Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
distinction is merely theoretical. Because, according to Särkhya also, the self in that stage is without any knowledge, owing to the lack of appropriate means like the internal organ and the senses. The pure consciousness does not serve any practical purpose in that stage. According to Nyāya the self is like an image made of earth; which gets motion when drawn by a horse. According to the Sankhya it is like an invalid person who, inspite of his power to move, is practically helpless. The Sänkhya splits the power and its application into two different entities. Two Types of Consciousness
Cārvāka denied the existence of the self as a separate entity and explained the phenomenon of consciousness as based on the physical elements. The Nyāya held the self as a separate entity and explained consciousness as an adventitious quality. Prabhākara followed the Nyāya in respect of the self but maintained consciousness as an act. These systems regarded the self in itself as unconsci: us. According to them cognition and consciousness do not make any difference. They are one and the same phenomenon, which appears at the collocation of certain causes, and disappears in their absence. Kumārila is an advocate of energy or power as a separate entity; which manifests itself into corresponding actions. He contends that if the soul does not possess consciousness i.e. the power of generating cognition as its nature, there is no difference between a jar and the soul. The latter also cannot produce cognition just as the former. It is therefore essential to admit the faculty of consciousness as nature of the soul, which is transformed into the act of cognition. He introduces the theory of consciousness and cognition as separate categories.
The Sārkhya, in his view of the soul, stresses upon the point of consciousness and leaves the problem of cognition entirely on the matcrial substance known as buddhi. Thus he hold them not only as separate categories, but also as belonging to separate realities. The two factors of consciousness and cogni