Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
Difference between Agent and the Instrument :
It can be proposed here that the agent and the instrument are always different from each other. In the action of cutting a tree the scythe is instrument while the cutter is a gent. Both of them have different positions and different existences. Similarly, in the act of cognition the soul is agent and the consciousness is instrument. Both of them cannot be held as one and the same thing. The Jaina replies that merely the grammatical use of instrumental case does not establish onc's absolute difference from the agent. There are numerous instances where the instru mental case is used for a category identical with the agent. We say that a serpant makes a coil with his body. In this case the serpant is agent, his body is instrument and the state of coil is effect. But, we cannot say that they are absolutely different from one another. The Vedantic example of the spider, weaving its web by itself is well-known.
Two Types of Instruments :
On examination, one can find two sets of instrumental cases. In a number of cases the instrument is separate from the agent; as in the case of scythe and the cutter. But in other cases it is identical with the agent. The instances of the serpant's coil and the spider's web come into this class. It can be further illustrated : when we say “Rāma goes by a car', the car is a case of the external instrument. But when we say, "Rāma goes on foot”' the foot is a case of internal instrument. The foot is a part of Rāma. It is not totally different from him.
It can be argued that difference between instrument and the agent, in the case of internal instruments, is imaginary. But, this argument has no ground. We see that the state of coil in the snake is different from the state of straightness. No body can say that these states are imaginary. The agent transforming himself into these states must do so with some instrument. The Nyāya holds that an agent without instrument, and an instrument without agent, cannot function. Mere imagination cannot