the apprehension of sense-objects there is likewise participation by the intellect; but these dharmas are nonsensuous objects, they are the exclusive domain of receptive intellect, just as colour is the exclusive domain of the sense of vision. The Buddhist does not regard the soul as different from mind. 248 In Jainism, the mind is known as no-sense (anindriya) or not-sense (no-indriya). The terms 'no' or 'not' in this case, do not mean negation but comparatively lesser degree of the character of a sense. Though mind also is a source of knowledge, it is regarded as no-indriya; because, it is dependent on other senses for grasping the external objects. It is a common factor in all cognitions. The object of other senses is fixed but the mind is not confined to any of the physical qualities. It is capable of apprehending the past and future also. The main function of the mind is thinking. It arranges the data given by the senses. Like other senses the mind also is divided into two varieties 1. Tattvartha, 2,19

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Indirect Knowledge 249 the physical mind (dravyamana) and the psychical mind (bhavamana). The physical mind is material, constituted of manovargana. It occupies the whole body. The Digambaras admit the heart as its abode; and of the shape of a lotus with eight petals. The psychical mind (bhavamana) is the power or activity of the self resulting into various states of mentation. To the Nandi and Anuyogadvara the ordinary perception is confined to the five external senses. Mental cognition is not regarded as perceptian. But, in the later stage the apprehensions of pleasure, pain etc. are included into perception. In the Agamic period feeling has no relation with the mind. It is effected by Vedan/ya-karman and directly connected with the soul. Even the animals without mind, feel pleasure, pain etc. The Arhats, who generally do not apply the mind to any psychic activity, are said to feel favourable or unfavourable experiences directly through the soul. In this stage the mind is purely connected with the function of thinking. According to the Nyaya, the qualities of soul are cognized by the mind.2 The Jaina dose not favour this dependence. He says that soul can apprehend its own qualities independently, The Vedanta, Sankhya and Buddhist assign the qualities of pleasure, pain etc. to mind only. The Jaina says that they are the qualities of the self mixed with karmic matter. The Function of Mind The Agamic term for the function of mind is samjna. It is divided into many ways.3 (1) The First Division According to the first division it has three varieties : (a) Dirghakaliki--The sense of keeping the past impressions 1. NandIsutra 5, Anuyogasutra 144 2. Siddhanta Muktavall K. 57 3. Vaisesika Bhasya G. 504-527

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Epistemology of Jainas into memory and reflection on the future. This sense is found in the kingdoms of heaven and hell and in the womb-born (garbhaja) animals. The division of samjnins (with mind) and asamjnins (without mind) depends mainly on this sense. 250 (b) Hetuvadiki-The sense of acceptance or rejection of an object after proper consideration of its advantages or disadvantages. This sense is found in all the mobile (trasa) animals; who can move from place to place according to their interest. (c) Drstivadiki-The sense of getting the knowledge of Drsti vada, the twelvth anga. This sense is found in the persons with right attitude (samyagdrsti) only. The above division of samjna is related to the higher grade animals only. (2) The Second Division According to the second division the samjna is divided into two varieties of (a) knowing and (b) feeling: (a) The variety of knowing relates to the five types of kno wledge, mati, sruta etc. (b) The variety of feeling is divided into the following four types: (i) Aharasamjna-The feeling of hunger. It is effected1 by the rise of corresponding Vedaniya karman. (ii) Bhayasamjna-The feeling of fear; effected by the Mohaniya karman. (iii) Maithunasamjna-The feeling of sexual desire, effected by Mohaniya. (iv) Parigrahasamjna-The desire for accumulation, effected by Mohaniya. The Bhagavati-Sutra adds six more varieties; i. e. the four passions (kasayas), Oghasamjna and Lokasamjna. Oghasamjna is the habitual feeling without any explicit psychic conscious1. Bhagavati 7.8. Prajnapana pada 8.

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Indirect Knowledge 251 ness. It is just like the activities of unconscious mind lokasamjna is the ordinary type of articulate cognition. In the Acarangal there are six more samjnas of (i) Moha, (ii) Dharma (iii) Sukha, (iv) Duhkha, (v) Jugupsa and (vi) soka. The above types of samjnas are common to all the mundano being. They are found in the one-sensed animals also, The Problem of Sarjnin and Asamjnin In the Jaioa biological evolution only a particular section of the five-sensed animals is regarded as samjnin. All other animals are asamjnins. This division is roughly based on the possession of mind or otherwise. The animals with mind are known as samjnins and others as asamjnins. But, at the same time it is held that Mati and Sruta are common to all the imperfect souls. We have divided mati into three types of indriyanimitta (produced by the senses alone), anindriyanimitta (produced by the mind only) and ubhayanimitta (produced by the both). The first type of mati is possible in the one-sensed animals also as they also possess the sense of touch. The fruta is caused exclusively by the mind; so it cannot exist in the lower grade animals who are without mind. Jinabhadra tries to explain this inconsistency by holding the division of samjnin and asamjnin as based on the physical mind; which is not completed in the lower grade animals. Their activity is mere instinctive and not rational. But, as far as the psychical mind is concerned, they are not absolutely without mind. They also possess the power of thinking or feeling to a certain degree. The trees, though one-sensed in physical consideration, exhibit a clear sense of feeling, the favourable or unfavourable touches. But, this contention of Jinabhadra, goes against the theory of cognitive causal system. The psychical 1. Acaranga Ntrukti G. 38. 39. 2. Tattvartha II. 25 3. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 104

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252 Epistemology of Jalnas sense does not function without the help of pbysical sense, as we have stated in the case of a blind. According to the same principle, the psychical mind is impotent without the physical mind. Consequently, the phenomena of mental activities cannot be explained in the case of asamjnins. The only possible explanation of this division is that the negation in the case of asamjnins, does not mean total absence, but an undeveloped condition. The mind of the lower grade animals is not so developed as amounting to rationality. This view is further confirmed by the first division of samjna, stated above. The animals by instinct also possess mind in undeveloped form; and consequently, they have sruta also. The Object of Mind According to the Non-Jaina systems mind is an essential condition for all types of psychic function. It is only the Vedanta, which holds certain qualities as saksibhasya (cognized by the pure soul). But, as far as the cognition of external things is concerned, he also holds antahkarana, as an essential .condition. The Jaina does not favour this view. The Nandi clearly holds the sense cognition as different from the mental cognition. The first is pratyaksa while the lattet is paroksa. All types of paroksa in the logical period, except Agama are included into paroksa-mati. Akalarka includes them into Sruta;3 but, this difference is related with the fixation of a demarcation line between mati and sruta. Akalanka includes all types of mental cognition into sruta. As far as the sense cognition is concerned he does not differ from the Nandi. Thus, mind is not an essential condition for all types of knowledge. In the logical period it is held that mind functions in the case of sense cognitions also. But, that is an external influence. We have stated the variety of mati exclusively rela1. Vedanta Paribhasa p. 72 2. Nandi Sutra 4 and 24 3. Tattvartha Rajavartika p. 54

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Division of Knowledge 253 ted with the senses. In such cases the soul cognizes the object through the medium of senses, without depending upon the assistance of mind, just as in the case of supersensual cognition, it does so directly. It is another thing that in the case of samjnins, the miod begins to function as soon as an object is presented. In the case of supersensual cognition of avadhi and manahparyaya the role of mind is finished with the desire to know a particular object. After knowledge it begins to function again for the creation of favourable or unfavourable attitude. In the case of an omniscient it is absolved from that function also. Similar, is the case with sense-cognition. It (mind) functions in creating a desire to know a particular thing. It has nothing to do with the stage of sensation. It functions again for creating the particular attitude. But the stages of desire and attitude are not cognitive stages. They are result of MohanIya karman. Here, the mind does not function as an instrument of knowledge, but that of feeling or willing. The mind as an instrument of cognition is related with the four types of imperceptual knowledge. They are memory, recognition, hypothetical judgement and authority. In the Agamic period these types are expressed along with mati or sruta. No doubt, the feelings of pleasure, pain etc. are directly related with the mind. But, they are not cognitions. The four types of passions (kasayas) and nine types of mild passions. (pokasayas) also are related with the mind, but those also are not cognitions. In the four stages of avagraha etc. the mind begins to function from the stage of Iha, which is a mental inclination towards judgement. Here, it operates upon the data supplied by the senses. According to Jainism mati advances. from general to particular. This process consists in doubt, inclination and judgement. All these stages are mental phenomena. In the animals without mind these states do not occur. Such animals get sense-impression and react habitually. For, the states of doubt etc. the memory of past impression is necessary. It is not possible in the lower grade animals. They

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254 Epistemology of Jainas cannot retain the memory of past events. The flies sit on the same thing even if they are hundred times blown away. They cannot be rational. Memory is the quality of a developed mind. Similarly, the power of retention (dharana) also is a mental quality. The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that mind is an instrument of knowing as well as the other psychical activities of feeling and willing. The external senses are related with knowing only. In the case of knowing the mind is further analysed in two varieties. It serves as an instrument of an independently recognised category of knowledge, as in the case of memory, inference etc. It also serves as an instrument of the development of sense-cognition. As a matter of fact both types are fundamentally the same. The elements of memory and inference exist in both cases. But, in one case they are independently recognized while in others they are secondary to the sensecognition. This division does not exist in the Agamic period. It was introduced by the logical period, where the question of inference etc. came into prominence. The Division of Mati Sruta-Nisrita and Asruta-Nisrita Mati covers all the stages of acquisition, conservation and elaboration, accepted by the modern pschology as the stages of thinking. These stages are only a logical assumption. They are hardly felt distinct from the another in our common experience. Sometimes, our mind works so abruptly that one. cannot discriminate whether the experience is a mental contribution or a sensation. Russell cites an example to clarify this point. Once, in the days when motor-car was a new invention, and people were not acquainted with its machinery, he moto red with a friend in a country-side. Suddenly, the tyre burst out with the noise like a gun-shot. His friend was not acquaiinted with the noise of bursting and took it as that of a gun. 1. Analysis of Mind. p. 139

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Indirect Knowledge 235 At the same moment he told Mr. Russell that he had seen the flash also. The flash, at that time was decidedly a mental creation. But, the feeling was so strong that it appeared like a sensation. We may quote another example from him. When we listen to a foreign dialogue, though we know it, we have to sit near the speaker and be careful to listen every word. But, when the dialogue is in the mother tongue, such closeness or attention is not required. As far as auditory sense is concerned it works with equal capacity in both places. But, in the former case the mind does not work so swiftly as to fill up the gap at once. In the second case it is swift and fills all the gaps left by sensation, at once. It is therefore, difficult to ascertain the limits of sensation and mentation in a particular case. But, the sensation does not reach the stage of knowledge unless it is interpreted, understood or given a mental arrangement. The function of interpretation or understanding is generally known as intellectuation. The back-ground of this intellectuation is based on the material supplied by the person himself or some other person. When a child is born he is not able to understand anything. Gradually, his intellect develops either on his own experiences or instruction from other persons. The instructions are either oral or through books. The main difference between the two bases of intellectual development is, that the former is automatic and experimental. The second is derived and indirect. The Nandi divides Mati into two varieties of sruta-nisrita and Asruta nihsrita on the above mentioned two grounds. The intellectuation based on scriptures of other kinds of instructions is srutanisrita and that based on other sources is asruta nisrita. Malayagiri defines sruta-nisrita as the cognition of a person with the intellect developed through the study of scriptures. The latter are not recollected at the time of cognition; but, function as assimilated in the mental set up. 1. Nandr Sutra, 26 2. Nandi tika, p. 143

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256 Epistemology of Jainas On the other hand, if they are remembered at the time of cognition as authorities, the resulting knowledge would be sruta and not mati. The natural capability of mind to strike at the right solution or exact point without the previous knowledge of scriptures is Asruta nisrita. It is the direct result of ksayopasama attained through birth (utpatti), self-discipline (vinaya), practice (karma) and rationality (parinama). The Nardi again divides Sruta-nissta into four types of Avagraha etc. and Asruta-pissta into four Buddhis. It is convenient to discuss first, the four buddhis. The Nandi describes them as follows. 1. Aut pattiki : The sense of striking at the right point, which is never seen, heard or otherwise known before; and thus, leading to a successful resuit is known as autpattiki. It does not depend upon instruction or other external causes. It is a natural gift. The Nandi cites thirteen stories to illustrate it. They are stories of wits and wisdom like the Aesop's Fables. They only show how the natural genious of persons get them successfully through hardships. 2. Vainayiki : The intellect of finding out a right solution in a complicated matter is known as Vaipayiki. It enables one to known the essence of religion, ethics and politics. It is beneficial in this life as well as after death. It is attained through self discipline (vinaya). The Nandi illustrates it with fifteen stories. It is attained through long service of the preceptor. It should not be taken as resulting from the tea. ching of the latter. The result of teaching is Sruta-nissita, while vainayiki is a mental development of intellect obtained through service and self-discipline. The first example makes the distinction very clear. Two disciples of the same teacher, with the same amount of book-koowledge observe the same phenomenon. One of the, two who was rather impertinent, reacu hed the wrong conclusion, while the other, with obedient nature, 1. Nandi Sutra, 27

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Indirect Knowledge 257 strikes at the right conclusion. The distinction between the two is not based on the knowledge but on their personal intelligence. (3) Karmaja-The intellect developed through practice in a particular vocation. It is illustrated with twelve stories. (4) Parinamihi - The intellect attained through inference, reason and other methods of rationality; ripened with the advancement of age, is known as parinamiki. It also helps in mundane as well as spiritual attainments. It has twenty-one stories. If we consider the sphere of Asruta nisrita on the basis of buddhis we can say that it covers the whole field of indirect mati. Sruta nisrita is confined to direct mati. Some Historical Remarks The above division of Sruta nisrita and Asruta njsrita is not found in the Digambara tradition. In the Svetambaras also it is not found in the Bhagavati, Prajnapana, Niryuktis and Anuyoga. It is the Nandi which refers to it for the first time. In the Bhagavati and Ayasyaka-Niryukti four buddhis are described without their relation with mati. They are not specifically mentioned as related to any of the five types of knowledge. The Sruta at that time was confined to scriptural knowledge only. Consequently, these examples of wits, generally associated with unlettered persons, could not be credited as sruta. So, it appears that the author of Nandi tried to include them in Mati through the above mentioned device. The fluctuation in sense of pbilosopbical terms, helps in adjustment; but, at the same time makes distinction a diffi. cult problem. This is seen especially in the case of distinction between Mati and Sruta; which we shall discuss shortly. We cannot say that the division of Sruta pisrita and Asruta nisrita is precise and mutually exclusive. The process of Avagraha etc. is as common to the unlettered as it is to a 1. Bhagavali, Avasyaka Niryukti G. 932

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258 Epistemology of Jainas lettered. One cannot say that the four types of avagraha etc. are always Sruta nisrita. Similarly, the buddhis also are not peculiar to the uneducated only. It appears that the author has followed in it the local tradition of associating the above tit-bits with uneducated people. So, when they were recognised as associated with the persons without sruta, the others came to be accepted as related with the person with sruta. According to VBh. the four buddhis also appear in the natural process of Avagraha etc., yet, they are named as Asruta pisrita, because, they depend upon the ksayopasama of the previous life or of the same life attained through practice or such other things. They do not depend upon the scriptural knowledge or the instruction by a teacher. On the other hand the stage of 'Tha' is an inclination to classify the object, i.e. to attach it with some connotation. It is not possible unless the cognizer possesses the knowledge of words and their meanings. This knowledge is obtained through scriptures or instruction only. A person, however, intelligent he may be, cannot be acquainted with the terminology of a particular language without instruction. But this solution raises another difficulty. It implies that the stage of Tha' cannot be attained by a being unacquainted with language. By language we do not mean here the personal inner articulation, which is a constant companion of thought. Here it means the common dialect based on the instruction. We cannot say that a cow, monkey or such other intelligent animals do not reach the stage of "iba'. They form their judgements also, and reach even the stage which is more advanced. They do not get any instruction from scriptures, but learn everything by their natural instinct. So, the solution given by VBh. also is a general way of classification. There is no hard and fast demarcation between the two. The Division of Sruta nisrita It has been stated above that the two-fold division of Sruta 1. Vibesavasyaka Bhasya G. 177

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Indirect Knowledge 259 nisrita and Asruta-nisrita was introduced by the author of Nandi. If this division is not taken into consideration Mati is directly divided into the four varieties of Avagraha, Iha, Avaya and Dharana. This division is common with the Svetambaras as well as Digambaras. It is found in all the cononical and latter literature. It expresses the psychological process of knowing as admitted by the Jainas. Knowledge, in the ordinary sense of the term, is judgement, But, a judgement is not reached at once. One has to pass through certain stages before reaching it. The philosophical systems have explained these stages in various ways. The Nyaya admits four stages in the following order :(1) Contact between the organ of sense and the object. (2) The cognitions of the object and its characteristic with out relation (visistavaisistyanavagahi jnanam). (3) Coguition of the two as related with each other. (4) The desirable, undesirable or indifferent attitude to wards the object. Prabhakara and Kumarila endorse the Nyaya view with a slight change in the second stage, which we shall point out in the chapter of Darsana. The Sankhya explains these stages as follows :(1) Contact (2) Outgoing of buddhi at the spot of the object. (3) Reflection of the object into buddhi. (4) Reflection of purusa into buddhi or that of buddhi into purusa; the conceptions held by Vacaspati and Vijnana. bhiksu respectively. The Vedanta holds the following process? :(1) Contact (2) Outgoing of Antahkarana at the spot of object. (3) The removal of ignorance obscuring the consciousness conditioned by the object.

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Epistemology of Jainas (4) The illumination or projection of the new object. This stage varies according to the two schools of the Vedanta. The Buddhist holds a different process: (1) Contact or contiguity as the case may be. (2) Inarticulate cognition of the particular object-instants (artha-ksana). 260 (3) Mental creation of the name, class etc. In the Abhidharma philosophy the sense cognition is known as Pancadvara vIthi. It is explained through the simile of a man sleeping under a mango-tree. A man is lying under a mango-tree lost in deep sleep. A fruit drops down and rolls by his side. He is suddenly woke up and tries to find out what has disturbed him. He sees the mango fruit nearby; picks it up and smells and examines. Hav. ing been ascertained that it is quite ripe and good, he eats it. In this process: (1) The deep sleep is compared to the passive state of mind, when it is having its own course, undisturbed by any kind of impression, either objective or ideational. This state of mind is called Bhavanga. (2) Getting up and trying to find out what has disturbed him, is like that lazy state of mind when the subject feebly strives to make out whether the stimulus came through the eye, or the ear, or the nose, or the tongue or the skin (touch). This is called Pancadvaravajjana or turning to impressions at the five doors of senses. (3) 'Seeing the mango fruit' is like the arising of the particular sensation, either of the eye or any other four doors of senses. It is sensation, pure and simple, free from any reflection over it. This state is known as 'Vinnana' or consciousness. (4) The picking up the mango fruit' is like the mind receiving the stimulus as an independent object existing outside in the world of reality. This is called 'sampaticchana' or the recei. pient consciousness.

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Indirect Knowledge 261 (5) Smelling and examining the mango fruit is like the mind reflecting over the object and trying to understand it in the light of its previous experiences. This is called 'santfrana' or the investigating consciousness. (6) Ascertaining that the mango is quite ripe and good is like the mind giving the object a definite place in the field of knowledge. This is called 'Votthapana' or the determining con. sciousness. (7) 'Eating the mango' is like the mind tending to adjust the object according to its own suitability. This is the most lively state of consciousness, in which the subject is fully conscious of itself and determines its own attitude towards the object. This is called javana or the active consciousness. In Manodvara-vithi or the course of cognition through the mind door, the object of cognition is not a stimulus of the outside world; but, an ideational image arising from within, which presents itself with an already ascertained and determined character. This course of cognition, therefore, begins with the sixth stage of the Pancadvara vithi, i. e. with Votthapana or the determining consciousness. The modern psychology admits the following stages : Sensation (1) Acquisition | Perception (2) Conservation Memory 7 Imagination Conception (3) Elaboration Judgement | Reasoning Avagraha (sensation) According to the Jaina psychology of knowing, the cognitive process begins with darsana and ends with Dharana. There are three middle stages of Avagraha, iba and Avaya. The stage of judgement is reached in Avaya. The first two stages comprise in awareness and the inclination towards a judgement. The stage of Avagraha appears immediately after Darsana.

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262 Epistemology of Jainas Its conception, therefore, varies according to the views about Darsana to which we have devoted an independent chapter. According to the general view Darsana is the first cognitive stage appearing after contiguity of the senses and the object. Pujyapada,1 Akalarka2 and all scholars of the logical school have accepted this view. According to them Avagraha is not mere awareness. This stage is covered by Darsana. Avagraha goes one step further towards apprehension of the particularity. According to Virasena3 darsana is the first inclination of the soul, for knowing. It does not refer to any external object. It puts the senses at work. According to this view avagraha means the stage of contiguity, which is closely followed by the first awareness of the external existence, known as arthavagraha. The process of particularization begins with Iba. According to the first view Avagraha is defined as the cognition of object, following the general awareness of mere existence appearing at the contiguity of the sepse-organ with the object. It holds that in the stage of Avagraha one is able to make a distinction whether the object is a sound or colour. This view is open to certain difficulties. The Avagraha; as will be seen later on, is divided in two stages of Vyanjanava. graha and Arthavagraha. The first stage is the contact of the senses with the object. This stage cannot be explained in any other way; as its four-fold division, i. e. the exclusion of visual sense and mind from its sphere, points out clearly that it is nothing but the contact between the two. It would mean that the stage of Avagraha begins with the contact and Darsana comes after it; which is against the established order. Secondly, the particularization is always preceded by a doubt, having an equal balance on two or more, alternatives, then there is the stage of leaning towards one side followed by 1. Sarvarthasiddhi Satra, I. 15 2. Tattvartharajavartika Sutra, I. 15 3. Dhavala p. 354

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Indirect Knowledge 263 the stage of judgement. We cannot make the cognition of first particularity an exception to this rule. If Avagraha is admitted as cognition of first particularity it also must be preceded by doubt and speculation (Iba). These points will be discussed further as we proceed. The second view dominates the Agamic literature. Umasvati, Siddhasena Gapin and Jinabhadra support it. The examples of a sleeping man and the earthen pot fresh from the oven, as expressed in the Nandi, support the same. According to this view Avagraha is the first awareness of external existence, without any distinction of sound, colour etc. All particulars in this stage lie unmanifest. The first stage towards the realization of particularity begins with iba. The process of cognition as admitted by the above mentioned two views can be placed as follows : 1. Contact - Darsana - Avagraha-Iha etc. 2. Darsana --contact--Avagraha-Iha etc. According to the second view contact is a stage of avagraha, known as vyanjanavagraha. Vyanjana vagraha (The contact between senses and the object) Avagraha is divided in two stages of Vyanjanavagraha and Arthavagraha. Vyanjanavagraha means the contact between senses and the object leading to the manifestation of the latter. By senses we mean here the internal physical senses (antarpirvrtti), which possess the power of cognition. The term Vyanjana has three meanings : The senses, the object to be cognized and the contact between the two. The third is known as Vyanjanavagraha. It can be objected here that the contact is not knowledge, it is a physical relation. It exists between sound and the auditory sense of a deaf also, who is decidedly without any knowledge. Jinabhadra replies to this objection that Vyanjapavgaraba is not absolutely without knowledge as it supplies matter to 1. Jaanabindu p. 10

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Epistemology of Jainas Arthavagraha;1 which is knowledge without any doubt. Vyanjanavagraha results into Arthavagraha. If it were without any knowledge, it cannot transform into a knowledge. Jnana does not necessarily mean a cognition but, also its cause. 264 It is interesting to contrast this view with that of the logical period, where Sannikarsa is explicitly rejected as not knowledge, and therefore Apramana. It is the paucity of our philosophical discussions that when the same thing comes from a rival system it is severely attacked and it is forgotten that the criticism goes against their own tenets also. Jinabhadra suggests another explanation also. He says that a thin ray of knowledge exists in Vyanjanavagraha as well, but is unmanifest on account of its dimness. A single ray of light cannot appear distinctly in thick darkness. The contact, in the case of a deaf does not result into cognition, nor it contairs even the thinnest ray of knowledge. Consequently, it cannot be accepted as Vyanjanavagraha. It means that Vyanjanavagraha is a contact of the object with living senses only. Even in the stage of mere contact they possess some distinction from the dead senses. This distinction is based on two grounds. Firstly, the living senses differ from the dead ones in their capacity of producing knowledge. Secondly, the living senses begin their function from the very first moment. If they are like the dead in that stage, they cannot produce knowledge in the subsequent stages also. It can be further objected that knowledge is always manifest. It is like the light which is ever-illuminated. To say the knowledge as unmanifest, is a contradiction. They are contrary to each other like the light and darkness. Jinabhadra replies that 'unmanifest' does not mean here, that the thin ray of knowledge is unmanifest even to its own extent. It is always manifest to the extent of its size. But, that manifestation is so feeble that we cannot realize it. It is just like the cognition of a sleeping or unconscious person. He is 1. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 200

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Indirect Knowledge 265 not aware of his own sensation. When awake he expresses total absence of knowledge during sleep or senselessness. But, we cannot say that knowledge was totally absent in those conditions. During sleep also some persons utter meaningful sentences, reply to the calls in a general way and move their limbs. These, functions are not possible in total absence of koowledge. After all they are reactions of certain stimuli which are a kind of knowledge. They are never seen in inanimate things like stones and bricks. But knowledge at that time is so obscured by slumber that it is realized neither at that time, nor afterwards. In the waking state also we do not realize all the impressions or sensations, changing every moment. It is only the strong feelings and distinct apprehensions, that we are aware of. Many others come and go without invoking any attention. Similarly, Vyanjanavagraha also is indistinct on account of its feebleness. But, it cannot be excluded from the category of knowledge As a matter of fact knowledge is a long process gradually advancing towards judgement and confirmation. It begins with the contact and gets completion in the stage of judgement The first judgement is again scrutinized and results into discrimination. This process goes on as long as the cognizer does not divert his attention. It is difficult to hold any of the middle stages as knowledge and reject others. If the preceding stage is not knowledge, it cannot result into knowledge subsequently. The particles of sand, which do not possess oil in any degree, cannot produce it even when assembled in a big quantity. The oil-seeds can do so; only because they possess oil in single grain also; however, scanty it may be. Nothing can be produced in later stages which is not possessed by a thing in the first stage. This principle holds good in the case of knowledge also. If the first moment, i. e. the contact, is not knowledge, it cannot develop into knowledge even in the succeeding stages. So, Vyanjanavagraha must be accepted as knowledge.

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Epistemology of Juinas Moreover, Vyanjanavagraha lasts for a duration of innumerable moments, changing into Arthavagraha at the last moment. We cannot say that knowledge appeared suddenly at the last stage. It is an accumulation of the impressions taken in the innumerable moments. There is no instant without putting its mark. As the cloth is produced by all the threads constituting it; one cannot say, that the last thread is cloth and the others are not; similarly, impressions of all the instants combined make a knowledge. They cannot be divided into two groups, one as knowledge and the other as not-knowledge. 266 According to Pujyapada and the exponents of first view, the distinction between Vyanjanavagraha and Arthavagraha consists in their degree of distinctness. Vyanjnavagraha is indistinct while the latter is distinct as compared with the former. This explanation does not appeal to the logical mind. There must be some distinct characteristic separating one stage from the other. If Darsana is the first stage of awareness of general character, the succeeding stage would be the speculation of particularity, and the third is judgement. If the two stages of avagraha are fixed between awareness (darsana) and speculation (Iba) there must be some distinguishing factor. If the classification is based merely on the degree of distinctness, there are as many stages as the units of time. According to the former view this difficulty does not arise. It is clear in its classification. Darsana is a psychical state preceding the contact; then, there is the contact known as Vyanjanavagraha, then, there is the general apprchension known as Arthavagraha followed by the speculation (Iha) which leads to judgement (avaya). Types of Vyanjanavagraha The senses of sight and mind apprehende the object without physical contact, while the others depend upon contact. Accordingly, the sight and the mind do not pass through

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Indirect Knowledge the stage of Vyanjanavagraha.1 They reach the stage of arthavagraha directly after darsana. So, Vyanjanavagraha is related with the remaining four senses only, i. e. the senses of the touch, taste, smell and sound. Arthavagraha (The first apprehension) Vyanjanavagraha was mainly related with the function of senses, without producing any appreciable result in respect of grasping the object. The first moment, when the cognizer becomes aware of the external existence, is arthavagraha. It lasts for a moment only. Jinabhadra describes it as a cognition of generality without any mixture of particularity; free from connotation and classification. The cognizer does not know even the nature of object, whether it is visible, audible or the object or some other sense. It results, in the subsequent stage into speculation of particularity. The Nandr includes classification of sound, colour etc. into arthavagraha. Jinabhadra explains away the contradiction in the following way* : In arthavagraha sound or colour etc. are apprehended in a general way; i. e. not as sound or colour, but, merely as an external existence. The object is the same in all stages beginning from avagraha upto the judgement. None can say that avagraha does not have sound or colour as its object. The difference amongst the successive stages is that they gradually advance towards particularization Avagraha is the starting point of external awareness. It does not go beyond the most general form of mere existence. He contends further5 that the cognition of sound as sound is a judgement i. e. avaya and not avagraha. If it is admitted as the first stage, Avagraha and Iha will have no scope. Moreover, the cognition of "this is 3 1. Tattvartha I. 12; Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 194 2. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G 252 3. Nandisutra 29-30 4. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G 253 5. Viscsavasyaka Bhasya G 254 267

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268 Epistemology of Jainas sound' implies the exclusion of colour etc. which is clearly, a a knowledge of particularity. It can be argued that the cognition of sound as sound is Avagraha and not Avaya, because, in the stage of Avaya we go a step further towards particularity. In that stage we cognize the particulars also whether the sound emanates from a horn or conch. Thus, the difference between the two lies in degree of awareness and not quality. Jinabhadral replies, if the above classification is based on degree only, there cannot be any limit of it. If the decision of sound as belonging to conch is admitted as Avaya, what about the further particulars. We go further and decide that the sound is sweet and not harsh. Further, it is coming from North and not from the South. Either we shall have to fix other classes for these particulars or admit the preceding stages as avagraha in relation to the succeeding ones. This will render the whole classification an anamoly. Further, the decision of 'this is sound' implies the exclusion of colour etc. This exclusion is not possible without the speculation of two sides. It necessitates the existence of Iha (speculation) before reaching the above decision. Speculation is not possible unless a thing, at first, is apprehended in a general way, and this general apprehension must be admitted as free from all particularity. Otherwise, it also will have an Iha and a general apprehension as the preceding stages. We cannot say this general apprehension as Vyanjanavagraha as it is related with the four senses only, and is confined to the function of mere senses. Consequently, we have to admit arthavagraha as a general apprehension of the type stated above. Further, arthavagraha is admitted as lasting for a moment only. The decision of this is sound' can last as long as the further investigations are not carried. It is only the cognition of generality without any particularity that lasts only for a moment, as the cognition of particularity begins from the very next moment, 1. Visesavasyaka Bhasya 255

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Indirect Knowledge 269 Again, if the decision 'this is sound' is admitted as avagraha it must pass through certain stages before reaching that decision. It implies the existence of Avagraha and Iba before it. In that case it must be admitted as Avaya. If that decision is reached without previous stages the same should be accepted in the case of avaya also, and this will render the stages of avagraba and Iba without any scope. It can be argued that the whole process upto the stage of decision is included into arthavagraha, and the succeeding stages would go to Iba and Avaya. This argument is inconsistent with the time duration of arthavagraha, which lasts for not more than one moment. The whole process is not possible in such a short period. According to another view the conception of arthavagraha varies according to the cognizer. In the case of a just-born baby avagraha is free from all particularity. He is unacquainted with the terminology or the classsification of language. In his case, therefore, avagraba can be defined according to the first view. But, in the case of an experienced person there is no knowledge of general type. He apprehends particularity at the very first moment. In his case, avagraha should be defined according to the latter view. The above explanation also goes against the accepted cognitive process. The stage of particular decision cannot be reached at the very first moment. It must be preceded by the stages of general apprehension and speculation. Moreover, an experienced person can reach the decision swifter than the inexperienced one. But, there cannot be any difference in the procedure. The cognition of particularity without a general apprehension is an impossibility. This holds good in both cases, the experienced as well as the inexperienced. If an experienced person is believed as to reach the stage of particularity without passing through the previous stages; ano. ther person with more experience would cognise further particularity at the first moment; and thus, the established procedure

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270 Epistemology of Jainas will have no explanation. Again, in this case, avagraha would include all particularity into its sphere, and the subsequent stages will go without any function. It can be argued : If arthavagraha lasts for one moment oply and has the apprehension of most general type, it cannot have the twelve varieties of bahu (cognition of many), eka (cognition of one) etc. These varieties are possible, if avagraha lasts for more than one moment and possesses a gradation in the sphere of objectivity. Jinabhadra replies that the above division is mainly based on judgement (avaya) and not avagraha. The introdution of these varieties in avagraha also is only figurative and not real; based on the avagraha being a cause of avaya, which is the real possessor of these varieties. Naiscayikavagraha and Vyavaharikavagraha After discussing the general nature of avagraha Jinabhadra explains two aspects related with the problem. According to the real aspect avagraha lasts for the moment only and does not apprehend any particularity. But, the process of knowledge is so swift that the moment of real arthavagraha cannot be appreciated by the persons with imperfect knowledge. It is beyond general apprehension. It is accepted only as a logical postulation. Avagraha according to the discursive aspect lasts for more than one moment, and apprehends the general types of particularity also. The avagraha based on real aspect is known as Naiscayikavagraha and that on discursive aspect as Vyavaharikavagraha. The first is followed by Iha with speculation of the most general division, and sha is followed by Avaya with the decision of this is sound'. Again there is iba speculating the sound with further discrimination and it is again followed by Avaya. The former Avaya, apprehending the sound only may be taken as Avagraha in relation to the subsequent iha and Avaya. If one goes further towards particularization the same process will be repeated again. There will be again Iba 1. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 289

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Indirect Knowledge and then Avaya. This process goes on according to the interest of the cognizer. In every process the stage preceding Iha may be held as avagraha; because, it is general in relation to the subsequent stages. In this way avaya will be the last stage where a cognizer ceases to go further. This stage will be preceded by Iha and the stage preceding Tha would be avagraha in relation to the following stages; and Avaya in relation to the preceding ones. The first stage lasting for a moment is real avagraha; which is not preceded by any cognition. Similarly, the last stage is exclusively avaya where the cognizer stops to go further. The middle stages of speculation are Iha, and those of decision are avagraha as well as avaya. The connotation of avagraha in the middle stages is discursive (vyavaharika) based on their being a cause to the subsequent Iba and Avaya, and being a general apprehension in respect of the further stages. Iha (speculation) The real avagraha has been described as the apprehension of mere existence. The speculation of particularity starts with Iha, which continues upto the stage of judgement (avaya). It is beginning of the process of sifting, whether the object known is a sound or colour. If the cognition of first particularity is accepted as the sphere of avagraha, the view held by logical school, Iha starts with further particularization. In that case the speculation whether the sound emanates from a horn or a conch would constitute the subject-matter for Iha. As a matter of fact Iha is a desire for knowing a thing in particularity. This particularity is not confined to a definite stage. Even after reaching the stage of the judgement of a particular type, one can desire to know further about its particulars. Thus, Iha occurs not only before avaya but also after it, if the cogniser continues thinking and is desirous of knowing a thing further. 271 iba and Jijnasa (desire for knowledge) The logical school, following the definition of Pujyapada, 1. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 289

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272 Epistemology of Jainas maintains that Iha is a desire for the knowledge of particular rity. The Nyaya contends that desire does not necessarily precede knowledge. Even, the objects which we do not desire, come to be known. The Jaina replies that we come across hundreds of things in our daily life; but, only about a few of them, reach the stage of judgement. This difference cannot be explained without accepting the existence of desire, distinct or indistinct, for knowing. Even in the case of undesirable things the desire for knowing cannot be ruled out. Desire for possession is something different from that knowing. This desire is explicit in the advanced stages of knowledge. On the same ground it can be postulated in other stages also. Moreover, Iha is a mental contemplation on data supplied by the senses. This contemplation is not universal. Some objects disappear altogether after the first sensation withcut leaving any mark or impression on the mind. Only those which impress the mind, favourably or unfavourably, are contemplated further till the stage of judgement. These phenomena lead us to the conclusion that a desire precedes the judgement. This desire is not of a general type, where the agent follows bis freewill. It is forced upon the cognizer by sensation. The cognizer has to limit his. choice within the boundaries, constructed by sensation. Iha and Doubt (samsaya) It can be argued that iba cannot be differentiated from doubt. Both of them are apprehensions without any decision. The Jaina replies that there is a lot of difference between the two. In doubt one wavers in two or more alternatives without reaching the stage of judgement. He puts equal balance on all the alternatives. It leaves the subject in confusion. Tha does not waver amongst alternatives. It naturally advances towards a judgement. It prepares the ground for the latter. It speculates the nature of a thing on logical ground and inclines towards accepting one alternative and rejecting the others. Iha does not lead to perversity or confusion. 1. Visesavasyakatika G. 289

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Indirect Knowledge 273 Akalanka states that sha is not doubt; because, it occurs after it. Avaya (Judgement) Avaya is the stage of judgement where one reaches at a decision. The decision is reached after due deliberation on the points of agreement and disagreement. Just again the case of sound, one ascertains on the ground of its being sweet, that it emanates from a conch and not from a horn. 2 Regarding judgement there are two tendencies in Indian systems. The Buddhist asserts that judgement is always nega. tive. According to him "this is a jar" means that 'it is not not. jar'. It follows the principle of apoha, that is negation. The Sankhya and Mimamsa hold hat judgement is always affirmative. Even the negative iudgement, according to them, points to something positive. The Nyaya accepts both kinds. The negative judgement, he says, refers to only the negative aspect and the affirmative judgement relates to the positive aspect. The Jaina holds that both, the positive as well as negative aspects, are present in all the judgements. Even in the negative judgement something is affirmed and in the affirmative judgement something is denied. The process of Avaya confirms the above statement. The Iha speculated two alternatives. Out of them one is accepted and the other is rejected in the stage of avaya. Thus, a judgement is always associated with both aspects; posis tive as well as negative. A paya and Avaya The Praksta term avaya is rendered into Sanskrta in two forms having different meanings. If it is taken to be Apaya the sense of negation dominates. In that case it resembles the Bauddha term Apoha. If it is held as Avaya it carries the positive sense, meaning a decision. Umasvati and the subse 1. Tattvartha Rajavartika p. 43 2. Visesavasyaka Bhasya, G. 290

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274 Epistemology of Jainas quent Svetambara literature accepts the former1 term while Digambaras patronize the latter.1 This controversy leads to the discussion about the factor that plays most important part in arriving at a judgement. At the stage of Iha, the assertion of the existing factor carries more weight, but the negation of the non-existing factor is not reached as yet. This is completed in the stage of Avaya. According to this process the positive factor is known at the stage of Iha, while the negative factor awaits Avaya. Umasvati in his Bhasya stresses upon this point and recognizes the term Apaya on that basis. The Digambara tradition, perhaps under the influence of MImamsa, does not give any prominence to the negative aspect. They have always interpreted it as Avaya, in the sense that it reaches the positive aspect. Akalanka has tried at a compromise and stated that it does not matter whether we call it Apaya or Avaya. In both cases both aspects must be accepted. No judgement is possible in absence of any of the two. Jinabhadra refers to another view also holding the stage of Avaya as the negation and that of Dharana, the fourth stage, as assertion.3 Dharana (Retention) Dharana consists in retention of the judgement already arrived at. It does not add anything new to the knowledge but helps in retaining the already acquired for a longer duration or in putting the subconscious impression that can be revived into memory. It is divided into the following three types5: (1) Avicyavana-Fixation of attention on the same point for a long time without diversion. It is the state of cognition 1. Tattvartha Bhasya Sutra I. 15 2. Tattvartha Rajavartika I. 15, p. 43 3. Ibid. 4. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 185-87 5. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 291

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Indirect Knowledge 275 lasting for a longer duration without interruption. The Nyaya and Buddhist systems, which maintain that knowledge lasts for a moment only, explain such cases as a series of similar cognitions. They have termed it as Dharavabika jnana (repeated cognition). The systems like Mimamsa and Buddhist contend that only the first cognition is valid while the following are invalid; because, they do not add anything new to the knowledge. Amongst the Jainas also Digambaras hold the same view. This point is hotly discussed in the logical field. The Vedantist admits that in such cases, there is only one cognition lasting as long as the attention is not diverted. This view resembles the present avicyavana. (2) Vasana (impression)--The concentration on a subject for a long period, makes strong memory in brain impressions which can te revived into memory. These impressions are known as Vasana and constitute the second variety of Dharana. (3) Smrti (memory)-Mental revival of the past impressions. It is effected by Vasana as stated above and arises generally through sensation of the same object or its associates. Other Senses and Avagraha etc. While illustrating the four stages of Avagraha etc. we have generally mentioned the auditory sense only. The same process can be explained in other senses also. In the stage of avagraha the sensation is not distinguished whether the stimulus came from the sense of vision or that of audition. In this stage we have the same appearance through all the senses. The discrimi. nation begins from Iba. It wavers between two alternatives. It does not occur where the apparent objects do not bear similarity to a considerable extent. In the case of visual Iba the choice is possible between a man and a stump, and not between a man and a camel. Because, the camel is totally dissimilar to a man. The same thing can be said of other sepses also. In the state of dream where the external senses do not function the mind undergoes the same process.

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276 Epistemology of Jainas The Order of Avagraha etc. The above mentioned four stages occur one after another. Their order cannot be charged or reversed nor can they occur simultaneously. The next stage is impossible without the preceding one. In cases where the object is familiar ihe above process does not appear distinctly, on account of its abruptness; but it exists already there. The Division of Mati concluded Thus, we see that mati bas twenty eight types. The four stages of avagraha etc. multiplied into the six senses comprise twenty-four; to this we can add the four types of vyanjanavagraha which does not occur in the case of mind and the visual sense. 1 According to another division the four Buddhis are included in place of Vyanjanavagraha. But, this view is not sound, as the process of avagraha etc. is present in the case of four Buddhis also. They cannot have a separate class. Mati divided into three hundred and thirty six types The above mentioned twenty-eight varieties of Mati are again divided into the following twelve objective considerations : (1) Bahu (many)- The apprehension of many things simultaneously by the same sepse. In a concert of many musical instruments a person, with minute observation apprehends all the instruments distinctly. His cognition is known as bahu, i. e. grasping of many things by the same sense. In case of different senses the Jainas do not admit simultaneity. They bold that two senses cannot operate simultaneously. But, the principle that two cognitions do not occur simultaneously holds good in the case of two senses as well as two things. Consequently, the idea of bahu can be explained in collective sense only. 1. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 300 2. Ibid. tika 3. Ibid. G. 307

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Indirect Knowledge 277 (2) Eka (One)-The opposite of Bahu (many) is one. It means grasping one thing at a time. (3) Bahuvidha (Qualitative plurality)-The cognition of different qualities at a time. The former division was related with the numerical plurality, while the present one refers to qualitative plurality. (4) Ekavidha (Qualitative unity)-The apprehension of one quality at a time. (5) Ksipra (Swift)-Grasping the object swiftly. (6) Aksipra or manda (Slow)--Grasping an object slowly. (7) Nisrita (Inferential)--Grasping the object through some sign or emblem. (8) Anisritu (non-inferential)(9) Niscita (decisive)- Grasping an object ultimately. (10) Aniscita (unconclusive)-Grasping the object without arriving at a decision. (11) Dhruva (unfailing)--The cognitive power of a person, which never fails, which grasps the object positively when the latter comes into contiguity. (12) Adhruva (uncertain)-The power of cognition is liable to failure on certain occasions. Some persons are gifted with such a power of keen observation that nothing can escape from it; while the others are not so keen. These two divisions are based on this fact. The ninth and tenth types are interpreted in two ways. Malayagiril refers to both of them. The second interpretation is this, cognition of an object mixed with other qualities is Nisrita and that without any mixture is Anisrita. Jinabhadra interprets them in the sense of Viparyaya (false cognition) and its opposite. The Digambaras read Nisritain place of Nigrita. They explain it that the cognition of an object fully manifested is Nisrita while that of partially manifested is Anisrita. 1. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 307 2. Tattvartha Rajavartika p. 49

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278 Epistemology of Jainas Similarly, in place of Niscita they read 'anukta', meaning the cognition of whole word or sentence on hearing the first Jetter or word; or knowing the tune of lute etc. from its tinkling. 1 Out of the above mentioned twelve varieties the first four are related with the object, while others with the cognitive power. This division is roughly applied to all the varieties of Mati. Really seen it is not possible in the case of vyanjanavagraba or Naiscayika arthavagraha. Jinabhadra says that vyanjapavagraha is the cause of all subsequent stages. The characteristics manifested in the effect exist in the cause also. Thus, the above varieties are not improbable in the case of Vyanjapavagraha also. As a matter of fact the twelvefold division is merely a fanciful expansion of the fundamental categories. Some of the twelve categories are incompatible with the fundamental stages. sha when reaches the stage of decision, becomes Avaya. Thus, it cannot have the type of Niscita. Similarly, the Avaya is the stage of decision. It cannot have the state of aniscita. Jina. bhadra replies to these objections that even a decisive knowledge, leading to a judgement, is not always of the same nature. Two persons reaching the same judgement differ in their strength of conviction. We cannot say that both of them possess an equal degree of it. One is adamant wbile the other is shaky, so the above types can be explained in all cases. But, this explanation is far-fetched. These twelve types multiplied into the twenty-eight original types come to the number of three hundred and thirty six as the division of mati. Matijnana and Samsaya etc. One may ask here that certain categories of Mati do not differ from Samsaya (doubt), Viparyaya (illusion) or Anadhyavasaya (iparticulate appearance). The tenth category of the twelvefold division i. e. aniscita, does not differ from doubt. The category of nissrita in its second sense, is nothing but illusion. iba, is nothing but doubt. The Naiscayika-avagraha 1. Tattvartha Rajavartika p. 49

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Indirect Knowledge 279 is the same as apadhyavasaya. If they are included into Mati, the latter claim to be a pramana or valid knowledge. Jinabhadral replies to the above in two ways. The first reply is mainly counected with the logical period. According to it, none of the categories can be identified with doubt etc. The latter are not knowledge; because they do not lead to any decision. They stop where they are. The categories of avagraha etc. on the other hand do not stop where they are. Ultimately, they lead to a judgement. They are the middle steps carrying to valid knowledge. If they are invalid the resultant cognition cannot be valid. So they cannot be discarded as Apramana. The criteria of a jnana is that which leads to a judgement. It should not hamper the successful activity. The aniscita' category of the twelvefold division does not obstruct the subject. ja his successful activity. It differs from its opposite in not having the firm conviction, that ibe latter does. Both of them are equally active for successful result. In the case of doubt the subject is lost in alternatives. In Iha he strives to reach a judgement. The category of Nisrita as explained in the second sense, also does not stand in the way as an obstruction. The subject knows the object as it is, but he is slightly disturbed by a parallel notion; but, he does not stop there. The parallel notion does not stand in the way of his activity. For instance, the subject correctly knows animal in his sight, as buffalo, and acts according to the conviction, but, occasionally, his conviction is slackened and he begins to suspect the same as a horse also. Even then, he does not diverge from his activity according to the former notion. The difference between Naiscayika avagraha and Apadhyavasaya is this, Avagraha does not stop where it is. It provides material for further apprehension. It is a starting point. Anadhyavasaya stops where it is, as in the case of a mad or inattentive persons. Avagraha is knowledge, because it serves as means for subsequent real stages of knowledge. Apadhyavasaya 1. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 313

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280 Epistemology of Jainas is not so, because it does not serve even as a cause. Thus, the fundamental difference between the two lies in their having or not having the subsequent stages. The second explanation follows the Agamic notion and it is more reasonable. As a matter of fact, Jinabhadra says, the three categories of doubt etc. also, are included into Matijnana. After all, they also emerge from the attention of consciousness and have the same process as that of valid knowledge. Validity in the Agamic school, is subjective and not objective. The Duration of Avagraha etc. Vyanjapavagraha is a contact between senses and the object. It does not produce any knowledge as the mind does not operate in it. It can last for antarmuhurta (duration of time more than one avalika and less than forty-eight minutes). Naiscayika Avagraba lasts for a moment only. Iba and Avaya last for antarmuhurta. Out of the three types of Dharana Avicyavana and smoti last for Antarmuhurta; while the third category of Vasana can last for indefinite period. 1 The order of Causation in Avagraha etc. Yasovijaya proposes that avagraha and Tha are cause and Apaya the result of knowledge. Avicyavana the first category of Dharana, is confirmation of the judgement reached in the stage of Apaya. The remaining two categories of Dharana are separate cognitions. 1. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 333-34 2. Joanabindu p. 10

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Indirect Knowledge 281 Sruta Jnana (Scriptural Knowledge) Sruta-Jnaga comes second in list of the five types of knowledge. It is defined as the knowledge having mati as its cause. Really, it is Mati with prolonged activity. The root of the conception of sruta as an independent type of knowledge lies in the respect and reliability bestowed on the ancient scriptures. No religious order can stand any longer if it loses its faith in the ancient tradition. Every sect has one or the other book as its pivot around which it revolves and can leave it only at the risk of its own life. The Vedic religions took shelter in the Vedas as the final and infallible authority, in ethical and metaphysical matter. The Christians, Muslims, Jews, Persiaps, Buddhists and all other religions of the world have accepted this or that book as final authority. Moreover, we construct the building of our future on rocks of the past. The present knowledge gets its material from the past events. If every generation starts its journey of the cultural progress from the very beginning and ignores the past tradition altogether, it cannot make any progress. Our state of the present mental development is a result of the past hundreds and thousand years. We have to give due importance to the past history and its records. Before the advent of logical period the traditional scriptures were given a very high place. Even the thinkers like Sankara have discarded reasoning where it goes against the scriptures. Three stages The conception of Sruta as distinct from Mati has passed through three stages. In the first stage Sruta Jnana meant knowledge derived from the scriptures. It is divided into Angapra. vista and Angabahya and further subdivisions. The peculiarity of this period is that it confined sruta-jnana to the Jaina 1. Tattvartha I. 20, Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 100 2. Tattvartha I. 20

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282 Epistemology of Jainas canonical literature only. It is represented by the stbanarga and the Tattvartha. The second stage is represented by the Niryuktis3, the Nand14 and the Visasavasyakabhasya5., where the sruta is divided into fourteen types of aksara, Samjnin etc. and the whole knowledge associated with speech is included in it. In this stage sruta becomes a prolonged function of mati. This view gained prominence in the later Jaina literature and got a general approval. The third stage is represented by Siddhasena Divakara who rules out totally the distinction between mati and sruta. He appounces them as identical. Yasovijaya also shows some favour for Siddhasena. This view, thougb somewhat reasonable did not get much favour as it went against the established tradition of the five types of knowledge. We would try to discuss all the three stages in detail in the following pages. The First stage : Sruta as scriptural knowledge According to Jaina tradition, religion is an eterpal factor and so the scriptures. In the ksetra of Mahavideba they exist permanently. But, in the ksetra of Bharata they become extinct in a certain period and are again instituted by a new Tirthankara. In the present era, known as Hunda Avasarpini the first Tirthankara was Rsabhadeva and the last Mahavira. All of them had their own canonical literature. It does not mean that at the time of new Tirthankara the old tradition is totally extinct. The Bhagavati states that out of the twenty-three intervals occurring between the twenty-four Tirthankaras the tradition of Jainism had only seven breaks. In the first eight 1. Sthanarga II 2. Tattvartha I. 20 3. Avasyaka Niryukti G. 18 4. Nandi Sutra 37 5. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 451 6. Bhagavati XX. 8.677

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Inditect Knowledge 283 intervals it continued getting revision with every new Tirtharkara. Similar is the case with the last eight. According to this view the present tradition starts from Santinatha, the sixteenth pontiff of the current series. But, his existence also goes, to a mythical past. As far as our knowledge of history Parsvanatha is the earliest, who can definitely be assigned a historical existence. In the time of Parsvanatha scriptural knowledge was arranged into fourteen Purvas. The Nandi relates them as follows: 1. Uppaya-It is related with the Jaina metaphysics; describ ing the origin of substances and their qualities. 2. Agganiya---related with the numbers and dimensions. 3. Viria-it discusses the potentialities or powers of the ani mate and inanimate beings. 4. Atthinatthippavaya-it discusses the problem of the exis tence and non-existence from the stand points of dravya, ksetra, kala apd bbava. 5. Nanappavaya-related with the five types of knowledge. 6. Saccappavaya-related with Jaina ethics, discussing the questions of samyama (restraint) and truth with their opposites. 7. Ayappavaya-related with the problem of soul. 8. Kammappavaya-dealing with the eight types of karman with their subdivision, 9. Paccakkbanappavaya--dealing with various types of vows practised by the ascetics and householders. 10. Vijjanuppavaya-dealing with magic and supernaturat powers. 11. Avanjha-dealing with the question of merits and demerits with their results. 12. Panao-dealing with the ten types of Paranas (vibrations). 13. Kiriavisala---discusses the practises to be observed by an ascetic (samyamin) 1. Nandi Sutra 56 also Samavaya

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284 Epistemology of Jainas 14. Lokabindusara-The subject is not mentioned. Probably it dealt with the Jaina cosmology. These purvas were present in the tradition of Mahavira also. We have given in the introduction how they came to extinction. The Tradition of Mahavira The present canonical literature belongs to the tradition of Mahavira. He had eleven Ganadharas (chief disciples). It is said that each of them composed one dvadasangl! (a set of twelve agamas compared with the different part or limbs of the body of sruta purusa, i. e. personified sruta-jnana). But, we come across only one dvadasangr. Perhaps, each ganadhara propagated the same knowledge and was taken as the independent compiler of it. Mahavira himself did not compose any book. It is said that Gautama, the first ganadhara, put him a question thrice and Mahavira expressed the essence of ultimate truth in three words. They are known as three Matnkapadas. We have already referred to them in the first chapter. Gautama elaborated these words and composed the entire set of dvadasangi. The questions of Gautama are known as three Nisejjas (Samskrta Nisadyas). They are defined as asking questions with due reverence. It bears a striking resemblance with Upanisads in the Vedic literature. We have no means to know the number of nisadyas pertaining to the remaining ten Ganadharas; but, it is certain that at least one of them has recourse to fifteen nisadyas. But, we do not know anything about the answers given by Mahavira. In the tradition of Mahavira the Jaina literature was arranged in the following twelve Agamas : 1. Haribhadra on Avasyaka Niryukti G. 735 2. Ibid. also Avasyakacurni p. 337 3. Nandi Sutra 55

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Indirect Knowledge 285 1. Ayara (Sk. Acara) 2. Suyagada (Sk. Sutraksta) 3. Thana (Sk. Sthana) 4. Samavaya 5. Viana Pannatti (Sk. Vyakhya prajnapti or Bhagavati) 6. Nayadhamma kahao (Inatadharma-katha) 7. Uvasagadasao (Upasakadasa) 8. Antagadadasao (Antaksddasa) 9. Anuttarovavaiyadasao (Anuttaraupapatikadasa) 10. Panha-vagarana (Prasna vyakarana) 11. Vivagasuya (Vipakasutra) 12. Ditthivaya (Dsstivada) Out of the above list Ditthivaya is now extinct. It had five sections :-(1) Parikamma, (2) Sutta, (3) Puvvagaya, (4) Anuyoga and (5) Culiya. Perhaps, Ditthivaya included all the Purva literature and other reminants of the tradition of Parsvanatha. The remaining eleven angas are the contribution of the tradition of Mahavira. It is also said that Dsstivada was originally composed in Samskrta, while other Angas in Ardha-Magadbi, the spoken language of that time on the borders of Magadha and Kosala. The Order in the Composition of Dvadasangr In the enumeration of twelve Angas Dsstivada comes as the last. But, there is a difference of opinion regarding its composition. Some believe that the Angas were composed just in the order as they are enumerated. While others maintain that fourteen Purvas, which comprise Purvagata, the third section of Drstivada, were composed first; they were followed by the rest of dvadasangi. It seems that the fourteen Purvas were prevalent as an old tradition at the time of Mabavira, but were not included into sruta. After the completion of eleven Angas all the traditional knowledge prevelent at that time, was included in one anga, namely Dsstivada. This is why the last Anga differs from the

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286 Epistemology of Jainas remaining Angas in many respects i. e. size, language and subject matter. Its early extinction also proves the same fact. Dsstivada is divided into the following five sections of (1) Parikamma (2) Sutta (3) Puvvagaya (4) Anuyoga (5) Culiya The above order is based on the Nandl.? Akalamka, Hemacandra, Devendra Suri and Vinaya Vijaya assign third place to Anuyoga and the fourth to Puvvagaya. The Literature Known as Agamas Dvadasa ogi is not the only literature recognised as the Agamas. There are numerous works in addition to it which are credited with the same amount of authority. The Nandi provides three definitions of Samyak Sruta and Mithya Sruta.2 According to the first definition Dvadasangi, composed by the omniscient Tirtharkaras, the works composed by the sages possessing the knowledge of fourteen Purvas and those composed by the sages possessing knowledge of not less than complete ten Purvas are Samyak-Sruta, while those composed by the persons with lesser knowledge, may be samyak-sruta as well as Mithya.Sruta. The non Jaina works like Bharata, Ramayana etc. are Mithya Sruta. According to the second definition all scriptural knowledge-Jaina and non-Jaina is samyak sruta if it is possessed by a person with right attitude (samyag dosti), and the same is Mithya.Sruta if possessed by a person with wrong attitude (Mithya-drsti). The third definition ascribes the credit of samyak Sruta to the scriptures possessed by a person with wrong faith also if they persuade him to abandon the wrong faith and embrace the right one. The second or third definitions are not pertinent to our discussion. The first definition fixes a basis for recognising a script as Agama. After Dvadasamgi composed by Ganadharas, we come to the works composed by the saints having a knowledge of four1. Nandi Sutra 55 2. Ibid 40.41

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Indirect Knowledge 287 teen Purvas; otherwise known as Sruta-kevalins. It is said that in addition to Ganadharas, Mabavira had 289 Sruta kevalins as his disciples. But, we do not know anything about their works. After them we have Jambu Svamin, the last saint to attain liberation. He is a well-known figure in the dialogues between him and Sudharman, but nothing is known about his independent works. Jambu is followed by four Sruta kevalins, viz. (1) Prabhava Svamin, (2) Sayyambhavasuri (3) Yasobhadrasuri and (4) Sambhutivijaya. Sayyambhavasuri composed Dasavaikalikasutra which is a digest of the Acaranga and deals with the conduct of a Jaina ascetic. We are in dark about the works of other three. Then comes Bhadrababu Svamin. In addition to some Niryuttis, he is accredited with authorship of the following works : (1) Pajjosanakappa, (2) The eighth chapter of Dasa-Suyak. khandha, (3) Vyavaharasutra and (4) Kalpasutra. Sthulabhadra was the last of Srutakevalins; but nothing is known about his works. Now, we come to the list of sages knowing ten purvas, Vajrasvamin was last in this line. But, no work is available written by any of them. Syama-Suri is the only one to write the Pannavana; which deals with all the topics of Jaina philosophy. Dronasuri also who is ascribed with some Samgrahanis on the Upangas, is placed with Dasapurvadharas. In addition to the above, there are certain works composed by Pratyekabuddhas, the persons who were to attain liberation in the same life. Some chapters of Uttaradhyayana are said to belong to this category. The works known as Painnas (Prakirnakas) are ascribed to the disciples of Mahavira other than Ganadharas and Pratyekabuddhas. Such disciples were 1444 in number; but, the number of accepted painnas is ten only. It is said that Mabavira at the time of his Nirvana, recited fifty five adhyayanas dealing with the fructification of punya (merit), fifty five that of papa (demerit), thirty six unasked and

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288 Epistemology of Jainas one named as Pahana (Sk. Pradhana). We do not know whether any one of these adhyayanas is incorporated in the exis ting canons. Further, there are some anonymous works. Some of them are commented upon by Bhadrabahu and this gives them the position of Agamas. The works like Suria Pannatti are included in the Agamas on the basis of tradition only. The Present classification The Nandi divides Sruta Jnana into fourteen types. Out of them the first ten are related with second stage of development. We shall discuss them in their proper place. The last four varieties are related with scriptures. They are introduced in the following two pairs : (1) Gamika and (2) Agamika; (3) Angapavitha and (4) Anangapavittha. Gamika and Agamika The Nandi-Curni defines Gamika as the text which is read twice, thrice or hundred times with a slight change in the leginning middle or at the end. Gamika is also explained as the literature with various types of classification or alternative interpretations. But, nothing can be said with precision about the meaning of this term. Generally, Dsstivada is held as gamika and the rest as agamika. Angapavittha and Anagnapavittha The second division is current in these days also. We have already enumerated the twelve Angas. They are known as dvadasargi or dvadasanga Ganipitaka. These 12 angas are considered as 12 limbs of the personified sruta. They are two feet (padas) two lower legs, (Janghas), two thighs (urus), two halves (gatrardhas) of back and belley, two arms (bahus) cne neck (griva) and one head (strsa). Ayara and Suyagada stand for the feet, Ditthivaya for the head and the rest angas stand for other limbs. On the other hand the Ananga-pravista literature does not form a part of this sruta-purusa. It comprises such scriptuies as are not included into dvadasangi. But,

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Indirect Knowledge 289 this does not answer the question why a particular canon is admitted as a part of the allegorical sruta purusa. This distinction is explained on the basis of two factors. Firstly, it is admitted that the works composed by Ganadharas are Angapavittha, whereas composed by Srutasthaviras (learned scholars) are anangapavittha. Secondly, that sruta which exists in every tirtha-in short which is niyata, is angapavittha and the rest is anangapavittha. The second view, it seems, is an influence of the Vedic Tradition. At least four of the angas are biographical sketches of the historical personages. We cannot say that the same persons or the same number of other persons with the same names and life-events take birth again and again. It is an acceptance of the theory of incarnation which the Jainas do not hold. The question of eternal literature, therefore, does not arise Further division The Anangapavittha is further divided as follows: Anangapavittha Avassaya Avassayavairitta 1. Samayiya Kaliya Ukkaliya 2. Cauvisatthava 3. Vandanaya 4. Padikkamana 5. Kausagga 6. Paccakkhana Avassaya (Sk. Avasyaka) means essential. It consists of the text to be recited in daily rites observed by ascetics and householders. It is just like the sandhya of the Vedic system. Kaliya Suya-The sruta studied or recited during the first and the last quarter of the day and night. The sruta which is not confined to a particular time for its recitation is designated as Ukkaliya suya. The Nandi provides a list of thirty.one canons as Kaliya suya and twenty-nine as Ukkaliya-suya'. 1. Nandi Sutra 43-44

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290 Epistemology of Jainas Comparison with the Vedic Tradition It can be observed that the term sruta carries the same idea as sruti of the Vedic tradition. Some Agamas also bear similarity in names with the Vedic literature. But, as far as their subject matter is concerned they are totally different. We may quote some of them below: (1) Kalpasutra :-The Vedic literature also contains a number of kalpasutras. But, they discuss the rules of conduct to be followed in the various stages (asramas) of life. The Jaina Kalpasutra contains biographical sketches. It is a matter of further investigation what was the original meaning of 'kalpa' and how it came to be applied in two different senses. (2) Vyakarana :- In the Vedic literature Vyakarana means grammar. But in the Jaina Agamas Vyakarana means explanation. The Prasna Vyakarani is an explanation of a number of questions. (3) Nirukta :-The Vedic term Nirukta, in its exact form is not found in the Jaina literature. But, we have the term Niryukti bearing a certain degree of resemblance. Nirukta discusses the derivation of Vedic words. Niryukti is a commentary in Praksta in the gatha form. Here, we have some resemblance, as in both cases it means explanatory notes in addition to it there are certain original agamas bearing the title Niryukti. They have nothing to do with derivation or etymology. The explanation of such terms is an independent subject which can throw much light on our ancient philology. (4) Amga-The term 'amga' occurs in the Vedic as well as the Buddhist literature. The Vedas are reported to have six amgas. But there, the term occurs not in the sense of limbs but a subordinate or helping literature. The Vedic text is not included in the amgas. Moreover, each of the six amgas contains an exclusive field of subject, quite distinct from the others. In Jaina literature the amgas constitute the main body of Srutapurusa. Secondly, the twelve amgas are not so exclusive in the subject matter as it is in the Vedic literature. They are not associated with different branches of learning as we find in the

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Indirect Knowledge Vedic amgas. In the Buddhist literature this term is found in Amguttaranikaya. There, the literature is divided according to the form. Thus, the verses, small anecdotes, stories of Buddha's previous births, literature in the form of questions and answers, Buddha's sayings and such other forms, each constitutes a different amga; which are nine in number. It is probable that the term amga has been taken from the Vedic literature by the Jainas, which does not fit so well in the case of their literature. Modern classification According to the modern classification the Agamas are divided into six groups: (1) Amga, (2) Uvamga, (3) Cheyasutta, (4) Mula-sutta, (5) Painnaga and (6) Culiyasutta. (1) Amga-Drstivada on account of its extinction is not included in the modern agamic division. So, the number of Amgas comes to eleven. (2) Uvamga-In conformity with the 12 amgas there are 12 uvangas: 1. Uvavaiya. 2. Rayapaseni. 3. Jivabhigama. 4. Pannavana. 5. Canda Pannatti 6, Surapannatti 291 7. Jambuddivapannatti. 8. Nirayavaliyao. 9. Kappiya. 10. Pupphia. 11. Puppha culiya. 12. Vanhidasa. Every amga is associated with one upamga in the order stated above. But, we do not find any conformity of the subject-matter. The term Upamga is found for the first time, in the Tattvartha only; otherwise, it was Anangapravista. It appears that the term Upanga means only the secondary stage in comparison with amgas. (3) Cheya sutta-The term Cheda is peculiar to Jaina literature only. It also, is not found earlier than the Avasyakaniryukti. Literally 'cheda' means 'cut'. In cases of certain

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292 Epistemology of Jainos misconducts the seniority of an ascetic is cut down by certain months, and he becomes junior to his youngers. Perhaps, the sutras where this kind of punishment was prescribed came to be known as chedasutras. They are just like 'prayascittas' of the Vedic literature. They also provide direcious im tue course to be adopted in unusual circumstances. They are six in number : 1. Nisitha. 4. Dasasruta skandha. 2. Mahanisitha. 5. Bshatkalpa. 3. Vyavahara. 6. Jitakalpa. The Sthanakavasi sect of Svetambara Jaina accepts four only. It omits Mahanisitha and Jitakalpa. (4) Mula Sutras-The significance of the term Mula also cannot be explained in clear terms. It does not occur in the ancient literature. There is a number of conjectures with the interpretation of this term. According to Winternitz these sutras came to be known as Mula-sutras in contrast to their commentaries. Carpentier says that they were Mabavira's own words. Schubring, accounts for the name for their being fundamental teachings of the Jaina cult. They are prescribed for a disciple at the beginning of his ascetic career. The last explanation appears more probable. It is also probable that they got this name as their original text was committed to memory and recited without explanation. This practice continucs even now. Mulasutras are five in number: 1. Uttaradhyayana, 4. Pindanijjutti, 2. Dasaveyaliya, 5. Ohanijjutti, 3. Avassaya, Sthapakavasips omit the last two. They do not recognise the two niryuktis as composed by Bhadrabahu. Prof. Weber and Prof. Bulbar also admit the same on different grounds. The Sthanakavasins exclude Avasyaka also from the list of Mulasutras and add Nandi and Abuyogadvara in its place, and make the number four.

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Indirect Knowledge (5) Painnagas-Originally Painnagas (Sk. Prakirnaka) meant miscellaneous literature. The number of painngas varied according to the number of gifted disciples of a Tirthankara. Thus, in the time of Mahavira it is stated that there were 1400 painnas. But in the modern classification the painnas are recognised as ten. They are: 1. Causarana 2. Aurapacckkhana, 3. Bhakta parijna, 4. Tandula Veyalija 5. Candavijya 6. Ganivijja, 7. Marana Samahi, 8. Devendra Sutra 9. Samstaraka 10. Mahapaccakkhana (6) Culiya sutta-The Nandi and Anuyogadvara are recognized as Chuliyasuttas. Perhaps, this name was given to them on account of their short volume. 293 The Sthanakavasins do notre cognise the fifth and sixth class. They follow thirty two Agamas in the following order: (1) 11 Angas, 12 Upangas, 4 chedas, 4 Mulas and 1 Avassaya, In addition to the original agamas the Murtipujaka sect of the Svetambaras admits Niryuktis, Bhasyas, Curnis and Tikas also as authority which the Sthanakavasins do not support. Classification according to the subject-matter As far as the subject-matter is concerned the Jaina Agamic literature is divided into four anuyogas : 1. Caranakarananuyoga-Ethics 2. Dharmakathanuyoga-Religious stories, 3. Ganitanuyoga- Mathematics and secular sciences, 4. Dravyanuyoga-Metaphysics. But, in the allotment of the Agamas to these four groups no much attention is paid. It is more or less haphazard. All the eleven amgas and Dasaveyaliya are classed in the first group; when some of them are exclusively biographical sketches The Digambara-division The Digambaras also divide sruta into Amgapravista and Amgabahya, The Amgapravista is the same as that of the

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Epistemology of Jainas Svetambaras. Amgababya is divided into the following four teen kinds :-- 294 1. Samayika, 2. Samstava, 3. Vandana, 4. Pratikramana, 5. Vinaya, 6. Krtikarma. 7. Dasavaikalrka. 8. Uttaradhyayana, 9. Kalpavyavahara, 10. Kalpakalpa, 11. Mahakalpa, 12. Pundarika, 13. Mahapundarika, 14. Nisidhika. We have discussed the present state of the Digambara as well as Svetambara Agamas in the Introduction. There is not a single canonical work which is commonly held as genuine by the Svetambaras as well as Digambaras alike. But, still there is a considerable volume of the text which is supported by both the traditions. Eor instance, the Jnatadharmakatha, has the same form even now, as it is described by Dhavala and others in the Digambara tradition, If such works are admitted as original, they can serve as a common link for both the sects. The Second Stage: Sruta as Knowledge We have given above a short description of the Jaina Agamic literature known as Sruta. But, in reality it is only a source of the Srutajnana. The literature it self is not knowledge. It is called so on account of its being a source of the latter. Srutajnana, generally means a knowledge based upon authority. That authority is either a person or a book. But, in the later period, it covers a wider field. Every knowledge associated with speech as its cause or its effect, came to be recognised as Sruta. On the other hand it was realized that every articulate cognition is associated with speech. Thus,, there arose a difficult problem of fixing the limtts of mati and Sruta, Jinabhadra1 points out the difference in the following seven points (1) Definition, (2) Causation, (3) Classification, (4) Senses, (5) Speech, (6) Articulation, (7) Dumb and eloguent. These points will be elaborated in the following pages: 1. Viscsavasyakabhasya G. 97

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Indirect Knowledge 295 The Definition of Sruta Visesavasyaka gives two definitions of Sruta. According to the first, whatever is the object of auditory sense is sruta.1 But, the sound as the definition leads, cannot be included in the divisions of knowledge, still it is known as sruta; because, it plays important part in producing sruta-jnana. It is called Dravyasruta, meaning the material cause of Sruta-jnapa. Sruta in the real sense means the knowledge produced by senses and the mind; associated with sound and capable of being expressed into words. It is known as Phavasruta in contrast with Dravyasruta. Limits of Mati and Sruta There are three parts in the above definition. The first part is related with the cause, which is the same as in Mati. As a matter of fact sruta does not depend upon external senses. It has the mind only as its producing cause. Even, in the case of auditory sense, it is mati as far as the question of grasping the sound is concerned. The stage of sruta begins when one starts to formulate an idea on the basis of its meaning. The second part distinguishes Sruta from Mati. It holds that the knowledge based on speech is Sruta. The mati does not depend upon speech. Roughly, this factor distinguishes the two types of knowledge from each other. By speech, here, Jinabhadra says, we should take the words, whose meaning is already known. It means that the auditory sense is not so important as the words of other person, whether spoken or written, to produce srutajnana. But, one can say that everything that is seen, touched, smelt or tasted has a meaning behind it. Our mind brings out that meaning after due delibearation. We see a particular arrangement of colour and shape and interpret it as flower. We relish a sweet taste and interpret that it is a mango fruit. This process is common with all the senses and their objects, and nor merely with words, There is no reason in including the one 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 81 2. This complete discussion based on Vieesavasyakabhasya and its commentary G. 81-176

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296 Epistemology of Jainas into sruta-jnapa and the others into mati. Roughly, a cognition is sruta-jnana when it arisese at hearing or reading something, in the form of mental association of word with its meaning. The third part expresses the special quality or srutajnapa. It is capable of being expressed to others through the medium of speech. The cognition of mati cannot be fully transmitted as it arises without the association of words. Moreover, when we grasp an object through external senses, the experience cannot be put into words entirety. Only a fragment of it can be conveyed through speech; and that also by the person who knows the expression of language, to a person with the same ability. The cognition of a new-born baby does not associate any words with the knowledge. Thus, the range of mati differs from that of sruta. Sruta considers only that object and only to that extent as can be expressed in words. It is associated with speech as its cause as well as the effect. It can be argued : if every cognition associated with speech is sruta, iha, Avaya and Dharana also would become sruta; as they also do not occur without the association of speech. Thus, the mati will be confined to Avagraha only. Jinabhadra replies to the above that every cognition associated with speech is not sruta, but, only that which follows the speech; which has words as its genetic cause. The stages of iha etc., though associated with speech, are not produced by it. In the case, where those stages are produced by words, there is no harm in accepting them as sruta. Again, it can be asked : mati has been divided into srutanisrita and a srutanisrita; and Avagraha etc. are admitted as srutanisrita. If every cognition that is produced by Sruta or word is sruta-jnana the Iha etc. cannot be explained as the division of mati; because, all of them are based on sruta i. e. Sabda or speech. The above objection does not hold good in the present case, as Srutani;sita in the case of avagraha etc. does not mean that they depend upon speech at the time of their occurrence. Their dependence lies in the person; who possesses a mind cultivated

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Indirect Knowledge 297 through the knowledge of scriptures, who is a learoed or educated person. The case of Srutajnana is quite different, where the speech is depended upon at the time of occurrence. Sruta in the Animals Having less than five Senses It can be asked further, if Sruta is dependent on speech, it is not possible in the case of one-sensed animals. They neither possess mind to associate a word with its sense, nor the faculties of heariag and speaking; to grasp or utter any word. Thus, the existence of sruta cannot be explained in their case. This will go against the Agamic conception that all the animals positively possess two types of knowledge. Jinabhadra replies that one-sensed animals, though devoid of speech i. e. dravyasruta, prossess bhavasruta. The faculties of hearing, speaking and thinking are the cause of dravyasruta only. In their absence dravyasruta is not possible. But, there is no difficulty in having bhavasruta in their absence. Bhava sruta is neither cause nor the result of speech. A learned man, while asleep, neither listens nor speaks any word. Still we cannot say that he is devoid of srutajnana. By seeing its manifestation in the waking state one can infer its existence in the sleeping state also, as one infers the existence of butter in the milk from the latter production, though it was not visible before. Similarly the one-sensed amimals also possess sruta in unmanifested form. The manifestation, in their case, is not possible as they are not equipped with the necessary instrumeni. Bbava sruta, in such cases, means the Ksayopasam of Srutajnanavarana. Its existence can be proved, not only on the basis of testimony, but, also on basis of the existence of different desires (samijnas) in them. They also feel hunger or desire for food. Such desires are not possible if they are totally devoid of mind; and the existence of mind leads to the existence of sruta also. Again, it can be asked ; sruta has been defined in two ways. In the case of dravyasruta it was defined as whatever is heard. The bhava sruta is defined as soul in the state of atteintion (upayoga) towards dravyasruta i. e. words. Both

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Epistemology of Jainas are impossible in the case of one-sensed animals as well as in the sleeping man, who can neither listen a word nor can apply their attention to utter a word. Jinabhadra replies that in such cases we have another derivation which means the instrument of hearing (srnotyanena) or cause of hearing (asm at) or the location of hearing (asmin). Ultimately, these derivations express the sense of ksayopasama of the obscuring karmic matter; and it is not impossible in the case of one-sensed animals as well as in the sleeping man. But, these derivations do not explain the fundamental difficulty. 298 It can be argued that the example of sleeping man does not suit in the case of one-sensed animals. Sruta, ultimately depends upon the faculties of speaking and hearing. The person with these faculties can convey his ideas through the vehicle of words and can understand others. A sleeping man possesses both of the faculties. Though, in sleeping state he does not apply them; yet, they are not absent. He can use them at any moment. Thus, we can admit the existence of sruta in his case. But, in the case of one-sensed animals those faculties are totally absent. There is no basis to prove the existence of sruta in them. The above argument does not put any difficulty as the faculties of speech and hearing are accepted to be present, though in mild form, in one-sensed animals also. We observe a particular tree, sensitive of nontactual impressions. On this basis we can say that the other senses are not totally absent in them. Similarly, they also have their feelings and desires which are the functions of mind. Even then, their classification as the one-sensed animals, means the absence of materialsenses (dravyendriyas) in them. In the same way they possess bhavasruta and not dravyasruta. Again it can be asked; if sruta is possible in one-sensed animals also without any recourse to speech, the latter can not be a condition of sruta and thus cannot form a part of the definition.

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Indirect Knowledge 299 The Jaina clarifies, his position that the above definition, is meant for the sruta as found in the five-sensed animals. Who are fully conscious of the words and their meanings. It does not include the sruta of the one-sensed animals who are admitted as having two types of knowledge merely on the basis of Agamic conception. Their sruta does not function in any appreciable manner. It is known as Oghasruta, quite indistinct, like a tree in the seed. Again, one can ask, if the existence of sruta is accepted in one-sensed animals without any functional appearance or other basis, the existence of all the five types of knowledge should be accepted there on the same ground. This objection is replied on two grounds ; firstly, the existence of a particular type of knowledge in a particular person depends upon the corresponding ksayopasama. For knowing a particular ksayopa. sama in a particular being the only source is the Agamic statement. It is a matter of faith only. The Agamas do not propose existence of ksayopasama of Avadhi etc. in onesensed animals. Secondly, they are not totally deprived of the function of first two types of knowledge. It has been al. ready stated that they also possess desires and feelings and the power of articulate thinking. As a matter of fact, as will be seen later on, Sruta has no connection with speech or sound. It is articulate cognition or vikalpa as known in the Buddhist and other systems. The Nyaya recognises the same as prakara. Thus, every articulate thinking is sruta. Difference between Mati and Sruta based on causation! We have pointed out the difference between mati and sruta on the basis of their having different definitions. They can be further differentiated on the following basis. Mati is the cause and sruta is its effect. Sruta is always preceded by Mati. One can argue that sometimes mati also is preceded by sruta and it is wrong to say that in every case mati is the cause and sruta the effect. For example, when mati is generated at 1. Visesavasyakabbasya G. 110-115

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300 Epistemology of Jainas bearing a sound i. e. sruta, the order changes. sruta becomes cause and mati the effect. This argument is based on misunderstanding the nature of real sruta. In the case quoted above, only dravya-sruta stands as the cause of mati, while we are concerned with bhavasruta. The above principle is applicable in the case of causation only. It only proposes that mati does not occur as the effect of sruta. It does not rule out the occurrance of mati after sruta as an independent knowledge. Just as the ornaments of bangles or eat rings must have gold as its cause, Gold must precede them. But, it does not mean that gold cannot have existence even after those forms are no more. The subsequent existence of gold does not depend upon the ornaments as its cause. Similarly, sruta is a particular form of mati and must have the latter as its cause. When that form disappears, there is no difficulty in occurrence of mati from its own causes. None can say, that sruta, once produced, rules out mati for ever. Dravyasruta preceded by Mati According to another opinion it is not bhavasruta, that is preceded by mati but the dravyasruta i. e. speech. No body speaks without thinking. First, we establish the idea in our mind and then convey it to others. So, the speech is preceded by mati. There are three objections to this view. Firstly, it leaves no scope for bhavasruta. If the mental association of word with its meaning, which precedes utterance of a speech, is mati, the same should be admitted in case of the knowledge resulting from hearing the specch. Thus, the mental thoughts preceding as well as following the speech are included into mati and no room is left for sruta. Secondly, we are not concerned with the difference between dravyasruta and mati. It is already established; because, the former is a matter while the latter is knowledge. There can be no question about their difference. The question is related to the difference, between two types of

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Indirect Knowledge 30r knowledge; i. e. mati and bbavasruta only. Thirdly, it was proposed that sruta is preceded by mati and mati is not preceded by sruta. If sruta is taken as dravyasruta the above proposal is not supported. Because, dravyasruta is not only the effect of mati, it is also a cause of the laiter. It is effect of mati in the case of a speaker; but, in the case of listener it is the cause of mati. The knowledge that is generated in the listener has the speech as its cause. As a matter of fact dravyasruta is preceded not by mati but, bhavasruta. When one thinks before speaking, his thinking is associated with words. It is, therefore, not mati but bhavasruta. One can infer from dravyasruta the existence of preceding bhavassuta. Difference on the Basis of Division Mati is divided into 28 types of avagraha etc. Sruta is divided into Angapravista and Amgabahya etc. This basis is founded on the tradition only. It does not possess any logical signffcance. The Senses as the Basis of Difference The fundamental difference between mati and sruta is based upon the senses that produce them. Sruta is produced by the auditory sense while mati results from all the five. It should be observed that all cognitions produced by the auditory sense are not sruta. They are sruta as well as mati. The only limitation is that the cognition resulting from other senses is necessarily mati, wbile resulting from the auditory sense may be sruta as well as mati. But, the confinement of sruta to the auditory sense does not mean that it is the result of hearing only. In the case of scriptures sruta results from visual perception. It is sruta in spite of its independence from the auditory sense. If a cognition is associated with or follows a speech, oral or written, it is generally regarded as the case of auditory sense. It can be grasped through vision or other senses also. Like spoken words, written scriptures also are accepted as dravyasruta; because, they are cause of bhavassruta. 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 116-121

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302 Epistemology of Jainas The auditory perception of a boy, who does not understand the meaning of words is not sruta. It is only mati and takes its usual stages of avagraha etc. similarly, the perception of written scriptures, without understanding their meaning is mati. The acceptance of sruta as result of all the seoses does not render the distinction, based on senses, meaningless; because, knowledge associated with speech is the main factor that constitutes sruta. It may result from any of the five senses. It is admitted as the cognition of audition on account of its capability of being an object of hearing. Whatever is associated with speech must possess that capability. Thus, every cognition of this sort is admitted as related with the sense of audition, and the same becomes a distinguishing factor between mati and Sruta. According to a certain view, the sruta here, means dravyasruta i. e. speech only, and it is mati as well as gruta. In relation to the speaker it is sruta, because it is heard. In relation to the listener it is mati, because it is deliberated upon for finding out a meaning. But, this view is not correct. The same word cannot be mati as well as sruta. Mere etymological derivation, leading to dfferent forms in relation to different persons, cannot establish any real difference in one and the same thing. Moreover, as far as dravyasruta is concerned, the difference between mati and sruta is beyond any doubt. One is knowledge and the other is matter. The present controversy is related with bhavasruta and mati. So, the above view cannot hold good any longer. The Definitions of Dravyasruta, Bhavasruta and Ubhayasrutal In the discussion of srutajnana the terms dravyasruta etc. have been repeated many times. It is necessary that we understand them clearly. VBh, defines them in the following way, based upon a gatba ascribed to purva-literature. 1. Dravyasruta -When the words known through srutajnana, are spoken merely out of habit; without any 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 127-134

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Indirect Knowledge attention on their meanings, it is dravyasruta. The speaker is not aware of the scriptures of the speech to which his words are connected. He has become so familiar with them that they come out spontaneously. Such, words are not connected with srutajnana as far as their origin is concerned. But, they produce sruta-jnana in the listener and on this basis they are called dravyasruta. The scriptures also are dravyasruta on the same ground. 303 2. Bhavasruta-When the cogniser, knows the meaning associated with a speech; but, does not speak, his cognition is bhavasruta. The cognition in this case is not put into words. 3. Ubhayasruta-When the object cognized by sruta-jnana gets utterance at the same time, it is ubhayasruta. Bhavasruta is infinitely richer than dravyasruta and ubhayasruta; as we can speak only a fragment of what we know. we can keep hundreds of things in our mind at a time, but can speak them by order; one at a time. Thus, in the whole life we can speak very few things. Mati and Dravyasruta1 As far as dravyasruta is concerned it is not contrary to mati. If a person speaks the object cognized by mati, his mati becomes dravyasruta, as it is the cause of dravyasruta i. e. speech. There are three categories in which the speech of a person can be classified: 1. Suppose, one knows the object through oral instruction or scriptures or some other way of sruta and then speaks. In this case the cause is bhavasruta and the result is dravyasruta. 2. He knows the object without any recourse to scriptures or instrunction and then speaks. In this case the cause is mati while the result is dravyasruta. 3. He speaks without attention. It is dravyasruta only. In case he is silent the first category is purely bhavasruta, while the second is purely mati. 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 135-144

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304 Epistemology of Jainas According to another opinion, when anything is cognized by mati and spoken with attention, it is bhavasruta. When the same is spoken without attention it is dravyasruta and if it is not spokso at all, it is mati. Thus, the differentiating factor of mati and sruta is speech only. As far as cognition is concerned they are identical. VBh refutes the above view that it leaves no scope for bhavasruta. In the first case there are two things viz. attention and speech. The first is mati and the latter is dravyasruta. None of them has any affinity with bhavasruta. In the second case it is clearly dravyasruta. Moreover, the cognition, which is mati at the time of its inception, cannot become sruta by merely being expressed in words. If it is mati it will remain so throughout. There should be some qualitative difference if sruta is accepted as a separate type of cognition. Difference between mati and sruta due to expressibility and inexpressiblity Another important difference between mati ant sruta consists in that the objects apprehended by sruta can be expressed in toto. They are not beyond the reach of words. It does not mean that all such objects are actually expressed or conveyed to others. A greater part of them is left unexpressed. But, this is due to their huge number and the shortness of life. By nature they are not inexpressible. On the other hand the objects cognised by mati and the avadbi etc. are not within the reach of the words. The objects known through scriptures or preaching can be put into words in their entireness. Every thing known in this way can be conveyed to othere. But, what we know through senses or other types of perceptual cognition, cannot be expressed through words as it is. The words are generally related with class concepts. The individual peculiarities, appearing new and new with every perception, are beyond the reach of words. We can experience them but not express. It is on this basis that 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 145-150

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Indirect Knowledge Dharmakirti defines perception as the cognition beyond kalpana-the apprehension that can be put into words. The scriptures say that only an infinitely small part of the inexpressible object can be put into words and those which can be put into words do not entirely come into scriptural form. Only a very small part of them is collected into scriptures. 305 Conclusion In order to have a clear conception of the distinction between mati and sruta we can divide the matter in the following three categories: e. 1. In the first category we include those objects as are expressible but not accompanied by the attention of sruta; the cognition of which does not depend upon instruction or scriptures. The cognition of such objects is mati. 2. In the second category we include those objects which are not expressible. They also come into mati. 3. In the third category we place those, which are expressible and at the same time accompanied by sruta attention. The cognition of such objects is sruta. The above classification would show that there are two conditions for sruta. Firstly, its object should be expressible. Secondly, its cognitions should be produced by sruta i. e. speech or scriptures. All expression is not sruta, because it may arise without the help of instruction or scriptures. In such cases it is nothing but mati. The reason for excluding such cases from the category of sruta is this: in the case of sruta it is necessary that the whole knowledge should be expressible. It is possible only if the cognition depends upon some verbal testimony. Any knowledge gathered from self-experience may have some element that can be put into words, but, the whole of it cannot be translated into language. It is always mixed with certain material that is inexpressible. So, the only possible limitation

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306 Epistemology of Jainas is that whatever is sruta, it must be expressible and not the vice versa, i. e. whatever is expressible is not necessarily sruta. Mati is expressible as well as in expressible. Sruta is always expressible. It can be said; in the case when mati and sruta, both are expressible, they do not differ as far as their subject-matter or the nature of cognition is concerned. The only difference, that can be held in such cases is that, one depends upon scripture or speech while the other on experience. But, the defference in cause does not make any intrinsic difference in the nature of knowledge. The above objection does not arise if we compare the internal nature of the sruta with mati. The object of sruta is naturally expressible as it is cognized. It does not allow any difference between expression and the cognition. On the other hand the object of mati is not expressed as apprehended. The difference among the tastes of sugar, gur, sugarcane, honey and dates is beyond the reach of words. The term sweet is only a lame expression. Much of the experience is left unexpressed. So, mati aad sruta differ in their internal nature also. The Illustration of Bark and Rope 2 The difference between mati and sruta is also illustrated by the bark and rope. Mati is like the bark and sruta like the rope. It means that sruta is a particular stage of mati. The latter continues to exist even in that stage. As the existence of bark is not finished on its transformation into rope. The latter is merely an advanced stage of the former. Similarly, sruta is an advanced stage of mati. The Difference of Articulation and Inarticulation According to another opinion sruta is articulate ( saksara ) and mati inarticulate (anaksara). This view goes against the conception of iba etc. as the sub-class of mati, which are articulate cognition. In the stages of mati, only avagraha is 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 154-161 2. Ibid G. 162-170

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Indirect Knowledge 307 inarticulate. In the latter stages the cognizer must have articulate cognition. It can be argued that avagraha etc. are recognized as the stages of sruta-pisrita-mati, so the function of articulation, in the latter stages can be performed by sruta. This view also is not free from defects. If the function of iba is performed by sruta the former cannot be a stage of mati. If, in spite of its being the function of sruta Iba is admitted as the stage of mati sruta will have no scope. The alternative that both mati as well sruta should be accepted to exist there, also is not feasible; because, two upayogas do not occur simultaneously. Moreover, sruta-nisrita does not mean articulation or dependence upon sruta at the time of occurrence. It only means the relation with a person whose mind is will-cultivated through the knowledge of scriptures or other instructions. As a matter of fact, bhavasruta and mati both are articulate as well as inarticulate. Mati in the stage of avagraha is inarticulate and in the latter stages articulate. Sruta is articulate as far as it follows the scriptures or articulate speech. It is inarticulate when it follows a sound other than books or distinct speech : just as the sound of inhaling or exhaling, spitting, coughing etc. But, in the case of dravyasruta it is positively articulate. Inarticulate sound is not accepted as dravyasruta. So, the difference of articulation and inarticulation is applicable to dravyasruta and mati only. The difference between the two based on Silence and Eloquency Sruta is eloquent. It can express the object to others. Mati is silent. It cannot make the object known to others. It can be said, as far as cognition is concerned mati and sruta, both are silent. It is only speech, recognized as dravyasruta, that can express the meaning to others. It is related with bhavasruta; because, it is a cause of the latter. If bhavasruta is he.d as eloquent on account of the expressiveness of its cause, the mati also can be proved eloquent on the same basis. The object of mati is not expressed through words, but the same can be done 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 171-176

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308 Epistemology of Jainas through movements of the body or other sources. The above contention goes against the following reasons. Firstly, the physical movements are not the exclusive cause of mati. They are common to mati as well as fruta. They cannot be called dravyamati as we call speech as dravyasruta. So, dravyasruta, being closely related with bhavasruta, can assign eloquence to sruta in general. This cannot be said in the case of mati. Secondly, the indications also when they go beyond the limit of perception and indicate something more, come into the category of sruta. Sruta does not mean spoken or written words only. t, every thing that given some idea based on authority. After all words also are indications. A person touches his mouth with folded five fingers. As far as the perception of his movements is concerned it is mati. But, when we come to know that such indications express hunger, we pass into the sphere of sruta. Thus, what cannot be perceived, inferred or otherwise known, and is exclusively based on the authority of the other person, is sruta. In the above case. if hunger is known through other conditions it will be mati. It is sruta when the fact is made known by the person through words, speech or any other ostensible movement. Fourteen categories of Srutajnanal The Nandi divides sruta into fourteen kinds of Aksara, Anaksara etc. Before coming to their explanation some historical remarks are necessary. These fourteen categories are not found in the Digambara literature. In the Svetambara literature also they are mentioned for the first time by Avasyakaniryukti. They are not referred to even in the Tattvartha. But, the first two categories of Aksara and Anaksara are accepted by the Digambara also. In the karma-literature of Svetambaras as well as the Digambaras sruta is described as having twenty varieties; which include the above-mentioned two. VBh refers to a gatha from the Purvaliterature refering to the same. It appears that the fourteen categories are a development of these two. Jinabhadra has, 1. Nandi sutra, sutra 40-57 See also- Visesavasyakabhasya G. 459-555

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Indirect Knowledge 309 given an elaborate descripion of them on the basis of Niryukti. Akalaska also has mentioned them but his explanation is quite different. The Nandy refers to following fourteen categories : 1. Aksara sruta 2. Anaksarasruta 3. Samjnisruta 4. Asamjnisruta 5. Samyak sruta 6. Mithyasruta 7. Sadi sruta 8. Anadi sruta 9. Saparyavasita 10. Aparyavasita 11. Gamika 12. Agamika 13. Angapravista 14. Anangapravista Aksara sruta and Anaksarasrutal Aksara means the symbols that express some idea. They are called Aksara, becauase, they are not destroyed even at the destruction of object. They are imperishable. The Jainas do not admit eternity of letters in the form of sound as the school of grammarians holds. The imperishability means that they last for even, as far as their knowledge is concerned. That knowledge also exists not in the form of attention; but, in the form of faculty or power (labdhi). The aksara is divided into vowels and consonants. The vowel is known as svara meaning that which sounds. The consonant is known as vyanjana, that which expresses. It is generally consonant that are responsible for the expression of different meanings; while the vowels are mere sounds. Articulate sound expressing definite meaning is Aksarasruta. Inarticulate sounds with definite expressions are Apaksarasruta. Long and deep breathing expresses the state of grief, spitting expresses hatred. Similarly, coughing, nasal and such other sounds express a definite meaning. They are included into Anaksara sruta. One can say that the motions of body also express some meaning. The different kinds of hand-movements denote refusal, calling, threat etc. They also should be included into Anaksara sruta. Jinabhadra holds that the pre1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 454-503

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310 Epistemology of Jainas sent consideration is concerned with sound only and therefore movements are not taken into account. The Division of Akasrasruta 1 Aksarasruta is divided into samjnaksara, Vyanjanaksara and Labdhyaksara (1) Samjnaksara means the particular shape and form of the latter of a script. Maladhari Hemacandra refers here to the eighteen kinds of scripts prevalent at that time. (2) Vyanjanaksara means a word that expresses certain meaning. All the words of different languages, with particular meanings are vyanjanakarsas. (3) Labdhyaksara-- The learning of an Aksara is labdhyaksara. It includes both, the upayoga as well as labdhi related with the knowledge of a script. The first two varieties dravyasruta. The last is bhavasruta. Two kinds of Labdhyaksara2 Jinabhadra divides labdhyasara into two varieties of perception and inference. The cognition of Aksara obtained by the senses and the mind is perception; while that obtained through mark is inference. It may be recalled here that according to the Tattvartha as explained by Akalamka and later Digambara logicians, all varieties of mediate cognition (paroksa) are included into mati. They interpret the four synonyms of mati as four varieties of mediate cognition. According to Jinabhadra sruta and mati both are mediate as well as immediate. When they arise from senses and the mind they are immediate and when they depend upon other sources, say hetu etc. they are mediate. But, Jinabhadra does not clarify the difference between mati and sruta in respect of the categories of pratyaksa and paroksa. On the other hand he seems to include all varieties of inference into paroksa-sruta, and leaves no scope for paroksamati. Akalamka also includes inference etc. into Srutajnana. 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 464-468 2. Ibid. 469-500

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Indirect Knowledge Akalamka's Interpretation of Aksara and Anaksara1 Akalamka interprets aksara and anaksara as the two varieties of inference, viz., inference proper (svarthanumana) and syllogism (pararthanumana) Anaksara is the inferential knowledge related with the inferer. It is anaksara; because, it does not take the form of oral sentences. The syllogism is aksara-sruta as it takes the form of speech in order to convey the idea to others. Thus, according to Akalamka Aksara is only a Dravyasruta limited to speech; and Anaksara is Bhavasruta i. e. knowledge, According to Swetambaras the third category of labdhyaksara was bhavasruta. It was pratyaksa as well as paroksa. The Anaksara-sruta of the Svetambaras has no place in the Digambara literature. Perhaps, Akalamka being a logician, tried to incorporate the Agamic view in the logical system. As far as the Agamic conception is concerned, the Digambara tradition is not so rich as that of the Swetambaras. The three-fold division of Aksara-sruta, so common in the Seetambara literature is not found in the Diga mbaras. 311 Samjnisruta and Asamjnisruta2 The division of Samjnisruta and Asa mjnisruta is based on the stages of mental development or the degree of the power of thinking. According to Jainism, as stated before the mind is divided into physical mind and psychical mind. The physical mind is not possessed by all animals. It is found in a portion of the five-sensed animals only. The general classification of sanjnins and Asanjnins is based on the possession of physical mind. But, this does not mean that the animals without it are totally devoid of the mental activities. Their different movements clearly express the existence of mental functions in greater or lesser degree. The one-sensed animals, who cannot move from one place to another place at their free will, or who cannot move, have their limbs by themselves, also possess certain amount of mental function, like feeling and willing etc. Considered from this point of view no animal is asanjoin. 1. Tattvartha Vartika 2. Visesavasyakabbasya G. 504-536

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312 Epistemology of Jainas But, the mental function as found in one-sensed animals like earth etc. is so minute that it cannot be commonly apprehended. The animals like ants are seen running in several ways in search of food. They react to the external stimuli and do such other things as clearly cxpress the cxistcnce of mind in them. This is not so clear in the case of one-seosed animals. Their mental function is known as Oghasanjna; which in the present case is not recognised as such. The present distinction of sanjnisruta and Asamjnisruta is based on this very assumption of Jinabhadra that a karsapana ( a four apna coin ) also is money; but, a person cannot be held as a moneyed man by possessing that much. Similarly, a thing does not become colourful by merely possessing some colour. Moneyed man is called by possessing a big amount of money and the designation of colour-ful is based on possession of beautiful colour. The first case depends upon big quantity and the second on commendability. In the present case both the factors are taken into consideration. Out of the three varieties of Sanjnisruta, which we are going to describe, the first two depend upon the first factor and the last one on the second factor. Three types of Samjoisruta The question of Samjnisruta and Asamjnisruta is considered in the following three aspects : (1) Kaliki or Dirghakaliki Samjna - The mental power of retaining the past experiences and speculation in future plans is known as kaliki or Dirghakalike samjna. It is besed on, as the name suggests, the capacity of dwelling upon a long span of time. According to this assumption a person with the power of memory and future speculations is samjnin and others are Asamjnin. This type of Samjnisruta is found in the animals that possess physical mind i. e., the residents of heaven and hell, and the womb-born ( garbhaja ) five-sensed animals. The general classification of Samjnin and Asamjoin is based upon the above contention. This Samjna corresponds to the soul of Western thinkers.

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Indirect Knowledge 313 (2) Hetuvadopadesa Samjna The animals who can feel the agreeable and diasgrecable objects and react accordingly for protection or comfort of their body are samjoins and others asa mjoins. The thinking of such animals is generally confined to the present only. They cannot keep in view the past or speculate the future. According to this assumption all the animals having two senses or more are sarijsins, while the one-sensed animals are asamjnins. Hetu. vada means reaction to the external stimuli. (3) Destivadopadesa samjna This assumption is besed upon the ethical factor like that Jnana or Ajnana. According to it a person with right attitude (samyagdssti) is samjnin, and that with a wrong attitude (mithya drsti) is asamjnin. The latter is called asasjnin because his samjna is not useful for the spiritual development, just as his jnana also amounts to ajnana, Samyak sruta and Mithyasrutal There are two considerations in recognising a sruta as samyak or mithya. According to the first consideration the scriptures composed by the sages having a minimum knowledge of full ten purvas is samyak sruta ; while the whole non-jaina literature is mithyasruta, the works composed by the Jaina sages having the knowledge of less than ten purvas may be included into samyak as well as mithya. This assumption is based on the conception that a Mithyadrsti cannot obtain the knowledge of full ten purvas. This consideration keeps in view the question of authoritative validity. According, to the second consideration every scripture possessed by a samyagdrsti is samyak sruta and that possessed by a mithya-drsti is mithyasruta. Sadi-saparyavasita sruta 3 Srutajnana is without beginning and end (anadi-aparyavasita) in the view of the Dravyarthika-naya. It has beginning well as end in view of the Paryayarthika-naya. 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 527-536 2 . Ibid. 537-539

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314 Epistemology of Jainas If we leave aside the question of two Nayas and consider srutajnana on its owa merit we have the following four alternatives : 1. Sadi-saparyavasita-Having beginning as well as end. 2. Sadi-aparyavasita - Having beginning but no end. 3. Apadi-saparyavasita-Having end but no beginning. 4. Anadi-aparyavasita--Having neither beginning nor end. These four alternatives are discussed in relation to the following four consideration :-(1) Dravya (person), (2) Ksetra (place), (3) Kala (time), (4) Bhava (state). If the sruta is considered in relation to one person it has both, the beginning as well as the end. A person with srutajnana can have three prospects: Firstly, he may make further progress and attain kevalajnana. Secondly, he may die with his knowledge of sruta and forget the majority of it in the next life. Thirdly, he may lose the knowledge in the very life on account of physical or mental disorder. All the three cases prove that the sruta is never without end. Jinabhadra says that a person with the knowledge of fourteen purvas, does not remember all of them in his heavenly life. He may remember a portion of them or forget entirely. Even in the same life he may retain it or forget according to the external and internal factors. The change of faith from right to wrong, death, falling ill, absence of revision etc. are some of the factors which wipe out the already acquired sruta-jnana. So far, we were considering the subject in relation to samyagjnana. If the sruta is taken as general, we come to the following conclusions : 1. The first alternative can be applied to an individual in the case of samyaksruta only. 2. The second alternative of beginning without end is merely hypothetical. It is found nowhere.

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Indirect Knowledge 315 3. The third alternative, i.e. end without beginning, applies to the person who is expected to attain liberation. He was never without sruta but loses it with the attainment of kevalajnana i.e. omniscience. 4. The fourth alternative, i.e. neither beginning nor end applies to a being who is Abhavya, who does not possess the capacity of attaining liberation. In respect of the conditions of place, time and state the alternatives are applied as follows: As far as the countries of Bharata and Airavata are concerned we have the first alternative. In these two parts sruta begins with the first Tirthankara and ends when the order of the last Tirthankara is ended. As regards time also we have the first alternative in relation to the above two countries. According to Jainism the wheel of time is divided into two halves having six spokes (ara) each. The first half, where everything progresses with the march of time is known as Utsarpini. The latter half, where everything deteriorates gradually is known as Avasarpini. In both the halves sruta begins with the third spoke and ends in Utsarpini by the beginning of the fourth spoke and in Avasarpini upto the end of the ofta spoke. The present age is considered as the fifth spoke of Avasarpini, which has a duration of twenty.one thousand years. Out of which two thousand and five hundred years have been passed. As regards the states of attention, sound, effort, place, pose etc. sruta has the first alternative. We have the fourth alternative of neither beginning nor end in respect of the persons taken collectively, Videhaksetra, the time prevalent there in, and the state of ksayopasama. The above alternatives show the potitions of scriptural knowledge in different times and regions. They also show when the scriptures come into existence and when they are extinct.

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316 Epistemology of Jainas Gamika and Agamika srutal The sruta which is connected with mathematical calculations or repeats the same text agrin and again with a particular purpose is known as Gamika. This name was generally given to Dsstivada, the twelveth ainga. The sruta composed in various meters and prose forms is Agamika, it is also known as kalika. Amgapravista Angabahya The division of Amyapravista and Angabahya is based on three factors which we have already discussed. It is said that Distivada centaines the full subject matter of all the purvas, Amgas and other literature. Even that the composition of the literature other than Drstivada is meant for the persons who could not learn Drstivada. A woman was not allowed to study the Dsstivada. According to the Digambara tradition she cannot attatn liberation, but the Swetambaras do not deny her that privilege. According, to them a female can become a Tirthankara also. The nineteenth Tirtharikara was a woman. Still, they also contain many injuuctions belittling the position of woman. It appears to be a Brahmanical influ. ence. The Subject matter of Sruta jnana A person with sruta-jnana can know all the objects of the world, the present, past or future with all modes and states. But his cognition is indirect. He knows, but cannot perceive them. Sruta is not preceded by sensation or the stage of acquisition. According to certain systems the scriptural knowledge result into intuition or perceptual knowledge. But, the Jaina does not support it. As far as the subject matter is concerned the Jaina also holds that sruta is not inferior to kevala. The only difference between the two is that the first is indirect while the latter is direct. 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 549.555

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CHAPTER IV Direct Knowledge It has been already stated that the Tattvartha and Avasyaka Niryukti divide the five types of knowledge, into two categories of direct cognition (prayaksa) and the indirect cognition (paroksa). The first two types of Mati and Sruta are Indirect cognitions while the remaining three are direct-cognitions. We have also discussed the basis of this division. The cognition which arises from the soul without any external help is direct and that depending upon external cause is indiret. The direct knowledge is independent of all factors, commonly held as she cause of knowledge. Regarding the object also it differs from the ordinary cognitions. It apprehends the objects that are remote, past, future, minute, hidden or otherwise uncognizable through the external senses. It is supernormal. Almost all the schools of Indian philosphy believe in supernormal perceptions. Only the materialist school of Carvaka does not believe in any source of knowledge other than senseperception. The Mimarsaka also denies the possiblity of super-normal knowledge, except that derived from the Vedas. But, the systems of Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhyas, Yoga, Vedanta, Buddhism and the Jaina believe in supernoimal perceptions and give their own accounts. The modern sciences of hypnotism, occultism etc. will find sufficient material for research in the Indian account of supernormal perceptions. They will find in it the evidences of autosuggestion, clairaudience, hyperalesthesia of vision, hearing, touch, etc., hypermpesia, thought reading, thought transference telepathy, and different types of trance or ecstasy obtained through yogic practices.

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Epistemology of Jainas The Nyaya Theory of Supernormal Perception According to the Nyaya theory of knowledge all pereption. except that of God, results from a contact between senses and the object. This principle is applied every where, Even the supernormal-perception is not an exception to it. But, in order to depend the above principle and to apply it every where the Nyaya has become so lenient or rather lose in the conception of contact, that it has nearly lost the sense of restriction. One can establish the contact everywhere. 318 The Nyaya divide that contact into two categories of Ordinary contact (laukika sannikarsa) and Extraordinary contact (alaukika sannikarsa). The ordinary contact has been already discussed with its six varieties. Extraordinary contact has the following three types1 : (1) The contact through the knowledge of generic character (samanya-laksana-sannikarsa). contact through association (2) The sannikarsa) (Jnana-laksana (3) The contact produced by meditation (yogaja-sannikarsa) (1) The Contact through the Knowledge of generic character Sometimes, through the knowledge of generic nature of an individual, we perceive all other individuals of that kind with all times and places, in respect of the same generic nature. In such cases, the knowledge of generic nature (samanya) of an object constitutes the extraordinary contact. For instance, when we see a particular case of smoke along with its generic character (dhumatva), we have a universal preception of smokeness related with all the three times. In the preception of smoke we have ordinary contact viz., union (samyoga) between the visual organ and the particular smoke; in the perception of generic character we have the contact of united-inherence (samyukta-samavaya) between visual organ and the generic character. These two are the cases of ordinary contact, but in 1. Karlkavali K. 63-65

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Direct Knowledge 319 the perception of aniversal smoke the contact is extra-ordinary. It is established through the knowledge of generic character, which inheres in all the smokes. It is extra-ordinary in the sense that it is not objective. It is merely conceptual. The necessity of cogoizing all smoke of all times and all places arises, according to the Nyaya, is to ascertain the relation of universal connection between smoke and fire, which is essential condition of inference. The Jaina as bas been already discussed does not belive in the contact-theory. He resorts to Ksayopasama as the ultimate source in all cases of knowledge. The ascertainment of invariable concommittance (vyapti) also does not require the knowledge of all individuals; but, the knowledge that one does not happen without the other, or one happens only when the other is present (tathopapatti or anyathanupa patti) is sufficient for it. But, this knowledge, if confined to particular cases, is not competent to establish a universal relation. If it is universal, it does not differ materially from the Nyaya-conception. The only difference is, where the Jaina resorts to Ksayopasama and gets freedom from the responsibility of further explanation, the Nyaya tries to give some interpretation, feasible or unfeasible. (2) The contact through Association Sometimes an object or a quality is not actually present before the sense-organ. it is recollected on the basis of its association with the object that is present. But, the cognitions of the object that is presented and that of its associate, are not held as two. There is one apperance where certain matter is supplied by direct sensation and the other by association. This is called the contact through association, which brings about an indirect perception of the quality that is not presented. For instance, when we see a piece of sandal-wood, we feel that it is fragrant. What is the cause of this visual perception of fargrant sandal ? Here, the visual organ is united with the piece of sandal-wood which produces the direct visual perception of sandal-wood, but, the fragrance is not a direct object of vision. In this case

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320 Epistemology of Jainas the perception of sandal-wood generates the idea of fragrance through association, which serves as the extraordinary contact in the visual perception of fragrant sandal-wood. According to Jainism the fragrance of saydal-wood is not perceived. It is the object of recollection, which appears as one with the visual perception. It is recognized as pratyabhijna, which is a variety of indirect knowledge. The Nyaya holds it as perception. He, therefore, has to explain the experience of fragrance through some abnormal contact. The cognitions generated by the above-mentioned two con. tacts are not held as super-normal by the Jainas. We are not mainly concerned with them in the present discussion which is related with the supernormal knowledge (3) The contact produced by Meditation The third variety of extraordinary contact is produced by meditation or yoga. It is beyond the recognized process of contact. Jayanta Bhattal describes the nature of Yogipratyaksa that it can perceive all the objects that are past, distant, hidden, subtle, or have not come into existence as yet. It can perceive dharma which is absolutely supersensible. A Yogin can apprehend all the objects of world simultaneously in one cognition. Bhasarvajnas distinguishes the yogipratyaksa from ordinary one in this respect, that the latter apprehends only the gross objects through a physical contact; is dependent of the help of light, time, space and merit or demerit of the person. The yogic perception does not depend upon this help. It is a direct and immediate perception with the apprehension of all the objects, gross as well as subtle, existent as well as non-existent, without the physical contact. Yogic Perception and Divine Preception Both, the yogins and God equally know all the objects of world, even those as are naturally supersensible as dharma 1. Nyayamajanri p. 97 2. Nyayasara p. 3

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Direct Knowledge 321 (merit) etc; still, they differ in their omniscience. The omniscience of yogins is produced by meditation, while divine omniscience is eternal. Moreover, the divine perception of dharma (Moral law) is oatural (samsiddhika), dharma constitutes the essential wature of God, who is the author of Vedic injunctions. But, yogips learn the real nature of dharma, first indirectly through the Vedic injunctions, and then have an intuition through long meditation. When they attain the stage of direct intuition the dependence on Vedic texts is finished. They become themselves an authority. Just as in the case of inference, when we perceive the same fire as was inferred before, the dependence on the mark is finished. The Jainas do not recognise the above two types. They do not admit the conception of God. Every cognition, according to them, has a beginning. They classify the supernatural cognitions, on the besis of their gradation. The knowledge of an omniscient, though attained at the destruction of entire obscurance through the self-disciple and penance, does not disappear. It is eternal and constant. But, the supernormal knowledge of lower type is open to disappearance as well as further development, resulting into the stage of omniscience. It is not constant and functions only when the attention is applied. The Division of Yogipratyaksa Prasastapada' divides yogic perception into two types of (1) Yuktapratyaksa-the perception of those who are in ecstasy and (2) Viyuktapratyaksa--the perception of those who are not in ecstasy. Those with ecstasy can perceive their own souls, the souls of others, space, time, atoms, air, manas, qualities ( gunas ) movements (karmans), universalities (samanya) and particularties (visesa), inherence (samavaya) through the mapas strengthened by the powers attained through maditation. And those without ecstasy perceive subile, hidden and remote things, 1. Prasastapada Bbasya p. 97

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322 Epistemology of Juinas through the fourfold contact of the self, mauas, sense organs and the object. The main difference between the two is that the former does not depend upon the four-fold contact while the latter docs. Bhasarvajnat also follows Prasastapada in dividing yogic perception into two types of (1) ecstatic intuition and (2) the non-ecstatic intuition. In the ecstatic iotuition there is no peripheral stimulation or contact of the external sense-organs with the object; the perception of all objects follows from the conjunction of the self with the internal organ or mapas aided by dharma brought about by intense meditation and the grace of God. Thus, in the state of ecstasy the internal organ or manas, alone is operative, the external organs are entirely inoperative at that time. But in the non-ecstatic intuition the yogic perception of supersensil le objects, follows from the four-fold, three fold, or two-fold contact as the case may be. When the objects are perceived through the senses, other than the auditory organ, the contact is four-fold, i. c. of the soul with mind, of the mind with the sense-organs, of the senseorgans with their respective objects. In the perception of sound the contact is threefold ; i. e. of the self with manas, and the manas with auditory-organ of auditory organ with its object. And in the perception of pleasure etc. there is the two-fold contact of the self with the mapas and of manas with its object. The Jainas divide yogic perception into two varieties of Incomplete (vikala) and complete (sakala). The complete perception is constant and all-apprehensive. It apprehends all the objects of the universe; present, past or future, subtle or gross, material or immaterial with same cognition without any break or obstruction. The Incomplete perception is not constant. It occurs only when and where the attention is paid. It is also limited in scope. According to Jainism the ssense-organs do not play any part in the yogic perception. The soul is not assisted by any thing else in such cases. Though, in ordinary perception a so soul is the main factor; but, the sense-organs also help as 1. Nyayasara p. 3

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323 Direct Knowledge auxiliaries without which the soul is helpless. In the case of extraordiuary perception the senses do not function at all. The soul is empowered by the particular ksayopasama to apprehend the objects, without taking any help from the sense-organs, The ioner sense or manas also does not play any part as far as this cognition is concerned. It functions only in creating desire to know a particular object. It has nothing to do after that. In the case of complete knowledge that desire also is not required, as an omniscience knows all the objects every moment. The Neo-Naiyayikas divide yogins and their perception in the following two types! :1. Yukta --the perception of a yogin, who has attained union with the Supreme Being. 2. Yunjana--the perception of a yogin, who is endeavouring to attain such a union. Ths first type enjoys a constant perception of all the objects, while the second type can do so with a little effort, i. e. attention or meditation. The above conception of the modern Naiyayikas bears a considerable resemblance with that of the Jainas. The Incomplete perception (vikala) resembles the Yunjana and the complete one with yukta. But, the Nyaya conception of contact between mind and the soul as a necessary condition is protested by the Jainas more strongly in this case. Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka stages in Yogi-Pratyaksa Jayasimhasuriholds that the yogic perception in the state of ecstasy, is always indeterminate; since in ecstasy the complete focus of attention cannot be brought about by a determinate or discriminate perception. There is no element of discrimination in the yogic intuition in the state of ecstasy. But, it must not be supposed that the yogic intuition in ecstasy is the same as ordinary indeterminate perception which apprehends the mere forms of objects and not their mutual 1. Karikavali K. 65 2. Nyayasartika p. 82

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324 Epistemology of Jainas relations. Our indeterminate perception marks the lowest stage of immediacy, while the yogic intuition in ecstasy marks the highest limit of immediacy. Our indeterminate perception is below determinate perception, while the indeterminate perception of a yogin in ecstasy, is above determinate perception and indeed, above all determinate cognitions, presentative or representative, perceptual or conceptual. Our indeterminate perception is immediate 'sense-perception', while that of the yogin in ecstasy is immediate "intellectual intuition". Our indeterminate perception apprehends the mere form of an object, through an external sense-organ, while that of the yogin in ecstasy apprehends all the objects of the world simultaneously. The speciality of the indeterminate perception of a yogin lies only in the state of ecstasy. But the perception of yogin out of the condition of ecstasy can be both, determinate or indeterminate. According to Jainism the cognition of yogins also, whether complete or incomplete, is preceded by indeterminate perception (darsana). It is only the manah-paryaya jnana (perception of others'miod) which is always determinate. The other two varieties pass through the stages of determipate as well as indeterminate. But, in case of the cognition of an omniscient, there is a controversy whether he passes through two stages, or has one stage with both specialities or without the distinction. We shall discuss the problem along with Kevalajnana and Kevaladarsana. Arsajnana (Intutition Produced by Austerities) Prasastapada refers to another kind of supernarmal knowledge, which is kindred to yogipratyaksa. It is held that the sages, who are authors of the Sastras, have a true intuitive cognition of all objects, past, present, and future, and also of dharma (moral Law) and other supersensible objects. Owing to its dependence on the contact of the manas with the self and peculiar dharma or power born of austerities, such an intuitive

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Direct Knowledge 325 cognition is called arsajnana. It is perceptual in character; since, it is not produced by inferential marks and so forth; but it differs from ordinary perception in that it is not produced by the external organs. It is known also as pratibhajnana. Jayasimhasuril says that essentially there is no difference between arsa intuition and the yogic intuition (yogipratyaksa), as both of them are produced by a peculiar dharma or merit. The only difference between the two lies in fact that former is produced by the practice of austerities (tapojanita), while the latter is produced by meditation (yogaja). Both of them are non-sensuous and have mind only as their instrumental cause. The Jaina tradition designates the authors of Agamic literature as Sruta-kevalins. Their knowledge is just like the omniscient, but not perceptual in character. It is not direct but indirect acquired through the preachings of the omniscient. Consequently, it is included into srutajnana. As a matter of fact there are three considerations regarding the Arsajnana, If it is related with the scriptures it is sruta. It is not necessary for sruta that it should be acquired from or based upon entirely on the speech of others. We have already stated that the omniscient lords (Tirtharkaras) preach only three words (Tripady) and the Ganadharas acquire the knowledge of full 14 purvas or 12 angas. In spite of it the whole of their knowledge is sruta; because, it is based on preaching, however short it may be. The intelligent listener can develop the idea in volumes; but, he does not lose the central theme or the nucleus of it. In such cases the Arsajnana is sruta. If the Arsajnana is held as perceptual in character and as apprehending the objects beyond sense-perception, it must be admitted as yogipratyaksa. It does not make any difference wbether the power obtained is caused by austerities or meditation. 1. Nyayasaratika p. 83, sce also "The Positive sciences of the Ancient Hindus" by Seal, p. 17

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326 Epistemology of Jainas In case the Arsajnana isi intuitional (pratibha), appearing like a flash of light, produced through the operation of mind, it is nothing but mati. We have cited the examples of four buddbis which cover the whole range of pratibhajnana. As a matter of fact the difference between the Vaisesika and the Jaina is very little. The Vaibesika holds that knowledge of dharma depends upon the scriptures for its origination. Whea developed it becomes Arsa or yogic according to the two types of practices. According to Jainism also the knowledge of supersensual objects is acquired first through scriptures. The same when highly developed through self-discipline and meditation, results into keyalajnana. In the state of sruta it was imperceptual; but, in the stage of kevala it becomes perceptual The Vedic tradition makes a distinction between the two stages by calling their possessers as ssi and muni respectively. The ssi has intuitional direct knowledge. The muni possesses the same indirectly. The idea of scriptural knowledge, gradually developing into intuition is also expressed by the Upanisads through their three-fold way of realization. The Sravana (to learn the scriptures from a preceptor), manana (logical deliberation) and pididhyasana (constant meditation) result into the intuition or realization of Brahman. Siddha. Darsana (Occult Perception) Besides the intuition of yogins and sages, Prasastapada describes the perception of occultists who cannot perceive super sensible objects like dharma. They can perceive only the sensible objects as are too subtle or too remote for an ordinary perception; and as such are hidden from our view. They perceive these subtle, remote and hidden objects not through meditation or austerities; but through the external sense-organs sharpened by the application of certain ointments or the like; which, produce certain occult powers. And such an occultperception is purely sensuous, since, it is produced by the external sense-organs with the help of certain occult medicines, 1. Vaisesika Sutra-Bhasya 9.2.13

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Direct Knowledge 327 chants etc. Thus, the difference between ordinary perception and occult perception lies in that the former is produced by the sense organs unaided by any external application, while the latter is produced by the sense-organs sharpened and refined by the application of medicines etc. The former does not go beyond the ordinary limits. The latter is not confined there. Both of them are sensuous. Prasastapada and his commentators SrIdhara, Udayana and others do not explain how occult powers are generated in sense organs, by the application of occult medicines. They have simply recorded occult-perception as a fact of experience. According to Jainism all cognition which depends upon the sense-orgap is included into Mati or Sruta. The application of occult-medicine or performance of chants may help in increasing the power of a particular sense-organ; but, this much cannot place it with supernormal perception. A cat can see in the darkness, the vultures can see an object from a long distance, but, their cognitions do not go beyond the scope of Mati. If the man also happens to possess that power his cognition cannot be recognised other than mati. Even the memory of past lives is a variety of mati. A person begins to sce distant objects through the help of telescope, similarly he can see the subtle objects through a microscope. It does not make his cognition supernormal Supernormality, according to Jainism, means complete independence from the senseorgans. Ku marila's objection Kumarilal contends that the sense organ can never apprehend the object beyond its scope; the sense of vision can see only the visible objects. The extraordinary power produced through meditation or austerity can work only within the scope. One can see remote and subtle objects through it. But, it cannot make colour as the object of auditory sense. Dharma, which is naturally supersensible cannot be perceived through any sense. Jayanta meets this objection by citing the examples 1. sloka-Vartika, II. 111-13

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Epistemology of Jainas of cats and vultures, who can perceive the object where human eyes are incompetent. Similarly, he says, yogins with their supernatural powers can behold everything, even the objects which are beyond the scope of ordinary perception. But, Kumarila's objection is not really met with. He dose not oppose the perception of a remote object or of that in darkness. They are not beyond the scope of visual perception by nature. They are not perceived by a man on account of remoteness or the obstruction of darkness where the human perceptual power falls short. These objects by themselves are not invisible. But, the objects like dharma etc. are naturally beyond the scope of sense-organs. They cannot be perceived even through supernormal power. 328 The above objection does not arise in the case of Jainas as they do not maintain that supernormal or direct, perception depends upon the senses. It is produced by the soul directly, without any dependence on the senses. Kumarila puts forth some other objections also, but they are based on the assumption that Direct knowledge also depends upon the senses; which the Jainas do not accept. The Sankhya Theory of Supernormal Perception According to the Sankhya, everything exists at the present moment; nothing goes out of existence and nothing new comes into existence. The various qualities of things are only modes of energy (rajas) acting in different collocations of the original gunas, or reals of mass (tamas) energy (rajas) and essence (sattva). And these various energies are sometimes actual (kinetic), sometimes potential, rising to actuality, and sometimes sublatent, subsiding from actuality into sublatency. Thus, the so called future objects are present as latent or potential, and the so-called past objects are present as sublatent; and only those things which are supposed to be present are actual. So the mind of the yogin can come in contact with the past and future objects, which are not nonexistent at present, but

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Direct Knowledge 329 exist only as sublatent and potential respectively by virtue of certain peculiar powers produced by meditation. Vijnanabhiksu2 points out that the mind of the yogin can come in contact with the distant and hidden objects by virtue of the peculiar power (atisaya) acquired by meditation. This peculiar power of the mind consists in its all-pervasiveness or its power of acting on all objects owing to the complete suppression of the inertia or matter-stuff (tamas) of the mind which prevents it from acting on all objects. He also points out that the inertia (tamas) of the mind is removed sometimes by the intercourse of sease-organs with their objects as in ordinary sense perception, and sometimes by the dharma born of meditation as in yogic perception. Aniruddha3 says that the perception of a yogin is produced by the internal organ or mind and not by the external organs, and consequently, it is not like the perception of an ordinary person. The yogin alone, who has acquired particular powers through the favourable influence of the dharma born of yoga, can perceive objects in all times and places through the connection of his mind with praksti, the ultimate ground of all existence. Vijnanabhiksu's account conforms with the Jaina conception to a great extent. As far as the theory of obscurance is concerned tamas of the Sarkhya is just like the Avarana of the Jaina. It is removed through meditation or other varieties of self-discipline, and thus the power of supernormal cognition is unveiled. The self which comes in possession of that power is according to the Sankhya, the mind and according to Jainism the soul itself. This difference is not epistemological but metaphysical. The soul of Sankhya is devoid of all qualities. So he has to resort to prakrti for all activities mental or physical. 1. Sankhyasutra Vtiii by Aniruddha 1. 90 2. Sankhya Pra. Bhasya 1. 91 3. Saokhyasutra Vttti, 1.90

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330 Epistemology of Jainas The Jajna soul is not so. It possesses all the psychical virtues. The existence of past and future objects also is partially admitted by the Jainas. Everything, they say, exists in form of the cause, even before its production. It exists even after destruction in the form of another shape. Nothing, they say, which is not existent in any form, can come into existence. Their theory of causation also is more akin to the Sarkhya than that of the Nyaya. Yoga and Supernormal Perception According to the system of yoga there are five stages of mental activity. 1 Out of them the first three i. e. wandering (ksipta) forgetful (mudha) and occasionally steady (viksipta ) have no bearing on the yogic powers. In the fifth stage the mind reaches the highest state of supra-conscious ecstasy (asamprajnata samadhi). It is the state of pure consciousness, without the appearance of any object.2 The fourth stage i. e, the conscious ecstasy (samprajnata samadhi) is divided into eight stages : | Samprajnata Samadhi Vitarkanugata Vicaranugata Anandanugata Asmitanugata Savitarka Savicara Sananda Sasmita Nirvitarka Nirvicara Nirapanda Asmita or Adandamatra (1-2) Savitarka and Nirvitarka stages are related with gross objects. (3) Savicara Samadhi is the condition of the mind when on account of deep concentration, it becomes identified with subtle objects such as atoms, tanmatras, etc. associated with the notions of time, space and causality; and qualified by many other qualities and associations, and erroneously identi fied with their names and concepts. 1. Yoga sutra I 5-6 2. Yoga sutra I 17

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Direct Knowledge 331 (4) Nirvicara samadhi is the condition of mind when through deep concentration, it becomes identified with subtle objects such as atoms, tanmatras etc., in their pure state, divested of all the notions of time, space, and causality, and devoid of all qualifications and associations. These two stages may have for their objects, atoms, tanma. tras the Ahankara, the buddhi and the praksti. (5) Sananda samadhi is the determinate state of mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with gross sense organs, the essence of which is sattva owing to their power of manifesting object. This is the view of Vacaspati Misra. But, Vijnanabhiksu holds that the sense organs are the objects of savitarka samadhi. According to him, the object of sananda samadhi is extreme bliss arising from the predominance of sattva (essence); though rajas (energy) and tamas (inertia) are not entirely suppressed. (6) Nirananda samadhi is indeterminate state of mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with gross senso organs. But, Vijnanabhiksu holds that anandasamadhi does not admit of two forms, viz. sananda and nirananda. (7) Sasmita samadhi is the determinate state of mind when by deep concentration it becomes one with the Buddhi (the cause of the sense-organs) which is identified with the empirical self. This is the view of Vacaspati. According to Vijnanabhiksu, the object of asmita is the consciousness transformed into the form of pure self. This kind of samadhi may have for its objects either the finite self (jivatman) or the infinite self (paramatman). According to Bhojaraja, in this stage the Buddhi which is endowed with pure sattva, rajas and tamas, being entirely suppressed, becomes the object of contemplation. (8) Asmita-samadhi is the indeterminate state of the mind when it becomes one with the Buddhi which is identified with the pure self.

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Epistemology of Jainas Vijnanabhiksu does not recognize two forms of samadhi each under Anandanugata and Asmitanugata. He recognizes the six types only. 332 Vacaspati Misra comprehends all the different kinds of samprajnata samadhi under three classes: 1. Grahya-samadhi or concentration on external objects 2. Grahana-samadhi or concentration on the sense organs 3. Grahitr-samadhi or concentration on the ego. In the different stages of samprajnata-samadhi the yogin attains certain miraculous powers (siddhis) which strengthen his faith in the process of yoga. They are achieved as the result of concer tration on different objects. No reason is given why these powers are attained or why particular powers are attained as the result of concentration on particular objects. These are the facts of actual experience of the yogin, and they have been recorded as such. The Yoga system of Patanjali bears a striking resemblance with the process of spiritual development as depicted in the Jaina Agamas. The Jainas hold fourteen gunasthanas (steps of spiritual development) showing the gradual progress of soul. The first gunasthana is Mithyatva, which is like the first three stages of mind accepted in the yoga-system. But, in this stage also, according to Jainism, certain miraculous powers of inferior type are possible. The manahparyayajnana (perception of the mind of others) is possible in the sixth stage only, which is attained by an ascetic. Omniscience is achieved in the thirteenth gunasthana when the avarana corresponding to the inertia (tamas) and Moha corresponding to the energy (rajas) are fully destoyed. The processes of the spiritual development as depicted in the yoga, Buddhism and Jaina systems is a separate subject for study. We have given short comparative notes wherever necessary.

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Direct Knowledge 333 The Vedanta and Supernormal Perception The Vedanta is not particular about the supernatural powers attained through yogic practices. It aims at the intuition of Brabman realized through the threefold way of the Upanisads. The yogic practices are adopted only as the means for purification of mind. 1 Mahadeva Sarasvaty, the author of Tattvanusamdhana, divides samadbi into two types of samprajnata and asamprajnata. He defines the samprajnata as an unbroken stream of mental functions apprehending pure consciousness (cit or Brahman) without the distinction of subject and object. In this stage the mental modes are not entirely destroyed; they have Brahman or pure consciousness as their object and are transformed into it. The consciousness of subject and object drops altogether, but the mental modes remain concentrated on and transformed into pure conciousness; it is the result of the utmost practice of concentration. He defines asamprajnata samadhi as the complete suppression of the effects of samprajnata. samadhi. Even the transformation of mind into the form of Brahman or pure consciousness without the medium of mental modes, are entirely destroyed. Sadananda, the author of Vedantasara, recognizes two kinds of samadhi, viz., Savikalpaka-samadhi and Nirvikalpakasamadhi. He defines the former as the mental mode which has Brabman or pure consciousness as its object, is transformed into the latter and where the distinction of the knower, the known and the knowledge is not destroyed. In this stage there is the consciousness of identity with the pure-self through the medium of mental modes, in spite of the consciousness of quality of the subject and object. He defines the latter as the mental mode which has Brabman or pure consciousness as its object, into which it is transformed and with which it is completely identified, in this stage, though there is a mental mode which 1. See Das Gupta, Yoga as Philosphy and Religion. Ch. XIII

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334 Epistemology of Jainas is transformed into Brabman or pure consciousness, there is no consciousness of the mental modes; but, only the consciousness of pure Brahman. According to Vedanta the external world is an illusion. It appears as long as the reality i. e, pure consciousness or Brahman is not realized. The yogin in the highest stage, according to the Vedanta, is totally freed from the illusion. He, therefore, does not see the external world. But, this is not the case with the Jainas. According to them the external world is as real as the internal one. It is not an illusion. It does not disappear even when the perfect knowledge is attained. On the contrary the yogin begins to observe it in more detail. According to Jainism the fourteenth gunasthana is Ayogin kevalia. It is also kaown as the stage of Saileba, which means the stage when all activities, mental, vocal or physical are stopped and the person becomes like a mountain (saila). This stage resembles the asamprajnata samadhi of the yoga. But, in that stage also, according to Jainism, the articulate knowledge does not disappear. The Jainas hold that the articulate or determinate cognition does not necessarily depend upon the mental activity. In perfect knowledge all things are directly perceived by the soul independent of mind. The Buddhist and Supernormal Perception According to Dharmakirti? the intuitive perception of yogin is produced by the constant meditation on ultimate truths. Dharmottara explains that there are four ultimate truths : 1. All is momentary (sarvam ksaaikam) 2. Al is void (sarvam sunyam) 3. All is pain (sarvam duhkham) 4. Everything is like itself (sarvam svalaksanam). By constant meditation on these four truths the yogin gradually attains a more and more distinct vision of them; and when he attains the highest stage he acquires the most distinct 1. Nyayabindu p. 20 see also tika by Dharmottara

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Direct Knowledge 335 vision or intuition. As long as the Yogin does not reach the highest limit of distinct vision, his perception is slightly blurred as if hidden behind mica. But, when he reaches the highest limit, he perceives them most distinctly, as if they were within his grasp. His intuitive perception in this stage is indeterminate. According to Buddhists the indeterminate perception itself is not distinct and vivid, but it acquires distinctness and vividness from its contact with the determinate perception which is its immediate antecedent. Aniruddha, the author of Abhidhammattha samgaho, describes the different levels of consciousness. He divides consciousness into two stages viz , subliminal consciousness or subconsciousness below the threshold of consciousness (manodvara), and supraliminal consciousness or consciousness above the threshold of consciousness. He divides supraliminal consciousness, again, into two orders, viz., normal consciousness and supernormal consciousness. Normal consciousness is called kama-citta as it is generally confined to the kamaloka or the plane of existence in which kama (desire) dominates. Super-normal consciousness is called Mahaggata citta or sublime or exalted consciousness. And this supernormal consciousness, again is subdivided into rupa citta, which is generally found in the rupa loka or the sphere of visible forms which are not altogether immaterial, and Arupa-citta, which is concerned with Arupa loka or the sphere of the invisible or formless, and Lokottaracitta or transcendental consciousness which is above the three worlds, viz. Kamaloka, Rupaloka and Arupaloka. In order to pass from Kamacitta to Rupacitta severe discipline and concentration of mind are necessary. A monk must regulate all physical and mental activity and concentrate his mind on a single selected object or sensation without changing the object of thought. After sometime the sensuous mark or symbol is replaced by the corresponding image. This concentration of the mind on a bare sensation or its image is called

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336 Epistemology of Jainas preliminary concentration (parikamma-samadhi). Then by more intense concentration of the mind the image is divested of its concrete, sensuous, or imaginal form, and is converted into an abstract conceptualized image, though not completely deindividualized. The concentration of the mind on this conceptualized image during the period of transition from normal consciousness to super-normal consciousness is still known as access concentration (Upacara-Samadhi). At this stage there intervenes the lowest order of supernormal consciousness known as the first Rupa-jhana. There are five rupa.jbanas, which consist in the gradual elimination of the factors of consciousness and attainment of an intensified inward vision and on absolute equanimity or hedonic indifference. The higher stages of samadhi in the yoga system are attained by concentrating the mind on subtler and subtler objects. Bu the higher stages of Jhana in the Buddhist system are attained by eliminating the factors of consciousness gradually. Above the level of Rupa-citta there is the arupa.ciita which is concerned with Arupaloka or the world of the invisible or formless. The Anupaloka is entirely non-spatial. And the experience of this world can never be sensuous. In the highest stage of the Rupa citta, which is attained by the gradual elimination of the factors of consciousness, there is the abnormal clarity of inward vision or intuition together with hedonic indifference or equanimity. Above this stage there is no longer elimination of factors of consciousness, but all consciousness of distinction or limitations. There are four stages of Arupa jhana. When the mind transcends all these different stages of supernormal consciousness concerned with the Rupaloka and the Arupaloka, it attains the highest stage of supernormal consciousness which is called transcendental or supermundane consciousness (lokottara citta).

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Direct Knowledge 337 Jhana consciousness is a mystic consciousness. It is brought about by auto-suggestion. It consists in intensifying or concentrating consciousness on a single object. The object is first of all a percept, than an image, than a concept. So far the mind is in the preparatory stage. Then gradually the contents of consciousness are eliminated in the different stages of Rupa jbana till the mind at last acquires supernormal clarity of vision and hedonic indifference. So long the mind is in the plane of visible forms ( Rupaloka ). It is conscious of the ethereal but not of the immaterial or non spatial. Then the mind comes in touch with the entirely immaterial world of the invisible or formless by gradually eliminating all consciousness of distinction and limitations. The mind is, at first, concentrated on infioite space, then on infinite consciousness, then on infinite pothingness, and last of all attains the stage of complete trance or quasi unconsciousness which may be described as neither consciousness nor unconsciousness. This is the highest stage of Jhana-consciousness, but not the highest plane of consciousness. When the mind completely transcends even the plane of visible or formless (Arupa loka), it attains the stage of transcendental or super mundane consciousness (Lokottaracitta). As to the noetic quality, Jhana.consciousness is strongly characterised by it. It gives us insight into depths of truth upfathomed by the discursive intellect: it brings the mind into touch with higher and higher planes of existence. The chief intellectual result of the different stages of Jhana-consciousness is a supernormal clarity of inward vision or intuition untroubled by discursive intellection or hedonistic affection. The Jbana process gives the following powers : (1) Hyper-aesthesia of vision or clairvoyance (dibbacakkhu abhinna), e. g. the supernormal vision of the past and the future history of a particular individual. (ii) Hyper-aesthesia of hearing or clairaudierce (dibbasota)

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338 Epistemology of Jainas e. g. supernormal hearing of sounds and voices, both human and celestial, the distant become near. (iii) Thought reading and thought transference or telepathy (cetopariyasana or para citta vinnana). (iv) Hypermnesia (pubbenivasanusatti) or reminiscence of the past history of former lives. According to Jainism there are three planes of supernormal consciousness. The first plane known as avadhi-jnana is limited to the material objects. It resembles the Rupacitta of the Buddhist. It is limited to the cognition of rupins or material objects. The second plane is known as manahparyaya jnana, where one can know the other's mind. It is subtler than the previous plane. Moreover, the avadhijnana is not necessarily connected with the spiritual aspiration. It is found in the beings with right faith as well as wrong faith (mithyadrsti). The second and third planes are based on the spiritual development. The second is confined to the monks only who have eliminated the third stage of Mohadlya-karman (attachment) and revealed the natural virtues found in the sixth step of the spiritual ladder. But, the Jainas do not hold that the consciousness of the lower plane is eliminated in the higher plane. On the contrary the knowledge of lower plane gets further development in the higher stages. In the third plane one knows the arupin (immaterial) objects also. The Jainas do not admit any order of objective appearance, in this stage. All the objects material or immaterial, conscious or unconscious are apprehended simultaneously. The Jaina Theory of Direct knowledge According to Jainism transcendental perception is produced by the self alone; it is assisted by neither sense-organs nor the mind. It is a natural quality of the soul, lying inactive on

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339 Direct Knowledge account of the karmic obscurance. It gets its manifestation according to the partial or total removal of the corresponding obscurance. It is divided into the following three stages of (1) Avadhijnana, (2) Manah paryayajnana, (3) Kevalajnana.1 Umasvatiholds the above three types of knowledge as perception (pratyaksa-pramana) in contrast to Mati and Sruta which are paroksa on account of their dependence upon the senses and the mind or scriptures. Jinabhadra, Akalarka and the latter logicians have named them as paramarthika pratyaksa in contrast to the sense cognition named as samvyavaharikapratyaksa. The Sthavangas classifies the above three types into Vikala (incomplete) and sakala (complete). The first two are Vikala-pratyaksa while the last is sakala-pratyaksa. Avadbijnana (clairvoyance) Avadhijnana is the supernormal knowledge of material objects. 4 It is known as avadhi, because, its sphere of apprehension is limited.5 It resembles clairvoyance or clair-audience of the modern psychology. But, according to Jainism all cognitions related with Avadbi are produced direct by the soul. The senses do not play any part in them. There are three characteristics which distinguish avadbi from kevala i.e. omniscience. Firstly, it is limited in the scope of apprehension. It perceives the material objects only. Secondly, it is not constant. It follows attention (upayoga). The kevala is constant, and does not require any attention. Thirdly, its (avadhi) area of objectivity is wider in the lower regions thao in the upper ones. 1. Nandi Sutra 5. 2. Tattvartha I. 11-12 3. Stbanaagasutra 71 4. Tattvartha I. 28 5. Anuyoga Maladbart p. 1 6. Malayagiri on Nandi p. 65

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340 Epistemology of Jainas The types of Avadhi? Avadhi is divided into two types, based upon the factors of its cause. Thougb, the real cause of all avadhi, as in the case of other types of knowledge, is ksayopasama, without which no cognition is possible; yet, in certain beings it is natural; just like the capacity of flying in birds. Every bird, merely on account of its birth as a bird, is adept in flying. Similarly, every being born in the plane of gods or hellish beings, is equipped with avadhijnana. This avadhi is called bhava-pratyaya (caused by birth). This conception is based, perhaps, on the notion that abnormal knowledge is a necessary equipment for the excess of happiness as well as misery. Further, the inha. bitants of these kingdoms do not possess gross bodies. Their bodies are fluid (Vaikreyaka), Supernormal bodies and supernormal knowledge go together. The second type of avadhi is known as ksayopasama-pratyaya, caused by the partial removal of avadhijnanavarana. This occurs in the kingdoms of men as well as animals. According to Jainism an animal also can rise up to the fifth step of the spiritual progress and can observe the vows of a glhastha or sravaka. We have not come across any other system giving so much concession to a being of sub-human kingdom. In the Puranas some animals, associated with the gods incarnate or sages, are described as having supernatural powers. In the Indian legends also so.ne birds are characterized as possessing occult koowledge and describing hidden treasures or foretelling the future calamities or personal destiny. But, they are not given any philosophical importance. The capacity of bhavapratyaya avadhi is fixed according to the region where a being takes its birth. For instance, the being of hellish plane cannot perceive beyond six miles. Similarly, in the different stages of gods and the seven hells (rarakas) the potentiality of avadhi is fixed. But, this is not the case with the 1. Tattvartha I. 21-22; Nandi sutra 7-8 Stbananga Sutra 71; Visesavasyakabhasya G. 572.

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Direct Knowledge 341 other type. It varies according to ksayopasama, not only in the matter of area but in certain other respects also. Accordingly, the ksayopasama-pratyaya avadhi is divided into the following six sub-classes. The six varieties of Bhava pratyaya avadhi 2 (1) Ananugamika-the avadhi which sticks to the place of its birth; which does not follow the owner if he happens to leave that particular place where avadhi was produced. It is like the knowledge based on the local acquaintance and the study of environment. A person can reply the querries related with his own surroundings. If he happens to leave his hometown, he cannot answer any question. (2) Anugamika-tbe avadhi which follows the owner even if he leaves the place of its birth. It is compared with the colour of a cloth wbich accompanies the latter everywhere. We can compare it with the koowledge of philosophy or other higher sciences pot dependent of particular environment. (3) Hiyamana--the avadhi which covers large area at the time of its origin, but shrinks gradually up to the stage of negligibility or disappears totally. It is like the flame of fire spreading in dry fuel, but gradually extinguishing with the consumption of fuel. (4) Vardhamana--the avadhi which is negligible at the time of its birth but gradually increases upto the extent of whole universe. It is like the fire of match-stick thrown into a heap of dry fuel. (5) Anavasthita--the avadhi which is unsteady; increases and decreases without any system. It is like the waves of ocean undergoing various forms. (6) Avasthita- the avadhi which is steady. Having once appeared, it never disappears upto the attainment of Kevalajnana or the end of life. Sometimes, it follows the next life 1. Sthabanga Sutra 526; Nandi 8; Tattvartha I. 22

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342 Epistemology of Jainas also. It is like the sex-organ which does not change through out the life. Two varieties of Anugamikal The anugamika avadhi is again divided into two varieties of antagata (situated at the border) and madhyagata (situated in the middle). (1) Antagata is explained in three ways : According to the first explanation it means that which is situated at the fringes of soul. The avadhi is produced by a number of molecules (spardhaka) which appear like the particles of light spreading out of the window in the sun. In certain beings they are numerable, in others innumerable. These units consist of various powers and forms. Some of them appear on the border of the soul, Again a number of them occupies the front position, another operates on the back, and a third in the lower parts; while another number is associated with upper parts. Another number occupies the middle. Antagata-avadhi means the avadhi having only those upits as occupy the border and not other parts. According to another explanation it is body and not the soul that is concerned here. Antagata means, situated at the border of the physical body. A person sometimes can see in a particular direction only. Though the soul has no parts as far as ksayopasama is concerned, yet a person sees a particular direction only. This is due to the body where the spardhakas of avadhi operate. The ksayopasama appears in various ways. Its nature can be judged from the result oply. Avadhi for a particular direction postulates the particular ksayopasama. According to the third explanation antagata means the cognizer situated at the end of the area illuminated by the avadhi directed towards a particular direction. It means that when the cognizer stands on one end of his cognitive area and not in the middle of it, then it is antagata. (2) Madhyagata also is explained in the similar three ways, taking into consideration the three factors of the border of soul, body or area respectively. 1. Malayagiri on Nandi p. 82

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Direct Knowledge 343 The avadhi of gods, hellish beings and Tirtharkaras is madhyagata; that of animals is antagata and that of humanbeings is not fixed. It varies according to ksayopasama. The avadhi of gods and hellish-beings lasts for the whole life; that of Tirtharkaras upto the attainment of kevalajnana, that of others is uncertain. The area cognized by Avadhi? The knowledge of common people is confined to the capacity of senses and the mind. The area of avadhi is ascertained from the point where the soul begins to function independently. The minimum and the maximum area cognised by it can be fixed by placing the sense.cognition on one side and. omniscience on the other. Avadhi with the minimum capacity apprehends the area, as little as the dimension of a panaka? in the third moment of its birth.2 The maximum area cognised. by avadhi is the entire universe and innumerable units of the same size beyond it. According to Jaina cosmology the whole universe is measured by fourteen Rajjus, a hypothetical scale: of innumerable yojanas. It is believed that the five substances: of Dharma, Adharma, Jiva, pudgala and kala are found in this area of fourteen rajjus only. Beyond it there is only one substance, i. e. Akasa (space). Out of the six dravyas the pudgala is material while the other five are immaterial. Avadhi can know the material objects only. But, the question under discussion is the extension of space, where the object can be apprehended by the avadhi with maximum capacity. Jinabhadra holds that ayadhi can apprehend an area as much as is constituted by innumerable worlds of the dimension of fourteen. Rajjus. Though practically, avadhi does not know anything. beyond the universe, as there is no material to be apprehended, it is only the statement of capacity in respect of area. 1. Visesa vesyaka Bhas ya. 585-703; Malayagiri on Nandr, p. 97 2. Panaka is the shortest being of the vegetable kingdom which takes birth in the body of a huge fish stretching eight thousand miles. The simile indicates the very short area as. the object of minimum avadbi. 3. Vissesavasyakabhasya G. 598-607.

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344 Epistemology of Jainas The four measurements of Avadhi? There are four factors on which the capacity of avadhi is ascertained. They are time, space, substance (dravya) and mode (bhava or paryaya). By time and space we mean here, the material objects existing in a particular span of time or area. The two substances of space akasa) and time (kala) cannot be perceived by avadhi, as they are immaterial. These four factors excel one after the other in minuteness. It means that avadhi cognizing a certain number of space-units cannot cognize the same number of time units. It requires a higher potency to cognize them. It requires still higher potency for cognizing the same quantity of substance units, and still higher for modes. Space is minuter than time; substance is minuter than space and modes are minuter than substance. The shortest unit of time is samaya and that of space is pradesa. If the number of space-units covered by a finger-tip (angula) is compared with the same number of samayas, the latter would amount to innumerable utsarpints and avasarpinis. So, with the one unit of time, there are innumerable units of space. With one unit of space there are infinite (ananta) units of substance, and with one unit of substance there are numerable (sarkbyata) or innumerable (asankhyata) modes. With the extension in span of time the area must extend; but there is no certainty vice versa. With the extension of area the span of time may or may not increase. Similarly, with the extension in space and time the substances and modes must increase, but, there is no guarantee vice versa. In the same way the modes must increase with the increase in substance; but, it is not so, if the position is reversed. The proportional development of Avadhi in respect of Time and Space? We have mentioned above the minimum and maximum area 1. Visesavasyaka bhasya G. 611-614 2. Ibid. G. 617-626

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Direct Knowledge 345 cognized by the avadbi. All other units of space fall in the middle. As the area extends, time also gets its extension. But, this extension is not without a proportion. Jinabhadra gives the following account of it. According to Jainism samaya and pradesa are the shortest indivisible units of time and space-respectively. But they are so minute as beyond the common appreciation. They are not taken into account for general measurement. Argula (finger tip) and Avalika are the shortest units commonly applied to the measurement of space and time respectively. The avadhi cognizing an area measured by an innumerably small part of angula, would cognize the span of time measured by the correspondingly small part of avalika. The avadhi with an area of one angula will have one avalika in respect of time. This proportion continues as below: Space Time Hasta ( 1.5 feet) Muhurtanta (less than 48 minutes) Gavyuti (4 miles) Divasanta (less than 24 hours) Yojana ( 8 miles ) Divasapsthaktva (2 to 9 days) 25 Yojanas ( 200 miles) Paksankta (less than one fortnight) Bharata ksetra Masanta (less than one month) Jambudvipa More than one month Manusyaloka One year Rucakadvira 2 to 9 years; according to another view one thousand years. Sankhyeya dvipa-sagara Numerable years more than one (numerable islands and thousand. oceans) Asankhyeya dvipa-sagara Innumerable years. The increase in time is not certain with the increase in area; but, with the increase in time that in space is certain. The scope of Avadhi in respect of substance! We have known the area and the span of time cognized by 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 627-669

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346 Epistemology of Jainas avadhi in its three degrees of minimum, maximum and the middle. We have also known the proportional expansion of the two. Now, we come to the scope of avadhi in respect of substance. It has been already stated that matter (pudgala) is the only substance that can be cognized by avadbi. Its molecules are divided into the following eight classes known as varganas: 1. Audarika vargana - The molecules forming the parts of gross bodies (audarika sarira). 2. Vaikreyaka vargana -- Those forming the parts of fluid body (vaikriya sarfra) 3. Aharaka vargana - Those forming the parts of astral body (abarakasarira) 4. Taijasa varagana - Those forming the parts of firy body (Taijasa sarfra) 5. Bbasa vargana - Those constituting the parts of sound. 6. Anaprana vargana -- The molecules of respiration 7. Manovargana- The molecules of mind. 8. Karmanavargana- Molecules of karmans. All the atoms occupying single space-units constitute one vargana. All molecules occupying two space-units constitute the second vargana and so on ad infinitum. This constitutes an infinite number of varganas. The molecules upto a certain grade are not fit for constitution of a gross body. After than there comes a number of fit molecules. Again they are unfit. When the number of atoms is further increased, the molecules become fit for the fluid body. Further increment makes them fit for astral body. This process goes on upto the karmavargana. The number of atoms increases in the higher and higher varganas but the grossness decreases. Vaikreyaka vargana is finer than the audarikavargana. Abaraka vargana is still finer. Karmavargana is the finest. 1. Visesiavasyakabhasya G. 631.

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Direct Knowledge 347 The solidity of matter is divided into four degree of guru (heavy) laghu ( light ), gurulaghu (mixed ) and agurulaghu (neither of the two). The matter with the pature of falling down is known as guru as a stone. That with the nature of upward movements is laghu; as fire. That with side movement is gurulaghu as air; and that which is free from all these categories is agurulaghu. The above division is only a rough estimate. In reality there is no matter which is absolutely guru or absolutely laghu. Everything possesses both the natures more or less degree. Even a stone can move upwards or side-wards when thrown accordingly. In the real aspect there are only two groups; that of gurulaghu and agurulaghu. The first four of the above varganas are gurulagbu and the rest are agurulaghu. The scope of avadhi in respect of substance begins from the cognition of either tejovargana or bhasavargana. If it starts with tejovargana, it is more on the side of gurulaghu. Then, it moves towards the apprehension of grosser objects. When the gurulaghu group is fully apprehended it expands, if further purified, towards the apprehension of agurulaghu group. In case it is not further purified it stops there for some time and then disappears. The avadhi beginning with the cognition of bhasavargana is more on the side of agurulaghu. It progresses towards the cognition of finer varganas. Having apprehended all the four varganas of agurulagbu group, it covers the gurulaghu group also, if further purified. The following table will show how the avadhi develops in the case of substance in proportion to time and space. Substance Time 1. Taijasa sarfra Space Innumerable islands and oceans do do 2. Karmana sarira 3. Taijasa vargana 4. Bhasavargana 5. Manovargana Innumerable parts of palyopama do do do A numerable part. of palyopama. do A numerable part of the entire universe.

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Epistemology of Jainas 6. Karma vargana A considerable part of the universe The entire universe 348 7. do Karma-vargana consists of the finest molecules. It has been shown in the sixth category. The seventh category is therefore, left blank. But it does not mean that the proportion of substance does not increase in it. In the seventh category avadhi begins to see dhruva varganas, which are subtler than the karmavarganas. An avadhi jnanin in this stage, begins, to apprehend the atoms as well. Moreover, it generally turns into paramavadhi, which is necessarily followed by kevalajnana. A considerable portion of palyopama. A little less than palyopama. The object limit of Bhavapratyaya-Avadhi1 So far we were discussing the scope of avadhi attained as the result of extraordinary virtues, in the human and sub-human kingdoms. The capacity of this avadhi is not fixed. It fluctuates according to the ethical status or the past virtues. The scope of avadhi related to the kingdoms of hell and heaven, which is effected thereby the very birth is more or less fixed. In the kingdom of hell the minimum area is four miles and the maximum eight miles. In the kingdom of heaven minimum is two hundred miles and the maximum lokanadi, the central part of universe from top to the bottom with a lenght of 14 rajjus and breadth of one ra jju. Three stages of Desavadhi, Pramavadhi and Sarvavadhi2 We have mentioned above that the scope of avadhi is not fixed. It begins with an innumerable part of angula, and extends upto the entire universe. As far as its capacity is concerned it can cognize an area as big as innumerable universes. It extends up to the stage just preceding omniscience. Keeping in view the above consideration, Akalanka divides avadhi into three stages of Desavadhi (the avadhi related with a part), Parama 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 690-699 2. Tattvartha Rajavartika pp. 56-57.

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Direct Knowledge 349 vadhi (avadhi developed into the highest stage) and sarvavadhi (Avadbi related with the whole). Desavadhi has three grades, minimum (jaghanya), maximum (utkssta) and the middle (ajaghanyotkssta). The paramavadhi also has the above three grades. Sarvavadhi is without any gradation. Desavadhi in the minimum stage perceives an infinitely small part of an angula. In the maximum stage it cognizes the entire universe. All the middle stages are related with the third category. Paramava in the minimum degree perceives the entire universe with an additional unit of space, that in the maximum degree percei. ves the space measured by innumerable universes. The middle stages are related with the third category. Sarvavadhi perceives innumerable units of space in addition to those already covered by paramavadhi. Desavadhi may undergo all the eight stages of vardhamana, hiyamana, avasthita, apavasthita, apugamin, apratipatin and pratipatin. Out of the eight, we have already discussed the first six. Pratipatin means that which shines like a flash of lightening disappears at once, without any duration. Apratipatin is the opposite of pratipatin. The Paramavadbi does not meet the stages of blyamana and pratipatin. Sarvavadbi meets with the four stages of avasthita, anugamin, ananugamin and apratipatin. We have discussed above the gradations of desavadhi with middle capacity. All these stages. are found in the human kingdom. The maximum limit of avadhi in the case of sub-human kingdom is innumerable is. lands and oceans in respect of space, innumerable years of time and a certain degree of firy substance. Paramavadbi is possible in the human kingdom only. It is attained by a person with a high degree of self-discipline. Sarvavadhi cognizes all the objects that are within the scope of avadhi. It necessarily results into kevala. As a matter of fact Paramavadhi is a variety of Desavadhi only. The categories of Desavadhi and sarvavadbi cover the entire range of avadhi. The conception of sarvavadhi is not found in VBh. According to Svetam bara tradition Paramavadhi results into kevalajnana.

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350 Epistemology of Jainas Manahparyayajnana (Thought-reading) Manahparyaya means the modes of mind. Their knowledge is called manahparyayajnana.1 It is also called manahparyava (prakrta-Manapajjava) or manahparyaya. The Digambara literature uses the last name only. The terms paryava and paryaya express the sense of thought-reading, while paryaya means the modes of mind. The Object of Manahparyaya There are two opinions regarding the real nature of the object of manahparyaya. The Niryuktis and Tattvartha1 with its commentaries of Sarvarthasiddhi, Rajavartika and Slokavartika propose that the subject-matter of manahparyaya is the object conceived by the mind. Gommatasara adds that the object which is half-conceived or is to be conceived in future also is apprehended by Manahparyaya. According to Jinabhadra Manahparyaya apprehends the different modes of mindsubstance. The objects conceived are not cognized by it, but, later on inferred by Mati. Siddhasena Ganin in his commentary on the Tattvartha favours the latter view. The Nandr seems to support the former but it is interpreted in both ways by commentators.8 It may be recalled here that Jainism proposes two types of mind (1) Physical mind (dravyamana) and psychical mind (bhavamana). Psychical mind is a mode of soul in the state of deliberation. It is immaterial like the soul and so beyond the reach of imperfect knowledge. There are no two opinions in 1. Visesavasyabhasya G. 810 2. Tattvartha 1/9- Digambara tradition 3. Avasyaka Niryukti G. 76 4. Tattvartha Sutra I. 23 5. Gommatasara G. 438 6, Visesavasyakabhasya G. 841 7. Nandi Sutra 78 8. See Curni and tika on the above

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Direct Knowledge 451 this matter. The physical mind is the material composition made of molecules known as Manovargana. The physical mind changes and takes various forms according to thought-impressions. Every idea puts some mark on it. Sometimes, when the feeling is intense, the impression is so deep that it is visible on the outer surface also. The face of an angry person is reddened. His body trembles. When the feeling is not so intense, or the thought is merely of the nature of knowledge, it is not externally visible. But, it cannot escape from the physical mind; which catches the impression of every idea and feeling, however, feeble it may be. On the other side the physical miod is affected by the gross physical body also. Heavy stomach, hunger, thirst, holding up the calls of nature produce different effects on the physical mind, which further puts its impressions on the psychical mind. So, the physical mind is passive as well as active. The main objection against the view that Manahparyaya perceives the objects conceived by the mind is that the objects under conception are material as well as immaterial. The immaterial objects are beyond the scope of imperfect perception. On this ground Jinabhadra holds that Manahparyaya does not perceive the objects conceived; but, the different modes of physical mind. In the Svetambara literature none possesses the above view before Jinabhadra. The Nandi 1 states, 'Manogae bhave janai'. Its simple translation is, "It knows the objects existing in the mind." But the commentators like Jinadasa Gaoin and Malayagiri, following the footsteps of Jinabhadra, interpret, 'maaogae bhava' as the modes of mind-substance. In the Digambara tradition none has adopted this view. Even the logicians like Akalanka and Vidyananda do not favour it. The Yogasutra of Patanjali supports the view of Jinabhadra, 1. Nandi Sutra 18 with its curnl and Tika. 2. Yogasutra III. 19

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352 Epistemology of Jainas but, on a different ground. Patanjali describes the psychical powers produced by the practice of yoga. Through the concentration on different objects, he says, one can have supersensuous perception of that very object. In the same context he states that by concentration on the mind of other person one is able to know his mind. The object conceived by that mind is not perceived, because, that is not the object of concentration. Majjhimanikaya of Suttapitaka describes certain rules of conduct to be observed by a bhikkhu if he desires some accomplishments, natural as well as supernatural. Amongst the supernatural powers the cognition of all varieties of mind also is referred. It also does not indicate the objects conceived by the mind as the subject-matter of that cognition. Critical Examination of the views represented by Akalanka and Jinabhadra We can analyse the above problem under the following heads :-- 1. The meaning of the term. 2. The purpose or distinguishing characteristics. 3. The cognition of physical mind. 4. The cognition of the object conceived. (1) The term 'mapahparyaya' means the modes of mind. But, the mind can be physical as well as psychical. So the term itself does not indicate sufficiently which aspect is meant for. The terms of manahparyaya and manahparyava also can be interpreted in both ways. (2) The main purpose of manah-paryaya jnana is, roughly speaking thought-reading. It can not mean merely the cognition of changes produced in the mindsubstance; but, that of the ideas contained in it. Akalanka maintains that the function of manahparayaya is not completed unless it knows the ideas also. Jinabhadra2 confines it to the cognition of mind substance only. The cognition of ideas, he says, is the result of subsequent inference. 1. Tattvartha Rajavartika I. 23 2. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 814

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Direct Knowledge 353 (3) As far as the cognition of physical mind is concerned, there is no difference between the two exponents. Both of them hold that physical mind is perceived by manahparyaya. It may be mentioned here that according to Mababandha, 1 the physical mind is apprehended by the mind (Mana) of the cognizer. Akalanka2 interprets 'mana' as soul while Dhayala interprets it as Matijnana. But, the contention of Dhavalas is not right; as according to this view, Manahparyaya loses the credit of being a direct (pratyaksa) cognition. If it depends upon Mati it must be helped by the senses or mind; and thus, must fall into the category of Indirect cognitions (paroksa). Though, an attempt is made to explain away this difficulty and it is said that Mati, in the present case, is not a producing cause; but, only a helper pointing out the location of the object of Manahparyaya, just as the cognition of cloud in perceiving the moon. But, when Manahparyaya cannot perceive the contents of mind directly, it will have to depend upon the cognition of mind as a producing cause; as it is in the case of inference. (4) It is about the cognition of objects conceived that there are two opinions. Jipabbadra holds that it is an inference abd beyond the scope of manahparyaya. Akalarika holds that it is manahparyaya, Now the question remains whether manahparyaya, according to Akalanka, cognizes the conceived objects directly or indirectly. If it perceives directly it would perceive the immaterial objects also, which is an impossibility. Akalanka says that the cognition of the conceived objects is not direct. They are congized through the perception of the physical mind. Thus, Akalarka also has accepted in a way the 1. Mababandha p. 64 2. Tattvartha Rajavartika p. 58 3. Dhavala p. 1258 4. See-Studies in Jaina Philosophy pp. 66 68 Visesavasyakabhasya G. 814-821 Tattvartharajavartika p. 58 (1-23-6-7)

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354 Epistemology of Jainas inferribility of the conceived objects; but he does not recognize this as a separate cognition. It can be objected that if the cognition of conceived objects is indirect, it cannot be manahparyaya, as the latter is a direct cognition (pratyaksa). Akalanka replies that indirectness and directness do not depend upon the direct or indirect apprehension of the object. They depend upon the external assistance. If the soul is assisted by the senses or mind the resulting cognition is indirect; otherwise, it is direct. In cognition of the conceived objects the soul is not assisted by any of the senses. It is, therefore, direct. Even if a thing is known through another one, the cognition is direct, provided it does not depend upon the external factor as its cause. One may say that the physical mind also is an external factor. If knowledge of the conceived objects is derived through it, the latter is not direct. It must be matijnana. Akalanka replies, where the mind is a producing cause the resulting cognition is mati. In the present case the mind is not a producing cause but only an auxiliary. When we see the moon in clouds, the clouds are not considered as producers of the cognition of the moon. They are simply location. Similarly, the mind substance of a person in which the conceived ideas are known, is not a producing cause, it is simply a location of the object, ie, the conceived ideas. The inference which is a variety of mati, depends upon the senses or mind as its producing cause. In the present case no external help is taken by the cognizer. Thus, the cognition of the conceived ideas though indirect on the objective side, is not indirect (paroksa) on the causal side, which is the main consideration in deciding the nature of pratyaksa or paroksa. In logical period the clarity of appearance becomes the criterion of perception. If manahparyaya is a perception it must have that clarity, which is found in the direct observations only. The cognition of the conceived objects cannot come into that category. In that case we shall have to confine the sphere

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Direct Knowledge 355 of Manahparyaya to the mind-substance only. Perhaps, Jinabhadra was influenced by the logical school in this regard. But, Akalarka is very careful. We do not find any confusion bet. ween Akalanka as a logician and Akalanka as an exponent of the canonical theories. Thus, we can see that the real difference between the two Acaryas is not about the subject matter but about the inclusion of the cognition of the conceived objects into manahparyaya. The above discussion leads to another question of fundamental importance, we have to decide whether Manahparyaya, by natu re, is a direct cognition or indirect one. By direct we do not mean here the subjective directness or independence from assistance of the senses, but, the objective presentation or the direct apprehension. If it is a direct cognition we must confine its sphere of objectivity to the physical mind only. Conceived ideas on no account, can be presented directly. If it is indirect we must admit the conceived ideas as its object. The question of the object being a material substance does not arise in this case. We can know the soul and other immaterial substances through inference, i. e. indirectly. According to the Jaina theory of knowledge a direct cognition is preceded by the corresponding darsana. An indistinct flash of general type is essential before plunging deep into particularity. Amongst the five types of cognition sruta and manahparyaya have no corresponding darsanas. The sruta is definitely indirect. About Manahparyaya Jinabhadra states that it has no corresponding darsana; because, owing to its intensity of force produced by the particular ksayopasama, it dives direct into particularity and does not pass through the stage of generality, as other cognitions do. But, this explanation is not convincing. Manahparyaya is not more forceful than kevala. When kevala also has a corresponding darsana, there is no reason why Manahparyaya should not pass through that stage. We can admit the possibility of swiftness as in the case of well-acqua. inted objects. But, it is not reasonable to leave that stage

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356 Epistemology of Jainas altogether. The absence of corresponding darsana leads us to the idea that Manahparyaya is an indirect cognition. There is no other reason which can be ascribed to this factor. We think that Manahparyaya is not a perceptual but conceptual. Its real function is the reading of thoughts and not the perception of mind-substance. It is immaterial whether it passes through the latter stage but that is not its real purpose. This indirectness, on the part of Manahparyaya does not interfere with in its position as pratyaksa; because, the basis of the conception of pratyaksa and paroksa, as we have already stated, is not objective directness but the subjective independence from the senses and other external help. One more point that requires clarity in this connection is, how the physical mind is perceived. It is beyond the reach of sepses, and therefore, Mati and Sruta are out of the question, Avadhi can know it; but, it does not necessarily, precede Mapahparyaya. The person having Manahparyaya may or may not possess it. So, Manahparyaya is the only cognition that is left. If its function is confined to the conceived objects there is no cognition to perceive the mind-substance. The alternative that it can be left upperceived also is unthinkable, because, without the perception of the physical mind the conceived ideas cannot be cognized. Akalanka explains away this difficulty by accepting the mind-substance also as the object of Manahparyaya in its first stage, the subsequent stage being the cognition of conceived objects. One is direct, while the other is indirect. but both constitute one cognition. The modern Naiyayika may object that directness and indirectoess cannot go together. But, this contention appeals no more to reason when the particular cases of a cognition are examined. In the visual perception direct cognition finishes with the apprehension of a particular shape and particular colour. It cannot formulate the ideas of jar, cloth etc. which is the result of subsequent deliberation, and therefore, indirect. But, we are accustomed to mix up both the elements and the

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357 Direct Knowledge entire conceptual cognition is designed as perception. The same factor can be applied in the case of manahparyaya also. As real mati is judgement (avaya) which is the third stage, and, the stages of avagraha and Tha are also included into mati on account of their being a cause to avaya. According to Mahabandha? and Dhavalal Manahparyaya is a cognition of another's desire (samjna), Memory (smrti), Intellect (mati), Deliberation (cinta), Life (JIvita), Death (marana), Gain (Labha), Loss (Alabha), Pleasure (Sukha), Pain (Duhkha) the destruction of city (Nagaravinasa), the destruction of a district (Desavidasa), the destruction of a province (Janapadavipaka) etc. This account makes the distinction between avadhi and manahparyaya insignificant. The cause of Manahparyaya It has been stated before that avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala are supernatural powers attained through the spiritual progress. But, avadhi is supernatural as well as natural. In the case of human and sub-human beings it is super-natural but in the case of heavenly and hellish beings it is natural. Manahparyaya is always supernatural. It is enumerated in the eight powers (labdhis) attained through yoga. The Yogasutrastates that the knowledge of other's minds is obtained through concentration on them. The Majjhimanikayat proposes that if a bhikkhu desires to know other's mind, he should completely observe the rules of conduct (srla), restraint from sensual pleasures (samana), concentration (dhyana) and cognizance (vipasyana) and should stay in deserted houses. These practices are not particular for attaining the power of thought-reading only but, general conditions for all sorts of supernatural powers. 1. Mahabandha p. 64 2. Dhavala p. 1258 3. Yogasutra III. 19 4. Majjhina Nikaya

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358 Epistemology of Jainas Pujyapadal accounts manahparyaya to four factors : (1) Ksayopasama of Viryantaraya, (2) Ksayopasama of manahparyayajnanavarana, (3) Angopanga Nama-Karman and (4) the contact with other's minds, (1) Antaraya-karman puts obstacles in the progress of soul towards mundane as well as spiritual attainments. The first four types of it are related with the obstruction of worldly gains. The last is viryantaraya. It suppresses the natural as well as super-natural powers of the soul. The power of knowledge also is not free from its effect. The soul cannot attain a particular knowledge ucless Viryantaraya is subsided or otherwise removed. This is why, its ksayopasama is a common cause in every type of cognition. The second cause is the ksayopasama of the corresponding avarana, It does not require any explanation. The third factor is Angopanganamakarman. It should be noticed that the physical mind plays an important role in producing Manahparyaya. Its completion on the subjective as well as the objective side is the first condition for the cognition of thoughts. The completion of the physical mind is the function of Namakarman. The Angopanganamakarman is it ssubclass particularly related with the completion of body and its parts. The fourth factor is the physical mind. According to Jinabhadra it is the very object of manahparyaya. According to Pujyapada it is a helping cause the object being the conceived ideas. Manahpar! Iya and Avadbi? It may be recalled here that Avadhi has all the material objects as its subject matter. The physical mind also is included in its scope. Thus, as far as the subject matter is concerned, Manahparyaya has nothing new. On this basis Siddhasena, proposes the identity between Manahparyaya and Avadhi. But, it goes against the traditional division. As a matter of 1. Saryarthasiddhi Sutra I. 23 2. Tattvartha I. 16, Visesavasyakabhasya G.812-814

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Direct Knowledge 359 fact Siddhasena?, being a logician gives prominence to the objective side. His two-fold division of Pramana follows the Buddhist tradition, which is based on the two kinds of objects, The other factors are not taken into consideration. In the Agamic tradition, as bas been stated before, objective consideration is not so important as the subjective. If we take into consideration the subject Avadhi and Mapahparyaya differ from each other. Avadhi can occur in all the four kingdoms of heaven, hell, human and subbuman. Manahparyaya is possible in the kingdom of men only. Among men also it is confined to samyagdsstis only, while both samyagdsstis as well as mithyadsstis can possess avadhi. Manahparyaya occurs in ascetics with a high quality of character only. The Tattvartha2 relates the following four factors that distinguish Mapahparyaya from Avadhi : (1) Visuddhi (purity) - Manahparyaya is purer than Avadhi. Avadbi also can perceive the mind-substances; but, it is not so clear as Manahparyaya. Avadhi perceives them only in a general way. Manahparyaya is specially meant for them. Naturally the latter is more precise and deep. For instance, a person knowing many things in a general way is not so deep in a particular subject as its specialist is. (2) Ksetra (area) - Avadhi begins from an innumerably small part of a finger and goes up to the whole universe or more. Manahparyaya is limited to the human habitation (Manusaksetra) only i. e. (two and a half islands). (3) Visaya (object) -Avadhi has all the material objects with an amount of their modes, as its object. The object of Manahparyaya is only an infiniteth part of matter (pudgala). (4) Svamin (Owner)- Avadhi occurs in all the four kingdoms without any dependence on spiritual virtues. Manahpar1. Niscayadvatrimsika 2. Tattyarthasutra 1.16

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360 Direct Knowledge yaya is possible in ascetics with a high standard of character only. Amongst the fourteen stages of the spiritual development it is found only in seven stages i.e. from sixth to twelveth. In those stages also there are two kinds of aspirants. Some aspirants, advance in their spiritual journey by destroying the obstructing karmans. Their path is known as ksapakasreni; others do not destroy the obstructing karmans, but bring them to the state of subsidence. This path is known as Upasamasreni. The aspirant with Upasamasreni cannot go beyond the eleventh stage. His progress is stopped at that stage when the subsided karmic matter is disturbed and comes up on the surface. Consequently, the aspirant falls down. Manahparyaya is not possible in the condition of retrogression. It occurs in the ascending state only. Though the higher grade of Avadhi also requires a certain degree of character; yet, avadhi as general is not so dependent. The Nandi and Manahparyaya darsana We have already stated that Manahparyaya has no corresponding darsana. But, the Nandi attributes to it both the functions of knowing (janai) as well as perceiving (pasai). It seems a contradiction to the above proposal. This difficulty is explained several ways:-According to the first explanation the two functions are related not with manahparyaya, but, the person having it. The Nandi means, only that the cognizer apprehends first, the mind-substance and then thinks over it. The second function is related with the mind and can be placed in the second type of darsana, i. e. acaksurdarsana. In the case of Srutajnana also, it is beld, that the cognizer conceives certain ideas through sruta-jnana and then deliberates on them. This deliberation is acaksurdarsana. The only possible objection to this view, is that acaksur. darsana is classed as mediate (paroksa) cognition. It is possible in the case of distant objects only; which are beyond perception and known through scriptures, as the golden mountain eto. 1. Naodi Sutra 18 with its curni and Tika

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Indirect Knowledge But, where the object is directly cognized, as in the case of manahparyaya, no such darsana is possible. But, this objection has no ground, as there is nothing which can prevent the possibility of acaksurdarsana in case of the objects directly perceived. One can think over a jar which is directly perceived, and have a mental perception. The Jain as do not believe in the Buddhist epistemological division of objects, holding certain objects as merely perceptible while others as inferrible. In the logical period they have supported the theory of Pramanasamplava (convergence of the sources of knowledge). Even the existence of perceived fire on the hill-top they say, can be further examined through inference. One more point of minor significance, that can be raised in this respect is, whether the cognition of a person with manahparyaya is direct or indirect. The position of the Jainas in this respect is very clear. When the object is cognized by manahparyaya it is direct or pratyaksa and when it is cognized through acaksurdarsana it is indirect or paroksa. 361 According to another opinion a person with manahparyaya possesses avadhi also. So, the function of knowing (janai) and perceiving (pasai) as related in the Nandi, are performed by Manahparyaya and avadhi respectively. This view is inconsistent with the Bhagavati, which holds that a person with Manahparyaya may or may not possess avadhi. But, the above difficulty can be explained if the statement of the Bhagavati is given a bit more consideration. The Bhagavati is related with jnana only. It does not say anything about darsana. It does not propose that the coexistence of avadhidarsana and Manahparyayajnana also is merely a probability. Moreover, it can be held that in the stage of darsana there is no difference between avadhi and manahparyaya. In that stage they have a cognition of general type, which develops into avadhi in one case and manahparyaya in the other. That stage is termed as avadhi in a general way; on account of its being an all-inclusiveness. We cannot say that avadhi-darsana

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Epistemology of Jainas precedes Avadhijnana only, and not manahparyaya-jnana. But it has no claim to be called as manahparyayadarsana; because that distinction comes in the later stage. 362 According to Akalanka1 manahparyaya has three stages(1) Darsana, (2) Cognition of the mind-substance and (3) cognition of the conceived objects. In the case of Sruta also we have three stages, viz. (i) Darsana, (ii) Matijnana and (3) Srutajnana. Both Sruta and Manahparyaya rely on the darsana occurring in the first stage. Although they are mediated by Mati and avadhi respectively, yet, their field begins with the first stage. According to Jinabhadra there are only two stages. According to another explanation the two functions of 'Janai' and 'Pasai' are related with the person who possesses both avadhi as well as Manahparyaya. Jinabhadra2 says that refer to darsana, but to a as 'pasyatta'. 'Pasai' in the present case does not clear and distinct knowledge known Two Types of Manahparyaya Manahparyaya is divided into two types of Rjumati and Vipulamati. The difference between the two is not that of quality but that of degree. Vipulamati apprehends3 the objects more minutely than Rjumati. The Tattvartha mentions two points to express the difference between the two. Firstly, Vipulamati is purer than Rjumati. Secondly, it is infallible while the latter is subject to fall or disappearance. We have mentioned before the fourteen ethical steps which a soul aspires for attaining liberation. At the end of the sevneth step the aspirant adopts either of the two paths. In the path of Upasamasrent the karmic matter is not destroyed 1. Tattvarthavartika G. 162-170 2. Visesa vasyakabhasya G. 814-820 3. Tattvartha I. 24-25

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Indirect Knowledge 3631 but remains subsided, ready to rise at any disturbance. The aspirant adopting this path does not go beyond the eleventh step; where be falls down and reverts to a lower position. He may try again and reach the goal by adopting the other path; but as long as he is in Upasamasrent the fall is inevitable. The other path is known as Ksapakasreni. The aspirant adopting this path does not fall and rises gradually till the attainment of kaivalya. In this path the karmic matter does not stay in reserve. It is totally destroyed; leaving no chance of rising again.1 Rjumati, generally, occurs in the aspirant with Upasamasreni. Owing to the existence of karmic matter in reserve his knowledge is not so pure as it is in the case of ksapakasreni. Secondly, it is subject to disappearance when the aspirant falls down. Vipulamati is attained by the aspirant with ksapakasreni; who destroys the obscuring karmic matter totally. Naturally, his cognition is purer and infallible. Jipabhadra2 holds that Rjumati and Vipulamati differ from cach other in respect of subject-matter also. Rjumati apprehends an object in its simple form. Vipulamati cognizes. the same with more particulars. For instance, in apprehension of a mind engaged in the conception of jar, Rjumati will grasp only the gross changes in the mind-substance, enabling the kpower to infer the jar in a general way; while Vipulamati will apprehend the minute changes also; whereby the cognizer can infer also the particulars. He can make out the colour, size, stuff and other particulars of the object under conception. Siddhasena Ganin3 also supports the above view. The same thing, he says, which is grasped by Rjumati in a general way, is apprehended by Vipulamati with more particulars. 1. Tattvartha Rajavartika See I. 25 2. Visesavasyaka bhasya G. 3. Tattvarthabhasya Tika, Sutra I. 25, p. 101-22

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364 Epistemology of Jainas Mahabandha1 explains the difference in another way. It holds that Rjumati cognizes the objects which have come into mind distinctly. The objects that are half-conceived or to be conceived in future are not apprehended by it. While Vipulamati apprehends all of them. According to Akalanka1 Rju means formed (nirvartita) by the knowledge of the object lying in others' mind or simple. He incorporates the view of Mahabandha by the first condition and that of Niryukti by the second. Rjumati is fomed by the cognition of the object lying in others mind. This object has three types of mind, speech or physical activity. A person conceives an object distinctly in his mind, utters a speech in clear tone or moves his body with some specific purpose; but forgets it in the course of time. He cannot recall them to his mind. Rjumati knows those objects or acts and can say that such and such object was conceived, spoken or expressed in some physical act. Thus Rjumati apprehends the desire, memory, anxiety about life or death, pleasure, pain etc. existing in others mind. But, the contents must be clearly formed in the mind, speech or body, as the case may be. Vipulamati does not wait for clear formation of the concepts. It is so sharp that it apprehends the concepts which are not fully formed or are yet to be formed. Moreover, it apprehends them more minutely. It should be observed here that the text of Mababandha is read as "Vattamananam" (Sk. vyaktamanasam) as well as 'Vattamananam' (Sk. vartamananam). Akalanka follows the first reading and interprets it as the persons who have formed the idea clearly. The second reading means the object which is already present in the mind. According to this interpretation Rjumati does not apprehend the objects which have slipped from memory or would be coming to mind in future. In the terms of modern psychology we can say that Rjumati apprehends the conscious mind only. Vipulamat is competent to apprehend the subconscious and unconscious minds also. 1. Tattvartha Rajavartika p. 58

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Indirect Knowledge 365 Kevalajnana (Omniscience) The fifth type of cognition is known as kevalajnana. It is attained when the obscuring karmic veil is totally removed. It knows all the objects in their entirety with all qualities and modes. It is the stage of omniscience, the perfect knowledge. The Meaning of Kerala In Sankhya-system the term kevala is applied to Purusa dissociated from Praksti. Kaivalya is the state of liberation free from the bondage of world; where all the three types of pain are totally removed. Where the three gunas of praksti revert to their original source, i. e. praksti and leave purusa in its purity. According to the yoga-system kaivalya means the state of equilibrium where the mind is free from wandering. The Vedanta holds Kaivalya as unity with Absolute Brahman. According to the above-mentioned systems kaivalya has nothing to do with omoiscience; which is an independent supernatural power. They do not regard omniscience as an essential pre-requisite of salvation, An aspirant may or may not reach the stage of omniscience, before attaining the final goal. In the Buddhist literatures the term kevala has been used in two senses. It means oneness as well as perfectness. Kevalin is described as one who is perfect or fully accomplished. Suttanipata Atthakatha relates kevalins as having all the virtues (savvaguna), fully accomplished (paripunna ) all-powerful (savvayoga) and free from worldly dispositions (visamyutta). It is an epithet of Arhat or Buddha often accompanied by Mahesi. But, in Buddhist literature also the term 'kevalin" does not express a man with knowledge of all the objects, past, present and the future. 1. Saokhyakarika 17 2. Yogasutra IV. 34 3. Samyuttanikaya A. 153

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366 Epistemology of Jainas In the Jaina literature the term kevala, whether single or with 'jnana' is applied to perfect knowledge. The last type of knowledge is called kevala; firstly, because, it exists alone. It does not coexist with any other type of cognition. Secondly, according to Yasovijaya1 the first four types of cognition are produced by the corresponding ksayopasama as well as the rise of kevalajna navarana. The soul unassisted by the karmic matter is not competent to produce them. But, the kevala is produced by the soul alone.2 We may assign this reason also to its designation as kevala. If the kevala is taken in the second sense, i.e. perfect, then kevalajnana means perfect knowledge. Definition means Avasyakaniryukti defines kevala as the of knowing all substances with their qualities modes and states. It is infinite, eternal, imperishable and without gradation. The Bhasya elaborates the above view as follows:-All substances undergo the modes (paryayas) of origination and destruction etc. These modes can be classified into three types; viz. (1) produced by the external factors, (2) natural and (3) mixed i.e. produced pratially by the external cause and partially natural. The nature of all these modes is known by kevalajnana. It dawns when the obscuring matter is totally destroyed. It is infinite, because it has infinite modes as its object. It is eternal, because it functions incessantly. The other types of cognition do not illumine the objects constantly. They do so, only when it is desired and the attention is paid. In the case of kevala the attention is permanent. It is not recurrent. All the objects are always under-cognition. Further, kevala is imperishable. Once appeared it never vanishes. It has one degree only. There is no gradation in it; because, it appears when the soul is completely purified. It is the state of perfection. Degrees are possible in imperfect state only. 1. Visesavasyakab Bhasya G. 823 2. Ibid.

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Direct Knowledge 367 The Problem of Omniscience It has been stated above that kevalajnana is infinite. It knows all the objects with their states and modes entirely. This brings us to the question of omniscience. Indian philosophers hold different opinions regarding it. The system of Carvaka totally denies the existence of extraordinary cognition. It does not believe in any supersen. sual or spiritual knowledge, nothing to say of omniscience. The Sutrakstanga mentions another system known as Ajnanavadin; which resembles modern scientist. It does believe in supernormal cognition; but asserts that its scope is limited. There is no cognition with unlimited area. One cannot know all the objects of past, present and the future. The capacity of knowledge is naturally limited. The Mimansa system is very particular about the supreme authority of the Veda. In accepting the existence of omniscience also it it cautious that the Vedic authority is not violated. According to Sabara, only through the Veda can know objects that are past, present, future, minute, obstructed or distant. No sense-organs can approach them. Kumarila says, "We do not aim at the refutation of omniscience. We only mean, that it is not possible without the knowledge of the Veda. If the existence of an omniscient is proposed on the basis of all the six sources of knowledge, there can be no objection. But, when it is held as effected by one source only it is not probable. It is like the apprehension of all the properties of smell, taste etc. by the organ of sight." We can sum up the Mimamsa conception as follows : 1. As far as the meaning of omniscience is concerned the Mimamsa does not differ from the Jaina. Both of them agree that omniscience (sarvajnatva) means the cognition of entire universe. 1. Sabarabhasya Su 1.1.2. 2. slokavartika. 1. 110-12.

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368 Epistemology of Jainas 2. According to the Jaina an omniscient knows all the objects simultaneously in the same cognition. The Mimamsa holds that certain things like virtue (dharma), vice (adharma). etc. are the exclusive field of the Vedas. They cannot be known by any other source. Regarding other things also the Mimamsa holds that all the objects cannot be known through the same source of knowledge. 3. According to Jainism the knowledge of an ompiscient is perceptual and purely spiritual. The Mimamsa holds that it is indirect based on the authority of the Veda. The Omoiscient of the Mimamsa, is just like the srutakevalin of Jainas. The Buddhist, like Jaina, believes in the direct knowledge of Dharma etc. for which the Mimamsa depended solely upon the Veda. It is not irrelevant if we state here briefly the underlying idea of the two notions of omniscience as direct knowledge and that as indirect koowledge. The exponents of these views intended to establish the authority of their respective canons. The Mimamsa held them eternal, not composed by any body, the systems of Buddhism and Jainism held them as composed by an omniscient and faultless person. Naturally, the Mimam saka could not rely on any person, human or superbuman for the validity of the Veda. He attributed the validity to the Vedic text itself and gave it with supreme authority. The Buddhist and Jainas held their scriptures as composed by competent persons. There are two conditions of this competency. The person should have complete knowledge and he should be faultless. The Buddhist meant by complete knowledge the knowledge of virtues and vices, or the things that are desirable or undesirable. Dharmak Irti says that it does not matter whether a person does or does not apprehend all the objects. What matters is that be should know the relevent things. No purpose is served by knowing the number of insects. The Jainas on the other hand contend that it is difficult to make a distinction between relevent and irrelevent thing. All the objects of world are so interconnected that the knowledge

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Direct Knowledge 369 of one is incomplete without knowing all. Nothing can be known completely until and unless all things are known. So, Sarvajna, according to Jainism, means one who knows all the things completely. According to the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems there are two types of omniscience. The omniscience of God is eternal. It is neither produced nor destroyed. The omniscience of yogin is a kind of supernatural power obtained through yogic prac. tices. But, unlike the Jaina, this power is not the manifestation of a natural property of the soul, but an acquired embelishment; which vanishes after a certain period. According to Jainism the omniscience is an essential prerequisite of liberation. No soul cao aspire to the state of salvation without obtaining it. But this is not the case with the Nyaya-Vaisesik systems. According to them the way to liberation is independent of omniscience. All the yogins do not necessarily obtain that power before attaining liberation. In the state of liberation also, they hold, cognition is totally absent, On the other band the Jairas propose that all the liberated souls are omniscient. They are always with perfect knowledge. According to the Sankhya, Yoga and Vedanta systems also Kaivalya and Sarvajnatva are two different things. Kaivalya as has been stated above is the state of liberation; where the cog. nition of worldly things does not remain. Sarvajnatva is a lower stage where the soul and matter are not absolutely separated from each other. According to the Sankhya knowledge is a function of Buddhi, which is an evolute of prakrti. The ques. tion of omniscience, therefore, has no concern with purusa. When the Buddhi obtains purity by removing the dirt of tamas and rajas, and the property of pure sattva is fully manifested, the aspirant attains the highest state of Vasikarasamjna, the state of complete dispassionateness or perfect self-control; only then the omniscience is obtained. Like, Nyaya-Vaisesik the Sankhya also holds this power as perishable and unessential for liberation. The state of Vasikarasamjna can be compared with the state of Vitaraga as held by the Jainas,

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370 Epistemology of Jainas The Sarkhya does not believe in the existence of God. But, the yoga system accepts his existence. Though God in the yoga system also is not a creator as it is in the Nyaya; yet, he possesses all the virtues that are the ideal of an aspirant. He is held as omniscient also. But, it is to be decided whether the omniscience ascribed to God is a quality of buddhi or that extraordinary Purusa (Purusavieesa) himself. In the latter case it cannot be conceptual. According to the Vedanta Avidya contains two powers; i e. the power of obscurance (Avaranasakti) and the power of projection (Viksepasakti). Avidya with the second power is recognised as maya which is the condition of God. The Absolute Brahman is neither omniscient nor ignorant. It is pure intelligence. The second stage is that of God. He is Brahman conditioned by Maya. He is omniscient, as Maya in his case, is without the power of obscurance. Thus, it will be seer, that according to the Vedanta also omniscience is not a state of the pure soul. Another type of omniscience, held by the Vedanta is related with yogins. It is perishable and not essential to liberation. Two types of omoiscience We can see from the above discussion that according to Nyaya and Vedanta there are two types of omniscience. The first type is related with God while the second type is found in the yogin. The first is eternal while the second is the result of yogic practices. One is natural while the other is acquired. One is permanent while the other perishable. The omniscience of God, more or less, is an ethical hypothesis. Those, who have admitted God as creator and controller of the universe, could not assign him that function, without the attribute of omniscience. No control is possible without knowing the subjects under control. The second necessity of admitting God as omniscient arose from the desire to attribute validity to the Vedas on the basis of their being created by God. Those who did not believe in the existence of God had to

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Direct Knowledge 371 propose the omniscience of a human being in order to establish the authority of their scriptures. The reliability of a statement can be proved on two tests; either its contents are proved by logic or its author has perfect knowledge of the subject concerned and is free from any vice which may induce him to speak a lie. The first test was rather hard. It could not be applied to many objects which could be neither proved nor disproved on the basis of logic. Ethical problems also were beyond its scope. Consequently, the second test was adopted. Every system tried to establish the omniscience of their first preacher to whom the authority of their scriptures goes. The Mimamsa system established the validity of the Veda not on the basis of its being created by an omniscient being but on the basis of its being an eternal knowledge. The Arguments for omaiscience The existence of omniscience is proved on the following grounds : (1) Whatever has gradation must have two limits; as it is in the case of dimension. The lower limit of dimension is found in the atom while the upper in space (akasa). Similarly, knowledge also is a graded phenomenon. Some people possess it more than the other. The lower limit of knowledge is accepted in the kingdom of migoda. It develops gradually in the plane of other animals having one, two, three, four or all the five senses. With the possession of mind it gets further development. The upper limit is fixed when everything is known. There is no reason in fixing it any where in the middle, arbitrarily. Perfect knowledge means, where nothing is left to be known. The above argument was originally proposed by Yogabbasya and adopted with slight adjustments by nearly all the systems in support of their own conception." 1. Yogabhasya 1.25; Tativa Vai 1.25; Tattvasamgraha Panjika K. 3160

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372 Epistemology of Jainas The Mimamsaka argues that the existence of gradation does not necessarily prove a particular stage. The spau of gradation may be sborter or longer according to the capacity of the agent or other circumstances. The upper limit of knowledge can be fixed according to the maximum capacity of the sense-organs. A human being can perceive an object from a distance of one furlong or so; and an eagle can do so from two or three miles. But, this does not mean that one can see the whole universe, sitting at one place. After all the capacity of the senses is limited. Yasovijayal replies that the argument stated above holds good in the case of sepse-perception only. But, ihe sphere of knowledge is far wider than sepse-perception. If the existence of yogic perception is accepted, we shall have to go beyond the senses. In that case the only limit that can be fixed is, where nothing remains to be known. Moreover, knowledge with Jainism, as we have stated above, is not an acquired phenomenon. It is a natural characteristic of the soul. That characteristic does not function fully as long as it is obstructed by the karmic matter. As soon as the obstacle disappears, there is no reason why the soul should not regain the natural characteristic. The Jaina, as well as Buddhist logicians, have compared the karmic matter with the impurity mixed with gold. The gold, fresh from the mine, is always mixed with foreign matter; which is gradually separated through the process of purification. Similarly, every soul, in this world, is mixed with karmic matter. That matter is sometimes thick and sometimes thin. The old matter flows out while the new one flows in. These phenomenal variations prove the possibility of a stage when the foreign matter is totally washed away. In that state there is no more obstruction. Consequently, the natural characteristic of omniscience is fully revealed. Jaina ethics proposes samvara and nirjara as the process of 1. Jnapabindu p. 19

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Direct Knowledge 373 achieving total freedom from the karmic matter. Samvara stops the new inflow while nirjara exterminates the same in store. The Path leading to Kevalajnana Kevalajnana, as we have stated above, is the state of perfection. According to Jainism it means the state of omniscience while other systems hold different views about it. But, they are unanimous in one respect, viz., that it is the highest stage of ethical attainment. They also agree, except the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems, that it is knowledge of the highest truth. The conception of highest truth is different with every system. According to the realist school of buddhists it is the fourfold noble truth. According to Yogacara it is Alayavijnana and according to Ma Ihyamika it is void (sunya). Perfect knowledge to these systems, is the realization of truth as held in their respective views. The Vedanti holds Brahman as the highest truth. Consequently, it holds the knowledge of Brahman as the perfect knowledge. The Sarkhya maintains that the realization of distinction between praksti and purusa is the perfect knowledge. According to Jainism the highest truth is the relative existence of every object. All objects of the world are so interrelated that perfect knowledge of one is impossible without knowing all. This factor is further supported by the canonical maxim, as he knows all who knows one; who knows all, he knows one. Thus, the comprehensive view of the relative existence is impossible without knowing all things. This led to the conception of omniscience as the highest kaowledge. Nearly, all the systems, except Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mimamsa, hold discursive knowledge as the cognition of falsity or half-truth. According to Jainism, all types of knowledge except kevala have only a partial view of an object. The conception produced by them presents the truth in a part only. It is kevala that can realize the truth completely. Thus, according to Jainism, omniscience is both; it is knowledge of the entire universe as well as the koowledge of reality, According to other systems the knowledge of reality is something above the knowledge of

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374 Epistemology of Jainas uoiverse. A person striving for the knowledge of reality may or may not possess the knowledge of the universe; which is as discursive as lower types of knowledge. One has to rise above the stage of omniscience for attaining liberation. But, the path leading to omniscience i. e. the knowledge of universe and that leading to the knowledge of reality is roughly the same in all systems. The person who obtains universal knowledge is not far from perfect knowledge, which he must attain in the same life. Generally, the Indian systems are not particular in describing the way to omniscience but to the knowledge of reality or perfection. The omniscience is gained by the way in the journey of spiritual progress. Omniscience and Buddhism According to Buddhism, the knowledge of ultimate truth is attained through constant contemplation on the four noble truths. When contemplation reaches the highest and most perfect stage, the aspirant has a most distinct vision; of these truths. It is perceptual and not conceptual. Dharmakirti holds that good and bad qualities of mind can be increased infinitely through practice. Knowledge also is a quality of the mind as compassion, nonattachmeot etc. So, it can be developed to the degree of perception. Omniscience is the development of prajna which is a quality of mind. Santa Raksita maintains that knowledge (prajna) means the cognition of dharmas. It is incomplete as long as eveo a single dharma remains unknown. It gets perfection when all the dharmas are known.2 Dharmakirti's view is challenged by the Mima msaka on two issues : firstly, he says, that the practice in a particular act may increase the capacity of the doer, but it is possible within a limit only. A person practising in long jump may increase his capacity by a few feet or yards. But, however high his skill and practice may be, he cannot jump over miles toge1. Nyayabindu 1. 11. 2. Pramana Vartika 1. 132 see also Tattvasamgraha K. 3441-43; Kandali 196; Saomati tika p. 60

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Direct Knowledge 375 ther. His jumping capacity must remain within a narrow limit. Secondly, conceptual and perceptual cognitions are totally different from each other. Perception is very clear and distinct, conception is not. In the stage of meditation the knowledge of a person is conceptual, It cannot be transformed into perception even after a long and hard practice. He cites the example that water and fire are opposite to each other; water may imbibe a certain degree of heat but, on no account it can be transformed into fire. Dharmakirti replies that the examples of long jump and water cannot be applied to the present case. In the case of long jump the person has to start from the very beginning in every new attempt. A considerable part of the new effort is exhausted in preserving the old capacity from diminution. It does not necessarily add something to the already acquired capacity. With the fall of physical powers the rate of diminution is so high that it becomes impossible even to keep up the old capacity; nothing to say of progress. This is not the case with knowledge. One need not worry about it in respect of the state already reached. The aspirant climbs higher and higher with every new effort. There is no possibility of going down if he is a bit careful. Even death does not hamper his progress. Thus, when the progress is certain and there is no obstruction or any other cause to stop progress in the way, there is no reason why the aspirant should not attain the highest stage; where nothing is left to be known. Moreover, the capacity of jumping is adventitious. It is not natural with the body or the soul. The body acquires it when certain attempt is made and loses it the very next moment, Consequently, it cannot go beyond a limit. An acquired phenomenon is always limited. The case of knowledge is quite different. It is a natural characteristic of mind. The example of water also suffers from the same defect. The heat generated in water is not natural. It is acquired. Moreover, the water is consumed up by the intensity of heat. So, there is no chance of its being transformed into fire. But, in the case of conceptual

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376 Epistemology of Jainas knowledge becoming perceptual the above difficulties do not Santa Raksita says that the constant meditation of the of one's beloved makes the latter appear as if present. He makes a general rule that whatever is meditated upon, whether existent or non-existent, must appear distinctly when the meditation comes to the stage of perfection. The Jaina does not agree with the Buddhist in that meditation can lead to a perceptual knowledge. The appearance of face the beloved is orly an illusion. The knowledge of an omniscient cannot be placed in the same category. On the contrary it is the highest truth Moreover, nobody can meditate upon many things at a time The meditation on four noble-truths cannot turn into the knowledge of entire universe which is quite different from the former. But, it does not mean that the Jainas hold meditation as useless. They also hold it highly useful for the destruction of karmans and thereby worldly bondage. It is an important member of the six varieties of internal penance (abhyantaralapa), which is essential for soul-purification. The only point of disagreement is that the conceptual knowledge cannot turn into perceptual one. The two are absolutely diffe rent from each other. The position of Omniscient in the Buddhist Ethics The Buddhism holds ten stages (bhumis) through which a Bodhisattva (Buddha-designate) passes before reaching his goal. There are ten paramitas (perfections) corresponding to ten bhumis Originally, there were six bhumis and six paramitas, but, the Mahayana added four more, which are particular to Bodhisattva only. It should be mentioned here that, according to Buddhism, there are three Sravakas, varieties of aspirants; viz. Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas. The Sravakas attain salvation through learning the path of liberation from others. Pratyekabuddhas realize the truth by practising penance and meditation in seclusion. These two types of aspirants attain Nirvana (liberation) in the sixth stage and do

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Direct Knowledge 377 not go beyond. The person who attains prajnaparamita, realizes the noble truths and destroys the bondage. He is known as Arhat. An Arhat need not be an omniscient. His efforts are confined to the salvation of his own self. He does not care for others. Bodhisattva is the compassion--incarnate. He strives for happiness and salvation of others more than his own. Upto the sixth stage his journey is common with others. But, after that he acquires some powers which are helpful in preaching and converting others to his faith. In the seventh stage, known as Durangama, a bodhisattva acquires great wisdom in the choice of expedients for helping others. He understands that all the Buddhas are identical in their spiritual cosmic hody. He participates in the infinite attributes of Buddhas, and sees their multifarious physical bodies. He discerns the thoughts and feelings of others. He has conquerred all the passions and sins and is free from them. His thoughts, words and deeds are pure, and he is in possession of all the factors of Enlightenment. He works without effort or ulte. rior motive. Ble transcends the lower wisdom of the Hinayana. He attains the liberation, but does not come to realize personal nirvani He enters the great ocean of Buddha-knowledge. He is free from the four viparyasas. The eighth stage is called Acala. A bodhisattva now acquires the ksanti called apautpattika-dharma ksanti. He is not contaminated by any actions. The Buddhas initiate him into infinite knowledge, otherwise be would enter into nirvana, instead of persevering in his efforts to gain bodbi for the good of all. He understands the process of the evolution and involution of the universe. He knows the exact number of atoms in the different elements, of which the universe is composed. He assumes different bodies and shows them to the people as he thinks fit. He acquires the ten powers (vasitas). In this bhumi a bodhisattva pervades the whole world with the feeling of friendliness. The ninth stage is Sadhumatl. A bodhisattva now, knows all phenomena and principles truly and certainly, whether they

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378 Epistemology of Jainas are mundane or supermundane, conceivable or inconceivable, compounded or uncompounded. He knows everytbing about the minds and bearts of men and about meritorious and demeritorious actions. He becomes a great teacher and acquires the four pratisatisvids (accurate understanding of the particulars of everytbing). He is protected by the dbarasis (protectiv, spells.) The tenth stage is Dharmamegha. In this stage the bocbisattva acquires a glorious body, emits some rays which destroy the pain and misery of all living beings. He obtains the ten deliverances of a Bodhisattva. The above account of the four stages, particular to a Bodhisattva, shows that the knowledge of universe has no relation with salvation. Prajna or the transcendental kocwledge is attajned in the sixth stage; which means the knowledge of four noble truths. In the succeeding four stages a bodhisattva tries to achieve those embelishments as are helpful in propagation of bis mission The metaphysics, logic and all other types of philosophical knowledge are, according to buddhism, mere equipments of a preacher. They are not essential to the progress of the soul. In other words they are a social utility. The person who is interested in his personal uplift does not require them. This factor brings into light a remarkable point related with the hise tory of omniscience. It shows clearly that the conception of an omniscient came as a social necessity. The compassion and mercy attached to God in Vedic systems were attributed to the Bodhisattva in Buddhism. But, that mercy can be effectual only if the person having it, is gifted with necessary power and knowledge, with which he can convince others and make them believe his own gospel. The seventh perfection according to Buddhism, is UpajaKausalya-Paramita, also given as Upaya-Paramita. It is explained as skilfulness or wisdom in the choice and adoption of the means or expedients for converting others or helping them. The practice of this paramita involves the practice of all

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Direct Knowledge 379 virtues that a preacher requires. Such a preacher needs threc other things for complete cuocess in his mission. These are : (1) The saigrahavastus (means or items of sympathy or conversion ), (2) The pratisan vids funderstanding of all things) and (3) Dharanis ( protective spells ). He is immune to danger and diserase, The omniscience is included in four pratisam vids; which the bodhisattva attaigs gradually as he rises in the higher stages. In the ninth, i. e. Sadhumats they are complete. We can bold it as the stage of omniscience. The acceptance of omniscience in the case of Buddha raises one problem. The Buddhist regards all the conceptual knowledge as the result of passions or avidya. When Buddha is free from avidya he can no more have conceptual knowledge or the acts of preaching etc. This problem was solved by the conception of Apabhogacarya; meaning that the Buddha does not desire to know or do anything. His acts for the salvation of beings are performed automatically. Even his sermops come out without any preconception Regarding conceptual knowledge also santa Raksita holds that the teaching of past and future events is done only by yogins, who are not pure. Tathagata does not possess the discursive knowledge, however, superior it may be. He is in a constant trance and is entirely free from avidya. But, the old scriptures of Buddhism do not propose any such category of yogins except Bodhisattva, who possesses the knowledge of entire universe. Of course, in Abhidharmakosa and Vinayapitaka some supernatural powers are attributed to other aspirants also, but the knowledge of entire universe is confined to Buddha only. The conception of Anabhogacarya bears striking resemblence with the Digambara conception of Tirtharkaras speaking automatically without any preconceived plan. Tlus, according to Buddhism there are two types of transcendental knowledge, viz. prajna and bodhi. Prajna is the knowledge of four noble-truths, attained through concentration

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380 Epistemologo of Jainas on them, at the destruction of Klesavarana and Jneyavaramar. Bodhi is the knowledge of entire universe, which helps Buddha in his preaching. Prajna is perceptual and inarticulate Bodhi is articulate. Though, these terms are generally confused and sometimes applied in one and the same sense; yet they can be distinguished in the above way. The souls, which attain prajfia enter into nirvana, which is the state of cessation of all the psychic phenomena the series of which is known as soul. It is interpreted as total extinction of the discursive knowledge, dissolution in Alayavijnana or sunya by the different buddhist tenets Bodhisattva does not enter into Nirvana till he is not able to liberate all the souls from bondage. The conception of bodhisattva can be compared with the Jaina conception of Tirtha karas A Tirthankara also is altributed with many supernatural embellishments which are not found in ordinary Arhats. They are, in Jainism also, meant for increasing the influence of a Tirthaikara who establishes a new order for salvation of others. But, as far as knowledge is concerned, there is no difference between an ordinary Arhat and a Tirthankara. Furtber, a Tirtharkara does not wait for the salvation of all beings, as bodhisattva of the buddhist does. Tirtharkara also enters into pirvana with the expiry of of his current life as other Arhats do, In the stage of Nirvana or Moksa all of them enjoy equal status. The soul does not cease to exist in it, but continues with its knowledge of the universe. As far as kevalajnana is concerned the ordinary Arhats. Tirtharkaras and Siddhas (the liberated souls) do not hold any difference; which is not the case with Buddhists. According to them Bodhisattva is superior to all others in res. pect of knowledge. As a matter of fact, according to Buddhism, omniscience is not natural. It is a quality attained through practice. Bodhisattva attains it through long practice of ionumerable lives. It is not a necessary result of the destruction of passions. According to Jainism it is a necessary result.

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Direct Knowledge 381 Santaraksita explains the knowledge of all the three times as follows: All the objects of past and future are related with the present. The past object is directly or indirectly the cause of the present Similarly, the future object is the effect of the present. A yogin, who knows the present perfectly, understands its cause and the effect also. Thus, he knows all the objects of past and future. This idea can be compared with the Jaina maxim, he knows all, who knows one.' But, the above description shows that the knowledge of past and future is derived from perception of the present. It is not direct. On the other hand the Jaina holds that the knowledge of a sarvajna is perceptual or direct in all the three times. He does not infer the past or future from the present; but, perceives all in the three tenses directly. Kaivalya and Advaita-Vedanta According to Advaita-Vedantal also the knowledge of Universe and the knowledge of reality i.e. Brahman are two diffe. rent things. The knowledge of Universe is an attribute of isvara (God). Brahman, according to the Vedanta, is pure consciousness. When the some is conditioned by Maya, it is known as Isvara. Now, the Maya has two powers of obscurance and projection. It is known as avidya where both powers are in operation as in the case of ordinary souls. In the case of Isvara where Maya is in its pure substance, the first power does not operate. Accordingly the knowledge of God is not obscured and he knows the entire universe. The second power of Maya helps him in the creation of universe; which is his own proja tion. He creates it, retains it and destroys it. Maya is the con tituent (parinamin) cause of the universe, while God is illusory (vivatar) cause ? Vidyacanya explains the phenomenon of omniscience as follows: Universal experience means the consciousness reflected 1. Vedantaasra 2. Vivarana Prameya Sangraba p. 202

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382 Epistemology of Jainas into the effects of Maya. Thus, as far as the present is concerned, God is relaled with all objects through universal illusion. Io the case of fast objects this relation is not possible as the objects as well as the modes of Maya related with them, do not exist any more. But, their impressions last forever, as it is in the case of ordinary persons. The modes of Maya continue in the form of memory. God knows the past objects as consciousness is reflected into those modes. He knows the future objects also just as a potter knows the pots to be made which are under his contemplation. The above discussion leads one to a significant point. It means that the knowledge of past and future objects, even in the case of God, is not perceptual. Perception according to (Vedanta, as has been stated above, consists in three-fold identity of consciousness conditioned by the object, consciousness conditioned by the mode (vitti) and consciousness conditioned by the mind (antah karapa). The identification is not possible in the case of past and future objects, as they do not exist at that tre. The Buddhist also holds the knowledge of past and future objects as conceptual and not perceptual. But, it holds a different view regarding the way of knowing them. In his view the knowledge of objects that are not present, is inferential. The past objects are inferred as cause of the present ones. The future objects are inferred as the effects of the present ones. In the first case it is an inference of the cause from its effect. In the second case it is inference of the effect from its cause. On observation' it will appear that God of the Vedanta and the Bodhis ttva of the Buddhists more or less, stand on the same level. Of course, the Vedantic God is creator, protector and destroyer of the universe, which the Buddhist does not admit. But, in other ressects, the fundamental idea is the same. Both are assigned the highest place in their respective systems 1. Compare with the Jain conception of twofold division of karman; Ghatin and Aghatin.

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Direct Knowledge 383 and are attributed with similar powers, as are necessary for their functions. Both are omniscients; possess the knowledge of reality; but, behave as if on the discursive plane. God acts on account of Maya while Bodhisattva does so out of compassion; which also is an effect of discursive knowledge. Both of them help others in attaining salvation; but, the mselves are never freed from their pious duty. The only difference between their status is that Buddha makes his spiritual journey through many births and deaths while God is eternal. But, the theory of incarnation bears some comparison in that respect also. According to the Vedanta all the discursive knowledge is illusion. The transcendental knowledge is the ethical goal which an aspirant strives for. Liberation means the removal of illusion, which is effected by the realization of substratum (adhi. sthana) in its reality. Just as the illusion of snake in a rope lasts as long as the existence of rope is not realized; similarly, the universal illusion exists only upto the realization of Brahman. The ignorance of Brahman and the illusive appearance of external objects are caused by avidya with its two-fold power. In order to realize the substratum i. e. Brahman, one has to destroy avidya. The latter is destroye 1 by the knowledge of Brahman only. But, this koowledge is not the same as occurs after the destruction. The latter is a revelation where the differences of koower, kaown and the sources of knowledge disappear. In that state, only the pure consiousness persists, nothing else is existent. But, the knowledge of Brahman preceding the destruction of avidya is not so pure. In that stage the same process is bold as in the ordinary perceptions i.e. Antahkarana is transformed into the mode of Brahman. This mode is a creation of antahkarana which by itself, is an effect of Maya. The way to realization According to Vedanta, Brahman is realized through the knowledge of Upanisads. Sankara has discussed elaborately how the purport of all the Upanisads lies in establishing the unity between jiva and Brahman. 'Eka mevadvitlyam' and

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384 Epistemology of Jainas 'Tattvamasi', are regarded as the supreme gospels (Mahavakyas) wbich express the essence of Upanisadic teaching. Ramatirtha, in his 'Vidvanmanoranjini', the well-known commentary on <Page #410
Direct Knowledge 385 with Brahman is done by the mabavakya of the Upanisads. The constant meditation (prasankhyana) on the preaching of the Upanisads leads one to the realization of that unity. The Vedanta also quotes the illustration of the beloved damsel, who appears distinctly before her lover's vision even though past or distant. But, the appearance of damsel, as we have stated, in the case of Buddhists, is an illusion and, therefore, invalid. Does the realization also come in the same category ? The Vedantist replies that it is not invalid; because, all the scriptures testify to its validity. Moreover, the criterion of validity is the agreement (samvada) with the object. This agreement is confirmed in the present case by the Vedic texts. In the case of the damsel there is no source of confirmation. It may be mentioned here that the theory of agreement is not generally held by the Vedantists. Fundamentally, it is a Buddhist notion. Moreover, the instance of damsel does not fit in the present case. An illusory appearance cannot lead to the idea of real appearance in another case. Vacaspati holds miod with the above meditation as the main source of realization. The Vedantic scriptures, in general, do not take meditation into consideration. They are emphatic on the facts of the Upanisads and propose that scriptural authority is the only source of realization. This rules out the question of invalidity; as the Vedic scriptures, according to the Vedanta, hold supreme validity. Sankara is not prepared to assign any validity to reason where it goes against the Vedic text. The above conception raises another difficulty which stood in the cas: of Buddhist also. The realization is held as perceptual knowledge. If it depends upon authority, it cannot be perceptual. The Vedanta replies that there is no doubt about the perceptuality of realization. A perceptual illusion can be

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386 Epistemology of Jainas removed only by the perception of reality. The knowledge caused by the speech, though as a general case, is imperceptual; yet, the same becomes perceptual when assisted by constant meditation; just as simple fire is not able to produce apurva (the merit produced by sacrifice, which helps the sacrificer in obtaining the fruit of his deeds), yet, the same does so when assisted by the Vedic sacraments. This explanation is founded on assumption that the authority of the Veda is unchallengeable and it cannot be explained in any other way. According to another version the speech also can produce perceptual knowledge when assisted by the intensity of contemplation; just as in the case of parted beloved. This conception resembles the Buddhist notion of yogipratyaksa. The only difference is that the latter does not take testimony into consideration, authority of which is fundamentally against the Buddhist logic. According to another conception perceptuality of cognition does not depend upon the cause, but, upon the object. The object is perceptual where it is identical with consciousness of the cognizer. Pleasure, pain and other qualities of antahkarana are perceptual because, they are imposed on the inrer consciousness known as saksicaitanya; which is always in unity with the cognizer. In the case of external objects also, that unity is obtained through mode (vrtti). Thus, the realization of Brahman is perceptual; because, its object is perceptual. It does not matter whether it is caused by the senses or the verbal authority. According to another view, attributed to the preceptors of monism, the imperceptuality of cognition does not depend upon that of the object. It is a quality of consciousness. It is perceptual when the object and cognition are identified. Thus, according to Vedanta, the realization of Brahman, though produced by authority, is perceptual in nature. As soon as Brahman is realized the ignorance (avidya) is removed. With the removal of avidya the mode of antah

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Direct Knowledge 387 karana, transformed into Brahman, which is also an effect of avidya, vanishes; as the effect cannot last any more when the material cause disappears. In that state there is no more a distinction between cogaizer and the cognized; only the pure Brahman subsists. The Vedantic Theories compared with the Jainas We have stated above that the two powers of Maya can be compared with the two types of karmans accepted by the Jainas. Ghatikarmans correspond to Avaranasakti and Aghatikarmans to viksepasakti. In the state of arhats, according to Jainism Ghatikarmans disappear altogether, while aghatikarmans subsist. We can compare this state with God of Vedantins as far as knowledge is concerned. The pure state coming after realization is comparable with that of the siddhas (liberated souls). In that state, according to Jainism, both types of the karmans are destroyed. But, the distinction between cognizer and the cognized remains all the same. This, and other differences between the two systems owe to their different metaphysical positions. The middle state of the realization through vstti can be compared with the Sailesi state of the Jainas which occurs in the fourteenth gunasthana. A note of warning is necessary here that above comparison does not mean that the above states are same in both the systems. There are many points of disagreement which will be pointed out when the Jaina conception is discussed fully, The purpose of the present discussion is to give a rough idea of the line of spiritual progress held by different systems in comparison with the Jaina; and it is interesting to note that there is striking resemblance. We find the same thing expressed in different words. The Vedantic Theory of Jivanmukta criticized The Vedanta holds, though the appearance of external objects is illusive and caused by avidya, it continues for somo

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388 Epistemology of Jainas time even after realization. This is known as the state of JIvanmukta. An objection is raised to this conception that, as the illusive appearance is the effect of avidya, it can no longer stay when avidya is destroyed. The Vedantists reply to this objection in various ways by citing the examples of physical phenomena. For instance, the person whose illusion of snake in a rope has vanished continues to tremble for some time out of the impression of fear lasting in his mind. Similarly, the wheel of a potter continues to move for some time even when the rod, which sets the wheel op motion, is removed. But, these examples do not solve the riddle in its real perspective. The real question is that, when the constituent cause is removed the effect can stay no-where. A cloth cannot last if its constituent yarn is burnt. The above instances do not provo the existence of effect after the destruction of constituent cause. The appearance of snake is only an auxiliary cause of fear or trembling. The real causes are physical and mental weaknesses. The impressions made by the appearance of snake are so intense that they last for sometime even after disappearance of the cause of fear. But, in the case of realization there is nothing on which the impressions can stay. The pure Brabman cannot have any impression. It is pure like the space. Avidya is the material of which the impressions are constituted. When it is totally destroyed there is no possibility of any impression. The instance of potter's wheel also is a case of auxiliary cause only. Madhusudana tries to silence the Nyaya, by holding that the impression of avidya can stay without any substratum just as, according to the Nyaya system, a thing stays for a moment even without any substratum at the time of destruction. But, this is not an explanation. No system other than the Nyaya favours this theory. Sankara has refuted the Nyaya system on this very point in his Sariraka Bhasya. Nothing can be proved by merely quoting a similar defect in the conception of a rival system. The example of the pot with flower or garlic, which bears the odour even when the contents are taken away, also is not helpful; as the invisible particles bearing that smell are already there.

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Direct Knowledge 389 Madhusudanal says that the impression of avidya is without any material cause, just as the destruction (dhvamsa)of a thing. But, destruction is a negation. It cannot be compared with a positive phenomenon. Another example, that is cited relates to a person, who knows clearly that the moon is one, yet, he perceives two moons out of the defective vison. This simile also is defective. The appearance of two moons is caused by the defect in vision. In the present case no defect is possible as there is no more avidya. The simile of burnt cloth also suffers from the same defect, moreover avidya has no parts. According to another view avidya has many forms. Out of them one form lasts even when Brahman is realized; just as the generic character lasts even when the individual is no more. This is a confusion of the conceptual and physical existences. The generic character is merely conceptual. Its existence or nonexistence does not depend upon the physical existence or otherwise of a thing. But, avidya, with all its forms, stands on the same level of existence. Moreover, if a portion of avidya lasts even after realization, it will remain for ever. Madhusudana gives another explanation that maya has many powers. Some of them are removed by realization while others subsist even after that. Avidya also exists along with the remaining powers. This explanation is logical but, goes against the Vedantic conception that avidya is removed totally by realization. Moreover, the Vedanta will have to find out another source for the removal of avidya with a remaining power, as realization is not sufficient to put it away. The Jaina theory of Arhat is more clear in this respect. An Arhat destroys the four karmans only. At which he attains full knowledge, full perception, complete happiness and full energy. The remaining four karmans are already there. They are responsible for keeping the body and meeting physical necessities. These four karmans are removed when their term 1. Advaitasiddhi p. 889

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390 Epistemology of Jalhas expires naturally or by the particular yogic power known as samudghata According to the Vedanta a Jiyanmukta does not make any distinction between good and bad; but owing to the natural good habits, which he has inculcated during past practices, he generally does not behave badly or in an objectionable manner. Otherwise, he is free from all the moral or ethical codes. The Jaina maintains that an Arhat is free from all passions, which are the main cause of objectionable deeds. The Vedantic conception goes near to the Vajrayana way of living. The only difference is that the former proposes it after realization, while the latter does so as the way for attaining siddhi. As for the omniscience obtained through yogic practices, the Vedanta does not advance any special theory, Omniscience and Sankhya According to the Sankhya liberation means realization of difference (vivekakhyati) between Prakrti and Purusa. This is obtained through constant meditation on distinction between the two. When the meditation reaches its highest stage Purusa realizes that he is distinct from Praksti. This realization is known as vivekakhyati, kaivalya or salvation. Three states of Realization Like Vedanta, the Sarkbya also believes that a Purusa may continue for some time to enjoy the fruits of his past deeds, even after realization. It has three states or grades. The highest state destroys all the worldly bondage as soon as it is attained. The person in it does not wait for enjoying the fruits of his past deeds. His meditation and feeling of discrimination are so intense that no more scope is left for any connection with praksti. It is attained into the highest state of trance (asamprajnata samadhi) from which there is no possibility of coming back (vyutthana). The second state is obtained when the aspirant reachos samprajnata samadhi; the state of trance with concep 1. Sankhya Sutra III. 23 Yogabbasya 111. 55, alio II. 26.

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Direct Knowledge 391 tual feeling. The aspirant realizes in it the soul as distinct from praksti; but, his feeling is not so intense as to destroy all the past impressions. Consequently he continues to enjoy the physical pleasures for some time, till he rises above and attains asamprajnata samadbi. This state is known as Jivanmukta; which is possible in the second grade only. The third state is still lower. The aspirant in it, does not acquire realization. It is confined to study, deliberation and meditation only. The Sankhya also generally cites the example of potter's wheel to explain the state of Jivamukta. Prakrti layas The aspirants, who do not reach the stage of realization yet practise nonattachment from buddhi etc., and concentrate on praksti, submerge into the latter. This state is known as Praketi-laya. But, it is not the final stage. The persons so submerged are born again as gods in their next life. Their past impressions are not destroyed owing to the absence of realization. The persons taking birth in this way are gifted with the knowledge of entire universe. They are omniscient and omnipotent. The Sankhya conception of God or Isvara is limited to this stage only. It does not believe in an eternal God. A person in the state of Prakstilaya is naturally empowered with Asamprajnata-samadhi, through which he attains liberation. In Yogasutra Asamprajnatasamadhi is described as having two causes. In the case of gods and prakrtilayas it is attained as a birth-right (bhava-pratyaya). In case of others it is caused by faith, energy, memory, meditation and illumination. The above conception is comparable with the two types of avadhi recognized in Jainism. But, the Jainas hold that the knowledge or other virtues of higher type can be attained through penance 1. Sarkhya Sutra III. 77 2. Sarkhya Pra. Bbasya p. 113 3. Ibid. p. 106

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392 Epistemology of Jainas and the self-control oply, with an exception that they are certain in the case of Tirtharkaras. Thus, we see that according to Sankhya the way to liberation and the way to omniscience are quite different from each other. For liberation the knowledge of distinction is essential; while for omniscience one has to concentrate on praksti. But, one thing is certain that an omniscient is naturally gifted with asamprajnata samadhi. So, he is not far away from liberation; he gets it as a certain future. According to Jainism also omo! science is not same as liberation. The aspirapt has to destroy four karmans more for attaining the latter. The only difference hetween the two systems is that according to Sankhya omnisci. ence is not an essential stage for attaining liberation while the Jaipas hold it as essential, Omniscience and Yoga The yoga system gives a vivid description of the stages attained by an aspirant along with the supernatural powerswirich he comes to possess. Omniscience also is one of these powers. According to Yogabbasyal there are two directions in which the river of mind flows; it flows towards the evil and it flows towards the good or right. The flow that is directed towards kaivalya is good. It is known as kaivalyapragbhara. The other, that is directed towards worldly pleasures is known as samsara-pragbhara. The kaivalyapragbhara is like samyagdarsana and the samsara-pragbhara like mithyadarsana of the Jaipas. In the Buddhist tradition kaivalyapragbhara can be compared with the beginning of prajnaparamita. Yoga with its eight stages of yama, niyama etc. is the general way of attaining vivekakhyati, which is the highest goal of human pursuit. The last stage is asamprajnata samadbi; where the mind is without any content. On reaching this stage 1. Yogasutra 1. 19 2. Ibid. I 20

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Direct Knowledge 393 one realizes the distinction between praksti and purusa and attains liberation, without further delay. There are three ways to reach the stage of asamprajnata samadbi. In the case of gods and prakstilayas it is natural, attained with the birth. It does not mean that they have attained it without any yogic practices or purification of the miod; but they have done so in their previous lives. It only means that in the current life they attain that stage without any further effort. Another way to reach asamprajnata-samadhi is the fivefold path of yogic practices i. e. Sraddha (mental cheerfulness and hope), Virya (courage and enorgy leading to firmness or perseverence), Smrti (memory), Samadhi (meditation) Prajna (wisdom or enlightenment). Through prajna the aspirant koows the reality and by concentration on the knowledge of reality he acquires nonattachment and through that asamprajnata samadhi. These five equipments are rather stages. The lower one paves the ground for the higher one. The third way to attain asamprajnata-samadhi is the devotion to God. Yoga and the conception of God? Like Sarkhya the Yoga also does not believe in God as a creator. But, he maintains that it is a person who is never influenced by the effects of praksti. Ho is ever pure, never touched by sorrows, activities and their good or bad results. The difference between a liberated soul and God is that the former was once attached with worldly ties and God was never 80. Similarly, the difference between a praksti-laya and God is that the former is liable to bondage in future, while God is never. As far as their present condition is concerned there is no much difference among the three. The supremacy of God lies in His eternity. He has the upper limit of knowledge leading to the establishment of omniscience. His omniscience does not serve any self interest. It is meant for the benefit of 1. Yogasutra I. 20 2. Ibid. 1. 23 3. Ibid. I. 24-29

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394 Epistemology of Talnas others. He preaches the path of salvation to worldly souls after partial or complete delusion. Out of compassion he instructed the highest truth to the sage Asuri. God is the eternal teacher. He is preceptor of even the oldest sages. The person, who is a devotee of God, comes to know the pure soul and is freed from all obstacles. Thus, we see that the conception of God, in the yoga system, is a source of consolation and encouragement for the aspirant, who feels the direct way of salvation a bit hard. It places an ideal before him for which he has to strive. Secondly, when God himself shows the path, there is no room for misguidance. Thirdly, the compassion of God is a great solace in the arduous journey of spiritual realization. One thing is common with Boddhisattva of the Buddhist and God of the yoga; that this omniscience is an equipment for the salvation of others. Yoga and Development of Knowledge2 According to Yoga the reason for shortness of our knowledge is that the states of our mind are continually changing and we do not dwell upon one thing for a long time to go into its heart. If the concentration is deeper and steadier the real and perfect knowledge of all things begins to appear before mind's eye. The eight parts of yoga are solely a preparation for the highest stage of concentration when the knowledge of entire universe is attained. The first four parts i. e. yama, niyama, asana and pranayama, are mainly concerned with the spiritual and physical discipline, which is necessary for checking the miod from wandering after worldly pleasures. In pratyahara the mind is centered in its own nature, is completely identified with the object of inner concentration. Dharana is the concentration of mind on a particular point. Dhyana is the continuance of the same, without changing the current. Samadbi or 1 Yogasutra IV. 29-35

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Direct knowledge 395 trance contemplation results, when by deep concentration mind is transformed into the form of object. Samadhi is again divided into various stages. The first stage is vitarkanugata, where the mind is concentrated on gross objects. It has two parts; i.e. savitarka, where mind becomes one with a gross object together with its name, etc. and nirvitarka; where the mind is without any consciousness of name etc. The savitarka state is not different from ordinary conceptual states in which the particular thing is not only associated with the concept of its name, but also with other concepts and their various relations. The second stage is vicaranugata. In this the yogin directshis attention to finer and subtler objects, those from which the atoms have been derived, namely tanmatras. It also has two states of savicara and nirvicara based on the association and the absence of time, space, causality. In this stage the aspirant can perceive the fine elements in their pure state, which are otherwise uoperceivable. The third stage is Apandanugata. In this stage the mind is filled with supreme bliss or happiness. The self elevates itself from the objective meditation and is one with the pure sattva or blissful aspect of the senses. The fourth stage is Asmitaaugata. In this stage the mind is in the state of pure being when the self is one with the Buddhi. The stages of anandanugata and asmitanugata also are divided into two each. Anandanugata is sananda and nirananda. Asmitanugata is sasmita and nirasmita. Thus, the four stages of samadhi turn into eight kinds. The first stage is confined to discursive knowledge; concertual as well as perceptual. The second is the knowledge of reality. In the nirvicara stage the steady light of perfect knowledge burns, and this is the highest and the truest knowledge known as stambhara prajna. This knowledge is quite different from the knowledge derived from the scriptures or inference, as those are based on concepts which only take notice of the

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396 Epistemology of Jainas general characteristics of things, and thus are only symbols which can never take us to the heart of reality. Ordinary perception also does not reach there, as it is confined to gross objects only. As the right knowledge of samadhi is gradually more and more sustained, the potencies of imperfect knowledge and ignorance of ordinary consciousness are superseded. These potencies being superseded, those states of consciousness cannot manifest themselves, and thus samadhi becomes strengthened, and by the strengthening of samadhi, comes further prajna; new potencies of prajna come to be accumulated, and these bring in the prajna states, and thus further strengthen their potencies. Thus, the potencies of ordinary consciousness being gradually rooted out, the yogin remains in a new world of right knowledge or prajna consciousness. But, it is the peculiarity of this prajna consciousness that neither it nor its potencies serve to bind the purusa except by loosening the knots or avidya, which gradually tend to disintegrate the citta and dissociate it from the purusa. We have seen above that in the bigher and higher stages of samadhi the mind passes from the gross objects to the finer ones. It happens in the same order reversed, in which the apparent universe comes into existence. This returning process reaches its final stage when the equilibrium of praksti is attained. In that state buddhi, which fascinated purusa into its charm, disappears into praksti. This state of trance or samadhi is known as asamprajnata samadbi or the contentless meditation. The final prajnas which help the movement of this returning process are said to be of seven kinds. The first four are as states of consciousness associated with the four stages of samadhi. The first one dawns in the form : "I have known the world, the object of suffering and misery, I have nothing more to know of it." The second stage is of the form; "The grounds and the roots of samskaras have been thoroughly uprooted, nothing more of it remains to be uprooted." The third is of the form; "Removal has become a fact of direct cognition by means of inhibitive trance." The fourth is of the form "The

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Direct Knowledge 397 means of knowledge in the shape of discriminative knowledge has been understood." This is the fourfold freedom of consci. ous discrimination from external phenomena. The three prajnas that rise after this are pot psychological states of mind but metaphysical and real states of the disintegrating process of the return of the citta to praksti. These movements are as follows: (1) The double purpose of buddhi, bhoga (ordinary experience) and apavarga (salvation) have been realized; (2) The strong gravitating tendency of the disintegrated gunas drive them into the praksti like heavy stones dropped from high bill tops; and they finally collapse into the praksti substance where they remain merged for ever : (3) the purusa having passed beyond the bondage of the three, shines forth io its own pure and ultimate freedom. The main difference between the Saukhya and the Yoga regarding the way to emancipation is this, that Sankhya laysmore stress on the knowledge of distinction between praksti and purusa. This knowledge is attained through contemplation and meditation. The yoga is emphatic on concentration and the control of mind through yogic practices. Ultimately the mind becomes useless and submerges into its cause, i. e. praksti. Thus, the purusa is freed from the mental bondage. This state is known as kaivalya. According to the Buddhist soul is not a permanent entity. It is a flow of successive psychical phenomena. Nirvana or emancipation means the discontinuation of this flow. According to the Vedanta the soul is a permanent, unchangeable reality. The discursive knowledge is the effect of antahkarana, which is the substitute for the self of other systems. This aptahkarana loses its existence after realization. According to Sankhya and Yoga systems the function of the self is served by buddhi. When it returns to its original source, i. e. prakrti the self is no more. The Purusa has nothing to do with discursive knowledge. Thus, according to all the above systems salvation means the end of discursive self with its qualities of knowledge, feelings and passions. According to Jainism passions are removed with

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398 Epistemology of Jainas the destruction of Mohaniya. But, there is nothing to destroy knowledge. Yasovijaya, perhaps under the influence of Vedanta, has proposed that the four types of discursive knowledge are effected by kevalajnanavarana. When this avarana disappears they do not exist any more. Thus, in a way, we can say that according to Jainism also the discursive knowledge disappears at the dawn of kevalajnana; but the Jaina does not make any distinction between the two types, as far as their appearance is concerned. The Jaina divides the mind ethically into four dhyanas. In the first two dhyanas it is directed towards evil-thinking. They resemble the samsara-pragbbara state of the Yoga. In the remaining two the mind is directed towards good thinking, They resemble the state of kaivalyapragbbara. The different states of these two dhyanas bear a striking resemblance with the yoga theory of samadbi. We shall discuss them in detail along with the Jaina theory of spiritual progress. Conception of Taraka Stage in Yoga According to the system of yoga the last three parts of dbarana, dhyana and samadhi are known as samyama. 1 The concentration or samyama on different objects results into various supernatural powers. The yogia who concentrates on the three times comes to possess the knowledge of all the three times. Similarly, he gets the knowledge of entire universe when pratibha-jnana arises. It is the knowledge just preceding vivekakhvati. This state is known as Taraka, because it brings the worldly bondage to an end. It knows the entire universe, in all the times and conditions simultaneously. This is attained in the stage of visoka. It resembles the kevalajnana of the Jainas, appearing after the destruction of Mona. According to yoga it is perishable and a sort of obstacle in the path of realization; It is a disturbance in meditation. The Jaina does not support this view. But, no other system except yoga has described the omniscience as akrama, which is maintained by the Jaina also. 1 Yogasutra III. 54

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Direct Knowledge 399 The yoga-conception of infinite knowledge also bears a striking resemblance with the Jaina conception of anantajnana. Patanjali says that when the dirt of obscurance is removed totally the knowledge becomes infinite; as the knowable objects are finite, they fall short in comparison with knowledge. Vyasa cites the example of sky and glow-warm. Similarly, the Jaina also maintains that practically a kevalin perceives the entire universe, but its capacity is infinite. Had there been infipite number of universes a kevalin would have perceived all of them. Kevalajnana and the Nyaya and Vaiseseika Schools We have already described the Nyaya view of the Vaisesika super natural knowledge; which is attained through an extraordiuary contact with the universe. This contact is established through yogic practices for which they do not prescribe any definite course and generally follow the yoga system. In the state of liberation the soul is devoid of all qualities including knowledge. The Nyaya does not make any difference between the discursive and transcendental types of knowledge. In the state of liberation where the other systems propose absence of discursive knowledge and the revelation of transcendental knowledge, the Nyaya proposes the total absence. Practically, they are on the same level. In addition the Nyaya accepts eternal omniscience of God; which is a necessary equipment for his functions of creation, preservation and destruction of the universe. The Nyaya, chiefly being a devotee of logic does not propose any original theory regarding omniscience. Jainism and Omniscience The Jainas hold a very clear and systematic view about the journey of soul towards liberation. Their theory of gunasthana presenti a definite road with well-measured mile-stones; leading to the ultimate goal. Gunasthana means the different stages of spiritual attainments. The soul regains its natural powers in higher

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400 Epistemology of Jainas and higher degrees as the aspirant ascends to the stairs of gunasthanas. The powers of soul are lying burried under the obscuring karmans. The degree of manifestation of those powers varies according to the thickness or thinness of the obscurance. According to Jainism Mohanlya is the most powerful of all the karmans. This is the principal cause of bondage of the soul. The other karmans get their strength from moha. The arrangement of fourteen gunasthana also is mainly based on its different potencies. We can compare it with the avidya of other systems. Moha operates on the soul in two ways. Firstly, it does not allow the soul to know its own reality. The soul, which is immaterial, eternal and pure, is wrongly identified with the material, perishable and impure body or senses. The cause of this perverted attitude is recognized as Darsanamohaniya. Darsana means vision; attitude or faith. Darsana-moha clouds that vision, makes the attitude perverted and misdirects the faith. The second operation of Mohanlya is to obstruct the soul in its attempt to attain the pure state of infinite bliss. The passions keep the soul involved in external pleasures and pains. This operation is effected by caritramohanlya. The first four gunastbadas are based on different stages of darsanamohanlya and five to twelve on caritramohaniya. The last two are the stages of complete realization. The first gunasthana is koowo as Mithyadrsti. It can be compared with the samsarapragbhara conception of the yogasystem. In this stage the attitude of soul is always misdirected. He through after external pleasures and is known as bahiratman or bahirmukha. This stage also has many grades of karmic influence. Sometimes, the influence is thick and sometimes it is thin. These gradations are the result of a definite process or deliberate striving for liberation. Nor they set the aspirant on right path. They are merely wanderings in a forest where the person, who has lost the way, sometimes, goes very

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Direct Knowledge 401 close to the right path and sometimes far away. In no case he is sure to get the right path. Three karanas and granthibheda The soul, wandering thus, when reaches near the way, it is known as yathapravstti-karana. It means a right step taken accidentally without deliberate attempt. This step is compared with a stone of hilly river, which becomes round, rolling in the current. Similarly, a soul suffering from miseries of the world and wandering through high and low kingdoms of the universe, accidentally reaches the stage when his reserve karmic matter comes within a fixed degree. It is said that in this stage the duration of all the karmans, except Ayusya, comes within a period of one kotakoti (one crore multiplied into one crore) sagaropamal. But, this stage is not unique in the career of a soul. Every soul has reached it innumerable times without breaking the koot of passions, though he comes oftenly on that point. The second step is apurvakarana. In this stage he unlooses the knot of passions. The aspirant, who has once attained this stage is sure to get liberation within a specified period; namely, ardhapudgala paravartapa. This stage comes as a new step in the beginningless career of soul. This is why it is called. apurvakarapa. 1. According to Jainism the attachment of karmic matter with the soul lasts for a definite period only. It must detach by the expiry of that period; during which the new matter flows in and is attached with the soul for a shorter or longer period. The duration of this period is fixed according to the intensity of passions (kasayas). The maximum duration of MohanIya is seventy kodakoli (one kcti multiplied into one kcti) sagaropama, a particular measurement of time. Jnanavarana, Darsanavarana, Vedaniya and Antaraya have thirty kooakodi. Nama and Gotra have twenty and Ayusya has thirty-three sagaropama only as their maxir mum duration.

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Epistemology of Jainas The third step is anivrttikarana, where an aspirant definitely gets the right attitude (samyagdrsti ). This is the starting point of spiritual journey. The Jaina divides it into fourteen stages. 402 Fourteen Gunasthanas (the ladder of spiritual journey) In the ladder of gunasthana the first step is mithyadrsti i. e. wrong attitude. The aspirant does not rise above it until he unloosens the tie of moha existing in the form of darsanamoha. The second step is sasvadana which is touched when the aspirant with Upasamasreni falls down. The third is misra gunasthana meaning a mixture of the right and wrong attitudes without a firm belief. This gunasthana may be touched both in ascending as well as the descending condition. The fourth step marks a definite progress in the spiritual journey. In this stage the effect of darsanamohaniya is weakened and the aspirant gets the right attitude along with a firm faith in reality. We can compare it with the beginning of prajnaparamita of the Buddhist, Brahmajijnasa of the Vedantist and Kaivalyapragbhara of the yoga system. The aspirant, at this stage finds out the right path and firmly believes in its efficacy to lead to the final goal. But, he stops with the faith only and does not start marching. The effect of caritramohaniya does not allow him to put the decision into practice. This gunasthana is known as avirata samyagdrsti (right attitude without observation of the rules of conduct). In the fifth gunasthana the aspirant is partially freed from the effect of caritramohaniya and takes to the vows of a householder. This stage continues upto the stage of complete renunciation. It should be mentioned here that caritramohanlya is divided into four grades based on the intensity of passions. Anantanubandhi is the first grade, where the passions are so intense that the person under its influence is debarred from

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Direct Knowledge 403 getting right attitude. He is confined to first gunasthana as long as it continues. The second grade is apratyakhyanavarana. It does not allow the person to take any vow or observe the rules of conduct. One, who aspires in the fifth gunastbana, has to subdue it. The third grade is pratyakyanavarana which stands in the way of full renunciation attained in the sixth gunasthana. The fourth grade is samjvalana. In this grade the intensity of passions is reduced to such mildness as they do not put any material obstacle. Still they affect the life of an ascetic to the extent of minor pitfalls. This effect is subdued in the seventh step. In the sixth gunasthana, one takes to the vows of an ascetic and adopts complete renunciation. But, still he is prone to pitfalls (pramadas). This is why, it is called pramattasamyata gunasthana. The pitfalls are five in number; namely: (1) Intoxication (Madya), (2) sensual pleasures (visaya), (3) passions (kasaya), (4) slumber (nidra) and (5) mundane talks (vikatha). The fifth gunasthana is open to subhuman beings also. But, the gunasthanas beginning from the sixth onwards are open to human beings only. It means, an animal can take to the vows of a householder, but not those of an ascetic. The seventh gunasthana is Apramatta samyata. In this stage the aspirant is very careful and keeps himself away from pitfalls. The eighth is Nirvstti gunasthana. In this stage the aspirant prepares himself for the destruction or subsidence of the remaining part of mohaniya. One thing is noticeable here that darsanamohaniya is divided into three potencies, which are compared with the three gunas of the Sarkhya. The first and the strongest potency is mithyatvamohaniya, where the right attitude is an impossi. bility. The second is misramohaolya which resuls into the mixed attitude marking the third gunasthana. The mildest potency is samyaktvamohanlya. This potency does not obstruct the right attitude. It is like an intoxicant bereft of the

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404 Epistemology of Jainas power of intoxication. It only blurs the vision slightly resulting into a partiality towards one's benefactories. (prasastaraga ); just as devotional love towards a Tirthankara or some other high personality, based on the virtues of the latter. But, ultimately it is also a tie, wbich can last upto the seventh gugastbana only. In the eighth gunasthana darsanamohanlya is totally removed either by destruction or subsidence. From this stage the aspiraut undertakes either of the two courses of upasamasreni or ksapakasreni. The ninth gunasthana is Adivstti-badara-sam paraya. This stage is attained when the aspirant either destroy or subdue the six types of nokanaya such as hasya (laughter), rati (attachment), arati (hatred), bhaya (fear), soka (grief) and jugupsa (spitefulness). The tenth stage is suksmasamparaya. It is attained when the aspirant is freed from the gross passions entirely. By the end of the pinth gupasthana he removes the sexual urge of all the three types, along with krodha (anger), mana (conceitedness) and maya (crookedness) of samjvalana potency. Only the lobba (greed) remains. It is also removed by the end of this stage. The eleventh gupasthana is upasantamoba. This stage is attained by the aspirant in upasamasreni ; who subdues the passions completely. By the end of this stage the passion which were so far lying dormant come into operation and the aspirant falls down. He may go down to the first stage or stop somewhere in the middle. He strives again in the same or other lives and rises upwards by adopting ksapakasreni. The person who adopts ksapakasreni and ascends bigher and higher by destroying the passions, has nothing, in reserve. He does not touch the eleventh gunastbana and reaches direct the twelfth. This stage is known as ksinamohaniya, where Mohan Iya is totally destroyed. The aspirant in this stage is known as chadmasthavitaraga; meaning the person who has destroyed passiops but has pot attained full knowledge. We

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Direct Knowledge 405 have seen that in the gunasthanas beginning with the fifth upto the twelfth mobaniya plays the important role. The other ghatikarmans are not directly taken into account. In the thirteenth gunasthana the other three gbatikarmans jnanavarantya, Darsanavaransya and Antaraya are destroyed simultaneously. The soul attains full knowledge, full perception and full energy. This is known as Sayogikevalin; meaning that an omniscient with the activities of mind, speech and body continued. It is the stage of Arhat or jivanmukta. The fourteenth gunasi hana is Ayogi-kevalin. In this stage the activity of all the three types is stopped. This state is known as Sailesr; meaning the static condition like the king of mountain. This state can be compared with asariprajnata samadbi of the yoga system. After the fourteenth gunasthana the soul leaves this body and shoots up like an arrow, till it reaches the top end of this universe. It is the state of liberation. According to Jainism there is a place on the top of the universe, known as siddhasila which is the abode of liberated souls. Four Dhyanas (contemplations) In addition to the fourteen gunasthanas the Jainas hold four dhyanas expressing the ethical development of mind. Dhyana means contemplation. It has four types of (1)artadhyana (contemplation on material gains and losses), (2) raudradhyana (contemplation of violent acts), (3) dharmadhyana (contemplation on virtuous deeds), and (4) sukladhyana ( contemplation on the self). The first two types are related with the persons engrossed in worldly desires. The remaining two are useful for attaining liberation. They have four stages cach. Dharmadhyana has the following stages(1) Ajnavicaya-- to contemplate over the teachings of a vstaraga or sarvajna. i (Soe Karmagrantha IV.

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406 Epistemology of Jainas (2) Apayavicaya- to contemplate over the pature of vices and the way to get rid of them. (3) Vipakavicaya- to contemplate over the fruits of good and bad deeds. (4) Samstbapavicaya to contemplate over the form of the universe. According to the Svetambara tradition dharmadhyana is found upto the twelfth gunastbana, beginning with the sixtb. The Digambaras hold that it is possible in four gunasthanas only i. e. from fourth to the seventh. The Sukladhyana has the following four stages (1) Psthaktva vitarka savicara-Analytic contemplation focussed on different objects; it changes from object to object, word to word, object to word and word to object. This stage can be compared with the savitarka and savicara stages of samadbi held by the yoga. (2) Ekatva vitarka-avicara-synthetic deliberation, where the person sticks to one object. It is comparable with nirvitarka and nirvicara of yoga. (3) Suksamakriya-apratipatin-This stage is attained in the fourteenth gunastbana, when the activities of mind and speech are stopped through the control over physical activity. The activities thus stopped do not revive again. This is why it is called apratipatin. (4) Samucchinnakriya-nivstti-In this stage the activities of mind, speech and body are completely stopped. Even the mildest movements of respiration etc. do not occur. This stage lasts for a few moments only, comparable with the pronunciation of five short vowels. The first two stages of sukladhyana are found in the eleventh and twelfth gunasthanas, provided the aspirant possesses the knowledge of purvas. The person with less knowledge gets dharmadhyana only. The remaining two stages occur in the thirteenth and fourteenth gunasthanas only.

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Direct Knowledge 407 There is another way to know the existence of above four stages. The first stage is possible in the aspirant with all the three yogas (activities). He can apply the motors of mind, speech and body for his deliberations. The second is possible in the aspirant who uses one instrument only for his deliberation. The third stage is possible with kaya.yoga (bodily activity) only; and in the fourth stage no activity of any type is possible. Dharmadhyana appears at the removal of darsanamohanlya. It is possible in a samyagdssti only. The first stage of sukla dhyana is reached when Mohanlya is totally removed. The second stage occurs when all the ghatikarmans are destroyed and kevalajnana is attained. The third stage is a complete cessation of mental and verbal activities. It is a process to attain the fourth stage where the activities come to stop entirely whereby the soul is liberated from all bonds. Lesya (Thought paints) Another category that expresses the different stages of soulpurification is lesya. It is that by which a jiva assimilates virtue and vice with itself. The feelings arising from yoga, coloured by passions, lead to bhavalesya and the actual colours of bodies produced by such feelings are called dravyalesyas. They are held six according to the different grades of temperament possessed by living beings. Each grade is represented by a colour in the following way : 1. Krsnalesya--Black 4. Tejolesya--Golden 2. Nilalesya-Blue 5. Padmalesya-Lotus colour 3. Kapotalesya-- Pigeon 6. Suklalesya-White All of them are found upto the sixth gunasthana. The seventh contains only the last three. The eighth to thirteenth contains sukla only. The fourteenth gunasthana has no lesya as the mind does not work there. 1 Stbanangasutra 247, Avasyaka IV. 2 Avasyaka, Haribhadra Tika p. 645 3 Tattvartha X. 10

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408 Epistemology of Jainas The Way to Liberation concluded According to Jainism liberation means the absolute freedom from karmic bondage. The way leading to it is divided into two parts i. e. (1) samvara (stoppage of the new ipflow of karmans) and (2) Nirjara (the destruction of those already ip store) There are five passages of new inflow : (1) mithyatva (wrong attitude), (2) avirati (non-abstipance from sensual indulgence), (3) pramada (slips), (4) kasaya (passions) and (5) yoga (activity). The first passage is blocked in the fourth gunasthana; second in the sixth; third in the seventh; fourth in the eleventh or twelfth and fiwh in the fourteenth. It should be noticed here that in thirteenth gunasthana the activity of all the three types of mind, speech and body continues; and thereby the ipflow of karmaps also. But, the karmic matter inflowing in that stage is not attached with the soul. It comes in and goes out by itself. The bondage (bandha) of karmans is divided into the following four types :(1) Prakrtibandha--The bondage related with the types of karmaprakstis that are to flow in a particular activities. (2) Pradesabandha--the bondage related with the number of molecules to flow in. (3) Sthitibandha-the bondage related with fixing the period of duration of each karmapraksti. (4) Anubhagabandha-the bondage that decides intensity of the fruit giving power of a particular praksti. The yoga (activity) is responsible for the first two types only. It is the cause of the inflow of karmaprakstis. The period of duration and the intensity in fruit are controlled by the kasaya (passions). If the kasaya is intense the duration will be longer and the intensity of fruit will be higher. On the other hand, if passions are mild the duration and fruit intensity also are reduced in the same proportion. In the gunasthanas from eleven to thirte:n kasaya has no effect. Consequently, the )

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Direct Knowledge karmic matter flowing in has neither durance nor intensity to give any fruit. In the fourteenth gunasthana the activity is stopped entirely. Hence, there is no possibility of any inflow. In this stage all the passages of karmic inflow are completely blocked. The other requisite of the freedom from karmic bondage is the destruction of karmans which have already flowed in. This function also continues along with samvara. This destruction is achieved in two ways: either by experience of the result, or by nirjara (removal through various types of penances). A certain amount of karmic matter is removed by experiencing its fruit, while the other is destroyed by observing certain penances. These penances are divided into twelve types, out of which the first six are external, related with the physical restraints, the remaining six are internal related with spiritual development. We have already stated the gradual removal of mohanIya in the gunasthanas. The effects of other karmans also are gradually minimized along with it. But, as has been stated above, up to the twelfth gunasthana mohanlya is the main factor. The thirteenth is attained by the destruction of three more. At the end of fourteenth the remaining four also are destroyed. 409 Three places of Kevalajnana We have been discussing so far the way to emancipation as held by the Jainas, without which the conception of the omniscient connot be understood fully. We have seen that the aspirant gets right attitude in the fourth gunasthana. The attainment of samyagdarsana changes his knowledge also into samyak, before which it was mithya. In this stage he is expected to direct his knowledge and other powers towards the emancipation of soul; which were formerly misdirected towards worldly pleasures. As far as the amount of knowledge is concerned there is no increase in it. In the sixth gun isthana the aspirant may attain certain supernatural powers including two types of knowledge i.e. avadhi and manahparyaya. But

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410 Epistemology of Jalnas avadhi is possible in lower stages also while manahparyaya does not occur below the sixth stage. But, these powers are not inevitable. They are exceptional powers (labdhis) obtained by only a small number of aspirants. Like yoga-system the Jaipa also holds that these supernatural powers are interruptions in the spiritual progress, but the latter exempts super-normal knowledge from that category. In the twelfth gunasthana the aspirant destroys mohapiya completely. This stage can be compared with destruction of avidya as held by the Buddhist aud Vedantist and the removal of illusion of identity between praksti and purusa as held by Sankhya. The thirteenth gunastbana is the stage of revelation; which is attained by destroying the remaining three ghatikarmans. According to the Buddhist the cessation of avidya means the cessation of soul, which is a flow of impressions produced by avidya. The stage of realization, therefore, does not exist any longer. According to Vedanta it is the state of realization of Brahman. According to Sankhya and Yoga it is vivekakhyati. According to Jainism it is complete view of the entire universe. But, the function of mind continues in it. In the fourteenth gunasthana the activity of all the three yogas is stopped. In the stage of liberation the physical body also does not exist. As far as the question of omniscience is concerned we have three stages (1) sayogi-kevalin or the thirteenth gunastbana, (2) ayogikevalin or the fourteenth gunastbana and (3) the siddhas (liberated souls). The first question that arises in this respect is whether there is any difference among the three stages, as far as kevalajnana is concerned. We can compare them with other systems in the following way : 1. Sayogikevalin--Jivanmukta without trance, 2. Ayogi kevalin-JIvanmukta in trance (asamprajnata. samadhi) 3. Siddha-Kaivalya. All the non-jaina systems except Nyaya and Vaisesika, .

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Direct Knowledge 411 whose opinion does not hold much importance in this respect, maintain that the knowledge of the type of omniscience is possible in the first stage only. The second and third states do not realize any difference of subject and the object. They are states of pure consciousness. But the Jaipas hold that all the three states hold similar knowledge. The responsibility of this disagreement goes to their different views regarding the cause of such knowledge. The non-Jaina systems hold that knowledge with a distinction of subject and object does not accur without mind. When a yogin is in trance or attains kaivalya, the mind ceases to function. The Jainas hold that mind is required in the cases of imperfect knowledge only. In the case, of perfect or complete knowledge the mind does not play any part. It is an organ of discrimination and limitation. The limited knowledge requires it to fix up the focus on a particular point. In the case of kevala focus on a particular object is not needed. The lense of kevala is so powerful that it gets the reflection of all the objects simultaneously. We have cited the examples of a candle and the sun. The candle illumines the objects that are placed near it successively. The sun brings into light all the objects under it, simultaneously. But, this conception is a bit confused on the part of the Jainas. Knowledge is not a single function. In the case of ordinary perception the first thing is stimulation; where the senses are not active but passive. They receive the external stimuli. All the external objects that are placed within a particular area, generate stimulation simultaneously. The sounds coming from various instruments strike the ear-hole simultaneously. After this stimulation there comes the stage of discrimination, where the mind works gradually. The mind cannot take into account all the sounds coming from different instruments in a lump. It contemplates the stimulants in succession. The stage of stimulation is not knowledge. According to Jainism it may be called darsana or vyanjapavagraha. Knowledge is always discriminatory, leading to a judgment." 1 Satkhandagama Sutra 135

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412 Epistemology of Jainas In the case of kevalajnana it may be admitted that all things reflect into the soul without any via media; or they are illumined by the soul simultaneously. But the stage of mere reflection or illumination does not constitute knowledge. The knowledge begins when particular objects are conceived discriminately. This conception is not possible without some organ which takes into consideration the individual cases in succession. We can put the same problem in another way. The process of knowledge has two actions related to two different agents. In the stage of stimulation the objects are agents and the senses are passive receivers. The second stage is a response the stimulation caused by the first stage. Here, the agent is mind or soul, The simultaneous stimulation by many objects is possible as it has many agents. But the simultaneous action of mind on all the objects is not possible, as in this case the agent is one. It must act gradually. Of course; when the agent contains a huge body and can cover many units of space simultaneously, it can act upon many things simultaneously, but the Jainas cannot hold that view; because their soul has a limited size. If the Jaina conception of knowledge, in the case of kevala, is limited to mere stimulation, without reaching the stage of discrimination, as the instance of the sun leads to, it is understandable. But it would mean that kevala is without any kalpana (articulation) as the Buddhists hold regarding their perception. If the discrimination also is within the range of kevala, it cannot be explained without mind. The Jainas give one explanation that according to Buddhism, only the thing in itself is existent. The discriminations of name, class etc. are merely conceptual. They do not exist externally. But, according to Jainism nothing is merely conceptual. Every concept has a corresponding external existence. In kevala, as in the case of other cognition, the concepts also reflect as good as the solid objects. In the case of limited cognition the operating organ, i. c. mind has a limited capacity.

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Direct Knowledge 413 It covers the range of reflections gradually. But, in the case of kevala the operating organ is the soul itself. It has unlimited capacity; consequently the entire range is covered simultaneously. Really seen in both the cases the soul is the only operator. The psychical mind (bhavamana) is nothing but the partial manifestation of the soul. In the case of kevala it is fully manifested. Dhavala distinguishes the two types of knowledge on the basis of karma-theory. The limited knowledge is produced by the partial removal (ksayopasama) of the avarapa, while the unlimited, i. e. kevala is produced by complete destruction (ksaya) of the avarana. Mind (bhavamana) is itself a ksayopasamika state. It cannot co-exist with the ksayika state of kevala. So, as far as knowledge is concerned, there is no difference between sayogin and the ayogin gunastbanas. The Kevalin and Mind It can be asked here, that the thirteenth and fourteenth gunastbanas are separated from each otber merely on the ground that one is with yoga, while the other is without yoga. The meaning of yoga in the present case is not physical structure (dravyayoga), which exists in the fourteenth gunastbapa also. In the present case yoga means the mental, oral and physical activity. It means that a kevalin in the thirteenth gunastbana possesses these activities and that in fourteenth gunasthana does not. The Svetambaras hold that a kevalin uses his mind when a sage with mapahparyaya, or a god in the Anuttaravimapa, the highest region of gods, feels some doubt in his convictions; he repeats the question in his mind. The kevalin understands the question and repeats the reply in his mind. The sage and god apprehend it by their own supernormal cognitions. This view may be significant to trace the history of telepathy, but, does not prove the real utility of mind in a kevalin.1 1. Siddhasen Ganin on Tattvartha II, 26

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414 Epistemology of Jainas The Digambara tradition holds that the existence of mental activity in a kevalin is merely a presumption (upacara), based on the common-place conviction that mind is a necessary preliminary of speech. Commonly it is held that a person with mind must have some mental activity before he speaks. The speech is always preceded by deliberation. An Arhat also preaches sermons, which cannot come out without preceding thought. One is likely to speculate on this basis, the Digambaras say, that a kevalin also possesses some mental activity. But, in reality a Tirthankara speaks without any prethought. His words come out spontaneously. Perhaps, this idea is borrowed from the Buddhist in his theory of anabhogacarya.1 As a matter of fact the existence of mental activity cannot be denied in the thirteenth gunasthana. The kevalin visits different places for preaching his sermons, holds discussions, replies the questions asked by different persons and takes part in debates with the upholders of rival views. All these activities are not possible without mind. It is another thing that his knowledge is purely spiritual. Generally, the activities of mind are classified into three functions, of feeling, willing and knowing. About feeling there are two opinions. Some hold that it is direct function of soul. The mind has nothing to do with it. The Vedantic conception of Saksibhasya presents the same view. The Nyaya and other realistic systems hold it as the function of mind. The Jaina logicians of the latter period have adopted the same view. But, the theory of karman and the Agamas seem to hold a different conception. The Tattvartha relates sruta as the function of mind; which has nothing to do with feeling. Moreover, the conception of psychical senses, which include the mind also is based on the apprehension of different objects. They are spiritual energies produced by the ksayopasama of jnanavaranlya. On the other hand feeling is an effect of Vedaniya. The Sarkhya holds both 1 Gommatasara, Jiva Kanda G. 228-29

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Direct Knowledge feeling and knowing as the qualities of citta. The Nyaya also regards mind as an instrument of feeling as well as knowing. But, according to these systems the soul, in itself, is more or less inactive. It is simply a passive substratum where the mind plays its role, and bears the entire responsibility of conscious activity. But, the Jaina position is different. He holds the soul as an agent and active force in the functions of feeling and willing also. The mind is a particular capacity of soul and plays its part in a very limited sphere, as the other senses do. The function of feeling does not depend upon it. Further, the mental activities are divided into four types of (1) Satya manoyoga (true mentation), (2) Asatyamanoyoga (false mentation), (3) Misramanoyoga (mixed), (4) Anubhaya manoyoga (neither of the two). This division solely depends upon the activities of mind related with cognition. It means that we cannot explain the existence of mind on ground other than cognition. It creates the same difficulty again in the case of kevalins. If they possess mind it must have some bearing on their cognition. 415 to In order to explain this difficulty we should understand the position of mind clearly. It is wrong confine the activity of mind to cognition only. The mind as a faculty of knowing and the mind as yoga or inner activity are two different things. One is the result of ksayopasama while the latter is a positive activity of the soul, produced as the effect of certain karmans. When the same activity is caused by Mohaniya it results into anger, pride or other passions. When it is caused by Vedaniya it results into painful or pleasurable feelings. But, the physical mind, which is the general cause of all these activities, is the same in all these cases. We cannot explain certain activities of a kevalin, just as preaching, replying the questions, discussions, visiting various places for propagation of his mission etc. Without admitting the existence of mind. As far as his intuitional knowledge is concerned, mind is not required. As a matter of fact the mind is incapable or rather contrary to the vision of

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416 Epistemology of Jainas truth. It leads towards a particular point of view only; while the intuition is comprehensive. It is always above the mental approach. Thus, we come to the conclusion that as far as kevalajnana is concerned, the mind has nothing to do. But, the other functions of a keyalin are not free from the mental operation, Kerala and Feeling The kevalin in sayogin gunasthana possesses four karmans, Vedanrya is one of them. Consequently, he feels the pleasure and pain according to the physical or external causes. Of course, this feeling is not so intepse as it would have been if accompanied by moha. Nevertheless, the feeling is there and a kevalio also cannot escape from it as long as there is Vedanfya. Kundakunda and the Digambara tradition following him, deny the existence of pain in a kevalin. But, their view goes against the Tattvartha and the theory of karman, which propose the existence of eleven hardships (parisaha) in a kevalin also. Though Pujyapada and Akalarka, in the light of Kundakunda, have tried to minimize it on the ground that the absence of MohanIya renders the effect of Vedaniya insignificant. But, there is no sense in accepting the existence of Vedaniya in a kevalin if it is absolutely without effect. Samantabhadra has clearly stated the existence of pleasure and pain in a kevalin. The Keralin and other Activities Like Bodhisattva the Jaina Arhat also, after revelation, is engaged in different activities of preaching and converting others to his path of liberation. He also possesses certain external and internal embellishments for influencing others. The complete knowledge is one of them. It is described as one of the twelve exceptional merits possessed by an Arbat. But, leaving jnadatisaya and apayagamatisaya, the remaining ten! exceptional merits are not common to every kevalin. There are 1 Aptam masa, 93

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Direct Knowledge 417 muka-kevalios, ( dumb) who cannot speak. They are far from pujatisaya ( excellence is worship ) and vagatisaya ( excellence in speech). The eight external embellishments are particular to Tirtharkaras. The other arhats, who rise from the position of a common man do not possess them. The Buddhists attribute omoiscience also to Bodhisattva only as his exceptional merit. The Jainas hold it as common. According to Svetambaras the activities of an arhat, just as cating, walking, speaking and others are similar to ordinary men. But, the Digambaras hold exceptions in them also. An arhat does not take his diet from the solid food. He gets it from other stuff through supernatural power. He does not feel hunger or thirst. His speech does not come from mouth but sprouts from the entire body; with an inarticulate sound; which is understood by all the audience in different languages. It is said that the same sound turns into seven hundred different dialects. The Svetambaras hold that a Tirtharkara gives bis sermons in Ardhamagadhi, the dialect spoken on the borders of ancient Magadha and Kosala. It is, perhaps, because, the last two Tirthankaras flourished in that region. The Other Differences between an Arhat and Ordinary Kevalios We have discussed above, yoga as the distinguishing factor between the thirteenth and fourteenth gunasthanas. The same makes a distinction between an arhat and siddha. The difference between the kevalin in fourteenth gunasthana and the siddhas is that the latter is without physical existence. The former possesses it without any activity. The siddhas possess eight qualities : (1) Ananta Jnana-Infinite knowledge (2) Ananta Darsana-Infinite perception (3) Avyabadha Sukha - Infinite bliss (4) Aksaya sthiti-Permanent existence (5) Ksayika samyaktva ---Right attitude resulting from the destruction of karmans 1 Prayacanasara I. 44.

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418 Epistemology of Jainas (6) Amurtitva-Immateriality or intergibility (7) Ananta Sakti-Infinite power. (8) Agurulaghutva-Absence of weight. Out of these the first, second, fifth and seventh are found in the Arhat also. The remaining four are particular to Siddhas only, The Kevala and Other Types of Knowledge It has been already stated that jnanavaraniya is divided into five types, corresponding to the five types of knowledge. Each type is manifested when the corresponding avarana is removed. Kevalajnana is manifested when the avaranas are totally removed. It means the existence of all the four types of knowledge along with kevala. The Jaina thinkers hold different explanations to this phenomenon. 1. According to the old tradition the four types of incomplete knowledge also co-exist with the kevala; but, they are useless as kevala dominates them. They are like a hundred rupees possessed by a millionare. We cannot say that the millionare does not possess hundred rupees, but they are not mentioned when his worth is estimated. We can also compare them with the light of candle in the midday when the sun is shining brightly. According to this conception the incomplete knowledge does not differ from the complete one as far as its nature is concerned. 2. According to Jayadhavala and Dhavala! Kevalajnana. varana obscures the complete knowledge. But, that obscurance is not so thick as to wipe out the light entirely. Certain rays comeout inspite of the obscurance. Those rays are responsible for the different types of incomplete knowledge. They are fur. ther obscured by the corresponding avaranas. When the obscurance is totally removed the question of certain rays producing knowledge does not arise. We compare this phenomenon with the light coming in the room through a small hole. 1. Dhavala Book XIII pp. 214, 215 & 345

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Direct Knowledge 419 When the complete wall is removed the certain rays coming through the hole amalgamate in the full gloom. 3. Yasovijaya explains the same in different manner. He compares kevalajnanavarana with the clouds obscuring the sun. Though the cloud enshrouds the light of the sun; yet its obscurance is not very thick. It is not so strong as to wipe out the difference between day and night. But, that dim light also can be further obscured by wall etc. The avaranas of mati etc. are compared with this obscurance. At the time of kevala the obscurance of both the types is destroyed. This also means a sort of merger into the complete knowledge. But, Yasovijaya introduces a new theory. He says that kevalajnanavarana has two functions. On one hand it obscures the keyalajnana; on other hand, it produces the incomplete knowledge, which is further obscured by the other types of avarana. When the kevalajnanavarana is removed the question of the existence of incomplete knowledge does not arise. It is evident that Yasovijaya is clearly influenced by the Vedantic conception of the two functions of avidya. An avarana can conceal the light as well as blur the vision so that the object appears as disfigured, as in the case of whirling stick lighted at the ends (alatacakra) or the appearance of two moons. But, where the knowledge is correct, whether partial or complete, it cannot be produced by avarana. The Vedantic conception of viksepasakti can be justified on the ground that the appearance of external objects is false. It must have some defect in the cause. But, the Jainas do not hold the appearance of external objects as false. It is as true as the cognition produced by kevala. The difference lies in quantity and not in quality. Kevalajnana and its avarana are opposed to each other. The latter cannot produce kevalajnana. In the same way it cannot produce any other knowledge which holds the same nature as kevala. 4. Kundakunda proposes a fundamental difference between the two types of knowledge. He says that kevala is natural (svabbava) while the other types are extra-natural (vibhava)2. 1. Pravacanasara. 1/47-49 & 58.

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420 Epistemology of Jainas But, he does not explain his view. We can explain it in the light of Yasovijaya. It can also be interpreted in the light of Brahmajnana of the Vedanta. It means that the incomplete knowledge is not a part of the complete one but, an altogether different or rather opposite category. The reality cannot be realized in parts. The partial vision is not a true vision even to some extent. The truth is always complete. Even if we want to know one thing we have to know the all. There is no differenco between the complete knowledge of one thing and the knowledge of entire universe. It means that the complete knowledge and incomplete knowledge cannot stay together. 5. There is another factor also which draws a line of distinction between the two. The incomplete knowledge is always accompanied by pride and prejudice, favour and disfavour. It results into love or hatred, attachment or enmity. The complete koowledge results into the indifferential attitude. Though this difference is not due to the existence or nonexistence of passions; yet, the passions do play a part in deciding the nature of knowledge. We cannot think incomplete knowledge without passions. Similarly, one cannot think the complete knowledge with passions. 6. Samantabhadra asserts that complete truth is found in the knowledge of the omniscient only. Incomplete knowledge is always mixed with more or less amount of falsity. Kevala and Speech According to the Buddhist and Vedantist the reality is beyond the approach of mind as well as speech. The speech can represent the reality only when it is mixed with some conceptual element; which is not a reality. On this ground they hold that speech and omniscience are opposite to each other. According to Jainism the speech represents only a partial view of the object, but, that view is not wrong. It is also correct in relation to its own sphere of relativity. It becomes wrong only when it denies the views based on other aspects. Thus, according to Jainism the speech and omniscience are not opposed to each other.

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Direct Knowledge 421 The Object of Kevalajnana The Upanisads repeatedly stress upon the knowledge of one which can lead to the knowledge of all. It is their main teaching. The Acaranga also anounces that a person who knows one, he kaows all; and who knows all, he knows one. Both of them identify the knowledge of one with the knowledge of all.1 But, the two systems explain the above fact in different ways. According to the Vedanta Brahman is the only reality. The knowledge of Brahman means the knowledge of entire reality. It denounces the knowledge of external things as mere verbal wrangling. It holds that the cause is the only reality and its knowledge implies the knowledge of effect. Behadaranyaka says that the earth is the only reality. Its effects are merely the play of words. It is earth where all the pots of different types subsist. The knowledge of earth means the knowledge of all pots. Similarly, the knowledge of Brahman means the knowledge of entire universe. It does not mean that a person with the knowledge of Brahman comes to possess the knowledge of all things. It only means that he has seen the fundamental reality; after which the knowledge of resultant objects becomes false. But, the Jaina interpretation is quite different. It does not hold that the knowledge of the fundamental cause is the only knowledge. The knowledge of effects also is as true as that of the cause. Knowledge of one as leading to the knowledge of all only means that all objects are so interrelated that the complete knowledge of one implies the knowledge of all. This contention is based on the fundamental principles of relative existence. Kundakunda's view Kundakunda provides another explanation of the above. He says that the above issue can be explained according to two view-points (nayas). If we follow that real view point (niscaya. naya) a kevalin perceives his self only. But, from the discursive i. Acaraoga 1/23.

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422 Epistemology of Jainas view-point he knows all the objects.2 Kundakunda generally interprets Jaina conceptions in the light of Vedanta. According to the Vedanta Brahman is self cognizant, similarly Kundakunda also holds soul as the self-cognizant. The vyavaharanaya of Kundakunda is just like the vyavabarika-satta of the Vedanta; which maintains that, on discursive plade, sarvajna means the cognizer of all external appearances, as it is in the case of God. Kundakunda is interpreted also in the following way: According to the real view.point the soul is self-cognizant. It does not cognize anything else. But, all objects stand as reflected into soul. The knowledge of soul, therefore, ultimately leads to the knowledge of entire universe. Arguments for Omniscience We have given above some arguments generally advanced to prove omiscience. Below we give a summary of those and others briefly: I. The soul is a knower by nature. It cannot remain ignorant of any object if there is no obstruction ; just as fire cannot cease to burn the fuel if it is without obstacle. 2 2. The incomplete knowledge, which we experience, is a part of the complete one. The existence of the whole implies the existence of the part. 3. The passions (dosa) and obscurances (avarana) must disappear totally at a certain stage as they have gradation ; just as the removal of the foreign matter from gold3. 4. The knowledge must have its stage of completeness as it is a graded phenomenon ; just as in the case of size the highest stage is found in the space, similarly, in the case of knowledge it is omniscience4. 5. We see the people with different degrees of intellect, sagacity etc. They must attain perfectness at a certain stage; because, they have a gradation. 1. Niyamasara 159. 2. Astasahasrl p. 50. 3. AptamImamsa, 4-5; Tattvartha Slokavartika, 1/29/32-33. 4. Tattvartha, Slokavarika 1/29/23.

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CHAPTER V DARSANA INARTICULATE COGNITION Darsana as Attitude The term darsana is applied in two senses. In ethical field it means attitude of the soul towards worldly objects. It is right (samyak) if the soul leans towards spiritual progress & believes in liberation as the highest aim of life. It is wrong (mithya) if the soul is engrossed in worldly pleasures and goes astray from the ultimate goal?. According to Siddhasena Divakara darsana, in the sense of attitude, is to be included into matijnapa.? But this can be said of the attitude found upto the seventh gunasthapa only; where right attitude is caused by the rise of samyaktva mohan Iya. The ksayopasama of matijnanavarana and the rise of either of the three degrees of darsanamohaniya create a certain attitude of mind towards worldly objects; it is called samyagdssti, mithyadssti or misradesti as the case may be, Beyond the seventh gunasthana the aspirant positively gets ksayika samyaktva which is a natural characteristic of the soul. It exists even in the liberated souls. This attitude is beyond the range of matijnana. Though ksayika samyaktva is possible in the fourth gunasthana also, yet, the existence of other varieties is not ruled out. As a matter of fact, the right attitude can be created in two ways; firstly, it is a result of simple faith produced by the teachings of certain persons to whom we are devoted; or by the books which we hold in high esteem, being the sacred books of our family; or by logical confirmation based on arguments. Secondly, it comes as the result of inner purification; when a person subdues his passions, and rises above the pride apd prejudices, be gets a real and distinct vision of soul and 1. Tattvartha I. 2. 2. Tattvartha tika p. 29

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424 Epistemology of Jainas matter. The first type is a variety of mati as it is a mental phenomenon. The second type is manifestation of the natural quality of soul. The psychology of early Buddhism divides knowledge into three degrees-ditthi (opinion), vitakka vicara (logical operations) and bodhi (intuitive knowledge). The latter two degrees can be compared with paroksa and pratyaksa of the Tattvartha. The first degree is characterised as opinion not guided by reason (pannindiya) but, by desires (tanha). In the Jaina literature we meet both the terms; i. e. darsana and ditthi. But the ditthi of Buddhists is related with wrong attitude only. They do not hold any category as right attitude; because all conceptual knowledge, according to them, is false.1 Epistemology and Darsana In the theory of knowledge darsana is generally interpreted as inarticulate (nirakara) appearance preceding articulate (sakara) knowledge.2 Almost all the Indian schools of philosophy, except Bhartr hari, Madhva and Vallabha, have admitted two stages of perception and recognized the existence of an indeterminate cognition before the stage of determinate cognition. But, they hold slightly different views regarding the nature of these two stages: - Sankara holds indeterminate perception as the apprehension of mere being; the particular object and its properties are beyond its scope. According to this view the appearance of mere being (satta) is the only appearance of reality. The association of particular names and properties is a projection of avidya, and therefore, false. It means that the first stage of inarticulation is the cognition of reality and the stages of articulation are mere concepts, without corresponding objective 52 1. Psychological attitude of Early Buddhism p. 2. Prajnapana 15 pada. 3. Vedanta Sara

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425 reality. The general conception of the Jaina also resembles the Vedanta as far as it holds mere being as the object of darsana. But, the Jaina does not make any distinction between articulate and inarticulate cognition in regard to their relation with the reality. He holds that both are equally real and objective. In the above sense akara means bheda (division). Darsana The Buddhist1 also holds the articulate cognition merely conceptual, having no objective reality; and inarticulate cognition as the apprehension of mere objective reality. But, unlike the Vedantist he does not hold it as the apprehension of mere being. He contends that inarticulate cognition apprehends the thing-in-itself, without any association of name or class-concepts. The difference between Vadanta and the Buddhism owes to their different conceptions of reality. The Buddhist does not divide perception into the above-mentioned two varieties, but holds them as independent types of knowledge; namely, pratyaksa (perception) and anumana (inference). There are two different types of objects also corresponding to them. Perception is related with percepts, the objective reality and inference with concepts which have no objective reality. According to Jainism concepts are not devoid of objective reality. The Buddhism holds akara as vikalpa, the conceptual notions of class, name etc. and not bheda as the Vedanta maintains. According to Buddhism every thing is svalaksana, i. e. having its own individual definition, without any similarity with others. The difference between Jaina and Buddhist can be noticed in the following points: 1. According to Buddhism vikalpa is merely conceptual; according to Jainism it is as real as the percepts. 2. According to Buddhism the object of first appearance is particular without any identification with others. According to Jainism it is general without any distinction. 3. The Buddhist stresses upon the term nirvikalpa; as vikaIpa according to him, means absence of reality. The Jainas 1. Nyayabindu p. 11

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426 Epistemology of Jainas propose nirakara, as the cognition of generality has no particular form or shape. 4. The Buddhists proceed from particular to general. The Jainas from general to particular. 5. According to the Buddbist nirvikalpaka cognition occurs when three factors of mental-stream (citta-saptati), sepse-stream (indriya-santati) and object-stream (visaya-santati) meet one another. According to Jainism it occurs just after the contiguity between senses and the object. This contiguity is not necessarily a contact but the capability of perceiving the object; caused by a particular ksayopasama. In the case of intuitional (avadhi and kevala) darsanas the senses do not play any part 7. As far as the cognizer and the object are concerned the Jaina does not hold any difference between jnana and darsana, According to Buddhism nirvikalpa is the result of above three factors while savikalpa is mere mental. In one case the object is real, in the other it is unreal. 8. The Buddhism holds pratyaksa as the ielumination and anumana as creation. According to Jainism every cognition is illumination. Kumarila i holds that indeterminate perception apprehends the individual (vyakti), which is the substratum (adhara) of its generic and specific characters. The Buddhist also held individual as the object of inarticulate cognition; but, that individual was devoid of all concepts. Kumarila maintains, the same as the substratum of class-concepts. He also holds akara as the name or class but, unlike Buddhism they are not merely conceptual. Prabha kara maintains that both the generic and specific characters are the object of inarticulate cognition; but they appear in it as an indistinguishable mass. 1 In his view 1. Slokavartika Sutra IV. 113. see also Strua lv, 112 and 118; and Nyayaratnakara

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Darsana akara means arrangement. The earlier Vaisesika also holds the same view. Parthasarathi Misra,1 the great exponent of Kumarila, views that inarticulate cognition is the apprehension of an object with its multifarious properties, such as generality, substantiality, quality, action and name etc. but they do not appear as related to one another. According to this view akara means relation * Vacaspati Misra presents the Sankhya view of immediate perception as the simple apprehension of an object, pure, unqualified and uncharacterised. In this view akara means qualification or characterization.3 427 The earlier Naiyayika1 maintains that there is no difference between the two except that the inarticulate cognition does not give any name to the object. As far as the cognition of substantiality, quality, generality and action are concerned they are similar to each other. Here akara means 'name' which resembles the Jaina conception of sruta-jnana. The later N.V. hold that indeterminate perception apprehends the object and its property as unrelated to each other. Here, akara means relation.5 The Neo-Sankarites also hold that indeterminate perception is the nonrelational appearance of an object which is not necessarily sensuous in character. The old Vedantist expressed the object of immediate perception in positive terms. Here, the same is repeated in negative terms in order to avoid dialectical difficulties. 1. Prakarana Pancika pp. 54-5. 2. Sastradipika pp. 139-140. 3. Sankhya Tattva Kaumudi K. 5. 4. Nyayabhasya 1. 1. 4. 5. Tattvacintamani Vol. I. (B. I.) p. 809 6. Vedanta Paribhasa p. 89

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428 Epistemology of Jainas The above mentioned systems have coined different terms to suit their conceptions of the two cognitions. The main terms are as given below: 1. Vedanta and Jainism - Nirakara sakara 2. Buddhism Nirvikalpaka savikalpaka 3. Nyaya Nisprakara saprakara If we take up nirakara and sakara as the general terms, the above views can be summed up as follows: 1. Nirakara has generality as its object while sakara has particularity (Vedanta). 2. Nirakara is particular while sakara is general. The position is totally reversed (Buddhism). 3. Nirakara has both, general and particular, as its object but without any relation (Parthasarathi Misra). 4. Nirakara means cognition of an object without any quality (Saonkhya). 5. Nirakara means cogpition of both, the object as well as its property, without relation (Nyaya). 6. Akara means class. Nirakara means the cognition of individual without associating it with a class (Kumarila). 7. Nirakara means absence of name (old Nyaya). Darsana in the Jaina Epistemology The Paanavana sutta divides upayoga into sakara (articulate) and nirakare ( inarticulate ) cognitions. The sakara is known as jnana while nirakara as darsana. Darsana is devoid of judgment (vyavasaya). In the logical period it is not included into the category of pramana. As a matter of fact it is neither pramana nor apramapa. The terms applied to valid and invalid judgments respectively. Darsana is mere awareness without any predication. Regarding the actual nature of darsana the Jaina scholars

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Darsana hold widely different views. Before going into the detailed account we would like to sum up them in the following: 1. The direct cognition is darsana while that obtained through a mark is jnana. 2. Darsana apprehends the present only, while jnana is related with all the three times. 429 3. Darsana is limited to the appearance of mere existence; while jnana begins with particularization. 4. Darsana represents the view-point of universality and jaana that of particularity. 5. Darsana is the cognition of particular object without knowing their particularity. 6. Darsana is the first two stages of mati; i. e. avagraha and Tha. Jnana begins from the stage of avaya. 7. Darsana stands on the same stage in the case of mind and vision where Vyanjanavagraha stands in the case of touch senses. 8. Darsana is identical with Vyanjanavagraha; jnana proceeds with Arthavagraha. 9. Avagraha is Dargana; while the subsequent stages of tha etc. are jnana. 10. Darsana apprehends the self only, while jnana is related with external objects. 11. Darsana is the first inclination of soul towards knowing something, preceding the contiguity: 1) Darsana as Direci Cognition: The first view has been referred to by Siddhasena Ganin in his commentary on the Taevartha. Unfortunately, we are in the dark about the upholder of this view. Siddhasena Ganin mentions it only to reject it at the end. According to this view the term akara, as stated in the Prajnapana and other Agamas, means the mark. Sakara 1. Prajnapana 15 pada 2. Tattvarthatika Su. II. 8, p. 152

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430 Epistemology of Jainas upayoga mzans the cogaition obtained through a mark, as one infers a conch from its sweet and soft sound. It does not include the case of visual perception where we cognize a jar through appearance of certain form, as the mark must be diffe. rent from the object that is conceived. Roughly stated, this view renders all the sense-cognitions as darsana while limits jnana to the inferential types only. But, in its deeper sense, this view reflects Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. They hold two types of koowledge corresponding to the two types of objects. The external real objects are particulars without the association of class or name, which makes them expressible. They are merely perceptual. The notions of class, name ete. are merely mental creations. Their knowledge is conceptual. Perceptual knowledge is direct, while the conceptual is formed by the mind on the basis of perception. It is an attempt to explain the appearance. The division of darsana and jnana, according to the view under discussion, can be identified with perceptual and conceptual types of knowledge of the Buddhist. Like Dinnaga and Dharmakirti, the modern thinkers like Bosanquet also hold that all conceptual knowledge is inferential. We do not see a jar, but a particular form which gives rise to a particular class-concept already existing in the mind. The cogni. tion of mere form is Darsana while its adjustment with a class concept is joana. In the words of Kant the appearance of the thiag-initself is darsana while its understanding through moulding it into certain categories is jnana. The Indian realists maintain that knowledge of an object through visual and factual qualities is perception while that through the qualities of taste or sound is inference. The knowledge of a jar, through its visible form is perception; but, the knowledge of a car through its sound is inference. As a matter of fact both the cases belong to the same category. In the case of jar, we do not see jar but a particular shape. We call that shape as jar, because, we are taught to associate that particular name with that particular form. That teaching is revived in memory and we call a particular shape with the particular name. In the case of car we listen to

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Darsana 431 the sound and infer the car. In the case of jar we see a particular colour and form and infer the jar. There is no material difference between the two cases. It can be said that sound is not a quality of the car. It is a mark, indicating existence of the car. In the case of visual perception the form and colour are the very characteristics of the object. The person who has cognition of this type does not make further attempts. His curiosity is satisfied. The process of perceiving the object is finished along with it. But, in the case of sound one is not satisfied with that much. He desires to ascertain further till the object is clearly seen. It shows a clear difference between the knowledge of sound and that of the form. But, this distinction holds good in a rough estimate only. When the question is discussed minutely it does not stand any longer. The desire does not prove the absence of clarity; but, the anxiousness to know a particular quality on the part of the subject. In the case of a mango-fruit the subject is not satisfied with the observation of colour and form. He is not satisfied till he does not taste it. In the case of a flower one is not satisfied till he smells it. In the case of a musical instrument one desires to kaow its sound. The desire depends mainly on the purpose served by the object. The object is not deemed as known until its main quality, for which it is recognized as such, is known. What is said about the sound and car, can be said of taste and the fruit also. The objection that sound is different from the object, does not apply to this case. The taste is a quality of the fruit. One infers the nature of fruit through its taste; which is an essential characteristic of all the tangible objects (rupins). Thus, we can say that all the conceptual knowledge is inferential. According to the view under discussion all knowledge, i. e. jnada is conceptual or inferential. It is a judgment, where something is predicated. The appearance without predication is darsana. If the present view is accepted in the sense explained above, not much difference remains between it and the popularly accepted view which we have numbered three. The only difficulty

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Epistemology of Jainas that stands against it, is, that it falls short in the case of intuitional cognitions. The Jaina Agamas accept distinction between darsana and jnana in the case of avadhi and kevala also. But, we cannot say, in their case, that one is obtained through mark while the other is not. All of them are direct. Siddhasena Ganin rejects the above view on this very ground.1 432 (2) Darsana as Confined to the Present only: The second view is this; darsana apprehends the present only while jnana is related with all the three tenses, present, past and future. We can compare this view with the modern thinkers like Russell, differentiating sensation from image. Russell holds that sensation is without any mixture of the past events or memory, while the image is not constructed until it is mixed with the past impressions or memory. This view also falls short in the case of intuitional knowledge, particularly that of omniscience, where every thing is perceptual. It may be observed that the above two views, though logically sound, are not accepted, because they fall short in the case of supernatural knowledge. (3) Darsana as the Apprehension of Generic character: According to Jainism everything consists of both the generic as well as the specific characters. It is also admitted that knowledge as a general rule, proceeds from generality to particularity. We have elaborately discussed this factor in the division of matijnana. According to the present view dargana, apprehends generality while jnana is related with particularity. It can be said that the terms of generality and particularity are not fixed, they are relative. The same object can claim both the categories in different relations. But, in the present case generality means absolute generality, which is in no way particularity, such as the apprehension of mere being. Though, this view is generally accepted by the Agamic as well as the later scholars; yet, it is not free from confusion. It 1. Tattvartha Sutra II, 8. p. 152 2. Sanmati Tarka 2. 1

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Darsana 433 is generally held that darsana is the first apprehension, occurring after the contiguity of subject with the object. But, it is incopsistent with the conception of vyanjanavagraha. VyanjaDavagraha is generally defined as the contact between senses and the object. It is the physical grasping of an object. It is included in the process of knowledge simply because it is cause of the latter. No knowledge of any sort, whether general or particular is possible before it. The limitation of vyanjana. vagraha to the four senses, which cognize the object after real contact, has no significance if it is not the first stage or is preceded by some other apprehension. Vyanjanavagraha is followed by arthavagraha. Thus, there is no place for darsana. While defining avagraha, some scholars have specified that after contiguity there is darsana and then avagraha. But, this order also goes against the notion of vyanjapavagraha. In other definitions the avagraha is stated as the first apprehension of generality after the contiguity. If this view is accepted, darsana would mean a stage before contiguity. Yasovijayasuggests a solution for this difficulty. He states that darsana is nothing but naiscayikavagraha. It should be recalled here that vyanjapavagraha is mere contiguity of senses and the object. The subsequent stage is artbavagraha. It has two considerations. When considered precisely it is the first general apprehension occurring after contiguity. It is known as naiscayikavagraha. Roughly considered avagraba is a relative term. Generality, in this case, means a comparative generality. The apprehension, "He is a man" is a cognition of particularity as it specifies the class of man etc. In true aspect such cogoitions are avaya. But, when the cognizer goes further and tries to know whether the person under consideration is an English or German, the former cognition becomes ava1. Sarvarthasiddhi 2. Laghsyastraya p. 2, sloka 5. 3. Jnanabindu

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434 Epistemology of Jainas graba. But, the paiscayikavagraha is absolutely free from the potions of class, name etc. Yasovijaya holds the same as darsana. This view, though rational, upsets the Agamic divisions of mati. The province of mati starts with vyanjanavagraha and ends with dbarana. To hold darsana as a middle stage makes the latter a part of mati. (4) Darsana as the Representative of dravyarthika naya : Siddhasena Divakara, who always looks to the side of object, explains jnana and darsana in another way. He says that universality and particularity are two aspects of one and the same individual. The consideration of these aspects is based on two different view-points (payas). The view-points related with the aspect of universality are known as dravyarthika while those with the aspect of particularity are termed as paryayarthika. Darsana and jnana stress upon these two fundamental aspects respectively. Though the object is same in both cases; yet, darsana takes into consideration the universal aspect, while jnana the particular one. 'In the stage of omniscierce, when the object is intuitioned as whole and not in parts, and the knowledge is all comprehensive, the distinction of darsana and jnana disappears. (5) Darsani as the cognition of particulars without particularity: According to Abhayadeva', the commentator of Sanmati, Darsana is the cognition of particular objects without knowing their particularity. This is a logical explanation of Siddhasena in the light of Nyaya. It means that the object is same in the case of Darsana as well as Jnana. But, in the first case the particulars are not recognized as such. They are apprehended without any relation between one another. (6) Darsana as the first two stages of Mati : Jinabhadra in his Visesavasyakabhasya and Malayagiri in his commentary on the Sthanarga sutra, refer to a view holding avagraba and iha 1. Sanmatitarka II. 2. 2. Sanmatitarka Tika p. 553

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Darsana 435 as darsana, while the latter stages of avaya and dharana as jnana. The identification of darsana with avagraha and tha, as the present view proposes, puts down the objection raised above. But, this would either upset the theory of the four stages of matijnana or reject the separate existence of darsana.1 (7) Darsana as the first stage of Distant-senses: Siddhasena Divakara2 holds that darsana is the first apprehension of things cognized by the distant senses. According to this view darsanais confined to two senses only, i. e. the sight and the mind. The four touch-senses do not come in this category. The terms caksur-darsana and acaksur-darsana are confined here, to the visual and mental cognitions respectively. The mental cognition here does not include inference etc. in it. It is confined to conceptual judgments only, just as the existence of atoms. This view brings darsana at par with vyanjanavagraha. The stage ascribed to vyanjanavagaraha in the case of touch-senses, is allotted to darsana in the case of other senses. (8) Darsana as identical with Vyanjanavagraha: Brahmadeva3 states contiguity as the definition of darsana; but, he does not exclude the touch-senses from this category. In his case the scope of vyanjanavagraha is identical with darsana. (9) Darsana as Arthavagraha: Siddhasena Divakara1 refers to another view, which holds that arthavagraha is darsana, while the subsequent stages are jnana. We have already discussed this view in the name of Yasovijaya. According to Brahmadeva the cognition of colour, taste etc. in a general way is darsana while that of its division, yellow, white etc., is jnana. This conception also amounts to the same view as expressed above. 1. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 536 2. Sanmatitarka II. 21. 3. Brhaddravyasangraha p. 81 4. Sanmatitarka II. 22. 5. Brhaddravyasangraha p. 88

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436 Epistemology of Jainas (10) Darsana as apprehension of the self: Virasena' refers to a view that every cognition apprehends the self as well as the external object. The two parts of objectivity are confined to darsana and jnana respectively. Darsana apprehends the self only while jnapa is related with external objects. This view fixes the provinces of jnana and darsana definitely. A point is raised that the above view goes against the general notion of jnana. It is defined as cognition of the self as well as the object. If the distinction between jnana and drasana is based on their being cognitions of the external objects and the self, respectively, jnana stands no more as the cognition of both. Thus, the Jaina conception of knowledge would become identical with that of the Nyaya. Brahmadeva" replies that the above objection is not applicable in the present case. The Naiyayika does not hold darsana and jnana as two different types of knowledge. He maintains that no knowledge is self-luminous. It means that there is no instrument to know knowledge itself. It would remaid always unknown at the time of its production. It is only in later stages that the knowledge itself can be cognised, if so desired. According to Jainism darsana and jnada are two different types complementing each other. Thus, nothing remains unknown. They are two functions of the same agent. For instance, fire burns as well cooks. The activity of fire is the same in both cases. The distinction is based on the objects it operates upon. The same activity operates on fuel as burning, and on rice as cooking. Similarly, the same consciousness when acts as apprehension of the self, it is darsana; while the same is jnana when. apprehending external objects. The division is based on the objects and not on the activity. (11) Darsana as the first inclination of the self: Dhavalas. improves the last view that darsana starts with the first inclina1. Dhavala pp. 145-48 2. Bshaddravyasangraha p. 82 3. Dhavala p. 458.9

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Darsana 437 tion of the self to know an object. This stage precedes the stage of contiguity. If we consider the process of knowledge, the above views can be put in the following order : 1. Inclination or mere awareness-The view held by Dhavala 2. Contiguity-Siddhasena and Yasovijaya. 3. The cognition of mere existence-Pujyapada and the logical period 4. Cognition of general type-Nemicandra and Brahmadeva As a matter of fact the term avagraha and its general definition denote that it is the first stage where an object comes into consideration. Darsana, therefore, must be the stage of mere awareness or contiguity. In the latter case it would be confined to two senses only as the case of touch-senses goes to vyanjapavagraha. Further, the terms of vyanjanavagraha and Arthavagraha themselves support the above view. Vyanjanavagraha is merely an activity of senses before reaching the object, as vyanjapa means the senses which manifest the object. It is in the stage of arthavagraha that the object enters into the process. Now, darsana must be a stage preceding them. It can be nothing but the desire of soul towards knowing a particular object, which sets the senses at work. Brahmadeval explains it in the following way: The self makes an effort to know the external object. It is an intellectual phenomenon resulting into jnana. This effort is darsana while the later cognition is joana. For instance, a person is engaged in conceiving a jar, wishes to know a cloth. He turns his mind from the jar and tries to apply the same to cloth. The middle stage when the mind has left the association with jar and has not reached the cloth is darsana. This state lasts for a short while only. 1. Bihaddravyasangraha p. 81

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438 Epistemology of Jainas Darsana is recognized as 'samapyagrahana' in all the texts. But the term samanya is interpreted differently. Virasena' and Brahmadeva2 assert that samanya means the self or jiva. Virasena says that the self is samanya (general); because, it is common in all the cases of cognition. He further states that visual darsana is the result of the ksayopabama of caksurdarsanavarna. This ksayopasama, though confined to visual perception only, does not make any distinction amongst the perceptions of different objects. Perception of jar is the result of similar ksayopasama as it is the perception of cloth. Ksayopasama is the manifestation of a particular power. The power is not related with the cognition of particular objects, but, to the capacity of soul. It would illumine any object that is within the grasp of that capacity. The ksayopasama is identical with the self and its first inclination towards application of that power is darsana. Brabmadeva holds that the self is samanya; because, it is common to all cognitions. The soul is a common cause in the perception of a jar as well as a cloth. The two cognitions are differentiated from each other on the basis of objects only. Dhavala and Akalarka Another explanation in this context may be traced in Rajavartika. Akalarkal states that consciousness has two forms; the subjective form (jnanakara) and the objective form (ineyakara). The subjective form is like the mirror without reflection; and the objective form is like that with reflection. Darbapa, as stated by Dhavala, can be identified with jnanakara while jnana with jneyakara. Akalanka relates jnanakara as paratman while joeyakara as svatman; but, that is in respect of a jar, the object. If the same thing is considered in respect of the self or knowledge the order will be reverse. Then, jnadakara would be considered as svatman and jneyakara or parat1. Dhavala p. 380-82 2. Behaddravyasangraha p. 81 3. Rajavartika p. 55

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Drasana 439 man. Darsana, on account of its being unassociated with the objective element, is svatman, the real nature of the self. Jnana is associated with the object, and therefore, it is not the real nature of the self. It is paratman. Akalanka also states jnada. kara as common to all cognitions (sarvasadbarana) while joeyakara as different with each cognition. It is particular (visesa). Thus, we can say that the above statement is a logical interpretation of Dhavala. The Criticism of Dhayala An objection based on the literal meaning of the term of darsana, is advanced against Dhavala. Darsana means observation. If the external objects are not observed by darsana, none else can do so. This will render the whole universe invisible as it is in the case of a blind man. Brahmadeva replies to the above that the function of observation is done by jnana. Philosophical conceptions do not pecessarily follow the popular sense of a term. The process of knowledge begins with darsana and lasts upto the final stage of jnana. The purpose of present discussion is to allot the province to each stage. The popular view has no weight whether observation should be included into jnana or darsana. Moreover, darsana is not directly related to the external object. Indirectly, it covers everything. Darsana observes the self, which contains jnana and jnana is related with the external object. Again, it can be objected; if darsana and jnana are apprehensions of the self and external things respectively, they should appear simultaneously; as the soul is never selfignorant. Dhavala replies, when the obscuring karman is totally removed, jnana and darsana are always simultancous. But, in the case of incomplete knowledge they appear gradually. In the state of external appearance the internal is obscured. Obscurance does not mean here total disappearance but its falling into the back ground.

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440 Epist, mology of Jainas Again it can be asked that srutajnana also is self.cognitive ike other cognitions. Consequently, there should be a srutadarsana preceding srutajnana. Dhavala replies that this objection stands no more as sruta is preceded by mati, which is also jnana. Similarly, manahparyaya also preceded by mati or avadhi, and therefore, has no corresponding darsana. Again, there is one objection, which is a bit hard to explain. If darsana, being an internal appearance, is independent of the senses; the division of caksurdarsana and acaksurdarsana becomes groundless, because, in the region of internal cognitions the only instrument that works is the soul; which is common in all cases. Dhavala replies that the division of darsana is not based on the self-appearance but on its subsequent transformation into jnana. Caksurdarsana means the self-appearance resulting into visual cognition and so on. According to Jaipas every cognition of an exterpal object is preceded by the corresponding effort of soul which is termed after the resulting jnana. The number of ksayopasamas, responsible for darsana, is the same as that of resulting jnana, This contention is not a fancy. It is based on sound logic. In each and every case of cognition we have to admit the consciousness of certain inherent power existing in the soul, This explains the order of succession also in the case, of different darsanas. The darsana of jar is not coexistent with the darsana of cloth; because, they are produced in succession. Two senses of self cognition According to Jainism all cognitions apprehend the object as well as the self. But, Dhavala holds that darsana does not apprehend the external object, while jnana does not apprehend the self. We can explain this difficulty by analysing the mean. ing of the self (sva). The cognition of the self ( svaprakasa ) has two meanings. Firstly, it is self-illumination accompanying all the appearances of external as well as the internal objects. Secondly, it is activity of the self occurring before

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Darsana 441 jnana. It is a sort of attention. In the distinction of jnana from darsana we take the latter sense. In the definition of knowledge as general we have the former sense. The Main differences summed up The main differences between the conventional view and that of Dhavala can be summed up in the following points : Conventional view Dhavala's view 1. Jnana is a decisive knowledge Darsana and jnana both are of the self as well as the decisive; darsana is related object, darsana is not deci. with the self while jnana sive. with external objects. 2. Darsana is the cognition of Darsana and jnana both are generality, while jnana is that cognitions of generality as of particularity. well as particularity. 3. Both occur after the conti- Barsana is prior and jnana guity of senses with the posterior to the contiguity. object. 4. Both are related with the self Darsana is related with the as well as external objects. self while jnana with the external objects 5. Darsana is not pramana; Darsana is always pramana, jnana is both. jnana is both. The view of Dhavala can be compared with Samanantarapratyaya of the Buddhist. The Two Views Reconciled We have stated above several notions regarding darsana, which are found in the Svetambara or Digambara literature. Fundamentally, they can be put into two broad and naturally opposite groups. According to the first group darsana occurs after the contiguity between subject and the object; while, according to the second group it occurs before. In the original Agamas we find two terms expressing the nature of darsana. They are nirakara and samanyagrahana. But, these terms do not lead to any conclusion, as they can be interpreted in both

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442 Epistemology of Jainas ways. In the later literature generally, the first view is followed's but, Virasena, who is held in very high esteem by Digambaras, successfully refutes the above view and establishes the second. It is strange that he did not get a following. The great scholars like Pujyapada, Akalanka and Vidyananda do not care even to mention the second view. All of them are advocates of the first view. Of course, they lived earlier than Virasena, but not earlier than the date of the first view; which was first proposed by Kundakunda. We cannot say that the later scholars were not in its knowledge. Brahmadeval makes an attempt to reconcile both the views. He says, 'If a parson explains both the views after understanding clearly the import of logic as well as the Agamas and keeps an impartial attitude; then, both are correct. 'He holds that logic is meant for convincing others. It explains a theory in the light of the conceptions held by others. When a nonJaina asks about the difference between jnana and darsana, he is roughly replied that darsana is the cognition of generality, while jnana is that of particularity. But, when the same thing is explained for a clear understanding of darsana, it is the cognition of the self. Brahmadeva's solution for the two views is not fully convincing; yet, be points out to one significant thing. It can be said, on this basis, that the first view is a later phase. It appears that this view was introduced as a logical interpretation of the Jaina theory. We have stated before that the Agamas are silent about the self-cognizability of jnana. Abbinibodhika, the synonym of mati, is explained as the cognition leaning towards the object. The introduction of 'sva' (self) in the definition of pramana is a later development, perhaps borrowed from Dinnaga. But, it was adjusted in the system as the term pramana in its early phase stood for an aggregate of jnana as well as darsana. According to Dhavala darsana is not excluded from the category of pramana. Moreover, the Jainas 1. Bihaddravyasangraha p. 83

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Darsana did not leave the self unknown as the Nyaya did. Like all other systems, admitting consciousness as a natural characteristic of the self, the Jaina also admitted the soul as self-luminary. But, he maintained two bases for the two phenomena in the same process. In the course of time pramana and samyagjnana became synonyms, and the term jnana included in it the self-cognition also. Consequently the logicians had to find out another explanation for darsana. Though, they gave up the original view; yet, did not abandon two things. Firstly, that darsana is the starting point of knowledge. Secondly, it is the apprehension of generality. With the advent of logical period, as I have stated before, the venue of eipstemological interpretations changed from subjective to objective. Consequently, the activity of mere soul was altogether left. The first stage of knowledge became contiguity between senses and the object; and 'samanyagrahana' was interpreted as the cognition of mere existence. 443 Another point which may be held responsible for the above two views is this; pramana is generally held as the cause of valid knowledge; but the Svetambaras and Digambaras differ from each other in the exact nature of that cause. Vidyananda holds that the cause of knowledge is labdhIndriya, meaning the psychical senses in the form of power. He clearly states that in the definition of pramana, jnana means the power of soul leading to the apprehension of an object. Devasuri, on the other hand, holds upayoga, i. e. attention or application of that power as the cause of knowledge. The stage of labdhi exists before the contiguity, but, that of attention comes after it. The view held by Dhavala, is nowhere mentioned by the Svetambaras. In the Digambara tradition we have both the views; for which the above difference regarding the cause of knowledge also may be held responsible to some extent. The Popular View Criticized by Virasena Virasena1 criticizes the popular view on the following grounds: 1. Dhavala p. 145-8

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-444 Epistemology of Jainas 1. Firstly, a reality consists of generality and particularity both combined. One without the other is inconceivable. Both of them appear simultaneously in each and every cognition. If generality is admitted as the object of darsana and particularity that of jnana, they cannot appear at one and the same moment; as a person with incomplete knowledge cannot have two cognitions at a time. We shall have to admit, therefore, that none of the jnana and darsana, is devoid of either of the two aspects. 2. Secondly, even if it is accepted that jnana and darsana are related with one aspect each, they will lose their validity. A valid cognition means the knowledge of reality. Generality without particularity and particularity without generality are no more a reality. Their cognition means a partial cognition and hence, it is not valid. 3. Thirdly, the aspects of generality and particularity, in exclusion of each other cannot be the objects of knowledge, as one, divested of the other does not exist at all. 4. Fourthly, the conception of darsanavaransya also goes against the popular view. Amongst the pine types of it, the first four follow the corresponding types of darsana. They cannot be understood independently. But, the remaining five types of slumber (nidra) etc. are self-evident. According to the theory of karman they do not put any obscurance on jnana. They are related with darsana only. They do not put obstruction merely to the cognition of generality. They obstruct the very activity of soul towards knowing. Our body, and hence the physical sense of touch, is already in contact with the bed during sleep. Yet, cognition does not arise, as the soul activity is obstructed. In karma-literature darsanavarana is compared with a gate-keeper who does not allow the person to be presented to the king. It means that darsanavarana is a general obstruction not allowing any type of cognition, general or particular. This is possible if the very activity of soul jsobstructed.

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Dursana 445 As a matter of fact the consciousness of an object is accompanied by two appearances (pratyayas); ie the appearance of assertion (anvayapratyaya) and the appearance of negation (vyatirekapratyaya). When we see a jar, our aprearance asserts the existence of jar and negates the existence of other things. These two pratyayas are not separate from each other. They constitute two aspects of expression related with the same cognition. The appearance of an object is impossible without resorting to both of them. Anvayapratyaya is related with generality and vyatirekapratyaya with particularity. They appear in succession only when expressed through words or conceived discriminately; but, in general appearance they are simultaneous. Even in speech or conception the assertion of jar naturally means the negation of others. The only difference is that one sense is expressed while the other is implied. Darsapa and jnana, which in the case of incomplete knowledge must have succession, cannot be related with two aspects appearing simultaneously and identically. Darsana is, therefore, simple awareness of the self without any contact with the object. This appearance is called svagata-pratyaya (self-awareness). Siddhasena's view of jnapa and darsana as the representative of two dayas also is untenable on the same ground. The Nayas are not cognitions of particular aspects; but expressions. In expression also the different aspect is not altogether left, but regarded as implied; which in no way can be interpreted as: absence. The aspects of generality and particularity are present in every appearance. In expression also the relevant point is put forth while the other goes to the background. The naya which totally rejects the possibility of other aspects is regarded as durnaya or nayabhasa (fallacious view-point). Dhavalal also rejects the view that avagraha and Tha are darsana while the other stages are jnana. It specifically asserts that all the four stages, beginning with avagraha upto dharana are matijnana. 1. Ibid.

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446 Epistemology of Jainas Darsana as Cit and Joana as Prakasa Dhavala makes a distinction between jnana and darsana on the basis that darsana is simple awareness of the self. It is known as cit or caitanya (consciousness). Joana is the knowledge of external objects, known as prakasa (illumination). In the state of darsana, there is no arrangement of the subject and object. It is a sort of awakening, where the self gets ready to know objects. Nemicandra defines darsana in following verse : Jam samannaggahanam, bhavanam neya kattu ayaram, Avisesiuna atthe, damsanamidi bhannae samae.? The above verse is admitted as the standard way of distinguishing darsana from jnana. It is generally translated as, that perception of the generalities of things without particularities in which there is no grasping of details, is called darsana in the scriptures. This definition is divided into the following three parts: (1) Jam Samanpaggahanam bhavanam - General apprehe nsion of the objects. (2) Neya kattu ayaram-without particulars. (3) Avisesiuna atthe--without grasping details. According to Dhavala sama naggahana means the awareness of the self. The self is samanya (general) because it is common to every cognition. In the former interpretation samannaggahana meant general apprehension and bhavanam (of objects) stood as its objective. In the present interpretation samaanaggahana means the appearance of samanya i. e. the self. Bhavanam is associated with the second particular of peya kattu ayaram.' Thus it means, without qualifying or characterizing it with the objects. Before, the association of attributes of the objects knowledge is simple and without any form or shape. The objects transform the knowledge and give it a particular shape. This shape is described as akara. 1. Gommatasara

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Darsana Jayadhavala1 interprets akara in two ways. Firstly, it means the state of being object to certain knowledge. All external things exist in their own nature independent of knowledge. A certain internal or external phenomenon transforms a particular thing into the objective of a certain knowledge. On account of this transformation that particular thing is separated from the multitude of other things. Darsana is the stage occurring before this phenomenon. Secondly, 'akara' means the object other than the self. Both definitions lead to the same conclusion. The first takes into consideration the object while the second is related with the self. 447 The third particular is 'avisesiuna atthe'. In the former interpretation it meant without associating the object with its details. In the present it means without specification or qualification of the objects. In the former case it meant qualifying the cloth with colour etc. as it is red, white, cotton, woollen etc. In the present case it means qualifying the knowledge with objects, as it is the knowledge of jar, cloth etc. In the cognition of 'this is a jar', the jar stands as the object of consciousness and; thus, it is objectified. At the same time the object on its part qualifies the consciousness. These, two functions i. e. the objectification of the thing and qualification of consciousness are designed by Jayadhavala as akara. Darsana is free from either of the two functions. In its case neither a thing stands as an object nor the consciousness as qualified. It is self-luminous. We can compare it with the light, when there is no object to be illumined. The light is no more an illuminer as long as the object does not come in its contiguity. We may call it simply shining. But, the same becomes illumining when an object enters into the sphere. Similarly, the state of consciousness before the introduction of an object is nirakara or without object. This is called darsana or cit. As soon as an object is introduced it becomes sakara, jnana or prakasa. 1. Jaya Dhavala p. 359

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Epistemology of Jainas We can compare the view of Dhavala with the conception of Saksicaitanya as held by the Vedanta. 448 Darsana and Pramana As on the nature of darsana, there are different views regarding its validity also. According to Buddhism and the Vedanta it is the sole claimant of real validity. The articulate cognition or conceptual knowledge can have only a discursive validity. In the systems of Nyaya and Vaisesika the conception of validity changes with the change in definition of pramana. The old schools generally define pramana as the experience free from illusion. On this basis Sridhara has accepted inarticulate cognition as pramana. Visvanatha also follows him. But, Gangesa, the father of the school of Navyanyaya, holds validity of predication as an essential condition of pramana.1 According to him darsana is neither prama (valid knowledge) nor aprama (invalid knowledge). The systems of MImamsa, Sankhya and Yoga, generally follow the Nyaya in this respect. In Jainism the problem of pramana is a contribution of the logical period. The Agamic conception of samyak or mithya was subjective. All knowledge related with a samyagdrsti was samyak and that with a mithyadrsti was mithya. But, darsana was held as free from the controversy of samyak or mithya. In the division of upayoga there are three ajnanas or mithyajnanas in addition to the five jnanas. But, we do not see such division in the case of darsana. As a matter of fact the notion of samyak and mithya is related with personal attitude. It is the fruit of jnana. Through jnana one decides whether an object should be accepted, rejected or held indifferently. Darsana is not competent to help in the formulation of that attitude; as it does not lead to any judgment, Siddhasena Ganin2 clearly states that the difference between samyagdrsti and mithyadrsti exists in the case of articu1. Nyayakandalf 198; Karikavall 134 2. Sanmatitarka Tika, p. 553

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Darsana 449 late cognition only. In the case of inarticular cognition both are on the same level. Darsana of a person in the first stage of spiritual development (gunasthana) is just like that in the fourth or further stages. But, Abhayadeva divides darsana also into samyak and mithya. He does not care whether it leads to any judgement or not, He says that every cognition, whether articulate or inarticulate is samyak, if its upholder is a samyagdrsti and it is mithya in the reverse case. We have mentioned above the Agamic view about the validity of darsana. Umasvati? has advocated the same view. With the advent of logical period the question of samyak and mitbya changed into pramana and apramana and the criteria also changed from subjective to objective. The question arose whether in respect of the object darsana is pramana, apramana or something beyond the two. All the Jaioa logicians accept decision or judgement as the essential condition for pramana. They express it through different terms like adhyavasaya vayavasaya niscaya or nirnaya etc. By this they wanted to exclude the Buddhist perception from the category of piamana; but it held true in the case of darsana also. Consequently, darsana was not included into pramana. Manikyanandins and Devasuriu go to the extent of calling it pramanabhasa (invalid cognition ) and specify its exclusion from the category of pramana. Abbayadevas bas accepted darsapa as pramana, but his interpretation of sanmati follows the Agamic school. Yasuvijaya6 in bis Tarkabbasa excludes darsana from the category of pramana. But, in Joapabindu be accepts it as 1. Tativarthabhasya 2/9 2. Pramanamimamsa p. 5 3. Parlksamukha I. 27 4. Pramananaya Tattvaloka I. 5. Sanmati Tika p. 553 6. Jaina Tarkabhasa p. 1

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450 Epistemology of Jainas naiscayika-avagraha, and thereby includes it into mati wbich is both pramana as wellas apramana. As a matter of fact, though mati is pramana; yet, its first stage, where no judgement is formed, is neither pramana nor apramana. Hemacandra? excludes nirvikalpaka pratyaksa from the category of pramana by inserting virnaya in his definition. Though he specifies the exclusion of Buddhist perception and apadhyavasaya only; yet, it brings darsana also to the same lot by implication. According to Virasena? darsana also is a judgement. The question of its validity, he holds, is not subjective but objective. Jnana, which he names prakasa or pratibhasa is both pramana as well as apramana. But, darsana, being a cognition of the self, is always pramana. It is absolutely free from doubt (samsaya) illusion (viparyaya) or indefiniteness (anadhyavasaya). We can compare this view with Sankara who holds cognition of the self as always free from doubt etc. Division of Darsana Darsapa is divided into the following four types :3 1. Caksurdarsana. 3. Avadhi darsana. 2. Acaksurdarsana. 4. Kevala darsana. The first two types depend upon the senses as their cause while the remaining two are supernormal. They are produced by the self independently. According to Dhavala all the four darsanas spring from the self. None of them has sense as its cause. 1. The term caksurdarsana does not require any explanation. It is related with the sense of vision. 2. About acaksurdarsana there are different views. The general conception is this, that the darsana related with nonvisual senses and the mind is acaksurdarsana. The discrimina1. Pramana Mimamsa p. 5. 2. Dhavala p. 148 3. Prajnapana, 29 Upayogapada

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Darsana 451 tion between visual and the nonvisual senses is understandable as the former apprehends from a distance while the latter through contact. But, to place the mind also in this category is hard to explain. As a matter of fact mind has no darsana. Its function is limited to the objects grasped by the external senses. Memory and conceptual deliberations like inference etc., which are the actual province of mind, do not pass through the stage of darsana. This view is supported by the Nandi sutra also, which does not admit the variety of mental perception. According to Siddhasena Divakaral ordinary darsana is .confined to mind and the visual sense only. Consequently, acaksurdarsana means the mental apprehension not derived through a mark or hetu. According to this view the cognition springing from mind alone, and not from any other senses, falls under the head of acaksurdarsana. It is the cognition of :subtle or distant things, such as atom, meru etc. We are at a loss to understand precisely the underlying idea of the above view that the mental cognition of an atom is acaksurdarsana while that of fire through the mark of smoke is jnana. Perhaps, it means that in the case of inference the mind does not conceive the object independently. The conception of fire is memory which depends upon the former sensecognition. The perception of the mark helps in revival of that memory. In the case of mental cognition like that of atoms, the idea is formed by the mind itself. It is a mental vision, where the senses are helpless. Further, in ipference we do not construct a mental image. It is simply the cognition of the existence of major term. In the mental visual cognition a certain image is constructed. The former is conceptual, the latter perceptual. The above views are mainly concerned with the conception of darsana as the cognition of generality, Dhavala also follows nearly the same view. But in its case caksurdarsana does not 1. Saninati II. 25, 26

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452 Epistemology of Jainas mean the darsana springing from the vision, but that effort of of the soul wbich later on results into visual cognition. As a matter of fact the division of caksurdarsana etc., has no real significance in the conception of Dhavala. It is merely assumed. Moreover, the distinction between visual and other senses exists on the physical plane only. The former grasps the object without any physical contact; while the others are touchsenses. In the plane of internal experience they do not hold any distinction. In case, darsana is an internal experience, this division has no ground. If, inspite of it, darsana is divided on the basis of future development, then, there should be six varieties corresponding to the five external senses ard the mind, and not two based on touch and without touch. According to another view, referred by Dhavala?, acaksurdarsana means recollection of the objects already perceived. Dhavala rejects it on the plea that it would mean the absence of acaksurdarsana in one-sensed animals. If 'perceived' is held as 'grasped' by any of the senses, acaksurdarsana would be confined to a mental activity, and this comes to the view of Siddhasena Divakara. Jinabhadra holds that manahparyaya apd sruta are followed by acaksurdarsana. Perhaps, Dhavalal has the same jo view. 3. Avadhidarsana is the awareness preceding avadhijnana. It has the same sphere of objectivity as avadhijnana. The above three types of darsanas occur before jnana. Caksur and acaksur precede matijnana while avadhi darsana preceded avadhi-jnana. Sruta has no preceding darsana as it is preceded by matijnana. Mabahparyaya also is preceded by jnana, which we have already discussed. 4. The last type is kevaladarsana. It corresponds to kevalajnana. According to the traditional view it occurs before kevalajnana; but, it is not accepted by all. There are three views regarding it, each championed by a great stalwart of Jaipa tradition; which we propose to discuss in brief. 1. Dhavala p. 380-382

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Darsana 453 Kevalajnana and kevaladarsana There are three views about the order of succession regarding kevalajnana and kevaladarsana : 1. According to the first view kevala-darsana precedes kevalajnana. This view is championed by Jinabhadra and has been generally accepted in the Svetambara tradition. It is also supported by the old Agamic tradition. 2. The second view holds that both of them occur simultaneously. It is advocated by Mallavadin and has got a general acceptance in the Digambara tradition. 3. The third view maintains that in the stage of kevala; jnana and darsana become one. This view is held by Siddhasena Divakara. Historical Survey of the Three Views The Agamas as well as the other literature earlier than Umasvati' favour the first view only. The second and third views are not found in it. They are not mentioned even for Tefutation. Of course, Kundakunda has supported the second view, but, it is a controversial point whether he lived before Umasvati. For the present we have followed Pandit Sukhlal, who is definite that Umasvati was earlier than Kundakunda. Avasyakaniryukti asserts that even a kevalin does not possess two upayogas simultaneously. This statement appears to be a refutation of the second view. But, it is doubtful whether this portion of Niryukti is genuine and not interpolated after Umasvati, as it is clear that the entire literature which goes with the name of Niryukti is not genuine. It is Tattvartha-Bhasya?, where we find the second view for the first time. Umasvati states that in the case of first four types of mati etc. the upayoga occurs in order. In the case of kevalin where jnana and darsana are inseparable, all cognizant and constant, the upayogas are simultancous. Siddhascna 1. Tattvartha Bhasya I. 31.

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454 Epistemology of Jainas Gasin interprets the above statement in favour of the first view; but, he does so on the plea that Umasvati cannot go against the Agamas. His very arguments show, if the question of Agamas is left aside, the meaning would be quite different. It also shows that before him, Umasvati's statement was interpreted in favour of the second view. We are not sure about the author of that interpretation as no other commentary on the Bbasya is available. Kundakunda in his Niyamasara?, Pujyapada in Sarvarthasiddhis and Samantabhadra in AptamImamsat refer to the second view only. They do not refer to the first and third views even for refutation. Thus, up to Samantabbadra we do not meet with any Digambara work which mentions the opposite views even for refutation. Akalarka is the first to refute the first and third views. In the Astasat1,5 he supports the second view and clearly refutes the first view. In the Rajavartika he mentions the first view as an insult to the omniscient; and at other places indicates the undesirability of the third view also. He gives a verbatim reply to Siddhasena Divakara by quoting a stanza from Sanmati-Tarka. Thus, we can say that Digambara tradition favours the second view only; but the attempt to refute other views was not made before Akalanka. Now, we come to the Svetambara tradition. We have stated before that the Agamic literature supports the first view, while the Tattvartha Bbasya favours the second. There is a gap of at least two hundred years between Umasvati and Jinabhadra; but no work of this period, which discusses the above controversy is available. When we come to the works of Jinabhadra, in the seventh century of Vikrama era, we see that the second and 1. Tattvartha Bhasya Tika p. 111-112 2. Niyamasara, G. 159 3. Sarvarthasiddhi I. 9 4. AptamImamsa K. 101 5. Astasati with Astasabasrt p. 281 6. Tattvartha Rajavartika 6.13.8

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Darsana third views are not only introduced; but, show the existence of sufficient literature before it, dealing with the point. Jinabhadra in his Visesavasyakabhasya1 not only supports the first view but also refutes the second and third views. In his Visesanavati (184-219), though a small compendium, he has discussed the same more elaborately. Jinabhadra's detailed account and logical presentation of the different views shows that all the three views were prevalent in the Svetambara tradition and were represented by different schools of thinkers. On the other hand, upto the time of Jinabhadra there is no Digambara scholar to refer to the first or third view. Further, we can say that even upto the present time, no Digambara scholar has supported two other views. 455 The above survey leads us to the conclusion that the old tradition favoured the first view only, i. e. kevaladarsana and kevalajnana occur successively and not simultaneously, as the second view holds; nor they are identical as the third view shows. Now, we shall try to trace out how the idea of remaining two views originated. Pt. Sukhlal holds it as the influence of logical period. He states that the theory of omniscience as held by the Jainas was attacked on two issues. Firstly, it was said, if jnana and darsana occur successively the stage of omniscience cannot be had. When there is jnana the data of darsana will remain unknown, and when there is darsana the data of jnana would remain unapprehended. Secondly, when an omniscient has known everything, what would he do in the second moment? The second objection was common to all systems admitting the existence of omniscience. But, the first objection was particular to the Jaina only. It is probable that the Jaina thinkers came to the theory of simultaneity just to reply it. But no theory can get general approval unless it is supported by the scriptures. Consequently, the advocates of the second view interpreted scriptures as to support their own view. But the people for whom the old tradition was supreme did not favour it. Siddhasena Ganin clearly expresses the view 1. Visesavasyakabhasya G. 3089-3135

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456 Epistemology of Jainas that, though he is not against the logicality of the second view; but the words of the Agamas are the supreme authority, If logic goes against them we should drop it and hold the Agamic view. Siddhasena Divakara, being a great logician, holds that in case jnana and darsana are simultaneous, there is no reason in holding them different. The same logic which establishes their simultaneity supports identity also. So, he introduced the third view; and interpreted some Agamic quotations also in his support. Thus, all the three views were established and had its champions. But, Umasvati was a great supporter of the Agamic tradition. His support to the second view still remains a mystery. It is also probable that these views might have originated from the mutual discussions of the Jaina thinkers, without any outside influence. The discussion about these three views continued in the Svetambara literature for more than 150 years. Each view was supported by reputed scholars. Jinabhadra has collected all the views with their arguments in his Visesanavati and Visesava. syakabhasya. Arguments for each view The first view is generally based on the Agamic statements. In the Pannavanasutra Gautama asks Mahavira whether a kevalin sees (pasai) Ratnaprabha (the first plane of hellish kingdom) at the same moment when he knows (jani) it. Mahavira replies in the negative. He gives reason in the support of his view that jnana is articulate while darsana is inarticulate. If is for this reason that a kevalin when sees, does not know; and when knows, does not see. The same question is asked about the other planes of hellish kingdom also, with the same reply. The above statement of Pannavana, which has parallel passages in the Bhagavati also, clearly expresses that jnana and

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Darsana 457 darsana do not occur simultaneously. It is argued that kevalin, in the above discussion, means the person with avadhi; but it is rejected by Jinabhadra as without any ground. The second view is based on the following arguments : 1. The Agamas state kevalajnana and kevaladarsana as the upayogas which begin but never end. If they are accepted as occurring in succession it would mean that they begin as well as end; and this would go against the above conception of the Agamas. 2. According to the theory of karman jnanavarana and darsanavarana are destroyed simultaneously. It means that kevalajnana and kevaladarsana are manifested at the same moment. There is no reason why two lamps should not shine simultaneously when their cover is removed at one and the same moment. If, even at the removal of avarana the jnana and darsana do not occur, the removal would become useless, 3. If it is said that the occurrence of one stands as obstacle to the other, it would mean their mutual obscurance, which is against the general conception. 4. If either of them does not occur even at the destruction of karmic avarani, the non-occurrence would become natural and consequently permanent. 5. If jnana and darsana occur in succession, a kevalin cannot be omniscient. He will not be able to apprehend the generals and particulars at the same moment, or when he sees all things he cannot know them, and when he knows them, cannot see. Jinabhadra replies to the above arguments as follows: 1. The first objection that kevalajnana and kevaladarsana are held as without end, which is not possible if they occur in order, is not tenable. The succession or order exists in upayoga only, and the conception of endlessness is in regard to labdhi. Matijnana also is said to exist for sixty-six sagaropama. But, we cannot say that this period is related with upayoga.

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458 Epistemology of Jainas 2. The second objection also has the same answer. The removal of avarana is responsible for labdhi only. The upayoga takes certain other factors also into account. Otherwise, the duration of mati etc. for a long period of sixty-six sagaropamas cannot be explained. 3. If jnana and darsana do not occur at a time, it does not mean that they are avarana to each other. It is the nature of cognition that two do not occur simultaneously. 4. The fourth objection that non-occurrence of cause would lead the phenomenon to permanence; also is replied by the above. As it is in the case of mati etc. that even at the ksayopasama of avarana, they are not constantly in upayoga; similarly, keyalajnana and kevala-darsana also are not constantly in the state of upayoga even when avarana is destroyed. It should be noted here that the above objections are replied on the same ground; and it is this, the ksaya or ksayopasama of the karmic matter is responsible for manifesting the cognitive power only. Its application depends upon other auxiliaries external as well as internal. The existence of power does not necessarily mean its application. For instance, in the state of liberated souls the antarava karman disappears totally. with all its five varieties; including danantaraya (obstruction in giving) labbantaraya (obstruction in getting), bhogantaraya (obstruction in enjoyment of consumable commodities), upabhogantaraya (obstruction in other enjoyments). But a liberated soul never gets any of the previleges obtainable from the disappearance of these five varieties; because, other auxiliaries are no more operative in that state. We can compare this view with the yogic perception of other systems. They believe that a yogin, though possesses the power to know all things; yet, actually knows them only when he applies a particular attention. The notion of constant cognition is, perhaps, due to the influence of the notion of God, accepted by other systems. The Jainas tricd to incorporate all

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Darsana 459) the virtues in their kevalins, as were accepted in God by other system. They left the function of creation, as is expressively went against the karma-theory. The Vedanta also has attributed all powers of God to jivanmuktas, except that of creation. The upholders of the second view are ready to accept power and its application as two things in the case of incomplete cognitions; where other auxiliaries are needed. But, in the case of complete knowledge, which does not depend on any external cause, both are one and the same. In the case of avadhi and manahparyaya also a particular mental inclination is necessary. In their case the mind serves as director. But, in the case of kevalin, where mind also not function any more, the casual attention is hard to explain. 5. The fifth objection also is replied in the same manner. A kevalin is omniscient because he possesses the power of seeing and knowing all things. It does not matter whether he actually applies that power. The opponent can raise one difficulty in this respect, if both avaranas are destroyed simultaneously, the resulting jnana and darsana must be simultaneous. There is no reason why one of them should be earlier than the other. It is also replied that simultaneous occurrence is related with power only. The upayoga is independent. The Unity between Kevalajnana and Kevaladarsana 1. The first and the main argument advanced by the upholders of unity is this, that the destruction of two avaranas does not necessarily imply the existence of two cognitions of kevaladarsana along with kevalajnana. The avaranas of mati etc. also are no more in existence in the stage of kevala; yet the cognitions of mati etc. do not exist with it. It is an established principle that two upayogas do not coexist. So, we conclude that inspite of the destruction of two avaranas the resulting cognition is one.

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Epistemology of Jainas Jinabhadra replies that kevalajnana is complete knowledge. It cannot co-exist with the incomplete knowledge, as they are contradictory to each other. Similarly, we can hold that compdete darsana arises at the expiry of incomplete darsana. But, there is no contradiction between the two types of complete cognitions. .460 Moreover, kevalajnana and kevaladarsana stand on equal ground. To hold that at the expiry of both incomplete jnana as well as darsana, only kevalajnana is manifested and not kevaladarsana is quite irrational. In the above discussion we have mainly followed Jinabhadra; who is an advocate of the first view. The second view is ascribed to Mallavadin, but, his arguments in original are no where to be seen. The third view is represented by Siddhasena Divakara. His arguments are further supported by Yasovijaya in his Jnanabindu. The statement of Pannavanasutra also, presented in the support of the first view, interpreted by Yasovijaya in his own support. General Remarks The discussion of kevalajnana and kevaladarsana is an important commentary on the conception of omniscience. According to the first view, which no doubt, represents the Agamic tradition, sarvajna means a person possessing the power to know all objects. The application of that power is arbitrary. This view seems to be genuine. Other systems also hold the same view. Later on came the age of competition in the glory of religious founders. Every sect tried to prove its founder as supreme in all respects. The Nyaya and Vedanta observed that God is omniscient without mind. All of his activities go on automatically. The Jainism and Buddhism being atheistic attributed those virtues to Bodhisattva or Arhat. So, the knowledge of Arhat was accepted as constant. It was not possible unless the principle of constant attention (satata upayoga) was accepted.

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Darsana The simultaneity of jnana and darsana also was accepted for the same reason. 461 Siddhasena being a logician, made further improvement. He held that omniscience cannot be established unless jnana and darsana are simultaneous. But, both of them are partial views of the same thing. The view of an omniscient cannot be a partial view. It is always complete. So, he held that in the stage of kevala jnana and darsana merge into one. As we have stated before, Siddhasena always looks to the objective side. But, Jaina notion of jnana and darsana is subjective, related with two natural powers of the self,

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CHAPTER VI AJNANA IGNORANCE Four Meanings of the Term Ajnana In Indian philosophy the team ajnana is applied to four -senses (1) Firstly, ajnana means wrong knowledge; the cognition which does not correspond with the object or does not cohere with the subsequent cognitions as the idealists hold. In this sense ajnana is generally known as mithyajnana, samaropa, khyati, viparyaya or adhyasa. It is related mainly with the problem of validity of knowledge which is a topic for logical period. 2. In the second sense ajnana means perverted knowledge which is a subjective consideration. Perversion does not mean wrong apprehension but the wrong attitude towards the object. This is the main problem of ethics as well as the Agamic conception of ajnana. 3. In the third sense it means absence of knowledge. Here, we have to discuss, if knowledge is a nature of the self, why we know a few objects only and those also not without some effort. Further, why there is inequality in respect of knowledge among different persons. 4. In the Vedanta-system Ajnana means avidya with its two-fold power of obscurance as well as false projection. The Jaina term for obscurance is jnanavarana or darsanavarana. This sense is related to the nature of the cause of ignorance. The Agamas are mainly related with the last three senses only. We shall discuss all the four under the following heads : 1. Ajnana as wrong knowledge. 2. Ajnana as perverted attitude. 3. Ajnana as absence of knowledge. 4. Ajnana as the cause of ignorance.

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Ajnana 463 Ajnana as Wrong Knowledge We have stated before that the epistemology of Agamas is subjective and not objective. So, the question of validity of knowledge according to the correspondance, coherence or some other theory is a subject for logical discussion. It is beyond the scope of our present treatment. According to the Jaina logic valid knowledge (prama) means a decisive cognition of the self as well as the object. The wrong knowledge is known as samaropa (false imposition) which has three types : (1) samsaya (doubt) 2. viparyaya (illusion) and 3. anadhyavasaya (indistinct appearance). Darsana also is generally included in the last category. The only difference that can be held between darsana and anadhyavasaya is based on their future development. Agadhyavasaya stops with its flash of indistinct appearance. Darsapa later on develops into jnana. On this basis it is held by some as pramana. Manikyanandin adds 'apurva' (aovel) also to the definition of pramana, just to exclude repeated cognition (dbaravani jnana) from the category of pramana. But the Svetambara tradition does not agree with Manikyanandin. It holds repeated cognition also as pramana. The Nyaya system excludes smsti (memory) and tarka (hypothetical judgment) also from the category of prama,which the Jaina logicians do not favour. But, these problems form an independent subject of study. Some Jaina scholars, though following the Agamic treatment, have adopted the objective view of validity. They have used the term samyagjnada in place of pramana and thus, mixed both the schools. But, their view is not supported by the Agamic spirit. The Cause of Wrong Knowledge The only question, relevant with the Agamic theory, is about the cause of wrong appearance. We can discern two factors in a wrong appearance. Firstly, nonappearance or indistinct appearance of a reality; secondly, the imposition of foreign element. As far as the first factor is concerned we ascribe it to jnagavaranlya. The second element is the result of myhaniya

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Epistemology of Jainas mixed with past impressions. A person who is absolutely free from greed will never impose silver on a conch shell. In the same way he will never see a snake in the place of rope if he is free from fear. In such cases the apparent qualities are, more or less, common to both alternatives i.e. the real as well as apparent. But, the preference for apparent is caused by the complexes inherent in the self. In the case of doubt also mohaniya works to some extent. In anadhyavasaya avarana plays the important part, which does not allow the indistinct appearance result into the distinct one. Or, we can say in such cases the mind is drifted towards another object owing to certain forces that work in the mind or natural disinclination; and thus the former appearance remains indistinct. 464 As a matter of fact, according to Jainism, no demarcation line can be drawn between right and wrong as far as incomplete knowledge is concerned. No two things are absolutely dissimilar. When, one thing appears as something else it must possess some characteristics that are common to both. It is a matter of degree to what extent they are possessed. Similarly, in the case of so called valid cognition also the object must contain some characteristics as are common to other things. Anuyogadvara states that there are no two things absolutely similar or absolutely dissimilar. If correspondance with the object is held as the criterion of validity, every appearance is valid to some extent and to some extent only. The logical division of prama and aprama is only discursive, taking into consideration the major part only. According to Jaina logic difference between truth and falsehood is not that of quality, but of degree. This view can be compared with Hegelian idealism according to which the distinction between truth and error is one of degree and not of kind. Ajnana as Perverted attitude The Tattvartha1 relates that mati, sruta and avadhi have a reverse type (viparyaya) also; meaning that they are not only 1. Tattvartha I. 32

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Ajnana 465 jbapa but also ajnana. The reverse of jnana is ajoana. Apparently, it seems a contradiction. The samething cannot be jnana as well as ajnana. But, the above difficulty does not arise when the terms are considered in relation to the subject. Jnana in the present context stands for samyagjnana and ajnana for mithyajnana. But, the jnana in itself is neither samyak (right) nor mitbya (wrong). It is samyak or mithya according to the attitude (drsti) of the subject. If the subject holds a right attitude, his knowledge is samyak, and if he holds a wrong attitude his knowledge is mithya. Pujyapadad and Akalanka' explain this point through the instance of milk placed in the gourd with dust. The milk, though sweet by nature gets bitter if placed in a gourd with dust. Similarly jnana becomes ajnana when possessed by a mithyadrsti. It may be argued that a jewel does not lose its lustre wherever it may be placed. Even if burried under-ground it will hold its nature as before. Similarly, jnana also does not change its nature of samyaktva or mithyatva merely by association with different subjects. Akalarka replies, We do not propose that everything changes its nature by different associations. It is the peculiarity of certain things that they do not change while others do. Moreover, it is also possible that the same condition may influence one thing and not the other. No, general rule can be made in this respect. Regarding jnana it is held, that it changes according to the subject. The main reason for this view is that jnana is not an entity separate from the subject. It is the very nature of the soul. Consequently, its change is natural with the change of the subject's attitude. Difference between Jnana and Ajnana in respect of appearance The next point related with this topic is whether there is any difference between jnana and ajnana in respect of cognition. In ajnana also a jar appears as jar as good as in the case of jnana. Umasvatis explains that ajnana, i. e, the knowledge of 1. Sarvarthasiddhi I. 31 2. Tattvartharajavartika p. 63 3. Tattvarthasutra I. 33

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466 Epistemology of Jainas a mithyadssti, is not rational. He strikes at the right point merely by accident. For instance, an intoxicant or lumatic does not recognize a thing as it is. He may take a cow for a horse and vice versa. He may call a stone as gold and gold as stone. Accidentally, he may strike at the right point also and call an object what it is. But, this accidental recognition of reality is not rational. It is based on eccentricity. We cannot recognize it as valid inspite of its correspondance with the reality. Similarly, the knowledge of a mithyadrsti, though similar to samyagdrsti in its outward form, is not based on rational ground. A mithyadssti also knows the jar as jar but he does not know in what relation it is so. He does not know that the existence of a thing is relative. It exists in relation to its own substantiality, space, time and state; while in relation to those of another it does not. A mithyadrsti cannot make out this distinction. His knowledge of existence or non-existence is merely accidental. rujyapadal states that a mithyadrsti takes a non-existent for existent, an existent for non-exisient and sometimes both of them rightly; just as a person in the state of delirium mistakes his wife for mother and vice versa. He, accidentally, strikes at the right point also and calls the mother as mother. But it can not be recognized as valid cognition. Similarly, mati etc. when not based on rationality, become wrong. Four types of Illusion (viparyaya) As a matter of fact the distinction between right and wrong, in this respect, is not discursive but philosophical. Pujyapada classifies the perverted knowledge into the following types : 1. Karanaviparyasa-Perverted notion regarding the cause of an object. The monistic Vedanta holding Brahman as the cause of universe; and other systems differing from the 1. Sarvarthasiddhi, I. 31 2. Ibid.

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Ajnana 467 Jainas in respect of the cause of universe, are included in this category. 2. Bhedabhedaviparyasa--Perverted notions regarding the relative identity and difference. The notions of absolute identity or absolute difference between cause and effect are the instances of this perversion. 3. Svarupaviparyasa-Perversion about the nature of reality; like the Buddhist conception of all objects as particulars or without conceptual elements, or without any real existence. All these false notions are examples of different types of viparyasa, i. e. perverted knowledge. Two Denotations of Sat and Asat1 The main contention of the Tattvartha sutra is that in ajnana there is no discrimination between sat and asat. Akalarka takes them in two senses each. Firstly, sat means commendable and asat means censurable. An aspirant tries to make a distinction between what is commendable or beneficial and what is the contrary. He accepts the beneficial and abandons the harmful. The criterion of this valuation is nothing but salvation, the absolute emancipation from the worldly ties and pains. The other standards of valuation are not ultimate. A person with right attitude can rightly judge the value of everything on the standard of salvation; while the person with wrong attitude goes astray. The second meaning of sat is existent. In this respect also the various systems hold different views. According to the Vedanta sat means an unchangeable eternity; according to Buddhism it is a flux and so on. The Jaina holds that sat means change with permanence. This philosophical distinction bet. ween sat and asat is held rightly by a samyagdrsti only. The first meaning is related with the ethics while the second with metaphysics. A wrong attitude rejects in either of the two 1. Tattvartha Rajavartika p. 63

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468 Epistemology of Jainas meanings, is sufficient to make the knowledge a mithyajnana The metaphysical perversion can be further analysed into karanaviparyasa etc. Four bases for calling the knowledge of Mithyadrsti as Ajnana Jinabhadra1 relates the following four reasons in calling the knowledge of a mitbyadrsti as ajnana. 1. Sadasatoravisesa (Indiscrimination between sat and asat). A mithy adrsti takes up everything in the absolutistic way while the reality consists of nonabsolutism. Thus, he is not able to ascertain what is sat, and what is not. This is a mithyajnana in the realm of metaphysics. 2. Bhavahetu (The cause of bondage)-Knowledge of a mithyadrsti leads him to entanglement in the worldly affairs. He takes those very acts as the cause of liberation as increase the cycle of births and deaths. This point relates to the field of ethics. 3. Yadrcchopalambha-Irrationality in judgement. This point relates to the field of logic. 4. Jnanaphalabhava (nonattainment of the fruit of knowledge) The purpose of knowledge is to accept what is beneficial and to abandon what is harmful. A mithyadrsti does not get this efficiency. He adopts the harmful way to bondage which deserves abandonment. On the other hand he rejects the blessed way to emancipation, which is worthy of following.. This is a pragmatistic explanation. The Objective view of Vidyananda Vidyananda takes the objective view in deciding the problem of mithyajnana and includes all the three varieties of samsaya (doubt), viparyaya (illusion) and anadhyavasaya (indistinct appearance) in viparyaya. He states that the first three types of jnana can occur in the form of illusion also with its abovementioned three types. In mati and sruta all the three types. 1. Visesavasyaka Bhasya G. 15

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Ajnana 469 are possible; but, in avadhi there are two only; for, doubt is confined to the mental function only. In avadhi the senses or the mind do not function any more. It is intuitional, a direct apprehension by the soul. The possibility of illusion, in the case of avadhi, is caused by the existence of wrong attitude in the beings with avadhi. Similarly indistinct appearance (anadhyavasaya) is possible where the attention is withdrawn or diverted towards some other objects without reaching the :stage of decision. This viparyaya or perversion is possible in the first three types only; as only they can coexist with mithyadarsana (wrong attitude). Mapahparyaya occurs in an ascetic only, where darsanamohaniya and the major portion of caritramohanfya is either destroyed or subdued. Kevala occurs when the four ghatikarmans are destroyed completely. So, viparyaya, wbich is the result of darsanamohaniya, does not occur in these stages. In the case of avadhi also it occurs with the lower types only. It is not possible in the cases of parmavadhi or sarvavadhi. Eleven types of Aharya and Sahaja etc. Vidyanandadivides viparyaya into two categories of aharya (imposed) and sahaja (natural). Aharyaviparyaya is the perversion created by wrong instructions, verbal or scriptural. It is an external imposition. Sahajaviparyaya means the perversion created by the effect of past impressions existing naturally. The sruta is abarya in some cases and sahaja in others. Mati and vibhanga (perverted avadhi) are sahaja only. Thus, we have the following eleven categories : 1. Aharyasrutaviparyaya - The convictions derived from mithyasruta i. e. the books or preachings related to misguided authorities; such as the various notions of absolutists regarding the existence and nonexistents etc. 1. Tattvartha Slokavartika I. 31 2. Ibid.

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470 Epistemology of Jainas 2. Abaryasrutasamsaya-There are some heretics doubtful in the existence of distant objects like heaven, hell etc. Others are doubtful in the apparant objects also. Their holding is Abarya-sruta-samsaya. 3. Abarya-sruta-Anadhyavasaya--There are others who hold indistinct knowledge (anadhyavasaya) regarding the existence of an omniscience. Further, there are some, not clear in ethical code also. 4. Mativiparyaya-sahaja. 5. Matisamsaya-sahaja. 6. Matyanadhyavasaya-sahaja. We have stated above forty-eight types of mati related with cach sense. Any illusion, doubt or indistinction related with * them constitutes the corresponding type of viparyaya. Similarly, any wrongness in memory, recognition or inference also would come in these categories : 7. Sruta-viparyaya-sahaja 8. Sruta samsaya-sahaja 9. Sruta-Anadhyavasaya-sahaja. These types are connected with the sruta where no external authority is depended upon, just as in the case of inference. Vidyananda considers the views of Mimarsa and Grammarian schools regarding the interpretation of a sentence as aharya viparyaya. 10. Avadhiviparyaya-sahaja 11. Avadhi-Anadhyavasaya-sahaja. Other systems compared The above stated view of ajnana is not peculiar to Jaina only. Other systems also maintain similar views. Buddhism divides knowledge (prajna) into three types of Anasravaprajna, Sasravaprajna and Avyakstaprajna. The first is called vidya and the second avidya. Vasubandhul states that avidya is not the absence of vidya but an opposite to vidya; 1. Abhidharmakosa VII, 2.

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Ajnana 471 just as the terms of apeta (untrue) and amitra (not friend). They do not express merely the negative sense, i.e. the absence of truth or that of friends, but something positive which goes against the sense of the term without negation. They mean falsity and enmity respectively. Similarly, avidya means a knowledge which is not vidya i. e. perverted knowledge. As a matter of fact avidya is the dirt of knowledge. Avyaksta prajna is simple kaowledge and cannot be classified in either of the two. It is like darsana of the Jainas. The Buddhist also accepts that vidya leads to salvation and avidya to bondage 1 But unlike Jainism the Buddhist does not hold vidya and avidya on the same level in respect of their objective side. According to Jainism the object appears similar in both cases, but, it is conceived differently. In vidya the conception is nonabsolutistic wbile in avidya it is absolutistic. According to Bud. dhism the conceptual knowledge is loka-samvsti-satya, i.e. true in discursive consideration only. It is not paramarthasatya i. e. true in reality. The real truth relates to the knowledge of four noble truths only. At the same time the Buddhist does not distinguish vidya from avidya on subjective consideration as the Jainas do. According to Buddhist both are common with every-body. The only difference between an enlightened and the layman is that the former has realized the truth while the latter has pot. As far as their cognition of external objects is concerned they are on the same level. The enlightened having realized the truth concentrates on it and purifies his mind, Purification does not mean the absence of discursive knowledge but abstinance from vices (akusala) and leaning towards virtuous deeds (kusala). This purification gradually slackens the worldly ties, the group of which is recognized as the self. Ultimately, when all the ties break away, the self does not exist any more, it attains the state of pirvana. 1. Abbidharmakosa II. 28

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472 Epistemology of Jainas Though samma.ditthi (right attitude) plays important part in Buddhism also, it is not the sole criterian of distinction between vidya and avidya. Further, it should be observed that avidya, according to Buddhism, is not a foreign matter that obscures the natural light of the self as it is according to the Jaina and Vedanta. According to Buddhism avidya also is a natural state of the mind, i. e. self. It is a flow of psychical activities directed towards the so-called impious deeds (akusala). The same flow becomes vidya when the direction is changed. So, vidya does not rise as the destruction or disappearance of avidya but the latter turns into vidya. The distinction of purity and impurity also is merely discursive, based on social convictions. According to the Vedanta jnana and ajnana are diametrically opposite to each other. One is intelligent, the other is nonintelligent. One is light, the other is darkness. One is internal, the other is changeable. One is beyond time and space, the other is within those limits. One is without any positive quality, the other is the cause of all conceptual thoughts. One is eternal, the other is external. According to Buddhism avidya was a particular direction of the self. According to the Vedanta it is an obscurance of the natural state of Brahman. One is noumenal, the other is phenomenal. The Vedanta attributes ajnana with two functions. It obscures the knowledge of reality and it projects a non-real matter for imposition. The latter function can be compared with mithya drsti of the Jainas. But, the Jaina being a realist does not believe in phenomenal projection. He holds misconceptions in its place. The function of obscurance is comparable with jnanavarana of the Jainas, to which we shall come shortly. Vijnana Bhiksu and Patanjali2 also interpret avidya as the knowledge opposite to vidya. The Sarikhyasutra maintains jnana as the cause of salvation 1. Yogasutra II. 3-4

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Ajnana 473 while viparyaya that of bondage. By jnana it means the knowle. dge of discrimination between praksti and purusa. Viparyaya is not merely illusion or wrong cognition, but, all the mental impressions or activities that lead the self astray and keep it involved in the worldly affairs. Vijnana Bhiksu, following Yogasutra, enumerates the following five types of viparyaya : 1. Avidya-The cause of taking one as permanent, pure, pleasurable and spiritual what is really perishable, impure, painful and material is called avidya. 2. Asmita --Arrogance or the conception of identity between spirit and matter; to maintain that there is no spirit except the material body. 3. Raga-attachment 4. Dvesa---Hatred 5. Abhinivesa-complexes like the fear of death etc. Vacaspati relates the following three types of bondage as the effect of viparyaya. 1. Prakrtika -Holding praksti (matter) as the self and worshipping it with that esteem. 2. Vaikstika-Holding viksti, the effects of praksti, i. e. the material elements, senses, ego (aharkara) and mind (buddhi) as the self and worshipping them. 3. Daksinaka-To hold sacrifice (ista) and the works of public utility (apurta) as the path to happiness. All these conceptions, according to Sarkhya are misleading. Jainism included these into mithyatva. Patanjali supports the Sarkhya view by holding the above mentioned five types of viparyaya as klesas. He divides tbe mental activities into klista (afflicted) and aklista (non-afflicted) corresponding to mithyajnana, the samyagjnaoa of the Jainas. Avidya is the fundamental cause of the remaining four klesas. He states in clear term that avidya is not absence of knowledge, but the knowledge opposite to vidya.

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474 Epistemology of Jainas The Nyaya also holds tattvajnapa as the path to liberation while viparyaya as the cause of bondage. But in its later stages, it leaves the aim of liberation and deals mainly with logic, where ajnana is not perverted knowledge, but absence of knowledge. Ajnana as Absence of Knowledge Now, we come to the problem of ignorance, in its literal sense, i. e. the absence of knowledge. The term knowledge, in the present context, has two denotations. Firstly, it means the power of knowing and secondly, it means the cognition or the application of that power. The question of the absence of knowledge will be discussed in both perspectives. We shall discuss why we cannot know an object, as well as wby we do not know an object. By absence also we can take partial as well as the total absence. Partial absence in other words is the problem of inequality in knowledge. The total absence is the problem of mind and matter which we have already discussed in the first chapter. We can analyse the problem in following questions : 1. Why does one class of entities possess the power of knowing while the other does not? In other words it is a question related with distinction between intelligent and nonintelligent beings. 2. Amongst intelligent beings also why there is a gradation of knowledge ? 3. If knowledge is a natural characteristic of the self why it is not permanent ? These questions and such others are replied by different systems in their own way. According to the materialistic view of Carvaka there is no difference between intelligent and nonintelligent beings. Regarding inequality or gradation of knowledge he depends upon the physical structure of mind. It can grasp more objects and penetrate deeper if the tissues are fine. Their roughness results into intellectual bluntness. Our mind is. affected by diet and other physical environment also. The third question does not arise in the case of Carvaka as it rela

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Ajnana tes to the upholder of consciousness as natural characteristic of the self, 475 The Nyaya makes a distinction between non-intelligent and intelligent on the basis that the latter can inhere in the quality of buddhi or consciousness. That quality is generated by the contact between mind and the soul which is possible in the physical body only. In the state of sleep as well as liberation that contact is lost and therefore on cognition is possible. Regarding the gradation of knowledge, the Nyaya attributes all responsibility to buddhi, which can be developed through various excercises. The question of constant knowledge does not arise in his case. According to Buddhism mind or citta is naturally intelligent or intelligence. It is a psychical flow, but it grasps the object only when the latter comes into concomittance. The power of cognition is obscured by jneyavarana also. The gradation in knowledge depends upon the thickness or thinness of that avarana. But, it should be noted here, that avarana, according to Buddhism, is not a material substance but impression (samskara) of the past experiences. We see that our mind loses balance or concentration when anger or other passions invade it. It is not able to apprehend even a clear object in that state. Thus, these samskaras influence the mind and rob it of its natural power. Ignorance results from absence of concentration or concomittance. According to Sankhya ignorance results from absence of vrtti. It holds knowledge as well as its obscurance as belonging to matter (prakrti); which is constituted of three ingredients. The first ingredient, namely sattva causes knowledge, while the third namely tamas, causes obscurance. The destruction of the sense power (indriyavadha) is one of the functions of tamas. Deafness, blindness, and other defects of senses result from it. Thus, the absence of knowledge is caused by tamas, which is a substantial matter. The gradation in knowledge depends upon

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476 Epistemology of Jainas the purity of sattva which again depends upon the lesser or greater influence of rajas and tamas. According to the Yoga-system there are five activities of mind. The state of ignorance also is one of them. The gradation in knowledge depends upon the first activity i. e. pramana. The Advaita Vedanta holds avidya or ajnana as a positive -category, which is neither permanent like Brahman nor nonexistent like lotus in the sky. It coosists of two powers, namely the power of obscurance (a varanasakti) and the power of projection (viksepa sakti). We have already discussed the latter which is responsible for imposition or mithyajnana. At present we are concerned with the power of obscurance, which conceals the reality. At realization, as we have stated, obscurance is destroyed totally and reality is revealed. It does not present any difficulty in its explanation. We have to discuss particularly the discursive knowledge of external objects, known as vittijnana, Brahman is one and the ajnana obscuring it also is one. If it is removed at the first cognition, there should be no further obscurance. There are five views to explain this difficulty. 1. According to the first view Vsttijnana is like a flash of glow-warm in the all-covering universal darkness. It destroys ajnana in a very small part only that also for a moment. 2. According to the second view the ajnana contracts like a mat and spreads again when the cause of that contraction disappears. 3. The third view maintains that ajnana flees away like a defeated soldier and comes again when the cause of fear is no more. 4. The fourth view holds that ajnana by nature is not able to obscure that region of reality which is occupied by vrtti. It obscures only that region as is free from vstti. 5. According to the fifth view, which is the most popular there are two types of ajnana, Mulajnana (root ignorance) and Tulajnada (temporary ignorance) or avasthajnana (pheno

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Ajnana 477 menal ignorance) Mulajnana is one. It is destroyed at realization only. Tulajnanas are as many as there are cognitions. Every cognition destroys the corresponding tulajnana while the others subsist as they were. The last view can be compared with the Jaina theory of kevalajnanavarana and the four types matijnanavarana etc., which can be put in other words as sakalajnanavarana (obscurance of complete knowledge) and vikalajnanavarana (obscura. nce of incomplete knowledge). The Jaina theory of ksayopasama is a combination of the first and second views. The first propounds partial destruction (ksaya)which the Jaipas do not believe. The next question relates to the position of tulajnanas. There are two views regarding it : 1. According to the first view these ajnanas also have no beginning just as Mulajnana. 2. According to the second view they are not without beginning. They come and go like the states of dream and sleep. According to Jainism the duration of all the karmans is fixed. None can be said as beginningless. Yet, all the karmans are beginningless in respect of their stream. The old are destroyed and new ones come in. This stream is sometimes thick and sometimes thin. When it is thick the amount of knowledge decreases. When it is thin the amount of knowledge increases. But, this gradation occurs in the four types of incomplete knowledge only. Kevala has no gradation. It occurs at the destruction of obscurance completely. Consequently, it is permanent. In this respect we can say that the obscurance of kevala is beginpingless. It does not mean that the same obscuring substance is in operation from the time without beginning. The maximum duration of the obscuring substance is twenty kodakodi sagaropama; after which it cannot remain attached with the soul. It only means that the obscurance of kevala has no beginning and consequently the stream of its obscurance also is without beginning. This cannot be said of other types as they

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478 Epistemology of Jainas appear and disappear. In the cases of avadhi and Manah. paryaya also where they have never occurred before, the stream of their obscurance also can be held as beginningless. We can compare the stream with Mulajnana and individual obscuring substances with Tulajnana. The Jaina Theory of Avarana According to the karma theory of Jainas the function of obscurance is related with the first two types of karman, i.e. joanavaraplya and darsana varaniya. The function of projecting mithyajnana or other false notions are related with Moha. niya. According to Jainism this projection is not false appearance, but wrong attitude. Wrongness does not mean unreality but pervertion or leading astray from the path of liberation. Jnanavarana is compared with a cloth bondage on the eyes. It means that jnanavarana obscures the power of knowledge. Darasanavarana is compared with the door keeper who does not allow a person to present himself before the king. Similarly, darnsanavarana obstructs the presentation. A child and an animal possess the power of sensation in same amount as does a learned man. The presentation of a thing is similar in both cases. But, the child lacks in the power of knowledge. His understanding cannot be compared with that of a grown up son. On the other hand a blind man and a person with perfect sight possess the same power of understanding. But, in the case of blind the things are not presented while in the latter case they do. Division of Avarana? We have divided the avarana into jnanavaraniya and darsanavaranlya. They are further divided into five and nine types respectively. The five types of jnana. yarana correspond to the five types of jnana. Darsanavarana is divided into nine types, out of which the first four correspond to the four types of darsana. The remainining five types are as follows: 1 Sec, Karmagratha I. 10

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Ajnana 479 1. Nidra---sleep; where the person can be awakened easily. 2. Nidra.nidra-sound sleep; to be awakened with difficulty. 3. Pracala - sleep in sitting or standing position. 4. Pracala-pracala-sleep in the state of walking. 5. Styanageddhi --Somnambulism, or doing work in sleep. Sarvaghatin and Desaghatin According to the karma theory, as we have stated before, the eight karmans are divided into two groups. The first group consists of Joanavaraniya, Darsanavaraniya, Mohanlya and Antaraya. It is known as ghatio, because, it suppresses the natural qualities of soul. The second group consists of Vedaniya, Ayusya, Nama and Gotra. It is known as aghatin, because, it does not suppress the qualities of soul. It is mainly related with new creation. The gbati-karmans are further classified in the following types known as uttaraprakstis : 1. Jnanavaraniya ... 2. Darsanavaraniya ... 3. Mohaniya ... Four passion multiplied into four grades ... Nine Nokasayas (mild) passions... Darsana mohanlya ... 4. Antaraya ... In all there are forty-seven ghatiprakstis. They are divided into two groups, according to their potency to suppress or observe the corresponding spiritual quality. The prakstis which suppress the corresponding quality completely are known as sarvaghatinis and those which do so partially are desaghatiois. ...16 ...9 Out of the above forty-seven prakstis the following are sarvaghatinis : 1-2. Two avaranas of kevalajnana and kevaladarsana. 3--7. Five types of sleep, pidra etc.

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480 Epistemology of Jainas 8-19. First three quadruples of passions. They obstruct the right attitude, the vows of a laymau and the vows of an ascetic respetively. 20. Mithyatvamohaniya. At present we are concerned with 1 to 7 only. The remaining prakstis mainly obstruct the right conduct and right attitude. The remaining twenty seven prakstis are defaghatinis. They' are as follows : 1.-4. First four types of jnanavaranlya. 5-7. First three types of darsana varaniya. 8-11. The fourth quadruple of passions. 12-20. Nine types of mild passions. 21-22. Samyaktvamohaaiya and misramobansya. 23-27. Five types of antaraya. In this group also we are concerned with 1 to 7. Thus we have seven sarvaghatinand seven desaghatini prakstis related with jnana or darsana. Out of the seven sarvaghatinis kevelajnanavarana is related with jnana wbile the remaining six with darsana. The last five are different types of slumber wbich obstruct darsana completely. But, it is only a rough estimate. During sleep also one reacts the external stimuli. It is not possible without a certain degree of sensation. Further, we make up a sleeping person by calling him. It is not possible if he does not get any sensation of sound. So, we have to admit there a certain degree of sensation however feeble it may be. Kevalajnanavarana and Kavaladarsanavarana Kevalajnanavarana is compared with a cloud obscuring the sun. The cloud, however, thick it may be, cannot obscure the sun completely. It cannot wipe out the difference between day and night. It can be asked in this respect : if kevalajnanavarana does not obscure knowledge completely, it cannot be a sarvaghatini praksti. For, it is held that even a minutest particle of sarvaghatint is sufficient to obscure the corresponding quality completely.

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Ajnana 481 Te above objection does not stand any more if we consider the quality obscured by kevalajnanavarana. It does not obscure knowledge in general; but, only the kevala type of it, which does not know any gradation. It is always obscured completely. Complete knowledge is the last point of the gradation of knowledge. It cannot have further degrees. Even, if one particle of obscurance exists, there is no complete knowledge. Thus, one particle is sufficient to obscure the corresponding quality completely. Further, kevalajnana is a ksayika state; which occurs at the complete destruction of corresponding avarana. We have stated above the three types of the removal of karmic matter. They are ksaya, ksayopasama and upasama. Ksaya means complete destruction, Upasama means complete subsidence, and Ksayo. pasama means partial destruction or subsidence with a partial rising. It can be asked here, whether all the avaranas of kevalajnana are destroyed at one and the same time or at different times. In first case we shall have to accept them as beginningless. Because, kevalajnapavarana once removed,cannot reappear;and kevalajnana once realized cannot be reobscured. But, we cannot accept this view as the duration of avarana is fixed. In the second case partial removal has to be accepted. This objection does not stay any longer if the nature of kevalajnanavarana is considered precisely. There are innumerable avaranas related with kevalajnana, each with full capacity of obscuring the latter. They are destroyed automatically at the expiry of their duration or by following internal or external pedances. The old are destroyed and new ones come in. Absence of partial destruction only means that kevala is not revealed partially. As a matter of fact complete knowledge is not obscured by the volume of jnanavarana which increases and decreases. according to our passions. Complete knowledge is obscured by the last molecule of avarana, destruction of which results into kevalajnana. Other molecules assembled in that volume arerelated with incomplete knowledge only. At the same time we

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482 cannot fix a particular molecule with that designation; because it will produce the same difficulty. No particle can exceed the maximum limit of duration. Every particle is lost in a volume. It is a question of relativity; but, the whole volume cannot be designed as such. Though no particular molecule lasts for more than the fixed duration; yet, the last molecule is always there. Every molecule, while operating, obscures complete knowledge; but, when it disappears, the resulting knowledge is not complete but incomplete, as other particles are left behind, and new ones are added to them. When new inflow is stopped, and the stored molecules are destroyed, knowledge also increases gradually. All the middle stages are ksayopasamikas. But, at the end there comes a stage when the last molecule also is destroyed. The destruction of that molecule means ksaya or complete destruction; which results into kevalajnana. Thus, we can see that ksayika state occurs once only. In spite of it the corresponding avarana is not beginningless. The comparison of kevalajnapavarana with cloud raises another confusion. Does the cloud obscure the sun or the lower world ? Sarvajnatman has beautifully described this confusion. He says, ordinary people hold the sun as obscured by the cloud; while in reality the object of obscurance is their own vision. According to the Vedanta, ignorance about Brahman is the root cause of the apparant world. The sun in that system is compared with the object of ignorance i. o. Brahman and the observer is jiva. But, the Jainas are realists. They do not hold that ignorance of reality projects the apparent world. So, they hold that the object of jnana as well as ajnana is the external objective world as well as the knowledge itself. Thus, as far as the knowledge of sva (self) is concerned we can say that the consciousness itself is the locus as well as the object of ignorance. But, in respect of the knowledge of external world the locus and object are different. The self is the locus and the external world the object. Thus, the two views of the Vedanta are more or less reconciled.

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Ajnana 483 Further, we have stated that Darsadavarana is like a doorkeeper and Joanavarana like a bondage on the eye. The first is concerned with presentation, while the second with understanding. Presentation is objeetive; it introduces a new object to consciousness. Moreover, the varieties in presentation depend upon thc object. On this basis, we can associate the corresponding obscurance also with the object. The understanding, though it moves round the presented object, does not depend upon it. The variation in understanding does not necessarily require variation in the object. The same man, with similar presentation, is taken into different relations by different persons. On this plea, we can say jnana as subjective, and consequently the corresponding avarana also. The question of kevaladrsanayarana also is the same as that of kevalajnanavarana. The only difference is that it is related with presentation. Yasovijaya attributes the above two types of avaranas with double functions i.e. the obscurance of the kevalajnana and kevaladarsapa as well as p.oduction of incomplete cognitions.

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About the Book This work is evidently an outcome of extensive study of Jaina Agamas at first hand, great industry and philosophical discrimination. The work is not mere descriptive catalogue of contents but sets out to marshall the data on a logical basis It also shows healthy outlook and freedom from dogmatic bias. Though the author takes up the role of an advocate of the dogman of Jaina religious tradition, he takes care to distinguish what possesses more dogmatic value from what has intrinsic logical work Though the writer's principal concern is with the Jaina theory of knowledge, he has elucidated the ontological concepts of the school that have bearing upon the epistemic problems. His treatment is in the main correct and adequate. The maturity of judgement and sober appraisal of the rival and orthodox positions and their points of agreement and divergence evinced by the author will ensure him the reputation of being one of the pioneer exponents of Jainology in English. On the whole the work of Mr. Indra Chandra Shastri is a praiseworthy contribution. The Author shows himself capable of rising superior to partisan spirit and parochial vision. The Jaina epistemology like its ethics is an essential factor of Indian culture, heritage and is thus entitled to the serious study which it has received in the book. It is creditable for the author that he has fully done justice to his subject and achieved ramarkable success in drawing out the philosophical implications of the ancient notions to the utmost limit. -Prof. Satkari Mookerjee Calcutta University www.jarragona