Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Direct Knowledge auxiliaries without which the soul is helpless. In the case of extraordiuary perception the senses do not function at all. The soul is empowered by the particular kşayopasama to apprehend the objects, without taking any help from the sense-organs, The ioner sense or manas also does not play any part as far as this cognition is concerned. It functions only in creating desire to know a particular object. It has nothing to do after that. In the case of complete knowledge that desire also is not required, as an omniscience knows all the objects every moment.
The Neo-Naiyāyikas divide yogins and their perception in the following two types! :1. Yukta --the perception of a yogin, who has attained
union with the Süpreme Being. 2. Yuñjāna—the perception of a yogin, who is endeavouring
to attain such a union.
Ths first type enjoys a constant perception of all the objects, while the second type can do so with a little effort, i. e. attention or meditation.
The above conception of the modern Naiyāyikas bears a considerable resemblance with that of the Jainas. The Incomplete perception (vikala) resembles the Yuñjāna and the complete one with yukta. But, the Nyāya conception of contact between mind and the soul as a necessary condition is protested by the Jainas more strongly in this case. Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka stages in Yogi-Pratyaksa
Jayasimhasuriholds that the yogic perception in the state of ecstasy, is always indeterminate; since in ecstasy the complete focus of attention cannot be brought about by a determinate or discriminate perception. There is no element of discrimination in the yogic intuition in the state of ecstasy. But, it must not be supposed that the yogic intuition in ecstasy is the same as ordinary indeterminate perception which apprehends the mere forms of objects and not their mutual 1. Kārikāvali K. 65 2. Nyāyasārtika p. 82