Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

Page 152

The General Tonception of Knowledge
127
change into the crystal; yet, makes it appear as red through the reflection: similarly, Vștti makes the Purusa appear as the knower or experient without making any real change. This reflection of Vștti into Purusa is mere uparāga or abhimāpa.1
Patañjalia describes Purusa as a pratisamvedin (reflection) of Buddhi. As echo of the sound is called pratidhvani, similarly, reflection of knowledge is called pratisamvedana. Buddhi takes the mode of object and the same modified Buddhi reflects ioto purusa.
According to Vijñāpabhikṣu the object is known by Vịtti and Vịtti by Purusa. It can be asked here if coordination (tadā. kāratā) with the object is an essential condition of a cognition, how it is possible in the case of Purusa. Vștti can coordinate, the object as it is a changable object. But Puruşa is unchangea. ble. How can it know the Vștti without any transformation ? The objection is replied by Vijñānabhikṣu by expliniting the term coordination in two ways. In the case of Buddhi coordinations means a real transformation. In the case of Puruşa it is mere reflection. It means, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, the object can be apprehended either thiough taking its form or through its reflection. Purusa, though all.pervasive, does not know all objects. His cognition is limited to reflections only. Buddhi also is all-pervasive but Vịtti is confined to certain conditions of external or internal senses. This is why Vștti also cannot grasp all objects.
The difference between Vijñānabhiksu and Vācaspati regarding the conceptions of the knower (pramāta), the knowledge (pramā) and the source of knowledge (pramāņa) can be ascertained in the following table :
1. Samkhyapravacanabhyāsya I. 87 2. Yogadārsna p. 45-46 3. Sāô khyapravacanabhāsya I 87