Jaina Epistemology

SR No.: 006738
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Indra Chandra Shastri
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1990
Total Pages: 516
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 21 MB

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Epistemology of Jainas
inferribility of the conceived objects; but he does not recognize this as a separate cognition. It can be objected that if the cognition of conceived objects is indirect, it cannot be manaḥparyāya, as the latter is a direct cognition (pratyaksa). Akalanka replies that indirectness and directness do not depend upon the direct or indirect apprehension of the object. They depend upon the external assistance. If the soul is assisted by the senses or mind the resulting cognition is indirect; otherwise, it is direct. In cognition of the conceived objects the soul is not assisted by any of the senses. It is, therefore, direct. Even if a thing is known through another one, the cognition is direct, provided it does not depend upon the external factor as its cause.
One may say that the physical mind also is an external factor. If knowledge of the conceived objects is derived through it, the latter is not direct. It must be matijñāna. Akalanka replies, where the mind is a producing cause the resulting cognition is mati. In the present case the mind is not a producing cause but only an auxiliary. When we see the moon in clouds, the clouds are not considered as producers of the cognition of the moon. They are simply location. Similarly, the mind substance of a person in which the conceived ideas are known, is not a producing cause, it is simply a location of the object, ie, the conceived ideas. The inference which is a variety of mati, depends upon the senses or mind as its producing cause. In the present case no external help is taken by the cognizer. Thus, the cognition of the conceived ideas though indirect on the objective side, is not indirect (paroksa) on the causal side, which is the main consideration in deciding the nature of pratyaksa or paroksa.
In logical period the clarity of appearance becomes the criterion of perception. If manahparyāya is a perception it must have that clarity, which is found in the direct observations only. The cognition of the conceived objects cannot come into that category. In that case we shall have to confine the sphere