Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

Page 323

Epistemology of Jainas
are impossible in the case of one-sensed animals as well as in the sleeping man, who can neither listen a word nor can apply their attention to utter a word. Jinabhadra replies that in such cases we have another derivation which means the instrument of hearing (śrnotyanena) or cause of hearing (asm at) or the location of hearing (asmin). Ultimately, these derivations express the sense of kṣayopasama of the obscuring kärmic matter; and it is not impossible in the case of one-sensed animals as well as in the sleeping man. But, these derivations do not explain the fundamental difficulty.
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It can be argued that the example of sleeping man does not suit in the case of one-sensed animals. Śruta, ultimately depends upon the faculties of speaking and hearing. The person with these faculties can convey his ideas through the vehicle of words and can understand others. A sleeping man possesses both of the faculties. Though, in sleeping state he does not apply them; yet, they are not absent. He can use them at any moment. Thus, we can admit the existence of śruta in his case. But, in the case of one-sensed animals those faculties are totally absent. There is no basis to prove the existence of śruta in them.
The above argument does not put any difficulty as the faculties of speech and hearing are accepted to be present, though in mild form, in one-sensed animals also. We observe a particular tree, sensitive of nontactual impressions. On this basis we can say that the other senses are not totally absent in them. Similarly, they also have their feelings and desires which are the functions of mind. Even then, their classification as the one-sensed animals, means the absence of materialsenses (dravyendriyas) in them. In the same way they possess bhavaśruta and not dravyaśruta.
Again it can be asked; if śruta is possible in one-sensed animals also without any recourse to speech, the latter can not be a condition of śruta and thus cannot form a part of the definition.